Vergara v.

CA
Facts:
A vehicular accident occurred on August 5, 1979, when Martin Belmonte, while driving a
cargo truck belonging to petitioner Vicente Vergara, rammed the store-residence of
private respondent Amadeo Azarcon, causing damage assessed at P53,024.22. The trial
court rendered decision in favor of private respondent, ordering the petitioner to pay,
jointly and severally with Travellers Insurance and Surety Corporation, the following: (a)
P53,024.22 as actual damages; (b) P10,000.00 as moral damages; (c) P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages; and (d) the sum of P5,000.00 for attorney's fees and the costs. The
insurance company was sentenced to pay to the petitioner the following: (a) P50,000.00
for third party liability under its comprehensive accident insurance policy; and (b)
P3,000.00 for and as attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision in toto;
hence, this instant petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner is guilty of quasi-delict
Held:
It was established by competent evidence that the requisites of a quasi-delict are
present in the case at bar. These requisites are: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2)
negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant, or some person for whose acts he
must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between such
negligence and the damages. The fact of negligence may be deduced from the
surrounding circumstances thereof. According to the police report, "the cargo truck was
travelling on the right side of the road going to Manila and then it crossed to the center
line and went to the left side of the highway; it then bumped a tricycle; and then another
bicycle; and then said cargo truck rammed the store warehouse of the plaintiff."
According to the driver of the cargo truck, he applied the brakes but the latter did not
work due to mechanical defect. Contrary to the claim of the petitioner, a mishap caused
by defective brakes can not be consideration as fortuitous in character. Certainly, the
defects were curable and the accident preventable.

FGU Insurance Corp. v. CA

Facts:
On April 21, 1987, a car owned by private respondent FILCAR Transport Inc., rented to
and driven by Dahl-Jensen, a Danish tourist, swerved into the right and hit the car owned
by Lydia Soriano and driven by Benjamin Jacildone. Dahl-Jensen did not possess a
Philippine drivers license. Petitioner, as the insurer of Sorianos car, paid the latter
P25,382.20 and, by way of subrogation, sued FILCAR, Dahl-Jensen, and Fortune
Insurance Corporation, FILCARs insurer, for quasi-delict. The trial court dismissed the
petition for failure to substantiate the claim for subrogation. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision, but on the ground that only Dahl-Jensens negligence was proven,
not that of FILCAR. Hence, this instant petition.
Issues:
(1) Whether an action based on quasi-delict will prosper against a rent-a-car company
and, consequently, its insurer for fault or negligence of the car lessee in driving the
rented vehicle
(2) Whether the ruling in MYC-Agro-Industrial Corporation v. Vda. de Caldo is applicable
in the case at bar
Held:
(1) We find no reversible error committed by respondent court in upholding the dismissal
of petitioner's complaint. The pertinent provision is Art. 2176 of the Civil Code which
states: "Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict . . . . ". To
sustain a claim based thereon, the following requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered
by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and, (c) connection of cause and
effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the
plaintiff. We agree with respondent court that petitioner failed to prove the existence of
the second requisite, i.e., fault or negligence of defendant FILCAR, because only the fault
or negligence of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently established, not that of FILCAR. It should be
noted that the damage caused on the vehicle of Soriano was brought about by the
circumstance that Dahl-Jensen swerved to the right while the vehicle that he was driving
was at the center lane. It is plain that the negligence was solely attributable to DahlJensen thus making the damage suffered by the other vehicle his personal liability.
Respondent FILCAR did not have any participation therein. Respondent FILCAR being
engaged in a rent-a-car business was only the owner of the car leased to Dahl-Jensen. As
such, there was no vinculum juris between them as employer and employee. Respondent
FILCAR cannot in any way be responsible for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen, the former
not being an employer of the latter.

(2) Petitioner's insistence on MYC-Agro-Industrial Corporation is rooted in a

misapprehension of our ruling therein. In that case, the negligent and reckless operation
of the truck owned by petitioner corporation caused injuries to several persons and
damage to property. Intending to exculpate itself from liability, the corporation raised the
defense that at the time of the collision it had no more control over the vehicle as it was
leased to another; and, that the driver was not its employee but of the lessee. The trial
court was not persuaded as it found that the true nature of the alleged lease contract
was nothing more than a disguise effected by the corporation to relieve itself of the
burdens and responsibilities of an employer. We upheld this finding and affirmed the
declaration of joint and several liability of the corporation with its driver.

Air France vs Caroscoso

In March 1958, Rafael Carrascoso and several other Filipinos were tourists en route to
Rome from Manila. Carrascoso was issued a first class round trip ticket by Air France. But
during a stop-over in Bangkok, he was asked by the plane manager of Air France to
vacate his seat because a white man allegedly has a better right than him. Carrascoso
protested but when things got heated and upon advise of other Filipinos on board,
Carrascoso gave up his seat and was transferred to the planes tourist class.
After their tourist trip when Carrascoso was already in the Philippines, he sued Air France
for damages for the embarrassment he suffered during his trip. In court, Carrascoso
testified, among others, that he when he was forced to take the tourist class, he went to
the planes pantry where he was approached by a plane purser who told him that he
noted in the planes journal the following:
First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the
captain refused to intervene
The said testimony was admitted in favor of Carrascoso. The trial court eventually
awarded damages in favor of Carrascoso. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Air France is assailing the decision of the trial court and the CA. It avers that the issuance
of a first class ticket to Carrascoso was not an assurance that he will be seated in first
class because allegedly in truth and in fact, that was not the true intent between the
parties.
Air France also questioned the admissibility of Carrascosos testimony regarding the note
made by the purser because the said note was never presented in court.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not Air France is liable for damages and on what basis.
ISSUE 2: Whether or not the testimony of Carrasoso regarding the note which was not
presented in court is admissible in evidence.

HELD 1: Yes. It appears that Air Frances liability is based on culpa-contractual and on
culpa aquiliana.
Culpa Contractual
There exists a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso. There was a
contract to furnish Carrasocoso a first class passage; Second, That said contract was
breached when Air France failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok;
and Third, that there was bad faith when Air Frances employee compelled Carrascoso to
leave his first class accommodation berth after he was already, seated and to take a
seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments
and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded
feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages.
The Supreme Court did not give credence to Air Frances claim that the issuance of a first
class ticket to a passenger is not an assurance that he will be given a first class seat.
Such claim is simply incredible.
Culpa Aquiliana
Here, the SC ruled, even though there is a contract of carriage between Air France and
Carrascoso, there is also a tortuous act based on culpa aquiliana. Passengers do not
contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carriers
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to
be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses
from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of
employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the
carrier. Air Frances contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress
of Carrascosos action is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public
duty by the Air France a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
HELD: 2: Yes. The testimony of Carrascoso must be admitted based on res gestae. The
subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry does
not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is
admissible. Besides, when the dialogue between Carrascoso and the purser happened,
the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The
excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then, in this environment, are
admissible as part of the res gestae. The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in
the notebook was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident.
Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay
rule. It forms part of the res gestae

G.R. No. L-9356

February 18, 1915
Lessons Applicable: Interference with Contractual Relations (Torts and Damages)
Laws Applicable: Article 1902 (old law)
GILCHRIST VS CUDDY
FACTS:

Cuddy was the owner of the film Zigomar

April 24: He rented it to C. S. Gilchrist for a week for P125

A few days to the date of delivery, Cuddy sent the money back to Gilchrist

Cuddy rented the film to Espejo and his partner Zaldarriaga P350 for the week
knowing that it was rented to someone else and that Cuddy accepted it because
he was paying about three times as much as he had contracted with Gilchrist but
they didn't know the identity of the other party

Gilchrist filed for injunction against these parties

Trial Court and CA: granted - there is a contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy

ISSUE: W/N Espejo and his partner Zaldarriaga should be liable for damages though they
do not know the identity of Gilchrist
HELD: YES. judgment is affirmed

That Cuddy was liable in an action for damages for the breach of that contract,
there can be no doubt.

the mere right to compete could not justify the appellants in intentionally inducing
Cuddy to take away the appellee's contractual rights
o Everyone has a right to enjoy the fruits and advantages of his own
enterprise, industry, skill and credit. He has no right to be free from
malicious and wanton interference, disturbance or annoyance. If disturbance
or loss come as a result of competition, or the exercise of like rights by
others, it is damnum absque injuria(loss without injury), unless some
superior right by contract or otherwise is interfered with
o Cuddy contract on the part of the appellants was a desire to make a profit by
exhibiting the film in their theater. There was no malice beyond this desire;
but this fact does not relieve them of the legal liability for interfering with
that contract and causing its breach.

liability of the appellants arises from unlawful acts and not from contractual
obligations, as they were under no such obligations to induce Cuddy to violate his
contract with Gilchrist

So that if the action of Gilchrist had been one for damages, it would be governed
by chapter 2, title 16, book 4 of the Civil Code.
o Article 1902 of that code provides that a person who, by act or omission,
causes damages to another when there is fault or negligence, shall be
obliged to repair the damage do done
o There is nothing in this article which requires as a condition precedent to the
liability of a tort-feasor that he must know the identity of a person to whom
he causes damages

An injunction is a "special remedy" which was there issued by the authority and
under the seal of a court of equity, and limited, as in order cases where equitable
relief is sought, to cases where there is no "plain, adequate, and complete remedy
at law," which "will not be granted while the rights between the parties are
undetermined, except in extraordinary cases where material and irreparable injury
will be done," which cannot be compensated in damages, and where there will be
no adequate remedy, and which will not, as a rule, be granted, to take property out
of the possession of one party and put it into that of another whose title has not
been established by law

o irreparable injury

not meant such injury as is beyond the possibility of repair, or beyond

possible compensation in damages, nor necessarily great injury or
great damage, but that species of injury, whether great or small, that
ought not to be submitted to on the one hand or inflicted on the other;
and, because it is so large on the one hand, or so small on the other, is
of such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair or reasonable
redress can be had therefor in a court of law

Gilchrist was facing the immediate prospect of diminished profits by reason of the
fact that the appellants had induced Cuddy to rent to them the film Gilchrist had
counted upon as his feature film
o It is quite apparent that to estimate with any decree of accuracy the
damages which Gilchrist would likely suffer from such an event would be
quite difficult if not impossible

So far as the preliminary injunction issued against the appellants is concerned,

which prohibited them from exhibiting the Zigomar during the week which Gilchrist
desired to exhibit it, we are of the opinion that the circumstances justified the
issuance of that injunction in the discretion of the court

the remedy by injunction cannot be used to restrain a legitimate competition,

though such competition would involve the violation of a contract

Separate Opinion:

MORELAND, J., concurring:

o The court seems to be of the opinion that the action is one for a permanent
injunction; whereas, under my view of the case, it is one for specific
performance.
o The very nature of the case demonstrates that a permanent injunction is out
of the question. The only thing that plaintiff desired was to be permitted to
use the film for the week beginning the 26th of May. With the termination of
that week his rights expired. After that time Cuddy was perfectly free to turn
the film over to the defendants Espejo and Zaldarriaga for exhibition at any
time.
o No damages are claimed by reason of the issuance of the mandatory
injunction under which the film was delivered to plaintiff and used by him
during the week beginning the 26th of May.

PEOPLES BANK V DAHICAN LUMBER

May 16, 1967
SUBJECT MATTER: Chattel mortgage-subject matter: machinery
I. FACTS
A.
Dahican lumber company (DAMCO) obtained several loans amounting to 250,000pesos
from Peoples bank (BANK) and ,together with DALCO, another loan amounting to$250,000 from
Export-Import bank secured by five promissory notes through peoples bank. In both loans,
DAMCO executed and registered respective mortgages with inclusion of after acquired
properties. DAMCO and DALCO failed to satisfy the fifth promissory note in favor of Export bank
so Peoples bank paid it and subsequently filed an action for the foreclosure of the mortgaged
properties of DAMCO including the after acquired machinery, equipment and spare parts upon
the latter's failure to fulfill its obligation.
B. Contention of the Petitioner
Peoples bank asserted that the after acquired machinery and equipment of DAMCO are
subject to the deed of mortgage executed by DAMCO. Hence, these can be included in the
foreclosure proceedings.
C. Contentions of the Respondent
DALCO argued that the mortgages were void as regards the after acquired
propertiesbecause they were not registered in accordance with the chattel mortgage law.
Moreover,provision of the fourth paragraph of each of said mortgages did not automatically
makesubject to such mortgages the "after acquired properties", the only meaning thereof
beingthat the mortgagor was willing to constitute a lien over such properties.
II. ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED
Whether the after acquired machinery and equipment of DAMCO are included as
subjectof the Real Estate mortgage, thus can be foreclosed.
III. RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT
Judgment rendered in favor of Plaintiff Peoples bank. The after acquired machinery and
equipment are included in the executed mortgages. It is not disputed in the case at bar that the
"after acquired properties" were purchased by DALCO in connection with, and for use in the
development of its lumber concession and that they were purchased in addition to, or in
replacement of those already existing in the premises on July 13, 1950. In Law, therefore, they
must be deemed to have been immobilized, with the result that the real estate mortgages

involved herein which were registered as such did not have to be registered a second time as
chattel mortgages in order to bind the "after acquired properties" and affect third parties. Under
the fourth paragraph of both deeds of mortgage, it is crystal clear that all property of every
nature and description taken in exchange or replacement, as well as all buildings, machineries,
fixtures, tools, equipments, and other property that the mortgagor may acquire, construct,
install, attach; or use in, to upon, or in connection with the premises that is, its lumber
concession "shall immediately be and become subject to the lien" of both mortgages in the
same manner and to the same extent as if already included therein at the time of
their execution. As the language thus used leaves no room for doubt as to the intention of the
parties, We see no useful purpose in discussing the matter extensively. Suffice it to say that the
stipulation referred to is common, and We might say logical, in all cases where the properties
given as collateral are perishable or subject to inevitable wear and tear or were intended to be
sold, or to be used thus becoming subject to the inevitable wear and tear but with the
understanding express or implied that they shall be replaced with others to be thereafter
acquired by the mortgagor. Such stipulation is neither unlawful nor immoral, its obvious purpose
being to maintain, to the extent allowed by circumstances, the original value of the properties
given as security. Indeed, if such properties were of the nature already referred to, it would be
poor judgment on the part of the creditor who does not see to it that a similar provision is
included in the contract.

CORLISS vs. MANILA RAILROAD CO.

Facts:
Plaintiffs husband was driving a jeep close to midnight at the railroad crossing in
Balobago, Angeles, Pampanga on February 21, 1957. Defendants train was passing by
and blew its siren. Plaintiffs husband slowed down his jeep but did not make a full stop.
The jeep collided with the locomotive engine of the train. Plaintiffs husband was injured
and died as a result of such injuries. Plaintiff brought an action for damages for the death
of her husband.
Issue: WON the plaintiff can recover damages.
Ruling: Complaint Dismissed
Ratio: A person in control of an automobile who crosses a railroad, even at a regular
road crossing, and who does not exercise that precaution and that control over it as to be
able to stop the same almost immediately upon the appearance of a train, is guilty of
crominal negligence, providing a collission occurs and injury results. The accident was
caused by the negligence of plaintiffs husband and she was not allowed to recover.

RCPI VS CA
Loreto Dionela received a telegram via the Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc.
(RCPI). However, at the end of the telegram were the following:
SA IYO WALANG PAKINABANG DUMATING KA DIYAN WALA KANG PADALA DITO KAHIT
BULBUL MO
The said portion of the telegram was not intended for Loreto. Loreto sued RCPI for
damages based on Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 19.- Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
ART. 20.-Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
In its defense, RCPI averred that there was no intention to malign Loreto and that the
attached message was an insider joke between RCPI employees which was not meant to
be attached. RCPI also disclaimed liability as it insisted it should be held liable for the
libelous acts of its employees.
Loreto however averred that the said message was read by his employees and it affected
greatly his business reputation. The trial court ruled in favor of Loreto. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the liability of RCPI is
predicated under Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court. The cause
of action of private respondent is based on Articles 19 and 20 of the new Civil Code as
well as respondents breach of contract thru negligence of its own employees. RCPI is not
being sued for its subsidiary liability.
RCPI was negligent as it failed to take the necessary or precautionary steps to avoid the
occurrence of the humiliating incident now complained of. The company had not imposed
any safeguard against such eventualities and this void in its operating procedure does
not speak well of its concern for their clienteles interests. Negligence here is very
patent. This negligence is imputable to appellant and not to its employees. RCPI should
be held liable for the acts of its employees. As a corporation, RCPI acts and conducts its
business through its employees. It cannot now disclaim liability for the acts of its
employees. To hold that the RCPI is not liable directly for the acts of its employees in the
pursuit of its business is to deprive the general public availing of the services of RCPI of
an effective and adequate remedy.

PICART vs. SMITH, JR.

