Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
2.
3.
Does the trial courts decision adopting the compromise agreement partake the nature of
judicial confirmation of the separation of property between Miguel and Carlina and the
termination of their conjugal partnership?
4.
Can Kristophers status and claim as an illegitimate son and heir be adjudicated in an
ordinary civil action for recovery of ownershipand possession?
5.
Held:
1. The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The provision of
law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation when a man
and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda contracted
marriage on July 15, 1973, said union was patently void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and
Carlina was still susbsisting and unaffected by the latters de facto separation.
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision, in
contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and
household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no
salary or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be
no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.
Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy and sell and had
a sari-sari store. Worth noting is the fact that on the date of conveyance, May 17, 1973, she was only
around 22 years of age and Miguel was already 64 and a pensioner of the U.S. Government.
Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she contributed P3,750.00 as
her share in the purchase price of subject property, there being no proof of the same.
In the nature of an afterthought, Erlinda claims that the riceland was bought 2 months before she and
Miguel actually cohabited to exclude their case from the operation of Article 148 of the Family Code.
Proof of the precise date when they commenced their adulterous cohabitationnot having been
adduced, we cannot state definitively that the riceland was purchased even before they started living
together. In any case, even assuming that the subject property was bought before cohabitation, the
rules of co-ownership would still apply and proof of actual contribution would still be essential.
Since Erlinda failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland, there is
no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Consequently, the riceland should
revert to the conjugal partnership property of Miguel and Carlina.
2. With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00 on September
23, 1975 when she was only 22 years old. The testimony of the notary public who prepared the deed
of conveyance for the property reveals the falsehood of this claim. Atty. Constantino Sagun testified
that Miguel provided the money for the purchase price and directed that Erlindas name alone be
placed as the vendee. The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one
which was clearly void and inexistent by Article 739 of the Civil Code because it was made
between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation. Moreover, Article 87 of
the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses now
applies to donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, for
otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal
union.
3. No. Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except
by judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation in the marriage
settlements. The judgment which resulted from the parties compromise was not specifically and
expressly for separation of property and should not be so inferred.
4. No. Questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof of filiation of illegitimate children and
the determination of the estate of the latter and claims thereto should be ventilated in the
proper probate court or in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose and cannot be adjudicated in
the
instant
ordinary
civil
action
which
is
for
recovery
of ownership and
possession.
5. No. Kristopher, not having been impleaded, was not a party to the case at bar. His mother, Erlinda,
cannot be called his guardian ad litem for he was not involved in the case at bar. (Erlinda Agapay vs.
Carlina Palang, G.R. No. 116668, July 28 1997).
4. MAXEY V. CA
Nature:
Action to annul sale of properties and recovery thereof
Date: 11 May 1984
DOCTRINE: A common law wife owns property in common with herhusband because of her
contribution to the marriage, which need not come inmonetary form.
FACTS:Relevant Provision of Law:
Art. 144 of the Civil Code
Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales started living together in 1903 but were only married in a
military fashion. However, they had a church wedding in 1919. The properties in dispute were
acquired in 1911 and 1912.In 1919, Regina died. Melbourne remarried and in 1953, his second wife
Julia (using a power of attorney) sold the properties to private respondents spouses Macayra. Julia is of
the belief that said properties were exclusive to Melbourne. Petitioners are children of Melbourne and
Regina. They seek the annulment of the above sale and recovery of possession. They allege that such
properties were conjugal properties of their parents marriage as they were bought with their joint
effort and capital. The trial court ruled for the petitioners, while the CA found otherwise.
ISSUES:(1)
W/N Melbourne and Regina were married in 1903 in military fashion
RULING:
Act No. 3613 recognizing military marriages was only enacted in1929. The military wedding did not
make a valid marriage. They were only legally married in 1919.
(2)
W/N the properties in question were conjugal or exclusive to Melbourne
RULING:
They were conjugal property. The CA disputed the application of Art. 144 of the Civil Code because it
could not be applied retroactively in prejudice of vested rights. But even if Art. 144
When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from
the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
did apply, the CA is of the view that the property could not have been acquired by the spouses joint
efforts because this pertains to monetary contributions and Regina was a mere housewife. SC rules
otherwise. It applies Article 144 retroactively because no vested rights of Melbourne were impaired
because there exists a concurrent right of Regina or her heirs to a share of the properties in question.
