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People vs Dacuycuy

Petitioner: People of the Philippines


Respondent: Judge Auxencio C. Dacuycuy, Celestino
Matondo, Segundino A. Caval, and Cirilio M. Zanoria

S.

Facts:
On April 4, 1975, private respondents Celestino S. Matondo,
Segundino A. Caval, and Cirilio M. Zanoria, public school
officials from Leyte were charged before the Municipal Court of
Hindang, Leyte for violating Republic Act No. 4670 (Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers). The respondents pleaded
not guilty and petitioned for certeriori and prohibition with
preliminary injuction before the Court of First Instance of Leyte,
Branch
VII
alleging
that:
a. The Municipal Court of Hindang has no jurisdiction over the
case due to the correctional nature of the penalty of
imprisonment (as state in Sec. 32 of R.A. No. 4670) prescribed
for
the
offense
b. Section 32 of R.A. No. 4670 is unconstitutional because, (1)
the term of imprisonment is unfixed and may run toreclusion
perpetua; and (2) it constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power, the duration of the penalty of imprisonment
being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the latter
were the legislative department of the Government.
On March 30, 1976, the petition was transferred to Branch IV
where the respondent Judge, Judge Dacuycuy ruled that R.A.
No. 4670 is valid and constitutional but cases for its violation
fall outside of the jurisdiction of municipal and city courts.
Issue:
Whether or not Repbulic Act No. 4670 is unconstitutional.
Whether or not the municipal and city courts have jurisdiction
over the case.
Held:
Yes, Republic Act No. 4760 is unconstitutional.
Section 32 violates the constitutional prohibition against undue
delegation of legislative power by vesting in the court the
responsibility of imposing a duration on the punishment of
imprisonment, as if the courts were the legislative department
of the government.
Yes, the municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over the
case.
Republic Act. No. 296, as amended by Republic Act No. 3828,
considers crimes punishable by fine of not more than Php
3,000.00 fall under the original jurisdiction of municipal courts.
Decision:
The decision and resolution of respondent Judge (Judge
Dacuycuy) are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Criminal
Case No. 555 filed against private respondents herein is
hereby ordered to be remanded to the Municipal Trial Court of
Hindang, Leyte for trial on the merits.

KHOSROW MINUCHER, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF


APPEALS and ARTHUR SCALZO, respondents
FACTS:
Khosrow Minucher, an Iranian national and a Labor Attach for
the Iranian Embassies in Tokyo, Japan and Manila came to the
country to study in 1974 and continued to stay as head of the
Iranian National Resistance Movement.
In May 1986, Minucher was charged with an Information for
violation of Republic Act No. 6425, Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972. The criminal charge followed a buy-bust operation
conducted by the Philippine police narcotic agents in his house
where a quantity of heroin was said to have been seized. The
narcotic agents were accompanied by private respondent
Arthur Scalzo who became one of the principal witnesses for
the prosecution.
In August 1988, Minucher filed Civil Case before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) for damages on the trumped-up charges of
drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo.
ISSUE:
WON private respondent Arthur Scalzo can be sued provided
his alleged diplomatic immunity conformably with the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations
RULING:
The SC DENIED the petition.
Conformably with the Vienna Convention, the functions of the
diplomatic mission involve, the representation of the interests
of the sending state and promoting friendly relations with the
receiving state. Only diplomatic agents, are vested with
blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal suits.
Indeed, the main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is
a diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of whether
or not he performs duties of diplomatic nature. Being an
Attache, Scalzos main function is to observe, analyze and
interpret trends and developments in their respective fields in
the host country and submit reports to their own ministries or
departments in the home government. He is not generally
regarded as a member of the diplomatic mission. On the basis
of an erroneous assumption that simply because of the
diplomatic note, divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over his
person, his diplomatic immunity is contentious.
Under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit, the
precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign
state is a long-standing rule of customary international law. If
the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government
done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic
personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint
could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from
suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is
believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription
is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State,
in whose service he is, under the maxim par in parem, non
habet imperium that all states are sovereign equals and
cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. The implication is
that if the judgment against an official would require the state
itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as
the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages
decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being
against the state itself, although it has not been formally
impleaded
A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked
with immunity from suit but only as long as it can be
established that he is acting within the directives of the sending
state. The consent of the host state is an indispensable
requirement of basic courtesy between the two sovereigns.
The buy-bust operation and other such acts are indication
that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not
consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent
Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency. In
conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as
the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then
becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against
Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the
scope of his official function or duties.

LIANG VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR no. 125865


January 28, 2000
Petitioner: Jeffrey Liang
Respondent: People of the Philippines
FACTS:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development
Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering
defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he
was charged before the MeTC of Mandaluyong City with two
counts of oral defamation. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of
a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioners bail, the
MeTC released him to the custody of the Security Officer of
ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an office of
protocol from the DFA stating that petitioner is covered by
immunity from legal process under section 45 of the
Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government
regarding the Headquarters of the ADB in the country. Based
on the said protocol communication that petitioner is immune
from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution
dismissed the criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for
reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA. When its
motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari
and mandamus with the RTC of Pasig City which set aside the
MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the
warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for
reconsideration was denied, the petitioner elevated the case to
the SC via a petition for review arguing that he is covered by
immunity under the Agreement and that no preliminary
investigation was held before the criminal case.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the petitioners case is covered with
immunity from legal process with regard to Section 45 of the
Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Govt.
(2) Whether or not the conduct of preliminary investigation
was imperative.
HELD:
(1) NO. The petitioners case is not covered by the immunity.
Courts cannot blindly adhere to the communication from the
DFA that the petitioner is covered by any immunity. It has no
binding effect in courts. The court needs to protect the right to
due process not only of the accused but also of the
prosecution. Secondly, the immunity under Section 45 of the
Agreement is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the
acts must be done in official capacity. Hence, slandering a
person could not possibly be covered by the immunity
agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a
crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.
(2) NO. Preliminary Investigation is not a matter of right in
cases cognizable by the MeTC such as this case. Being purely
a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only
when specifically granted by law. The rule on criminal
procedure is clear that no preliminary investigation is required
in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.
Hence, SC denied the petition.

PEOPLE, et al. v. LACSON [April 1, 2003]


Facts: Before the court is the petitioners MFR of the resolution
dated May 23, 2002, for the determination of several factual
issues relative to the application of 8 RCP 117 on the
dismissal of the cases Q-99-81679 & Q-99-81689 against the
respondent. The respondent was charged with the shooting &
killing of 11 male persons. The court confirmed the express
consent of the respondent in the provisional dismissal of the
aforementioned cases when he filed for judicial determination.
The court also ruled the need to determine whether the other
facts for its application are attendant.
Issues:
1.
WON the requisites for the applicability of 8, 2000
RCP 117 were complied w/ in the Kuratong Baleleng cases
a.

Was express consent given by the respondent?

b.
Was notice for the motion, the hearing and the
subsequent dismissal given to the heirs of the victims?
Sec. 8, Rule 117 is not applicable to the case since the
conditions for its applicability, namely:
1) prosecution with the express consent of the accused or both
of them move for provisional dismissal,
2) offended party notified
3) court grants motion and dismisses cases provisionally,
4)public prosecutor served with copy of orders of provisional
dismissal, which is the defendants burden to prove, w/c in this
case hasnt been done.

US vs. Ah Chong
The United States, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Ah Chong, defendantappellant.
En Banc
Carson, March 19, 1910
Topic: Mental element (Mens rea) - Deliberate intent (Dolo) Mistake of fact
Facts:
The defendant Ah Chong was a cook at "Officers' quarters, No.
27," Fort McKinley, Rizal Province
Pascual Gualberto, deceased, works at the same place as a
house boy or muchacho
"Officers' quarters, No. 27" was a detached house some 40
meters from the nearest building
No one slept in the house except the two servants who jointly
occupied a small room toward the rear of the building, the door
of which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of
the building
This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its
entire length and height
The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt
or lock; the occupants, as a measure of security, had attached
a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the
habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening
the door by placing against it a chair
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10:00 pm, the
defendant was suddenly awakened by some trying to force
open the door of the room
He called out twice, "Who is there?"
He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the
door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon
forcing his way into the room
The defendant warned the intruder "If you enter the room, I will
kill you."
Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow,
the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder (when he entered
the room) who turned out to be his roommate Pascual
Pascual ran out upon the porch heavily wounded
Recognizing Pascual, the defendant called to his employers
who slept in the next house and ran back to his room to secure
bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds
Pascual died from the effects of the wound the following day
The roommates appear to have been in friendly and amicable
terms prior to the incident, and had an understanding that
when either returned at night, he should knock that the door
and acquaint his companion with his identity
The defendant alleges that he kept the knife under his pillow as
personal protection because of repeated robberies in Fort
McKinley
Defendant admitted to stabbing his roommate, but said that he
did it under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron (thief)"
because he forced open the door of their sleeping room,
despite the defendant's warnings
Defendant was found guilty by the trial court of simple
homicide, with extenuating (mitigating) circumstances, and
sentenced to 6 years and 1 day presidio mayor, the minimum
penalty prescribed by law

Issue:
Whether or not the defendant can be held criminally
responsible
Holding:
No.
Ratio:
By reason of a mistake as to the facts, the defendant did an act
for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts
were as he supposed them to be (i.e. if Pascual was actually a
thief, he will not be criminally liable/responsible because it
would be self-defense), but would constitute the crime of
homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state
of the facts (i.e. if he knew that it was actually Pascual, he
would be guilty of homicide/assassination)
The defendant's ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to
negligence or bad faith
"The act itself foes not make man guilty unless his intention
were so"
The essence of the offense is the wrongful intent, without
which it cannot exist
"The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances
as they appear to him."
If one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts
which will justify a killing, if without fault or carelessness he
does believe them, he is legally guiltless of the homicide
The defendant was doing no more than exercise his legitimate
right of self-defense
He cannot be said to have been guilty of negligence or
recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as
to the facts
RTC's decision is reversed. The defendant is acquitted.

