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The pricing and selling of industrial products are considered in sections on decision
theory, bidding and personal selling. It is suggested that the marketing of consumer durables and semi-durables can be studied by means of models which use
aggregate data but that consumer panel data are needed for modelling consumer
expendable markets. Finally, some problems which might be suboptimized are
indicated.
INTRODUCTION
mathematical relationships, which will enable management to make more effective decisions. Consequently the models must be capable of forecasting the outcome of any decision and of comparing alternative decisions. Thus operational
research differs from market research as traditionally practised. The latter can
realistically be regarded as the application of statistical analyses to marketing
data to produce statistics, which can be used either by the marketing manager
in taking a decision or in the model to forecast and compare the results of decisions. This explains why there are few realistic operational research models in
marketing in spite of the enormous amount of data which has been collected
and analysed. Indeed much of what finds its way into the operational research
literature could be described more appropriately as sophisticated market research.
Obviously, in future the two cannot exist separately as each has much to offer to
the other and they must be regarded as the two halves of marketing research.
Marketing is a dynamic activity complicated by a high level of risk, which can
be attributed to two distinct causes. First, there is the uncertainty of how the
customers will react to any change. Model building can be very difficult when
customer behaviour depends on intangibles, such as product performance and
convenience, which are very difficult to quantify. Second, the effects of any
company's marketing policy will be influenced by the actions of its competitors.
Consequently any model must include the competitors' activities for which data
must necessarily be obtained and this is frequently far from easy. Indeed in an
environment where the objective of some of the participants is to ensure that
there will be no equilibrium, the data are changing continuously so that models
may be developed long after they could make a useful contribution to the deci-
sion taking. Any model must be either dynamic or capable of being used with
more recent data than those used in the model's construction.
17
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sequently, models appropriate for one type of market may not be appropriate
in another. Whilst the overall plan for the following sections is to consider
industrial products first, followed by consumer durables and then expendables,
there is much in common and the appropriate markets are indicated where
necessary.
A decision on where to store products and how much to stock ought not to
be taken without considering what variety should be sold and this is clearly an
DECISION THEORY
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that the second manufacturer ceased supplying the chain of stores or there might
be a price war. The sequence of decisions and their resulting states are set out
in the form of a decision tree in Figure 1, from which it can be seen that decision
and outcome follow each other in an alternating sequence which must be terminated at some point in a fairly arbitrary manner. This is essential because a
payoff must be assigned to the end of each branch of the tree. In Figure 1, these
are denoted by Cil, i = 1, 2 and j = 1, ..., 6. For example, the payoff if ther
is a price war after the manufacturer has ignored the chain stores' request for a
private label might be minus one million pounds.
estimated, and these are denoted by pi, where the probabilities of the outcom
of a decision must sum to unity. Thus the expected payoff of any decision can
be determined and the best decision is that which gives the greatest payoff, which
then becomes associated with the outcome which necessitated a decision. For
example, the expected payoff from attacking the customers of the alternative
supplier after ignoring the chain stores' request is P25 C25 +P26 C26, where
P26 = 1 -P25* If this is less than C24, then the better decision is not to retaliate
and C24 is the payoff associated with the chain stores' obtaining all their supplies
from elsewhere. Then P14 C14 +P5 C21 is the expected payoff of ignoring the
chain stores' request and if this is greater than both C11 and the expected payoff
when a price reduction is offered, the request should be ignored. Thus the best
strategy for the manufacturer is to ignore the chain stores' request and if the
stores obtain their supplies from another manufacturer, there should be no
attempt to attack the new supplier's other customers.
The reaction of many analysts to the non-repetitive problem is that they are
unable to assist the decision-taker. Being accustomed to probabilities based on
frequency theory and cost functions estimated from historical data by sophisti-
cated statistical methods, the subjective probabilities and payoffs of the Bayesian
decision theory approach are unfamiliar and there is scepticism about its value.
However, many of the problems facing the marketing manager fall into the
above category and cannot be ignored. First, the very act of formalizing the
decision process will ensure that it is faced realistically and that no alternative
collected. Frequently this operation will take the form of detailed discussions
sought from more than one source. It may be argued that management finds
it extremely difficult to determine probabilities to the final outcomes resulting
from actions in any situation. This is true partly because the problem is one of
assigning relative values to a large number of possible final outcomes. Typically
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coo
P-4~~~~~~
Cl
0~~~~~~~~~~~~0 C
oto
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and their probabilities are seldom precise and become less so as the sequence of
decisions is lengthened so that the shorter it is, the more accurate the results are
BIDDING
Suppose that the name of the winning company and its bid are both known.
At the time that a firm made its own bid, it would have estimated the value of
the contract to itself. For example, if a company is selling plastic to firms of
boulders, the worth of a contract might be taken as the tonnage. Thus the
winning bids of all the companies can be plotted as a function of the analysing
company's estimate of the contract value. When this is done, it is found that the
average unit price for any given sized contract is a non-linear monotonically
decreasing function of the estimated worth. Moreover, the variation about the
average winning bid price decreases as the size of the contract increases. This
phenomenon is entirely as would be expected and is illustrated in Figure 2. The
average price decreases because selling organizations obviously prefer to make
large sales rather than small ones. Apart from ensuring a larger market share,
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has a high value, then a marketing organization striving to win the contract will
not quote too high a price or it is certain to lose. On the other hand, if a
ridiculous price much below that of the competitors were quoted, then the
profit will only be small. Equally it is likely to adopt the attitude that if a high
price is quoted and wins, then the firm will make a good profit but if it loses,
then little total profit will have been missed. Hence loose prices, with the
consequent large unit price variation, are quoted for small contracts.
-IU
U )(
r
C~~~~ X
C
)X
.O
x
)<
0)%
x>KX
x X
X~- XXX_
Log (estimated worth)
Thus when a contract comes up for tender, the first step is to estimate the
worth. Then it may be argued that the distribution of winning bids for the
estimated worth should be determined. Essentially this would be done from the
data used in Figure 2 and the mean winning bid would be given by the curve
and the variance of the distribution would decrease as the mean decreased. If
the selling company wished to ensure that it has a 95 per cent chance of winning
the particular contract, the bid should be the value of the lower 5 per cent point
Alternatively, a company might wish to decide what prices to quote for a number
of different contracts for which it will be tendering and the company's objective
might be to maximize its profits subject to keeping its market share within
defined limits. Then since the probability gives the unit winning price as a
function of the worth, alias sales, the tendering prices may be obtained from the
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tially the approach used by Hanssmann and Rivett2 and may be reasonable if
a market is static or if the problem is the complementary one of purchasing in
a one-off situation, typified by the tendering for oil-drilling rights.
Unfortunately few markets are static and if one company were to reduce its
prices to the lower 5 per cent point of the winning price distribution, then other
companies would follow quickly and the lower 5 per cent point would rapidly
be transformed into the mean. Even if a company had computed the prices for
a sequence of bids in advance of the first tender in order to maximize its profits,
then the same result would occur if the calculations lead to the first few bids
being put in at low prices even if the intention were to put in the later bids at
higher prices. Thus the approach developed for a static market would have
disastrous results if used in a dynamic market, as it would rapidly take all the
profit out of the business.
The use of probabilities is often regarded as a form of sophistication and
the choice process is regarded as probabilistic, then the results are compatible.
However, probabilities are used either because the process is not understood
completely or because it is too complicated to be explained simply. Essentially,
probabilities provide a way of making this unnecessary by integrating over the
the unit price of winning bids does and it means that the position of a particular
winning bid relative to the mean for all contracts of the same estimated worth is
determined purely by chance. It implies that the bidders are irrational but this
is obviously not the case. If a bid, whether successful or not, is made at a higher
than average price, then it is likely to be for some good reason, such as that
the customer's factory is a long way from the seller's factory with consequent
high distribution costs. If the bid is below average, it might be that the marketing
organization needs the sales in order to keep its factories in production. In other
words, there are usually very good reasons for whether the winning bid to a
contract is above or below average. Simply stated, these are the objectives of
the different companies and how successful they are in achieving them. Thus if
bidding study is to model each competitor's policy. This involves looking at the
winning bids of Figure 2 in terms of the companies who won the contracts, their
sales position at the time of the bid, their production capacities and locations
and the characteristics, including location, of the customers. For example, the
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companies where its distribution costs, etc., would be least. This stage of the
study is far from easy. Even if the competitors' policies were known, much of
the data for the model would be unknown. For example, it is likely that a
competitor's capacity will have to be estimated from the bidding data rather
than being known from market intelligence. In a real situation, the competitors'
strategies are unknown so that it is necessary to estimate the parameters of the
models and to compare many different models. The mathematical modelling of
a policy can be very complex if the firm's bid for any contract relates to what
it expects to happen at future tenders as well as reflecting declared contracts. It
is desirable to formulate policies solely in terms of past events but even so the
analysis may have to resort to simulation.
If the unit price of the winning bid is unknown the approach to the problem
remains unchanged. However, for contracts which the analysing company failed
to win, only an upper bound for the successful price is known, i.e. the company's
own bid. A different approach is needed if the number of bidders is too large
for the policy of each competitor to be considered. In this case, one possibility
is to consider the price of the tender to be given by a Markov process, in which
both the price of the previous tender made by the company and its market share
are used.
Pricing in industrial markets has been the subject of this section and it was
used to illustrate the ideas of decision theory. In the bidding situation, prices
are submitted simultaneously and the lowest wins the contract. In the example,
there is a fixed price for all customers at any particular time. In many markets,
the price is fixed by a process which might be termed bidding with matching. A
competitor's salesman calls upon a firm and offers a price which is lower than
that which the firm is currently paying. Before accepting the offer, the firm tells
the present supplier's salesman, who has the opportunity to revise his price.
Thus he might decide to match the competitor's offer or he might take the
calculated risk of losing the business by changing his price to something higher
than the competitor's offer. This pricing problem is also one in which competitors' policies should be evaluated, where possible. The supplier's salesman's
reaction will take account of his estimate of the value of the quality of his
product, the service of his company and his own selling effort. The greater they
are, the less likely it is that the price offer will be fully matched. Thus the final
model must include these factors.
PERSONAL SELLING
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lished on these problems and Ackoff and Green3 give 117 references. For
example, the sales volume per customer in unit time was plotted against the
number of calls per unit time made by the salesmen of one large organization.
Although it had been anticipated that for a given class of customer, the curve
would have an S-shape, as shown in Figure 3, no correlation was found. Thus
it was concluded that the calling rate was too high and the number of calls was
0)
a) +7
CL
0)3
0)
reduced without any adverse effects on the company's business. In another case,
the sales were actually found to decrease when the calling rate increased to a
high level suggesting that customers began to resent the attentions of the salesmen. In spite of the large number of published papers, Ackoff and Green concluded that there has been little serious research in the application of quantitative
techniques to personal selling. The work has lacked operational significance and
generalizable research into the productivity of personal selling and its relationship to optimal total marketing models is practically non-existent. Since personal
selling effort is often the only major factor apart from price, the situation in
industrial marketing is probably satisfactory in that the relatively simple models
can be used. However, there remains much to be done in the more complex,
fixed proportion of the gross profit and the gross profit is determined as a given
proportion of the cost. Hence the advertising budget is a proportion of sales,
so that there is a linear relationship between the two. However, since it is the
sales which determine the advertising budget, any attempt to use the line to
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Kuehn and Rohloff4 have discussed a proposed model, in which the ratio of
the sales for a region in one year to those in the previous year were plotted for
different sales regions of America as a function of the ratio of advertising
expenditure in the region for the year to the sales in the previous year. A line
fitted the data extremely well so that it might be concluded that the line could
be used to allocate advertising expenditure to the sales regions for the following
year. However, the sales regions were of different population sizes and the
marketing management had related the advertising budgets to such measures
when making the appropriations. But since sales are related to the size of the
population, the advertising budgets had been implicitly related to the sales so
that the cause-effect relationship was reversed. Moreover, each pair of variables
had a common denominator in the form of the previous year's sales for a region
and this produced a spuriously high correlation.
The two previous examples of fallacious arguments relate to static models.
the difference between its market share and its share of the total market advertising. This is expressed mathematically by the first-order Markov model:
St-St-, = K(at-St-,),
where St = market share in tth period
and at:= brand's share of total market advertising expenditure in tth period.
Now if at were constant, then the model gives an exponential growth or decline
of sales and indeed the starting point of many models is to assume an exponen-
tial change. Thus if it is reasonable to assume this exponential change, then the
dynamic difference formula is likely to fit well but the advertising share adds
little to the prediction of sales. A further objection to this formula is that it
implies that K will be the same constant for all brands.