The disputed properties were owned in common by Melbourne and the estate of his late wife Regina
when they were sold. Art. 144 recognizes that it would be unjust to require a woman who is a wife in all
aspects of the relationship except for the requirement of a valid marriage to abandon her home and
children, neglect her traditional household duties, and go out to earn a living or engage in business
before the rules on co-ownership would apply. It does not matter that she made no monetary
contribution, for the "real contribution" to the acquisition of property must include not only the
earnings of a woman but also her contribution to the family's material and spiritual goods through
caring for the children, administering the household, husbanding scarce resources, freeing her
husband from household tasks, and otherwise performing the traditional duties of a housewife.
But given that the properties were owned in common by the spouses, Julias sale over Melbournes
share is valid. Petitioners should return one-half of the purchase price of the land to private
respondents while the latter should pay some form of rentals for their use of one-half of the properties.
5. GONZALES VS GONZALES
G.R. No. 159521 December 16 2005 [Article 147-Property Regime of void marriage]
FACTS:
After two years of living together, Francisco and Erminda got married in 1979. Four children were born
from this union. During the time they lived together, they acquired properties, and Erlinda managed
their pizza business.
In 1992, She prays for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage based on Mario's alleged
psychological incapacity, and for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains. During the time
they lived together, they acquired properties. She managed their pizza business and worked hard for
its development. Mario denied she was the one who managed the pizza business and claimed that he
exclusively owns the properties "existing during their marriage."
In 1997 the trial court rendered its decision, rendered its judgment and ordered the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains and divide the conjugal properties between Francisco and Erminda. Not
satisfied with the manner their properties were divided, Francisco appealed to the CA, which in turn
affirmed the trial court decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Fransisco exclusively own the properties existing during their marriage.
RULING:
No. SC held that the Francisco and Erminda are co-owners of the properties in question. The marriage
of Fransisco and Erminda is declared void ab initio by the trial court which was later affirmed by the
CA. Consequently, their properties shall be governed by the provisions of Article 147 of the Family
Code.
These provisions enumerate the two instances when the property relations between spouses shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership. These are: (1) when a man and woman capacitated to marry
each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage; and
(2) when a man and woman live together under a void marriage.
Under this property regime of co-ownership, properties acquired by both parties during their union, in
the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of
the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares.
Article 147 creates a presumption that properties acquired during the cohabitation of the parties have
been acquired through their joint efforts, work or industry and shall be owned by them in equal
shares. It further provides that a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of
any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
properties in common in equal shares. Being herself a co-owner of the structure in question,
respondent, as correctly ruled by the CA, may not be ejected therefrom.
V. FAMILY
1. Article 151 Members of Family
SPOUSES MANUEL and ROSEMARIE WEE vs. ROSARIO D. GALVEZG.R. No. 147394.August 11,
2004
Facts:
Petitioner Rosemarie Wee and respondent Rosario D. Galvez are sisters.[3] Rosemarie lives with her
husband, petitioner Manuel Wee, in Balanga, Bataan, while Rosario resides in New York, U.S.A. The
present controversy stemmed from an investment agreement between the two sisters, which had gone
sour along the way. On April 20, 1999, Rosario, represented by Grace Galvez as her attorney-in-fact,
filed a complaint before the RTC of Quezon City to collect a sum of money from Manuel and Rosemarie
Wee. The amount for collection was US$20,000 at the exchange rate of P38.30 per dollar. The
complaint, which was docketed, alleged that Rosario and Rosemarie entered into an agreement
whereby Rosario would send Rosemarie US$20,000, half of said amount to be deposited in a savings
account while the balance could be invested in the money market. The interest to be earned therefrom
would be given to Rosarios son, Manolito Galvez, as his allowance. Rosario claimed that pursuant to
their agreement, she sent to Rosemarie on various dates in 1993 and 1994, five Chemical Bank
checks. However, sometime in1995, Rosario asked for the return of the US$20,000 and for an
accounting. Rosemarie promised to comply with the demand but failed to do so. In January 1999,
Rosario, through her attorney-in-fact, Grace Galvez, sent Rosemarie a written demand for her
US$20,000 and an accounting. Again, Rosemarie ignored the demand, thus causing Rosario to file suit.