People vs. Oanis


July 27, 1943 (74 Phil 257)
PARTIES:
Plaintiff and appellee: People of the Philippines
Defendants and appellant: Antonio Oanis, Alberto Galanta
FACTS:
Antonio Oanis and Alberto Galanta were instructed to arrest a
notorious criminal and escaped convict, Anselmo Balagtas,
and if overpowered, to get him dead or alive. They went to the
suspected house then proceeded to the room where they saw
the supposedly Balagtas sleeping with his back towards the
door. Oanis and Galanta simultaneously or successively fired
at him which resulted to the victims death. The supposedly
Balagtas turned out to be Serepio Tecson, an innocent man.
ISSUE:
1. WON Oanis and Galanta incur no liability due to innocent
mistake of fact in the honest performance of their official
duties.
2. WON Oanis and Galanta incur no criminal liability in the
performance of their duty.
HELD:
1. No. Innocent mistake of fact does not apply to the case at
bar. Ignorance facti excusat applies only when the mistake is
committed without fault or carelessness. The fact that the
supposedly suspect was sleeping, Oanis and Galanta could
have checked whether it is the real Balagtas.
2. No. Oanis and Galanta are criminally liable. A person incurs
no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in
the lawful exercise of a right or office. There are 2 requisites to
justify this: (1) the offender acted in teh perfomance of a duty
or in the lawful exercise of a right or office, (2) that the injury or
offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due
performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or
office. In this case, only the first requisite is present.

Case of People of the R.P. vs. Pugay


No. L-74324 17November1988

FACTS:
The accused are pronounced by the RTC of Cavite guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of murder of Bayani
Miranda and sentencing them to a prison term ranging from 12
years (prison mayor) as mimimum to 20 years (prison
temporal) as maximum and for samson to be sentenced to
reclusion
perpetua.
Miranda and the accused Pugay are friends. Miranda used to
run errands for Pugay and they used to sleep together. On the
evening of May 19, 1982 a town fiesta was held in the public
plaza of Rosario Cavite. Sometime after midnight accused
Pugay and Samson with several companions arrived (they
were drunk), and they started making fun of Bayani Miranda.
Pugay after making fun of the Bayani, took a can of gasoline
and poured its contents on the latter, Gabion (principal witness)
told Pugay not to do the deed. Then Samson set Miranda on
fire making a human torch out of him. They were arrested the
same night and barely a few hours after the incident gave their
written
statements.
ISSUES:
Is conspiracy present in this case to ensure that murder can be
the crime? If not what are the criminal responsibilities of the
accused?
There
is no:
CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or more persons
agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy
must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the
felony itself, more specifically by proof beyond reasonable
doubt. It is not essential that there be proof as to the existence
of a previous agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient if, at
the time of commission of the crime, the accused had the
same purpose and were united in its executed.
Since there was no animosity between miranda and the
accused, and add to the that that the meeting at the scene of
the incident was purely coincidental, and the main intent of the
accused
is
to
make
fun
of
miranda.
Since there is no conspiracy that was proven, the respective
criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from
different acts directed against miranda is individual NOT
collective and each of them is liable only for the act that was
committed
by
him.
**Conspiracy may be implied from concerted action of the
assailants
in
confronting
the
victim.
Criminal
Responsibilities:
PUGAY: Having failed to exercise diligence necessary to avoid
every undesirable consequence arising from any act
committed by his companions who at the same time were
making fun of the deceased. - GUILTY OF RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE
RESULTING
TO
HOMICIDE
SAMSON:Since there are NO sufficient evidence that appears
in the record establishing qualifying circumstances (treachery,
conspiracy). And granted the mitigating circumstance that he
never INTENDED to commit so grave a wrong. - GUILTY OF
HOMICIDE
HELD:
JUDGEMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WAS AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATIONS. JUDGEMENT FOR GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR MURDER WAS
LOWERED TO THE ABOVE JUDGEMENTS.

[G.R. No. 153591. February 23, 2004]


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RENATO
GARCIA y ROMANO, appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Appellant Renato Garcia y Romano was charged with
Murder before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
87, in Criminal Case No. Q-98-79961 in an Information [1] which
reads:
That on or about the 22nd day of May, 1998, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused, being then the driver and/or
person in charge of an Isuzu Jitney bearing Plate No. NPJ-948
did then and there unlawfully and feloniously drive, manage
and operate the same along Zabarte Road in said City, in a
careless, reckless, negligent and impudent manner, by then
and there making the said vehicle run at a speed greater than
was reasonable and proper without taking the necessary
precaution to avoid accident to person/s of the traffic at said
place at the time, causing as consequence of his said
carelessness, negligence, impudence and lack of precaution,
the said vehicle so driven, managed and operated by him to hit
and bump, as in fact it hit and bumped Sanily Billon y Trinidad,
a pedestrian, thereafter, with intent to kill, qualified by evident
premeditation and use of motor vehicle, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously ran said vehicle over the
victim thereby causing her serious and mortal wounds which
were the direct and immediate cause of her untimely death, to
the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said Sanily Billon
y Trinidad.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. Thereafter,
trial on the merits followed.
The prosecution alleged that at around 12:00 noon of
May 22, 1998, Bentley Billon and his younger sister, Sanily,
boarded a passenger jeepney on their way to Sacred Heart
School in Barangay Kaligayahan, Novaliches, Quezon City to
attend remedial classes. They alighted on Zabarte Road in
front of the school. Bentley crossed the street and waited on
the center island for Sanily to cross. While Sanily was crossing
the street, a passenger jeepney driven by appellant, coming
from Camarin and heading towards Quirino Highway, hit her on
the left side of the body. Sanily fell and was thrown to the
ground a meter away from the vehicle. The jeepney stopped.
But as Bentley was running towards his sister, the vehicle
suddenly accelerated with its front tire running over Sanilys
stomach. Bentley and appellant pulled Sanily, who was
writhing in excruciating pain, from underneath the vehicle and
brought her to the Sta. Lucia Hospital but due to lack of
medical facilities, she was transferred to the Quezon City
General Hospital (QCGH) where she was operated. However,
she died four days later.
Dr. Emmanuel Reyes,[2] Medico-legal of the Southern
Police District, Fort Bonifacio, testified that the attending
physician, Dr. Santiago C. Sagad, noted lacerations in Sanilys
liver and spleen which was caused by a blunt/strong force on
the victims body, resulting to her death due to internal
bleeding. He opined that the blunt force may have also caused
lacerations in the victims intestine and the abrasions on the
arm, from the elbow to the shoulder could be the result of the
skins contact with a rough surface.
Appellant admitted having ran over the victim, but
claimed that it was an accident. He narrated that at around
noon on May 22, 1998, while driving his passenger jeepney
along Zabarte Road, he saw a boy crossing the street followed
by the victim. While the vehicle was running, he heard a thud.

He immediately applied his breaks and alighted to check what


it was. He saw to his horror a girl sprawled underneath his
vehicle between the front and the rear tires. He and the victims
brother rushed the girl to the Sta. Lucia Hospital, but they
transferred her to the Quezon City General Hospital which has
better facilities. A week later, he learned that the victim died.
On May 2, 2002, the trial court rendered judgment,
finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
the dispositive portion of which reads:[4]
[3]

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused


guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, for
which, said RENATO GARCIA y ROMANO is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the heirs of Sanily Billon the sum of One Hundred
and Twenty Three Thousand and Five Hundred Pesos
(P123,500.00) as actual damages including attorneys fees;
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity for the
death of Sanily and Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) as moral damages.
Cost against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
The trial court held that appellant is guilty of murder
qualified by evident premeditation because he deliberately ran
over the slumped body of the victim.
Hence this appeal, raising the following errors, to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
APPRECIATING AGAINST ACCUSEDAPPELLANT THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE
OF EVIDENT PREMEDITAION
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME
OF MURDER AS CHARGED.
The issue to be resolved is whether or not appellant is
guilty of murder or reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
Appellant argues that the trial court gravely erred in
finding that the qualifying circumstance of evident
premeditation attended the commission of the offense. He
contends that the mere allegation by the prosecution that he
bumped the victim and intentionally ran over her body is not
sufficient to establish evident premeditation. He claims that he
did not intentionally run over the victim when his vehicle
bumped her because he was rattled and was no longer aware
of what he was doing.
We find from a careful review of the facts on record that
the unfortunate incident was more the result of reckless
imprudence than of malicious intent. Therefore, the trial court
erred in convicting appellant of the crime of murder qualified by
evident premeditation.
The elements of evident premeditation are: (1) a previous
decision by the appellant to commit the crime; (2) an overt
act/acts manifestly indicating that the appellant clung to his
determination; and (3) a lapse of time between the decision to
commit the crime and its actual execution sufficient to allow
appellant to reflect upon the consequences of his acts.

