Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 106922
April 20, 2001
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AURELIO C. TRAMPE, FERDINAND R. ABESAMIS and EULOGIO
MANANQUIL,petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
Branch 66, Regional Trial Court of Makati and JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals and Resolution 2 dated June 29,
1992 and August 27, 1992 respectively which affirmed the Order 3 dated October 8, 1991 of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 66, in Civil Case No. 90-2327 denying petitioners' motion to dismiss as
well as the Order4dated January 6, 1992 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
After the unsuccessful December 1989 coup d' etat, the Department of Justice, then headed by petitioner
Franklin Drilon, referred to the Special Composite Team of Prosecutors (Team of Prosecutors, for brevity),
composed of co-petitioners Aurelio C. Trampe, Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Eulogio Mananquil, a lettercomplaint from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI, for brevity) requesting for the investigation of
private respondent Juan Ponce Enrile for his alleged participation in the said coup attempt.
Finding sufficient basis to continue the inquiry, the Team of Prosecutors issued a subpoena to private
respondent with an order to submit his counter-affidavit to the letter-complaint. Instead of filing his
counter-affidavit, private respondent filed a Petition for Summary Dismissal of the charge against him. He
also filed an urgent motion praying that he be given a notice of at least five (5) days before the filing of
any information against him to enable him to take the appropriate legal action. At the same time, private
respondent sent "cautionary letters" to all judges in Quezon City, Manila, Makati and Pasay City requesting
that he be apprised of any information which may be filed against him and that he be given the
opportunity to personally witness the raffle of the case against him. Said notice also appeared in several
newspapers of general circulation.
On February 27, 1990, the Team of Prosecutors filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City on
Information charging private respondent with the complex crime of rebellion with murder and frustrated
murder. The Team of Prosecutors likewise filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City an Information
charging, among others, private respondent with the offense of obstruction of justice for harboring an
alleged felon under Presidential Decree No. 1829. Private respondent was later arrested and detained
overnight at the NBI headquarters in Taft Avenue, Manila, and, on the following day, transferred to a
detention room at Camp Karingal in Quezon City. The lawyers of private respondent also discovered that
the information against the latter was first filed on February 21, 1990, but was subsequently withdrawn for
re-filing on February 27, 1990. After a petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed before this Court
entitled Enrile v. Salazar5, we granted private respondent's provisional liberty upon posting of a cash bond.
On June 5, 1990, in the same case of Enrile v. Salazar, we ordered the modification of the Information
before the RTC of Quezon City to simple rebellion only in consonance with our ruling in People v.
Hernandez6. On September 13, 1990, in Enrile v. Amin,7 this Court ruled that the filing of a separate
information for obstruction of justice also violated the Hernandez doctrine and accordingly ordered the
quashal of the said information.
As a consequence of our said Order dated September 13, 1990, private respondent on August 20, 1990
filed a Complaint for damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 90-2327, before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City while the rebellion case was still pending litigation. Private respondent's complaint impleaded
as defendants herein petitioners, then Solicitor General Francisco Chavez and Judge Jaime Salazar. The
complaint basically accuses the petitioners of bad faith in filing the information for rebellion complexed
with murder and frustrated murder. Thus, the complaint alleges:
2.5 The so-called "preliminary investigation" of the charge against plaintiff was railroaded from the very
start. Plaintiff's pleas and motions asking for strict compliance with the rules of procedure and the norms of
fairness and justice were either ignored or summarily denied by the investigating panel. Plaintiff, in utter
frustration, filed a petition for summary dismissal of the charge and, anticipating the denial of that as well,
also filed an urgent motion to be given at least five (5) days notice to enable him to take the appropriate
legal action, before the filing of any information against him.
xxx
3.1 All of the defendants, in and by all their actuations in connection with the information for rebellion
"complexed" individually, collectively, and with unity of purposes and intentions, illegally and unjustly
caused, directed and prolonged plaintiff's arrest and detention without bail, through the expediency of
disregarding the Hernandez doctrine prohibiting the complexing of rebellion with other crimes.
In and by all their aforementioned actuations, all of the defendants individually, collectively and with unity
of purposes and intentions
(a) wilfully, manifestly and maliciously obstructed, defeated, violated, impeded and impaired plaintiff's
constitutional and legal right to due process, right to be secure in his person against unreasonable and
unwarranted arrest, and right to bail, as enshrined in Sections 1, 2 and 13 of Article 14(1) of the Bill of
Rights of the Constitution;
(b) grossly abused their rights and violated their duties as citizens, as members of the legal profession,
and as public officers;
(c) willfully acted in contravention of the basic standards of good faith and justice; and
(d) willfully acted in a manner contrary to law, morals and public policy
- all causing great suffering and injury to plaintiff.

3.2 Defendants Chavez, Drilon, Trampe, Abesamis and Mananquil knowingly, manifestly and maliciously
abused and exceeded their duties and authority as public officials in charge of the enforcement and
prosecution of laws, as well as violated the tenets of good faith and justice in human relations, by directly
and actively advocating and indulging in what these defendants had publicly admitted and described to be
a "legal experimentation" consisting in the knowing disregard and defiance of the well-established
Hernandez doctrine.
Defendant Drilon and his co-defendants Trampe, Abesamis and Mananquil, being the head and members,
respectively, of the Department of Justice, by their above-alleged actuations, violated their principal
responsibility, as legal counsel and prosecutors, to administer the criminal justice system in accordance
with the established and accepted laws and processes.
Defendant Drilon, being the Secretary of Justice having supervision, control and direction over the
actuations of co-defendants Trampe, Abesamis and Mananquil violated the tenets of good faith and justice
in human relations and abused his official duties and authority, by, among others, expressly instigating,
authorizing, ordering and causing the filing of the information for rebellion "complexed" against the
plaintiff.
xxx
3.3. Defendants Drilon, Trampe, Abesamis and Mananquil filed or cased the filing of the information for
rebellion "complexed" with manifest bad faith, deception and duplicity, all in violation of the tenets of good
faith and justice in human relations and in gross abuse of their duties and authority as public prosecutors
"to see that justice is done." (Canon 6, Rule 6.01, Lawyers' Code of Professional Responsibility).
More particularly, these defendants originally filed or caused the filing of the information on 21 February
1990 but, for some mysterious reason, the information was subsequently withdrawn. The initial filing and
withdrawal of the information defendant Chavez admitted these facts during the Supreme Court hearing
on 6 March 1990 were done in total secrecy and without the knowledge of plaintiff who learned of this
incident only after his arrest on 27 February 1990.
Likewise, on or about 27 February 1990, these defendants deliberately misled plaintiff and his lawyers and
induced them to believe that the charge of rebellion "complexed" was set to be filed against the plaintiff in
the Regional Trial Court of Makati. While plaintiff's attention was diverted to the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, these defendants surreptitiously filed or caused the filing of main information for rebellion
"complexed" in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
All of the above-named defendants' actuations were meant to conceal from the public in general and the
plaintiff and his counsel in particular, the filing of the information and to prevent plaintiff and his lawyers
from witnessing the raffle and from questioning the irregularity of the assignment, the validity of the
information, the authority of the court to issue the warrant of arrest, the obvious lack of probable cause,
and, finally, to prevent plaintiff from posting bail.
xxx
3.5 The defendants' unfounded and malicious persecution of plaintiff, calculated to malign the person and
reputation of the plaintiff, a duly elected Senator of the country, has caused and continues to cause
plaintiff extreme suffering, mental anguish, moral shock and social humiliation,
3.6 The reckless and wanton conduct of the defendants who, as public officials, are supposed to be the
guardians of the democratic institutions and civil liberties of citizens, in charging, taking cognizance of,
and defending a non-existing crime, and in causing the harassment and persecution of the plaintiff, should
be strongly condemned8
xxx
On October 9, 1990, the petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure of the Complaint to state a cause of
action. They claimed that there was no allegation of any actionable wrong constituting a violation of any of
the legal rights of private respondent. In addition, they put up the defense of good faith and immunity from
suit, to wit:
THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANTS IN THAT:
(A) THE FILING OF THE INFORMATION AGAINST PLAINTIFF FOR THE CRIME OF REBELLION WITH MURDER
AND FRUSTRATED MURDER WAS INITIATED IN THE HONEST BELIEF THAT IT COULD BE SUSTAINED UNDER
THE FIRST PART OF ARTICLE 48 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE; and
(B) DEFENDANTS, ACTING IN GOOD FAITH, WITHOUT MALICE AND WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THEIR
AUTHORITY, CANNOT BE HELD PERSONALLY LIABLE BY WAY OF DAMAGES FOR ANY ALLEGED INURY
SUFFERED BY PLAINTIFF.9
On October 8, 1991, respondent trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss and requiring
petitioners to file their answer and to present evidence in support of their defenses in a full-blown trial
inasmuch as the defense of good faith and immunity from suit does not appear to be
indubitable.10 Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner Trampe, in his own behalf and in his own behalf and in behalf of his
co-petitioners, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court alleging that the
respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying their motion to dismiss. On June 29,
1992, respondent appellate court dismissed the petition and the subsequent motion for reconsideration
ruling, thus:
We cannot perceive how respondent court could have acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying the
motion to dismiss. Before respondent court were two diametrically opposed contentions. Which to believe,
respondent court is at a loss. Hence, respondent court had no alternative but to be circumspect in acting
upon the motion to dismiss. This respondent court accomplished by requiring petitioners to file their
answer where they can raise the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action as an affirmative
defense. Indeed the better alternative would be to conduct a full blown trial during which the parties could
present their respective evidences to prove their respective cause of action/defense. 11
Hence, this instant petition.
In view of the appointment of petitioner Trampe to the judiciary, petitioner Abesamis filed a manifestation
stating that he would act as counsel for his own behalf and in behalf of his co-petitioners. In a Resolution

dated March 8, 1993, we granted the Manifestation of petitioner Abesamis to substitute for petitioner
Trampe as counsel for himself and his co-petitioners. Respondent did not file a motion for reconsideration.
Meanwhile, on February 12, 1993, or almost three (3) years after the filing of the complaint for damages
against petitioners, the Regional Trial Court of Makati dismissed with finality the rebellion charges against
private respondent12.
In their Memorandum,13 petitioners raise the following assignment of errors:
I
THE RESPONDENT COURT HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH
LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT BY HOLDING THAT THE
RESPONDENT JUDGE DID NOT ACT WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING THE MOTION TO
DISMISS FILED BY THE PETITIONERS AND THAT IN ANY EVENT, THE DENIAL OF A MOTION TO DISMISS IS
NOT SUBJECT TO REVIEW BY CERTIORARI.
II
PETITIONER TRAMPE ACTED CORRECTLY IN REPRESENTING AND APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE OTHER
PETITIONERS IN THE INSTANT PETITION. MOREOVER, BY HIS LONG SILENCE AND INACTION, PRIVATE
RESPONDENT CANNOT NOW QUESTION THE PERSONALITY OF PETITIONER TRAMPE TO REPRESENT AND
APPEAR ON BEHALF OF THE OTHER PETITIONERS HEREIN.
Before ruling on the substance of the petition, let us first deal with the legal personalities of petitioners
Trampe and Abesamis to represent themselves and the rest of the petitioners in the case at bar. Private
respondent avers that Trampe's representation is a nullity for the reason that under the Revised
Administrative Code, it is not the function of the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor to represent its
prosecutors in suits that may be filed against them. Private respondent likewise argues that Trampe and
Abesamis are prohibited from acting as private counsels for their co-petitioners inasmuch as it violates
Republic Act No. 6713, the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees."
It must be noted that petitioner Abesamis filed a Manifestation 14 before this Court asking that he be
permitted to replace petitioner Trampe as counsel for the petitioners in view of Trampe's appointment to
the judiciary. No opposition thereto was filed by private respondent. Thus, we granted the manifestation of
petitioner Abesamis to substitute for Trampe as counsel for and in behalf of himself and his co-petitioners.
There being no motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent, said resolution has become final.
Private respondent did not dispute the legal personality of petitioner Trampe to represent himself and his
co-petitioners in his Comment15 filed before the Court of Appeals. Private respondent belatedly raised this
contention in his opposition16 to the motion for reconsideration of the appellate court's decision.
Accordingly, private respondent is estopped and legally barred from questioning the representation of
petitioners Trampe and later, Abesamis to act as counsel for themselves and their co-petitioners in this
case.
Going now to the crux of the petition, petitioners contend that the complaint sets forth no cause of action
against them. They allege good faith, regularity in the performance of official duties and lack of ultimate
facts constituting an actionable wrong. On the other hand, private respondent argues that a cause of
action has been sufficiently pleaded and that the defenses of good faith and performance of official duties
are best disposed in a judicial hearing. Private respondent likewise maintains that the defense of good
faith is irrelevant for the reason that the petitioners are sued under Article 32 of the New Civil Code where
the defense of good faith is irrelevant.
We find merit in the petition.1wphi1.nt
A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. 17 A cause of action
exists if the following elements are present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and
under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect
or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right
of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter
may maintain an action for recovery of damages.18
The remedy of a party whenever the complaint does not allege a cause of action is to set up this defense
in a motion to dismiss or in the answer. A motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of
action in the complaint hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged therein. However, the
hypothetical admission is limited to the "relevant and material facts well pleaded in the complaint and
inferences fairly deductible therefrom. The admission does not extend to conclusion or interpretations of
law; nor does it cover allegations of fact the falsity of which is subject to judicial notice." 19 In De Dios v.
Bristol Laboratories (Phils.), Inc., 20 this Court was more particular in explaining that:
xxx. For the purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the
complaint. The admission, however, is limited only to all material and relevant facts which are well pleaded
in the complaint. Thus, it had been ruled that a demurrer admits only such matters of fact as are
sufficiently pleaded; that the demurrer does not admit the truth of mere epithets charging fraud; nor
allegations of legal conclusions; nor an erroneous statement of law. The admission of the truth of material
and relevant facts well pleaded does not extend to render a demurrer an admission of inferences or
conclusions drawn therefrom, even if alleged in the pleading ; nor mere influences or conclusions from
facts not stated; nor conclusions of law; nor matters of evidence; nor surplusage and irrelevant matter.
xxx.
The main question in the instant petition is whether the allegations in the complaint sufficiently plead a
cause of action to hold the petitioners liable for damages. According to the complaint, the petitioners
violated private respondent's constitutional rights for knowingly and maliciously filing a legally nonexistent offense and for depriving him of his right to be notified of the filing of the case against him.
Inasmuch as private respondent seeks to hold the petitioners accountable for the damage he has suffered
as a result of the case filed against him, his suit against the petitioners is one for malicious prosecution.
In Drilon v. Court of Appeals,21 where the facts in said case are basically the same as in the instant
case,22 we also labeled the complaint filed by complainant Homobono Adaza as one for malicious
prosecution. It is defined as an action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution,

civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the
termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein. The gist of the
action is the putting of legal process in force, regularly, for the mere purpose of vexation or injury. 23 The
statutory bases for a civil action for damages for malicious prosecution are found in the provisions of the
New Civil Code on Human Relations and on damages particularly Articles 19, 20, 21, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35,
2217 and 2219(8).24 A
Complaint for malicious prosecution states a cause of action if it alleges: 1) that the defendant was himself
the prosecutor or that at least he instigated the prosecution; 2) that the prosecution finally terminated in
the plaintiff's acquittal; 3) that in bringing the action the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and, 4)
that the prosecutor was actuated by malice, i.e., by improper and sinister motives. 25
We have no reason to depart from our ruling in the said Drilon case. It is our view and we hold that private
respondent's complaint fails to state a cause of action to hold the petitioners liable for malicious
prosecution.
First, the complaint for damages was filed long before private respondent's acquittal in the rebellion charge
thereby rendering the subject action premature. At the time the complaint was filed, the criminal action
against private respondent has not yet ended. That the criminal case eventually resulted in private
respondent's acquittal during the pendency of the civil case for damages is of no moment inasmuch as the
latter should be filed only after the accused is acquitted in the criminal case. To allow private respondent to
file a complaint, for damages based on malicious prosecution, before his acquittal would stifle the
prosecution of criminal cases by the mere expediency of filing damage suits against the prosecutors.
The complaint for damages cannot be based on the dismissal of the separate charge for violation of P.D.
No. 1829 inasmuch as the complaint does not contain any allegation to that effect. The complaint actually
limits the claim for damages based on the filing of the rebellion charge against the petitioners. Hence, it
cannot be sustained based on the dismissal of the case for violation of P.D. No. 1829.
Second, there are no factual allegations in the complaint that can support a finding that malice and bad
faith motivated the petitioners in filing the information against private respondent. Allegations of bad faith,
malice and other related words without ultimate facts to support the same are mere conclusions of law
that are not deemed admitted in a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action. From our reading of the
complaint, we find no ultimate facts to buttress these conclusions of law. In Drilon, this Court held that;
xxx
xxx
xxx
Lack of cause of action, as a ground for a motion to dismissmust appear on the face of the complaint
itself, meaning that it must be determined from the allegations of the complaint and from none other. The
infirmity of the complaint in this regard is only too obvious to have escaped respondent judge's attention.
Paragraph 14 of the complaint which states:
xxx
xxx
xxx
14. The malicious prosecution, nay persecution, of plaintiff for a non-existent crime had severely injured
and besmirched plaintiff's name and reputation and forever stigmatized his stature as a public figure,
thereby causing him extreme physical suffering, serious anxiety, mental anguish, moral shock and social
humiliation."
is a mere conclusion of law and is not an averment or allegation of ultimate facts. It does not, therefore,
aid in any wise the complaint in setting forth a valid cause of action against the petitioners.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The allegations of bad faith and malice in the complaint are based on the ground that the petitioners
knowingly and allegedly maliciously filed the information for an offense that does not exist in the statute
books. But as we have ruled in Drilon:
In the case under consideration, the decision of the Special Team of Prosecutors to file the information for
rebellion with murder and frustrated murder against respondent Adaza, among others, cannot be
dismissed as the mere product of whim or caprice on the part of the prosecutors who conducted the
preliminary investigation While it is true that the petitioners were fully aware of the prevailing
jurisprudence enunciated in People v. Hernandez, which proscribes the complexing of murder and other
common crimes with rebellion, petitioners were of the honest conviction that the Hernandez Case can be
differentiated from the present case. The petitioners thus argued:
"Of course we are aware of the ruling in People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil 515, which held that common crimes
like murder, arson, etc., are absorbed by rebellion. However, the Hernandez case is different from the
present case before us. In the Hernandez case, the common crimes of murder, arson, etc. were found by
the fiscal to have been committed as a necessary means to commit rebellion, or in furtherance thereof.
Thus, the fiscal filed an information for rebellion alleging those common crimes as a necessary means of
committing the offense charged under the second part of Article 48, RPC.
We, however, find no occasion to apply the Hernandez ruling since as intimated above, the crimes of
murder and frustrated murder in this case were absolutely unnecessary to commit rebellion although they
were the natural consequences of the unlawful bombing. Hence, the applicable provision is the first part of
Article 48 of the RPC."
While the Supreme Court in the case of Enrile v. Salazar, addressing the issue of whether or not the
Hernandez doctrine is still good law, in a 10-3 vote, did not sustain the position espoused by the herein
petitioners on the matter, three justices felt the need to re-study the Hernandez ruling in light of presentday developments, among whom was then Chief Justice Marcelo Fernan
xxx
Apparently, not even the Supreme Court then was of one mind in debunking the theory being advanced by
the petitioners in this case, some of whom were also the petitioners in the Enrile case.
xxx
A doubtful or difficult question of law may become the basis of good faith and, in this regard, the law
always accords to public officials the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official
duties. [Tatad v. Garcia, Jr., 243 SCRA 436, 463 (1995)] Any person who seeks to establish otherwise has
the burden of proving bad faith or ill-motive. Here, since the petitioners were of the honest conviction that

there was probable cause to hold respondent Adaza for trial for the crime of rebellion with murder and
frustrated murder, and since Adaza himself, through counsel, did not allege in his complaint lack of
probable cause, we find that the petitioners cannot be held liable for malicious prosecution. Needless to
say, probable cause was not wanting in the institution of Criminal Case No. Q-90-11855 against Adaza.
As to the requirement that the prosecutor must be impelled by malice in bringing the unfounded action,
suffice it to state that the presence of probable cause signifies, as a legal consequence, the absence of
malice. (Albenson Enterprises Corp., supra.) At the risk of being repetitious, it is evident in this case that
petitioners were not motivated by malicious intent or by a sinister design to unduly harass private
respondent, but only by a well-founded belief that respondent Adaza can be held for trial for the crime
alleged in the information.
All told, the complaint, dated July 11, 1990, filed by Adaza before Branch 100 of the Regional Trial Court
against the petitioners does not allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for malicious
prosecution. xxx
xxx
As a result, these general allegations do not help private respondent's action against petitioners. It is well
settled that one cannot be held liable for allegedly maliciously instituting a prosecution where there is
probable cause. Otherwise stated, a suit for malicious prosecution will lie only in cases where a legal
prosecution has been carried on without probable cause. The reason for this rule is that it would be a very
great discouragement to public justice, if prosecutors, who had tolerable ground of suspicion, were liable to
be sued at law when their indictment miscarried.26
On the issue of whether the petitioners should be held accountable for knowingly filing a non-existent
offense, this Court has definitely ruled in Enrile v. Salazar that:
The plaint of petitioner's (herein private respondent) counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not
exist in the statute books, while technically correct in so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not
be complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereon, must therefore be dismissed as a
mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the
petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal code: simple rebellion. 27
Accordingly, despite its defect, the information filed by petitioners remained valid inasmuch as it
nevertheless charges an offense against the herein private respondent.
With respect to private respondent's second basis for the charge of malicious prosecution, that is, he was
denied by the petitioners the right to be notified before the criminal information against him, his complaint
alleges that:
xxx
More particularly, these defendants originally filed or caused the filing of the information on 21 February
1990 but, for some mysterious reason, the information was subsequently withdrawn. The initial filing and
withdrawal of the information defendant Chavez admitted these facts during the Supreme Court hearing
on 6 March 1990 were done in total secrecy and without the knowledge of plaintiff who learned of this
incident only after his arrest on 27 February 1990.
Likewise, on or about 27 February 1990, these defendants deliberately misled plaintiff and his lawyers and
induced them to believe that the charge of rebellion "complexed" was set to be filed against the plaintiff in
the Regional Trial Court of Makati. While plaintiff's attention was diverted to the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, these defendants surreptitiously filed or caused the filing of the main information for rebellion
"complexed" in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.28
xxx
However, we hold that the said allegations still fail to maintain a cause of action against the petitioners. To
reiterate, a cause of action exists if the following elements are present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff
by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the
named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the
plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. 29 In the case at bar, we fail to
see any right of the private respondent supposedly violated by the petitioners. Nowhere in the statute
books is a prospective accused given the right to be notified beforehand of the filing of an information
against him. Likewise, the withdrawal of the information and the subsequent re-filing of the same do not
constitute an actionable wrong inasmuch as the filing or re-filing of an information lies within the discretion
of the prosecutor who must act independently of the affected parties.
Private respondent claims that an appeal or an original action for certiorari is not the proper remedy for a
defendant whose motion to dismiss has been denied by the trial court for the reason that the order does
not terminate the proceedings, nor finally dispose of the contentions of the parties. In its decision affirming
the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss, the appellate court sustained this contention. However, as
correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the rule admits of an exception. Thus, where the denial of the
motion to dismiss by the trial court was tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, as in the case at bar, the aggrieved party may assail the order of denial on certiorari. 30 A
wide breadth of discretion is granted in certiorari proceedings in the interest of substantial justice and to
prevent a substantial wrong.31 In the Drilon case, we also held that the denial by the trial court of the
motion to dismiss of herein petitioners based on the same grounds as in the instant petition constituted
grave abuse of discretion for the reason that "this (private respondent's baseless action) would unjustly
compel the petitioners to needlessly go through a protracted trial and thereby unduly burden the court
with one more futile and inconsequential case."32 The appellate court therefore erred in not ruling that the
trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion when the latter refused to dismiss the case as against
herein petitioners, notwithstanding the obvious insufficiency of the complaint against them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 29, 1992 of respondent Court of Appeals
and its Resolution dated August 27, 1992 which affirmed the Orders of the Respondent Regional trial Court
of Makati City, dated October 8, 1991 and January 6, 1992 are hereby NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE. The

