Lantin, John Lester C.

Page 1 of 11
JD 1-4
Legal Techniques and Logic
Atty. Jesus Malcolm G. Madriaga

1.
OBERGEFELL ET AL. v. HODGES, DIRECTOR, OHIO
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ET AL.
576 U. S. _____ (2015)
OPINION OF THE COURT
In a vote of 5-4, a decision delivered by Justice Anthony
Kennedy in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen
Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined, the
Supreme Court of the United States ruled in favor of the
petitioners Obergefell, et. al. It decided that the fundamental
right to marry is guaranteed to same-sex couples by both
the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of
the 14th Amendment. It declared that the Fourteenth
Amendment requires a state to license a marriage between
two people of the same sex and to recognize a marriage
between two people of the same sex when their marriage
was lawfully licensed and performed out-of-state.
The history of marriage is the beginning of this case.
History defines marriage as a union between two persons of
opposite sex. The respondents suggest that it should be the
end as well. To them, it would demean a timeless institution
if the concept and lawful status of marriage were extended
to two person of the same sex. On the other hand,
petitioners acknowledge this history but contend that these
cases cannot end there. Far from seeking to devalue
marriage, petitioners seek it for themselves because of their
respect and need for its privileges and responsibilities.
Marriage is one of both continuity and change. It is an
institution that has evolved over time. Changes have worked
deep transformations in the structure of marriage, affecting
aspects of marriage once viewed as essential. These new
insights have strengthened, not weakened, the institution.
These changed characteristics of marriage are characteristic
of a nation where new dimension of freedom become
apparent to new generations.
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, no State shall deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law. The
fundamental liberties protected by this Clause include most
of the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights. When new

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insight reveals discord between the Constitutions central

protections and a received legal stricture, a claim to liberty
must be addressed.
The court, in applying the principle of stare decisis, held
that the right to marry is protected by the Constitution. In
the case of Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 12 (1967), which
invalidated bans on interracial unions, a unanimous Court
held marriage is one of the vital personal rights essential to
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. The Court
reaffirmed that decision in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374,
384 (1978), which held the right to marry was hampered by
a law prohibiting fathers who were behind on child support
from marrying. The Court again said in Turner v. Safley, 482
U. S. 78, 95 (1987), which held the right to marry was
abridged by regulations limiting the privilege of prison
inmates to marry. Over time and in other contexts, the Court
has reiterated that the right to marry is fundamental under
the Due Process Clause.
Also, in defining the right to marry, jurisprudence and
precedence have identified essential attributes of that right
based in the history, tradition and other constitutional
liberties inherent in the intimate bond. This analysis compels
the conclusion that same-sex couples may exercise the right
to marry.
Four principles and traditions demonstrate that the
reasons marriage is fundamental under the Constitution
apply with equal force to same-sex couples.
First, is that the right to personal choice regarding
marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy.
Decisions concerning marriage are among the most intimate
that a person can make. The nature of marriage is that two
persons together can find each other freedoms. This is true
for all persons. (Windsor)
Second, is that the right to marry is fundamental
because it supports a two-person union unlike any other in
its importance to the committed individuals. In the case of
Griswold and Turner, the court acknowledged the intimate
association protected by the right to marry. The right to
marry dignifies couples who wish to define themselves by
their commitment to each other. As held in Lawrence case,

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same-sex couples have the same right as opposite-sex

couples to enjoy intimate association.
Third basis for protecting the right to marry is that it
safeguards children and families. The court recognized in the
case of Zablocki, 434 U.S., at 384, that the right to marry,
establish a home and bring up children is a central part of
the liberty protected by the Due Process of Law. Excluding
same-sex couples from marriage conflicts with the central
premise of the right to marry.
Fourth and finally, is that marriage is a keystone of the
social order. In Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888),
marriage is the foundation of the family and of society,
without which there would be neither civilization nor
progress. Marriage is a building block of a community. It is
the center of many facets of the legal and social order.
Excluding gays and lesbians from having the right to marry
demeans them. There is no difference between same and
opposite-sex couples with respect to this principle. The
limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples seemed
natural and just, but its inconsistency with the meaning of
fundamental right to marry is evident.
The right to marry is fundamental as a matter of history
and tradition. If rights were defined by those who exercised
them, then new groups could not invoke their own rights.
Under the Constitution, same-sex couples seek the same
treatment as opposite-sex couples, and it would ridicule their
choices and diminish their personhood to deny them this
right.
The right of same-sex couples to marry is derived too
from the Amendments guarantee of the equal protection of
the laws. The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection
Clause are connected in a profound way. The Equal
Protection Clause, like the Due process Clause, prohibits the
unjustified infringement of the fundamental right to marry.
The imposition of this disability to gays and lesbians serves
to disrespect and subordinate them.
These led to the consideration that the right to marry is
a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person. The
Court held that same-sex couples may exercise the
fundamental right to marry. They may no longer be denied
this liberty.