G.R. No. L-12219
March 15, 1918
FACTS: On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart was riding on his pony over said
bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, Smith approached from the opposite
direction in an automobile. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it
and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he
had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the
man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road.
Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being
perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the
pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the
left. He says that the reason he did this was that he thought he did not have sufficient
time to get over to the other side. As the automobile approached, Smith guided it toward
his left, that being the proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing the defendant
assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. Seeing that the pony was

apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some distance
away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse without
diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of
the horse getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned his car
sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse; but in so doing the automobile
passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its
body across the bridge, got hit by the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its
rider was thrown off with some violenceAs a result of its injuries the horse died. The
plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required
medical attention for several days.
From a judgment of the CFI of La Union absolving Smith from liability Picart has
appealed.
ISSUE: WON Smith was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to
repair the damage done
HELD: the judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and judgment is here rendered
that the Picart recover of Smith damages
YES
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be
stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person
would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The
existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal
judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be
reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence
and determines liability by that. The question as to what would constitute the conduct of
a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of
human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case.
Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the
course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard
against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion
born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated
in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a
given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of
the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently
probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that
negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant,
would in our opinion, have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was
fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as

reasonable consequence of that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on
the Smith the duty to guard against the threatened harm.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty
of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we
have already stated, Smith was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to
discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the
negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the
defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under
these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the
impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without
reference to the prior negligence of the other party.

JARCO MKTG VS CA
G.R. No. 129792 December 21, 1999

Lessons Applicable: Good Father of a Family (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:

May 9 1983: Criselda and her 6 year-old daughter Zhieneth were at the 2nd floor of
Syvel's Department Store, Makati City.
o While Criselda was signing her credit card slip at the counter, she felt a
sudden gust of wind and heard a loud thud. As she looked behind her, she
saw Zhieneth's body pinned by the bulk of the store's gift-wrapping
counter/structure. Zhieneth was crying and screaming for help. Although
shocked, Criselda was quick to ask the assistance of the people around in
lifting the counter and retrieving Zhieneth from the floor. Zhieneth was
quickly rushed to the Makati Medical Center where she was operated on.

Next day: Zhieneth lost her speech and communicated by writing on a magic
slate.

14 days after: She died on the hospital bed.

attributed to the injuries she sustained.

After the burial of their daughter, Criselda demanded upon Jarco Marketing the
reimbursement of the hospitalization, medical bills and wake and funeral
expenses which they had incurred. But, they refused to pay.

Criselda filed a complaint for damages

The cause of her death was

o Jarco Marketing: answered with counterclaim and denied any liability.

Criselda was negligent in exercising care and diligence over her

daughter by allowing her to freely roam around in a store filled with
glassware and appliances. Zhieneth too, was guilty of contributory
negligence since she climbed the counter, triggering its eventual
collapse on her. Petitioners also emphasized that the counter was
made of sturdy wood with a strong support; it never fell nor collapsed
for the past fifteen years since its construction.

maintained that it observed the diligence of a good father of a family in

the selection, supervision and control of its employees.

trial court dismissed the complaint and counterclaim

o proximate cause of the fall of the counter on Zhieneth was her act of clinging
to it.

CA: favored Criselda judgment. It found that petitioners were negligent in

maintaining a structurally dangerous counter. The counter was shaped like an
inverted "L" with a top wider than the base. It was top heavy and the weight of the
upper portion was neither evenly distributed nor supported by its narrow base.
Thus, the counter was defective, unstable and dangerous; a downward pressure on

the overhanging portion or a push from the front could cause the counter to fall.
Two former employees of petitioners had already previously brought to the
attention of the management the danger the counter could cause. But the latter
ignored their concern.
ISSUE: W/N Jarco marketing was negligent or it was an accident
HELD: YES. CA affirmed

accident
o pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to
the defendant
o a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening
o an event happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or
partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is
unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens
o occurs when the person concerned is exercising ordinary care, which is not
caused by fault of any person and which could not have been prevented by
any means suggested by common prudence

negligence
o omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would
do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would
not do
o the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person,
that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury

Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist with the
other

Under the circumstances thus described, it is unthinkable for Zhieneth, a child of

such tender age and in extreme pain, to have lied to a doctor whom she trusted
with her life. W

Without doubt, Panelo and another store supervisor were personally informed of
the danger posed by the unstable counter. Yet, neither initiated any concrete
action to remedy the situation nor ensure the safety of the store's employees and
patrons as a reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have done. Thus, as
confronted by the situation petitioners miserably failed to discharge the due
diligence required of a good father of a family.

Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive presumption

that favors children below 9 years old in that they are incapable of contributory
negligence. In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age is conclusively
presumed to have acted without discernment, and is, on that account, exempt
from criminal liability. The same presumption and a like exemption from criminal
liability obtains in a case of a person over nine and under fifteen years of age,
unless it is shown that he has acted with discernment.

Even if we attribute contributory negligence to Zhieneth and assume that she

climbed over the counter, no injury should have occurred if we accept petitioners'
theory that the counter was stable and sturdy.

Criselda too, should be absolved from any contributory negligence.

o Initially, Zhieneth held on to CRISELDA's waist, and only momentarily
released the child's hand from her clutch when she signed her credit card
slip. At this precise moment, it was reasonable and usual for her to let go of
her child.
o Further, at the time Zhieneth was pinned down by the counter, she was just
a foot away from her mother; and the gift-wrapping counter was just 4
meters away - time and distance were both significant.

METROPOLITAN BANK V. CA
FACTS:
Gomez opened an account with Golden Savings bank and deposited 38 treasury
warrants. All these warrants were indorsed by the cashier of Golden Savings,
and deposited it to the savings account in a Metrobank branch. They were sent
later on for clearing by the branch office to the principal office of Metrobank,
which forwarded them to the Bureau of Treasury for special clearing.
On
persistent inquiries on whether the warrants have been cleared, the branch manager
allowed withdrawal of the warrants, only to find out later on that the treasury
warrants
have
been
dishonored.

HELD:
The treasury warrants were not negotiable instruments. Clearly, it is indicated
that it was non-negotiable and of equal significance is the indication that they

are payable from a particular fund, Fund 501. This indication as the source of
payment
to
be
made
on
the
treasury
warrant
makes the promise to pay conditional and the warrants themselves nonnegotiable.
Metrobank then cannot contend that by indorsing the warrants in general, GS assumed
that they were genuine and in all respects what they purport it to be, in accordance to
Section 66 of the NIL. The simple reason is that the law isnt applicable to the nonnegotiable treasury warrants.
The indorsement was made for the purpose of
merely depositing them with Metrobank for clearing. It was in fact Metrobank
which stamped on the back of the warrants: All prior indorsements and/or lack of
endorsements guaranteed

PETER PAUL PATRICK LUCAS, et al. vs. DR. PROSPERO MA. C. TUAO
G.R. NO. 178763 21 April 2009
DOCTRINES:
In a medical negligence suit, the patient or his heirs, in order to prevail, is required to
prove by preponderance of evidence that the physician failed to exercise that degree of skill,
care, and learning possessed by other persons in the same profession; and that as a proximate
result of such failure, the patient or his heirs suffered damages.
There is breach of duty of care, skill and diligence, or the improper performance of such
duty, by the attending physician when the patient is injured in body or in health constitutes the
actionable malpractice.
FACTS:
Herein petitioner, Peter Lucas, first consulted respondent, Dr. Tuao, on a complaint of soreness
and redness on his right eye. The respondent, after a series of examinations, found that the

former was suffering from conjunctivitis or sore eyes and prescribed the use of the SpersacetC. However, after the petitioners condition seemed to have worsened, he sought for the
respondents second finding wherein the latter said that his condition had progressed to
Epidemic Kerato Conjunctivitis (EKC), a viral infection. The respondent then prescribed the use of
Maxitrol, a steroid-based eye drop. The petitioners condition worsened overtime, yet he
obediently complied with all the prescriptions and orders of the respondent.
Four months later and after the petitioner suffered from significant swelling of his right
eyeball, headaches, nausea and blindness on this right eye, he sought for the opinion of another
doctor, Dr. Aquino. Dr. Aquino found that the petitioner had been suffering from glaucoma and
needed to undergo laser surgery, lest he might suffer from total blindness.
After reading the literature on the use of the medicine Maxitrol, Fatima, one of the
petitioners herein and Peter Lucas wife, read that one of the adverse effects of prolonged use of
steroid-based eye drops could possibly be glaucoma. Peter, Fatima, and their two children
instituted a civil case for damages against herein respondent for medical malpractice.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners amply proved that Dr. Tuao failed to exercise diligence in the
performance of his duty as petitioner Peter Lucas physician.
RULING:
No.
Absent a definitive standard of care or diligence required of Dr. Tuao under the
circumstances, the Court has no yardstick upon which to evaluate the attendant facts of the case
at hand to be able to state with confidence that the acts complained of, indeed, constituted
negligence and, thus, should be the subject of pecuniary reparation.
In medical negligence cases, also called medical malpractice suits, there exist a physicianpatient relationship between the doctor and the victim. But just like any other proceeding for
damages, four essential (4) elements i.e., (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) injury; and (4) proximate
causation, must be established by the plaintiff/s. All the four (4) elements must co-exist in order
to find the physician negligent and, thus, liable for damages.
As the physician has the duty to use at least the same level of care as that of any other
reasonably competent physician would use in the treatment of his patient, said standard level of
care, skill and diligence must likewise be proven by expert medical testimony, because the
standard of care in a medical malpractice case is a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of
experts in the field. The same is outside the ken of the average layperson.
There is breach of duty of care, skill and diligence, or the improper performance of such
duty, by the attending physician when the patient is injured in body or in health [and this]
constitutes the actionable malpractice. Hence, proof of breach of duty on the part of the
attending physician is insufficient. Rather, the negligence of the physician must be the proximate
cause of the injury.

Flores vs Pineda (GR No. 158996 November 14, 2008)

Facts: Teresita Pineda consulted her townmate Dr. Fredelicto Flores regarding her
medical condition, complaining about general body weakness, loss of appetite, frequent
urination and thirst, and on-and-off vaginal bleeding. After interviewing Teresita, Dr.
Fredelicto advised her to go to United Doctors Medical Center (UDMC) in Quezon City for
a general check-up the following week but the former did not. As for her other
symptoms, he suspected that Teresita might be suffering from diabetes and told her to
continue her medications. When her conditions persisted, she went to UDMC where Dr.

Fredelictor check-up her and ordered her admission and further indicate on call D&C
operation to be performed by his wife, Dra. Felicisima Flores, an Ob-Gyne. Laboratory
tests were done on Teresita including internal vaginal examination, however, only the
blood sugar and CBC results came out prior to operation which indicated of diabetes.
D&C operations were still done and thereafter, Dra. Felicisima advised her that she can
go home and continue to rest at home but Teresita opted otherwise. Two days after the
operation, her condition worsened prompting further test to be done which resulted that
Teresita have diabetes melitus type II. Insulin was administered but it might arrived late,
she died.
Issue: Whether or not spouses petitioners are liable for medical negligence.
Held: Yes. A medical negligence case is a type of claim to redress a wrong committed by
a medical professional, that caused a bodily harm to or the death of a patient. There are
four elements involved in a medical negligence case, namely: duty, breach, injury, and
proximate cause.
Duty refers to the standard of behavior which imposes restrictions on ones conduct. The
standard in turn refers to the amount of competence associated with the proper
discharge of the profession. A physician is expected to use at least the same level of
case that any other reasonably competent doctor would use under the same
circumstances. Breach of duty occurs when the physician fails to comply with those
professional standards. If injury results to the patient as a result of this breach, the
physician is answerable for negligence.
If a patient suffers from some disability that increases the magnitude of risk to him, that
disability must be taken into account as long as it is or should have been known to the
physician.
Stress, whether physical or emotional, is a factor that can aggravate diabetes; a D&C
operation is a form of physical stress. Dr. Mendoza explained how surgical stress can
aggravate the patients hyperglycemia: when stress occurs, the diabetics body,
especially the autonomic system, reacts by secreting hormones which are counterregulatory; she can have prolonged hyperglycemia which, if unchecked, could lead to
death. Medical lecture further explains that if the blood sugar has become very high, the
patient becomes comatose (diabetic coma). When this happens over several days, the
body uses its own fats to produce energy, and the result is high level of waste products
in the blood and urine.
These findings leads us to the conclusion that the decision to proceed with the D&C
operation notwithstanding Teresitas hyperglycemia and without adequately preparing
her for the procedure, was contrary to the standards observed by the medical profession.
Deviation from this standard amounted to a breach of duty which resulted in the
patients death. Due to this negligent conduct, liability must attach to the petitioner
spouses.

Professional Services Inc. v. Agana

Professional Services Inc. (PSI) v. Natividad and Enrique Agana
Natividad and Enrique Agana v. Juan Fuentes
Miguel Ampil v. Natividad and Enrique Agana
2007 / Sandoval-Gutierrez / Petition for review on certiorari of CA decisions
Standard of conduct > Experts > Medical professionals
FACTS
Natividad Agana was rushed to Medical City because of difficulty of bowel
movement and bloody anal discharge. Dr. Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering
from cancer of the sigmoid. Dr. Ampil performed an anterior resection surgery on
her, and finding that the malignancy spread on her left ovary, he obtained the consent of
her husband, Enrique, to permit Dr. Fuentes to perform hysterectomy on her. After the
hysterectomy, Dr. Fuentes showed his work to Dr. Ampil, who examined it and found it in
order, so he allowed Dr. Fuentes to leave the operating room. Dr. Ampil was about to
complete the procedure when the attending nurses made some remarks on the Record of
Operation: sponge count lacking 2; announced to surgeon search done but to
no avail continue for closure (two pieces of gauze were missing). A diligent search
was conducted but they could not be found. Dr. Ampil then directed that the incision be
closed.
A couple of days after, she complained of pain in her anal region, but the doctors
told her that it was just a natural consequence of the surgery. Dr. Ampil recommended
that she consult an oncologist to examine the cancerous nodes which were not removed
during the operation. After months of consultations and examinations in the US, she was
told that she was free of cancer. Weeks after coming back, her daughter found a piece of
gauze (1.5 in) protruding from her vagina, so Dr. Ampil manually extracted this, assuring
Natividad that the pains will go away. However, the pain worsened, so she sought
treatment at a hospital, where another 1.5 in piece of gauze was found in her vagina.
She underwent another surgery.
Sps. Agana filed a complaint for damages against PSI (owner of Medical City),
Dr. Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes, alleging that the latter are liable for negligence for leaving 2
pieces of gauze in Natividads body, and malpractice for concealing their acts of
negligence. Enrique Agana also filed an administrative complaint for gross negligence
and malpractice against the two doctors with the PRC (although only the case against Dr.
Fuentes was heard since Dr. Ampil was abroad). Pending the outcome of the

cases, Natividad died (now substituted by her children). RTC found PSI and the two
doctors liable for negligence and malpractice. PRC dismissed the case against
Dr. Fuentes. CA dismissed only the case against Fuentes.
ISSUE AND HOLDING
1. WON CA erred in holding Dr. Ampil liable for negligence and malpractice. NO; DR.
AMPIL IS GUILTY
2. WON CA erred in absolving Dr. Fuentes of any liability. NO
3. WON PSI may be held solidarily liable for Dr. Ampils negligence. YES
RATIO
DR. AMPIL IS LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE AND MALPRACTICE
His arguments are without basis [did not prove that the American doctors were the ones
who put / left the gauzes; did not submit evidence to rebut the correctness of the
operation record (re: number of gauzes used); re: Dr. Fuentes alleged negligence, Dr.
Ampil examined his work and found it in order].
Leaving foreign substances in the wound after incision has been closed
is at least prima facie negligence by the operating surgeon. Even if it has been
shown that a surgeon was required to leave a sponge in his patients abdomen because
of the dangers attendant upon delay, still, it is his legal duty to inform his patient within
a reasonable time by advising her of what he had been compelled to do, so she can seek
relief from the effects of the foreign object left in her body as her condition might permit.
Whats worse in this case is that he misled her by saying that the pain was an ordinary
consequence of her operation.

Medical negligence; standard of diligence

To successfully pursue this case of medical negligence, a patient must only prove that a
health care provider either failed to do something [or did something] which a reasonably
prudent health care provider would have done [or wouldnt have done], and that the
failure or action caused injury to the patient.

Duty to remove all foreign objects from the body before closure of the incision; if
he fails to do so, it was his duty to inform the patient about it

Breach failed to remove foreign objects; failed to inform patient

Injury suffered pain that necessitated examination and another surgery

Proximate Causation breach caused this injury; could be traced from his act of
closing the incision despite information given by the attendant nurses that 2 pieces

of gauze were still missing; what established causal link: gauze pieces later
extracted from patients vagina
DR. FUENTES NOT LIABLE
The res ipsa loquitur [thing speaks for itself] argument of the Aganas does not convince
the court. Mere invocation and application of this doctrine does not dispense with the
requirement of proof of negligence.

Requisites for the applicability of res ipsa loquitur

1. Occurrence of injury
2. Thing which caused injury was under the control and management of the
defendant [DR. FUENTES] LACKING SINCE CTRL+MGT WAS WITH DR. AMPIL
3. Occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things, would not have
happened if those who had control or management used proper care
4. Absence of explanation by defendant
Under the Captain of the Ship rule, the operating surgeon is the person in complete
charge of the surgery room and all personnel connected with the operation. That Dr.
Ampil discharged such role is evident from the following:

He called Dr. Fuentes to perform a hysterectomy

He examined Dr. Fuentes work and found it in order

He granted Dr. Fuentes permission to leave

He ordered the closure of the incision

HOSPITAL OWNER PSI SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH DR. AMPIL [NCC 2180], AND
DIRECTLY LIABLE TO SPS. AGANAS [NCC 2176]
Previously, employers cannot be held liable for the fault or negligence of its
professionals. However, this doctrine has weakened since courts came to realize that
modern hospitals are taking a more active role in supplying and regulating medical care
to its patients, by employing staff of physicians, among others. Hence, there is no reason
to exempt hospitals from the universal rule of respondeat superior. Here are the Courts
bases for sustaining PSIs liability:

Ramos v. CA doctrine on E-E relationship

o For purposes of apportioning responsibility in medical negligence cases,

an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and
their attending and visiting physicians. [LABOR LESSON: power to hire, fire,
power of control]

Agency principle of apparent authority / agency by estoppel

o Imposes liability because of the actions of a principal or employer in

somehow misleading the public into believing that the relationship or the
authority exists [see NCC 1869]
o PSI publicly displays in the Medical City lobby the names and specializations
of their physicians. Hence, PSI is now estopped from passing all the blame to
the physicians whose names it proudly paraded in the public directory,
leading the public to believe that it vouched for their skill and competence.
o

If doctors do well, hospital profits financially, so when negligence mars

the quality of its services, the hospital should not be allowed to escape
liability for its agents acts.

Doctrine of corporate negligence / corporate responsibility

o This is the judicial answer to the problem of allocating hospitals liability for
the negligent acts of health practitioners, absent facts to support the
application of respondeat superior.
o This provides for the duties expected [from hospitals]. In this case, PSI failed
to perform the duty of exercising reasonable care to protect from harm all
patients admitted into its facility for medical treatment. PSI failed to
conduct an investigation of the matter reported in the note of the
count nurse, and this established PSIs part in the dark conspiracy
of silence and concealment about the gauzes.
o

PSI has actual / constructive knowledge of the matter, through the

report of the attending nurses + the fact that the operation was carried
on with the assistance of various hospital staff

o It also breached its duties to oversee or supervise all persons who practice
medicine within its walls and take an active step in fixing the negligence
committed

PSI also liable under NCC 2180

o It failed to adduce evidence to show that it exercised the diligence of a good

father of the family in the accreditation and supervision of Dr. Ampil
RAKES VS ATLANTIC GULF
M.H. Rakes was a black man working as a laborer for Atlantic Gulf in the early
1900s. One day, they were working in the companys yard and they were transporting
heavy rails using two cars (karitons?); each car carrying the opposite ends of the rails.
The cars were pulled by rope from the front and other workers are pushing the cars from
behind. There were no side guards installed on the sides of the cars but the rails were
secured by ropes. The track where the cars move were also weakened by a previous
typhoon. It was alleged that Atlantics foreman was notified of said damage in the tracks
but the same were left unrepaired. While the cars were being moved and when it
reached the depressed portion of the track, and while Rakes was beside one of the cars,
the ropes gave in and the rails slipped thereby crushing his leg and causing it to be
amputated. Rakes sued Atlantic Gulf and he won; he was awarded 5,000 pesos for
damages ($2,500).
Atlantic assailed the decision of the lower court alleging that they specifically
ordered their workers to be walking only before or after the cars and not on the side of
the cars because the cars have no side guards to protect them in case the rails would
slip. Atlantic also alleged that Rakes should be suing the foreman as it was him who
neglected to have the tracks repaired; that Rakes himself was negligent for having
known of the depression on the track yet he continued to work.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atlantic is civilly liable.
HELD: Yes. Rakes as per the evidence could not have known of the damage in the track
as it was another employee who swore he notified the foreman about said damage.
Further, his lack of caution in continuing to work is not of a gross nature as to constitute
negligence on his part. On the other hand though, Rakes contributory negligence can be
inferred from the fact that he was on the side of the cars when in fact there were orders
from the company barring workers from standing near the side of the cars. His
disobedient to this order does not bar his recovery of damages though; the Supreme
Court instead reduced the award of damages from 5,000 pesos to 2,500 pesos.
In this case, the SC also elucidated the two kinds of culpa which are:
1. Culpa as substantive and independent, which on account of its origin arises in an
obligation between two persons not formerly bound by any other obligation; may
be also considered as a real source of an independent obligation (extra-contractual
or culpa aquiliana).
2. Culpa as an incident in the performance of an obligation which cannot be
presumed to exist without the other, and which increases the liability arising from
the already existing obligation (contractual or culpa contractual).

VDA DE BATACLAN VS MEDINA

102 Phil 181 Civil Law Torts and Damages Proximate Cause
Pass-midnight in September 1952, Juan Bataclan rode a bus owned by Mariano Medina
from Cavite to Pasay. While on its way, the driver of the bus was driving fast and when he
applied the brakes it cause the bus to be overturned. The driver, the conductor, and
some passengers were able to free themselves from the bus except Bataclan and 3
others. The passengers called the help of the villagers and as it was dark, the villagers
brought torch with them. The driver and the conductor failed to warn the would-be
helpers of the fact that gasoline has spilled from the overturned bus so a huge fire
ensued which engulfed the bus thereby killing the 4 passengers trapped inside. It was
also found later in trial that the tires of the bus were old.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan et al was their
burning by reason of the torches which ignited the gasoline.
HELD: No. The proximate cause was the overturning of the bus which was caused by the
negligence of the driver because he was speeding and also he was already advised by
Medina to change the tires yet he did not. Such negligence resulted to the overturning of
the bus. The torches carried by the would-be helpers are not to be blamed. It is just but
natural for the villagers to respond to the call for help from the passengers and since it is
a rural area which did not have flashlights, torches are the natural source of lighting.
Further, the smell of gas could have been all over the place yet the driver and the
conductor failed to provide warning about said fact to the villagers.
WHAT IS PROXIMATE CAUSE?
Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred.
And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing
the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a

natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that
the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent
person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom.

Calalas v. CA
Facts:
Private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga took a passenger jeepney owned and
operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was already full, Calalas gave
Sunga an stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle. Along the way, the
jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. Sunga stepped down to give way when an Isuzu
truck owned by Francisco Salva and driven by Iglecerio Verena bumped the jeepney. As a
result, Sunga was injured. Sunga filed a complaint against Calalas for violation of
contract of carriage. Calalas filed a third party complaint against Salva. The trial court
held Salva liable and absolved Calalas, taking cognisance of another civil case for quasidelict wherein Salva and Verena were held liable to Calalas. The Court of Appeals
reversed the decision and found Calalas liable to Sunga for violation of contract of
carriage.
Issues:
(1) Whether the decision in the case for quasi delict between Calalas on one hand and
Salva and Verena on the other hand, is res judicata to the issue in this case
(2) Whether Calalas exercised the extraordinary diligence required in the contract of
carriage
(3) Whether moral damages should be awarded
Held:
(1) The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 finding the
driver and the owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict ignores the fact that she was
never a party to that case and, therefore, the principle of res judicata does not apply. Nor
are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case the same. The issue in Civil

Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for
the damage caused to petitioner's jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is
whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known
as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of the
tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the
negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation. Consequently, in quasi-delict,
the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action,
whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the
existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier,
failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination. In case of death or injuries to
passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision
necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof. It is immaterial that the
proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence
of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for
quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for
imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party.
In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the
obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created.
(2) We do not think so. First, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being
exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the
middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's
driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney. The
fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that
to which the other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable
to overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by
Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent in transporting
passengers. We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner's contention that
Sunga's taking an "extension seat" amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin
to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas should not be
compensated merely because those passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by
boarding an overloaded ferry. This is also true of petitioner's contention that the jeepney
being bumped while it was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. A caso fortuito is
an event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. This
requires that the following requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is
independent of the debtor's will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the
event is such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal
manner, and (d) the debtor did not take part in causing the injury to the creditor.
Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body
protruding two meters into the highway.
(3) As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages
predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items enumerated under Art.
2219 of the Civil Code. As an exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in
which the mishap results in the death of a passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in
relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty
of fraud or bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220. In this case, there is no legal basis for

awarding moral damages since there was no factual finding by the appellate court that
petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract of carriage.

