1.

Case Digest: G. R. No. 105308. September 25, 1998

Herbert Cang, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals and Spouses Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Clavano,
respondents.
_______________________________________________________________________
Facts: Petitioner and Ana Marie Clavano were married and begot three children. Ana Marie upon learning of her
husband's illicit liaison file a petition for legal separation with alimony pendente lite which was approved. Petitioner
then left for the United States where he sought a divorce from Ana Marie. He was issued a divorce decree and
granted sole custody of the children to Ana Marie, reserving rights of visitation at all reasonable times and places to
petitioner. Private respondents who were the brother and sister-in-law of Ana Marie filed a petition for adoption of
the three minor Cang children. The trial court granted the petition for adoption. Ana Marie was the only parent who
gives consent to the adoption of their children. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Issue: Whether petitioner has abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the adoption necessary.
Ruling: The law is clear that either parent may lose parental authority over the child only for a valid reason. No such
reason was established in the legal separation case. Deprivation of parental authority is one of the effects of a
decree of adoption. But there cannot be a valid decree of adoption in this case precisely because the findings of the
lower courts on the issue of abandonment of facts on record. The petition for adoption must be denied as it was
filed without the required consent of their father who, by law and under the facts of the case at bar, has not
abandoned them.

2.

TAMARGO VS CA
G.R. No. 85044 June 3 1992

[Parental Authority]

FACTS:
In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, a minor, shot and killed Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle. Jennifer's natural
parents filed civil complaints for damages with the RTC against Bundoc's natural parents.
In December 1981, spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto. The petition was granted in November
1982.
Adelberto's parents, in their Answer, claimed that the spouses Rapisura were indispensable parties to the action
since parental authority had shifted to them from the moment the petition for adoption was decreed. Spouses
Tamargo contended that since Adelberto was then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had
not ceased by mere filing and granting of the petition for adoption. Trial court dismissed the spouses Tamargo's
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the spouses Rapisura are the indispensable parties to actions committed by Adelberto.
RULING:
No. In Article 221 of the Family Code states that: "Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be
civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in
their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defences provided by law." In the case
at bar, parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged with the natural parents at the time the shooting incident
happened. It follows that the natural parents are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
SC held that parental authority had not been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, at the
time the shooting happened. It do not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of the adoption so
as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the time when adopting parents had no actual
custody over the adopted child. Retroactive affect may be essential if it permit the accrual of some benefit or
advantage in favor of the adopted child.

3.

Sayson v. CA
G.R. Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992
TOPIC: Order of Intestate Succession
Old doctrine:

The relationship only exist between the adopted and the Adopting parent

Civil Status cannot be attacked collaterally

Adopted cannot represent their parents in succession

FACTS:
1.

The family tree:

2. In this case Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and the Mother of Isabel filed for probate of the Esatate of
Teodoro and Isabel. Edmundo, Delia and Doribel , oppose.
3. Edmundo, Delia and Doribel filed a probate for the Estate of Elenor and Rafaela.
4. The position of Mauricio et al. Edmundo and Delia cannot inherit from Teodoro and Isabel because they were not legally adopted. When Doribel
was born, 10 days before the court decree the adoption, Teodoro and Isabel became disqualified to adopt Edmundo
and Delia.
Doribel is not legitimate because she is the daughter of one Edita Abila, who manifested in a petition for
guardianship of the child that she was her natural mother.

ISSUE(S): Who can inherit from who

HELD: From, Elenor and Rafaela, ONLY DORIBEL ; From Teodoro, all the siblings
RATIO:
Mauricio's testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to Edita Abila was understandbly suspect, coming
as it did from an interested party. The affidavit of Abila denying her earlier statement in the petition for the
guardianship of Doribel is of course hearsay, let alone the fact that it was never offered in evidence in the lower
courts. Even without it, however, the birth certificate must be upheld in line with Legaspi v. Court of Appeals, where
we ruled that "the evidentiary nature of public documents must be sustained in the absence of strong, complete
and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity."
Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the impropriety of the present proceedings for that
purpose. Doribel's legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition and accounting but in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party.
The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code . . . does not have this purely evidential character. It serves a more
fundamental purpose. It actually fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be
attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose,
by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a
different purpose
In consequence of the above observations, we hold that Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel
Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the
deceased couple, conformably to the following Article 979 of the Civil Code:
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants, without distinction
as to sex or age, and even if they should come from different marriages.
An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the same manner as a legitimate child.
The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love descends first to his children and grandchildren before
it ascends to his parents and thereafter spreads among his collateral relatives. It is also supposed that one of his
purposes in acquiring properties is to leave them eventually to his children as a token of his love for them and as a
provision for their continued care even after he is gone from this earth.

4.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA

HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005
FACTS:
Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He prayed
that the child's middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mother's surname, and that her surname Garcia be
changed to Catindig, his surname.
Trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his legitimate child and heir, and pursuant to Art. 189 of
the Family Code, she is now known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration that Stephanie should be allowed to use the
surname Garcia as her middle name.
The Republic, through the OSG, agreed with Honorato for her relationship with her natural mother should be
maintained and preserved, to prevent any confusion and hardship in the future, and under Article 189 she remains
to be an intestate heir of her mother.
ISSUE: Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name.
RULING:
Yes. there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle
name her mothers surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, (An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use
The Surname Of Their Father) is silent as to what middle name a child may use. Article 365 of the CC merely
provides that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter. Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating
the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter.
Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) an legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, Stephanie is
entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right
to bear the surname of her father and her mother.

5.

Republic vs. Hernandez, GR No. 117209, February 9, 1996

(Special Proceedings Adoption: Change of Name)

Facts: The RTC granted the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran and simultaneously granted the
prayer therein for the change of the first name of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to complement the surname
Munson y Andrade which he acquired consequent to his adoption.
Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same petition for adoption objecting to the
joinder of the petition for adoption and the petitions for the change of name in a single proceeding, arguing that
these petition should be conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings.
Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special proceedings which,
in substance and purpose, are different from and are not related to each other, being respectively governed by
distinct sets of law and rules. Petitioner further contends that what the law allows is the change of the surname of
the adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform with that of the adopter and as a natural consequence of the adoption
thus granted. If what is sought is the change of the registered given or proper name, and since this would involve a
substantial change of ones legal name, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 should accordingly be
instituted, with the substantive and adjective requisites therefor being conformably satisfied.
Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for adoption with a prayer for change of name
predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2 which allows permissive joinder of causes of action in order to avoid multiplicity
of suits and in line with the policy of discouraging protracted and vexatious litigations. It is argued that there is no
prohibition in the Rules against the joinder of adoption and change of name being pleaded as two separate but
related causes of action in a single petition.
Issue: WON respondent judge erred in granting prayer for the change of the given or proper name if the adoptee in
a petition for adoption.
Held: No.
Par (1), Art. 189 of the Family Code provides one of the legal effect of adoption:
(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire
the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the
adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance
of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptees surname to follow that of the adopter which is the
natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically be contained in the order of the
court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner.
However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it was
originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a
license to change the adoptees registered Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely
upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor
an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in
this case, cannot properly be granted.
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name appearing therein. If a
change in ones name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive and
procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein
the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined.
A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the requirements therefor is
indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an independent and discrete
special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of
any other proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to
denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate remedy available under our remedial law system.
6.

Ching Leng vs Galang

7.

Reyes vs. Sotero, GR No. 167405, February 16, 2006_digested

(Special Proceedings Adoption)
Facts: Respondent Chichioco filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration and settlement of estate of
the late Elena Lising claiming that she was the niece and heir of Lising who died intestate. Respondent claims that
real and personal properties were allegedly in the possession of petitioner Ana Joyce S. Reyes, a grandniece of the
deceased.
Petitioner Reyes filed an Opposition to the petition, claiming that she was an adopted child of Lising and the latters
husband and asserting that the petition be dismissed since she was the only heir of Lising who passed away without
leaving any debts.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Supplement to the Opposition attaching thereto the certification of her adoption
from the local civil registrars office that the adoption decree was registered therein and also a copy of a Judicial
Form and a certification issued by the clerk of court that the decree was on file in the General Docket of the RTCTarlac.
Respondents filed a Comment to the opposition stating that reasonable doubts have been cast on Petitioners claim
that she was legally adopted due allegedly to certain badges of fraud.

The appellate court refused to dismiss the proceeding because it was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove before
the trial court that she was indeed adopted by the Delos Santos spouse since, imputations of irregularities
permeating the adoption decree render its authenticity under a cloud of doubt.
Issue: WON petitioner had to prove the validity of her adoption due to imputations of irregularities.
Held: No. Petitioner need not prove her legal adoption by any evidence other than those which she had already
presented before the trial court.
An adoption decree is a public document required by law to be entered into public records, the official repository of
which, as well as all other judicial pronouncements affecting the status of individuals, is the local civil registrars
office as well as the court which rendered the judgment.
Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated. As such, the certifications issued by the local civil registrar and the clerk
of court regarding details of petitioners adoption which are entered in the records kept under their official custody,
are prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. These certifications suffice as proof of the fact of
petitioners adoption by the Delos Santos spouses until contradicted or overcome by sufficient evidence. Mere
imputations of irregularities will not cast a cloud of doubt on the adoption decree since the certifications and its
contents are presumed valid until proof to the contrary is offered.

8.

Quimiguing vs Icao
CITATION: 34 SCRA 132
FACTS:
Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant, were neighbors in Dapitan City and had close and
confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was married, he succeeded to have carnal intercourse with plaintiff
several times under force and intimidation and without her consent. As a result, Carmen became pregnant despite
drugs supplied by defendant and as a consequence, Carmen stopped studying. Plaintiff claimed for support at P120
per month, damages and attorneys fees. The complaint was dismissed by the lower court in Zamboanga del Norte
on the ground lack of cause of action. Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint that as a result of the intercourse,
she gave birth to a baby girl but the court ruled that no amendment was allowable since the original complaint
averred no cause of action.
ISSUE: Whether plaintiff has a right to claim damages.
HELD:
Supreme Court held that a conceive child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its
own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The
conceive child may also receive donations and be accepted by those persons who will legally represent them if they
were already born as prescribed in Article 742.
Lower courts theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that support is an obligation of parents and
illegitimate children does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn violates article 40 aforementioned.
Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married man forced a woman not his wife to yield to his
lust and this constitutes a clear violation of Carmens rights. Thus, she is entitled to claim compensation for the
damage caused.
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to the court of origin
for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.

9.

PATRICIO VS. DARIO

GR No. 170829 NOVEMBER 20, 2006
FACTS:
M died intestate and was survived by his wife and two children. The surviving heirs extrajudicially settled his
estate. One of the properties he left was the family home. A new title for the said property was thereafter issued
under the name of the wife and the two children as co-owners. After some time, the wife and one of the sons
expressed their desire to partition the family home and terminate the co-ownership. The other son opposed the
partition on the ground that the family home should remain despite the death of one or both the spouses as long as
there is a minor beneficiary thereof. The supposed minor beneficiary is oppositor's son, the grandchild of the
decedent.

ISSUE:
Whether the partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-owners refuse to accede to such a partition
on the ground that a minor beneficiary still resides in the said home.
HELD:
To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1) they must be among the relationships
enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home; and (3) they are dependent for legal
support upon the head of the family.
As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of the family home are: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person
who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the
relationship be legitimate or illegitimate. The term 'descendants' contemplates all descendants of the person or
persons who constituted the family home without distinction; hence, it must necessarily include the grandchildren
and great grandchildren of the spouses who constitute a family home. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire
debemos. Where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Thus, private respondent's minor son, who
is also the grandchild of the deceased satisfies the first requisite.
As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must be actually living in the family home to avail of the benefits
derived from Art. 159. The son of private respondent and grandson of the decedent has been living in the family
home since 1994, or within 10 years from the death of the decedent, hence, he satisfies the second requisite.
However, as to the third requisite, the grandson cannot demand support from his paternal grandmother if he has
parents who are capable of supporting him. The liability for legal support falls primarily on his parents, especially
his father, herein private respondent who is the head of his immediate family. The law first imposes the obligation of
legal support upon the shoulders of the parents, especially the father, and only in their default is the obligation
imposed on the grandparents.
10. Gamboa-hirsch vs CA
11. DINAH B. TONOG v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 122906 February 7, 2002
Facts:
- Dinah gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate child with Edgar V. Daguimol. The two cohabited
for a time and lived with Edgar's parents and sister.
- A year after Dinah left for US where she found work as a registered nurse. Gardin was left in the care of her father
and grandparents.
- Edgar later filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin and the trial court granted the petition and appointed
Edgar as the legal guardian.
- Dinah filed a petition for relief from judgement and the court set aside the original judgement and allowed Dinah
to file her opposition to Edgar's petition. Edgar filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied and the court
issued a resolution granting Dinah's motion for custody over Gardin.
- Edgar filed a petition for certiorari before the CA who modified their previous decision and granted Edgar custody
over Gardin.
- Dinah contends that she is entitled to the custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, as a matter of law. As the mother of
Gardin Faith, the law confers parental authority upon her as the mother of the illegitimate minor.
Issue: Is Dinah entitled to the custody of Gardin?
Ruling:
No. The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn
away from her. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for compelling reasons for the good of the child.
A mother may be deprived of the custody of her child who is below seven years of age for compelling reasons.
Instances of unsuitability are neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug
addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable illness. If older than seven years
of age, a child is allowed to state his preference, but the court is not bound by that choice. The court may exercise
its discretion by disregarding the childs preference should the parent chosen be found to be unfit, in which
instance, custody may be given to the other parent, or even to a third person.
Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, SC find that the appellate court did not
err in allowing her father to retain in the meantime parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the child should not be
wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into a strange environment away from the people and places
to which she had apparently formed an attachment.
Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of fact to be properly entertained in the special
proceedings before the trial court.

12. SAGALA-ESLAO VS CA
G.R. No. 116773 January 16 1997 [Parental Authority]
FACTS:

When Maria Paz's husband Reynaldo Eslao died, she entrusted custody of her youngest child Angelica to her
grieving mother-in-law. She then returned to her mother's house with Leslie. Years later, Maria Paz got married to a
Japanese-American and live with him in the US. After this she returned to the Philippines to be reunited with her
children and bring them to the US. She then informed Teresita about her desire to take custody of Angelica her new
husband's willingness to adopt her children. Teresita refused, and accused Maria of having abandoned Angelica
when she was 10 days old. Maria instituted an action against Teresita over the return of the custody of Angelica to
her. After the trial on the merits, the trial court granted the petition. CA affirmed in the full decision of the trial
court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Teresita Sagala-Eslao should be given the custody of the child
RULING:
No. The right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a
right supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or
decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship.
Thus, when Maria entrusted the custody of Angelica to Teresita, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary
custody and it did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority. The law allows a waiver of
parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an orphan
institution.

13. Perez vs. CA, GR No. 118870, March 29, 1996

(Special Proceedings Custody: A child under seven years shall not be separated from his mother)

Facts: Respondent father, a doctor of medicine and petitioner mother, a registered nurse working in the US are
married couples who are separated in fact with only one child.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus asking respondent to surrender the custody of their son. The RTC issued
an Order awarding custody of the one-year old child to his mother, citing the second paragraph of Article 213 of the
Family Code.
Upon appeal by the father, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts order and awarded custody of the boy to
him ruling that there were enough reasons to deny petitioner custody over the child even under seven years old. It
held that granting custody to the boys father would be for the childs best interest and welfare.
Article 213, par 2, provides in case of separation of parents that no child under 7 years of age shall be separated
from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
Rule 99, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court also states that No child under seven years of age shall be
separated from the mother, unless the court finds there are compelling reasons therefore.
Issue: WON custody of the child is to be given to the father.

Held:
No. The provisions of the law clearly mandate that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his
mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. The use of the word shall in Article 213 of
the Family Code and Rule 99, Sec 6 of the Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character.
Couples who are separated in fact are covered within the term separation.
The Family Code in reverting to the provision of the Civil Code that a child below seven years old shall not be
separated from the mother (Article 363), has expressly repealed the earlier Article 17, par 3 of the Child and youth
Welfare Code which reduced the childs age to 5 years.

14. TIJING VS CA
G.R. No. 125901, March 8, 2001 [Habeas Corpus]
FACTS:
Edgardo and Bienvenida Tijing filed a petition for habeas corpus in order to recover their youngest child, Edgardo Jr.,
whom they did not see for 4 years. Trial court granted the petition and ordered Angelita Diamante to immediately
release the child, now named John Thomas D. Lopez, and turn him over to his parents. CA reversed and set aside
the decision rendered by the lower court. It questioned the propriety of the habeas corpus in this case.
ISSUE:Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy to regain custody of the minor.
RULING:
Yes. SC upheld the decision of the trial court.
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived
of his liberty, or by the rightful custody of any person withheld from the persons entitled thereto. The writ of habeas
corpus is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in
the custody of a third person of his own free will. It must be stressed out that in habeas corpus proceeding, the
question of identity is relevant and material, subject to the usual presumption, including those as identity of the
person.
The trial court was correct in its judgment based on the evidence established by the parents and by the witness
who is the brother of the late common-law husband of Angelita. Furthermore, there are no clinical records, log book
or discharge from the clinic where John Thomas was allegedly born were presented. Strong evidence directly proves
that Thomas Lopez, Angela's "husband", was not capable of siring a child. Moreover, his first marriage produced no
offspring even after almost 15 years of living together with his legal wife. His 14 year affair with Angelita also bore
no offspring.
The birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez were attended by irregularities. It was filed by Thomas Lopez, the alleged
father. Under Sec. 4, Act No. 3753 (Civil Register Law), the attending physician or midwife in attendance of the birth
should cause the registration of such birth. Only in default of the physician or midwife, can the parent register the
birth of his child. Certificate must be filed with the LCR within 30 days after the birth. The status of Thomas and
Angelita on the birth certificate were typed in as legally married, which is false because Angelita herself had
admitted that she is a "common-law wife."
Trial court also observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were both in court, the two had strong
similarities in their faces. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material evidence
to establish parentage. Lastly, the spouses presented clinical records and testimony of the midwife who attended
Bienvenida's childbirth.

15. Madrinan vs. Madrinan, 527 SCRA 487, GR No. 159374, July 12, 2007
(Special Proceedings Court of Appeals and Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the family
courts of Habeas Corpus involving custody of minors)

Facts: Petitioner and respondent were married, and after a bitter quarrel, petitioner left the conjugal abode bringing
with him their three sons (2 of which are minors) to Albay and to Laguna subsequently.
Respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Court of Appeals for their their 2 minor sons on the ground that
petitioners act disrupted their education and deprived them of their mothers care.
Petitioner filed a memorandum alleging that respondent was unfit to take custody of their children and questioned
the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals claiming that under Section 5(b) of RA 8369, family courts have exclusive
original jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for habeas corpus filed by respondent.
The Court of Appeals rendered a decision asserting its authority to take cognizance and ruling, that under the
Family Code, respondent was entitled to custody of the minors.
Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the petition for habeas corpus and insists that
jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the family courts under RA 8369.
Issue: WON the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving custody of minors.
Held: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled in a previous jurisprudence that The Court of Appeals should has cognizance of
this case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the

custody of minors. RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction
over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors.
The concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court with family courts in said cases was further
affirmed by A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC (April 22, 2004) in Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in
Relation to Custody of Minors which provides that:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of
minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which the Family
Court belongs.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so
granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.

16. SABRINA ARTADI BONDAGJY, petitioner, vs. FOUZI ALI BONDAGJY, JUDGE BENSAUDI I. ARABANI, SR., in
his capacity as presiding judge of the 3 rd Sharia District Court, Sharia Judicial District, Zamboanga
City, respondents.
17. [G.R. No. 140817. December 7, 2001]

DECISION
PARDO, J.:
Is a wife, a Christian who converted to Islam before her marriage to a Muslim and converted back to
Catholicism upon their separation, still bound by the moral laws of Islam in the determination of her fitness to be
the custodian of her children?
We apply civil law in the best interest of the children.
The Facts
Respondent Fouzi (then 31 years of age) and Sabrina (then 20 years of age) were married on February 3,
1988, at the Manila Hotel, Ermita, Manila under Islamic rites. [1] On October 21, 1987, or four (4) months before her
marriage, Sabrina became a Muslim by conversion. However, the conversion was not registered with the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.
Out of their union, they begot two (2) children, namely, Abdulaziz, born on June 13, 1989, [2] and Amouaje, born
on September 29, 1990.[3] The children were born in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
At the time of their marriage, unknown to petitioner, respondent was still married to a Saudi Arabian woman
whom he later divorced.
After their marriage, the couple moved in with respondents family in Makati City. In 1990, the parties migrated
and settled in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia where they lived for more than two years.
Sometime in December 1995, the children lived in the house of Sabrinas mother in 145 Tanguile Street, Ayala
Alabang. Fouzi alleged that he could not see his children until he got an order from the court.Even with a court
order, he could only see his children in school at De La Salle-Zobel, Alabang, Muntinlupa City.
On December 15, 1996, Sabrina had the children baptized as Christians [4] and their names changed from
Abdulaziz Bondagjy to Azziz Santiago Artadi and from Amouaje Bondagjy to Amouage Selina Artadi.
Respondent alleged that on various occasions Sabrina was seen with different men at odd hours in Manila,
and that she would wear short skirts, sleeveless blouses, and bathing suits. [6] Such clothing are detestable under
Islamic law on customs.
[5]

Fouzi claimed that Sabrina let their children sweep their neighbors house for a fee of P40.00 after the children
come home from school. Whenever Fouzi sees them in school, [7] the children would be happy to see him but they
were afraid to ride in his car. Instead, they would ride the jeepney in going home from school.
The Case

On March 11, 1996, respondent Fouzy Ali Bondagjy filed with the Sharia District Court, Marawi City, an
action[8] to obtain custody of his two minor children, Abdulaziz, 10 and Amouaje, 9.
On June 6, 1996, petitioner filed her answer with motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the persons of the parties since both parties were residents of Manila and for lack of cause of action. Petitioner
likewise moved to transfer the venue to Zamboanga, which was more accessible by plane.
On June 18, 1996, the Sharia District Court granted petitioners motion to transfer the venue to Zamboanga. [9]

[11]

On June 27, 1996, respondent filed a reply [10] and motion for a temporary restraining order against petitioner.
He moved that petitioner desist from preventing him from exercising parental authority over his minor children.
On July 12, 1996, the court granted the motion and issued a writ of preliminary injunction. [12]
On August 12, 1996, the court ordered the parties to submit their memoranda on the issue of jurisdiction.

On October 30, 1996, the court granted petitioners motion to withdraw motion to dismiss on the issue of
jurisdiction and set the proceedings for pre-trial conference on November 14, 1996.
On November 14, 1996, respondent filed a motion to drop Joyce Artadi as defendant in the case and the trial
court issued an order:
During the pre-trial conference held this morning, the parties made their respective offer and counter proposals for
amicable settlement. The plaintiff proposed (1) solidarity of the family, and (2) alternate custody. The defendant
advanced the proposal of reasonable visitation of the father at their residence, for which the court will possibly fix
the period or time and schedule of visitations.
With these proposals, both parties agreed to continue the pre-trial conference on December 9, 1996.
WHEREFORE, let the pre-trial conference be again held on December 9, 1996, at 9:00 oclock in the morning. [13]
Meantime, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 256, Muntinlupa City [14] an action for nullity of
marriage, custody and support, ordered the parties to maintain status quo until further orders from said court.[15]
On March 2, 1999, petitioner filed another motion to dismiss [16] on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case since P.D. No. 1083 is applicable only to Muslims. On March 3, 1999, Fouzi filed an
opposition to the motion to dismiss and argued that at the inception of the case, both parties were Muslims, Fouzi
by birth and Sabrina by conversion.
On March 29, 1999, the court denied the motion to dismiss since P.D. No. 1083 had jurisdiction over all cases
of Muslims involving custody.[17]
On April 23, 1999, Sabrina filed a motion to reconsider the order of March 29, 1999 denying the motion to
dismiss.[18]
On June 22, 1999, the court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. ThusWHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing reasons, the motion for reconsideration of the defendant-movant is hereby
ordered DENIED; Defendant is further ordered to comply with the order of this Court dated July 12, 1996, to allow
plaintiff to exercise his right of parental authority over their minor children with that of the defendant in accordance
with article 71, of P.D. 1083, the Code of Muslim Personal Laws.
Let the continuation of this case be set on July 15, 1999 at 8:30 in the morning. [19]
On July 15, 1999, the trial court decided to move forward to the next stage of the case and allowed respondent
Fouzi to present evidence ex-parte.
On August 18, 1999, the court issued an order [20] giving respondent fifteen (15) days to submit his formal offer
of evidence and fifteen (15) days from receipt of transcript of stenographic notes to submit memorandum.
The Sharia District Courts Decision
On November 16, 1999, the Sharia Court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Awarding the custody of the minors Abdulaziz Artadi Bondagjy and Amouaje Artadi Bondagjy in favor
of their natural father, petitioner Fouzi Ali Bondagjy; and for this purpose ordering the respondent

Sabrina Artadi Bodagjy or any person having the care of said minors in her stead or behalf, to turn
over, relinguish and surrender the custody of said minors to their natural father, the petitioner in this
case Fouzi Ali Bondagjy;
(b) Ordering the petitioner Fouzi Ali Bondagjy to ensure that the said minors are provided with
reasonable support according to his means and in keeping with the standard of his family, and, a
suitable home conducive to their physical,
(c) mental and moral development; and, with his knowledge and under reasonable circumstances allow
the respondent and natural mother of the said minors Mrs. Sabrina Artadi Bondagjy to visit her minor
children Abdulaziz Artadi Bondagjy and Amouje Artadi Bondagjy. [21]
Hence, this petition.[22]
The Courts Ruling
The Sharia District Court held that P.D. No. 1083 on Custody and Guardianship does not apply to this case
because the spouses were not yet divorced.
However, the Sharia District Court found petitioner unworthy to care for her children. Thus A married woman, and a mother to growing children, should live a life that the community in which she lives
considers morally upright, and in a manner that her growing minor children will not be socially and morally affected
and prejudiced. It is sad to note that respondent has failed to observe that which is expected of a married woman
and a mother by the society in which she lives. xxx The evidence of this case shows the extent of the moral
depravity of the respondent, and the kind of concern for the welfare of her minor children which on the basis
thereof this Court finds respondent unfit with the custody of her minor children.
xxx Under the general principles of Muslim law, the Muslim mother may be legally disentitled to the custody of her
minor children by reason of wickedness when such wickedness is injurious to the mind of the child, such as when
she engages in zina (illicit sexual relation); or when she is unworthy as a mother; and, a woman is not worthy to be
trusted with the custody of the child who is continually going out and leaving the child hungry. (A. Baillie,
Muhammadan Law, p. 435; citing Dar-ul-Muktar, p. 280).[23]
On the other hand, the Sharia Court found that respondent Fouzi was capable both personally and financially
to look after the best interest of his minor children. [24]
When he was asked during the direct examination the question that, if ever this Honorable Court will grant you
custody of your children will you be able to house and give support to your children? He answered, Of course, even
up to now I am giving support to my children; And my comment is that the father should give everything the needs
of the family and now whatever the children needs even in school, considering the past, I have to love them, I have
to care for my children. In school, even when they see something they love and like, I buy it for them. Or sometime
(sic) I send my staff and bring something for them in their house. It is very hard, in school in front of other parents
my son would still climb on my shoulder. I want to see them happy. I have pictures of my children with me, taken
only last week.[25]
As a rule, factual findings of the lower courts are final and binding upon the parties. [26] The Court is not
expected or required to examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties.
[27]
However, although this Court is not a trier of facts, it has the authority to review or reverse the factual findings of
the lower courts if we find that these do not conform to the evidence on record. [28]
In Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, [29] the Court held that the exceptions to the rule that factual findings of the trial
court are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal are the following: (1) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based
on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making
its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings
of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion, and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.

Fitness as a Mother
The burden is upon respondent to prove that petitioner is not worthy to have custody of her children. We find
that the evidence presented by the respondent was not sufficient to establish her unfitness according to Muslim law
or the Family Code.

In Pilipinas Shell Corp. vs. Court of Appeals (April 20, 2001, G.R. No. 114923), we said that in the hierarchy of
evidentiary values, proof beyond reasonable doubt is at the highest level, followed by clear and convincing
evidence, preponderance of evidence and substantial evidence, in that order. [30]
The standard in the determination of sufficiency of proof, however, is not restricted to Muslim laws. The Family
Code shall be taken into consideration in deciding whether a non-Muslim woman isincompetent. What determines
her capacity is the standard laid down by the Family Code now that she is not a Muslim.
Indeed, what determines the fitness of any parent is the ability to see to the physical, educational, social and
moral welfare of the children,[31] and the ability to give them a healthy environment as well as physical and financial
support taking into consideration the respective resources and social and moral situations of the parents.
The record shows that petitioner is equally financially capable of providing for all the needs of her children.
The children went to school at De La Salle Zobel School, Muntinlupa City with their tuition paid by petitioner
according to the schools certification.[32]
Parental Authority and Custody
The welfare of the minors is the controlling consideration on the issue. [33]
In ascertaining the welfare and best interest of the children, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take
into account all relevant considerations.[34]
Article 211 of the Family Code provides that the father and mother shall jointly exercise parental authority
over the persons of their common children.
Similarly, P.D. No. 1083 is clear that where the parents are not divorced or legally separated, the father and
mother shall jointly exercise just and reasonable parental authority and fulfill their responsibility over their
legitimate children.
In Sagala-Eslao v. Court of Appeals,[35] we stated:
xxx [Parental authority] is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose of the
childrens physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the education of
their heart and senses.[36] As regards parental authority, there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a
sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor. [37]
xxx
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are dutybound and entitled to keep
them in their custody and company.[38]
We do not doubt the capacity and love of both parties for their children, such that they both want to have
them in their custody.
Either parent may lose parental authority over the child only for a valid reason. In cases where both parties
cannot have custody because of their voluntary separation, we take into consideration the circumstances that
would lead us to believe which parent can better take care of the children. Although we see the need for the
children to have both a mother and a father, we believe that petitioner has more capacity and time to see to the
childrens needs. Respondent is a businessman whose work requires that he go abroad or be in different places most
of the time. Under P.D. No. 603, the custody of the minor children, absent a compelling reason to the contrary, is
given to the mother.[39]
However, the award of custody to the wife does not deprive the husband of parental authority. In the case
of Silva v. Court of Appeals,[40] we said that:
Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to care for their children, see to their upbringing
and safeguard their best interest and welfare. This authority and responsibility may not be unduly denied the
parents; neither may it be renounced by them. Even when the parents are estranged and their affection for each
other is lost, the attachment and feeling for their offsprings invariably remain unchanged. Neither the law nor the
courts allow this affinity to suffer absent, of course, any real, grave and imminent threat to the well-being of the
child.
Thus, we grant visitorial rights to respondent as his Constitutionally protected natural and primary right. [41]
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision in Spl. Proc. No. 13-96 is hereby SET
ASIDE. Petitioner SABRINA ARTADI BONDAGJY shall have custody over minors Abdulaziz, and Amouaje Bondagjy,

until the children reach majority age. Both spouses shall have joint responsibility over all expenses of rearing the
children.
The father, FOUZI ALI BONDAGJY, shall have visitorial rights at least once a week and may take the children
out only with the written consent of the mother.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

18. REYMOND B. LAXAMANA vs MA. LOURDES D.LAXAMANA

G.R. No. 144763.September 3, 2002
Facts:
Petitioner Reymond B. Laxamana and respondent Ma. Lourdes D. Laxamana met sometime in1983. Petitioner, who
came from a well-to-do family, was a graduate of Bachelor of Laws, while respondent, a holder of a degree in
banking and finance, worked in a bank. They got married and the union blesses with three children. All went
well until petitioner became a drug dependent. Despite several confinements, respondent claimed petitioner was
not fully rehabilitated. His drug dependence worsened and it became difficult for respondent and her children to live
with him. Petitioner allegedly became violent and irritable, thus, respondent and her 3 children abandoned
petitioner and transferred to the house of her relatives. Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 107, and the instant petition for habeas corpus praying for custody of his three children. Respondent
opposed the petition, citing the drug dependence of petitioner. RTC ordered to remain the custody under
the respondent and parties are enjoined to comply with the terms and condition stated in the visitation
arrangement.
Issue: W/N THE COURT A QUO HAS RESOLVED THE ISSUE OF CUSTODY IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORDWITH LAW AND WITH THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT WHEN ITRESOLVED THE ISSUE OF CUSTODY WITHOUT
CONSIDERING THE PARAMOUNT INTEREST AND WELFARE OF HEREIN PARTIES THREE (3) MINOR CHILDREN.
Ruling:
Petitioner is not estopped from questioning the absence of a trial considering that said psychiatric report, which was
the courts primary basis in awarding custody to respondent, is insufficient to justify the decision. The fundamental
policy of the State to promote and protect the welfare of children shall not be disregarded by mere technicality in
resolving disputes which involve the family and the youth. While petitioner may have a history of drug dependence,
the records are inadequate as to his moral, financial and social well-being. The results of the psychiatric evaluation
showing that he is not yet completely cured may render him unfit to take custody of the children, but there is no
evidence to show that respondent is unfit to provide the children with adequate support, education, as well as moral
and intellectual training and development. Moreover, the children in this case were 14 and 15 years old at the time
of the promulgation of the decision, yet the court did not ascertain their choice as to which parent they want to live
with. In its September 8, 1999 order, the trial court merely stated that:
The children were asked as to whether they would like to be with petitioner but there are indications that they
entertain fears in their hearts and want to be sure that their father is no longer a drug dependent.
There is no showing that the court ascertained the categorical choice of the children. These inadequacies could
have been remedied by an exhaustive trial probing into the accuracy of Dr. Ocampos report and the capacity of
both parties to raise their children.
The trial court was remiss in the fulfillment of its duties when it approved the agreement of the parties to submit
the case for decision on the basis of sketchy findings of facts.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 107, for the purpose of receiving evidence to determine the fitness of petitioner and respondent to take
custody of their children. Pending the final disposition of this case, custody shall remain with respondent but subject
to petitioners visitation rights in accordance with the December 7, 1999 order of the trial court.
19. Luna vs IAC
20. Santos vs CA
21. Sabina Exconde vs Delfin and Dante Capuno
101 Phil 843 Civil Law Torts and Damages Liability of Parents

FACTS: Dante Capuno was a 15 year old boy who was a pupil of Balintawak Elementary School. In March 1949, he
attended a boy scout parade for Dr. Jose Rizal. While they were inside a jeep, he took control of the wheels which he
later lost control of causing the jeep to go turtle thereby killing two other students, Isidoro Caperina and one other.
Isidoros mother, Sabina Exconde, sued Dante Capuno for the death of her son. Pending the criminal action, the
mother reserved her right to file a separate civil action which she subsequently filed against Dante and his dad,
Delfin Capuno.

ISSUE: Whether or not Delfin Capuno, as the father of Dante is liable for damages.

HELD: Yes. The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them, is obvious. This is
necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the
duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them and instructing them in proportion to
their means, while, on the other hand, gives them the right to correct and punish them in moderation. The only
way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent the damage which Delfin failed to prove.
On the other hand, the school is not liable. It is true that under the law, teachers or directors of arts and trades are
liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody, but this provision
only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution.
JUSTICE J.B.L. REYES Dissenting:
Delfin Capuno should be relieved from liability. There is no sound reason for limiting the liability to teachers of arts
and trades and not to academic ones. What substantial difference is there between them in so far as, concerns the
proper supervision and vigilance over their pupils? It cannot be seriously contended that an academic teacher is
exempt from the duty of watching do not commit a tort to the detriment of third persons, so long as they are in a
position to exercise authority and supervision over the pupil.

22. Jose Amadora vs Court of Appeals

Civil Law Torts and Damages Article 2180 Liability of Schools of Arts and Trades and Academic
Schools Liability of Teachers and Heads of School
FACTS: In April 1972, while the high school students of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos were in the school
auditorium, a certain Pablito Daffon fired a gun. The stray bullet hit Alfredo Amadora. Alfredo died. Daffon was
convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The parents of Alfredo sued the school for damages under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code because of the schools negligence.
The trial court ruled in favor of Amadora. The trial court ruled that the principal, the dean of boys, as well as the
teacher-in-charge are all civilly liable. The school appealed as it averred that when the incident happened, the
school year has already ended. Amadora argued that even though the semester has already ended, his son was
there in school to complete a school requirement in his Physics subject. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the
school. The CA ruled that under the last paragraph of Article 2180, only schools of arts and trades (vocational
schools) are liable not academic schools like Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos.
ISSUE: Whether or not Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, an academic school, is liable under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code for the tortuous act of its students.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court made a re-examination of the provision on the last paragraph of Article 2180 which
provides:
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody.
The Supreme Court said that it is time to update the interpretation of the above law due to the changing times
where there is hardly a distinction between schools of arts and trade and academic schools. That being said, the
Supreme Court ruled that ALL schools, academic or not, may be held liable under the said provision of Article 2180.
The Supreme Court however clarified that the school, whether academic or not, should not be held directly liable.
Its liability is only subsidiary.
For non-academic schools, it would be the principal or head of school who should be directly liable for the tortuous
act of its students. This is because historically, in non-academic schools, the head of school exercised a closer
administration over their students than heads of academic schools. In short, they are more hands on to their
students.
For academic schools, it would be the teacher-in-charge who would be directly liable for the tortuous act of the
students and not the dean or the head of school.
The Supreme Court also ruled that such liability does not cease when the school year ends or when the semester
ends. Liability applies whenever the student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the

control and influence of the school and within its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already
ended at the time of the happening of the incident. As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school
premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in
the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the
responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues. Indeed, even if the student should be doing
nothing more than relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience
and atmosphere of the school, he is still within the custody and subject to the discipline of the school authorities
under the provisions of Article 2180.
At any rate, the REMEDY of the teacher, to avoid direct liability, and for the school, to avoid subsidiary liability, is to
show proof that he, the teacher, exercised the necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of, and the
school exercised the diligence of a bonus pater familias.
In this case however, the Physics teacher in charge was not properly named, and there was no sufficient evidence
presented to make the said teacher-in-charge liable. Absent the direct liability of the teachers because of the
foregoing reason, the school cannot be held subsidiarily liable too.

23. Salvosa v. IAC

G.R. No. 70458 [October 5, 1988]
Facts:
Baguio Colleges Foundation is an academic institution. However, it is also an institution of arts and trade because
BCF has a full-fledged technical-vocational department offering Communication, Broadcast and Teletype Technician
courses as well as Electronics Serviceman and Automotive Mechanics courses.
Within the premises of the BCF is an ROTC Unit. The Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit had Jimmy B. Abon as
its duly appointed armorer. As armorer of the ROTC Unit, Jimmy B. Abon received his appointment from the AFP. Not
being an employee of the BCF, he also received his salary from the AFP, as well as orders from Captain Roberto C.
Ungos. Jimmy B. Abon was also a commerce student of the BCF.
On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF, Jimmy B. Abon shot Napoleon Castro a student
of the University of Baguio with an unlicensed firearm which the former took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of
the BCF. As a result, Napoleon Castro died and Jimmy B. Abon was prosecuted for, and convictedof the crime of
Homicide.
Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages, impleading Jimmy B. Abon and the BCF .
Issue: WON BCF is subsidiarily liable.
Ruling of the Case:
Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
trades are liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their
custody. The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter
stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis as to the student and is called upon to exercise reasonable supervision
over the conduct of the student. Likewise, the phrase used in [Art. 2180 so long as (the students) remain in
their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise
over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time. Jimmy B.
Abon cannot be considered to have been at attendance in the school, or in the custody of BCF, when he shot
Napoleon Castro. Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable
with Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting from his acts.

24. St. Marys Academy vs. Carpetanos

GR No. 143363, February 6, 2002
FACTS:
Herein petitioner, conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996 They visited schools from where
prospective enrollees were studying. Sherwin Carpitanos joined the campaign. Along with the other high school
students, they rode a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School.
Such jeep was driven by James Daniel II, a 15 year old student of the same school. It was alleged that he drove the
jeep in a reckless manner which resulted for it to turned turtle. Sherwin died due to this accident.

ISSUE: WON petitioner should be held liable for the damages.

HELD:
CA held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin under Article 218 and 219 of the Family Code where it was pointed
that they were negligent in allowing a minor to drive and not having a teacher accompany the minor students in the
jeep. However, for them to be held liable, the act or omission to be considered negligent must be the proximate
cause of the injury caused thus, negligence needs to have a causal connection to the accident. It must be direct
and natural sequence of events, unbroken by any efficient intervening causes. The parents of the victim failed to
show such negligence on the part of the petitioner. The spouses Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of
the accident was not the reckless driving of James but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
Futhermore, there was no evidence that petitioner allowed the minor to drive the jeep of Villanueva. The
mechanical defect was an event over which the school has no control hence they may not be held liable for the
death resulting from such accident.
The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public
or to 3rd persons for injuries caused while it is being driven on the road. It is not the school, but the registered
owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin. Case was remanded to
the trial court for determination of the liability of the defendants excluding herein petitioner.

25. Elcano vs Hill

77 SCRA 100 May 26, 1977
Torts and Damages Civil Liability from Quasi Delicts vs Civil Liability from Crimes

FACTS: Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano). Elcano filed a criminal case against
Reginald but Reginald was acquitted for lack of intent coupled with mistake. Elcano then filed a civil action
against Reginald and his dad (Marvin Hill) for damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued that the
civil action is barred by his sons acquittal in the criminal case; and that if ever, his civil liability as a parent has
been extinguished by the fact that his son is already an emancipated minor by reason of his marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under Article 2180.

HELD: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar the filing of a separate civil action. A
separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found
guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if accused is actually charged also criminally, to
recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e)
of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas
the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the
accused. Briefly stated, culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and
under Article 397, emancipation takes place by the marriage of the minor child, it is, however, also clear that
pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus Emancipation by
marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the childs person. It shall enable the
minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber
real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with
the assistance of his father, mother or guardian. Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill the SC
however ruled since at the time of the decision, Reginald is already of age, Marvins liability should be subsidiary
only as a matter of equity.