The victims brother, Bentley, testified that the vehicle


stopped after it bumped the victim, but it moved forward and
ran over the prostrate body of her sister. From his narration, we
find that no sufficient time elapsed for appellant to decide to
commit the crime and reflect on its consequences. Moreover,
there was no showing that appellant performed other overt acts
to show that he was determined to commit murder. The
essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the
criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and reflection
upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent, during the
space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. [5] These
circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar.
Appellant could have reacted on instinct and relied on
sheer impulse to respond to the situation at hand. While it is
possible that appellant deliberately ran over the victim, it is
equally possible, if not more probable, that the vehicle moved
forward
because
appellant
failed
to
control
its
momentum. Indeed, this is more consistent with the unrebutted
evidence that the jeepney, which had no handbrake, was
moving fast and that appellant became confused when the
accident occurred. Furthermore, appellants act of bringing the
victim to the hospital despite numerous opportunities to flee
from the scene is more compatible with a state of mind devoid
of criminal intent.
In view of the gravity of the offense involved, the trial
court should have been more circumspect in weighing the
evidence of both parties. Our own evaluation of the evidence
reveals that appellant had no intention to kill the victim. As
such, he cannot be held liable for an intentional felony. All
reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate negligence, and not
criminal intent, must be resolved in favor of appellant.[6]
Thus, appellant is guilty of reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended. In U.S. v. Maleza,[7] we explained the rationale
behind this crime as follows:
A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in
all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious, careful, and prudent, if
not from instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment. He
is responsible for such results as anyone might foresee and for
acts which no one would have performed except through
culpable abandon. Otherwise his own person, rights and
property, all those of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed
to all manner of danger and injury.
In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in
negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the
mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous
recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia
punible.[8] Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
states that reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but
without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material
damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on
the part of the person performing such act. Compared to
intentional felonies, such as homicide or murder, what takes
the place of the element of malice or intention to commit a
wrong or evil is the failure of the offender to take precautions
due to lack of skill taking into account his employment, or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and
other circumstances regarding persons, time, and place.[9]
Appellant showed an inexcusable lack of precaution
when he disregarded a traffic sign cautioning motorists to slow
down[10] and drove his vehicle in full speed despite being aware
that he was traversing a school zone and pedestrians were
crossing the street. He should have observed due diligence of
a reasonably prudent man by slackening his speed and
proceeding cautiously while passing the area.
The imposable penalty, under Art. 365 (2) [11] of the
Revised Penal Code, homicide resulting from reckless
imprudence in the use of motor vehicle is prision

correccional in its medium and maximum periods, which


ranges from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to
six (6) years. Under Article 65 of the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty shall be divided into three equal portions of time, each
of which shall form one period. There being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance, the proper penalty shall be within the
medium period, which is three (3) years, six (6) months and
twenty-one (21) days to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten
(10) days. Applying the provisions of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, appellant is entitled to a minimum term to be
taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is arresto
mayor,
maximum
to prision
correccional,
minimum.
Accordingly, appellant should be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as maximum.[12]
The trial court correctly awarded P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity. However, the award of moral damages in the
amount of P500,000.00 should be reduced to P50,000.00.
[13]
The award of P30,000.00 as actual damages must likewise
be modified. The mother of the victim presented receipts that
they, in fact, spent P58,257.90 [14] for hospital bills and funeral
expenses. The fact that she received P40,000.00 from
insurance will not affect the award of actual damages. [15] The
award of exemplary damages is deleted for lack of factual
basis.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil
Case No. Q-98-79961, convicting appellant of the crime of
murder is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Renato
Garcia y Romano is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, and he is
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4)
months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
maximum. Appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim,
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P58,257.90 as actual damages
and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide,
Jr.,
C.J.
(Chairman),
Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Panganiban,

Garcia v CA
GR 157171; March 14, 2006
In 1995, Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., ran for the senatorial elections.
Meanwhile, in Alaminos, Pangasinan, Arsenia Garcia was one
of the designated election officers. Garcia was accused by
Pimentel of violating the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987.
Pimentel alleged that Garcia decreased Pimentels vote by
5,000 votes.
The trial court found Garcia guilty. On appeal, Garcia invoked
that the trial court erred in ruling that her defense of good faith
was not properly appreciated. She averred that due to the
workload given to her during said elections, she got fatigued
and that caused the error in the tabulation of Pimentels votes.
Pimentel argued that the Electoral Reforms Law is a special
law hence it is a malum prohibitum law and therefore, good
faith is not a defense.
ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged violation of Garcia of the
Electoral Reforms Law is a malum prohibitum.
HELD: No. Generally, mala in se crimes refer to those felonies
in violation of the Revised Penal Code. However, it must be
noted that mala in se are crimes which are inherently immoral.
Hence, even if the crime is punished by a special law, if it is
inherently immoral, then it is still a crime mala in se.
In this case, the said violation of the Electoral Reforms Law is
a mala in se crime because it is inherently immoral to decrease
the vote of a candidate. Note also that what is being punished
is the intentional decreasing of a candidates votes and not
those arising from errors and mistakes. Since a violation of this
special law is a malum in se, good faith can be raised as a
defense.
However, Garcias defense of good faith was not proven. Facts
show that the decreasing of Pimentels vote was not due to
error or mistake. It was shown that she willingly handled
certain duties which were not supposed to be hers to perform.
Thats a clear sign that she facilitated the erroneous entry.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 75369. November 26, 1990.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
FERNANDO ILIGAN y JAMITO, EDMUNDO ASIS y ILIGAN
and JUAN MACANDOG (at large), Defendants, FERNANDO
ILIGAN y JAMITO and EDMUNDO ASIS y
ILIGAN, Defendants-Appellants.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Cesar R. Canonizado, for Defendants-Appellants.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; APPEAL; THROWS THE CASE OPEN


FOR A COMPLETE REVIEW OF ALL ERRORS AS MAY BE
IMPUTABLE TO THE TRIAL COURT. While the factual
findings of the trial court are generally given due respect by the
appellate court, an appeal of a criminal case throws it open for
a complete review of all errors, by commission or omission, as
may be imputable to the trial court. (People v. Valerio, Jr., L4116, February 25, 1982, 112 SCRA 208, 231) In this instance,
the lower court erred in finding that the maceration of one half
of the head of the victim was also caused by Iligan for the
evidence on record point to a different conclusion. We are
convinced beyond peradventure that indeed, after Quiones,
Jr. had fallen from the bolo-hacking perpetrated by Iligan, he
was run over by a vehicle. This finding, however, does not in
any way exonerate Iligan from liability for the death of
Quiones,
Jr.
2. CRIMINAL LAW; LIABILITY; REQUISITES THEREOF,
PRESENT IN THE CASE AT BAR. Under Article 4 of the
Revised Penal Code, criminal liability shall be incurred "by any
person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended." Based on the
doctrine that "el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal
causado" (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the
evil caused), (People v. Ural, G.R. No. L-30801, March 27,

1974, 56 SCRA 138, 144) the essential requisites of Article 4


are: (a) that an intentional felony has been committed, and (b)
that the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct,
natural and logical consequence of the felony committed by the
offender. (People v. Mananquil, L-35574, September 28, 1984,
132 SCRA 196, 207). We hold that these requisites are present
in
this
case.
3. ID.; ID.; PROXIMATE LEGAL CAUSE, DEFINED. The
intentional felony committed was the hacking of the head of
Quiones, Jr. by Iligan. That it was considered as superficial by
the physician who autopsied Quiones is beside the point.
What is material is that by the instrument used in hacking
Quiones, Jr. and the location of the wound, the assault was
meant not only to immobilize the victim but to do away with him
as it was directed at a vital and delicate part of the body: the
head. (See: People v. Diana, 32 Phil. 344 [1915]). The hacking
incident happened on the national highway where vehicles are
expected to pass any moment. One such vehicle passed
seconds later when Lukban and Zaldy Asis, running scared
and having barely negotiated the distance of around 200
meters, heard shouts of people. Quiones, Jr., weakened by
the hacking blow which sent him to the cemented highway,
was run over by a vehicle. Under these circumstances, we hold
that while Iligans hacking of Quiones, Jr.s head might not
have been the direct cause, it was the proximate cause of the
latters death. Proximate legal cause is defined as "that acting
first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting
other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous
chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable
result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances
that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable
ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom. (Urbano
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72964, January 7,
1988, 157 SCRA 1 quoting Vda. De Bataclan v. Medina, 102
Phil. 181). In other words, the sequence of events from Iligans
assault on him to the time Quiones, Jr. was run over by a
vehicle is, considering the very short span of time between
them, one unbroken chain of events. Having triggered such
events,
Iligan
cannot
escape
liability.
4. ID.; ALIBI; NOT CONSIDERED WHEN ACCUSED IS
POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY WITNESSES. We agree with
the lower court that the defense of alibi cannot turn the tide in
favor of Iligan because he was positively seen at the scene of
the crime and identified by the prosecution witnesses. (People
v. Pineda, G.R. No. 72400, January 15, 1988, 157 SCRA 71).
5. ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY AND
EVIDENT PREMEDITATION, WRONGLY APPRECIATED IN
THE CASE AT BAR. But we disagree with the lower court
with regards to its findings on the aggravating circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation. Treachery has been
appreciated by the lower court in view of the suddenness of the
attack on the group of Quiones, Jr. Suddenness of such
attack, however, does not by itself show treachery. (People v.
Gadiano, L-31818, July 30, 1982, 115 SCRA 559) There must
be evidence that the mode of attack was consciously adopted
by the appellant to make it impossible or hard for the person
attacked to defend himself. (People v. Crisostomo, L-32243,
April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 47). In this case, the hacking of
Edmundo Asis by Iligan followed by the chasing of the trio by
the group of Iligan was a warning to the deceased and his
companions of the hostile attitude of the appellants. The group
of Quiones, Jr. was therefore placed on guard for any
subsequent attacks against them. (People v. Mercado, L33492, March 30, 1988, 159 SCRA 455). The requisites
necessary to appreciate evident premeditation have likewise
not been met in this case. Thus, the prosecution failed to prove
all of the following: (a) the time when the accused determined
to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the
accused had clung to their determination to commit the crime;
and (c) the lapse of sufficient length of time between the
determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act. (People v. Batas, G.R. Nos. 8427778,
August
2,
1989,
176
SCRA
46).
6. ID.; CONSPIRACY; NOT SUFFICIENTLY CONSTITUTED
BY MERE KNOWLEDGE, ACQUIESCENCE OR APPROVAL