Umali vs. Bacani

TEODORO C. UMALI vs. HON. ANGEL BACANI (Judge, CFI Pangasinan) and FIDEL
H. SAYNES
G.R. No. L-40570. 30 January 1976.
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CFI of Pangasinan.
Esguerra, J.:
Facts:
On May 14, 1972, a storm with strong rain hit the Municipality of Alcala Pangasinan.
During the storm, the banana plants standing near the transmission line of the Alcala
Electric Plant (AEP) were blown down and fell on the electric wire. The live electric wire
was cut, one end of which was left hanging on the electric post and the other fell to the
ground. The following morning, barrio captain saw Cipriano Baldomero, a laborer of the
AEP, asked him to fix it, but the latter told the barrio captain that he could not do it but
that he was going to look for the lineman to fix it. Sometime thereafter, a small boy of 3
years and 8 months old by the name of Manuel P. Saynes, whose house is just on the
opposite side of the road, went to the place where the broken line wire was and got in
contact with it. The boy was electrocuted and he subsequently died. It was only after the

electrocution

that

the

broken

wire

was

fixed.

Issues:
(1)

WON the proximate cause of the boy's death is due to a fortuitous event- storm;

(2)

WON

boys

parents

negligence

exempts

petitioner

from

liability.

Ruling:
Decision affirmed.

(1) A careful examination of the records convinces the SC that a series of negligence on
the part of defendants' employees in the AEP resulted in the death of the victim by
electrocution. With ordinary foresight, the employees of the petitioner could have easily
seen that even in case of moderate winds the electric line would be endangered by
banana
plants
being
blown
down.

(2) Art. 2179 CC provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff (parents of the victim in
this case) was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being
the defendants' (petitioners) lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but
the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. This law may be availed of by the
petitioner but does not exempt him from liability. Petitioner's liability for injury caused by
his employees negligence is well defined in par. 4, of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

Antonio Banzon, et. al.

VS
Court of Appeals, et. al.
G.R. No. 47258 [July 13, 1989]
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Facts of the Case:

Sometime in the year 1952, Maximo R. Sta. Maria obtained several crop loans from PNB. For
these loans, Associated acted as surety for Sta. Maria by filing surety bonds in favor of PNB
to guarantee and answer for the prompt and faithful repayment of said loans. In turn,
plaintiff Antonio R. Banzon and one Emilio R. Naval acted as indemnitors of Associated in the
indemnity agreements, obligating themselves to indemnify and hold it harmless from any
liabilities. However, Sta. Maria failed to pay his crop loan obligations in favor of PNB when
the same fell due, and accordingly, the bank demanded payment from Associated as surety.
Instead of paying the bank, Associated filed a complaint against Maximo R. Sta. Maria and
indemnitors Banzon and Naval. A writ of execution was issued and the properties of Banzon
were levied and later on sold in execution. In 1965, the spouses Pedro Cardenas and Leonila
Baluyot were able to execute upon and buy one of the properties of Banzon to satisfy the
judgment debt of Associated in favor of the Cardenas spouses. The Banzons however
refused to vacate the premises and to remove the improvements thereon. Petitioner spouses
Antonio Banzon and Rosa Balmaceda filed a complaint against Maximo and Valeriana Sta.
Maria for actual and moral damages in the total amount of P251,750.00 allegedly arising
from the deprivation of their property due to the Sta. Marias failure and refusal to pay their
plain, valid and just obligations with the PNB. The Court of First Instance ordered the Sta
Marias to pay damages. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Maximo and Valeriana Sta. Maria were liable to the
petitioners for the prejudice and damages the latter suffered.
Ruling of the Court:
NO. The Court held that it was the trial court that erred when it arrived at the
conclusion that the Sta Marias were responsible for the prejudice caused petitioners. The
Court ruled that it is a settled principle that moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission. While ideally such debacle
could have been avoided by Sta Marias payment of their obligations to PNB, such fact of
non-payment alone, without Associateds premature action and subsequent fraudulent acts,
could not possibly have resulted in the prejudice and damage complained of. While private
respondents non-payment was admittedly the remote cause or the factor which set in
motion the ensuing events, Associateds premature action and execution were the
immediate and direct causes of the damage and prejudice suffered by petitioners. Active
supervening events consisting of said premature and fraudulent acts of the Associated
Insurance and Surety, Inc. had broken the causal connection between the fact of nonpayment and the damage suffered by petitioners, so that their claim should be directed not
against the Sta Marias but against Associated. The Court was convinced as well that the
failure of the Sta Marias to pay their obligations with the PNB was not attended by bad faith
or willful intent to cause injury to petitioners. Under the Civil Code, the damages for which a
defendant may be held liable are those which are the natural and probable consequences of
the act or omission complained of. The prejudice caused petitioners cannot be said to be the
natural and probable consequence of the Sta. Marias mere failure to pay their crop loans as
such prejudice arose due to active supervening forces or events.

The petition was denied.

Urbano v. IAC
Facts:
On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his ricefield. He
found the place where he stored palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation
canal. Urbano went to the elevated portion to see what happened, and there he saw
Marcelino Javier and Emilio Efre cutting grass. Javier admitted that he was the one who
opened the canal. A quarrel ensued, and Urbano hit Javier on the right palm with his
bolo, and again on the leg with the back of the bolo. On October 27, 1980, Urbano and
Javier had an amicable settlement. Urbano paid P700 for the medical expenses of Javier.
On November 14, 1980, Urbano was rushed to the hospital where he had lockjaw and
convulsions. The doctor found the condition to be caused by tetanus toxin which infected
the healing wound in his palm. He died the following day. Urbano was charged with
homicide and was found guilty both by the trial court and on appeal by the Court of
Appeals. Urbano filed a motion for new trial based on the affidavit of the Barangay
Captain who stated that he saw the deceased catching fish in the shallow irrigation
canals on November 5. The motion was denied; hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause of the latters
death
Held:
A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is... "that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred."And more comprehensively, "the
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or
by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final
event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of
the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for
the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable
ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom."
If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at
the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a
mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after
the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore,
the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the
second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's
wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not
yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after
the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound
could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing
with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must
convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead
us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient
intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death.
The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent
infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the
proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. "A prior
and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause did nothing
more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was
made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a
distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury
would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the
condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the
proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into
operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition,
such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause."

Phoenix Construction v. IAC

Facts:
At about 1:30 a.m. on November 15, 1975, private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on
his way home from cocktails and dinner meeting with his boss. He was proceeding down
General Lacuna Street when he saw a Ford dump truck parked askew, partly blocking the
way of oncoming traffic, with no lights or early warning reflector devices. The truck was
driven earlier by Armando Carbonel, a regular driver of the petitioner company. Dionisio
tried to swerve his car to the left, but it was too late. He suffered some physical injuries
and nervous breakdown. Dionision filed an action for damages against Carbonel and
Phoenix Insurance. Petitioners countered the claim by imputing the accident to
respondents own negligence in driving at high speed without curfew pass and
headlights, and while intoxicated. The trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor
of private respondent.
Issue:
Whether the collision was brought about by the way the truck was parked, or by
respondents own negligence
Held:
We find that private respondent Dionisio was unable to prove possession of a valid
curfew pass during the night of the accident and that the preponderance of evidence
shows that he did not have such a pass during that night. It is the petitioners' contention
that Dionisio purposely shut off his headlights even before he reached the intersection so
as not to be detected by the police in the police precinct which he (being a resident in
the area) knew was not far away from the intersection. We believe that the petitioners'
theory is a more credible explanation than that offered by private respondent Dionisio,
i.e., that he had his headlights on but that, at the crucial moment, these had in some
mysterious if convenient way malfunctioned and gone off, although he succeeded in
switching his lights on again at "bright" split seconds before contact with the dump truck.
We do not believe that this evidence is sufficient to show that Dionisio was so heavily
under the influence of liquor as to constitute his driving a motor vehicle per se an act of
reckless imprudence. The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined
above is that private respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was
hurrying home that night and driving faster than he should have been. Worse, he
extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection of General Lacuna and General
Santos Streets and thus did not see the dump truck that was parked askew and sticking
out onto the road lane.

Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate
Court that the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was
the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked in other words,
the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck
was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence.
The distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which the 'petitioners would have us
adopt have already been "almost entirely discredited. If the defendant has created only a
passive static condition which made the damage possible, the defendant is said not to be
liable. But so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary
antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result it is quite
impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations, particularly since,
as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of other active forces which have gone
before. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the "condition" remains static
will not necessarily affect liability. "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in
the decisions; but the distinction is now almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any
validity at all, it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by the
defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and some new force
intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the distinction between "cause" and
"condition" which is important but the nature of the risk and the character of the
intervening cause.
We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and
static condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The improper parking
of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down
General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held
responsible. In our view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the
truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient
intervening or independent cause.
The defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a substantial
and important part of the risk, to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has
indeed come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope original risk,
and hence of the defendant's negligence. The courts are quite generally agreed that
intervening causes which fall fairly in this category will not supersede the defendant's
responsibility. Thus, a defendant who blocks the sidewalk and forces the plaintiff to walk
in a street where the plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of heavy traffic becomes liable
when the plaintiff is run down by a car, even though the car is negligently driven; and
one who parks an automobile on the highway without lights at night is not relieved of
responsibility when another negligently drives into it. We hold that private respondent
Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause"
of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently
respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to
mitigation by the courts.
Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine. The
common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff
who had also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to
avoid the casualty and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any,
the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the
common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the

plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is to determine
whose negligence - the plaintiff's or the defendant's - was the legal or proximate cause of
the injury. The relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the
defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that may be
taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act
or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act
or omission for the rest of the community. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the
risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate them among the members of
society. To accept the petitioners' pro-position must tend to weaken the very bonds of
society.
We believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the
damages on a 20-80 ratio. Thus, 20% of the damages awarded by the respondent
appellate court, except the award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00
as attorney's fees and costs, shall be borne by private respondent Dionisio; only the
balance of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be
solidarity liable therefor to the former. The award of exemplary damages and attorney's
fees and costs shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners. Phoenix is of course entitled
to reimbursement from Carbonel. 18 We see no sufficient reason for disturbing the
reduced award of damages made by the respondent appellate court.

AFRICA VS CALTEX
n March 1948, in Rizal Avenue, Manila, a tank truck was hosing gasoline into the
underground storage of Caltex. Apparently, a fire broke out from the gasoline station and
the fire spread and burned several houses including the house of Spouses Bernabe and
Soledad Africa. Allegedly, someone (a passerby) threw a cigarette while gasoline was
being transferred which caused the fire. But there was no evidence presented to prove
this theory and no other explanation can be had as to the real reason for the fire.
Apparently also, Caltex and the branch owner (Mateo Boquiren) failed to install a
concrete firewall to contain fire if in case one happens.
ISSUE: Whether or not Caltex and Boquiren are liable to pay for damages.
HELD: Yes. This is pursuant to the application on the principle of res ipsa loquitur (the
transaction speaks for itself) which states: where the thing which caused injury,
without fault of the injured person, is under the exclusive control of the defendant and
the injury is such as in the ordinary course of things does not occur if he having such
control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of the
explanation, that the injury arose from defendants want of care. The gasoline station,
with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of Caltex and
Boquiren. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The
persons who knew or could have known how the fire started were Boquiren, Caltex and

their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and
reasonable inference that the incident happened because of want of care.
Note that ordinarily, he who charges negligence shall prove it. However, res ipsa loquitur
is the exception because the burden of proof is shifted to the party charged of
negligence as the latter is the one who had exclusive control of the thing that caused the
injury complained of.

Ramos v. CA
Facts:
Erlinda Ramos, a 47-year old robust woman, was normal except for her experiencing
occasional pain due to the presence of stone in her gall bladder. She was advised to
undergo an operation for its removal. The results in the examinations she underwent
indicate that she was fit for the operation. She and her husband Rogelio met Dr. Hosaka,
one of the defendants, who advised that she should undergo cholecystectomy. Dr.
Hosaka assured them that he will get a good anaesthesiologist. At 7:30 a.m. on the day
of the operation at Delos Santos Medical Center, Herminda Cruz, Erlindas sister-in-law
and the dean of the College of Nursing in Capitol Medical Center, was there to provide
moral support. Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez was to administer the anaesthesia. Dr. Hosaka
arrived only at 12:15 p. m. Herminda saw Dr. Gutierrez intubating the patient, and heard
the latter say Ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O, lumalaki ang
tiyan. Herminda saw bluish discoloration of the nailbeds of the patient. She heard Dr.
Hosaka issue an order for someone to call Dr. Calderon. The doctor arrived and placed

the patient in trendelenburg position, wherein the head of the patient is positioned lower
than the feet, which indicates a decrease of blood supply in the brain. Herminda knew
and told Rogelio that something wrong was happening. Dr. Calderon was able to intubate
the patient. Erlinda was taken to the ICU and became comatose.
Rogelio filed a civil case for damages. The trial court ruled in his favor, finding Dr.
Gutierrez, Dr. Hosaka, and the hospital, guilty of negligence, but the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision. Hence, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the
Court of Appeals denied for having been filed beyond the reglementary period. However,
it was found that the notice of the decision was never sent to the petitioners counsel.
Rather, it was sent to the petitioner, addressing him as Atty. Rogelio Ramos, as if he was
the legal counsel. The petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari. On the procedural
issue, the Supreme Court rules that since the notice did not reach the petitioners then
legal counsel, the motion was filed on time.
Issue:
Whether a surgeon, an anaesthesiologist, and a hospital, should be made liable for the
unfortunate comatose condition of a patient scheduled for cholecystectomy
Held:
Res Ipsa Loquitor
Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means "the thing or the transaction
speaks for itself." The phrase "res ipsa loquitur'' is a maxim for the rule that the fact of
the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an
inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff's prima facie case,
and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. Where the
thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of
the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in ordinary course of things
does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident
arose from or was caused by the defendant's want of care. It is grounded in the superior
logic of ordinary human experience and on the basis of such experience or common
knowledge, negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself.
However, much has been said that res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law and,
as such, does not create or constitute an independent or separate ground of liability.
Mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with the requirement
of proof of negligence. It is simply a step in the process of such proof, permitting the
plaintiff to present along with the proof of the accident, enough of the attending
circumstances to invoke the doctrine, creating an inference or presumption of
negligence, and to thereby place on the defendant the burden of going forward with the
proof. Still, before resort to the doctrine may be allowed, the following requisites must be
satisfactorily shown.
(1) The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's
negligence;
(2) It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or
defendants; and

(3) The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is
eliminated.
Medical malpractice cases do not escape the application of this doctrine. Thus, res ipsa
loquitur has been applied when the circumstances attendant upon the harm are
themselves of such a character as to justify an inference of negligence as the cause of
that harm. Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice
suits to prove that a physician has done a negligent act or that he has deviated from the
standard medical procedure, when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the
plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury
itself provides the proof of negligence. Hence, in cases where the res ipsa loquitur is
applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of
injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of
common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care. When the doctrine is
appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus between the particular act or
omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody and
management of the defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony to
establish the standard of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no
other way, under usual and ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress
for injury suffered by him.
Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to
be cautiously applied, depending upon the circumstances of each case. A distinction
must be made between the failure to secure results, and the occurrence of something
more unusual and not ordinarily found if the service or treatment rendered followed the
usual procedure of those skilled in that particular practice. The real question, therefore,
is whether or not in the process of the operation any extraordinary incident or unusual
event outside of the routine performance occurred which is beyond the regular scope of
customary professional activity in such operations, which, if unexplained would
themselves reasonably speak to the average man as the negligent cause or causes of
the untoward consequence.
We find the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur appropriate in the case at bar. Erlinda submitted
herself for cholecystectomy and expected a routine general surgery to be performed on
her gall bladder. On that fateful day she delivered her person over to the care, custody
and control of private respondents who exercised complete and exclusive control over
her. At the time of submission, Erlinda was neurologically sound and, except for a few
minor discomforts, was likewise physically fit in mind and body. However, during the
administration of anesthesia and prior to the performance of cholecystectomy she
suffered irreparable damage to her brain. Thus, without undergoing surgery, she went
out of the operating room already decerebrate and totally incapacitated. Obviously, brain
damage, which Erlinda sustained, is an injury which does not normally occur in the
process of a gall bladder operation. In fact, this kind of situation does not in the absence
of negligence of someone in the administration of anesthesia and in the use of
endotracheal tube. Furthermore, the instruments used in the administration of
anesthesia, including the endotracheal tube, were all under the exclusive control of
private respondents, who are the physicians-in-charge. Likewise, petitioner Erlinda could
not have been guilty of contributory negligence because she was under the influence of
anesthetics which rendered her unconscious.
Negligence of the Anaesthesiologist

The pre-operative evaluation of a patient prior to the administration of anesthesia is

universally observed to lessen the possibility of anesthetic accidents. Respondent Dra.
Gutierrez' act of seeing her patient for the first time only an hour before the scheduled
operative procedure was, therefore, an act of exceptional negligence and professional
irresponsibility. Her failure to follow this medical procedure is, therefore, a clear indicia of
her negligence. Erlinda's case was elective and this was known to respondent Dra.
Gutierrez. Thus, she had all the time to make a thorough evaluation of Erlinda's case
prior to the operation and prepare her for anesthesia. However, she never saw the
patient at the bedside. She herself admitted that she had seen petitioner only in the
operating room, and only on the actual date of the cholecystectomy. She negligently
failed to take advantage of this important opportunity. As such, her attempt to exculpate
herself must fail.
Opinion of Expert Witness
An anesthetic accident caused by a rare drug-induced bronchospasm properly falls within
the fields of anesthesia, internal medicine-allergy, and clinical pharmacology. The
resulting anoxic encephalopathy belongs to the field of neurology. While admittedly,
many bronchospastic-mediated pulmonary diseases are within the expertise of
pulmonary medicine, Dr. Jamora's field, the anesthetic drug-induced, allergic mediated
bronchospasm alleged in this case is within the disciplines of anesthesiology, allergology
and pharmacology. On the basis of the foregoing transcript, in which the pulmonologist
himself admitted that he could not testify about the drug with medical authority, it is
clear that the appellate court erred in giving weight to Dr. Jamora's testimony as an
expert in the administration of Thiopental Sodium. Generally, to qualify as an expert
witness, one must have acquired special knowledge of the subject matter about which
he or she is to testify, either by the study of recognized authorities on the subject or by
practical experience. Clearly, Dr. Jamora does not qualify as an expert witness based on
the above standard since he lacks the necessary knowledge, skill, and training in the
field of anesthesiology. Oddly, apart from submitting testimony from a specialist in the
wrong field, private respondents' intentionally avoided providing testimony by competent
and independent experts in the proper areas.
Proximate Cause
Proximate cause has been defined as that which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred. An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or a
failure to act, whenever it appears from the evidence in the case, that the act or
omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or
damage; and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably
probable consequence of the act or omission. Instead of the intended endotracheal
intubation what actually took place was an esophageal intubation. During intubation,
such distention indicates that air has entered the gastrointestinal tract through the
esophagus instead of the lungs through the trachea. Entry into the esophagus would
certainly cause some delay in oxygen delivery into the lungs as the tube which carries
oxygen is in the wrong place. That abdominal distention had been observed during the
first intubation suggests that the length of time utilized in inserting the endotracheal
tube (up to the time the tube was withdrawn for the second attempt) was fairly
significant. Due to the delay in the delivery of oxygen in her lungs Erlinda showed signs
of cyanosis.

Responsibility of the Surgeon

As the so-called "captain of the ship," it is the surgeon's responsibility to see to it that
those under him perform their task in the proper manner. Respondent Dr. Hosaka's
negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the proper authority in not determining
if his anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia protocols. In fact, no evidence on
record exists to show that respondent Dr. Hosaka verified if respondent Dra. Gutierrez
properly intubated the patient. Furthermore, it does not escape us that respondent Dr.
Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at the same time as
Erlinda's cholecystectomy, and was in fact over three hours late for the latter's
operation. Because of this, he had little or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist
regarding the anesthesia delivery. This indicates that he was remiss in his professional
duties towards his patient. Thus, he shares equal responsibility for the events which
resulted in Erlinda's condition.
Responsibility of the Hospital
Hospitals hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting "consultant"
staff. While "consultants" are not, technically employees, a point which respondent
hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for the patient's condition, the control
exercised, the hiring, and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important
hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with the exception of the payment of
wages. In assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists, the control test is
determining. Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, we rule that for the purpose of
allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship
in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians.
The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the negligence of its
employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which considers a person accountable
not only for his own acts but also for those of others based on the former's responsibility
under a relationship of patria potestas. Such responsibility ceases when the persons or
entity concerned prove that they have observed the diligence of a good father of the
family to prevent damage. In the instant case, respondent hospital, apart from a general
denial of its responsibility over respondent physicians, failed to adduce evidence showing
that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the hiring and supervision of
the latter. It failed to adduce evidence with regard to the degree of supervision which it
exercised over its physicians. In neglecting to offer such proof, or proof of a similar
nature, respondent hospital thereby failed to discharge its burden under the last
paragraph of Article 2180. Having failed to do this, respondent hospital is consequently
solidarily responsible with its physicians for Erlinda's condition.
Damages
At current levels, the P8000/monthly amount established by the trial court at the time of
its decision would be grossly inadequate to cover the actual costs of home-based care
for a comatose individual. The calculated amount was not even arrived at by looking at
the actual cost of proper hospice care for the patient. What it reflected were the actual
expenses incurred and proved by the petitioners after they were forced to bring home
the patient to avoid mounting hospital bills. And yet ideally, a comatose patient should
remain in a hospital or be transferred to a hospice specializing in the care of the
chronically ill for the purpose of providing a proper milieu adequate to meet minimum

standards of care. Given these considerations, the amount of actual damages

recoverable in suits arising from negligence should at least reflect the correct minimum
cost of proper care, not the cost of the care the family is usually compelled to undertake
at home to avoid bankruptcy.
Our rules on actual or compensatory damages generally assume that at the time of
litigation, the injury suffered as a consequence of an act of negligence has been
completed and that the cost can be liquidated. However, these provisions neglect to take
into account those situations, as in this case, where the resulting injury might be
continuing and possible future complications directly arising from the injury, while
certain to occur, are difficult to predict. Temperate damages can and should be awarded
on top of actual or compensatory damages in instances where the injury is chronic and
continuing. And because of the unique nature of such cases, no incompatibility arises
when both actual and temperate damages are provided for. The reason is that these
damages cover two distinct phases. As it would not be equitable - and certainly not in
the best interests of the administration of justice - for the victim in such cases to
constantly come before the courts and invoke their aid in seeking adjustments to the
compensatory damages previously awarded - temperate damages are appropriate. The
amount given as temperate damages, though to a certain extent speculative, should
take into account the cost of proper care. In the instant case, petitioners were able to
provide only home-based nursing care for a comatose patient who has remained in that
condition for over a decade. Having premised our award for compensatory damages on
the amount provided by petitioners at the onset of litigation, it would be now much more
in step with the interests of justice if the value awarded for temperate damages would
allow petitioners to provide optimal care for their loved one in a facility which generally
specializes in such care. They should not be compelled by dire circumstances to provide
substandard care at home without the aid of professionals, for anything less would be
grossly inadequate. Under the circumstances, an award of P1,500,000.00 in temperate
damages would therefore be reasonable.
Petitioner Erlinda Ramos was in her mid-forties when the incident occurred. She has been
in a comatose state for over fourteen years now. The burden of care has so far been
heroically shouldered by her husband and children, who, in the intervening years have
been deprived of the love of a wife and a mother. Meanwhile, the actual physical,
emotional and financial cost of the care of petitioner would be virtually impossible to
quantify. Even the temperate damages herein awarded would be inadequate if
petitioner's condition remains unchanged for the next ten years. The husband and the
children, all petitioners in this case, will have to live with the day to day uncertainty of
the patient's illness, knowing any hope of recovery is close to nil. They have fashioned
their daily lives around the nursing care of petitioner, altering their long term goals to
take into account their life with a comatose patient. They, not the respondents, are
charged with the moral responsibility of the care of the victim. The family's moral injury
and suffering in this case is clearly a real one. For the foregoing reasons, an award of
P2,000,000.00 in moral damages would be appropriate.
Finally, by way of example, exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 are
hereby awarded. Considering the length and nature of the instant suit we are of the
opinion that attorney's fees valued at P100,000.00 are likewise proper.
WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution of the appellate court appealed from are
hereby modified so as to award in favor of petitioners, and solidarily against private

respondents the following: 1) P1,352,000.00 as actual damages computed as of the date

of promulgation of this decision plus a monthly payment of P8,000.00 up to the time that
petitioner Erlinda Ramos expires or miraculously survives; 2) P2,000,000.00 as moral
damages, 3) P1,500,000.00 as temperate damages; 4) P100,000.00 each as exemplary
damages and attorney's fees; and, 5) the costs of the suit.