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The right to marry is fundamental as a matter of history

and tradition, but rights come not from ancient sources
alone. They rise, too, from a better informed understanding
of how constitutional imperatives define a liberty that
remains urgent in our own era. Many who deem same-sex
marriage to be wrong reach that conclusion based on decent
and honorable religious or philosophical premises, and
neither they nor their beliefs are disparaged here. It stated:
There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry
solely because of racial classifications violates the central
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. With this link to
equal protection the Court proceeded to hold the prohibition
offended central precepts of liberty: To deny this
fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the
racial
classifications
embodied
in
these
statutes,
classifications so directly subversive of the principle of
equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely
to deprive all the States citizens of liberty without due
process of law. The reasons why marriage is a fundamental
right became more clear and compelling from a full
awareness and understanding of the hurt that resulted from
laws barring interracial unions.
These considerations lead to the conclusion that the
right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty
of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, couples of
the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that
liberty.

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DISSENTING OPINIONS
CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS
In the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Roberts, with
whom Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas joined, he criticized
the decision of the majority by relying on their will rather
than their legal judgment. The decision of the Court to order
every state to license and recognize same-sex marriage
should rest with the people and not through the majoritys
approach.
According to him, the universal definition of marriage as
the union of a man and a woman is no historical coincidence.
He stated that there is no prior jurisprudence that had the
nucleus of the definition of marriage. He also believed that
the human race must procreate to survive. Therefore, sexual
relations that could lead to procreation should occur only
between a man and a woman. With that, history dictates
that marriage should only be between opposite sexes.
He then mockingly urged the Americans who are
favoring the expansion of marriage, to celebrate its
achievement, the opportunity for a new expression of
commitment to a partner and the availability of new benefits
but advised to not celebrate the Constitution for it has
nothing to do with it.
JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA
In the dissenting opinion of Justice Scalia, with whom
Justice Thomas joined, he called the attention to the Courts

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threat to the American democracy. He said that when the

14th Amendment was ratified in 1868, every state limited
marriage to one man and one woman, and no one doubted
the constitutionality of it. However, the Court changed it
through an opinion lacking legal basis. He raised that a
system of government that makes the people subordinate to
a committee of nine unelected lawyers does not deserved to
be called a democracy. And to allow the question of samesex marriage to be resolved by nine persons is to violate a
fundamental principle.

JUSTICE CLARENCE THOMAS

In the dissenting opinion of Justice Thomas, with whom
Justice Scalia joined, he rejected the principle of substantive
due process. The petitioners would not have a claim. He said
that the concept of libertybears no resemblance to any
plaudible meaning of that word as is is used in the Due
Process Clauses. And even assuming that it means
something more than freedom from physical restraint, it
would not include the rights claimed by the majority.
Petitioners have in no way been deprived of it. Liberty is only
freedom from governmental action not an entitlement to
governmental benefits. He added that the majoritys
inversion of the original meaning of liberty will likely cause
damage to other aspects of the constitutional order that
protect liberty.
He also said that the decision of the majority disregards
the political process as a protection for liberty and threatens
the religious liberty of the nation. The majority goes to great
lengths to assert that its decision will advance the dignity of
same-sex couples. The majority misapplied a clause focused
on due process to afford substantive rights, disregards the
understanding of the liberty protected by that clause, and
distorts the principles on which the nation is founded.
JUSTICE SAMUEL ALITO

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In the dissenting opinion of Justice Alito, with whom

Justice Scalia and Thomas joined, he said that the people
should decide the question of same-sex marriage. The
Justices in the majority claim are wrong in conferring upon
that right because of the reason that they believe that it is
fundamental. In the system of government, ultimate
sovereignty resides in the people, and the people have the
right to control their destiny. This change on a fundamental
question should be made by the people through their elected
officials. He said that the decision usurps the constitutional
right of the people to decide and will also have a
fundamental effect on the Court and its ability to uphold the
rule of law. He warned about the power, the majority of the
Supreme Court holds.

LA BUGAL-BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL,

v. VICTOR O. RAMOS, SECRETARY, DENR, ET AL.
G.R. No. 127882, January 27, 2004
DECISION
The decision was written by Justice Carpio-Morales
granting the petition declaring unconstitutional and void
Sections 3 (aq), 23, 33 to 41, 56, 81 (2-3), and 90 of Republic
Act No. 7942, as well as all the provisions of DENR
Administrative Order 96-40, s. 1996 and the Financial and
Technical Assistance Agreement between the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines and Western Mining
Corporation Philippines, Inc (WMCP).
In the case at bar, then President Fidel V. Ramos
approved R.A. No, 7942, allowing fully foreign owned
corporations to explore, develop, utilize and exploit mineral
resources in the Philippines. Shortly after the effectivity, the
President entered into a Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement (FTAA) with WMCP covering lands in Mindanao.
Petitioner then filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition
praying that R.A. 7942 be declared unconstitutional, as well
as the FTAA issued.