OF THE ACT WITHOUT COOPERATION OR AGREEMENT


TO COOPERATE NOR BY MERE PRESENCE AT THE
SCENE OF THE CRIME. Absent any qualifying
circumstances, Iligan must be held liable only for homicide.
Again, contrary to the lower courts finding, proof beyond
reasonable doubt has not been established to hold Edmundo
Asis liable as Iligans co-conspirator. Edmundo Asis did not
take any active part in the infliction of the wound on the head of
Quiones, Jr., which led to his running over by a vehicle and
consequent death. As earlier pointed out, the testimony that he
was carrying a stone at the scene of the crime hardly merits
credibility being uncorroborated and coming from an
undeniably biased witness. Having been the companion of
Iligan, Edmundo Asis must have known of the formers criminal
intent but mere knowledge, acquiescense or approval of the
act without cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not
enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy. There must
be intentional participation in the act with a view to the
furtherance of the common design and purpose. (People v.
Izon, 104 Phil. 690 [1958]) Such being the case, his mere
presence at the scene of the crime did not make him a coconspirator, a co-principal or an accomplice to the assault
perpetrated by Iligan. (Orobio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
57519, September 13, 1988, 165 SCRA 316) Edmundo Asis
therefore
deserves
exoneration.
7. ID.; HOMICIDE; PENALTY; ABSENT ANY MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE AND APPLYING THE INDETERMINATE
SENTENCE LAW. There being no mitigating circumstance,
the penalty imposable on Iligan is reclusion temporal medium
(Arts. 249 and 64, Revised Penal Code). Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the proper penalty is that within
the range of prision mayor as minimum and reclusion temporal
medium as maximum. We find insufficient proof to warrant the
award of P256,960 for the victims unrealized income and
therefore, the same is disallowed.

DECISION
FERNAN, J.:
In this appeal, uncle and nephew, Fernando Iligan and
Edmundo Asis, seek a reversal of the decision of the then
Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Branch II 1
convicting them of the crime of murder and sentencing them to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the
heirs of Esmeraldo Quiones, Jr. in the amounts of P30,000 for
the latters death and P256,960 representing the victims
unrealized
income.
On October 21, 1980, the following information for murder was
filed against Fernando Iligan, Edmundo Asis and Juan
Macandog:chanrobles.com.ph
:
virtual
law
library
"That on or about 3:00 a.m., August 4, 1980, at sitio Lico II,
barangay Sto. Domingo, municipality of Vinzons, province of
Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the above named accused, conspiring and
mutually helping one another, with treachery and evident
premeditation, one of the accused Fernando Iligan armed with
a bolo (sinampalok) and with deliberate intent to kill, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, gang up and in a
sudden unexpected manner, hacked Esmeraldo Quiones, Jr.,
on his face, thus causing fatal injuries on the latters face which
resulted to (sic) the death of said Esmeraldo Quiones.
"CONTRARY

TO

LAW."cralaw

virtua1aw

library

Juan Macandog was never apprehended and he remains at


large. At their arraignment on January 12, 1981 Fernando
Iligan and Edmundo Asis pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. Thereafter, the prosecution presented the following
version of the commission of the crime.chanrobles.com.ph :
virtual
law
library
At around 2:00 oclock in the morning of August 4, 1980,

Esmeraldo Quiones, Jr. and his companions, Zaldy Asis and


Felix Lukban, were walking home from barangay Sto.
Domingo, Vinzons, Camarines Norte after attending a barrio
fiesta dance. In front of the ricemill of a certain Almadrones,
they met the accused Fernando Iligan, his nephew, Edmundo
Asis, and Juan Macandog. Edmundo Asis pushed ("winahi")
them aside thereby prompting Zaldy Asis to box him. 2 Felix
Lukban quickly told the group of the accused that they had no
desire to fight. 3 Fernando Iligan, upon seeing his nephew fall,
drew from his back a bolo and hacked Zaldy Asis but missed.
Terrified, the trio ran pursued by the three accused. They ran
for about half an hour, passing by the house of Quiones, Jr.
They stopped running only upon seeing that they were no
longer being chased. After resting for a short while, Quiones,
Jr. invited the two to accompany him to his house so that he
could change to his working clothes and report for work as a
bus
conductor.
4
While the trio were walking towards the house of Quiones, Jr.,
the three accused suddenly emerged on the roadside and
without a word, Fernando Iligan hacked Quiones, Jr. with his
bolo hitting him on the forehead and causing him to fall down.
5 Horrified, Felix Lukban and Zaldy Asis fled to a distance of
200 meters, but returned walking after they heard shouts of
people. Zaldy Asis specifically heard someone shout "May
nadale
na."
6
On the spot where Quiones, Jr. was hacked, Zaldy Asis and
Felix Lukban saw him already dead with his head busted. 7
They helped the brother of Quiones, Jr. in carrying him to
their
house.
8
That same day, August 4, 1980, the body of Quiones, Jr. was
autopsied at the Funeraria Belmonte in Labo, Camarines Norte
by the municipal health officer, Dr. Marcelito E. Abas. The
postmortem examination report which is found at the back of
the death certificate reveals that Esmeraldo Quiones, Jr., who
was 21 years old when he died, sustained the following
injuries:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. Shock and massive cerebral hemorrhages due to multiple
fracture of the entire half of the frontal left, temporal, parietal
and occipital bone of the head, with massive maceration of the
brain
tissue.
"2. Other findings Incised wound at the right eyebrow,
medial aspect measuring about 4 cms. in length, 0.5 cm. in
width and 0.5 cm. in depth, abrasion on the left shoulder and
right
side
of
the
neck."
9
The death certificate also indicates that Quiones, Jr. died of
"shock and massive cerebral hemorrhages due to a vehicular
accident."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
The defendants denied having perpetrated the crime. They
alleged that they were in their respective houses at the time
the
crime
was
committed.chanrobles
law
library
Accused Fernando Iligan testified that at around midnight of
August 4, 1980, he left his house to fetch his visitors at the
dance hall. 10 Along the way, he met his nephew, Edmundo
Asis, whom he presumed was drunk. He invited his nephew to
accompany him to the dance hall. However, they were not able
to reach their destination because Edmundo was boxed by
somebody whom he (Edmundo) sideswiped. 11 Instead,
Fernando Iligan brought his nephew home. 12 On their way,
they were overtaken by Juliano Mendoza whom Fernando
Iligan invited to his house to help him cook. 13 After bringing
his nephew home, Fernando Iligan and Juliano Mendoza
proceeded to Iligans house and arrived there between 1:30
and 2:00 oclock in the morning of the same day. 14
Edmundo Asis corroborated Iligans testimony. He testified that
while they were walking in front of the Almadrones ricemill, he
sideswiped someone whom he did not recognize because
there were several persons around. He said, "Sorry, pare" but
the person to whom he addressed his apology boxed him on
his left face. He fell down and Iligan helped him. Later, Iligan
accompanied him to his home in Lico II. 15 After Iligan and
Juliano Mendoza had left his house, he slept and woke up at
7:00
oclock
the
following
morning.
16
The defense made capital of the testimony of prosecution

witness Dr. Abas to the effect that Quiones, Jr. died because
of a vehicular accident. In ruling out said theory, however, the
lower court, in its decision of May 7, 1986,
said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The accused, to augment their alibi, have pointed to this Court
that the Certificate of Death have shown that the victims death
was caused by a vehicular accident. To this, notwithstanding,
the Court cannot give credit for some reasons. First, the fact of
the alleged vehicular accident has not been fully established.
Second, Esmeraldo Quiones, Sr., (the) father of the victim,
testified that Dr. Abas told him that if his son was hacked by a
bolo on the face and then run over the entire head by a
vehicles tire, then that hacking on the face could not be visibly
seen on the head (t.s.n., pp. 16-17, October 13, 1981) Third,
Exhibit 2 (the photograph of the victim taken immediately after
his body had been brought home) is a hard evidence. It will
attestly (sic) show that the entire head was not crushed by any
vehicle. On the contrary, it shows that only half of the face and
head, was damaged with the wound starting on a sharp edge
horizontally. There are contusions and abrasions on the upper
left shoulder and on the neck while the body downwards has
none of it, while on the right forehead there is another wound
caused by a sharp instrument. Therefore, it is simple, that if the
victim was run over by a vehicle, the other half portion of his
head and downward part of his body must have been likewise
seriously
damaged,
which
there
are
none."
17
The lower court also found that Iligans group conspired to kill
anyone or all members of the group of the victim to vindicate
the boxing on the face of Edmundo Asis. It appreciated the
aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and
treachery and accordingly convicted Iligan and Edmundo Asis
of the crime of murder and imposed on them the
aforementioned
penalty.
Iligan and Edmundo Asis interposed this appeal professing
innocence of the crime for which they were convicted. For the
second time, they attributed Quiones, Jr.s death to a
vehicular
accident.
No eyewitnesses were presented to prove that Quiones, Jr.
was run over by a vehicle. The defense relies on the testimony
of Dr. Abas, a prosecution witness, who swore that the multiple
fracture on the head of Quiones, Jr. was caused by a
vehicular accident 18 which opinion was earlier put in writing
by the same witness in the postmortem examination. Dr. Abas
justified his conclusion by what he considered as tire marks on
the victims left shoulder and the right side of his neck. 19 He
also testified that the incised wound located at the victims right
eyebrow could have been caused by a sharp bolo but it was so
superficial that it could not have caused the victims death. 20
Circumstantial evidence on record indeed point to the veracity
of the actual occurrence of the vehicular mishap. One such
evidence is the testimony of prosecution witness Zaldy Asis
that when he helped bring home the body of Quiones, Jr., he
told the victims father, Esmeraldo Quiones, Sr. that "before
Esmeraldo Quiones (Jr.) was run over by a vehicle, he was
hacked by Fernando Iligan." 21 When asked why he
mentioned an automobile, Zaldy Asis said that he did not
notice any vehicle around but he mentioned it "because his
(Quiones, Jr.) head was busted." 22 It is therefore not
farfetched to conclude that Zaldy Asis had actual knowledge of
said accident but for understandable reasons he declined to
declare it in court. Defense witness Marciano Mago, the
barangay captain of Sto. Domingo, also testified that when he
went to the scene of the crime, he saw bits of the brain of the
victim scattered across the road where he also saw tire marks.
23
For its part, the prosecution, through the victims father,
presented evidence to the effect that Iligan authored the
maceration of half of the victims head. Quiones, Sr. testified
that from their house, which was about five meters away from
the road, he saw Fernando Iligan holding a "sinampalok" as
he, together with Edmundo Asis and Juan Macandog, chased
someone. During the second time that he saw the three
accused, he heard Iligan say, "Dali, ayos na yan." 24 Hence,
the lower court concluded that the victims head was "chopped"
resulting in the splattering of his brain all over the place. 25 It
should be emphasized, however, that the testimony came from
a
biased
witness
and
it
was
uncorroborated.

While the factual findings of the trial court are generally given
due respect by the appellate court, an appeal of a criminal
case throws it open for a complete review of all errors, by
commission or omission, as may be imputable to the trial court.
26 In this instance, the lower court erred in finding that the
maceration of one half of the head of the victim was also
caused by Iligan for the evidence on record point to a different
conclusion. We are convinced beyond peradventure that
indeed, after Quiones, Jr. had fallen from the bolo-hacking
perpetrated by Iligan, he was run over by a vehicle. This
finding, however, does not in any way exonerate Iligan from
liability for the death of Quiones, Jr.chanrobles.com : virtual
law
library
Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability
shall be incurred "by any person committing a felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended." Based on the doctrine that "el que es causa de la
causa es causa del mal causado" (he who is the cause of the
cause is the cause of the evil caused), 27 the essential
requisites of Article 4 are: (a) that an intentional felony has
been committed, and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved
party be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the
felony committed by the offender. 28 We hold that these
requisites
are
present
in
this
case.
The intentional felony committed was the hacking of the head
of Quiones, Jr. by Iligan. That it was considered as superficial
by the physician who autopsied Quiones is beside the point.
What is material is that by the instrument used in hacking
Quiones, Jr. and the location of the wound, the assault was
meant not only to immobilize the victim but to do away with him
as it was directed at a vital and delicate part of the body: the
head.
29
The hacking incident happened on the national highway 30
where vehicles are expected to pass any moment. One such
vehicle passed seconds later when Lukban and Zaldy Asis,
running scared and having barely negotiated the distance of
around 200 meters, heard shouts of people. Quiones, Jr.,
weakened by the hacking blow which sent him to the cemented
highway,
was
run
over
by
a
vehicle.
Under these circumstances, we hold that while Iligans hacking
of Quiones, Jr.s head might not have been the direct cause, it
was the proximate cause of the latters death. Proximate legal
cause is defined as "that acting first and producing the injury,
either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting
the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which
first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent
and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom." 31 In other words, the
sequence of events from Iligans assault on him to the time
Quiones, Jr. was run over by a vehicle is, considering the very
short span of time between them, one unbroken chain of
events. Having triggered such events, Iligan cannot escape
liability.chanrobles
law
library
We agree with the lower court that the defense of alibi cannot
turn the tide in favor of Iligan because he was positively seen
at the scene of the crime and identified by the prosecution
witnesses.
32
But we disagree with the lower court with regards to its findings
on the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation. Treachery has been appreciated by the lower
court in view of the suddenness of the attack on the group of
Quiones, Jr. Suddenness of such attack, however, does not
by itself show treachery. 33 There must be evidence that the
mode of attack was consciously adopted by the appellant to
make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend
himself. 34 In this case, the hacking of Edmundo Asis by Iligan
followed by the chasing of the trio by the group of Iligan was a
warning to the deceased and his companions of the hostile
attitude of the appellants. The group of Quiones, Jr. was
therefore placed on guard for any subsequent attacks against
them.
35

The requisites necessary to appreciate evident premeditation


have likewise not been met in this case. Thus, the prosecution
failed to prove all of the following: (a) the time when the
accused determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly
indicating that the accused had clung to their determination to
commit the crime; and (c) the lapse of sufficient length of time
between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect
upon
the
consequences
of
his
act.
36
Absent any qualifying circumstances, Iligan must be held liable
only for homicide. Again, contrary to the lower courts finding,
proof beyond reasonable doubt has not been established to
hold Edmundo Asis liable as Iligans co-conspirator. Edmundo
Asis did not take any active part in the infliction of the wound
on the head of Quiones, Jr., which led to his running over by a
vehicle and consequent death. As earlier pointed out, the
testimony that he was carrying a stone at the scene of the
crime hardly merits credibility being uncorroborated and
coming from an undeniably biased witness. Having been the
companion of Iligan, Edmundo Asis must have known of the
formers criminal intent but mere knowledge, acquiescense or
approval of the act without cooperation or agreement to
cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party to a
conspiracy. There must be intentional participation in the act
with a view to the furtherance of the common design and
purpose. 37 Such being the case, his mere presence at the
scene of the crime did not make him a co-conspirator, a coprincipal or an accomplice to the assault perpetrated by Iligan.
38 Edmundo Asis therefore deserves exoneration.
There being no mitigating circumstance, the penalty imposable
on Iligan is reclusion temporal medium (Arts. 249 and 64,
Revised Penal Code). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the proper penalty is that within the range of prision
mayor as minimum and reclusion temporal medium as
maximum. We find insufficient proof to warrant the award of
P256,960 for the victims unrealized income and therefore, the
same
is
disallowed.cralawnad
WHEREFORE, appellant Fernando Iligan y Jamito is hereby
convicted of the crime of homicide for which he is imposed the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium as
maximum and he shall indemnify the heirs of Esmeraldo
Quiones, Jr. in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000).
Appellant Edmundo Asis is hereby acquitted of the crime
charged against him. Costs against appellant Iligan.

People v. Mananquil
GR No L-35574, Sep 28, 1994, Cuevas, J.
FACTS

Prosecutions version
o 1965 Mar 6: At about 11pm, Valentina
Manananquil went to the NAWASA Building
at Pasay City, where her husband was
working as a security guard
o She had just purchased 10 centavos worth
of gasoline from the Esso Gasoline Station
at Taft Avenue. She placed the gasoline in a
coffee bottle
o She was angry at her husband, Elias Day,
because the latter had burned her clothing,
was maintaining a mistress, and had been
taking all the food from their house
o Upon reaching the NAWASA Building, she
knocked at the door
o Immediately after the door was opened,
Elias Day shouted at his wife and castigated
her, saying PUTA BUGUIAN LAKAW
GALIGAON
o The appellant, tired of hearing the victim,
then got the bottle of gasoline and poured
the contents thereof on the face of the victim
o Then, she got a matchbox and set the polo
shirt of the victim aflame
Defenses version

o
o
o
o

o
o
o

Taking with her an empty bottle of Hemo,


she left for a nearby gasoline station and
bought ten centavos worth of gasoline,
intending to use the same to clean her
shoes, which she needed for church the next
day
Then she remembered that her husband
needed gasoline for his lighter so she
dropped by his place of work
She saw her husband inside a building of the
NAWASA standing by the window
She entered and knocked at the wooden
door. Elias opened the door, but when he
saw his wife he shouted at her.
She told him that she had brought him fluid
for his lighter, but Elias, who was drunk,
cursed her PUTA BUGUIAN LAKAW
GALIGAON. This shouting continued
despite her telling him that she had come
just to bring the gasoline that he wanted
She trembled and became dizzy. She was
beside herself and did not know that she was
sprinkling the gasoline on her husbands
face.
She was tired and dizzy and had to sit down
for a while. Then she remembered her
grandson who was alone in the house so
she went home, leaving her husband who
was walking to and fro and not paying
attention to her
She went to bed but could not sleep. She
returned to NAWASA to apologize to her
husband, but, upon arriving, saw that police
officers were present
An officer pulled her aside, asked her if she
was Eliass wife
When she said yes, officer accused her of
setting her husband on firean accusation
she denied
The police took her to the headquarters,
prepared a written statement which she was
made to sign upon a promise that she would
be released if she signed it

ISSUES/HELD

WON appellants extrajudicial confession was voluntarily given


YES
WON burns sustained by victim contributed to cause
pneumonia which was the cause of the victims death YES

RATIONALE

Court found appellants aforesaid assertions a mere


pretense to flimsy to be accepted as true, no error in
the trial courts pronouncement that the appellants
sworn statement was voluntarily given by her
Contrary to her claim, she knew and understood
Tagalog even though she was not a Tagala as she
had stayed in Manila continuously for 14 years
her total indifference and seemingly unperturbed
concern over the fate that had befallen the victim
supports the theory that she has murder in her heart
and meant to do harm to her husband
Mananquil claimed that victims pneumonia, from
which he died, was caused by the alcohol which he
was drunk on that night. But as testified by a doctor,
taking alcohol cannot cause pneumonia
Pneumonia was complication of the burns sustained
While accepting pneumonia as the immediate cause
of death, the court held on to state that this could not
have resulted had not the victim suffered from
second-degree burns

Quinto v. Andres
G.R. No. 155791 March 16, 2005
Lessons Applicable: Proximate cause, EX to Every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
FACTS:
November 13, 1995 7:30 am: Edison Garcia, 11 year-old and
Grade 4 elementary school pupil, and his playmate, Wilson
Quinto saw Dante Andres and Randyver Pacheco by the
mouth of a drainage culvert.
Andres and Pacheco invited Wilson to go fishing with them
inside the drainage culvert. Wilson agreed while Garcia seeing
that it was dark inside, opted to remain seated in a grassy area
about two meters from the entrance of the drainage system
Only Pacheco had a flashlight. Pacheco, who was holding a
fish, came out of the drainage system and left without saying a
word. Then, Andres came out, went back inside, and emerged
again carrying Wilson who was already dead. He laid his body
down in the grassy area.
Garcia, shocked, fled from the scene. Andres went to the
house of Melba Quinto, Wilsons mother, and informed her that

her son had died. They rushed to the drainage culvert. Wilson
was buried without any complaints filed.
November 28, 1995: National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
took the sworn statements of Pacheco, Garcia and Quinto
Pacheco alleged that he had never been to the drainage
system catching fish with Andres and Wilson
Dr. Dominic Aguda of the NBIs autopsy showed that the cause
death is drowning with traumatic head injuries as contributory
NBI filed a criminal complaint for homicide against Andres and
Pacheco with the RTC
Dr. Dominic Aguda testified that Wilson could have fallen, and
that the occipital portion of his head could have hit a blunt
object, That the 14x7-centimeter hematoma at the back of
Wilsons head could have rendered the him unconscious so he
drowned. The 4x3-centimeter abrasion on the right side of
Wilsons face could have also been caused by rubbing against
a concrete wall or pavement, or by contact with a rough
surface. He also stated that the trachea region was full of
mud, but that there was no sign of strangulation.
RTC: granted demurer to evidence on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence
CA: Affirmed RTC
ISSUE: W/N Acquittal in criminal case bars a civil action where
the judgment of acquittal holds that the accused did not commit
the criminal acts imputed to them
HELD: YES. petition is DENIED
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
o The civil liability of such person established in Articles 100,
102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code includes restitution,
reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for
consequential damages
GR: When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall
be deemed instituted with the criminal action
EX: the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the
right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action
With the implied institution of the civil action in the criminal
action, the two actions are merged into one composite
proceeding, with the criminal action predominating the civil.
The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the
offender in order to deter him and others from committing the
same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, to reform
and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order.
The sole purpose of the civil action is the restitution, reparation
or indemnification of the private offended party for the damage
or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act
of the accused
o While the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged, it is required
to prove the cause of action of the private complainant against
the accused for damages and/or restitution.
o Insofar as the civil aspect of the case is concerned, the
prosecution or the private complainant is burdened to adduce
preponderance of evidence or superior weight of evidence.
failed
That the deceased fell or slipped cannot be totally
foreclosed because even Garcia testified that the drainage
culvert was dark, and that he himself was so afraid that he
refused to join respondents Andres and Pacheco inside
failed to adduce proof of any ill-motive on the part of either
respondent to kill the deceased before or after the latter was
invited to join them in fishing
GR: The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil action.

EX: civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if


there is a finding in a final judgment in the civil action that the
act or omission from where the civil liability may arise does not
exist
a person committing a felony is criminally liable for all the
natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom although
the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended
o Natural - an occurrence in the ordinary course of human
life or events
o Logical - a rational connection between the act of the
accused and the resulting injury or damage
The felony committed must be the proximate cause of the
resulting injury
o Proximate cause
cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by an efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred
acting first and producing the injury, either immediately, or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor
o There must be a relation of cause and effect,
cause = felonious act of the offender
effect = resultant injuries and/or death of the victim.
The cause and effect relationship is not altered or changed
because of the
o pre-existing conditions
pathological condition of the victim
predisposition of the offended party
physical condition of the offended party
o concomitant or concurrent conditions
negligence or fault of the doctors
conditions supervening the felonious act
tetanus
pulmonary infection
gangrene
not the proximate cause of the resulting injury when:
1. there is an active force that intervened between the felony
committed and the resulting injury, and the active force is a
distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from the felonious act of
the accused; or
2. the resulting injury is due to the intentional act of the victim
The offender is criminally liable for the death of the victim if his
delictual act caused, accelerated or contributed to the death of
the victim.
the prosecution was burdened to prove the corpus delicti which
consists of two things:
1. first, the criminal act - objective
2. second, defendants agency in the commission of the act subjective element of crimes

In homicide (by dolo) and in murder cases, the


prosecution is burdened to prove:
1. the death of the party alleged to be dead
2. that the death was produced by the criminal act of some
other than the deceased and was not the result of accident,
natural cause or suicide
3. that defendant committed the criminal act or was in some
way criminally responsible for the act which produced the
death

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 42607

September 28, 1935

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiffappellee,


vs.
JUAN QUIANZON, defendant-appellant.
Pedro B. Pobre for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
RECTO, J.:
Charged with and convicted of the crime of homicide in the
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, and sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from six years and one day of prision
mayor, as minimum to fourteen years, seven months and one
day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, Juan Quianzon appeal
to this court for the review of the case.

On February 1, 1934, a novena for the suffrage of the soul of


the deceased person was being held in the house of Victoria
Cacpal in a barrio, near the poblacion, of the municipality of
Paoay, Ilocos Norte, with the usual attendance of the relatives
and friends. The incident that led to the filling of these charges
took place between 3 to 4 o'clock in the afternoon. Andres
Aribuabo, one of the persons present, went to ask for food of
Juan Quianzon, then in the kitchen, who, to all appearances,
had the victuals in his care. It was the second or third time that
Aribuabo approached Quianzon with the same purpose
whereupon the latter, greatly peeved, took hold of a firebrand
and applied ran to the place where the people were gathered
exclaiming that he is wounded and was dying. Raising his shirt,
he showed to those present a wound in his abdomen below the
navel. Aribuabo died as a result of this wound on the tenth day
after the incident.
There is no conflict between the prosecution and the defense
as regards the foregoing facts. The question to be determined
is who wounded Aribuabo. The prosecution claims that it was
Juan Quianzon and, to prove it, called Simeon Cacpal, Roman
Bagabay, Gregorio Dumlao and Julian Llaguno to the witness
stand.
The first witness, Simeon Cacpal, claims to have witnessed the
wounding of Andres Aribuabo in the abdomen by Juan
Quianzon. However, we find the testimony of this witness so
improbable, incongruent and contradictory that we consider
meritorious the claim of the defense that it was an error of the
lower court to have taken it into consideration in formulating
the findings of its judgment. Not so with respect to the
testimony of the other witnesses. Roman Bagabay, one of the
persons present at said gathering, testified that he saw Juan
Quianzon apply a firebrand to the neck of Andres Aribuabo
who shortly afterwards went toward the place where the
witness and the other guests were gathered, telling that he was
wounded and was going to die and naming Juan Quianzon as
the person who wounded him. He also testified that Juan
Quianzon, upon being asked immediately by him about the
incident, admitted to him attacked Aribuabo with a bamboo
spit. Gregorio Dumalao, a barrio lieutenant, who, upon being
informed of the incident, forthwith conducted an investigation,
questioned Aribuabo and the latter told him that it was the
accused who had wounded him. He likewise questioned the
accused and the latter, in turn, stated that he had wounded the
deceased with a bamboo spit. Upon being brought before Juan
Llaguno, chief of police of Paoay, for questioning, Quianzon
confessed to Llaguno that he had applied a firebrand to
Aribuabo's neck and had later wounded him with a bamboo
spit. Before the chief of police could put this confession of
Quianzon in writing, the later retracted, denying that he had
wounded Aribuabo, for which reason in the affidavit Exhibit B
the fact of having applied a firebrand to Aribuabo's neck
appears admitted by Quianzon but not of having wounded the
deceased with a bamboo spit.
The disinterestedness of these three witnesses for the
prosecution, Bagabay, Dumalo and Llaguno, is not questioned
by the defense. Neither the accused, in his testimony, nor his
counsel, in the brief filed by him in this court, was able to
assign any unlawful, corrupt or wicked motive that might have
actuated them to testify falsely in this case and knowingly bring
about the imprisonment of an innocent person. Bagabay is not
even a relative of the deceased. Dumlao, the barrio lieutenant,
is a nephew of the accused. Llaguno, chief of police of Paoay,
is an officer of the law whose intervention of this case was
purely in compliance with his official duties. All the appellant
has been able to state in his brief to question the credibility of
these witnesses is that they were contradicted by Simeon
Cacpal, the other witness for the prosecution, who testified that
he had not seen them speak neither to Aribuabo nor to
Quianzon in the afternoon of the crime. But the position of the
defense in invoking Simeon Cacpal's testimony for the purpose
of discrediting the other witnesses for the prosecution is
untenable, after having vigorously impeached said testimony,
branding it as improbable, incongruent and contradictory. If