respondent Regional Trial Court of Makati is hereby ordered to take no further action in Civil Case No. 902327 except to dismiss the same.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 164007 August 10, 2006
LT. (SG) EUGENE GONZALES, LT. (SG) ANDY TORRATO, LT. (SG) ANTONIO TRILLANES IV, CPT.
GARY ALEJANO, LT. (SG) JAMES LAYUG, CPT. GERARDO GAMBALA, CPT. NICANOR FAELDON, LT.
(SG) MANUEL CABOCHAN, ENS. ARMAND PONTEJOS, LT. (JG) ARTURO PASCUA, and 1LT. JONNEL
SANGGALANG, Petitioners,
vs.
GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, in his capacity as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
and B. GEN. MARIANO M. SARMIENTO, JR., in his capacity as the Judge Advocate General of the
Judge Advocate Generals Office (JAGO), Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the Petition for Prohibition (with prayer for a temporary restraining order) filed by the
above-named members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), herein petitioners, against the AFP
Chief of Staff and the Judge Advocate General, respondents.
The facts are:
On July 26, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo received intelligence reports that some members of
the AFP, with high-powered weapons, had abandoned their designated places of assignment. Their aim
was to destabilize the government. The President then directed the AFP and the Philippine National Police
(PNP) to track and arrest them.
On July 27, 2003 at around 1:00 a.m., more than 300 heavily armed junior officers and enlisted men of the
AFP mostly from the elite units of the Armys Scout Rangers and the Navys Special Warfare Group
entered the premises of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments on Ayala Avenue, Makati City. They
disarmed the security guards and planted explosive devices around the building.
Led by Navy Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes IV, the troops sported red armbands emblazoned with the emblem of
the "Magdalo" faction of the Katipunan. 1 The troops then, through broadcast media, announced their
grievances against the administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, such as the graft and
corruption in the military, the illegal sale of arms and ammunition to the "enemies" of the State, and the
bombings in Davao City intended to acquire more military assistance from the US government. They
declared their withdrawal of support from their Commander-in-Chief and demanded that she resign as
President of the Republic. They also called for the resignation of her cabinet members and the top brass of
the AFP and PNP.
About noontime of the same day, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 declaring a state of
rebellion, followed by General Order No. 4 directing the AFP and PNP to take all necessary measures to
suppress the rebellion then taking place in Makati City. She then called the soldiers to surrender their
weapons at five oclock in the afternoon of that same day.
In order to avoid a bloody confrontation, the government sent negotiators to dialogue with the soldiers.
The aim was to persuade them to peacefully return to the fold of the law. After several hours of
negotiation, the government panel succeeded in convincing them to lay down their arms and defuse the
explosives placed around the premises of the Oakwood Apartments. Eventually, they returned to their
barracks.
A total of 321 soldiers, including petitioners herein, surrendered to the authorities.
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigated the incident and recommended that the military
personnel involved be charged with coup detat defined and penalized under Article 134-A of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended. On July 31, 2003, the Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ)
recommended the filing of the corresponding Information against them.
Meanwhile, on August 2, 2003, pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War, respondent General Narciso
Abaya, then AFP Chief of Staff, ordered the arrest and detention of the soldiers involved in the Oakwood
incident and directed the AFP to conduct its own separate investigation.
On August 5, 2003, the DOJ filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City an Information for coup
detat 2against those soldiers, docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784 and eventually raffled off to Branch
61, presided by Judge Romeo F. Barza. 3 Subsequently, this case was consolidated with Criminal Case No.
03-2678, involving the other accused, pending before Branch 148 of the RTC, Makati City, presided by
Judge Oscar B. Pimentel.
On August 13, 2003, the RTC directed the DOJ to conduct a reinvestigation of Criminal Case No. 03-2784.
On the same date, respondent Chief of Staff issued Letter Order No. 625 creating a Pre-Trial Investigation
Panel tasked to determine the propriety of filing with the military tribunal charges for violations of the
Articles of War under Commonwealth Act No. 408, 4 as amended, against the same military personnel.
Specifically, the charges are: (a) violation of Article 63 for disrespect toward the President, the Secretary of
National Defense, etc., (b) violation of Article 64 for disrespect toward a superior officer, (c) violation of
Article 67 for mutiny or sedition, (d) violation of Article 96 for conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman, and (e) violation of Article 97 for conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline.
Of the original 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784, only 243 (including petitioners herein) filed with
the RTC, Branch 148 an Omnibus Motion praying that the said trial court assume jurisdiction over all the
charges filed with the military tribunal. They invoked Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7055. 5

On September 15, 2003, petitioners filed with the Judge Advocate Generals Office (JAGO) a motion praying
for the suspension of its proceedings until after the RTC shall have resolved their motion to assume
jurisdiction.
On October 29, 2003, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Initial Report to the AFP Chief of Staff
recommending that the military personnel involved in the Oakwood incident be charged before a general
court martial with violations of Articles 63, 64, 67, 96, and 97 of the Articles of War.
Meanwhile, on November 11, 2003, the DOJ, after conducting a reinvestigation, found probable cause
against only 31 (petitioners included) of the 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784. Accordingly, the
prosecution filed with the RTC an Amended Information. 6
In an Order dated November 14, 2003, the RTC admitted the Amended Information and dropped the
charge of coup detat against the 290 accused.
Subsequently, or on December 12, 2003, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Final Pre-Trial
Investigation Report 7 to the JAGO, recommending that, following the "doctrine of absorption," those
charged with coup detat before the RTCshould not be charged before the military tribunal for violation of
the Articles of War.
For its part, the RTC, on February 11, 2004, issued an Order 8 stating that "all charges before the court
martial against the accusedare hereby declared not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in
furtherance of the alleged crime of coup detat." The trial court then proceeded to hear petitioners
applications for bail.
In the meantime, Colonel Julius A. Magno, in his capacity as officer-in-charge of the JAGO, reviewed the
findings of the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel. He recommended that 29 of the officers involved in the
Oakwood incident, including petitioners, be prosecuted before a general court martial for violation of
Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War.
On June 17, 2004, Colonel Magnos recommendation was approved by the AFP top brass. The AFP Judge
Advocate General then directed petitioners to submit their answer to the charge. Instead of complying,
they filed with this Court the instant Petition for Prohibition praying that respondents be ordered to desist
from charging them with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War in relation to the Oakwood incident. 9
Petitioners maintain that since the RTC has made a determination in its Order of February 11, 2004 that
the offense for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of
War is not service-connected, but is absorbed in the crime of coup detat, the military tribunal cannot
compel them to submit to its jurisdiction.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, counters that R.A. No. 7055 specifies which offenses
covered by the Articles of War areservice-connected. These are violations of Articles 54 to 70, 72 to 92,
and 95 to 97. The law provides that violations of these Articles are properly cognizable by the court
martial. As the charge against petitioners is violation of Article 96 which, under R.A. No. 7055 is a serviceconnected offense, then it falls under the jurisdiction of the court martial.
Subsequently, petitioners filed with this Court a Supplemental Petition raising the additional issue that the
offense charged before the General Court Martial has prescribed. Petitioners alleged therein that during
the pendency of their original petition, respondents proceeded with the Pre-Trial Investigation for purposes
of charging them with violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the
Articles of War; that the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel then referred the case to the General Court Martial;
that "almost two years since the Oakwood incident on July 27, 2003, only petitioner Lt. (SG) Antonio
Trillanes was arraigned, and this was done under questionable circumstances;" 10 that in the hearing of July
26, 2005, herein petitioners moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that they were not
arraigned within the prescribed period of two (2) years from the date of the commission of the alleged
offense, in violation of Article 38 of the Articles of War; 11 that "the offense charged prescribed on July 25,
2005;" 12 that the General Court Martial ruled, however, that "the prescriptive period shall end only at
12:00 midnight of July 26, 2005;" 13 that "(a)s midnight of July 26, 2005 was approaching and it was
becoming apparent that the accused could not be arraigned, the prosecution suddenly changed its position
and asserted that 23 of the accused have already been arraigned;" 14 and that petitioners moved for a
reconsideration but it was denied by the general court martial in its Order dated September 14, 2005. 15
In his Comment, the Solicitor General prays that the Supplemental Petition be denied for lack of merit. He
alleges that "contrary to petitioners pretensions, all the accused were duly arraigned on July 13 and 18,
2005." 16 The "(r)ecords show that in the hearing on July 13, 2005, all the 29 accused were present" and,
"(o)n that day, Military Prosecutor Captain Karen Ong Jags read the Charges and Specifications from the
Charge Sheet in open court (pp. 64, TSN, July 13, 2005)." 17
The sole question for our resolution is whether the petitioners are entitled to the writ of prohibition.
There is no dispute that petitioners, being officers of the AFP, are subject to military law. Pursuant to Article
1 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise known as the Articles of War, the term
"officer" is "construed to refer to a commissioned officer." Article 2 provides:
Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. The following persons are subject to these articles and shall be
understood as included in the term "any person subject to military law" or "persons subject to military
law," whenever used in these articles:
(a) All officers and soldiers in the active service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or of the
Philippine Constabulary, all members of the reserve force, from the dates of their call to active duty and
while on such active duty; all trainees undergoing military instructions; and all other persons lawfully
called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty or for training in the said service, from the dates they are
required by the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the same.
Upon the other hand, Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055 reads:
SEC. 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other persons subject to military law, including
members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses penalized under
the Revised Penal Code, other special penal laws, or local government ordinances, regardless of whether or
not civilians are co-accused, victims, or offended parties, which may be natural or juridical persons, shall
be tried by the proper civil court, except when the offense, as determined before arraignment by the civil

court, is service-connected, in which case, the offense shall be tried by court-martial, Provided, That the
President of the Philippines may, in the interest of justice, order or direct at any time before arraignment
that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil courts.
As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses shall be limited to those defined in Articles
54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended.
In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court-martial may take into consideration the
penalty prescribed therefor in the Revised Penal Code, other special laws, or local government ordinances.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055, quoted above, is clear and unambiguous. First, it lays down the general rule
that members of the AFP and other persons subject to military law, including members of the Citizens
Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code
(like coup detat), other special penal laws, or local ordinances shall be tried by the proper civil court. Next,
it provides the exception to the general rule, i.e., where the civil court, before arraignment, has determined
the offense to be service-connected, then the offending soldier shall be tried by a court martial. Lastly, the
law states an exception to the exception, i.e., where the President of the Philippines, in the interest of
justice, directs before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil court.
The second paragraph of the same provision further identifies the "service-connected crimes or offenses"
as "limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97" of the Articles
of War. Violations of these specified Articles are triable by court martial. This delineates the jurisdiction
between the civil courts and the court martial over crimes or offenses committed by military personnel.
Such delineation of jurisdiction by R.A. No. 7055 is necessary to preserve the peculiar nature of military
justice system over military personnel charged with service-connected offenses. The military justice
system is disciplinary in nature, aimed at achieving the highest form of discipline in order to ensure the
highest degree of military efficiency. 18 Military law is established not merely to enforce discipline in times
of war, but also to preserve the tranquility and security of the State in time of peace; for there is nothing
more dangerous to the public peace and safety than a licentious and undisciplined military body. 19 The
administration of military justice has been universally practiced. Since time immemorial, all the armies in
almost all countries of the world look upon the power of military law and its administration as the most
effective means of enforcing discipline. For this reason, the court martial has become invariably an
indispensable part of any organized armed forces, it being the most potent agency in enforcing discipline
both in peace and in war. 20
Here, petitioners are charged for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman)
of the Articles of War before the court martial, thus:
All persons subject to military law, did on or about 27 July 2003 at Oakwood Hotel, Makati City, Metro
Manila, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously violate their solemn oath as officers to defend the
Constitution, the law and the duly-constituted authorities and abused their constitutional duty
to protect the people and the State by, among others, attempting to oust the incumbent duly-elected
and legitimate President by force and violence, seriously disturbing the peace and tranquility of the people
and the nation they are sworn to protect, thereby causing dishonor and disrespect to the military
profession, conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, in violation of AW 96 of the Articles of
War.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring ours)
Article 96 of the Articles of War 21 provides:
ART. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman. Any officer, member of the Nurse Corps, cadet,
flying cadet, or probationary second lieutenant, who is convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman shall be dismissed from the service. (Underscoring ours)
We hold that the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-connected. This is
expressly provided in Section 1 (second paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055. It bears stressing that the charge
against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the
Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities.Such violation allegedly caused dishonor and
disrespect
to
the
military
profession. In short,
the charge
has
a bearing on
their professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of the "service-connected"
nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same dismissal from the service imposable
only by the military court.Such penalty is purely disciplinary in character, evidently intended to cleanse
the military profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of military discipline.
Obviously, there is no merit in petitioners argument that they can no longer be charged before the court
martial for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War because the same has been declared by the RTC in
its Order of February 11, 2004 as "not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the
alleged crime of coup detat," hence, triable by said court (RTC). The RTC, in making such declaration,
practically amended the law which expressly vests in the court martial the jurisdiction over "serviceconnected crimes or offenses." What the law has conferred the court should not take away. It is only the
Constitution or the law that bestows jurisdiction on the court, tribunal, body or officer over the subject
matter or nature of an action which can do so. 22 And it is only through a constitutional amendment or
legislative enactment that such act can be done. The first and fundamental duty of the courts is merely to
apply the law "as they find it, not as they like it to be." 23 Evidently, such declaration by the RTC constitutes
grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore, void.
In Navales v. Abaya., 24 this Court, through Mr. Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., held:
We agree with the respondents that the sweeping declaration made by the RTC (Branch 148) in the
dispositive portion of its Order dated February 11, 2004 that all charges before the court-martial against
the accused were not service-connected, but absorbed and in furtherance of the crime of coup detat,
cannot be given effect. x x x, such declaration was made without or in excess of jurisdiction; hence, a
nullity.
The second paragraph of the above provision (referring to Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055) explicitly specifies
what are considered "service-connected crimes or offenses" under Commonwealth Act No. 408, as
amended, also known as the Articles of War, to wit:

Articles 54 to 70:
Art. 54. Fraudulent Enlistment.
Art. 55. Officer Making Unlawful Enlistment.
Art. 56. False Muster.
Art. 57. False Returns.
Art. 58. Certain Acts to Constitute Desertion.
Art. 59. Desertion.
Art. 60. Advising or Aiding Another to Desert.
Art. 61. Entertaining a Deserter.
Art. 62. Absence Without Leave.
Art. 63. Disrespect Toward the President, Vice-President,
Congress of the Philippines, or Secretary of National
Defense.
Art. 64. Disrespect Toward Superior Officer.
Art. 65. Assaulting or Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer.
Art. 66. Insubordinate Conduct Toward Non-Commissioned Officer.
Art. 67. Mutiny or Sedition.
Art. 68. Failure to Suppress Mutiny or Sedition.
Art. 69. Quarrels; Frays; Disorders.
Art. 70. Arrest or Confinement.
Articles 72 to 92:
Art. 72. Refusal to Receive and Keep Prisoners.
Art. 73. Report of Prisoners Received.
Art. 74. Releasing Prisoner Without Authority.
Art. 75. Delivery of Offenders to Civil Authorities.
Art. 76. Misbehavior Before the Enemy.
Art. 77. Subordinates Compelling Commander to Surrender.
Art. 78. Improper Use of Countersign.
Art. 79. Forcing a Safeguard.
Art. 80. Captured Property to be Secured for Public Service.
Art. 81. Dealing in Captured or Abandoned Property.
Art. 82. Relieving, Corresponding With, or Aiding the Enemy.
Art. 83. Spies.
Art. 84. Military Property.Willful or Negligent Loss, Damage
or wrongful Disposition.
Art. 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military Property
Issued to Soldiers.
Art. 86. Drunk on Duty.
Art. 87. Misbehavior of Sentinel.
Art. 88. Personal Interest in Sale of Provisions.
Art. 88-A. Unlawful Influencing Action of Court.
Art. 89. Intimidation of Persons Bringing Provisions.
Art. 90. Good Order to be Maintained and Wrongs Redressed.
Art. 91. Provoking Speeches or Gestures.
Art. 92. Dueling.
Articles 95 to 97:
Art. 95. Frauds Against the Government.
Art. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.
Art. 97. General Article.
Further, Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 7055 vests on the military courts the jurisdiction over the foregoing
offenses. x x x.
It is clear from the foregoing that Rep. Act No. 7055 did not divest the military courts of jurisdiction to try
cases involving violations of Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of the Articles of War
as these are considered "service-connected crimes or offenses." In fact, it mandates that these shall be
tried by the court-martial.
Moreover, the observation made by Mr. Justice Antonio T. Carpio during the deliberation of this case is
worth quoting, thus:
The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by holding that the charge of Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman is absorbed and in furtherance to the alleged crime of coup
detat. Firstly, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is peculiar to criminal law and generally applies to
crimes punished by the same statute, 25 unlike here where different statutes are involved. Secondly, the
doctrine applies only if the trial court has jurisdiction over both offenses. Here, Section 1 of R.A. 7055
deprives civil courts of jurisdiction over service-connected offenses, including Article 96 of the Articles of
War. Thus, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is not applicable to this case.
Military law is sui generis (Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 [1975]), applicable only to military personnel
because the military constitutes an armed organization requiring a system of discipline separate from that
of civilians (see Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 [1953]). Military personnel carry high-powered arms and
other lethal weapons not allowed to civilians. History, experience, and the nature of a military organization
dictate that military personnel must be subjected to a separate disciplinary system not applicable to
unarmed civilians or unarmed government personnel.
A civilian government employee reassigned to another place by his superior may question his
reassignment by asking a temporary restraining order or injunction from a civil court. However, a soldier
cannot go to a civil court and ask for a restraining or injunction if his military commander reassigns him to
another area of military operations. If this is allowed, military discipline will collapse.

xxx
This Court has recognized that courts-martial are instrumentalities of the Executive to enable the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, to effectively command, control, and discipline the armed forces (see
Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, 75 Phil. 875 [1946], citing Winthrops Military Law and Precedents, 2nd edition, p.
49). In short, courts-martial form part of the disciplinary system that ensures the Presidents control, and
thus civilian supremacy, over the military. At the apex of this disciplinary system is the President who
exercises review powers over decisions of courts-martial (citing Article 50 of the Articles of War; quoted
provisions omitted).
xxx
While the Court had intervened before in courts-martial or similar proceedings, it did so sparingly and only
to release a military personnel illegally detained (Ognir v. Director of Prisons, 80 Phil. 401 [1948] or to
correct objectionable procedures (Yamashita v. Styer, 75 Phil. 563 [1945]). The Court has never suppressed
court-martial proceedings on the ground that the offense charged is absorbed and in furtherance of
another criminal charge pending with the civil courts. The Court may now do so only if the offense charged
is not one of the service-connected offenses specified in Section 1 of RA 7055. Such is not the situation in
the present case.
With respect to the issue of prescription raised by petitioners in their Supplemental Petition, suffice it to
say that we cannot entertain the same. The contending parties are at loggerheads as to (a) who among
the petitioners were actually arraigned, and (b) the dates of their arraignment. These are matters involving
questions of fact, not within our power of review, as we are not a trier of facts. In a petition for prohibition,
such as the one at bar, only legal issues affecting the jurisdiction of the tribunal, board or officer involved
may be resolved on the basis of the undisputed facts. 26
Clearly, the instant petition for prohibition must fail. The office of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and
oppressive exercise of authority and is directed against proceedings that are done without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there being no appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. 27 Stated differently, prohibition is the remedy to prevent inferior
courts, corporations, boards, or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they
have not been vested by law. 28
In fine, this Court holds that herein respondents have the authority in convening a court martial and in
charging petitioners with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 81567
October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO
VILLANUEVA, MANOLITA O. UMIL and NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE, petitioners,
vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER
AGUIRRE, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 84581-82

October 3, 1991

AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners,

vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN, RAMON MONTANO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 84583-84

October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY. DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON
CASIPLE: DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL. EVARISTO CARIO, LT. COL. REX D. PIAD, T/SGT.
CONRADO DE TORRES, S/SGT. ARNOLD DURIAN, and Commanding Officer, PC-INP Detention Center, Camp
Crame, Quezon City, respondents.
G.R. No. 83162

October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VICKY A. OCAYA AND DANNY RIVERA:
VIRGILIO A. OCAYA, petitioners,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. HERCULES CATALUNA, COL. NESTOR MARIANO, respondents.
G.R. No. 85727

October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DEOGRACIAS ESPIRITU, petitioner,

vs.
BRIG. GEN.ALFREDO S. LIM, COL. RICARDO REYES, respondents.
G.R. No. 86332

October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF NARCISO B. NAZARENO: ALFREDO
NAZARENO,petitioner,
vs.
THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE STATION, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila, P/SGT.
JACINTO MEDINA, P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE, P/SGT. LEVI SOLEDAD, and P/SGT. MALTRO AROJADO, respondents.
Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No. 81567 and G. R. No. 83162.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84581-82
Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84583-84.
Potenciano A. Flores, Jr. for petitioner in G.R. No. 85727.
The Solicitor General for the respondents.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:p
Before the Court are separate motions filed by the petitioners in the above-entitled petitions, seeking
reconsideration of the Court's decision promulgated on 9 July 1990 (the decision, for brevity) which
dismissed the petitions, with the following dispositive part:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail
bond for petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No
costs.
The Court avails of this opportunity to clarify its ruling a begins with the statement that the decision did
not rule as many misunderstood it to do that mere suspicion that one is Communist Party or New
People's Army member is a valid ground for his arrest without warrant. Moreover, the decision merely
applied long existing laws to the factual situations obtaining in the several petitions. Among these laws are
th outlawing the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) similar organizations and penalizing
membership therein be dealt with shortly). It is elementary, in this connection, if these laws no longer
reflect the thinking or sentiment of the people, it is Congress as the elected representative of the people
not the Court that should repeal, change or modify them.
In their separate motions for reconsideration, petitioners, in sum, maintain:
1.
That the assailed decision, in upholding the validity of the questioned arrests made without
warrant, and in relying on the provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly Section 5 of Rule 113 (Arrest),
disregards the fact that such arrests violated the constitutional rights of the persons arrested;
2.

That the doctrine laid down in Garcia vs. Enrile 1 and Ilagan vs. Enrile 2 should be abandoned;

3.
That the decision erred in considering the admissions made by the persons arrested as to their
membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army, and their ownership of the
unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and subversive documents found in their possession at the time of
arrest, inasmuch as those confessions do not comply with the requirements on admissibility of extrajudicial
admissions;
4.

That the assailed decision is based on a misappreciation of facts;

5.

That G.R. No. 81567 (the Umil case) should not be deemed moot and academic.

We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration.

It can not be overlooked that these are petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, filed by
petitioners under the Rules of Court. 3 The writ of habeas corpus exists as a speedy and effective remedy
to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. 4 Therefore, the function of the special proceedings of habeas
corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's detention, 5 so that if detention is illegal, the detainee may be
ordered forthwit released.
In the petitions at bar, to ascertain whether the detention petitioners was illegal or not, the Court before
rendering decision dated 9 July 1990, looked into whether their questioned arrests without warrant were
made in accordance with law. For, if the arrests were made in accordance with law, would follow that the
detention resulting from such arrests also in accordance with law.
There can be no dispute that, as a general rule, no peace officer or person has the power or authority to
arrest anyo without a warrant of arrest, except in those cases express authorized by law. 6 The law
expressly allowing arrests witho warrant is found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which states
the grounds upon which a valid arrest, without warrant, can be conducted.

In the present cases, the focus is understandably on Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (b) of the said Rule 113,
which read:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a)
When, in his presence, the person to he arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b)
When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrest has committed it; and
. . . (Emphasis supplied).
The Court's decision of 9 July 1990 rules that the arrest Rolando Dural (G.R. No. 81567) without warrant is
justified it can be said that, within the contemplation of Section 5 Rule 113, he (Dural) was committing an
offense, when arrested because Dural was arrested for being a member of the New People's Army, an
outlawed organization, where membership penalized, 7 and for subversion which, like rebellion is, under
the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, 8 a continuing offense, thus:
The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and
other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance (sic) on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto,
or in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing
offenses which set them apart from the common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive
conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. . . .
Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which includes armed struggle for the
overthrow of organized government, Dural did not cease to be, or became less of a subversive, FOR
PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply because he was, at the time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes Hospital.
Dural was identified as one of several persons who the day before his arrest, without warrant, at the St.
Agnes Hospital, had shot two (2) CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. That Dural had shot the two (2)
policemen in Caloocan City as part of his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA member) did not end there and then.
Dural, given another opportunity, would have shot or would shoot other policemen anywhere as agents or
representatives of organized government. It is in this sense that subversion like rebellion (or insurrection)
is perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike other so-called "common" offenses, i.e. adultery, murder,
arson, etc., which generally end upon their commission, subversion and rebellion are anchored on an
ideological base which compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the
overriding objective of overthrowing organized government is attained.
Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the arresting officers of his
membership in the CPP/NPA. His arrest was based on "probable cause," as supported by actual facts that
will be shown hereafter.
Viewed from another but related perspective, it may also be said, under the facts of the Umil case, that the
arrest of Dural falls under Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which requires two (2)
conditions for a valid arrestt without warrant: first, that the person to be arrested has just committed an
offense, and second, that the arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested is the one who committed the offense. Section 5(b), Rule 113, it
will be noted, refers to arrests without warrant, based on "personal knowledge of facts" acquired by the
arresting officer or private person.
It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts," in arrests without warrant must be based upon
probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion 9
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the
suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual
facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of
guilt of the person to be arrested. 10 A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause,
coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. 11
These requisites were complied with in the Umil case and in the other cases at bar.
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil case), military agents, on 1 February 1988, were dispatched to the St. Agnes
Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was received by their
office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot
wound; that the information further disclosed that the wounded man in the said hospital was among the
five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January
1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City;
that based on the same information, the wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as
"Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Bian, Laguna. 12
Said confidential information received by the arresting officers, to the effect that an NPA member ("sparrow
unit") was being treated for a gunshot wound in the named hospital, is deemed reasonable and with cause
as it was based on actual facts and supported by circumstances sufficient to engender a belief that an NPA

member was truly in the said hospital. The actual facts supported by circumstances are: first the day
before, or on 31 January 1988, two (2) CAPCOM soldiers were actually killed in Bagong Bario, Caloocan City
by five (5) "sparrows" including Dural; second a wounded person listed in the hospital records as
"Ronnie Javellon" was actually then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital for a gunshot wound; third as the
records of this case disclosed later, "Ronnie Javellon" and his address entered in the hospital records were
fictitious and the wounded man was in reality Rolando Dural.
In fine, the confidential information received by the arresting officers merited their immediate attention
and action and, in fact, it was found to be true. Even the petitioners in their motion for reconsideration, 13
believe that the confidential information of the arresting officers to the effect that Dural was then being
treated in St. Agnes Hospital was actually received from the attending doctor and hospital management in
compliance with the directives of the law, 14 and, therefore, came from reliable sources.
As to the condition that "probable cause" must also be coupled with acts done in good faith by the officers
who make the arrest, the Court notes that the peace officers wno arrested Dural are deemed to have
conducted the same in good faith, considering that law enforcers are presumed to regularly perform their
official duties. The records show that the arresting officers did not appear to have been ill-motivated in
arresting Dural. 15 It is therefore clear that the arrest, without warrant, of Dural was made in compliance
with the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113.
Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few day after Dural's arrest, without warrant, an
information charging double murder with assault against agents of persons in authority was filed against
Dural in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (Criminal Case No. C-30112). He was thus promptly
placed under judicial custody (as distinguished fro custody of the arresting officers). On 31 August 1988,
he wa convicted of the crime charged and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The judgment of conviction is
now on appeal before this Court in G.R. No. 84921.
As to Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple
(G.R. Nos. 84583-84) and Vicky Ocaya (G.R. No. 83162), their arrests, without warrant, are also justified.
They were searched pursuant to search warrants issued by a court of law and were found wit unlicensed
firearms, explosives and/or ammunition in their persons. They were, therefore, caught in flagrante delicto
which justified their outright arrests without warrant, under Sec 5(a), Rule 113, Rules of Court.
Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few davs after their arrests without warrant,
informations were filed in court against said petitioners, thereby placing them within judicial custody and
disposition. Furthermore, Buenaobra mooted his own petition fo habeas corpus by announcing to this Court
during the hearing of these petitions that he had chosen to remain in detention in the custody of the
authorities.
More specifically, the antecedent facts in the "in flagrante" cases are:
1.
On 27 June 1988, the military agents received information imparted by a former NPA about the
operations of the CPP and NPA in Metro Manila and that a certain house occupied by one Renato
Constantine, located in the Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila was
being used as their safehouse; that in view of this information, the said house was placed under military
surveillance and on 12 August 1988, pursuant to a search warrant duly issued by court, a search of the
house was conducted; that when Renato Constantine was then confronted he could not produce any
permit to possess the firearms, ammunitions, radio and other communications equipment, and he
admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP. 16
2.
In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, he arrived at the house of Renato Constantino in the evening of
12 August 1988, and admitted that he was an NPA courier and he had with him letters to Renato
Constantine and other members of the rebel group.
3.
On the other hand, the arrest of Amelia Roque was a consequence of the arrest of Buenaobra who
had in his possession papers leading to the whereabouts of Roque; 17 that, at the time of her arrest, the
military agents found subversive documents and live ammunitions, and she admitted then that the
documents belonged to her. 18
4.
As regards Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple they were arrested without warrant on 13
August 1988, when they arrived at the said house of Renato Constantine in the evening of said date; that
when the agents frisked them, subversive documents, and loaded guns were found in the latter's
possession but failing to show a permit to possess them. 19
5.
With regard to Vicky Ocaya, she was arrested, without warrant when she arrived (on 12 May 1988)
at the premises ofthe house of one Benito Tiamzon who was believed to be the head of the CPP/NPA, and
whose house was subject of a search warrant duly issued by the court. At the time of her arrest without
warrant the agents of the PC-Intelligence and Investigation found ammunitions and subversive documents
in the car of Ocaya. 20
It is to be noted in the above cases (Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya) that the reason
which compelled the military agents to make the arrests without warrant was the information given to the
military authorities that two (2) safehouses (one occupied by Renato Constantine and the other by Benito
Tiamzon) were being used by the CPP/NPA for their operations, with information as to their exact location
and the names of Renato Constantine and Benito Tiamzon as residents or occupants thereof.

And at the time of the actual arrests, the following circumstances surrounded said arrests (of Roque,
Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple), which confirmed the belief of the military agents that the information
they had received was true and the persons to be arrested were probably guilty of the commission of
certain crimes: first: search warrant was duly issued to effect the search of the Constantine safehouse;
second: found in the safehouse was a person named Renato Constantine, who admitted that he was a
ranking member of the CPP, and found in his possession were unlicensed firearms and communications
equipment; third: at the time of their arrests, in their possession were unlicensed firearms, ammunitions
and/or subversive documents, and they admitted ownership thereof as well as their membership in the
CPP/NPA. And then, shortly after their arrests, they were positively identified by their former comrades in
the organization as CPP/NPA members. In view of these circumstances, the corresponding informations
were filed in court against said arrested persons. The records also show that, as in the case of Dural, the
arrests without warrant made by the military agents in the Constantino safehouse and later in the Amelia
Roque house, do not appear to have been ill-motivated or irregularly performed.
With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the arrest of the afore-named
persons (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya), no prudent an can say that it would
have been better for the military agents not to have acted at all and made any arrest. That would have
been an unpardonable neglect of official duty and a cause for disciplinary action against the peace officers
involved.
For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in the hands of
executive and judicial authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the acts constituting the
alleged violation of law and to prosecute and secure the punishment therefor. 21 An arrest is therefore in
the nature of an administrative measure. The power to arrest without warrant is without limitation as long
as the requirements of Section 5, Rule 113 are met. This rule is founded on an overwhelming public
interest in peace and order in our communities.
In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the conditions set forth
in Section 5, Rule 113, this Court determines not whether the persons arrested are indeed guilty of
committing the crime for which they were arrested. 22 Not evidence of guilt, but "probable cause" is the
reason that can validly compel the peace officers, in the performance of their duties and in the interest of
public order, to conduct an arrest without warrant. 23
The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. Under the
conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the arrested persons
are later found to be innocent and acquitted, the arresting officers are not liable. 24 But if they do not
strictly comply with the said conditions, the arresting officers can be held liable for the crime of arbitrary
detention, 25 for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code 26 and/or for other administrative sanctions.
In G.R. No. 85727, Espiritu, on 23 November 1988, was arrested without warrant, on the basis of the
attestation of certain witnesses: that about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 22 November 1988, at the
corner of Magsaysay Boulevard and Velencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, Espiritu spoke at a gathering of drivers
and sympathizers, where he said, among other things:
Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulona. 27 (Emphasis supplied)
and that the police authorities were present during the press conference held at the National Press Club
(NPC) on 22 November 1988 where Espiritu called for a nationwide strike (of jeepney and bus drivers) on
23 November 1988. 28 Espiritu was arrested without warrant, not for subversion or any "continuing
offense," but for uttering the above-quoted language which, in the perception of the arresting officers, was
inciting to sedition.
Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the language as falling within free
speech guaranteed by the Constitution. But, then, Espiritu had not lost the right to insist, during the pretrial or trial on the merits, that he was just exercising his right to free speech regardless of the charged
atmosphere in which it was uttered. But, the authority of the peace officers to make the arrest, without
warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or soon thereafter, is still another thing. In the balancing of
authority and freedom, which obviously becomes difficult at times, the Court has, in this case, tilted the
scale in favor of authority but only for purposes of the arrest (not conviction). Let it be noted that the Court
has ordered the bail for Espiritu's release to be reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00.
Let it also be noted that supervening events have made the Espiritu case moot and academic. For Espiritu
had before arraignment asked the court a quo for re-investigation, the peace officers did not appear.
Because of this development, the defense asked the court a quo at the resumption of the hearings to
dismiss the case. Case against Espiritu (Criminal Case No. 88-68385) has been provisionally dismissed and
his bail bond cancelled.
In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno), the records show that in the morning of 14 December 1988, Romulo Bunye II
was killed by a group of men in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila; that at about 5:00 o'clock in the
morning of 28 December 1988, Ramil Regala, one of the suspects in the said killing, was arrested and he
pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions during the killing of Bunye II; that at 7:20 of the
same morning (28 December 1988), the police agents arrested Nazareno, without warrant, for
investigation. 29

Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while Nazareno's arrest without warrant
was made only on 28 December 1988, or 14 days later, the arrest fans under Section 5(b) of Rule 113,
since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police authorities came to know that Nazareno was
probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II and the arrest had to be made promptly, even without
warrant, (after the police were alerted) and despite the lapse of fourteen (14) days to prevent possible
flight.
As shown in the decision under consideration, this Court, in upholding the arrest without warrant of
Nazareno noted several facts and events surrounding his arrest and detention, as follows:
. . . on 3 January 1989 (or six (6) days after his arrest without warrant), an information charging Narciso
Nazareno, Ramil Regala and two (2) others, with the killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed wit the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The case is dock eted therein as Criminal Case No. 731.
On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail but the motion was denied by the trial
court in an order dated 10 January 1989, even as the motion to post bail, earlier filed by his co-accused,
Manuel Laureaga, was granted by the same trial court.
On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Narciso Nazareno
and on 13 January 1989, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, retumable to the Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Bifian, Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said court to hear the case on 30 January
1989 and thereafter resolve the petition.
At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Bian, Laguna issued a resolution denying the petition for habeas corpus, it appearing that the said
Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the respondents by reason of an information filed against him with
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila which liad taken cognizance of said case and had, in fact,
denied the motion for bail filed by said Narciso Nazareno (presumably because of the strength of the
evidence against him).
This Court reiterates that shortly after the arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno, the corresponding informations
against them were filed in court. The arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno were based on probable cause and
supported by factual circumstances. They complied with conditions set forth in Section 5(b) of Rule 113.
They were not arbitrary or whimsical arrests.
Parenthetically, it should be here stated that Nazareno has since been convicted by the court a quo for
murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He has appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of
Appeals where it is pending as of this date ( CA-G.R. No. still undocketed).
Petitioners contend that the decision of 9 July 1990 ignored the contitution requisiteds for admissibility of
an extrajudicial admission.
In the case of Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), he admitted 30 that he was an NPA courier. On the other
hand, in the case of Amelia Roque, she admitted 31 that the unlicensed firearms, ammunition and
subversive documents found in her possession during her arrest, belonged to her.
The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested persons of their membership in the
CPP/NPA, as well as their ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and documents in their
possession. But again, these admissions, as revealed by the records, strengthen the Court's perception
that truly the grounds upon which the arresting officers based their arrests without warrant, are supported
by probable cause, i.e. that the persons arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain
offenses, in compliance with Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. To note these admissions, on the
other hand, is not to rule that the persons arrested are already guilty of the offenses upon which their
warrantless arrests were predicated. The task of determining the guilt or innocence of persons arrested
without warrant is not proper in a petition for habeas corpus. It pertains to the trial of the case on the
merits.
As to the argument that the doctrines in Garcia vs. Enrile, and Ilagan vs. Enrile should be abandoned, this
Court finds no compelling reason at this time to disturb the same, particularly ln the light of prevailing
conditions where national security and liability are still directly challenged perhaps with greater vigor from
the communist rebels. What is important is that everv arrest without warrant be tested as to its legality via
habeas corpus proceeding. This Court. will promptly look into and all other appropriate courts are
enjoined to do the same the legality of the arrest without warrant so that if the conditions under Sec. 5
of Rule 113, Rules of Court, as elucidated in this Resolution, are not met, then the detainee shall forthwith
be ordered released; but if such conditions are met, then the detainee shall not be made to languish in his
detention but must be promptly tried to the end that he may be either acquitted or convicted, with the
least delay, as warranted by the evidence.
A Final Word
This Resolution ends as it began, reiterating that mere suspicion of being a Communist Party member or a
subversive is absolutely not a ground for the arrest without warrant of the suspect. The Court predicated
the validity of the questioned arrests without warrant in these petitions, not on mere unsubstantiated
suspicion, but on compliance with the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court, a long

existing law, and which, for stress, are probable cause and good faith of the arresting peace officers, and,
further, on the basis of, as the records show, the actual facts and circumstances supporting the arrests.
More than the allure of popularity or palatability to some groups, what is important is that the Court be
right.
ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration of the decision dated 9 July 1990, are DENIED. This denial is
FINAL.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 92163
June 5, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner
vs.
JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City [Br. 103], SENIOR STATE
PROSECUTOR AURELIO TRAMPE, PROSECUTOR FERDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND CITY ASSISTANT CITY
PROSECUTOR EULOGIO MANANQUIL, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR ALFREDO LIM, BRIG.
GEN. EDGAR DULA TORRES (Superintendent of the Northern Police District) AND/ OR ANY AND ALL
PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE ACTUAL CUSTODY OVER THE PERSON OF JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.
G.R. No. 92164 June 5, 1990
SPS. REBECCO E. PANLILIO AND ERLINDA E. PANLILIO, petitioners,
vs.
PROSECUTORS FERNANDO DE LEON, AURELIO C. TRAMPE, FFRDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND EULOGIO C.
MANANQUIL, and HON. JAIME W. SALAZAR, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, Branch 103, respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our criminal jurisprudence, People vs. Hernandez 1 once more
takes center stage as the focus of a confrontation at law that would re-examine, if not the validity of its
doctrine, the limits of its applicability. To be sure, the intervening period saw a number of similar cases 2
that took issue with the ruling-all with a marked lack of success-but none, it would Beem, where season
and circumstance had more effectively conspired to attract wide public attention and excite impassioned
debate, even among laymen; none, certainly, which has seen quite the kind and range of arguments that
are now brought to bear on the same question.
The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan
Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of
Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941. The warrant had issued on an information signed
and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe,
State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging
Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion
with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup
attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the
NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the information
and none fixed in the arrest warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp
Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the
Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres. 3
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for habeas
corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990), alleging that he was
deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or having been:
(a)

held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books;

(b)
charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was initially filed or
preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was denied due process;
(c)

denied his right to bail; and

(d)
arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who issued it first
having personally determined the existence of probable cause. 4
The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5, 1990 and set the plea for hearing on March 6,
1990. 5 On March 5, 1990, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated return 6 for the respondents in this
case and in G.R. No. 92164 7 Which had been contemporaneously but separately filed by two of Senator
Enrile's co-accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and raised similar questions. Said return
urged that the petitioners' case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling because-and this is putting it very
simply-the information in Hernandez charged murders and other common crimes committed as a

necessary means for the commission of rebellion, whereas the information against Sen. Enrile et al.
charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion.
Stated otherwise, the Solicitor General would distinguish between the complex crime ("delito complejo")
arising from an offense being a necessary means for committing another, which is referred to in the
second clause of Article 48, Revised Penal Code, and is the subject of the Hernandez ruling, and the
compound crime ("delito compuesto") arising from a single act constituting two or more grave or less
grave offenses referred to in the first clause of the same paragraph, with which Hernandez was not
concerned and to which, therefore, it should not apply.
The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on March 6, 1990, after which the Court issued its
Resolution of the same date 8 granting Senator Enrile and the Panlilio spouses provisional liberty
conditioned upon their filing, within 24 hours from notice, cash or surety bonds of P100,000.00 (for Senator
Enrile) and P200,000.00 (for the Panlilios), respectively. The Resolution stated that it was issued without
prejudice to a more extended resolution on the matter of the provisional liberty of the petitioners and
stressed that it was not passing upon the legal issues raised in both cases. Four Members of the Court 9
voted against granting bail to Senator Enrile, and two 10 against granting bail to the Panlilios.
The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they are raised and litigated in Senator Enrile's petition,
G.R. No. 92163.
The parties' oral and written pleas presented the Court with the following options:
(a)
abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view expressed in the main dissent of Justice
Montemayor in said case that rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes, and that under Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code rebellion may properly be complexed with common offenses, so-called; this option was
suggested by the Solicitor General in oral argument although it is not offered in his written pleadings;
(b)
hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance, or as a necessary means for
the commission, of rebellion, but not to acts committed in the course of a rebellion which also constitute
"common" crimes of grave or less grave character;
(c)
maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses committed in its
course, whether or not necessary to its commission or in furtherance thereof.
On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court voted against abandoning Hernandez. Two (2)
Members felt that the doctrine should be re-examined. 10-A In the view of the majority, the ruling remains
good law, its substantive and logical bases have withstood all subsequent challenges and no new ones are
presented here persuasive enough to warrant a complete reversal. This view is reinforced by the fact that
not too long ago, the incumbent President, exercising her powers under the 1986 Freedom Constitution,
saw fit to repeal, among others, Presidential Decree No. 942 of the former regime which precisely sought
to nullify or neutralize Hernandez by enacting a new provision (Art. 142-A) into the Revised Penal Code to
the effect that "(w)hen by reason, or on the occasion, of any of the crimes penalized in this Chapter
(Chapter I of Title 3, which includes rebellion), acts which constitute offenses upon which graver penalties
are imposed by law are committed, the penalty for the most serious offense in its maximum period shall be
imposed upon the offender."' 11 In thus acting, the President in effect by legislative flat reinstated
Hernandez as binding doctrine with the effect of law. The Court can do no less than accord it the same
recognition, absent any sufficiently powerful reason against so doing.
On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject the theory that Hernandez is, or should be,
limited in its application to offenses committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion and
that the ruling should not be interpreted as prohibiting the complexing of rebellion with other common
crimes committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, thereof. While four Members of the Court felt
that the proponents' arguments were not entirely devoid of merit, the consensus was that they were not
sufficient to overcome what appears to be the real thrust of Hernandez to rule out the complexing of
rebellion with any other offense committed in its course under either of the aforecited clauses of Article 48,
as is made clear by the following excerpt from the majority opinion in that case:
There is one other reason-and a fundamental one at that-why Article 48 of our Penal Code cannot be
applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were punished
separately (assuming that this could be done), the following penalties would be imposable upon the
movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the
corresponding period, depending upon the modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years
of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death,
depending upon the modifying circumstances present. in other words, in the absence of aggravating
circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However, under Article 48 said
penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a single aggravating circumstance.
Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to
the movant.
Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose of favoring the culprit, not of sentencing
him to a penalty more severe than that which would be proper if the several acts performed by him were
punished separately. In the words of Rodriguez Navarro:

La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de delitos a que hace referencia este articulo (75 del
Codigo de 1932), esta basado francamente en el principio pro reo.' (II Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo
de Espana, p. 2168.)
We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71 (later 75) of the Spanish Penal Code (the
counterpart of our Article 48), as amended in 1908 and then in 1932, reading:
Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso de que un solo hecho constituya dos o
mas delitos, o cuando el uno de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el otro.
The provisions of the preceding article are not applicable in the case that a single fact
constitutes two or more crimes, or when one of them is necessary means to commit the other.
En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito mas grave en su grado maximo, hasta el
limite que represents la suma de las que pudieran imponerse, penando separadamente los delitos.
In these cases only the penalty corresponding to the most serious crime in its maximum
degree, up to the limit that represents the sum of those that could be imposed, punishing the
offenses separately.
Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se sancionaran los delitos por separado. (Rodriguez
Navarro, Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163)
When the penalty thus calculated exceeds this limit, the offenses will be sanctioned
separately. (Rodriguez Navarro, Criminal Doctrine of the Supreme Court
and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in said amendment, restricting the
imposition of the penalty for the graver offense in its maximum period to the case when it does not exceed
the sum total of the penalties imposable if the acts charged were dealt with separately. The absence of
said limitation in our Penal Code does not, to our mind, affect substantially the spirit of said Article 48.
Indeed, if one act constitutes two or more offenses, there can be no reason to inflict a punishment graver
than that prescribed for each one of said offenses put together. In directing that the penalty for the graver
offense be, in such case, imposed in its maximum period, Article 48 could have had no other purpose than
to prescribe a penalty lower than the aggregate of the penalties for each offense, if imposed separately.
The reason for this benevolent spirit of article 48 is readily discernible. When two or more crimes are the
result of a single act, the offender is deemed less perverse than when he commits said crimes thru
separate and distinct acts. Instead of sentencing him for each crime independently from the other, he
must suffer the maximum of the penalty for the more serious one, on the assumption that it is less grave
than the sum total of the separate penalties for each offense. 12
The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which is that
Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other
offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an
unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.
This, however, does not write finis to the case. Petitioner's guilt or innocence is not here inquired into,
much less adjudged. That is for the trial court to do at the proper time. The Court's ruling merely provides
a take-off point for the disposition of other questions relevant to the petitioner's complaints about the
denial of his rights and to the propriety of the recourse he has taken.
The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the information filed against the petitioner does in fact
charge an offense. Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with murder and
multiple frustrated murder, that indictment is to be read as charging simple rebellion. Thus, in Hernandez,
the Court said:
In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended information against defendant-appellant
Amado V. Hernandez, the murders, arsons and robberies described therein are mere ingredients of the
crime of rebellion allegedly committed by said defendants, as means "necessary" (4) for the perpetration
of said offense of rebellion; that the crime charged in the aforementioned amended information is,
therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies;
that the maximum penalty imposable under such charge cannot exceed twelve (12) years of prision mayor
and a fine of P2H,HHH; and that, in conformity with the policy of this court in dealing with accused persons
amenable to a similar punishment, said defendant may be allowed bail. 13
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute books,
while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with other
offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read
in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and
punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.
Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially filed and/or preliminary investigation
conducted? The record shows otherwise, that a complaint against petitioner for simple rebellion was filed
by the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, and that on the strength of said complaint a
preliminary investigation was conducted by the respondent prosecutors, culminating in the filing of the
questioned information. 14 There is nothing inherently irregular or contrary to law in filing against a
respondent an indictment for an offense different from what is charged in the initiatory complaint, if
warranted by the evidence developed during the preliminary investigation.

It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the warrant for petitioner's arrest without first
personally determining the existence of probable cause by examining under oath or affirmation the
complainant and his witnesses, in violation of Art. III, sec. 2, of the Constitution. 15 This Court has already
ruled, however, that it is not the unavoidable duty of the judge to make such a personal examination, it
being sufficient that he follows established procedure by personally evaluating the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor. 16 Petitioner claims that the warrant of arrest issued
barely one hour and twenty minutes after the case was raffled off to the respondent Judge, which hardly
gave the latter sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous records of the preliminary
investigation. 17 Merely because said respondent had what some might consider only a relatively brief
period within which to comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had not, or could not
have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed.
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's reaffirmation of
Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary corollary that the
information against him should be considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which is
bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct proposition. But the question remains:
Given the facts from which this case arose, was a petition for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate
vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial?
The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's right to
have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested
with said respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to
be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him.
Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been
invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also
available there.
Even acceptance of petitioner's premise that going by the Hernandez ruling, the information charges a
non-existent crime or, contrarily, theorizing on the same basis that it charges more than one offense,
would not excuse or justify his improper choice of remedies. Under either hypothesis, the obvious recourse
would have been a motion to quash brought in the criminal action before the respondent Judge. 18
There thus seems to be no question that All the grounds upon which petitioner has founded the present
petition, whether these went into the substance of what is charged in the information or imputed error or
omission on the part of the prosecuting panel or of the respondent Judge in dealing with the charges
against him, were originally justiciable in the criminal case before said Judge and should have been
brought up there instead of directly to this Court.
There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of these questions was beyond the ability
or competence of the respondent Judge-indeed such an assumption would be demeaning and less than fair
to our trial courts; none whatever to hold them to be of such complexity or transcendental importance as
to disqualify every court, except this Court, from deciding them; none, in short that would justify by
passing established judicial processes designed to orderly move litigation through the hierarchy of our
courts. Parenthentically, this is the reason behind the vote of four Members of the Court against the grant
of bail to petitioner: the view that the trial court should not thus be precipitately ousted of its original
jurisdiction to grant or deny bail, and if it erred in that matter, denied an opportunity to correct its error. It
makes no difference that the respondent Judge here issued a warrant of arrest fixing no bail. Immemorial
practice sanctions simply following the prosecutor's recommendation regarding bail, though it may be
perceived as the better course for the judge motu proprio to set a bail hearing where a capital offense is
charged. 19 It is, in any event, incumbent on the accused as to whom no bail has been recommended or
fixed to claim the right to a bail hearing and thereby put to proof the strength or weakness of the evidence
against him.
It is apropos to point out that the present petition has triggered a rush to this Court of other parties in a
similar situation, all apparently taking their cue from it, distrustful or contemptuous of the efficacy of
seeking recourse in the regular manner just outlined. The proliferation of such pleas has only contributed
to the delay that the petitioner may have hoped to avoid by coming directly to this Court.
Not only because popular interest seems focused on the outcome of the present petition, but also because
to wash the Court's hand off it on jurisdictional grounds would only compound the delay that it has already
gone through, the Court now decides the same on the merits. But in so doing, the Court cannot express
too strongly the view that said petition interdicted the ordered and orderly progression of proceedings that
should have started with the trial court and reached this Court only if the relief appealed for was denied by
the former and, in a proper case, by the Court of Appeals on review.
Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no longer countenance, but will give short shrift to,
pleas like the present, that clearly short-circuit the judicial process and burden it with the resolution of
issues properly within the original competence of the lower courts. What has thus far been stated is
equally applicable to and decisive of the petition of the Panlilio spouses (G.R. No. 92164) which is virtually
Identical to that of petitioner Enrile in factual milieu and is therefore determinable on the same principles
already set forth. Said spouses have uncontestedly pleaded 20 that warrants of arrest issued against them
as co-accused of petitioner Enrile in Criminal Case No. 90-10941, that when they appeared before NBI

Director Alfredo Lim in the afternoon of March 1, 1990, they were taken into custody and detained without
bail on the strength of said warrants in violation-they claim-of their constitutional rights.
It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of rebellion has lost that quitessentiany quixotic
quality that justifies the relative leniency with which it is regarded and punished by law, that present-day
rebels are less impelled by love of country than by lust for power and have become no better than mere
terrorists to whom nothing, not even the sanctity of human life, is allowed to stand in the way of their
ambitions. Nothing so underscores this aberration as the rash of seemingly senseless killings, bombings,
kidnappings and assorted mayhem so much in the news these days, as often perpetrated against innocent
civilians as against the military, but by and large attributable to, or even claimed by so-called rebels to be
part of, an ongoing rebellion.
It is enough to give anyone pause-and the Court is no exception-that not even the crowded streets of our
capital City seem safe from such unsettling violence that is disruptive of the public peace and stymies
every effort at national economic recovery. There is an apparent need to restructure the law on rebellion,
either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to be considered as
absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal activity
undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to effect such change, for it can only interpret the law as
it stands at any given time, and what is needed lies beyond interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will
perceive the need for promptly seizing the initiative in this matter, which is properly within its province.
WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the
questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda
Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before
final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely provisional
in character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered REMANDED to the respondent Judge to fix the
amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the
petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this Court shall become functus oficio. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 95136

October 3, 1991

RAFAEL BAYLOSIS and BENJAMIN DE VERA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. APOLONIO R. CHAVEZ, JR., RIZAL PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR MAURO CASTRO, COL.
VIRGILIO SALDAJENO, HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, JR., HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS and GEN. RENATO
DE VILLA, respondents.
Romeo T. Capulong for Rafael Baylosis.
Arno V. Sanidad for Benjamin de Vera.
Efren H. Mercado for Marco Palo.
NARVASA, J.:p
The constitutionality of the third paragraph of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 is put at issue in
the special action of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus at bar. That provision punishes with the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, 1 any person who unlawfully manufacturers, deals in, acquires, disposes of, or
possesses any firearm, 2 "in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion,
insurrection or subversion."
This is the second such attack against the provision. The first was launched sometime in 1988 and
eventually repelled in this Court's decision in Misolas vs. Panga, rendered on January 30, 1990. 3 The Court
in that case declined to hold the provision unconstitutional, overruling such arguments as that
a)
the questioned paragraph is violative of the principle of "substantive due process against arbitrary
law ... because it disregards the overwhelming weight of national as well as international laws and
jurisprudence behind the Hernandez (99 Phil 615) and Geronimo (100 Phil 90) rulings on the doctrine of
absorption of common crimes in rebellion;"
b)
it has given rise to the practice of charging armed rebels or subversives with "qualified' illegal
possession of firearms instead of subversion or rebellion ... (because) (1) the former is easier to prosecute
than the latter, and (2) the former has a higher penalty ...;"
c)

it is a bill of attainder; and

d)

it allows a second jeopardy.

This second challenge to the constitutionality of said third paragraph of Section 1 of Presidential Decree
No. 1866 relies on essentially the same arguments as those put forth in support of the first, petitioners'
insistence to the contrary notwithstanding. Since it does not seem that the passage of time has infused
any validity into those arguments, they shall again be struck down as specious, and the second
constitutional challenge, like the first, repulsed.
The case at bar originated from an information filed in the Regional Trial Court at Pasig charging petitioners
Rafael Baylosis and Benjamin de Vera, together with one Marco Palo, with a violation of PD 1866, 4
committed as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of March, 1988 in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines ...,
the above named accused, all known high ranking officers of the Communist Party of the Philippines, and
its military arm, the New Peoples Army, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each
other, did then and there willfully , unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, control and custody,
in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion/subversion, the following, to
wit:
A.

Firearms/Ammunition

One (1) AK 47 Automatic Rifle with M22N006726 with magazine and 9 rounds.
B.

Explosives

Three (3) pieces fragmentation hand grenades without first securing the necessary license or permit
thereof from a competent government authority.
Baylosis, de Vera, and Palo, filed a motion to quash the information on the following grounds, viz.:
I.
THE FACTS CHARGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE BECAUSE THEY ARE FOUNDED ON AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL/REPEALED STATUTE.
B.

FOR THE SAME REASONS, THIS HONORABLE COURT IS DEVOID OF JURISDICTION TO TRY THIS CASE.

After receiving the parties' arguments on the matter, the Trial Court denied the motion to quash, by an
extended Resolution dated April 24, 1990. A motion for reconsideration filed by Baylosis, et al. was also
denied in an Order dated July 12, 1990.
Baylosis and de Vera thereupon instituted the present action in this Court. Here, they plead for the
nullification and setting aside of the Trial Judge's Orders of April 24, 1990 and July 12, 1990; the dismissal
of Criminal Case No. 72705 or, alternatively, that the information therein be considered as charging only
simple rebellion; and that the public officials impleaded as respondents the Rizal Public Prosecutor, the
Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and the Special Military Prosecutor be "restrained from further initiating, filing or prosecuting
cases involving common crimes against the petitioners."
What the petitioners advocate at bottom is that a doctrine laid down by jurisprudence or case law is
superior to a statute afterwards enacted by legislative authority; that decisions construing certain specific
provisions of one law are sufficient basis for a declaration of the unconstitutionality of a subsequently
enacted law. More specifically, they contend that the rulings in People vs. Amado Hernandez 5 (reiterated
in some ten other subsequent rulings), Enrile vs. Salazar, 6 and Enrile vs. Amin 7 to the effect that the
felony of rebellion defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code cannot, in accordance with Article 48 of
the same Code, be complexed with the offense of murder, homicide, arson, or other crimes committed in
connection with, or on the occasion or in furtherance of, rebellion render invalid, as unconstitutional,
Section 1 (3) of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended.
The petitioners further posit the unconstitutionality of the challenged provision because "repugnant to the
provisions of the 1987 Constitution, which guarantee full respect for human rights, equal protection of the
laws, due process, right to bail, protection against double jeopardy and from cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment, and supremacy of civilian authority over the military."
PD 1866 was enacted on June 29, 1983 8 by the late President Marcos in the exercise of his legislative
powers under the 1973 Constitution, with the avowed purpose, indicated in its title, to codify "the laws on
illegal/unlawful possession, manufacture, dealing in, acquisition or disposition, of firearms, ammunition or
explosives or instruments used in the manufacture of firearms, ammunition or explosives; and disposing
stiffer penalties for certain violations thereof and for relevant purposes." The section (numbered 1)
containing the allegedly unconstitutional provision 9 reads as follows:
Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or
Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. The penalty of
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who
shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition
or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition.

If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be
imposed.
If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of
rebellion, insurrection or subversion, the penalty of death shall be imposed.
The penalty reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the
owner, president, manager, director or other responsible officer of any public or private firm, company,
corporation or entity, who shall wilfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm,
company, corporation or entity to be used by any person found guilty of violating the provisions of the
preceding paragraphs.
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any licensed firearm
outside his residence without legal authority therefor.
It is worthy of note that under this section
1)
simple possession of firearm without license or lawful authority (or unlawful manufacture, dealing
in, acquisition, or disposal of any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument
used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition), without more, is punished
by reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua a penalty that, to be sure, is heavier than prision
mayor, which is the penalty prescribed for rebellion or insurrection by Article 135 of the Revised Penal
Code;
2)
indeed, even if the firearm be licensed but is brought by the possessor outside of his residence
without authority, the penalty imposed for the act is prision mayor, the same sanction as for rebellion;
3)

the penalty is however increased to death (now reclusion perpetua) 10 if

a) the unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of murder or homicide, or

b) the unlicensed firearm (or part thereof, or ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument in the
manufacture of any firearm or ammunition) is possessed, dealt in, acquired, disposed of or possessed in
furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion.
Equally noteworthy is that the same PD 1866, as amended, 11 also defines as a crime punishable by
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua, the act of any person
... who shall unlawfully manufacture, assemble, deal in, acquire, dispose or possess hand-grenade(s), rifle
grenade(s), and other explosives, including but not limited to "philbox bombs (sic)," "molotov cocktail
bomb," "firebombs," or other incendiary devices capable of producing destructive effect on contiguous
objects or causing injury or death to any person.
In other words, the mere possession of the weapons (or the unlawful manufacture or assembly thereof, or
dealing in, acquisition or disposal thereof) is also punished by reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion
perpetua, a penalty higher than that imposed for rebellion or insurrection, prision mayor, supra.
But the even higher penalty of death (now reclusion perpetua) is imposed if the aforementioned
explosives, detonation agents or incendiary devices
1)
are used in the commission of any of the crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code, and this results
in the death of any person or persons; or
2)
are manufactured, assembled, dealt in, acquired, disposed of or possessed "in furtherance of, or
incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion ..."
It is of no little significance that the petitioners do not condemn these other provisions of Section 1 and 3
defining crimes also involving possession or manufacturing and/or use of firearms, ammunition and
explosives, and penalizing them by reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua, or even by death
as being unconstitutionally infirm because imposing cruel or unusual punishment, or violative of due
process, or otherwise.
What they say is that "laws and jurisprudence on political crimes are intended, and should always be
interpreted, as favoring the political offender" since "political crimes are committed by the best of
patriots," a theory that, it is said, runs counter to the Misolas decision 12 and impels re-examination of the
latter. What they condemn is the imposition of such heavy penalties on the crime of possession,
manufacture or use of firearms or explosives if committed "in furtherance of, or incident to, or in
connection with the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion," as if by some juridic alchemy, relation
to rebellion or subversion works a transformation in the nature of the crimes in question. The connection,
in other words, as the petitioners unabashedly affirm, is that the act of illicitly possessing or using a
firearm is ennobled and mitigated by its being connected with an attempt or a publicly asserted intention
to overthrow the Government; that killers, arsonists, terrorists should not be treated as "common
criminals," i.e., condemned and punished as the killers, arsonists or terrorists that they are, if they commit
their acts of violence and destruction in the name of "the Revolution." This is sophistry, totally

unacceptable under the constitutional scheme of things in this country. It is a theory which has never been
and should never be sanctioned by this Court. It is a proposition that is not in essence defensible, specially
in the context of contemporary events. 13
The petitioners further theorize that Section 1 (3) of PD 1866 is invalid because it gives the public
prosecutor an option not to file a case for rebellion and instead file as many crimes for murder, frustrated
murder, etc. as might have been perpetrated in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with
rebellion, insurrection or subversion. The argument is not tenable. The fact is that the Revised Penal Code
treats rebellion or insurrection as a crime distinct from murder, homicide, arson, or other felonies that
might conceivably be committed in the course of a rebellion. It is the Code, therefore, in relation to the
evidence in the hands of the public prosecutor, and not the latter's whim or caprice, which gives the
choice. The Code allows, for example, separate prosecutions for either murder or rebellion, although not
for both where the indictment alleges that the former has been committed in furtherance of or in
connection with the latter. Surely, whether people are killed or injured in connection with a rebellion, or
not, the deaths or injuries of the victims are no less real, and the grief of the victims' families no less
poignant.
Moreover, it certainly is within the power of the legislature to determine what acts or omissions other than
those set out in the Revised Penal Code or other existing statutes are to be condemned as separate,
individual crimes and what penalties should be attached thereto. The power is not diluted or improperly
wielded simply because at some prior time the act or omission was but an element or ingredient of
another offense, or might usually have been connected with another crime.
The interdict laid in Hernandez, Enrile and the other cases cited is against attempts to complex rebellion
with the so called "common" crimes committed in furtherance, or in the course, thereof; this, on the
authority alone of the first sentence of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Stated otherwise, the ratio of
said cases is that Article 48 cannot be invoked as the basis for charging and prosecuting the complex
crime of rebellion with murder, etc., for the purpose of obtaining imposition of the penalty for the more
serious offense in its maximum period (in accordance with said Art. 48). Said cases did not indeed they
could not and were never meant to proscribe the legislative authority from validly enacting statutes that
would define and punish, as offenses sui generis crimes which, in the context of Hernandez, et al. may be
viewed as a complex of rebellion with other offenses. There is no constitutional prohibition against this,
and the Court never said there was. What the Court stated in said cases about rebellion "absorbing"
common crimes committed in its course or furtherance must be viewed in light of the fact that at the time
they were decided, there were no penal provisions defining and punishing, as specific offenses, crimes like
murder, etc. committed in the course of as part of a rebellion. This is no longer true, as far as the present
case is concerned, and there being no question that PD 1866 was a valid exercise of the former President's
legislative powers. Thus, Misolas, 14 to the effect that charging the qualified offense of illegal possession
of firearms under PD 1866 does not charge the complex crime of subversion with illegal possession of
firearms, and hence does not run counter to Hernandez, et al., is good and correct rule and is applicable
here.
In Enrile vs. Salazar, the Court intimated that the remedy against the perceived lightness of the penalty for
rebellion was not to be sought from the courts, but by legislation. It may not unreasonably be supposed
that the purpose of PD 1866 appears to be precisely to remedy that perceived lenity of the penalty
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for rebellion or insurrection and the legal impossibility, pronounced
by this Court of complexing that felony with other crimes punished by higher penalties in accordance with
Article 48 of the same Code.
It is next argued that the proviso in question is unconstitutional because if inflicts on the convicted felon a
cruel or unusual punishment, considering that the Revised Code penalizes rebellion or subversion only by
prision mayor. The penalty fixed in said challenged section is, it is contended, flagrantly and plainly
oppressive, greatly disproportionate to the offense, and shocking to the people's sense of justice. The
result, it is further argued, is that the right to bail is denied under PD 1866 when the act thereby punished
is only an ingredient of simple rebellion or subversion (which are bailable offenses) under the Revised
Penal Code.
It is well settled that as far as the constitutional prohibition goes, it is not so much the extent as the nature
of the punishment that determines whether it is, or is not, cruel and unusual and that sentences of
imprisonment, though perceived to be harsh, are not cruel or unusual if within statutory limits. 15 As
pointed out by a brother in the Court, a noted authority on Constitutional Law, this Court had held (in
People vs. Dionisio, 22 SCRA 1299), "that mere severity does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
Reiterating the rule first announced in People vs. Estoista (93 Phil. 674), it declared that it takes more than
merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the
Constitution ... to come under the ban, the punishment must be 'flagrantly and plainly oppressive' 'wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.'" 16 The same
noted author further points out that "a penalty not normally proportionate to the offense may be imposed
in some instances without violation of the Constitution. ... (as) for example, where the offense has become
so rampant as to require the adoption of a more effective deterrent, like the stealing of jeeps or coconuts,
which is punished by the Revised Penal Code as qualified theft" 17 or, it may be added, like such crimes
as assassinations, bombings and robberies, which are committed nowadays with frightening frequency and
seeming impunity with the use of high-powered weapons, explosives or similar devices, whether in
connection with or in furtherance or pursuance of, rebellion or subversion, or not.

It bears repeating in this connection that mere possession of a firearm without license or lawful authority,
18 without more, is punished by reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua; and that the use of an
unlicensed firearm in the commission of murder of homicide is punished by death (now reclusion perpetua
19 ), yet there is no challenge to these penalties as being cruel or unusual.
The petitioners next proffer the argument that the Revised Penal Code punishes the crime of rebellion or
insurrection (including the "common crimes" of murder, homicide, arson, etc. therein absorbed) only with
the penalty of prision mayor. Comparisons, as the saying goes, are odious; and in this case, the attempt to
compare PD 1866 with the Revised Penal Code is unwarranted. That there is a difference in penalty
between the two laws does not necessarily establish that the heavier penalty imposed by one of said laws
is excessive, disproportionate, or "cruel or unusual." For it might be argued, too, and certainly not without
more than a modicum of validity, that the penalty in the Penal Code for rebellion may be regarded as
unduly light given the conditions now prevailing in the country. In fact, no lack of commensuration may be
pleaded if the avowed premises of PD 1866 (particularly the first, second and fifth whereas clauses of the
preamble) are taken into account, viz.:
1)
there has been an upsurge of crimes vitally affecting public order and safety (including, not to say
specially, offenses of rebellion or subversion) due to the proliferation of illegally possessed and
manufactured firearms, ammunition and explosives;
2)
these criminal acts have resulted in loss of human lives damage to property and destruction of
valuable resources of the country;
3)
there are some provisions in ... (the) and laws and presidential decrees which must be updated and
revised in order to more effectively deter violators of the law on firearms, ammunition and explosives.
The existence of rebellious groups in our society today, and of numerous bandits, or irresponsible or
deranged individuals, is a reality that cannot be ignored or belittled. Their activities, the killings and acts of
destruction and terrorism that they perpetrate, unfortunately continue unabated despite the best efforts
that the Government authorities are exerting, although it may be true that the insurrectionist groups of the
right or the left no longer pose a genuine threat to the security of the state. The need for more effective
measures against these nefarious activities, including of course more stringent laws and more rigorous
law-enforcement, cannot be gainsaid.
It is also argued that PD 1866 offends against the equal protection clause of the Constitution in that
government prosecutors may arbitrarily choose those they want to prosecute under said law and those
under Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code (or RA 1700, the Anti-Subversion Act). The argument is
unimpressive. It is not much different from saying that a suspected killer is denied the equal protection of
the laws because the prosecutor charges him with murder, not homicide, both crimes, though essentially
consisting in the taking of human life, being punished with different penalties under separate provisions of
the penal code. As already stressed, it is the prerogative of the legislature of the determine what acts or
omissions shall be deemed criminal offenses and what sanctions should attach to them. Certainly, the
public prosecutors should have the option to ascertain which prosecutions should be initiated on the basis
of the evidence at hand. That a criminal act may have elements common to more than one offense does
not rob the prosecutor of that option (or discretion) and mandatorily require him to charge the lesser
offense although the evidence before him may warrant prosecution of the more serious one. Now, if
government prosecutors make arbitrary choices of those they would prosecute under a particular law,
excluding from the indictment certain individuals against whom there is the same evidence as those
impleaded, the fault is not in the law but in the prosecutors themselves whose duty it is to file the
corresponding information or complaint against all persons who appear to be liable for the offense
involved, 20 a duty that should be performed responsibly, without discrimination, arbitrariness or
oppression. If that duty is not performed evenhandedly, the persons aggrieved are not without remedy.
They may avail of the remedy of mandamus of compel compliance with that duty by the prosecutors
concerned. 21
The petitioners' invocation of the doctrine of double jeopardy as an argument against the constitutionality
of PD 1866 is equally futile. They maintain that a person held liable under PD 1866 can still be made to
answer subsequently for rebellion. The argument is here disposed of by simply adverting to the resolution
of that self-same contention in Misolas:
The right against double jeopardy is a matter which the accused may raise in a motion to quash (Sec. 3[h],
Rule 117). But, precisely, petitioner's motion to quash filed in the trial court did not raise the issue of
double jeopardy because it had not arisen. The Court cannot anticipated that the opportunity for a second
jeopardy will still arise if he is acquitted or convicted as charged under P.D. 1866.
Moreover, even if such a subsequent or second jeopardy does arise, P.D. No. 1866 will not be rendered
unconstitutional. That an accused will be exposed to double jeopardy if he is prosecuted under another law
is not a ground to nullify that law. Double jeopardy is merely a defense that an accused may raise to defeat
a subsequent prosecution or conviction for the same offense.
WHEREFORE, the petitioner is DENIED for lack of merit, with costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.