On May 18, 1999, the Wees moved to dismiss Civil Case on the following grounds: (1) the lack
of allegation in the complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made in accordance
with Article 151[5] of the Family Code; (2) failure to state a valid cause of action, the action being
premature in the absence of previous earnest efforts toward a compromise; and (3) the certification
against forum shopping was defective, having been executed by an attorney-in-fact and not the
plaintiff, as required by Rule 7, Section 5*6+ of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Wees opposed
Rosarios motion to have the Amended Complaint admitted.
Issues:
1) WHETHER OR NOT THE AMENDED COMPLAINT BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTSUFFICIENTY
STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS
2) WHETHER OR NOT THE CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING EXECUTED BY THE PLAINTIFFS
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT IS DEFECTIVE
Held:
Petitioners submit that the amended complaint in Civil Case No. Q-99-37372 violates Rule 8, Section 1
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as there is no plain and direct statement of the ultimate facts on
which the plaintiff relies for her claim. Specifically, petitioners contend that the allegation of the
amended complaint that Earnest efforts towards have been made but the same have failed is clearly
insufficient. The sentence is incomplete, thus requires the reader of the pleading to engage in
deductions or inferences in order to get a complete sense of the cause of action, according to
petitioners. Under Article 151 of the Family Code, a suit between members of the same family shall
not be entertained, unless it is alleged in the complaint or petition that the disputants have made
earnest efforts to resolve their differences through compromise, but these efforts have not
succeeded. The attempt to compromise as well as its failure or inability to succeed is a condition
precedent to the filing of a suit between members of the same family. Petition DENIED for lack of merit.
Costs against the petitioners
2.
3. Martinez vs Martinez
GR No. 162084, June 28, 2005
FACTS:
Daniel Martinez Sr. and Natividad de Guzman-Martinez were the owners of a parcel of land. The former
executed a last will and testament directing the subdivision of the property into 3 lots bequeathed to
each of his sons namely Rodolfo, Manolo (designated as administrator of the estate), and Daniel Jr. In
October 1997, Daniel Sr. died. Rodolfo then found a deed of sale purportedly signed by his father on
September 1996 where it appears that the land was sold to Manolo and his wife Lucila and was also
issued to them. Rodolfo filed a complaint against his brother Manolo and sister-in-law Lucila for the
annulment of the deed of sale and cancellation of the TCT. Spouses wrote Rodolfo demanding him to
vacate the property which the latter ignored and refused to do so. This prompted the spouses to file a
complaint for unlawful detainer against Rodolfo. This matter was referred to the barangay for
conciliation and settlement but none was reached. It was alleged in the position paper of the spouses
that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made but the same proved futile.
ISSUE: WON spouses Martinez complied with the requirements of Art 151 of the Family Code.
HELD:
No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified
complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but the same have failed.
Lucila Martinez, the respondents sister-in-law was one of the plaintiffs in the case at bar. The
petitioner is not a member of the same family as that of her deceased husband and the respondent.
Her relationship with the respondent is not one of those enumerated in Article 150. It should also be
noted that the petitioners were able to comply with the requirements of Article 151 because they
alleged in their complaint that they had initiated a proceeding against the respondent for unlawful
detainer in the katarungan Pambarangay in compliance with PD1508 and that after due proceedings,
no amicable settlement was arrived at resulting in the barangay chairmans issuance of a certificate to
file action.
4. SANTOS VS CA
NICANOR T. SANTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CONSUELAO T. SANTOS-GUERRERO and
ANDRES GUERRERO
G.R. No. 134787
Facts:
Petitioner Nicanor T. Santos and private respondent Consuelo T. Santos-Guerrero are brother and
sister, born to spouses Urbano Santos and Candelaria Santos, now both deceased. Sometime in 1956,
Nicanor, Consuelo and eight of their siblings, executed a "Basic Agreement of Partition" covering
properties they inherited from their parents.
Two years later, Consuelo, joined by her husband, herein respondent Andres Guerrero
(collectively, the "Guerreros"), filed suit with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal against
petitioner Nicanor and two (2) other brothers, for recovery of inheritance.
Issue: Article 222 of the New Civil Code in relation to Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court has no
application
Ruling:
A lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers. Thus, the
provision making honest efforts towards a settlement a condition precedent for the maintenance of an
action between members of the same family. As it were, a complaint in ordinary civil actions involving
members of the same family must contain an allegation that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made pursuant to Article 222 of the Civil Code, now pursuant to Article 151 of the Family
Code. Otherwise, the complaint may be dismissed under Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.