Cacpal is a false witness and the court believes this claim of


the defense as true , none of his statements may be taken
into account or should exert any influence in the consideration
of the other evidence in the case.
After discharging testimony of Simeon Cacpal, the evidence
presented by the prosecution relative to the appellant's criminal
liability for the death of Andres Aribuabo, briefly consists, first,
in the victim's statement immediately after receiving the wound,
naming the accused as the author of the aggression, and the
admission forthwith made by the accused that he had applied a
firebrand to Aribuabo's neck and had wounded him, besides,
with a bamboo spit. Both statements are competent evidence
in the law, admissible as a part of the res gestae(section 279
and 298, No. 7, of the Code of Civil Procedure;
U.S. vs. Macuti, 26 Phil., 170; People vs. Portento and
Portento, 48 Phil., 971). Second, in the extrajudicial confession
of the accused to the barrio lieutenant, Dumlao, and later to the
chief of police Llaguno, in the same afternoon of the crime, that
he was the author of Aribuabo's wound and that he had
inflicted it by means of a bamboo spit. Inasmuch as this
confession, although extrajudicial, is strongly corroborated and
appears to have been made by the accused freely and
voluntarily, it constitutes evidence against him relative to his
liability as author of the crime charged (U.S. vs. so Fo, 23 Phil.,
379; People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil., 64, 82; U.S. vs. Jamino, 3
P.R.A., 52; Francisco's Quizzer on Evidence).
The defense of the accused consisted simply in denying that
he had wounded the deceased and that he had confessed his
guilt to the witnesses Bagabay, Dumlao and Llaguno. But such
denial cannot prevail against the adverse testimony of these
three veracious and disinterested witnesses, all the more
because neither the accused nor any other witness for the
defense has stated or insinuated that another person, not the
accused, might be the author of the wound which resulted in
Aribuabo's death, and because it is admitted by the defense
that it was the accused, whom Aribuabo had been pestering
with request for food, who attacked the latter, burning his neck
with a firebrand, afetr which Aribuaboappeared wounded in the
abdomen, without the accused and the witnesses for the
defense explaining how and by whom the aggression had been
made.
It is contended by the defense that even granting that it was
the accused who inflicted the wound which resulted in
Aribuabo's death, he should not be convicted of homicide but
only of serious physical injuries because said wound was not
necessarily fatal and the deceased would have survived it had
he not twice removed the drainage which Dr. Mendoza had
placed to control or isolate the infection. This contention is
without merit. According to the physician who examined
whether he could survive or not." It was a wound in the
abdomen which occasionally results in traumatic peritonitis.
The infection was cause by the fecal matter from the large
intestine which has been perforated. The possibility, admitted
by said physician that the patient might have survived said
wound had he not removed the drainage, does not mean that
the act of the patient was the real cause of his death. Even
without said act the fatal consequence could have followed,
and the fact that the patient had so acted in a paroxysm of pain
does not alter the juridical consequences of the punishable act
of the accused.
One who inflicts an injury on another is deemed by
the law to be guilty of homicide if the injury contributes
mediately or immediately to the death of such other.
The fact that the other causes contribute to the death
does not relieve the actor of responsibility. . . . (13 R.
C.L., 748.)
Furthermore, it does not appear that the patient, in removing
the drainage, had acted voluntarily and with the knowledge that
he was performing an act prejudicial to his health, inasmuch as
self-preservation is the strongest instinct in living beings. It
much be assumed, therefore, that he unconsciously did so due

to his pathological condition and to his state of nervousness


and restlessness on account of the horrible physical pain
caused by the wound, aggravated by the contract of the
drainage tube with the inflammed peritoneum. "When the
peritonitis is due to traumatism, or to a perforation of the
stomach, intestine or gall-bladder, etc., it is indicated by violent
shivering and pain first localized at a point in the abdomen,
extending later to the entire abdominal wall; acute intolerable
pain, which is aggravated by the slightest movement,
becoming unbearable upon contact with the hand, a rag, or the
bedclothes. The pain is continuous but it gives frequent
paroxysms. The abdomen is swollen, tense. Vomittings of the
greenish matter, which are very annoying and terribly painful,
take from the beginning and continue while the disease lasts."
(XVI Spanish-America Encyclopaedic Dictionary, 176; see
also XXI Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1911 ed., 171.) If to this is
added the fact that the victim in this case was mentally
deranged, according to the defense itself, it becomes more
evident that the accused is wrong in imputing the natural
consequences of his criminal act to an act of his victim.
The question herein raised by the appellant has already been
finally settled by jurisprudence. The Supreme Court of Spain,
in a decision of April 3, 1879, said in the case similar to the
present, the following: "Inasmuch as a man is responsible for
the consequences of his act and in this case the physical
condition and temperament of the offended party nowise
lessen the evil, the seriousness whereof is to be judged, not by
the violence of the means employed, but by the result actually
produced; and as the wound which the appellant inflicted upon
the deceased was the cause which determined his death,
without his being able to counteract its effects, it is evident that
the act in question should be qualified as homicide, etc."
In the case of People vs. Almonte (56 Phil., 54), the abdominal
wound was less serious than that received by Aribuabo in this
case, as it was not penetrating, merely involving the muscular
tissue. In said case the death of the victim was due to a
secondary hemorrhage produced twenty-four hours after the
wound had been inflicted, because of the "bodily movements of
the patient, who was in a state of nervousness, sitting up in
bed, getting up and pacing about the room, as as a
consequence of which he internal vessels, already congested
because of the wound, bled, and the hemorrhage thus
produced caused his death." The court in deciding the question
stated that "when a person dies in consequence of an internal
hemorrhage brought on by moving about against the doctor's
orders, not because of carelessness or a desire to increase the
criminal liability of his assailant, but because of his nervous
condition due to the wound inflicted by said assailant, the crime
is homicide and not merely slight physical injuries, simply
because the doctor was of the opinion that the wound might
have healed in seven days."
The grounds for this rule of jurisprudence are correctly set forth
in 13 R.C.L., 751, as follows:
While the courts may have vacilated from time to time
it may be taken to be settled rule of the common law
that on who inflicts an injury on another will be held
responsible for his death, although it may appear that
the deceased might have recovered if he had taken
proper care of himself, or submitted to a surgical
operation, or that unskilled or improper treatment
aggravated the wound and contributed to the death,
or that death was immediately caused by a surgical
operation rendered necessary by the condition of the
wound. The principle on which this rule is founded is
one of universal application, and lies at the foundation
of the criminal jurisprudence. It is, that every person is
to be held to contemplate and to be responsible for
the natural consequences of his own acts. If a person
inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a
manner as to put life in jeopardy, and death follows as
a consequence of this felonious and wicked act, it
does not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to

prove that other causes co-operated in producing the


fatal result. Indeed, it may be said that neglect of the
wound or its unskillful and improper treatment, which
are of themselves consequences of the criminal act,
which might naturally follow in any case, must in law
be deemed to have been among those which were in
contemplation of the guilty party, and for which he is
to be held responsible. But, however, this may be, the
rule surely seems to have its foundation in a wise and
practical policy. A different doctrine would tend to give
immunity to crime and to take away from human life a
salutary and essential safeguard. Amid the conflicting
theories of the medical men, and the uncertainties
attendant upon the treatment of bodily ailments and
injuries, it would be easy in many cases of homicide
to raise a doubt as to the immediate cause of death,
and thereby to open a wide door by which persons
guilty of the highest crime might escape conviction
and punishment.
Assuming that we should disregard Simeon Cacpal's
testimony, there is no evidence of record that the crime
charged was committed by means of the knife, Exhibit A, and
we only have the extrajudicial admission of the accused that he
had committed it by means of a bamboo spit with which the
wound of the deceased might have been caused because,
according to the physician who testified in this case, it was
produced by a "sharp and penetrating" instrument.
Inasmuch as the mitigating circumstances of lack of instruction
and of intention to commit so grave a wrong as the committed
should be taken into consideration in favor of the appellant,
without any aggravating circumstances adverse to him, we
modify the appealed judgment by sentencing him to an
indeterminate penalty with a minimum of four years of prision
correccional and a maximum of a eight years of prision mayor,
affirming it in all other respect, with cost to said appellant.

URBANO v IAC (GR 72964; January 7, 1988)

Facts:
On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his
way to his ricefield. He found the place where he stored palay
flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal. Urbano
went to the elevated portion to see what happened, and there
he saw Marcelino Javier and Emilio Efre cutting grass. Javier
admitted that he was the one who opened the canal. A quarrel
ensued, and Urbano hit Javier on the right palm with his bolo,
and again on the leg with the back of the bolo. On October 27,
1980, Urbano and Javier had an amicable settlement. Urbano
paid P700 for the medical expenses of Javier. On November
14, 1980, Urbano was rushed to the hospital where he had
lockjaw and convulsions. The doctor found the condition to be
caused by tetanus toxin which infected the healing wound in
his palm. He died the following day. Urbano was charged with
homicide and was found guilty both by the trial court and on
appeal by the Court of Appeals. Urbano filed a motion for new
trial based on the affidavit of the Barangay Captain who stated
that he saw the deceased catching fish in the shallow irrigation
canals on November 5. The motion was denied; hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the
proximate cause of the latters death
Held:
A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is... "that cause,
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred."And more
comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that acting first
and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous
chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable
result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances
that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable
ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom."
If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already
infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically
probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild
cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared
on the 22nd dayafter the hacking incident or more than 14
days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time
should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on
the second day from theonset time. The more credible
conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by
the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was
not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been
infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering
the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could
have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22
days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct,
natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon
him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal
conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's
death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt.
The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility
that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient
intervening cause later or between the time Javier was
wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore,
distinct and foreign to the crime.
There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause
and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary
precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause
of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. "A
prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if
such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition

or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made


possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote
cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and
efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not
have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger
existed in the condition except because of the independent
cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an
independent negligent act or defective condition sets into
operation the instances which result in injury because of the
prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is
the proximate cause."

People v Domasian

GR No. 95322 ; March 1, 1993


FACTS:
March 11, 1982 morning: While Enrico was walking with
Tirso Ferreras, his classmate, along Roque street in the
poblacion of Lopez, Quezon, he was approached by Pablito
Domasian who requested his assistance in getting his father's
signature on a medical certificate. Enrico agreed to help and
rode with the man in a tricycle to Calantipayan, where he
waited outside while the man went into a building to get the
certificate. Enrico became apprehensive and started to cry
when, instead of taking him to the hospital, the man flagged a
minibus and forced him inside, holding him firmly all the while.
The man told him to stop crying or he would not be returned to
his father. When they alighted at Gumaca, they took another
tricycle, this time bound for the municipal building from where
they walked to the market. Here the man talked to a jeepney
driver and handed him an envelope addressed to Dr. Enrique
Agra, the boy's father. The two then boarded a tricycle headed
for San Vicente. As Enrico was crying and being firmly held,
Alexander Grate, the tricycle driver became suspicious and
asked Domasian about his relationship with the boy who told
him they were brothers. Their physical differences and the
wide gap between their ages made Grate doubt so he
immediately reported the matter to two barangay tanods when
his passengers alighted from the tricycle. Grate and the
tanods went after the two and saw the man dragging the boy.
Noticing that they were being pursued, Domasian was able to
escape, leaving Enrico behind. Enrico was on his way home in
a passenger jeep when he met his parents, who were riding in
the hospital ambulance and already looking for him.
At about 1:45 in the afternoon of the same day, after
Enrico's return, Agra received an envelope containing a
ransom note. The note demanded P1 million for the release of
Enrico and warned that otherwise the boy would be killed. Agra
thought the handwriting in the note was familiar. After
comparing it with some records in the hospital, he gave the
note to the police, which referred it to the NBI for examination
March 11, 1982 1:45 pm: Agra received an envelope
containing a ransom note demanding P1 million otherwise
Enrico will be killed. . Agra thought the handwriting in the note
was familiar so he referred it to the NBI for examination and it
turned out to be Dr. Samson Tans signature.
Domasian and Tan were subsequently charged with the
crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention in the
Regional
Trial
Court
of
Quezon
o Domasians alibi: at the time of the incident he was
watching a mahjong game in a friend's house and later went to
an optical clinic with his wife for the refraction of his eyeglasses
o
Dr.
Tans
alibi:
he
was
in
Manila
Enrico, Tirso Ferreras and Grate all pointed Domasian.
RTC: Domasian and Tan guilty as charged and sentenced
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and all
accessory
penalties

Appealed
ISSUE: W/N Domasian and Tan is guilty of kidnapping
kidnapping
with
serious
illegal
detention
HELD:
YES.
appealed
decision
is
AFFIRMED
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention may
consist not only in placing a person in an enclosure but also in
detaining him or depriving him in any manner of his liberty
Tan claims that the lower court erred in not finding that the
sending of the ransom note was an impossible crime which he
says
is
not
punishable.
Tan conveniently forgets the first paragraphs of the same
article,
which
clearly
applies
to
him,
thus:
Art. 4. Criminal liability. Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
Even before the ransom note was received, the crime of
kidnapping with serious illegal detention had already been
committed. The act cannot be considered an impossible crime
because there was no inherent improbability of its
accomplishment or the employment of inadequate or
ineffective means. The sending of the ransom note would have
had the effect only of increasing the penalty to death under the
last paragraph of Article 267 although this too would not have
been possible under the new Constitution.

On the issue of conspiracy, we note first that it exists when


two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it, whether they
act through physical volition of one or all, proceeding severally
or collectively. These acts were complementary to each other
and geared toward the attainment of the common ultimate
objective, viz., to extort the ransom of P1 million in exchange
for
Enrico's
life.
The motive for the offense is not difficult to discover.
According to Agra, Tan approached him 6 days before the
incident happened and requested a loan of at least
P15,000.00. Agra said he had no funds at that moment and
Tan did not believe him, angrily saying that Agra could even
raise a million pesos if he really wanted to help.

People v Marco
GR Nos L-28324-5; May 19, 1978
FACTS:
November 5, 1964 2:30 pm: It was raining and there was a
fiesta being celebrated within the vicinity of the market place of
Barrio Subang, Pagadian, Zamboanga del Sur. Constancio
Sabelbero was approached by Simeon Marco who asked him if
he was the one who boxed the latter's brother the previous
year. Constancio denied. Then Simeon asked if he had
cigarettes and when he said he had none, Simeon said, "I have
cigarettes; here is my cigarette", as he pulled out a one-foot
long hunting knife. Frightened, Constancio ran away and
Simeon chased him. As Constancio was passing by Rafael
Marco, father of Simeon, he struck Constancio with a round
cane, hitting him on the left ear and left shoulder.
Vicente, the father of Constancio, who was in the crowd
heard a shout of "Fight! Fight!". He saw Simeon about to stab
Constancio, so he grabbed the hand of Simeon that was
holding the knife. Then, Rafael Marco approached him armed
with a cane and a hunting knife. Sensing danger, Vicente
shouted to Constancio and his other son Bienvenido, who
appeared on the scene, to run away. Vicente and Constancio
was able to run away but Bienvenido was chased and stabbed
by Rafael which wounded his left hand. Bienvenido tried to run
Vicente, but his foot got caught in a vine on the ground and he
fell. Out of nowhere, Dulcisimo Beltran, who was accused
arrived and stabbed Bienvenido near his anus while he had his
two hands touching the floor and both feet in a forward
position. Beltran was followed by Simeon who stabbed
Bienvenido on the left breast and the upper part of the left
arm. Then, Rafael, Simeon and Beltran ran away. Bienvenido
got up slowly and walked zigzagly towards the store of Pinda
where he fell to the ground. Vicente asked him what happened
and he said he was ganged up then died.
Criminal Case No. 2758: Rafael Marco was convicted of
slight physical injuries and his son, Simeon, was acquitted
Criminal Case No, 2757: Rafael Marco, Dulcisimo Beltran,
and Simeon Marco, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder, qualified by abuse of superior strength.
Sentenced Rafael Marco to reclusion perpetua. While,
Dulcisimo Beltran and Simeon Marco who surrendered
voluntarily sentenced EACH to an indeterminate penalty
consisting of 10 YEARS and 1 DAY of prision mayor, as
minimum, to 17 YEARS, 4 MONTHS, and 1 DAY of reclusion
temporal
as
maximum
ISSUE: W/N Rafael Marco should be guilty of murder.
HELD: NO. modified Rafael Marco guilty of slight physical
injuries
while it is true that Rafael started by stabbing Bienvenido on
the left hand, there is no clear evidence connecting his act with
those of Beltran and Simeon. If Rafael had any intention to
really kill Bienvenido, he did not have to await for Simeon and
Beltran
to
do
it.
The stabbing by the 3 was not simultaneous. Rather, it was
successive. The manner in which the incident occurred
indicates that there was no pre-conceived plan among the 3.
There is absolutely no showing that Rafael knew of the criminal
intentions of Dulcisimo Beltran or Simeon Marco as to the
decedent. Neither is there any showing that after the decedent
was able to run away that Rafael shouted to Dulcisimo Beltran
or Simeon Marco for assistance. Or that he gave them any
inciting or encouraging words, or that he even joined them
The accused must be shown to have had guilty participation
in the criminal design entertained by the slayer, and this
presupposes knowledge on his part of such criminal design. It
is not enough that there be a relation between the acts done by
the principal and those attributed to the person charged as coprincipal or accomplice; it is furthermore, necessary that the
latter, with knowledge of the former's criminal intent, should
cooperate with moral or material aid in the consummation of
the
crime.
The ensuing death was not the direct, natural and logical
consequence of the wound inflicted by Rafael. There was an
active intervening cause, which was no other than the sudden
and appearance and participation of Simeon Marco and
Beltran.

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