CASE DIGESTS

Prepared by Karlo G. Noche

Special Proceedings
Professor: Judge de Leon

DAISIE T. DAVID V. CA, RAMON R. VILLAR

G.R. No. 111180, 16 November 1995
By Karlo Noche
DOCTRINE:
Rule 102, 1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is
separated from her husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that
of a mother of an illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole parental
authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her child.
FACTS:
David was the wealthy businessman Villar's secretary with whom the latter
had extra-marital relations. As a result, David had 3 children by Villar:
Christopher J, Christine, Cathy Mae.
Villar recognized Christopher J and frequently brought him to his home and
was accepted by Villar's family. When Christopher J was 6 yrs. old, and during the
summer of 1991, Villar asked David for permission to take Christopher J on a trip
with his legal family to Boracay adnw as allowed by David. However, after
returning from the trip, Villar refused to give back Christopher J and informed
David that he had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for the next
school year.
Thus, on July 30, 1991, David filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf
of Christopher J.
RTC Angeles (Br. 58), decided in favor of David. It awarded custody to
David and ordered Villar to give a P3, 000 monthly support.
Upon appeal, the CA reversed. It observed that the petition for Habeas
Corpus has been applied to cases where the parents are married to each other
but are separated. Since in the CA's opinion, Villar is financially well-off, he gave
temporary custody to Villar pending the filing of the proper custody case to settle
the matter. Thus, the CA SET ASIDE the RTC decision and ENTERED A NEW ONE
DISMISSING THE HABEAS CORPUS case.
ISSUE:
WON a petition for Habeas Corpus be granted to preserve cutody of an
illegitimate child with his natural mother when an illegitimate father refuses to
return said child
HELD:
The SC held that although the CA was correct in its observation that
Petition for Habeas Corpus has been awarded in cases where the parents are
married to each other but are separated, "it does not follow, however, that it
cannot arise in any other situation."
Pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the
parental authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of
such authority, is entitled to have custody of him. 2 Since, admittedly, petitioner
has been deprived of her rightful custody of her child by private respondent, she
is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.

"Indeed, Rule 1021 1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother

who is separated from her husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and
that of a mother of an illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole parental
authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her child."
Next the SC upheld the order for Support as Villar demonstrated
willingness to extend it to Christopher.
The SC REVERSED the CA. It ORDERED Villar to deliver the minor child
Christopher to his natural mother, and to give him P3, 000 monthly support
pending a decision in an appropriate action.

LOURDES ZACARIAS V. HON. FERNANDO A. CRUZ, CFI RIZAL, CALOOCAN

BRANCH AND HON. BENJAMIN AQUINO, PROVINCIAL FISCAL.
G.R. No. L-25899; 29 November 1969
By Karlo Noche
DOCTRINE:
A Petition for Habeas Corpus will not lie in a criminal case where the
accused has already posted bail.
FACTS:
Zacarias was arrested by the order of arrest issued on January 24, 1966 by
respondent judge upon a criminal information for Estafa filed in court against her
following a preliminary investigation conducted by respondent fiscal. She has
temporary liberty upon posting a P10,000-bail bond and has also entered a plea.
Zacarias filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus to nullify respondent judge's
order of arrest alleging that respondent judge issued the same without
personally examining under oath or affirmation the complainant and the
witnesses in said case in alleged violation of Section 1 (3), Article III of the
Constitution and to restrain the CFI and Fiscal to proceed in the case.
ISSUE:
WON Petition for Habeas Corpus should be granted
HELD:
SC held that the petition could be already be dismissed on the reason that
the order of arrest was issued upon a criminal information following a preliminary
investigation. SC noted that she did not move to quash the information. Further,
by entering a plea she is deemed to have foregone her right to preliminary
investigation and to have abandoned her right to question any irregularity that
surrounds it.
Last, the SC emphasized that posting of a bail bond constitutes waiver of
any irregularity attending the arrest of a person, estops him from discussing the
validity of his arrest. Said the SC, It makes eminent sense to say that an
accused in a criminal case who is at liberty on bail and who had thus secured by
judicial decree release which the high prerogative writ of habeas corpus is
intended to afford, may no longer avail of that remedy.
SC DENIED the petition for the writ of habeas corpus; affirmed the validity
of the issuance of the order of arrest; and denied the prayer to restrain the judge
and fiscal from further proceeding with the Criminal Case.

ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., V. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-14639 ; 25 March 1919
By Karlo Noche
DOCTRINE:
A. The remedies available to a citizen unduly deprived of liberty are: remedies of
the citizen are three: (1) Civil action; (2) criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus.
The first 2 can be a slow, cumbersome process. The writ of habeas corpus was
devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left untouched by decision on the
writ, whose principal purpose is to set the individual at liberty.
B. The courses of action a government official has when faced with a court order
to produce citizens before the court in a petition for habeas corpus are: (1) They
could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the
writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or
infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they
could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their
attorney waived the right to be present.
C. A Court is not deprived of jurisdiction to hear the petition on allegation that
the citizen is in another province.
FACTS:
In a concerted effort to rid Manila of vice, Mayor Lukban ordered the
closure of the segregated district of Manila for women of ill repute from 16 Oct 25 1918. At around midnight of Oct 25, the Police of Manila rounded-up 170
women who were known to ply the oldest trade in the said district. Instead of
being brought to a police station, the women were brought aboard a steamship
and 3 days later arrived in Davao and made to work in farms. All these without
the prostitutes' consent.
The relatives of some of the deported prostitutes filed an
application for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus with a member of the
Supreme Court. The writ was issued and made returnable to the SC en banc and
made to cover all the women deported.
Mayor Lukban and the chief of polic of manila admitted the facts of deportation
but asked for the dismissal of the petition, arguing that it should have been filed
in Davao and further alleging that the women were not under their control and
that they were actually at liberty in Davao.
Some women were able to return to Manila at though their own efforts and
expense. The Court took their testimonies through Commissioners. This led to
the SC issuing a second directive, now including the Labor Secretary, and the
governor of Davao. The second return stated that eight women; that eighty-one
women were found in Davao who, on notice that if they desired they could return
to Manila, transportation fee, renounced the right through sworn statements;
that fifty-nine had already returned to Manila by other means, and that despite
all efforts to find them twenty-six could not be located
ISSUES:

WON Return complied with; WON to hold respondents in contempt

HELD:
The SC noted that, although prostitutes, "these women despite their being
in a sense lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens
protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens to
change their domicile from Manila to another locality."
Next it emphasized that the Constitution guarantees that: "No freeman
shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free
customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass
upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of
the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either
justice or right."
What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression? The
remedies of the citizen are three: (1) Civil action; (2) criminal action, and (3)
habeas corpus. Noting that the first two could not secure the immediate liberty
of such citizens deprived of liberty, the SC explained the necessity of the writ.
The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only
sufficient defense of personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left
untouched by decision on the writ, whose principal purpose is to set the
individual at liberty.
The SC then debunked Lukban's argument that the petition should have
been filed in Davao. It said: (The) prime specification of an application for a writ
of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the
writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint
is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The
forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed
them over to other parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived
these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been
imprisoned.
Lastly, the SC deliberated whether the orders pursuant to the writ were
complied with. It found that there was substantial compliance with the second
order but not the first. Thus, only Mayor Lukban was held in contempt and fined
P100. Mayor Lukban was held in contempt for failing to make a proper return.
SC noted that The courses of action a government official has when faced
with a court order to produce citizens before the court in a petition for habeas
corpus are: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to
the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on
account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before
the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in
question or their attorney waived the right to be present. The SC found none of
Mayor Lukban's acts showed an intention to comply.
SC HELD no further action warranted on the petition for writ of habeas
corpus; fined only Mayor Lucban; granted motion to strike out reply.

CARAM V. SEGUI
G.R. NO. 193652, 5 AUGUST 2014
By Karlo Noche
FACTS:
Christina Caram had a child with Marcelino Constantino but she misled him
to believe that she had it aborted. After giving birth, Caram voluntarily
surrendered Baby Julian to the DSWD. Marcelino later died and only then did
Caram disclose to his family that she had in fact put up their son for adoption.
The relatives of Constantino expressed their willingness to support Baby Julian.
By then, Baby Julian had already been declared legally available for adoption and
had been matched with the Medina Spouses.
Christina wrote a letter to the DSWS for the suspension of the Adoption
proceedings. The DSWD refused to terminated the proceedings as the Deed of
Voluntary Commitment had already become final, which has thus terminated her
parental authority. The DSWD also refused Marcelinos relatives request to have
Baby Julian DNA tested.
Christina filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo. The RTC
dismissed the petition without prejudice. It opined that Christina should have
filed a civil case for Custody under the Family Code and a petition for the
issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to The Rule on Custody of Minors
and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors.
ISSUE: Is a petition for a writ of amparo the proper recourse for to obtain/regain
parental authority and custody of a minor child put up for voluntary
commitment?
HELD: NO.
Christina alleged that DSWDs actions of denying her custody over Baby Julian
caused her enforced separation from her child and amounted to enforced
disappearance within the context of the Rule of the Writ of Amparo. The SC
found that Baby Julians whereabouts was never concealed from Christina. Thus,
there was no enforced disappearance.
The SC also noted that what Christina really asserting is her parental authority
over Baby Julian to gain/regain custody. Since it is extant from the pleadings
filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of
parental authority over a child, ... the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.
Lasty, the SC, emphasized that the Writ of Amparo is a remedy available to
victims of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats of a
similar nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or
omission is a public official or employee or a private individual. It is envisioned
basically to protect and guarantee the right to life, liberty and security of
persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of life.

SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE V. MANALO

G.R. NO. 180906, 7 OCTOBER 2008
The Manalo Brothers (Raymond and Reynaldo) were taken captive by CAFGU
members. They were detained, interrogated, and beaten for information for a
year. They were able to escape. They filed a petition for prohibition, injunction,
and TRO. Meanwhile, the Amparo Rule was promulgated by the SC. The SC
treated the Manalo Bros petition as a petition for a writ of amparo.
Sec. of Defense presented Lt. Col. Jimenez who was directed to investigate the
Manalo Bros alleged abduction by the CAFGU. Jimenez found that CAFGU
involvement in the alleged abduction was unsubstantiated.
ISSUE
Are the Manalo Bros entitled to the privilege of the writ of amparo?
YES.
SC explained, Amparo rule promulgated as response to address extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances.
SC found that the Manalo Bros abduction was an enforced disappearance. It
further noted that although they are now physically free, their movements
continue to be restricted as they are still under threat of abduction.
SC held that right to security of person means freedom from fear. Second, the
right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or
security. Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of
ones rights by the government.
Here, SC noted that the one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very
limited, superficial, and one-sided. (In fine the Government failed in its duty to
protect Manalo Bros right to security.) SC held that the violation of or threat to
the right to life, liberty, and security may be caused by either an act or omission
of a public official. (Here, the omission is the unsatisfactory investigation.)
SC said, the Writ of Amparo is a remedy available to victims of extra-judicial
killings and enforced disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless of
whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a public official or
employee or a private individual. It is envisioned basically to protect and
guarantee the right to life, liberty and security of persons, free from fears and
threats that vitiate the quality of life.

RUBRICO VS. ARROYO

G.R. NO. 183871, 18 FEBRUARY 2010
FACTS:
Rubrico, in her petition, said she was abducted on April 3, 2007 by armed men
belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron, based at the
Philippine Air Force Field Station at Fernando Air Base in Lipa City, Batangas.
During her detention, the petitioner added, her daughters Mary Joy Rubrico
Carbonel and Jean Rubrico Apruebo were harassed by Senior Insp. Arsenio
Gomez and that there were also armed men following them. The petitioners
prayed that a writ of amparo be issued, ordering the individual respondents to
desist from performing any threatening act against the security of the petitioners
and for the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) to immediately file an information
for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance of gender of the
offended party. It also prayed for damages and for respondents to produce
documents submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes.
The respondents then filed a joint return on the writ specifically denying the
material inculpatory averments against them. Respondents interposed the
defense that the President may not be sued during her incumbency.
Petitioners pleaded back to be allowed to present evidence ex parte against the
President, et al.
By a separate resolution, the CA dropped the President as respondent in the case
.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the [CA] committed reversible error in dismissing [their]
Petition and dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent.
Petitioners first take issue on the Presidents purported lack of immunity from suit
during her term of office. The 1987 Constitution, so they claim, has removed
such immunity heretofore enjoyed by the chief executive under the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions.
Petitioners are mistaken. The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved
under our system of government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present
constitution. Addressing a concern of his co-members in the 1986 Constitutional
Commission on the absence of an express provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin
Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in jurisprudence that the
President may not be sued during his or her tenure.[9] The Court subsequently
made it abundantly clear in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, a case likewise resolved
under the umbrella of the 1987 Constitution, that indeed the President enjoys
immunity during her incumbency, and why this must be so:
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need
to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high
office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court
litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed
from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully
attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the
legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and
anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and
important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the
operation of the Government.[10] x x x

And lest it be overlooked, the petition is simply bereft of any allegation as to

what specific presidential act or omission violated or threatened to violate
petitioners protected rights.

LANDINGIN VS. REPUBLIC

GR NO. 164948, 27 JUNE 2006
Karlo G. Noche
Facts: Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition
for the adoption of 3 minors, natural children of Manuel Ramos, the formers
brother, and Amelia Ramos. She alleged in her petition that when her brother
died, the children were left to their paternal grandmother for their biological
mother went to Italy, re-married there and now has 2 children by her second
marriage and no longer communicates from the time she left up to the institution
of the adoption. After the paternal grandmother passed away, the minors were
being supported by the petitioner and her children abroad and gave their written
consent for their adoption.
A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for the adoption
and narrated that Amelia, the biological mother was consulted with the adoption
plan and after weighing the benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily
consented.
However, petitioner failed to present the said social worker as witness and offer
in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Petitioner
also failed to present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent to
the adoption.
Issue: WON a petition for adoption be granted without the written consent of the
adoptees biological mother.
Held: No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the
biological parent(s) of the child, if known is necessary to the adoption. The
written consent of the legal guardian will suffice if the written consent of the
biological parents cannot be obtained.
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended
to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by
interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the
child in the manner of the proposed adoption.
The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of
the decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires
that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be
terminated and re-establish in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to
submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.
Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal
obligations of love and support. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time
undisturbed in the care of others is not such abandonment. To dispense with the
requirements of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed at
the time of adoption.

REYES VS. SOTERO

GR NO. 167405, 16 FEBRUARY 2006
Karlo G. Noche
Facts: Respondent Chichioco filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration and settlement of estate of the late Elena Lising claiming that she
was the niece and heir of Lising who died intestate. Respondent claims that real
and personal properties were allegedly in the possession of petitioner Ana Joyce
S. Reyes, a grandniece of the deceased.
Petitioner Reyes filed an Opposition to the petition, claiming that she was an
adopted child of Lising and the latters husband and asserting that the petition
be dismissed since she was the only heir of Lising who passed away without
leaving any debts.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Supplement to the Opposition attaching thereto
the certification of her adoption from the local civil registrars office that the
adoption decree was registered therein and also a copy of a Judicial Form and a
certification issued by the clerk of court that the decree was on file in the
General Docket of the RTC-Tarlac.
Respondents filed a Comment to the opposition stating that reasonable doubts
have been cast on Petitioners claim that she was legally adopted due allegedly
to certain badges of fraud.
The appellate court refused to dismiss the proceeding because it was incumbent
upon the petitioner to prove before the trial court that she was indeed adopted
by the Delos Santos spouse since, imputations of irregularities permeating the
adoption decree render its authenticity under a cloud of doubt.
Issue: WON petitioner had to prove the validity of her adoption due to
imputations of irregularities.
Held: No. Petitioner need not prove her legal adoption by any evidence other
than those which she had already presented before the trial court.
An adoption decree is a public document required by law to be entered into
public records, the official repository of which, as well as all other judicial
pronouncements affecting the status of individuals, is the local civil registrars
office as well as the court which rendered the judgment.
Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a
duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. As
such, the certifications issued by the local civil registrar and the clerk of court
regarding details of petitioners adoption which are entered in the records kept
under their official custody, are prima facie evidence of the facts contained
therein. These certifications suffice as proof of the fact of petitioners adoption by
the Delos Santos spouses until contradicted or overcome by sufficient evidence.
Mere imputations of irregularities will not cast a cloud of doubt on the
adoption decree since the certifications and its contents are presumed valid until
proof to the contrary is offered.

IN RE PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE AND MICHAEL LIM

G.R. NOS. 168992-93, 21 MAY 2009
Karlo G. Noche
FACTS:
Spouses Monina P. Lim and Primo Lim were childless. Subsequently, two minor
children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain
Lucia Ayuban. Being so eager to have children of their own, Monina and Primo
registered the children to make it appear that they were the childrens parents.
The children were named Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim. The spouses
reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. Unfortunately, in
1998, Primo died. On 27 December 2000, Monina married Angel Olario, an
American citizen.
Monina decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA
8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed separate
petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was
then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and 7 months
old. Michelle and her husband, Michael and Olario gave their consent to the
adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent.
On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the
petitions. The trial court ruled that since Monina had remarried, she should have
filed the petition jointly with her new husband.
Monina appealed contending that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed
because it is the duty of the court and the State to protect the paramount
interest and welfare of the child to be adopted. Petitioner argued that the legal
maxim dura lex sed lex is not applicable to adoption cases. She argued that
joint parental authority is not necessary in this case since, at the time the
petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael
was already 18 years of age. Parental authority is not anymore necessary since
they have been emancipated having attained the age of majority.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.
2. Whether the adoption should be granted considering that the alien spouse
consented to the adoption
3. Whether or not joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the
children have been emancipated having reached the age of majority.
HELD:
1. No. The law is explicit. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in the
following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided,
however, That the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or

(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other, which was not present
in the case at bar. (Section 7, Article III of RA 8552)
The use of the word shall means that joint adoption by the husband and the
wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental
authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is
elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses
to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses. Since the
petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her
husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption
on this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in
Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of
petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate
children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated
from each other.
2. No. The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his
Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario
must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set
forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has
diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have been
living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of
the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the
adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country;
and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopters country as the latters
adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the
trial.
These requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to
adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees
are not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner
or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.
3. Petitioners contention is untenable. Parental authority includes caring for and
rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development
of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being. The father and the
mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common
children. Even the remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental
authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the
guardian of the person or property of the children.
It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation that is, when he
attains the age of majority or 18 years of age emancipation terminates
parental authority over the person and property of the child, who shall then be
qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life. However, parental authority is
merely just one of the effects of legal adoption.
Even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still
considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights of a legitimate
child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to
receive support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and
other successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to

the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled
such as support and successional rights. (In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle
Lim and Michael Lim, GR No. 168992-93, May 21, 2009)