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The Court in its Decision, submit that FTAAs should

be limited to technical or financial assistance only.
Contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, the FTAA
allows WMCP to extend more than mere financial or
technical assistance to the State, for it permits WMCP to
manage and operate every aspect of the mining activity.
According to the literal text of the Constitution, assistance
accorded by foreign-owned corporations in the large scale
exploration, development, and utilization of petroleum,
minerals and mineral oils should be limited to technical or
financial assistance only. The argument of the respondent
that agreements involving technical or financial assistance
is just another term for service contracts is untenable.
Discussions and opinions of the drafters leaves no doubt as
to the intention of the framers to eliminate service contracts
altogether.
The court asserts that although the constitutional
provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs with
foreign-owned corporations is an exception to the rule that
participation in the nations natural resources is reserved
exclusively to Filipinos, it must be construed strictly against
the enjoyment by non-Filipinos. The Court finds that R.A. No.
7942 is invalid insofar as said Act authorizes service
contracts. Although it phrased financial and technical
agreements in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, it
actually treats these agreements as service contracts that
grant beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to
the fundamental law. By allowing foreign contractors to
manage all aspects of mining operation, the State would be
left with nothing but a bare title thereto.

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LA BUGAL-BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL,

v. VICTOR O. RAMOS, SECRETARY, DENR, ET AL.
G.R. No. 127882, December 1, 2004
RESOLUTION
The resolution was penned by Justice Panganiban
granting the respondents Motion for Reconsideration,
reversing and setting aside the January 24, 2016 Decision,
and thus, declaring R.A. No. 7942, known as the Philippine
Mining Law, DENR A.O. 960, and the FTAA dated March 30,
1995 between the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and WMCP constitutional.
After a decision was struck down, granting the
petitioners prayers, the respondents subsequently then filed
separate Motion for Reconsideration.
In its resolution, the court resolved that the transfer
of the WMCP shares to Sagittarius Mines, Inc., which equity
are owned by Filipinos, does not transgress the Constitution.
It said that FTAAs are not intended solely for foreign

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corporations but also for Filipino corporations. The Court also

believed that there is no need for a separate litigation of the
sale of shares from WMC to Sagittarius because the need for
such safeguard is not critical. Also, the FTAA is not void and
thus transferrable. The FTAA was just defective or
unconstitutional because it had been issued to a nonqualified, foreign-owned corporation. In the present case, the
FTAA must be deemed valid or constitutional. Thus, a need
to proceed to a resolution of the constitutional issues in the
case.
The Constitutional provision at the nucleus of the
controversy is paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article XII of the
1987 Constitution which states that:
The President may enter into agreements with
foreign-owned
corporations
involving
either
technical or financial assistance for large-scale
exploration,
development,
and
utilization
of
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions
provided by law, based on real contributions to the
economic growth and general welfare of the
country. In such agreements, the State shall
promote the development and use of local scientific
and technical resources.

The Court in interpreting the constitutional phrase

Agreements Involving Either Technical or Financial
Assistance used the Verba Legis approach. The use of the
word involving implies that the agreements with foreign
corporations are not limited to mere financial or technical
assistance. If they have intended to leave no doubt in
anyones mind, they would have certainly used unmistakably
restrictive and stringent words. The Court believed that the
deletion of Service Contracts is intended to avoid pitfalls of
previous constitutions and not to ban service contracts per
se.
The Court also used Ratio Legis Et Anima and
conclude that in pertinent deliberations, service contracts
were not deconstitutionalized. They found that the drafters
knew that the agreements with foreign corporations were
more than mere financial and technical assistance entailed
by the agreements. It conclude that agreements involving
technical or financial assistance are service contracts with
safeguards.

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Furthermore, the record of the ConCom to ascertain

intent was also used and as written by the framers and
ratified and adopted by the people, the Constitution allows
the continued use of service contracts with foreign
corporation.
In conclusion, applying principles of constitutional
construction, the framers choice of words does not indicate
the intent to exclude other modes of assistance, but rather
implies that there are other things being included or possibly
being made part of the agreement. Furthermore, a literal and
restrictive
interpretation
would
lead
to
logical
inconsistencies.
Also, the primacy of the States sovereign ownership
on all resources must be upheld. But full control and
supervision cannot be taken down literally as would render
impossible the legitimate exercise of its function. State has a
pivotal say in the operation of individual enterprises. FTAA
vest the state control and supervision over all aspects of the
operations.