SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES vs CA

the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia inasmuch as this case involves what is
known in private international law as a conflicts problem?

FACTS:
> Defendant SAUDIA hired plaintiff as a Flight Attendant for its airlines based
in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
> while on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, plaintiff went to a disco dance with
fellow crew members (Thamer and Allah) both Saudi nationals. The other
attempted to rape plaintiff. Fortunately, a roomboy and several security
personnel heard her cries for help and rescued her. Later, the Indonesian
police came and arrested both the Saudi Nationals.
> A negotiation with the police for the release of Thamer and Allah but was not
succeeded for she refused cooperate.
> She was brought many times to Saudi Arabia, faced the court knowing that it
would be necessary for the case.
> When plaintiff returned to Manila, she was again summoned to go back to
Saudi Arabia explaining the investigation was routinary and will pose no
danger to her.
> After one hour of interrogation, they let her go. At the airport, however, just
as her plane was about to take off, a SAUDIA officer told her that the airline
had forbidden her to take flight. Took away her passport and told her to remain
in Jeddah, at the crew quarters, until further orders.
> SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff to the same court where the
judge, to her astonishment and shock, rendered a decision, translated to her in
English, sentencing her to five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only
then did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together with Thamer
and Allah, for what happened in Jakarta. The court found plaintiff guilty of (1)
adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing and listening to the music in violation of
Islamic laws; and (3) socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic
tradition.
> Facing conviction, private respondent sought the help of her employer,
petitioner SAUDIA. Unfortunately, she was denied any assistance.
> Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed the
case against her and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her
return to Manila,she was terminated from the service by SAUDIA, without her
being informed of the cause.
> Milagros Morada filed a Complaint for damages against SAUDI SAUDI
filed an Motion to Dismiss but was denied by the Respondent Judge.
> SAUDI alleged that the trial court has no jurisdiction to hear and try the case
on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code, since the proper law applicable is
the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

RULING:

ISSUE:

On the other hand, Article 21 of the New Civil Code provides:

Whether or not trial court has jurisdiction to hear and try the case
based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code since the proper law applicable is

YES. Under the factual antecedents obtaining in this case, there is no

dispute that the interplay of events occurred in two states, the Philippines and
Saudi Arabia.
Where the factual antecedents satisfactorily establish the existence of a
foreign element, we agree with petitioner that the problem herein could present
a conflicts case.
A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by the
diverse laws of two or more states is said to contain a foreign element. The
presence of a foreign element is inevitable since social and economic affairs of
individuals and associations are rarely confined to the geographic limits of their
birth or conception.
In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that private
respondent Morada is a resident Philippine national, and that petitioner
SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation. Also, by virtue of the employment of
Morada with the petitioner Saudia as a flight stewardess, events did transpire
during her many occasions of travel across national borders, particularly from
Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a
conflicts situation to arise.
We thus find private respondents assertion that the case is purely domestic,
imprecise. A conflicts problem presents itself here, and the question of
jurisdiction confronts the court a quo.
After a careful study of the private respondents Amended Complaint, and the
Comment thereon, we note that she aptly predicated her cause of action on
Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code.
On one hand, Article 19 of the New Civil Code provides;
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice give everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith.

Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for damages.

Although Article 19 merely declares a principle of law, Article 21 gives flesh to

its provisions. Thus, we agree with private respondents assertion that
violations of Articles 19 and 21 are actionable, with judicially enforceable
remedies in the municipal forum.
Based on the allegations in the Amended Complaint, read in the light of the
Rules of Court on jurisdiction we find that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit.
Pragmatic considerations, including the convenience of the parties, also weigh
heavily in favor of the RTC Quezon City assuming jurisdiction. Paramount is
the private interest of the litigant. Enforceability of a judgment if one is
obtained is quite obvious. Relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial are
equally important. Plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, vex,
harass, or oppress the defendant, e.g. by inflicting upon him needless expense
or disturbance. But unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the
plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.
Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court a quo found it best to hear
the case in the Philippines. Had it refused to take cognizance of the case, it
would be forcing plaintiff (private respondent now) to seek remedial action
elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no longer maintains
substantial connections. That would have caused a fundamental unfairness to
her.
Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines no unnecessary difficulties
and inconvenience have been shown by either of the parties. The choice of
forum of the plaintiff (now private respondent) should be upheld.
Similarly, the trial court also possesses jurisdiction over the persons of the
parties herein. By filing her Complaint and Amended Complaint with the trial
court, private respondent has voluntary submitted herself to the jurisdiction of
the court.
The records show that petitioner SAUDIA has filed several motions praying for
the dismissal of Moradas Amended Complaint. What is very patent and explicit
from the motions filed, is that SAUDIA prayed for other reliefs under the
premises. Undeniably, petitioner SAUDIA has effectively submitted to the trial
courts jurisdiction by praying for the dismissal of the Amended Complaint on
grounds other than lack of jurisdiction.
Clearly, petitioner had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City. Thus, we find that the trial court has jurisdiction over the case
and that its exercise thereof, justified.
As to the choice of applicable law, we note that choice-of-law problems seek to
answer two important questions: (1) What legal system should control a given

situation where some of the significant facts occurred in two or more states;
and (2) to what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the situation.
Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine under what
category a certain set of facts or rules fall. This process is known as
characterization, or the doctrine of qualification. It is the process of deciding
whether or not the facts relate to the kind of question specified in a conflicts
rule. The purpose of characterization is to enable the forum to select the
proper law.
Our starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation, but a factual situation,
event, or operative fact. An essential element of conflict rules is the indication
of a test or connecting factor or point of contact. Choice-of-law rules invariably
consist of a factual relationship (such as property right, contract claim) and a
connecting factor or point of contact, such as the situs of the res, the place of
celebration, the place of performance, or the place of wrongdoing.
Note that one or more circumstances may be present to serve as the possible
test for the determination of the applicable law. These test factors or points of
contact or connecting factors could be any of the following:
(1) The nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of
sojourn, or his origin;
(2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation;
(3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed to be
situated. In particular, the lex situs is decisive when real rights are involved;
(4) the place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the place
where a contract has been made, a marriage celebrated, a will signed or a tort
committed. The lex loci actus is particularly important in contracts and torts;
(5) the place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of
performance of contractual duties, or the place where a power of attorney is to
be exercised;
(6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern their
agreement, the lex loci intentionis;
(7) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or
done. The lex forithe law of the forumis particularly important because, as we
have seen earlier, matters of procedure not going to the substance of the claim
involved are governed by it; and because the lex fori applies whenever the
content of the otherwise applicable foreign law is excluded from application in
a given case for the reason that it falls under one of the exceptions to the
applications of foreign law; and
(8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically all legal
relationships of the ship and of its master or owner as such. It also covers
contractual relationships particularly contracts of affreightment.
Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the
connecting factor or point of contact could be the place or places where the
tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And applying the torts principle in a

conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort
(the place where the alleged tortious conduct took place). This is because it is
in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a
Filipina residing and working here. According to her, she had honestly believed
that petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights and in the performance of its
duties, act with justice, give her her due and observe honesty and good faith.
Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed. That certain acts or parts
of the injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no moment. For in our
view what is important here is the place where the over-all harm or the fatality
of the alleged injury to the person, reputation, social standing and human
rights of complainant, had lodged, according to the plaintiff below (herein
private respondent). All told, it is not without basis to identify the Philippines as
the situs of the alleged tort.
As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that over-all injury occurred
and lodged in the Philippines. There is likewise no question that private
respondent is a resident Filipina national, working with petitioner, a resident
foreign corporation engaged here in the business of international air carriage.
Thus, the relationship between the parties was centered here, although it
should be stressed that this suit is not based on mere labor law violations.
From the record, the claim that the Philippines has the most significant contact
with the matter in this dispute, raised by private respondent as plaintiff below
against defendant (herein petitioner), in our view, has been properly
established.

VALMONTE vs CA
FACTS:
> Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a foreign resident.
> Petitioners Lourdes A. Valmonte and Alfredo D. Valmonte are husband and
wife. They are both residents of Washington, U.S.A. Petitioner Alfredo D.
Valmonte, who is a member of the Philippine bar, however, practices his
profession in the Philippines, commuting for this purpose between his
residence in the state of Washington and Manila.
> private respondent Rosita Dimalanta, who is the sister of petitioner Lourdes
A. Valmonte, filed a complaint for partition of real property and accounting of
rentals against petitioners Lourdes A. Valmonte and Alfredo D. Valmonte
before the RTC. The subject of the action is a three-door apartment located in
Paco, Manila.
> Service of summons was then made upon petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte,
who at the time, was at his office in Manila. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte
accepted the summons, insofar as he was concerned, but refused to accept
the summons for his wife, Lourdes A. Valmonte, on the ground that he was not
authorized to accept the process on her behalf. Accordingly the process server
left without leaving a copy of the summons and complaint for petitioner
Lourdes A. Valmonte.
> Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte thereafter filed his Answer with Counterclaim.
Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte, however, did not file her Answer. For this
reason private respondent moved to declare her in default. Petitioner Alfredo
D. Valmonte entered a special appearance in behalf of his wife and opposed
the private respondents motion.
> Trial court denied private respondents motion to declare petitioner Lourdes
A. Valmonte in default.
> Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the petition and declaring
Lourdes A. Valmonte in default.
> CA ruled: Mrs. Valmonte clearly and unequivocally directed the
aforementioned counsel of Dimalanta to address all communications (evidently
referring to her controversy with her sister Mrs. Dimalanta over the Paco
property, now the subject of the instant case) to her lawyer who happens also
to be her husband. Such directive was made without any qualification just as
was her choice/designation of her husband Atty. Valmonte as her lawyer
likewise made without any qualification or reservation. Any disclaimer therefore
on the part of Atty. Valmonte as to his being his wifes attorney (at least with
regard to the dispute vis-a-vis [sic] the Paco property) would appear to be
feeble or trifling, if not incredible.
This view is bolstered by Atty. Valmontes subsequent alleged special
appearance made on behalf of his wife.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner was validly served with summons?