Admittedly, the complaint filed in this case contains no such allegation. But a complaint otherwise
defective on that score may be cured by the introduction of evidence effectively supplying the
necessary averments of a defective complaint.
July 9, 2008
Facts:
Petitioner Auther G. Kelley, Jr. (Auther) acquired agricultural chemical products on consignment
from respondent Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) in 1989. Due to Authers failure to pay despite demand,
PPI filed an action for sum of money against him in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. After trial on
the merits, the RTC Makati City decided in favor of PPI and issued a writ of execution. After being
belatedly informed of the said sale, petitioners Auther and his wife Doris A. Kelley filed a motion to
dissolve or set aside the notice of levy in the RTC Makati City on the ground that the subject property
was their family home which was exempt from execution.
Issue: Whether or not the subject property is the family home of the petitioners.
Ruling:
Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the family home judicially or
extrajudicially. All family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code (August 3, 1988)
are constituted as such by operation of law. All existing family residences as of August 3, 1988 are
considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home
under the Family Code.
The exemption is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such and lasts
as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. Moreover, the debts for which the family
home is made answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. Otherwise (that is, if it was
incurred prior to August 3, 1988), the alleged family home must be shown to have been constituted
either judicially or extrajudicially pursuant to the Civil Code.
The rule, however, is not absolute. The Family Code, in fact, expressly provides for the following
exceptions: Article 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
except: (1) For non-payment of taxes; (2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family
home; (3) For debts secured by a mortgage on the premises before or after such constitution; and (4)
For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material men and others who have rendered
service or furnished material for the construction of the building.
7. Manacop vs CA
GR No. 104875, November 13, 1992
FACTS:
Florante Manacop and his wife Euaceli purchased on March 1972, a residential lot with a bungalow
located in Quezon City. The petitioner failed to pay the sub-contract cost pursuant to a deed of
assignment signed between petitioners corporation and private respondent herein (FF Cruz & Co).
The latter filed a complaint for the recovery for the sum of money with a prayer for preliminary
attachment against the former. Consequently, the corresponding writ for the provisional remedy was
issued which triggered the attachment of a parcel of land in Quezon City owned by the Manacop
Construction President, the petitioner. The latter insists that the attached property is a family home
having been occupied by him and his family since 1972 and is therefore exempt from attachment.
ISSUE: WON the subject property is indeed exempted from attachment.
HELD:
The residential house and lot of petitioner became a family home by operation of law under Article 153
of the Family Code. Such provision does not mean that said article has a retroactive effect such that
all existing family residences, petitioners included, are deemed to have been constituted as family
homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and henceforth, are
exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988. Since petitioner incurred debt in 1987, it preceded the effectivity of the Code
and his property is therefore not exempt form attachment.
The petition was dismissed by SC.
8.
9. Mondequillo vs Breva
GR. No. 86355, May 31, 1990
FACTS:
The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur on July
1988, registered in the name of Jose Mondequillo and a parcel of agricultural land located at
Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao de Sur also registered in the latters name. A motion to quash
was filed by the petitioner alleging that the residential land is where the family home is built since
1969 prior the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment under Article 152 and 153 except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that
the judgment sought to be enforced against the family home is not one of those enumerated. With
regard to the agricultural land, it is alleged that it is still part of the public land and the transfer in his
favor by the original possessor and applicant who was a member of a cultural minority. The residential
house in the present case became a family home by operation of law under Article 153.
ISSUE: WON the subject property is deemed to be a family home.
HELD:
The petitioners contention that it should be considered a family home from the time it was occupied
by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well-taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it provides
that the provisions of this Chapter shall govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are
applicable. It does not mean that Article 152 and 153 shall have a retroactive effect such that all
existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their
occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from the execution for payment
of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Code. The said article simply means that all
existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family
homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the FC. The
debt and liability which was the basis of the judgment was incurred prior the effectivity of the Family
Code. This does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the FC.
As to the agricultural land, trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made shall be on whatever
rights the petitioner may have on the land. Petition was dismissed.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners may be considered primary beneficiaries of the deceased for his
SSS pension and therefore entitled to the SSS death benefits.
Held: Only Jeylnn has sufficiently established her right to a monthly pension.
Jeylnns claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth certificate showing the signature of Pablo as her
father authenticating that Jeylnn was born on October 29, 1991. Records show that Rosanna and Pablo
were married on December 4, 1977 which continued, as far as the records are concerned, until the
death of Pablo on December 8, 1996. Based on the records, Jeylnn was born during the marriage of
Rosanna and Pablo. Since Jeylnn was conceived or born during the marriage of the parents, she is
considered legitimate.
Petitioner Rosanna married Romeo dela Pena during her marriage to Pablo. A wife who is already
separated de facto from her husband cannot be said to be dependent from support upon the
husband.
Even if the records show that the spouses adopted Janet, there were no legal papers to prove it. She
therefore does not qualify as a primary beneficiary
alive and living in Loyola Heights, QC. Trial court ruled that the son was an illegitimate child and the
custody was awarded to the wife while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. Theresa argued that
there was nothing in the law granting visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate
child. She further wanted to have the surname of the son changed from Concepcion to Almonte,
her maiden name, since an illegitimate child should use his mothers surname. After the requested
oral argument, trial court reversed its ruling and held the son to be not the son of Gerardo but of
Mario. Hence, the child was a legitimate child of Theresa and Mario.
HELD:
Considering that Theresas marriage with Gerardo was void ab initio, the latter never became the
formers husband and never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of the child. Theresas
contention was to have his son be declared as not the legitimate child of her and Mario but her
illegitimate child with Gerardo. In this case, the mother has no right to disavow a child because
maternity is never uncertain. Hence, she is not permitted by law to question the sons legitimacy.
Under Article 167 of the Family Code, the child shall be considered legitimate although the mother
may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. Having the
best interest of the child in mind, the presumption of his legitimacy was upheld by the Court. As a
legitimate child, the son shall have the right to bear the surnames of Mario and Theresa, in conformity
with the provisions of Civil Code on surnames. Gerardo cannot then impose his surname to be used by
the child, since in the eyes of the law, the child is not related to him in any way.
12.
13. De Jesus vs. Estate of Juan Gamboa Dizon
Facts:
Jinkie and Jacqueline are the legitimate children of spouses Danilo and Carolina. However, they were
acknowledged as an illegitimate children by Juan in a notarized document. Juan died.
Issue: Whether or not they are illegitimate children of Juan for the purpose of inheriting from him.
Ruling:
No, they are not. The issue whether the petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate children
of Juan cannot be adjudicated without an action having been first instituted to impugn their legitimacy
as being the children of Danilo and Carolina in a valid marriage.
14. Tison vs. CA
Facts: The petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are niece and nephew of the deceased Tedora
Dezoller Guerrero, who appears to be the sister of their father Hermogenes Dezoller . The present
action for reconveyance involves a parcel of land with a house and apartment which was originally
owned by the spouses Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. It. Teodora Dezoller Guerrero
died on March 5, 1983 without any ascendant or descendant, and was survived only by her husband,
Martin Guerrero, and herein petitioners. Petitioners' father, Hermogenes, died on October 3, 1973,
hence they seek to inherit from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of representation.
The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving spouse executed an
Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as sole heir, the land in
dispute. Martin sold the lot to herein private respondent Teodora Domingo and thereafter.
Martin Guerrero died. Subsequently, herein petitioners filed an action for reconveyance claiming that
they are entitled to inherit one-half of the property in question by right of representation. Tedoro
Domingo however, attacks the legitimacy of Hermogenes.
Issue: Whether or not a third person, not the father nor an heir, mayattack the legitimacy of
Hermogenes
Held: NO. the private respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of herein
petitioners. There is no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on
sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are
legitimate. And well settled is the rule that the issue oflegitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the one directly
confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he should decide
whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is
only in exceptional cases that his heir are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases,
none even his heirs can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his memory.
In this jurisdiction, the result of blood tests, among other evidence, to, affirm paternity was dealt with
in Co Tao v. CA. In said case, the NBI expert"s report of the blood tests stated that "from their blood
groups and types, the defendant Co Tao is a possible father of the child." From this statement the
defendant contended that the child must have been the child of another man. The Court noted: "For
obvious reasons, the NBI expert cannot give assurance that the appellant was the father of the child;
he can only give his opinion that he is a "possible father." This possibility, coupled with the other facts
and circumstances brought out during the trial, tends to definitely establish that appellant is the father
of the child."
Where the issue is admissibility and conclusiveness of blood grouping tests to disprove paternity,
rulings have been much more definite in their conclusions. For the past three decades, the use of blood
typing in cases of disputed parentage has already become an important legal procedure. There is now
almost universal scientific agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity,
although inconclusive as to paternity that is, the fact that the blood type of the child is a possible
product of the mother and alleged father does not conclusively prove that the child is born by such
parents; but, if the blood type of the child is not the possible blood type when the blood of the mother
and that of the alleged father are crossmatched, then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged
father.
In the United States jurisdiction, the admissibility of blood tests results to prove non-paternity has
already been passed upon in several cases. The positive results of blood tests excluding paternity, in a
case in which it was shown that proper safeguards were drawn around the testing procedures, were
recognized as final on the question of paternity (Gilpin v. Gilpin). Evidence of non-paternity consisting
of the result of blood grouping tests was admitted despite a finding that the alleged father had
cohabited with the mother within the period of gestation (Cuneo v. Cuneo). The Court said that the
competent medical testimony was overwhelmingly in favor of the plaintiff, and to reject such
testimony would be tantamount to rejecting scientific fact.
17.
18.
19. ILANO v. CA
G.R. No. 104376 February 23, 1994
FACTS:
Leoncia first met petitioner Artemio G. Ilano while she was working as secretary to Atty. Mariano C.
Virata.
Leoncia, then managing a business of her own as Namarco distributor, met petitioner again. Later,
he courted her more than four years. Their relationship became intimate and with his promise of
marriage, they eloped.
While they were living at Makati, private respondent Merceditas S. Ilano was born Her birth was
recorded as Merceditas de los Santos Ilano, child of Leoncia Aguinaldo de los Santos and Artemio
Geluz Ilano. Inasmuch as it was already past seven o'clock in the evening, the nurse promised to
return the following morning for his signature. However, he left an instruction to give birth
certificate to Leoncia for her signature, as he was leaving early the following morning.
During the time that petitioner and Leoncia were living as husband and wife, he showed concern
as the father of Merceditas. When Merceditas was in Grade I at the St. Joseph Parochial School, he
signed her Report Card for the fourth and fifth grading periods.
CA REVERSED RTC judgment declaring plaintiff MERCEDITAS S. ILANO as the duly acknowledged
and recognized illegitimate child.
ISSUE: W/N MERCEDITAS S. ILANO is the duly acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child.
HELD: Petition is DENIED. CA affirmed.
YES.
Under the then prevailing provisions of the Civil Code, illegitimate children or those who are
conceived and born out of wedlock were generally classified into: (1) Natural, whether actual or by
fiction, were those born outside of lawful wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the
child, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other (2) Spurious, whether
incestuous, were disqualified to marry each other on account of certain legal impediments. Since
petitioner had a subsisting marriage to another at the time Merceditas was conceived, she is a
spurious child. Rights of an illegitimate child arose not because he was the true or real child of his
parents but because under the law, he had been recognized or acknowledged as such a child. A
recognition once validly made is irrevocable. It cannot be withdrawn. A mere change of mind would
be incompatible with the stability of the civil status of person, the permanence of which affects
public interest. Even when the act in which it is made should be revocable, the revocation of such
act will not revoke the recognition itself. To be sure, to establish "the open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child," it is necessary to comply with certain
jurisprudential requirements. "Continuous" does not, however, mean that the concession of status
shall continue forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues
(De Jesus v. Syquia, 58 Phil. 866). The possession of such status means that the father has treated
the child as his own, directly and not through other, spontaneously and without concealment
though without publicity (since the relation is illegitimate). There must be a showing of the
permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his own, by continuous and
clear manifestation of paternal affection and care.
The mere denial by defendant of his signature is not sufficient to offset the totality of the evidence
indubitably showing that the signature thereon belongs to him. The entry in the Certificate of Live
Birth that Leoncia and Artemio was falsely stated therein as married does not mean that
Merceditas is not appellee's daughter. This particular entry was caused to be made by Artemio
himself in order to avoid embarrassment.
It is difficult to believe that plaintiffs mother, who is a mere dressmaker, had long beforehand
diabolically conceived of a plan to make it appear that defendant, who claims to be a total stranger
to be a total stranger, was the father of her child, and in the process falsified the latter's signatures
and handwriting.
The natural, logical and coherent evidence of plaintiff from the genesis of the relationship between
Leoncia and appellee, their living together as circumstances of plaintiff's birth, the acts of appellee
in recognizing and supporting plaintiff, find ample support from the testimonial and documentary
evidence which leaves no room to reasonably doubt his paternity which may not be infirmed by his
belated denials.
Any other evidence or proof that the defendant is the father is broad enough to render
unnecessary the other paragraphs of this article. When the evidence submitted in the action for
compulsory recognition is not sufficient to meet requirements of the first three paragraphs, it may
still be enough under the last paragraph. This paragraph permits hearsay and reputation evidence,
as provided in the Rules of Court, with respect to illegitimate filiatio
As a necessary consequence of the finding that private respondent is the spurious child of
petitioner, she is entitled to support. In awarding support to her, respondent court took into
account the following:
The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to
recover the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial
or extrajudicial demand.
The complaint in this case was filed on August 14, 1972. Plaintiff, having been born on December
30, 1963, was about 9 years old at the time and was already of school age spending about
P400.00 to P500.00 a month for her school expenses alone, while defendant was earning about
P10,000.00 a month. She is therefore entitled to support in arrears for a period of 12 years, 4
months and 14 days, which is hereby fixed at P800.00 a month for the 1st 3 years; and considering
the declining value of the peso as well as her needs as she grows older, at a graduated increase of
P1,000.00 a month for the next 3 years; P1,300.00 a month for the succeeding 3 years; and
P1,500.00 a month for the last 3 years, 4 months and 14 days until she attained the age of
majority.
This being an action for legal support, the award of attorney's fees is appropriate under Article
2208 (6) of the Civil Code. Moreover, the court deems it just and equitable under the given facts
and circumstances that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.
23. MENDOZA VS CA
CECILIO MENDOZA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and LUISA DE LA ROSA
MENDOZA
G.R. No. L-23102
April 24, 1967
Facts:
In the complaint, private respondent, Luisa De La Rosa Mendoza averred that she was married to
Cecilio Mendoza on 2 September 1953, that they lived together as husband and wife until 14 July 1954,
when the husband departed for the United States to further his studies and practice his profession.
Since then, defendant Mendoza, without justifiable cause or reason deliberately abandoned and
neglected plaintiff and despite repeated demands by plaintiff, defendant has failed and refused, and
still fails and refuses, to provide for the maintenance and support of plaintiff, who is allegedly to be
pregnant, sickly and without any source of revenue, while defendant (now petitioner) is employed in a
hospital in the United States.
Issue:
Whether or not the case at bar is covered under Article 151 where earnest efforts toward
compromise should first be made prior the filing of the petition, and invoking Article 222 of the New
Civil Code of the Philippines.
Ruling:
Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines requires that before a suit between members of
the same family (in this case between husband and wife) is filed or maintained, it must appear that
earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, and the only way to make it so appear when
the suit is filed is by a proper averment to that effect in the complaint. Since the law forbids a suit
being initiated filed or maintained unless such efforts at compromise appear, the showing that efforts
in question were made is a condition precedent to the existence of the cause of action. It follows that
the failure of the complaint to plead that plaintiff previously tried in earnest to reach a settlement out
of court renders it assailable for lack of cause of action and it may be so attacked at any stage of the
case even on appeal.
While the Supreme Court agree that petitioner's position represents a correct statement of the
general rule on the matter, we are nevertheless constrained to hold that the Court of Appeals and the
Court of First Instance committed no error in refusing to dismiss the complaint, for on its face, the
same involved a claim for future support that under Article 2035 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
cannot be subject of a valid compromise, and is, therefore, outside the sphere of application of Article
222 of the Code upon which petitioner relies. This appears from the last proviso of said Article 222,
future support.
24. Cruz vs. Cristobal GR. No. 140422 August 7, 2006
25. TIJING VS CA
G.R. No. 125901, March 8, 2001 [Habeas Corpus]
FACTS:
Edgardo and Bienvenida Tijing filed a petition for habeas corpus in order to recover their youngest
child, Edgardo Jr., whom they did not see for 4 years. Trial court granted the petition and ordered
Angelita Diamante to immediately release the child, now named John Thomas D. Lopez, and turn him
over to his parents. CA reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the lower court. It questioned
the propriety of the habeas corpus in this case.
ISSUE:Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy to regain custody of the minor.
RULING:
Yes. SC upheld the decision of the trial court.
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person
is deprived of his liberty, or by the rightful custody of any person withheld from the persons entitled
thereto. The writ of habeas corpus is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody
of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of his own free will. It must be
stressed out that in habeas corpus proceeding, the question of identity is relevant and material,
subject to the usual presumption, including those as identity of the person.
The trial court was correct in its judgment based on the evidence established by the parents and by
the witness who is the brother of the late common-law husband of Angelita. Furthermore, there are no
clinical records, log book or discharge from the clinic where John Thomas was allegedly born were
presented. Strong evidence directly proves that Thomas Lopez, Angela's "husband", was not capable of
siring a child. Moreover, his first marriage produced no offspring even after almost 15 years of living
together with his legal wife. His 14 year affair with Angelita also bore no offspring.
The birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez were attended by irregularities. It was filed by Thomas
Lopez, the alleged father. Under Sec. 4, Act No. 3753 (Civil Register Law), the attending physician or
midwife in attendance of the birth should cause the registration of such birth. Only in default of the
physician or midwife, can the parent register the birth of his child. Certificate must be filed with the
LCR within 30 days after the birth. The status of Thomas and Angelita on the birth certificate were
typed in as legally married, which is false because Angelita herself had admitted that she is a
"common-law wife."
Trial court also observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were both in court, the two
had strong similarities in their faces. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is
competent and material evidence to establish parentage. Lastly, the spouses presented clinical records
and testimony of the midwife who attended Bienvenida's childbirth.
2.
3.
4.
5.
whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests,
6.
The above test is derived from the Daubert Test which is a doctrine adopted from US jurisprudence
(Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.) The Daubert Test is a test to be employed by courts
before admitting scientific test results in evidence. More specifically, the Daubert Test inquires:
1.
2.
3.
4.
In this case, the Supreme Court declared that in filiation cases, before paternity inclusion can be had,
the DNA test result must state that the there is at least a 99.9% probability that the person is the
biological father. However, a 99.9% probability of paternity (or higher but never possibly a 100% )
does not immediately result in the DNA test result being admitted as an overwhelming evidence. It
does not automatically become a conclusive proof that the alleged father, in this case Herrera, is the
biological father of the child (Alba). Such result is still a disputable or a refutable evidence which can
be brought down if the Vallejo Guidelines are not complied with.
What if the result provides that there is less than 99.9% probability that the alleged father is the
biological father?
Then the evidence is merely corroborative.
Anent the issue of self-incrimination, submitting to DNA testing is not violative of the right against selfincrimination. The right against self-incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an exclusion of
evidence taken from his body when it may be material. There is no testimonial compulsion in the
getting of DNA sample from Herrera, hence, he cannot properly invoke self-incrimination.
Trial courts ruling: Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be
brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent to give the latter an opportunity to either affirm or
deny the childs filiation.
CA ruling: The rights of Adrian are governed under Article 285 of the Civil Code which allows an action
for recognition to be filed within 4 years after the child has attained the age of majority and that
subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take away his right.
ISSUE: Whether or not Adrian Bernabe may be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son.
HELD:
The Family Code makes no distinction on whether the former was still a minor when the latter died.
Thus, the putative parent is given by the new code a chance to dispute the claim, considering that
illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family
being aware of their existence.
Furthermore, the grounds or instances for the acknowledgment of natural children are utilized to
establish the filiation of spurious children.
Hence, the petition was denied and assailed decision was affirmed.
Issue:
Does mandamus lie to compel the Local Civil Registrar to register a certificate of live birth of an
illegitimate child using the alleged fathers surname where the latter admitted paternity?
Held:
No. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that illegitimate children shall use the
surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code.
This is the rule regardless of whether or not the father admits paternity. Consequently, the Local Civil
Registrar correctly refused to register the certificate of live birth of petitioners illegitimate child using
the surname of the alleged father, even with the latters consent. Of course, the putative father,
though a much married man, may legally adopt his own illegitimate child. In case of adoption, the
child shall be considered a legitimate child of the adopter, entitled to use his surname.
Mandamus will not lie to compel the local civil registrar to register the certificate of live birth of an
illegitimate child using the fathers surname, even with the consent of the latter. Mandamus does not
lie to compel the performance of an act prohibited by law. (Mossesgeld vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 111455. December 23, 1998)