The inference to be drawn from the preceding three examples of this section
is that it is ridiculously easy to confuse cause and effect when constructing
marketing models with historical, aggregate data. Because of this, it has been
argued that marketing models should only use data from experiments or data
relating to individual purchasers or households. Carrying out experiments
conditioning makes the linear multiple regression approach, of which the three
preceding examples are all simple cases, of doubtful value. Even if there is no
ambiguity in the interpretation of the resulting relationships, the predictions
are usually insensitive to large changes in the set of coefficients. However, these
difficulties can be overcome by constructing models, which are capable of explicit
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structuring so finely that historical, aggregate data would both be too coarse
and average over too long a period. Thus in such a market, it is necessary to use
consumer panel data.
wish to retail it and those who already sell the line are going to carry larger
stocks and probably therefore give the product better display. The second stage
is to persuade the consumer to buy the product from the retailer. In very recent
research not yet published, Emshoff and Mercer have considered the sales of a
particular product to the consumer to be primarily dependent on price, distribution and the advertising of all companies in the market. The advertising expenditure in a given period of time was assumed to still have some, although reduced
effect in later time periods and a non-linear transformation was made. The form
of this was based on market research studies although the parameters were
estimated from the model itself. The reason for this transformation is that
increasing the advertising effort by a certain proportion does not mean that its
effectiveness will increase by the same proportion. Many alternative but plausible
market mechanisms were modelled and the best was also the most realistic in
that advertising of all competitors contributed to the customers' awareness. The
conversion into sales was allowed to differ between companies and the advertising to sales conversion ratios were estimated from the data. In some of the
models, press and television advertising were considered separately. The value
of tied outlets was considered and the increased sales of a new product were
assumed to be made to customers who heard about it either from advertisements
or from retailers or from friends who had already bought the product. In the
final analysis, the models for the two stages must be brought together to formulate operational rules. Then it might be thought that one composite model
should be created by substituting the distribution function of the first model in
the second model. If this is done, then the sales in one period are a function of
those in the previous period and, of course, many models start with this assumption and ignore distribution entirely. However, whilst such a model might give
a good forecast of future sales for different strategies, it fails to convey the
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Thus at best they may be regarded as giving some indication of the likely
functional form for part of the total marketing model.
nature of most markets dictates that the data should be closely tied to the time
and point of the sale. One source of such data is the consumer panel, which is
usually a sample of housewives who are demographically and geographically
Consumer panel data are obviously a rich source of information and they
have been subjected to much difficult analysis in order to try to express pur-
The work of Herniter5 is typical of much in this field and examples of the
kind of results are given in Table 1. The variable 0 in the purchase sequence
signifies that some other brand was purchased and the variable 1 indicates that
the brand in question was bought. Thus the sequence 011 means that the brand
being studied was bought on the last two occasions and some other brand was
bought on the previous occasion and then the probability that the brand was
bought at the next purchase after this sequence was observed to be 0-64. The
binomial model assumes that each customer has a given set of probabilities of
buying the different brands and that there is a prior distribution of this probability set over the population of customers.
not change with time. Thus the same probability of 0 37 is associated with the
three sequences 001, 010 and 100, reflecting the fact that predictions depend only
on the number of l's in the sequence rather than their position and this is
only on whether or not the brand was purchased on the previous occasion and
purchase transition matrix does not change with time. In the simple case, this
transition matrix is assumed to be the same for all customers, whereas in the
Bayesian case a symmetrical 2 x 2 matrix is assumed and the transition probability has a distribution over the population. The quantitative fits to the data
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054
054
053
050
050
0-14 015
056 051
044 049
086 085
but
even
then
the objective of the authors of papers on consumer models must have been to
first fit models to the purchase data and then to fit the parameters of them to
the causal factors. In other words, the models so far have been nothing more
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sophisticated tool of market research. However, it seems that the best way of
using panel data is to simulate market behaviour in different, alternative environ
ments. This avoids much of the controversial data analysis, the conceptual
difficulties and the complex mathematics. Such a simulation would include consumer's attitudes, purchases and experiences of competing brands as they are
influenced by the products' characteristics, distribution, packaging, price, instore promotion and advertising. The market research which has been carried
out has been very useful in highlighting characteristics which must be explained
and included in the simulation models. More needs to be done, but the objective
of providing an operational tool for decision making must not be overlooked as
it appears to have been in the past.
One Markovian model using panel data which has proved useful in analysing
data for decision taking is the linear learning model which was first proposed by
Kuehn and Day.6 In this, the probability of buying the brand at the previous
purchase is the state variable rather than the brand bought at the last purchase.
Thus if the probability of purchasing the brand at the nth purchase is p(n) and
the brand is actually purchased on that occasion, then:
p(n?+1) (l-a)p(n)+bs
and the predictions made by the learning model, aggregated for the whole
market. For such short-range predictions, the assumed linearity of learning may
well be unimportant. However, the model must not be used for comparing
promotions of different products but rather for comparing promotions of the
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small and both the operators approach the diagonal. For light buyers, a and b
tend to one and the operators approach the horizontal. Obviously in using the
I / t ~~~~~~~~b (1-s)
Gain
operator
a-b
pin+I)
i j operator
bs{_
(n)
learning model, these differences in habit must be taken into account. Either the
model must be used for individual customers and the prediction for each used
to derive a market estimate or the customers must be grouped and group predictions used to estimate the overall market effect. In both cases, the marketing
organization must decide whether or not an average weighted with offtake is
used for the total market. Clearly there are also difficulties in determining operational measures of the success of a deal because some of the customers who were
attracted by the deal might not be converted to the brand and revert to a
competitor's product. Thus different conclusions might be reached if the sales
of the product over a 3-month period after the deal were used rather than the
sales during the deal. It is obvious that the parameters of the model should be
estimated from data for short periods before the deal. However, only experience
with particular products can determine how the probability at a purchase should
be estimated from the previous probability if the deal were taking place then
but the assumption was necessarily one of no dealing. One possible solution
would be to proceed as though there were no deal and another would be to use
the equation involving the expected probabilities. In all this, it is necessary to
watch for competitor's activities which might give rise to a misleading interpretation. The estimates of the effects of deals enable marketing management to
realistically compare alternative deals and should be invaluable in the construction of models containing all the major marketing factors. Collecting data for
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However, this should not imply that a study of personal selling alone in the
consumer field would not be rewarding if it were carried out carefully. One
reason for this is because it seems that the sales force cannot be reorganized
with the same frequency with which new promotional campaigns can be
mounted. Hence the personal selling cannot be truly optimal all the time.
Because it appears to be more difficult for a company to monitor the personal
selling of its competitors, this aspect seems to be. less competitive and hence
there does not seem to be the constant pressure for change. Suboptimizing the
The number of product lines and items per line must also influence the success
and profitability of any marketing organization, but it is seldom studied by the
analyst as part of the total marketing model or even on its own. The efficiency
of personal selling decreases if the product range is too large because the salesman is reduced to a passive role. However, if it is suggested that some lines or
items of a line should be dropped, which in most cases would also increase
production efficiency, the salesman will object because he fears that competitors
will acquire the business. Moreover, he believes that competitors would then be
in a strong position to successfully attack his sales of the continuing lines so
that he would eventually lose all his business. This highlights one of the two
difficulties in that any study of the product range must either predict the longterm effects of any changes in addition to the short-term results or the study
must be adaptive over a long time. In some markets, the reaction to any change
might come directly from the marketing organization's customers, but in others
the reaction will only reflect the behaviour of the ultimate consumers. Hence it
is necessary to know how this consumer will react to being unable to obtain a
behaviour might vary at successive attempted purchases and will depend on the
consumers' size, product and brand loyalties. Thus it is obvious that the second
difficulty is that of obtaining adequate data even in slow-moving markets and
the best solution would appear to be to carry out market experiments.
One of the reasons that it is necessary to cut out old lines is that new products
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successful and what market share is going to be obtained. Two typical curves
for new product sales with time are given in Figure 5, where the sales for the
first four time periods are plotted. In one case, many of those who are attracted
to the product continue to buy, whereas in the other there is a smaller conversion
rate. This might make the difference between success and failure but if only the
sales were plotted as a function of time, no distinction could be made after four
0 1 High conversion
rote
x
x/ \ Low conversion
Time
of turbulence in the market and may also be used for deciding whether a
particular moment in time is opportune for introducing a new product. None
of this work on new product introductions is causal so that whilst marketing
management may decide whether or not to continue a particular promotion,
the question of how much money should be devoted to a launch and how it
should be allocated still remains to be answered.
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data on this aspect. Since the objective of all advertising must be to eventually
affect the product sales, this might be very serious and there is a need to demonstrate that extensive calculations using data which are expensive to acquire are
not worthless because of this weakness. Media scheduling is certainly an area
in which it is very reasonable to suboptimize in the sense of getting the best
value for a predetermined cost. However, the results will also depend on the
quality of the advertising material, so that it might be worth while spending
more or less on the number of truly alternative advertisements which are
This paper was read at the First Research Conference of the Department of Operational
Research of the University of Lancaster and I am grateful to those who contributed to
the discussion. I am also indebted to all those with whom I have talked about marketing
problems during the years in which my present views have developed.
REFERENCES
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