RULING:
NO. We hold that there was no valid service of process on Lourdes A.
Valmonte.
To provide perspective, it will be helpful to determine first the nature of the
action filed against petitioners Lourdes A. Valmonte and Alfredo D. Valmonte
by private respondent, whether it is an action in personam, in rem or quasi in
rem. This is because the rules on service of summons embodied in Rule 14
apply according to whether an action is one or the other of these actions.
In an action in personam, personal service of summons or, if this is not
possible and he cannot be personally served, substituted service, as provided
in Rule 14, 7-8 is essential for the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over
the person of a defendant who does not voluntarily submit himself to the
authority of the court. If defendant cannot be served with summons because
he is temporarily abroad, but otherwise he is a Philippine resident, service of
summons may, by leave of court, be made by publication. Otherwise stated, a
resident defendant in an action in personam, who cannot be personally served
with summons, may be summoned either by means of substituted service in
accordance with Rule 14, 8 or by publication as provided in 17 and 18 of the
same Rule.

specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days
after notice, within which the defendant must answer.
In such cases, what gives the court jurisdiction in an action in rem or quasi in
rem is that it has jurisdiction over the res, i.e. the personal status of the plaintiff
who is domiciled in the Philippines or the property litigated or attached. Service
of summons in the manner provided in 17 is not for the purpose of vesting it
with jurisdiction but for complying with the requirements of fair play or due
process, so that he will be informed of the pendency of the action against him
and the possibility that property in the Philippines belonging to him or in which
he has an interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and
he can thereby take steps to protect his interest if he is so minded.
Applying the foregoing rules to the case at bar, private respondents action,
which is for partition and accounting under Rule 69, is in the nature of an
action quasi in rem. Such an action is essentially for the purpose of affecting
the defendants interest in a specific property and not to render a judgment
against him.

In all of these cases, it should be noted, defendant must be a resident of the

Philippines, otherwise an action in personam cannot be brought because
jurisdiction over his person is essential to make a binding decision.

As petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a nonresident who is not found in the

Philippines, service of summons on her must be in accordance with Rule 14,
17. Such service, to be effective outside the Philippines, must be made either
(1) by personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of general circulation
in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy
of the summons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail to the
last known address of the defendant; or (3) in any other manner which the
court may deem sufficient.

On the other hand, if the action is in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is not essential for giving the court jurisdiction so long
as the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. If the defendant is a nonresident
and he is not found in the country, summons may be served extraterritorially in
accordance with Rule 14, 17, which provides:

Since in the case at bar, the service of summons upon petitioner Lourdes A.
Valmonte was not done by means of any of the first two modes, the question is
whether the service on her attorney, petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte, can be
justified under the third mode, namely, in any . . . manner the court may deem
sufficient.

17. Extraterritorial service. - When the defendant does not reside and
is not found in the Philippines and the action affects the personal
status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is, property
within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or
interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded
consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any
interest therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached
within the Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out
of the Philippines by personal service as under Section 7; or by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and
for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the
summons and order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to
the last known address of the defendant, or in any other manner the
court may deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall

We hold it cannot. This mode of service, like the first two, must be made
outside the Philippines, such as through the Philippine Embassy in the foreign
country where the defendant resides. Moreover, there are several reasons why
the service of summons on Atty. Alfredo D. Valmonte cannot be considered a
valid service of summons on petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte. In the first place,
service of summons on petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte was not made upon the
order of the court as required by Rule 14, 17 and certainly was not a mode
deemed sufficient by the court which in fact refused to consider the service to
be valid and on that basis declare petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte in default for
her failure to file an answer.
In the second place, service in the attempted manner on petitioner was not
made upon prior leave of the trial court as required also in Rule 14, 17. As
provided in 19, such leave must be applied for by motion in writing, supported

by affidavit of the plaintiff or some person on his behalf and setting forth the
grounds for the application.
Finally, and most importantly, because there was no order granting such leave,
petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was not given ample time to file her Answer
which, according to the rules, shall be not less than sixty (60) days after notice.
It must be noted that the period to file an Answer in an action against a
resident defendant differs from the period given in an action filed against a
nonresident defendant who is not found in the Philippines. In the former, the
period is fifteen (15) days from service of summons, while in the latter, it is at
least sixty (60) days from notice.
Strict compliance with these requirements alone can assure observance of
due process. That is why in one case, although the Court considered
publication in the Philippines of the summons (against the contention that it
should be made in the foreign state where defendant was residing) sufficient,
nonetheless the service was considered insufficient because no copy of the
summons was sent to the last known correct address in the Philippines.
In contrast, in the case at bar, petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte did not appoint
her husband as her attorney-in-fact. Although she wrote private respondents
attorney that all communications intended for her should be addressed to her
husband who is also her lawyer at the latters address in Manila, no power of
attorney to receive summons for her can be inferred therefrom. In fact the
letter was written seven months before the filing of this case below, and it
appears that it was written in connection with the negotiations between her
and her sister, respondent Rosita Dimalanta, concerning the partition of the
property in question. As is usual in negotiations of this kind, the exchange of
correspondence was carried on by counsel for the parties. But the authority
given to petitioners husband in these negotiations certainly cannot be
construed as also including an authority to represent her in any litigation.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that there was no valid service on
petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte in this case.

JOHANNES vs HARVEY
FACTS:
> Mrs. Carmen Theodora Johannes died intestate in Singapore. Her
immediate family there remained the husband, B. E. Johannes, the brothers,
Frederick Charles D'Almeida and Alfred D'Almeida, and the sister, Ida
D'Almeida Johannes. Of these, the husband, the brother Frederick, and the
sister Ida, were residents of Singapore, while the brother Alfred was in Manila.
The Singapore heirs apparently joined in asking that letters of administration
be granted by the Supreme Court of Singapore to B. E. Johannes, the lawful
husband of the deceased.
> Under the British law, it would seem that the husband is entitled to the whole
of the estate of his wife if she die intestate to the exclusive of any other next of
kin.
> The brother Alfred D' Almeida was, on his petition, appointed administrator of
the Manila estate of the deceased. The sum of money appears, was on
deposit in the Manila banks under and by virtue of guardianship proceedings
for the late Carmen Theodora Johannes, which were finally terminated by the
discharge of the guardian, the Philippine Trust Company.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Honorable George R. Harvey, as judge of First
Instance of the City of Manila, has acted in excess of his jurisdiction in
appointing Alfred D'Almeida administrator of the funds of the estate on deposit
in the Philippines?
RULING:
NO. Relators pray that the administration in the jurisdiction is
unnecessary, pray the court to annul the appointment and to have placed to
the credit of B. E. Johannes as administrator of the estate of Carmen
Theodora Johannes.
It is often necessary to have more than one administration of an estate. When
a person dies intestate owning property in the country of his domicile as well
as in a foreign country, administration is had in both countries. That which is
granted in the jurisdiction of decedent's last domicile is termed the principal
administration, while any other administration is termed the ancillary
administration.
The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a
country other than that of his las domicile, property to be administered in the

nature of assets of the decedent, liable for his individual debts or to be

distributed among his heirs.
The principal administration in this instance is that at the domicile of the late
Carmen Theodora Johannes in Singapore. What is sought in the Philippine
Islands is an ancillary administration subsidiary to the domiciliary
administration.
The proper course of procedure would be for the ancillary administrator to pay
the claims of creditors, if there be any, settle the accounts, and remit the
surplus to the domiciliary jurisdiction, for distribution among the next of kin.
Such administration appears to be required in this jurisdiction, which permit of
the settlement of certain estates without legal proceedings, have not been met.

MICIANO vs BRIMO
It is almost a universal rule to give the surviving spouse a preference when an
administrator is to be appointed, unless for strong reasons it is deemed
advisable to name someone else.
As we reach the conclusion that the Court of First Instance has not acted in
excess of its jurisdiction.

FACTS:
> The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in
question in this case.
> The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre
Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however,
approved it.
> The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question
puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in
accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are
void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will is void?
RULING:
NO. Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to
the order of succession as well as to the amount of the successional rights and
the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of
the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of
the property or the country in which it may be situated.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary
dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did
not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter,
and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the
same as those of the Philippines.

The oppositor was granted ample opportunity to introduce competent

evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this
particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of
the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in
question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with
and executed.
Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not
erroneous.
I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been conferred upon
me by conquest and not by free choice. having resided for a
considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands where I
succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is my
wish that the distribution of my property and everything in connection
with this, my will, be made and disposed of in accordance with the
laws in force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my relatives to
respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever
disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons who
fail to comply with this request.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the
instituted legatees must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not
in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the laws
of the Philippines.

The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for
article 792 of the civil Code provides the following:
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be
considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any
manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is
considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will is unconditional
and consequently valid and effective even as to the herein oppositor.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which
shall govern it, and to the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and
void, being contrary to law.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests
are perfectly valid and effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary
to the testator's national law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the
distribution of this estate be made in such a manner as to include the herein
appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of partition
submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects.