May a Judge without ascertaining the facts through his own personal determination and relying

solely on the certification or recommendation of a prosecutor that a probable cause exists issue a
warrant of arrest?
On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning, at the vicinity of the airport road of the
Masbate Domestic Airport, located at the municipality of Masbate province of Masbate,
Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio
Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by a lone assassin. Dante
Siblante another security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot,
although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound.
An investigation of the incident then followed.
Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary investigation, the designated investigator, Harry
O. Tantiado, TSg, of the PC Criminal Investigation Service at Camp Bagong Ibalon Legazpi City
filed an amended complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing, among others,
Vicente Lim, Sr., Mayor Susana Lim of Masbate (petitioners in G.R. Nos. 9405457), Jolly T.
Fernandez, Florencio T. Fernandez, Jr., Nonilon A. Bagalihog, Mayor Nestor C. Lim and Mayor
Antonio Kho (petitioners in G.R. Nos. 94266-69) of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated
murder in connection with the airport incident. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
9211.
After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an order dated July 31, 1989
stating therein that:
. . . after weighing the affidavits and answers given by the witnesses for the prosecution during
the preliminary examination in searching questions and answers, concludes that a probable
cause has been established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named accused in the
amended complaint, namely, Jimmy Cabarles, Ronnie Fernandez, Nonilon Bagalihog, Jolly
Fernandez, Florencio Fernandez, Jr., Vicente Lim, Sr., Susana Lim, Nestor Lim, Antonio Kho, Jaime
Liwanag, Zaldy Dumalag and Rene Tualla aliasTidoy. (Rollo, p. 58, G.R. Nos. 94054-57)
The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional
provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant
of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other respondent officers as may be
authorized by law", has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now
requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination
of probable cause for the issuance of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing
judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence
of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally

examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedures, he
shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion
as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the
preliminary examinations and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on
hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.
2. Manalili vs Court of Appeals
(October 9, 1997)Ponente: PanaganibanNature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of
the Court of AppealsFacts:Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas were patrolling the
vicinity of the Kalookan City Cemetery dueto reports of drug addicts roaming the area. They
chanced upon a male (who turned out to be petitioner Alain Manalili y Dizon) who seemed to be
high on drugs in front of the cemetery. He was observed to have reddish eyes and to
be walking in a swaying manner. When Manalili tried to avoid the policemen, the latter
approached him and asked what he was holding in his hands. Manalili tried to resist, but
the policemen were persistent until he yielded his wallet which they examined and found to
contain crushed marijuana residue. Further examination by the Forensic Chemistry Section of the
NBI confirmed the findings. Trial court convicted Manalili of violation of Section 8, Article II, of RA
6425. Uponappeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.(In his defense,
Manalili claimed that he was not walking; that he was riding a tricycle until the three
policemenordered the driver of the tricycle to stop because the driver and passenger were
allegedly under the influence of marijuana. He claimed that he was searched and his pants were
turned inside-out but nothing was found. To someextent he implied that the marijuana sample
found in his entity was framed up by the policemen.)Issue: WON the evidence seized during a
stop-and-frisk operation is admissible.Held: YesRatio: The general rule is that a search
and seizure must be validated by a previously secured judicial warrant.However, this is not
absolute and exceptions have been contemplated by the law:1.
Search incidental to a lawful rrest2.
Search of moving vehicles3.
Seizure in plain view 4.
Customs search5.

Waiver by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure.In the
cited cases, the search and seizure may be made only with probable cause as
essential requirement.Probable cause (in relation to search and seizure): Existence of such facts
and circumstances which could lead areasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the item, article, or objectsought in connection with said
offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched. A stop-andfrisk operation is another exception to the general rule. In this case, probable cause
wasestablished with Manalilis suspicious behaviour.

3. PEOPLE VS. SUCRO

G.R. No. 93239 March 18, 1991

FACTS:
Roy Fulgencio was instructed by P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi, Jr. (Station Commander of the INP) to
monitor the activities of appellant Edison Sucro, because of information gathered by Seraspi that
Sucro was selling marijuana.

Pat. Fulgencio saw appellant enter the chapel, taking something which turned out later to be
marijuana from the compartment of a cart found inside the chapel, and then return to the street
where he handed the same to a buyer, Aldie Borromeo. After a while appellant went back to the
chapel and again came out with marijuana which he gave to a group of persons. Pat. Fulgencio
called up Seraspi to report that a third buyer later Identified as Ronnie Macabante, was
transacting with appellant.
At that point, the team of P/Lt. Seraspi proceeded to the area and while the police officers were
at the Youth Hostel at Maagma St., Pat. Fulgencio told P/Lt. Seraspi to intercept Macabante
and appellant.

Upon seeing the police, Macabante threw something to the ground which turned out to be a tea
bag of marijuana.
When confronted, Macabante readily admitted that he bought the same from Sucro. The police
team was able to overtake and arrest appellant and recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of
marijuana from the cart inside the chapel and another teabag from Macabante
ISSUES:
Whether or not the arrest without warrant of the accused is lawful and consequently.
Whether or not the evidence resulting from such arrest is admissible.

HELD:
The Court ruled in the affirmative. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules onCriminal Procedure provides
for the instances where arrest without warrant isconsidered lawful. The rule states:
A peace officer or private person may, without warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to bearrested has committed it;
An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of
the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a
distance, or hears the disturbancescreated thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof.
Fulgencio, within a distance of two meters saw Sucro conduct his nefarious activity and the fact
that Macabante, when intercepted by the police, was caught throwing the marijuana stick and
when confronted, readily admitted that he bought the same from accused-appellant clearly
indicates that Sucro had just sold the marijuana stick to Macabante, and therefore, had just
committed an illegalact of which the police officers had personal knowledge, being members of
the team which monitored Sucro's nefarious activity. Police officers have personal knowledge of
the actual commission of the crime when it had earlier conducted surveillance activities of the
accused.
That searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. Among
the exceptions granted by law is a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 13, Rule 126 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched
for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant. There is nothing unlawful about the arrest considering its compliance
with the requirements of a warrantless arrest. Ergo, the fruits obtained from such lawful arrest
are admissible in evidence.
4. [G.R. No. 129296. September 25, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ABE VALDEZ y DELA CRUZ, accused-appellant.

FACTS:
SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, a member of the police force of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya, testified that at
around 10:15 a.m. of September 24, 1996, he received a tip from an unnamed informer about
the presence of a marijuana plantation, allegedly owned by Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz at Sitio
Bulan, Ibung, Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. The prohibited plants were allegedly planted close to
appellant's (ABE VALDEZ y DELA CRUZ) hut. Police Inspector Alejandro R. Parungao, Chief of
Police of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya then formed a reaction team from his operatives to verify the
report. At approximately 5:00 o'clock A.M. the following day, said police team, accompanied by
their informer, left for the site where the marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. After a
three-hour, uphill trek from the nearest barangay road, the police operatives arrived at the place
pinpointed by their informant. The police found appellant alone in his nipa hut. They, then,
proceeded to look around the area where appellant had his kaingin and saw seven (7) five-foot
high, flowering marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters from appellant's hut. PO2
Balut asked appellant who owned the prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the latter
admitted that they were his. The police uprooted the seven marijuana plants, which weighed
2.194 kilograms. The police took photos of appellant standing beside the cannabis plants.
Appellant was then arrested. One of the plants, weighing 1.090 kilograms, was sent to the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for analysis. Inspector
Prevy Fabros Luwis, the Crime Laboratory forensic analyst, testified that upon microscopic
examination of said plant, she found cystolitic hairs containing calcium carbonate, a positive
indication for marijuana. She next conducted a chemical examination, the results of which

confirmed her initial impressions. She found as follows: "SPECIMEN SUBMITTED: Exh "A" - 1.090
grams of uprooted suspected marijuana plant placed inside a white sack with markings. x x x
"FINDINGS: Qualitative examination conducted on the above stated specimen gave POSITIVE
result to the test for Marijuana, a prohibited drug."
ABE VALDEZ y DELA CRUZ, the accused, was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt by trial court
of cultivating marijuana plants punishable under section 9 of Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection.
The accused-appellant contended there was unlawful search and that the court erred in declaring
the marijuana plants, as evidence despite that was the product of an illegal search; erred in
convicting the accused of violation of section 9 (Dangerous Drugs Act), Republic Act No. 6425
despite of the inadmissibility of the evidence; and gravely erred in imposing the supreme penalty
of death upon the accused despite failure of the court to prove that the land where the Indian
Hemp were cultivated was a public land on the assumption that the accused planted.

Issues stated:
1. Was the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in this case lawful?
2. Was the used evidence (seizure of marijuana plants) in the case against Valdez admissible?
3. Has the prosecution proved that Valdez was guilty beyond reasonable doubt?

HELD:
The Supreme Court REVERSED the decision of the Regional Trial Court and the appellant was
AQUITTED
1. and 2.
No. In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination of the existence of probable cause.
Contention: For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that the records clearly
show that there was no search made by the police team, in the first place. The OSG points out
that the marijuana plants in question were grown in an unfenced lot and as each grew about five
(5) feet tall, they were visible from afar, and were, in fact, immediately spotted by the police
officers when they reached the site. The seized marijuana plants were, thus, in plain view of the
police officers.
Ruling: We find no reason to subscribe to Solicitor General's contention that we apply the "plain
view" doctrine. For the doctrine to apply, the following elements must be present:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by
the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately
apparent; and (d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

In the instant case, recall that PO2 Balut testified that they first located the marijuana plants
before appellant was arrested without a warrant. Hence, there was no valid warrantless arrest
which preceded the search of appellant's premises. Note further that the police team was
dispatched to appellant's kaingin precisely to search for and uproot the prohibited flora. The
seizure of evidence in "plain view" applies only where the police officer is not searching for
evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Clearly,
their discovery of the cannabis plants was not inadvertent. We also note the testimony of SPO2
Tipay that upon arriving at the area, they first had to "look around the area" before they could
spot the illegal plants. Patently, the seized marijuana plants were not "immediately apparent"
and a "further search" was needed. In sum, the marijuana plants in question were not in "plain
view" or "open to eye and hand." The "plain view" doctrine, thus, cannot be made to apply.
We therefore hold, with respect to the first issue, that the confiscated plants were evidently
obtained during an illegal search and seizure. As to the second issue, which involves the
admissibility of the marijuana plants as evidence for the prosecution, we find that said plants
cannot, as products of an unlawful search and seizure, be used as evidence against appellant.
They are fruits of the proverbial poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a reversible error on the part of
the court a quo to have admitted and relied upon the seized marijuana plants as evidence to
convict appellant.

3. No.
In convicting appellant, the trial court likewise relied on the testimony of the police officers to the
effect that appellant admitted ownership of the marijuana when he was asked who planted them.
It made the following observation: "It may be true that the admission to the police by the
accused that he planted the marijuana plants was made in the absence of any independent and
competent counsel. But the accused was not, at the time of police verification; under custodial
investigation. His admission is, therefore, admissible in evidence and not violative of the
constitutional fiat that admission given during custodial investigation is not admissible if given
without any counsel."
The Constitution plainly declares that any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right: (1) to remain silent; (2) to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be informed of such rights. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. An investigation begins when it is no
longer a general inquiry but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the
police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in connection
with an alleged offense. The moment the police try to elicit admissions or confessions or even
plain information from a person suspected of having committed an offense, he should at that
juncture be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
In the instant case we find that, from the start, a tipster had furnished the police appellant's
name as well as the location of appellant's farm, where the marijuana plants were allegedly
being grown. While the police operation was supposedly meant to merely "verify" said
information, the police chief had likewise issued instructions to arrest appellant as a suspected
marijuana cultivator. Thus, at the time the police talked to appellant in his farm, the latter was
already under investigation as a suspect. The questioning by the police was no longer a general
inquiry.

Moreover, we find appellant's extrajudicial confession flawed with respect to its admissibility. For
a confession to be admissible, it must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be
voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it
must be express; and (4) it must be in writing. The records show that the admission by appellant
was verbal. It was also uncounselled. A verbal admission allegedly made by an accused during
the investigation, without the assistance of counsel at the time of his arrest and even before his
formal investigation is not only inadmissible for being violative of the right to counsel during
criminal investigations, it is also hearsay.

Summary of ruling in no. 3: First, as earlier pointed out, the seized marijuana plants were
obtained in violation of appellant's constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures. The search and seizure were void ab initio for having been conducted without the
requisite judicial warrant. The prosecution's very own evidence clearly establishes that the police
had sufficient time to obtain a warrant. There was no showing of such urgency or necessity for
the warrantless search or the immediate seizure of the marijuana plants subject of this case. To
reiterate, said marijuana plants cannot be utilized to prove appellant's guilt without running afoul
of the constitutional guarantees against illegal searches and the inadmissibility of evidence
procured pursuant to an unlawful search and seizure.
Second, the confession of ownership of the marijuana plants, which appellant allegedly made to
the police during investigation, is not only hearsay but also violative of the Bill of Rights. The
purported confession was made without the assistance of competent and independent counsel,
as mandated by the Charter. Thus, said confession cannot be used to convict appellant without
running afoul of the Constitution's requirement that a suspect in a criminal investigation must
have the services of competent and independent counsel during such investigation.
In sum, both the object evidence and the testimonial evidence as to appellant's voluntary
confession of ownership of the prohibited plants relied upon to prove appellant's guilt failed to
meet the test of Constitutional competence.

5. G.R. No. 128222 June 17, 1999PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.CHUA HO

SAN @ TSAY HO SAN, accused-appellant.FACTS OF THE
CASE:In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and othercontraband, Chief of
Police Jim Lagasca Cid of Bacnotan Police Station,
LaUnion began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his officers. Whilemonitoring the coastal
area of Barangay Bulala, he intercepted a radio call
ataround 12:45 p.m. from Barangay Captain Juan Almoite of Barangay Tammocalao requesting fo
r police assistance regarding an unfamiliarspeedboat the latter had spotted. According to
Almoite, the vessel lookeddifferent from the boats ordinarily used by fisherfolk of the area and
waspoised to dock at Tammocalao shores. Cid and six of his men led by
SPO1Reynoso Badua, proceeded immediately to Tammocalao beach and thereconferred with
Almoite. Cid then observed that the speedboat ferried a lonemale passenger, who was later
identified as Chua Ho San. When the speedboat landed, the male passenger alighted, carrying a
multicolored
strawbag,and walked towards the road. Upon seeing the police officers, the manchanged
direction. Badua held Chuas right arm to prevent him from fleeing. They then introduced
themselves as police officers; however, Chua did notunderstand what theyre saying. And by

resorting of sign language, Cidmotioned with his hands for the man to open his bag. The man
acceded tothe request. The said bag was found to contain several transparent plasticscontaining
yellowish crystalline substances, which was later identified to
bemethamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Chua was then brought toBacnotan Police Station,
where he was provided with an interpreter to informhim of his constitutional rights.ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure
conductedby the Police Officers constitute a valid exemption from the warrantrequirement.RULIN
G: The Court held in the negative. The Court explains that the Constitution bars State intrusions
to a person'sbody, personal effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid
of a valid search warrant issued in accordance with the Rules. However,warrantless searches
may be permitted in the following cases, to wit:(1)search of moving vehicles,(2)seizure in plain
view,(3)customs searches,(4)waiver or consent searches,

(5)stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and(6)search incidental to a lawful arrest.It is required
in cases of
in flagrante delicto
that the arresting officer
musthave personal knowledge of such facts or circumstances convincinglyindicative or constituti
ve of probable cause. Probable cause means areasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficientlystrong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the
personaccused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. In the case atbar, there are no
facts on record reasonably suggestive or demonstrativeof CHUA's participation in on going
criminal enterprise that could havespurred police officers from conducting the obtrusive search.
CHUA wasnot identified as a drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact thatthe vessel
that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishingboats of the area did not
automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating an offense. With these, the Court held
that there was noprobable cause to justify a search incidental to a lawful arrest. The Court
likewise did not appreciate the contention of the
Prosecutionthat there was a waiver or consented search. If CHUA could notunderstand what was
orally articulated to him, how could he
understandthe police's "sign language?" More importantly, it cannot logically beinferred from his
alleged cognizance of the "sign language" that hedeliberately, intelligently, and consciously
waived his right against suchan intrusive search.Finally, being a forbidden fruit, the subject
regulated substance was heldto be inadmissible in evidence.Hence, the accused was acquitted
as the evidence was not sufficient toestablish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

6. (Constitutional Law Warrantless Arrest, Inflagrante Delicto)

Facts: Accused-appellant, convicted of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 assailed the
validity of a warrantless arrest by a police officer, after marijuana leaves were found on the
formers bag when it was inspected. Accused-appellant contends that the arrest is
unconstitutional due to lack of warrant.

Issue: Whether or not there was valid arrest without warrant.

Held: Yes. A police officer or a private person may without a warrant arrest a person in flagrante
delicto.

7. UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE)LEILA REYES JOHNSON, respondent[GR 138881, 18

December 2000]
FACTS:Leila Reyes Johnson was, at the time of the incident, 58 years old, a widow, and a resident
of Ocean Side, California, U.S.A. She is a former Filipino citizen who was naturalized as an
American on 16 June 1968 and had since been working as a registered nurse, taking care of
geriatric patients and those with Alzheimer's disease, in convalescent homes in the United
States. On 16 June 1998, she arrived in the Philippines to visit her son's family in Calamba,
Laguna. She was due to fly back to the United States on July 26. On July 25, she checked in at the
Philippine Village Hotel to avoid the traffic on the way to the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
(NAIA) and checked out at 5:30 p.m. the next day, 26 June 1998. At around 7:30 p.m. of that day,
Olivia Ramirez was on duty as a lady frisker at Gate 16 of the NAIA departure area. Her duty was
to frisk departing passengers, employees, and crew and check for weapons, bombs, prohibited
drugs, contraband goods, and explosives. When she frisked Johnson, a departing passenger
bound for the United States via Continental Airlines CS-912, she felt something hard on the
latter's abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained she needed to wear two panty
girdles as she had just undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic pregnancy. Not satisfied
with the explanation, Ramirez reported the matter to her superior, SPO4 Reynaldo Embile, saying
"Sir, hindi po ako naniniwalang panty lang po iyon." She was directed to take Johnson to the
nearest women's room for inspection. Ramirez took Johnson to the rest room, accompanied by
SPO1 Rizalina Bernal. Embile stayed outside. Inside the women's room, Johnson was asked again
by Ramirez what the hard object on her stomach was and Johnson gave the same answer she
had previously given. Ramirez then asked her "to bring out the thing under her girdle." Johnson
brought out three plastic packs, which Ramirez then turned over to Embile, outside the women's
room. The confiscated packs contained a total of 580.2 grams of a substance which was fount by
NBI Chemist George de Lara to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu." Embile took
Johnson and the plastic packs to the 1st Regional Aviation and Security Office (1st RASO) at the
arrival area of the NAIA, where Johnson's passport and ticket were taken and her luggage
opened. Pictures were taken and her personal belongings were itemized. Johnson was charged
for the possession of 3 plastic bages of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug,
weighing a total of 580.2 grams; a violation of 16 of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), as
amended by RA 7659. On 14 May 1999, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 110, Pasay City, found
Johnson guilty and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
P500,000.00 and the costs of the suit. Johnson appealed.
ISSUE
Whether the extensive search made on Johnson at the airport violates her right against
unreasonable search and seizure.
RULING: The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never placed under
custodial investigation but was validly arrested without warrant pursuant to the provisions of

Section 5, Rule 113 of tie 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that "A peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) when in his presence, the person
to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b)
when an offense has in fact just been committed and person to be arrested has committed it;
and xxx." The circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused falls in either paragraph (a)
or (b) of the Rule above cited, hence the allegation that she has been subjected to custodial
investigation is far from being accurate. The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her
during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security
procedures. Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of
their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of
privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is
implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and
terrorism has come increased security at the nation's airports. Passengers attempting to board
an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked
luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of
suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is
little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity
of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline
travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and
notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or
substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers
on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do
not apply to routine airport procedures. The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having
thus been obtained through a valid warrantless search, they are admissible in evidence against
Johnson. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant, was justified since
it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of "shabu" in her person in flagrante delicto.
8. The People of the Philippines vs Mikael MalmstedtThe Swedish National with Hashish
CaseFacts:M i k a e l M a l m s t e d t , a S w e d i s h n a t i o n a l , w a s f o u n d , v i a a r o u t i n e N A R
C O M i n s p e c t i o n a t K i l o m e t e r 1 4 , A c o p , Tu b l a y M o u n t a i n P r o v i n c e , c a r r y i n g H a
s h i s h , a d e r i v a t i v e o f M a r i j u a n a . R T C L a Tr i n i d a d f o u n d h i m g u i l t y f o r v
i o l a t i o n o f t h e Dangerous Drugs Act. The accused filed a petition to the Supreme Court for
the reversalof the decision arguing that the search and the arrest made was illegal because there
wasno search warrant.Issue:Whether or not the decision of the trial court should be
reversed (or affi rmed) because the accused argues that the search and arrest was made
without a warrantHeld:The RTC decision is affirmed.Ratio:The constitution states that a peace
officer or a private person may arrest a personw i t h o u t a w a r r a n t w h e n i n h i s p r e s e n c e
t h e p e r s o n t o b e a r r e s t e d h a s c o m m i t t e d , i s actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense. The offense was recognizedwith the warrantless search conducted by
NARCOM prompted by probable cause: (1)
ther e c e i p t o f i n f o r m a t i o n b y N A R C O M t h a t a C a u c a s i a n c o m i n g f r o m S a
g a d a h a d prohibited drugs in his possession and (2) failure of the accused to
immediately presenthis passport.
9. Valmonte vs. De VillaFacts:
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC)
wasactivated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters,AFP,
with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility andperipheral
areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintainingpeace and

order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic andpolitical development
of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC
installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.Petitioners aver that, because
of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed
and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary,capricious and whimsical disposition of the
military manning the checkpoints, consideringthat their cars and vehicles are being subjected to
regular searches and check-ups, especiallyat night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search
warrant and/or court order. Their allegedfear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July
1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supplyofficer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned
down allegedly in cold bloodby the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along
McArthur Highway at Malinta,Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the
checkpoint and forcontinuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air.
Issue:
WON the installation of checkpoints violates the right of the people againstunreasonable
searches and seizures
Held:
Petitioner's concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by themilitary manning
the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints per se
, illegal. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of theirroutine
checks, the military, indeed, committed specific violations of petitioners'' rightsagainst
unlawful search and seizure of other rights. The constitutional right
againstunreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose
rightshave been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. Not all searches and seizures
areprohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. The setting up of the
questionedcheckpoints may be considered as a security measure to enable the
NCRDC to pursue itsmission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace
and order for thebenefi t of the public. Checkpoints may not also be regarded as
measures to thwart plots todestabilize the govt, in the interest of public security. Between the
inherent right of thestate to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an
individual s right against awarrantless search w/c is, however, reasonably
conducted, the former should prevail. True,the manning of checkpoints by the military is
susceptible of abuse by the military in thesame manner that all governmental power is
susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even
irritation to the citizen, the checkpointsduring these abnormal times, when conducted w/in
reasonable limits, are part of the pricewe pay for an orderly society and a peaceful
community.
10.
11. Social Justice Society vs Dangerous Drugs Board, et al

November 3, 2008
Facts:
In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party,
seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
from enforcing paragraphs (c),(d) and (f) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 which provides that random drug testing will
be conducted on Students of secondary and tertiary schools and also to officers and employees of public and
private offices persons, while mandatory drug testing to All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with
a criminal offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day
on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm, for the persons constitutional right against unreasonable
searches is breached by said provisions.

Issue:
Whether or not paragraph (c) and (d) and (f) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 violates the persons constitutional right
against unreasonable searches.
Held:
Sec. 36 (c) and (d) of RA 9165 is Constitutional but Sec. 36(f) is unconstitutional. Using US Jurisprudence, the
Court ruled in favor of the constitutionality of Sec 36(c) applying the following reasonable deduction: (1)
schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor students have
contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of their parents,
guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well-being
of their students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4)
schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair, just, and nondiscriminatory. It is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission,
compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. Just as in the case of secondary and
tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 (d) of RA 9165 for officers and
employees of public and private offices is justifiable. The Court notes in this regard that petitioner Social Justice
Society, other than saying that subjecting almost everybody to drug testing, without probable cause, is
unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to privacy. The essence of privacy is the right to
be left alone. In context, the right to privacy means the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of ones
person or from intrusion into ones private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a persons ordinary
sensibilities. Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain
provisions specifically directed towards preventing a situation that would unduly embarrass the employees or
place them under a humiliating experience. While every officer and employee in a private establishment is
under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really
singled out in advance for drug testing. The intrusion into the employees privacy is accompanied by proper
safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively minimal. Like their
counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor under reasonable supervision
and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a
high standard of ethics in the public service. And if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private
employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are
required to be accountable at all times to the people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.
In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutors office, a mandatory drug testing can never
be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being
made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. The
persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutors office and peaceably submitting
themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their
right to privacy.
12. Facts
Respondent CSC Chair Constantino-David received an anonymous letter complaint alleging of an anomaly
taking place in the Regional Office of the CSC. The respondent then formed a team and issued a memo
directing the team to back up all the files in the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and
Legal divisions.Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard disk of PALD and LSD
computers were turned over to Chairperson David. The contents of the diskettes were examined by the
CSCs Office for Legal Affairs (OLA). It was found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing files
copied from the computer assigned to and being used by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42
documents, were draft pleadings or lettersin connection with administrative cases in the CSC and other
tribunals. On the basis of this finding, Chairperson David issued the Show-Cause Order, requiring the
petitioner, who had gone on extended leave, to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit within five days
from notice.

In his Comment, petitioner denied the accusations against him and accused the CSC Officials of fishing
expedition when they unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his computer.He was charged of
violating R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). He
assailed the formal charge and filed an Omnibus Motion ((For Reconsideration, to Dismiss and/or to Defer)
assailing the formal charge as without basis having proceeded from an illegal search which is beyond the
authority of the CSC Chairman, such power pertaining solely to the court.

The CSC denied the omnibus motion and treated the motion as the petitioners answer to the charge. In
view of the absence of petitioner and his counsel, and upon the motion of the prosecution, petitioner was
deemed to have waived his right to the formal investigation which then proceeded ex parte.
The petitioner was dismissed from service. He filed a petition to the CA which was dismissed by the latter
on the ground that it found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents. He filed a motion
for reconsideration which was further denied by the appellate court. Hence, this petition
Issue
WON the search conducted by the CSC on the computer of the petitioner constituted an illegal search and
was a violation of his constitutional right to privacy
Ruling
the search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal files was lawful and did not
violate his constitutional right.
Ratio Decidendi
In this case, the Court had the chance to present the cases illustrative of the issue raised by the petitioner.

Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 437 (1967), the US Supreme Court held that the act of FBI agents in
electronically recording a conversation made by petitioner in an enclosed public telephone booth violated
his right to privacy and constituted a search and seizure. Because the petitioner had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in using the enclosed booth to make a personal telephone call, the protection of the
Fourth Amendment extends to such area. Moreso, the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan noted that
the existence of privacy right under prior decisions involved a two-fold requirement: first, that a person has
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective).