Fang 2014

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Journal of Management Studies : 2014

doi: 10.1111/joms.12107
Bringing Political Skill into Social Networks: Findings

from a Field Study of Entrepreneurs
Ruolian Fang, Lei Chi, Manli Chen and Robert A. Baron

National University of Singapore; EmblemHealth; BBK Worldwide; Oklahoma State University
ABSTRACT The authors integrate the entrepreneurship literatures sociological and
behavioural perspectives and examine the processes through which entrepreneurs first build
social networks and then use the network resources for enhancing venture performance. Field
interviews of entrepreneurs during a six-month period reveal that political skill is an important
individual-level factor that influences the construction and use of social networks. Theoretical
and practical implications of the major findings are discussed.
Keywords: entrepreneurship, political skill, social capital, venture performance
INTRODUCTION
Creating and developing ventures is a social process in which both individuals and their
social networks contribute to entrepreneurial success (e.g., Aldrich and Ruef, 2006;
Baron, 2002; Baron and Markman, 2003). To date, entrepreneurship researchers have
taken sociological and behavioural perspectives in their efforts to understand entrepreneurial performance. Taking the sociological perspective, several researchers have examined social networks effects on venture performance and have found that social networks
are important in the creation, growth, and success of new ventures (e.g., Aldrich and
Ruef, 2006; Batjargal and Liu, 2004; Hoang and Antoncic, 2003; Jack, 2005; Shane and
Cable, 2002). Others taking the behavioural perspective have found that individual
characteristics impact venture success (e.g., Baron and Tang, 2008; Ciavarella et al.,
2004). Those prior studies have provided insights into the respective roles of entrepreneurs social networks and individual factors in influencing venture performance.
However, our understanding of entrepreneurial processes within the social network
context remains limited when we consider such processes by which entrepreneurs first
construct social networks and gain access to social capital, and then use their networks for
mobilizing social capital to enhance performance. Although research taking the sociological perspective has identified the important effects of social networks on venture
Address for reprints: Lei Chi, EmblemHealth, 55 Water Street, New York, NY 10041, USA (lchi@
emblemhealth.com).
2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd and Society for the Advancement of Management Studies
R. Fang et al.
performance, two fundamentally important questions remain largely unanswered. The

first relates to how entrepreneurs actually construct their social networks. Few processoriented studies have examined this issue (Hoang and Antoncic, 2003; Jack, 2010; Stuart
and Sorenson, 2007). Compared with the well-documented entrepreneurship studies on
the effects of social networks, researchers have paid much less attention to examining
social networks as dependent variables (Hoang and Antoncic, 2003). For instance, papers
on entrepreneurial networks remain silent on the assumption that entrepreneurs strategically construct their social networks, so that we continue to know little about the
emergence or evolution of networks (Stuart and Sorenson, 2007, p. 212). Only a few
recent studies have begun examining how entrepreneurs create and shape their social
networks (e.g., Hallen and Eisenhardt, 2012; Vissa, 2012).
The second question pertains to entrepreneurs use of social networks. Empirical
findings are still limited as to whether all entrepreneurs are equally capable of utilizing
social capital (i.e., resources embedded in networks) for achieving the desired venture
performance (Baron, 2007; Stuart and Sorenson, 2007). To date, research on the effects
of entrepreneurial networks implicitly assumes that all entrepreneurs maximally utilize
accessible social capital. Social capital scholars, however, have suggested that not all
actors can fully use available social capital (Lin, 1999). Although social networks create
opportunities for social capital transactions, their mere existence reveals little about
whether their benefits will be realized (Adler and Kwon, 2002). Indeed, some studies
have found that entrepreneurial networks significantly affect venture performance while
others have failed to do so (see Hoang and Antoncic, 2003), suggesting that entrepreneurs differ in their utilization of available social capital. As such, entrepreneurship
scholars have called for empirical insights into whether entrepreneurs individual characteristics affect their ability to realize network-based advantages (Baron, 2007; Stuart
and Sorenson, 2007). This line of inquiry on differences across entrepreneurs in how they
leverage network resources will also extend our understanding of the development
process of entrepreneurial networks.
In this study, we integrate the sociological perspective with the behavioural perspective
to address those two under-explored questions in the entrepreneurship literature. Beyond
the entrepreneurship context, emerging literature has identified that individual characteristics such as cognition and personality traits influence how people construct social
networks in organizational settings (Burt et al., 1998; Klein et al., 2004; Mehra et al.,
2001). For network usage, social capital scholars have suggested that individual differences
determine how well people can utilize their social capital (Emirbayer and Goodwin, 1994;
Stevenson and Greenberg, 2000). Personal characteristics affect how extensively and
successfully they leverage their social networks (e.g., Anderson, 2008; Fang et al., 2011).
Integrating the behavioural and sociological perspectives, we investigate the roles that
individual characteristics play in influencing how entrepreneurs first gain access to social
capital (network construction) and then mobilize social capital to enhance venture
performance (network use). Social capital refers to social-network-embedded resources
that can be accessed and mobilized for instrumental actions (Lin, 1999). Social capital
must be accessed if it is to be subsequently mobilized (Lin, 1999). Therefore, we specifically
address two fundamentally important yet under-studied questions in the entrepreneurship
literature: (1) Why are some entrepreneurs better than others at developing resource-rich networks that
Bringing Political Skill into Social Networks
allow them to access the social capital critical for venture performance? Do their individual characteristics
influence their network construction? (2) Given the same level of accessible social capital, why do some
entrepreneurs mobilize social capital better than others to achieve desirable venture performance? Do their
individual characteristics affect their network usage? Answers to those questions will provide
insights into the entrepreneurial process by which entrepreneurs construct and use their
social networks to achieve desired venture performance.
To address the questions, we conducted field interviews with 28 entrepreneurs in ten
different industries during a six-month period. Our findings suggest that political skill
influences the entrepreneurial process within the social network context. Political skill
reflects personal competency in social interactions and proficiency at applying
situationally appropriate behaviour and tactics to influence others, especially in highly
uncertain environments (Ferris et al., 2005, 2007). We see political skill as essential for
entrepreneurs to be successful in entrepreneurial environments often characterized by
high uncertainty levels. Following Eisenhardts (1989a) methods for building theory from
case studies, we derive propositions from our field interviews and summarize our findings
into an integrative model that depicts how political skill and social networks work together
to affect venture performance. The empirical grounding of these propositions is the main
subject of this paper.
Our study makes important theoretical and practical contributions to the entrepreneurship literature. Theoretically, we show how individual characteristics particularly
political skill influence entrepreneurs in the construction and use of social networks to
enhance venture performance. By integrating sociological and behavioural perspectives,
we elaborate and reveal the dynamic interplay between social networks and political skill,
well-established constructs in entrepreneurship literature, in the entrepreneurial process.
Consequently our qualitative research serves as theory elaboration (Bluhm et al., 2011)
by expanding our view into entrepreneurial processes within the social network context
and filling gaps in current knowledge about entrepreneurial networks. Furthermore, our
research advances theory on social capital and individual differences in the entrepreneurial context. On a practical level, it is important that social networks and individual
characteristics such as political skill are modifiable. As such, our results can assist in the
development of training tools, policies, infrastructure, and mechanisms to help entrepreneurs construct and use social networks for performance enhancement.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Sociological Perspective on Entrepreneurship
Entrepreneurial environments are highly uncertain and ambiguous (Lichtenstein et al.,
2006). In starting and developing new ventures, entrepreneurs are heavily involved in
tasks such as seeking market and growth opportunities, formulating business strategies
and business models, negotiating new business deals, acquiring essential resources, and
constructing effective relationships (Baron, 2008). However, new ventures are often
information- and wealth-constrained (Shane and Cable, 2002). Entrepreneurs thus face
substantial difficulty in responding to technology and demand uncertainties. Often they
must rely on social relations to identify opportunities for launching new ventures and to
garner crucial information and resources.
R. Fang et al.
Resources obtained through social relations are the foundation of social capital, which
has two key components (Lin, 1999). First, social resources are embedded in social
relations rather than in individuals that is, social capital is distinct from other capital such
as human and financial capital (Lin, 1999). Second, individuals can access and mobilize
social capital only when they are cognitively aware of social ties in their networks and of
resources those ties possess (e.g., Burt, 1992; Coleman, 1988; Lin, 1999). Social capital, in
its various forms, facilitates information and knowledge flows, exerts influence, builds
social credentials, and reinforces social identity and recognition (Lin, 1999). Those
elements of social capital information, influence, credentials, and reinforcement help
individuals and groups achieve desirable outcomes (Payne et al., 2011).
Taking the sociological perspective, entrepreneurship researchers have identified that
social networks containing social capital are important at various stages of venture
development. For example, during venture creation, entrepreneurs consistently use their
social networks to gather information and ideas and to identify market opportunities
(Ozgen and Baron, 2007; Singh, 2000; Smeltzer et al., 1991). Beyond the venture
creation stage, entrepreneurs continue to rely on social networks for acquiring resources
such as information, referral, advice, and technology (e.g., Batjargal and Liu, 2004; Jack,
2005; Lee et al., 2001; Shane and Cable, 2002). Social networks offer opportunities to
obtain low-cost financial capital (Uzzi, 1999) and enable young ventures to move forward
initial public offering (IPO) quickly and earn high IPO valuations (Stuart et al., 1999).
Those studies are insightful in showing how social capital enhances venture performance. As described previously, however, they remain limited in addressing the two
fundamentally important questions pertaining to entrepreneurial networks, that is, what
roles do individual characteristics play in the access and mobilization of social capital to
achieve desirable venture performance?
Behavioural Perspective on Entrepreneurship
Separately, researchers who take the behavioural perspective have found that entrepreneurs individual characteristics such as personality, motivation, cognition, affect, social
skill, and political skill have important effects on venture performance (e.g., Baron, 2007,
2008; Baron and Tang, 2008; Baum and Locke, 2004; Ciavarella et al., 2004; Tocher
et al., 2012). For example, social skill, which reflects social competence and effectiveness
in social interactions, has been found to be significantly related to venture success: more
socially skilled entrepreneurs achieved greater financial success in their new ventures
(Baron and Markman, 2003; Baron and Tang, 2008). More recently, political skill, a
closely related concept, has also been found to be positively associated with entrepreneurial performance (Tocher et al., 2012).
Individual characteristics such as political skill are suggested to help entrepreneurs
shape and build resource-rich social networks, which, in turn, provide social capital
critical for desirable venture performance (Baron, 2007; Baron and Markman, 2003;
Tocher et al., 2012). This suggestion aligns with recent findings that entrepreneurs
networking strategies influence the creation and development of resource-rich networks;
that is, strategies such as networking orientation in building potentially valuable ties
(Ebbers, in press), participation in heterogeneous industry events or bridging between
events with few common participants (Stam, 2010), network-broadening and networkdeepening networking styles (Vissa, 2012), and catalysing strategies for efficient tie
formation (Hallen and Eisenhardt, 2012). As such, an in-depth understanding of how
entrepreneurs individual characteristics influence their network construction and use
will provide additional insights into entrepreneurs strategic networking actions. To our
knowledge, however, no empirical investigations have considered the roles that individual characteristics play in the entrepreneurial process within the social network context.
Integrating the Sociological and Behavioural Perspectives
Combined sociological and behavioural perspectives reveal that social networks and
individual characteristics are important yet independent antecedents of entrepreneurial
performance. Although outside the entrepreneurship context, emerging literature indicates that individual characteristics influence how people construct and use social networks in organizational settings (e.g., Burt et al., 1998; Kalish and Robins, 2006; Klein
et al., 2004; Mehra et al., 2001; Totterdell et al., 2008). For example, self-monitoring is
related to network positions: employees high in self-monitoring are more likely than
those low in self-monitoring to occupy central positions in their social networks (Mehra
et al., 2001): they can take advantage of their personality orientation to forge different
types of network structures favourable for them (Mehra et al., 2001, p. 141). Individuals
spanning many structural holes (i.e., sparse regions in the network with absence of ties
between individuals) tend to be independent outsiders searching for change and authority; in contrast, individuals spanning few structural holes tend to be conformist, obedient,
and oriented towards security and stability (Burt et al., 1998). Furthermore, individual
differences can affect how people use their social networks (Emirbayer and Goodwin,
1994; Stevenson and Greenberg, 2000). For example, managers with higher level of need
for cognition better utilize their social networks to search for relevant information
(Anderson, 2008). New employees who have more positive core self-evaluations are
better at capitalizing social capital for adjusting and assimilating (Fang et al., 2011).
Simultaneously, a recent study of the association of political skill and venture performance focuses on political skill as an individual characteristic that may influence how
entrepreneurs construct and use their social networks (Tocher et al., 2012). Although
highly correlated with social skill, political skill is more widely studied in organizational
settings and refers to the ability to effectively understand others at work and use such
knowledge to influence others to act in ways that enhance ones personal and/or
organizational objectives (Ferris et al., 2005, p. 127). It allows individuals to form
constructive and effective relationships with others and adapt to widely ranging social
circumstances (Ferris et al., 2007, 2012). Studies on political skill and individual performance (e.g., Ferris et al., 2005) have suggested that political skill affects the ability to
develop, maintain, and/or change social relationships, which perhaps explains why
individuals with higher political skill tend to perform better in organizations. For instance,
they tend to achieve better work performance as assessed by supervisors or peers (Ferris
et al., 2005) and achieve better outcomes in managerial positions (Smith et al., 2009).
Although some political skill aspects are dispositional, others can be trained and developed
through formal and informal developmental experiences (Ferris et al., 2005). We believe
R. Fang et al.
that studying the role of political skill in the entrepreneurial process within the social
network context adds value to the entrepreneurship literature and provides practical
guidelines for entrepreneurs who seek to improve their venture performance.
Taken together, our study seeks to integrate sociological and behavioural perspectives
by examining how entrepreneurs political skill contributes to their network building and
their subsequent use of social networks to enhance venture performance.
METHOD
Our research design used a mixed approach involving qualitative and quantitative data.
Qualitative data provide rich insights into the entrepreneurial process while quantitative
data increase reliability and validity. To obtain the qualitative data, we followed
Eisenhardts (1989a) methods on building theory from case studies and used a multiplecase design that allows the replication logic (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). That is, we
treated a series of cases as experiments with each case serving to confirm or disconfirm
the inferences drawn from the others (Yin, 1994).
Table I summarizes the venture industries and relative venture performance high
versus low of the entrepreneurs we interviewed. Their businesses ranged from industries with relatively low technological/market uncertainty (e.g., garment tailoring, catering, and restaurant industries) to industries with relatively high technological/market
uncertainty (e.g., software, financial planning, and biotech industries). Because their
ventures were in widely ranging industries and the objective venture performance data
such as financial performance were so sensitive, we were challenged to use a common,
single measure for assessing venture performance. We drew on all available information
sources: entrepreneurs descriptions, our on-site observations, and data collected from
survey questionnaires and secondary data sources. We assessed relative venture performance as high versus low from multiple aspects, such as perceived business growth, new
business expansion, sales or revenue growth, and profit growth. For example, we considered interviewee D3 to have relatively high venture performance. She started her
restaurant about seven years ago. In the past five years, her sales rapidly grew from
$250,000 to $1.3 million. Less than six months ago, she opened her second restaurant.
The New York Times featured her restaurant twice. She was also invited to the Martha
Stewart show. We sat in her restaurant from 10 am until noon on a regular business day
and observed long lines and a packed restaurant. R2, who had a data communications
business, showed another example of relatively high venture performance. For two years,
his revenue doubled yearly and then tripled in the third year. In contrast, we considered
S1 to have relatively low venture performance because her business lost money.
Although some clients paid, most payments failed to cover the costs. We also assessed C2,
the owner of a social media marketing business with no revenues in the past five years,
as having relatively low venture performance.
Data Sources
Two members of the research team interviewed 28 entrepreneurs in ten different industries during a six-month period. The entrepreneurs were all born and started their
Table I. Venture industries and venture performances of interviewed

entrepreneurs
Venture industry
1. Non-profit organization
2. Corporate
communications/
entertainment and
recreation/social media and
marketing
3. Relocation management/
automotive parts
4. Real estate
5. Financing and strategic
planning consulting/
executive recruiting
6. Restaurants
7. Custom tailoring/catering
and personalized
consulting/premium
incentives
8. Enterprise software/online
gaming software
development
9. Data communications
10. Biotechnology
Total
Entrepreneurs with
Entrepreneurs with
relatively high venture relatively low
venture performance
performance
C1, V1
D1, R3
C2, M2, M4, S3
T1
P2
A2, J1, M6
E2
D2
D3, P1
M3, S1, E1
M2, M5
R2
R1
10
A1
15
Note: Three entrepreneurs, D4 in strategic planning consulting industry, G1 in

relocation management, and S2 in biotech industry, didnt provide sufficient
venture performance information that enabled us to make an assessment.
businesses in the United States. Their average age was 47.3 (SD = 10.6), ranging from 28
to 62 years of age. They had various educational levels: non-degree, bachelors, masters,
and PhD degrees. Their average industry experience was 16.2 years (SD = 9.3), ranging
from 2.5 to 32 years. Their venture ages ranged from 3 to 5 years.
Gender, age, education, and prior industry experiences have shown mixed relationships with entrepreneurs venture performance (e.g., Jo and Lee, 1996; Van de Ven
et al., 1984). Moreover, to our knowledge, no literature has evidenced whether those
demographic factors are associated with political skill and social relations. For example,
Aldrich et al. (1986) tested but found no gender differences in network size and amount
of networking activity. Therefore, we are unconcerned about whether those factors
significantly confounded our results.
As the interviews progressed, we adjusted the data collection instruments by adding
questions to the semi-structured interview protocol and questionnaire (Eisenhardt,
1989b). Our interviews provided much evidence that advances our understanding of
R. Fang et al.
how political skill influences the construction and use of social networks. Our study
includes: (1) semi-structured interviews with entrepreneurs, (2) questionnaires completed
by entrepreneurs, and (3) secondary sources and other data.
Semi-structured interviews. Our semi-structured interviews began by asking the interviewees
to summarize their businesses, to provide details regarding firm sizes, composition and
extent of their social networks (i.e., personal contacts), relationships with key contacts,
specific contexts of establishing relationships with contacts and purposes for using them,
and the speed and cost of identifying and using the right contacts to meet their needs and
objectives. If applicable, the interviewees described their financial objectives and business
performance in terms of growth. Each interview lasted approximately two hours.
Two researchers met with the interviewees: one researcher asked questions and one
took notes. Immediately after the interview, the researchers shared facts and impressions
with each other and exchanged thoughts and ideas. They followed several previously
suggested rules (Eisenhardt, 1989a, 1989b). First, detailed interview notes and impressions were completed within one to two days of the interview. Second, all data were
included, regardless of their apparent importance at the time of the interview. All
interviews were recorded and transcribed for detailed records. A third rule was to
conclude the interview notes with ongoing impressions of each entrepreneur.
Questionnaires. At the end of each interview, entrepreneurs completed questionnaires
rating their political skill, describing their direct ties with social contacts, and providing
relevant backgrounds of the contacts in their personal networks.
To measure political skill, we used the 18-item political skill scale (Ferris et al., 2005),
with response options ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree). Specifically, political skill is categorized as: (1) social astuteness the ability to understand social
interactions well and identify with others; (2) networking ability the ability to identify and
develop diverse contacts and networks; (3) interpersonal influence the ability to powerfully
influence others; and (4) apparent sincerity the ability to appear to others as having high
integrity and as being authentic, sincere, and genuine (Ferris et al., 2005). The first two
dimensions social astuteness and networking ability reflect interpersonal skills particularly related to social networking ability in terms of how to read nuances in social
interactions and how to develop networks of contacts. The other two dimensions
interpersonal influence and apparent sincerity reflect the ability to obtain trust and
credibility and to influence others to achieve desirable objectives. These four dimensions
of political skill enable entrepreneurs to strategically adjust their behaviour to different
and changing situational demands, to develop resource-rich networks, to occupy advantageous network positions with access to widely ranging network resources, and to more
fully mobilize available resources to achieve desired entrepreneurial performance.
An entrepreneurs personal social network includes direct ties with various social
contacts the entrepreneur knows and contacts when needed. Social capital literature has
examined social networks for their various structural characteristics capturing the
amount of social capital individually accessible; for example, dyadic structures (e.g.,
Granovetter, 1973; Krackhardt, 1992; Lin, 1999), triadic structures (e.g., Simmel, 1955),
network closure or cohesion (e.g., Coleman, 1988; Friedkin, 2004), and structural holes
(e.g., Burt, 1992). For our initial inquiry about political skill in network building and use,
we focus on dyadic ties or connections with contacts in the entrepreneurs social networks. As the most rudimentary yet important aspect of social networks, dyadic structure
is the focus in much social capital literature (e.g., Lin, 1999) and enriches our understanding of the antecedents and consequences of social relations. We specifically focus on
number, extent, and strength of social ties.
We measured number of social ties by asking entrepreneurs to indicate the number of
direct contacts in their social networks. We measured the extent of social ties by asking
them to indicate the diversity of their contacts backgrounds, including occupation, job
rank, education, expertise, and professional experience. The social capital literature has
widely studied tie strength: a combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy, and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie (Granovetter,
1973, p. 1361). Researchers have measured tie strength using various indicators, including intimacy (Bian, 1997; Granovetter, 1973), interaction frequency (Granovetter, 1973),
reciprocation of nomination (Friedkin, 2004), and role relations (relatives, friends, and
acquaintances) (Lin et al., 1981). Among the indicators, intimacy is a key measure
capturing tie strength (Marsden and Campbell, 1984). Thus, we particularly focused on
the intimacy measure to capture tie strength between entrepreneurs and their contacts.
The data were highly sensitive, so we measured average tie strength by asking the
interviewees to indicate the average emotional intimacy or closeness with their contacts
(Bian, 1997). We also asked each to indicate the average duration of relationships (in years
and months) and the specific types of the relationships (e.g., acquaintances, friends,
relatives, and/or family members), all indicators often used for measuring tie strength.
Secondary sources and other data. In addition to the interviews and questions, we collected
secondary data about entrepreneurs backgrounds and businesses through the internet
(e.g., company websites, LinkedIn), news reports, and on-site observations to validate the
self-reported data. For example, we confirmed whether their self-reported numbers of
contacts were generally consistent with the numbers indicated in their LinkedIn profiles.
We found that some entrepreneurs who reported high levels of political skill received
high recommendations from many friends. We often arranged to interview entrepreneurs at their business sites to carefully observe their interactions.
Table II shows descriptive statistics of the self-reported political skills, including
network ability, apparent sincerity, social astuteness, and interpersonal influence. We
Table II. Statistics of political skill dimensions (N = 28)
Political skill
Dimensions of political skill
1. Networking ability
2. Apparent sincerity
3. Social astuteness
4. Interpersonal influence
Mean
SD
Minimum
Maximum
4.21
0.55
2.33
3.97
4.83
4.03
4.33
0.68
0.38
0.72
0.74
2.67
3.33
1.8
1.5
5
5
5
5
10
R. Fang et al.
then compared the statistics in our sample with those obtained in prior studies (e.g.,
Ferris et al., 2005). The comparison shows that the self-ratings of political skill in our
sample are only slightly higher than those obtained using large samples. Given our small
sample, we consider the scores to be relatively consistent with prior studies. In addition,
our respondents political skills have a relatively wide range, suggesting considerable
personal differences. Therefore, selection bias poses no serious concern. We are confident that our sample is relatively representative, mitigating the potential concern that the
interviewees who agreed to participate in our research are politically skilled and sociable.
Although we cannot completely rule out the social desirability possibility that our
interviewees self-inflated their political skill, we believe that social desirability did not
distort our results given that several entrepreneurs in our sample reported very low
political skill scores. Indeed, across multiple studies and different samples, political skill
researchers have found that self-ratings of political skill are significantly correlated with
supervisor and peer ratings (Blickle et al., 2011).
Among the four dimensions of self-reported political skill, most interviewees perceived
themselves as highly sincere, and thus apparent sincerity has the smallest variation
(SD = 0.33). Social astuteness, networking ability, and interpersonal influence show
relatively wide variations and mostly explain differences in overall political skill scores.
Therefore, we use a novel approach to visualize the political skill scores along these three
most varied dimensions (Figure 1). This visual map allows us to effectively compare cases
and contrast patterns of network construction and usage of entrepreneurs with different
levels of political skill.
Data Analysis
Consistent with the research design of theory building and many prior studies (e.g.,
Elfring and Hulsink, 2007; Human and Provan, 2000; Jack, 2005), our study was largely
qualitative, being based on data from in-depth interviews. For additional insights, we
supplemented the qualitative findings with quantitative data from the questionnaire
responses. We analysed our data following Eisenhardt (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Eisenhardt
and Graebner, 2007). Specifically, the quantitative data, including scores of political skill,
number of social ties, and average tie strength, were calculated and analysed for patterns.
The qualitative responses were summarized around the key constructs of political skill,
social capital (or social networks), and entrepreneurial performance. Once preliminary
analyses were developed from both quantitative and qualitative data, we derived propositions using methods of theory building from case studies.
In our analysis, we first divided the entrepreneurs into two groups based on their
self-reported scores of political skill entrepreneurs with relatively high political skill
versus entrepreneurs with relatively low political skill. We based the splitting on the
median score of political skill because it has a highly skewed distribution. We then coded
the interview transcripts by extracting and summarizing verbal descriptions relevant
to the process of network building and network use. Under each process, we further
coded the verbal descriptions into social astuteness, networking ability, interpersonal
influence, and apparent sincerity, based on words that reflected each dimension. The
verbal accounts vividly described the entrepreneurs psychological characteristics or
11
Figure 1. Scatterplot of political skill of the interviewed entrepreneurs (the original figure uses greengrey
red colours to represent different levels of political skill associated with entrepreneurs. For readers interested
in the colour figures, please see http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/joms.12107/abstract for the
original figures)
Note: This scatterplot visualizes the self-reported political skill of the interviewed entrepreneurs along the
three dimensions (social astuteness, network ability, and interpersonal influence) with wide variation. Each
node represents an interviewed entrepreneur. X-axis gives social astuteness scores. Y-axis gives networking ability
scores. Colour of the node represents interpersonal influence scores: greengreylight red show a lower interpersonal influence; the light reddeep red show a higher interpersonal influence. Thus, the light blue shaded
area presents the low-political-skill region, where entrepreneurs (E2, S1, D1, D2, M1, M2, C2, E1, R3, M3,
M5, and G1) have relatively low political skill, especially in the two dimensions of social astuteness and
networking ability. The light yellow shaded area presents the high-political-skill region, where entrepreneurs
(A2, J1, D3, D4, P1, P2, R2, C1, R1, and M6) have relatively high political skill, especially in the two
dimensions of social astuteness and networking ability.
12
R. Fang et al.
behavioural tendencies (e.g., sensitivity to subtleties in interaction and ability to read

nuances or to develop large networks) and also provided detailed contexts of processes by
which the entrepreneurs leveraged their political skill consciously or unconsciously. For
example, A1 said: I would say 3040 per cent of my time . . . sort of target for investment
in building the networks, expanding or feeding the existing network, to make sure the
relationships are healthy and growing. The quote vividly conveyed A1s networking
ability and also explicitly suggested the context where he used his networking ability to
strategically develop his personal network. In this case, we coded the descriptions into the
networking ability dimension of political skill under the process of network building.
In another example, J1 said: I pick the contact in my network who I think most
appropriate for the job given the situation. The quote clearly described the context of
effectively using her network to get the work done. In addition, she conveyed her social
astuteness in sensitivity to the subtle context of when, where, and whom to summon for
the task. In this case, we coded the descriptions into the social astuteness dimension of
political skill under the process of network use. Overall, such coding allowed us to
identify associations between political skill and social capital and to observe distinct,
contrasting patterns in network construction and use between entrepreneurs with relatively high political skill and those with relatively low political skill. The patterns somewhat suggest that political skill contributes to access and mobilization of social capital.
Per Eisenhardt (1989a, 1989b), we conducted detailed within-case and cross-case
analyses between pairs of entrepreneurs to recognize distinct patterns from the data. As
described above, we treated the cases as experiments, with each case serving to confirm
or disconfirm the inferences drawn from the others (Yin, 1994). For cross-case analyses,
we selected pairs of entrepreneurs and listed similarities and dissimilarities between each.
We then categorized entrepreneurs according to the variables of interest, such as industry characteristics (e.g., high uncertainty versus low uncertainty) and venture performance (e.g., high versus low). The analyses allowed us to control for certain confounding
factors in identifying the patterns and to derive tentative propositions. Then we revisited
each case to see whether the data confirmed the propositions. If they did, we used the
cases to improve our understanding of the underlying dynamics. After several rounds of
iteration between the data and the propositions, we used the literature to sharpen insights
yielded by the iterative process. Propositions linking political skill, social capital, and
venture performance emerged in an integrative process model.
AN INTEGRATIVE MODEL OF POLITICAL SKILL AND

SOCIAL CAPITAL
Access to Social Capital
The three characteristics of social ties that an entrepreneur develops and maintains with
various contacts number, strength, and extent determine the amount of social capital
the entrepreneur can access. Specifically, the number of social ties pertains to the
number of contacts the entrepreneur knows and thinks of contacting when needed. The
strength of social ties captures whether entrepreneurs and their contacts have strong or
weak relationships. Strong ties, typically more reliable than weak ties, involve higher
13
Table III. Contacts in core network vs. extended network

Core network
Mean
SD
Extended network
Core network vs.

extended network
Mean
Mean difference
SD
Number of contacts 36.56 52.53 198.56 242.93 3.98**

Average tie strength 3.31 0.48
2.06
0.44 11.18***
Note: The mean differences are based on T-test; ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
trust, support, and emotional closeness (Granovetter, 1973; Marsden and Campbell,
1984). Thus, while weak ties are useful for transferring information that is highly scattered or unevenly distributed in the network but typically publicly available (e.g., market
prices), strong ties are useful for transferring private information, generating new ideas,
solving complex problems, or making critical decisions. Strong ties are also particularly
useful for individuals in insecure positions (Granovetter, 1973) or changing environments
(Krackhardt and Stern, 1988) where they need strong ties for protection and uncertainty
reduction. The extent of social ties reflects the diversity of contacts backgrounds, including occupation, job rank, education, expertise, and professional experience. More extensive network ties increase access to broader information about potential markets,
business locations, innovations, sources of financial capital, and potential investors
(Aldrich and Ruef, 2006; Dubini and Aldrich, 1991; Renzulli and Aldrich, 2005).
Our data suggest that entrepreneurs personal networks of social ties vary considerably
in number, strength, and extent. More important, entrepreneurs simultaneously maintain two types of social networks: core and extended networks. Core networks typically
include friends, colleagues, business partners, and sometimes family members with
similar backgrounds and interests. In core networks, entrepreneurs tend to have strong
ties, long-term, and stable relationships with social contacts they trust and rely on for
obtaining information, referral, social influence, financial capital, and social support. In
contrast, extended networks typically include weak ties with contacts who have more
diverse backgrounds and interests and more distant and fluid relationships. Contacts in
the extended network are good sources for information and referral of investors, clients,
or business opportunities.
As Table III shows, core networks have significantly fewer contacts and stronger
bonding. Figure 2 shows that core and extended networks together reflect resource-rich
networks (Uzzi, 1999). Uzzi (1999) examined arms-length versus embedded social ties
to understand how social embeddedness affects organizations acquisition and financial
capital costs in the middle-market banking industry, and found that arms-length ties are
characterized by lean and sporadic transactions and function without prolonged human
or social contact between parties . . . [who] need not enter into recurrent or continuing
relations as a result of which they would get to know each other well (Hirschman, 1982,
p. 1473). In contrast to arms-length ties, embedded ties promoted mutual benefits
through the transfer of private resources and self-enforcing governance and by
14
R. Fang et al.
Information
Channels
Contact
Information
Channels
Extended Network,
fluid type
Weak tie
Entrepreneur
Contact
Strong tie
Core Network,
stable type
Information
Channels
Information
Channels
Figure 2. Core network vs. extended network
enacting expectations of trust and reciprocal obligation that actors espouse as the right
and proper protocols for governing exchange with persons they come to know well
(Uzzi, 1999, pp. 48384). Uzzi (1999) captured the two types of ties based on the
relationship between the firm and the lending bank: (a) duration of the relationship (in
years); and (b) multiplexity of the relationship (number of business and personal bank
services the entrepreneur used). He found that arms-length and embedded ties can
complement each others advantages. Thus a mix of embedded ties and arms-length ties
provides resource-rich networks with optimal benefits, both increasing access to financial capital and reducing costs relative to networks composed predominantly of armslength or embedded ties. Uzzis definitions of arms-length and embedded ties are similar
to the weak and strong ties defined in our study. As such, our finding of a beneficial mix
of strong and weak ties with social contacts of diverse backgrounds in core and extended
networks echoes well with Uzzis (1999) finding of resource-rich networks comprising
both embedded and arms-length ties. Taken together, differences between core and
extended networks lead us to ask: As entrepreneurs strategically construct resource-rich
networks, what factors provide differential access to social capital?
Politically skilled individuals can better understand social interactions, read nuances
and hidden agendas in behaviour, and develop diverse contacts and networks (Ferris
et al., 2012; Witt and Ferris, 2003). They combine social astuteness with the capacity to
adjust their behaviour according to changing situational demands by appearing to be
sincere, inspiring support and trust, and influencing and controlling responses (Ferris
et al., 2005, 2007). Thus, political skill involves individual ability to interact with and
influence others (Ferris et al., 2005, 2007). Accordingly, we expect that entrepreneurs
with different levels of political skill will develop different patterns of social networks and
15
Table IV. Network comparison between entrepreneurs with high vs. low political skill
Core network
Number of contacts
Average tie strength
Extended network
Low political
skill
High political
skill
Low vs.
high
Low political
skill
High political
skill
Low vs.
high
19.33
3.18
52.46
3.69
2.65 (n.s.)
7.75*
133.83
2.00
235.87
2.20
1.27 (n.s.)
0.69 (n.s.)
Notes: (1) The mean difference is based on T-test: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, n.s. = non-significant. (2) Political
skill score is calculated based on a combination of its four dimensions. The classification of high and low political skill is
based on the median score, which approximates the mean score of political skill in our sample.
thus have access to different amounts of social capital. We find that political skill is
instrumental in enabling the development of resource-rich networks for gaining access to
information, money, equipment, influence, and referral. Interestingly, our
observationalso reveals that political skill is critical to core network stability and extended
network mobility and changing dynamics.
Comparing and contrasting cases allows us to recognize the patterns more easily.
Table IV summarizes the number of contacts and average tie strength across core and
extended networks for entrepreneurs with high versus low political skill. Figures 3 and 4
present examples of five highly politically skilled entrepreneurs (A2, J1, R2, C1, and D3)
and four less-politically skilled entrepreneurs (E2, S1, C2, and M2). We quoted their
vivid descriptions of how they constructed their core and extended networks. The visual
maps effectively contrast patterns of how entrepreneurs with different levels of political
skill construct their networks.
Table IV and Figure 3 show that politically skilled entrepreneurs tend to maintain
stable core networks of stronger ties than do less politically skilled entrepreneurs,
although the social ties are similar in number. For instance, five within-case analyses of
politically skilled entrepreneurs in our study (A2, J1, R2, C1, and D3) distinctly showed
that they developed a cohesive core network allowing them to rely on their contacts to
make key business decisions or important referrals, to provide financial support, and to
get tasks accomplished quickly. As C1 said, Whenever Im in need, I can rely on them.
They are willing to move around their schedules and even go out of their ways in order
to get the things done for me.
Table IV and Figure 4 further reveal that highly politically skilled entrepreneurs tend
to dynamically update the contacts in their extended network on a need basis, as
compared with less politically skilled entrepreneurs, although they do not differ in either
the number or strength of social ties in their extended network. Dynamically updating
the extended network enables the entrepreneurs to continually bring new information
and novelty into their social networks by building social ties with contacts who have more
extensive backgrounds, for example in occupation, job rank, prior education, expertise,
and professional experience. The verbal accounts we gathered revealed consistent patterns among the politically skilled entrepreneurs: they actively go to . . . events or talk
to different people to consciously expand, grow, or feed their extended network. The
Figure 3. Role of political skill in network construction (access to social capital): constructing core network (the original figure uses greengreyred colours to
represent different levels of political skill associated with entrepreneurs. For readers interested in the colour figures, please see http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/
10.1111/joms.12107/abstract for the original figures)
Note: The original words of the interviewed entrepreneurs suggest that compared to entrepreneurs with low political skill (e.g., E2, C2, M2, and S1), entrepreneurs
with high political skill (e.g., A2, J1, R2, C1, and D3) tend to maintain a stable core network, with which they tend to have stronger ties and more trustworthy
relationships with social contacts.
16
R. Fang et al.
Figure 4. Role of political skill in network construction (access to social capital): constructing extended network (the original figure uses greengreyred colours to
Note: The original words of the interviewed entrepreneurs suggest that compared to entrepreneurs with low political skill (e.g., E2, C2, M2, and S1), entrepreneurs
with high political skill (e.g., J1, A2, R2, D3) tend to maintain an extended network composed of weakly-tied contacts with a greater extensity of backgrounds and
keep updating this network.

17
18
R. Fang et al.
verbal accounts also vividly conveyed that political skill affects networking behaviour in
instrumental development of personal networks. Specifically, the narratives suggest that
networking ability allows them to proactively expand and update their networks, while
social astuteness and apparent sincerity enable them to understand various social interactions and to build effective rapport and trust with diverse contacts. In dynamically
updating their networks, politically skilled entrepreneurs tend to bring in more new and
diverse contacts who are more productive in terms of generating real business leads and
more relevant to help grow business or on a need basis. Thus, political skill allows them
to strengthen and solidify their relationships with valuable, trustworthy contacts and
avoid or reduce less-valuable contacts. This finding is consistent with the suggestion that
networking ability, a key dimension of political skill, enables people to mindfully and
proactively construct favourable social networks (Thompson, 2005). Below we illustrate
two between-case comparisons of how entrepreneurs with high versus low political skill
construct their networks.
As Table V shows (also see Figures 3 and 4), S1 and D3 work in similar industries
catering and restaurant but have contrasting levels of political skill. They construct
their networks using widely different processes. This cross-case comparison demonstrates
how political skill is conducive to social capital access through networks. Specifically, S1,
who reported relatively low political skill (in particular, very low networking ability),
owns a small catering and personalized consulting business. She reported difficulty
developing a resource-rich network, although she knew the importance of social networks and tried to develop her network for business growth. She developed both her core
and extended networks solely on a dense, closed family network that barely grew over the
years and remained relatively stagnant without breaking the closed-loop circle. Members
with similar family backgrounds could hardly bring her much new information, business
opportunities, or resources. Furthermore, she failed to bond strongly with her family
members: there is barely anyone in the family circle whom Im very close to or would
trust except my husband. In contrast, D3, who reported high political skill (in particular,
very high networking ability), owns a successful restaurant business. On one hand, she
has maintained a stable, strongly bonded core network of 1520: most are family
members who are also entrepreneurs and share the same entrepreneurial spirit. She
emphasized that these people are critical for my business development, especially when
I seek important advice, or try to secure important business deals and financial support.
She also manages a large, dynamic extended network of about 200 contacts with diverse
backgrounds, including a fast-growing number of media people (e.g., food editors and
columnists), customers (many acquaintances in the neighbourhood or friends of friends
referred through word-of-mouth), and suppliers (e.g., paper, goods, food suppliers). She
contributes freelance articles to food journals and circulates information about innovative menus or food items to her media friends. Her extended network has been growing
over the years and continues to expand. Comparing S1 and D3 shows that: (1) although
their core networks include similar family member contacts, D3 has stronger bonding
with her core network members; and (2) although their extended networks are similar in
size, D3s extended network comprises non-family-member contacts with diverse backgrounds and dynamically changing contacts, while S1s extended network is mostly
restricted to family members and unchanging over time.
19
Table V. Cross-case comparison between entrepreneurs S1 and D3
Industry
Political skill
Core network
Number of ties
Strength of ties
S1 (entrepreneur with low

political skill)
D3 (entrepreneur with high

political skill)
Catering and
personalized consulting
(information is publicly
available, with
relatively low
uncertainty)
Overall: 3.78
Social astuteness: 3.80
Networking ability: 2.67
Interpersonal influence:
4.50
Apparent sincerity: 5.00
7
Not-so-close: There was
barely anyone in the
family circle who was
very close or trustable.
Restaurant (information is publicly

available, with relatively low
uncertainty)
Overall: 4.72
Interpersonal influence: 4.75
1520
Very close: I have extremely strong
bonding with 1520 people. Most of
these people are family members
who are also entrepreneurs and
share the same entrepreneurial spirit
. . . These people are critical for my
business development, especially
when I seek important advice, or try
to secure important business deals
and financial support.
Extensity of ties Solely family members,
Mostly family members, entrepreneurs
people of various trades
of various trades, journal editors
Extended network Number of ties Barely grew over years:
Continuously growing: About 200
About 200
Strength of ties Not-so-close
Not-so-close
Extensity of ties Barely change over years:
Dynamically updating: media people (e.g.,
Solely family members,
food editors and columnists),
people of various trades
customers (many of whom are
acquaintances in the neighbourhood
or friends friends friends referred
through word-of-mouth), suppliers
(e.g., paper, goods, food)
Comparing M2 and A2 (Table VI) confirms that high political skill facilitates access to
social capital. Specifically, M2 works in the online gaming industry, and A2 works
in the executive recruiting industry. Their industries share a common characteristic:
information is highly scattered, implicit, and highly uncertain. However, M2 and A2
possess different levels of political skill and have developed different patterns of social
networks providing access to different amounts of social capital. Specifically, M2
reported an overall low score of 3.61 for political skill and particularly low scores in social
astuteness and networking ability. Most of his customers are video game publishers and
Extended network0
Core network
Political skill
Industry
Number of ties
Extensity of ties
Number of ties
Strength of ties
About 5060: I think the key word in here was large, I

think Ive developed a network, but a large network, I
dont considerate it that large . . . Larger is better, the
more people you know . . . Yeah, and thats really not
me.
Online gaming (information in the market is very

scattered, implicit, and highly uncertain)
Overall: 3.61
12
Between Not-so-close and Close: Theres probably about a
dozen people locally that Im fairly close with and help
out in matters of advertisement or looking for new
business, helping new business.
Those people in the inner circle are kind of in the middle
to not close to me . . . I know them for 13 years.
These are not personal friends, they are not friends of
the family, the majority of them are just kind of business
acquaintances, business associates. You know, one or
two I am close with.
Mostly local people
M2 (entrepreneur with low political skill)
Table VI. Cross-case comparison between entrepreneurs M2 and A2
Continued
Diversified backgrounds: And though I have built networks of relationships within those
dozens of areas of interests, and I usually am the one common denominator that
ties together parts of the world that would not otherwise speak to each other.
About 600700
Executive recruiting (information in the market is very scattered, implicit, and highly
uncertain)
Overall: 5.00
100
Close: there are probably 100 of them [my contacts] that I could call up in the middle
of the night and say come meet me right now, Ive got a problem . . . Im
extraordinarily blessed in that regard.
A2 (entrepreneur with high political skill)
20
R. Fang et al.
A2 (entrepreneur with high political skill)

Not-so-close: I think I have something like 750 primary contacts . . . And I have chosen
not to grow it, I know some people that have 10,000 contacts in Linked-In, and I
think thats crazy. Those are not contacts, those are just names, and it speaks to my
building relationships rather than contacts with people. So Linked-In is a very
efficient tool for growing the network and keeping it alive, and, Ive recently created
a personal page on Facebook as well as MySpace . . . I think the biggest difference
is if I have [between the 600 peripheral type of relationships and the 100 close
ones], well, Ill give you a very good example, one of my sons is facing serious
medical situation right now, he has a brain tumor.. Those 100 people I have no
problem letting them know that and asking for their thoughts and prayers, and
support. The 600 I wouldnt, but, for example, I might send them an e-mail and
say here listen, heres the very particular kind of search that Im doing right now, if
you know of anybody that has these skills Id love you to make me aware of
anybody in your network, that you think would be interested in making me learn
more. Its the difference between crossing the boundary between professional and
personal with the 100 versus keeping it a little bit more professional with the 600
. . . [In terms of the 600 people, I dont contact them very frequently or regularly
. . .] Its opportunistic, as the need arises.. However, theres a whole list of people,
several hundred people, lets see how many are there, maybe 400500 people, that
every time I publish a new blog posting which is once or twice a week, I send them
an e-mail alert, so they can be aware and they can choose to read it if they want
. . . That is a systematic, strategic proactive step that I take in feeding my network
and letting them hear from me . . . I sometimes will organize events. I will organize
theater parties, I will organize trips to concerts, I will organize large scale visits to
see the red Sox play, and send invitations to dozens of people within the network
and give them an opportunity to be part of that.
Dynamically updating: I really dont differentiate between my working hours and my
personal leisure hours. Because in my world, traditional boundaries of categories of
relationships, really dont exist. Theyre semi-permeable membranes because
candidates turn into clients, and clients turn into candidates, and friends turn into
business associates, and business associates turn into friends . . . So Im talking
about my whole life basically, I would say 3040% of my time . . . Sort of target for
investment in building the networks . . . Expanding or feeding the existing network,
to make sure the relationships are healthy and growing . . .
M2 (entrepreneur with low political skill)
No-so-close: Outside of that core network, here locally,

theres several dozen people, probably close to 5060
that I know who I can contact on a more specific basis,
if Im looking for a job referral or a way, a client, or
very specific information . . . those people . . . , they
dont know personal stuff about me, I dont know
personal stuff about them, but we have some kind of
working relationship, and weve met once or twice, and
I can pick up the phone and call them if I had a specific
question or I needed help with something.
Mostly local people
Strength of ties
Extensity of ties
Table VI. Continued

21
22
R. Fang et al.
developers obtained mainly through referrals. Although he realizes the importance of

social networks, he develops and maintains a relatively small network. He said: I think
Ive developed a network, but . . . I dont considerate it that large . . . Larger is better; the
more people you know . . . and thats really not me, I know a lot of people; they spend
a lot of time; they have a huge network of people. In sharp contrast, A2 reported an
overall high political skill score of 5.00. He said: I communicate reasonably well, and Im
very comfortable talking with people about very important and sometimes potentially
controversial or personal issues and without being nervous about it, or without being
uncomfortable. Therefore, Im able to make them feel very comfortable, and the most
common thing I hear from people after they meet me for the very first time and spend
an hour or two with me, the most common comment . . . is Ive just told you things that
Ive never told anybody else and you make me feel so comfortable. Furthermore, A2
skilfully reads nuances and senses others motivations: It is through conversation and
through asking diagnostic questions that draw stories out of them. Im a strong believer
in the power of narrative, and so I create an environment in which I give them
permission to tell me stories, face-to-face, over the phone, or in written form, and out of
the stories comes the fabric of those intangibles, their value systems, how they feel about
work, family life, balance, how they feel about accumulation of wealth and work ethic,
and making ethical decisions; all of those things come out of the context of the stories.
A2s political skill has enabled him to develop a large network of 600700 people with
diverse backgrounds and interests and to dynamically update his extended network. He
said: . . . basically, I would say 3040 per cent of my time . . . sort of target for investment
in building the networks . . . expanding or feeding the existing network, to make sure the
relationships are healthy and growing.
Our semi-structured interviews with J1 show the important role of political skill in
influencing access to social capital (Figures 3 and 4). J1 reported the second highest
overall political skill score in our sample. Her philosophy of developing personal contact
networks highlights the four key dimensions of political skill social astuteness, apparent
sincerity, networking ability, and interpersonal influence. Specifically, she owns a consulting firm that helps clients obtain financial loans. When asked how she developed her
personal network, she described: (1) approaching people on a conversational basis, but
not for the purposes of making a sale or conducting a business transaction (i.e., social
astuteness); (2) presenting as an interesting and genuine person (i.e., apparent sincerity);
(3) being able to bring benefits and value to others (i.e., networking ability); and (4) on
the basis of cultivating relationships of mutual interests and trust, influence can be
achieved through maintaining strong ties (i.e., interpersonal influence). She said that her
political skill facilitated her process of developing and managing her networks dynamically on an as needed basis. For instance, she uses her clients networks to help her get
new clients: I initially started my network from a group of 2 to 3 people, relying on
purely professional relationships, and then cultivated these professional relationships into
close friendships by getting to know my contacts families and by attending social events
with them. On the basis of reciprocity and mutual benefits, I then grew my network
through referrals from the initial 2 to 3 people. Sometimes, one referral source may bring
three contacts into my network. J1 currently maintains an extended network of more
than 200 people, with some moving in and out from time to time, based on her personal
23
needs. Her core network consists of roughly 10 to 15 people, some of whom she considers
very close. Her extended network consists of people with a wide range of professional
backgrounds, including federal government officers, bank loan officers, other business
consultants, and small business owners. Overall, J1 shares more social and intellectual
interests with contacts in her core network than with those in her extended network.
Taken together, we observed that political skill influences how entrepreneurs develop
different patterns of social networks that provide access to different amounts of social
capital. We also found that politically skilled entrepreneurs are better able to manage the
stability of their core network and the mobility and diversity of their extended network.
Therefore, we propose:
Proposition 1: Politically skilled entrepreneurs will develop a more stable core network
and a more dynamic extended network than will politically unskilled entrepreneurs.
Proposition 2: Politically skilled entrepreneurs will have more extensive social ties in
their extended network than will politically unskilled entrepreneurs.
Mobilization of Social Capital
Access to social capital creates the necessary condition for mobilizing social capital. The
amount of accessible social capital mobilized then influences the instrumental outcomes
(Lin, 1999). Entrepreneurship researchers have found that the structural characteristics of
social networks greatly affect entrepreneurial performance. In terms of the number and
strength of social ties, for instance, entrepreneurs who possess social capital characterized
by many social contacts, strong personal ties, and direct ties with referrals to investors are
more likely to receive funds from venture capitalists (Shane and Cable, 2002). Strong ties
reinforced by mutual feelings of attachment, reciprocity, and trust (Uzzi, 1999) are critical
to counter uncertainty concerns of potential partners who are often reluctant to risk their
reputation, capital, or other resources on uncertain ventures (Lee et al., 2001). Strong
social ties could significantly affect venture investment decisions, and thus affect the
likelihood and cost of acquiring financial capital (Batjargal and Liu, 2004). In terms of the
extent of social ties, for instance, before launching new ventures, entrepreneurs can often
identify or obtain valuable information from diverse and extensive contacts in their
informal social networks within their industry, such as current or past customers, suppliers,
and financial institution employees (Ozgen and Baron, 2007). New ventures associated
with high-status contacts were shown to undertake IPOs faster and earn greater valuations
at IPO than ventures lacking such connections (Stuart et al., 1999). However, those
authors implicitly assumed that all entrepreneurs have the same ability to utilize all
available network resources. Instead, our field observations indicate that political skill is a
widely varying individual difference that may determine the ability to mobilize accessible
social capital for achieving desirable venture performance.
Specifically, we observed that politically skilled entrepreneurs mobilize their social
capital better than politically unskilled entrepreneurs. Politically skilled entrepreneurs
are more likely to use their networking ability to connect with diverse contacts for
utilizing information and other resources. They are particularly more attentive to others
24
R. Fang et al.
needs and are more aware of opportunities when they arise. They are also better at
presenting themselves as honest, sincere, open-minded, caring, and helpful. Thus they
can foster a norm of reciprocity and openness in their networks, which, in turn, guides
the behaviour of other network members. Furthermore, they are often highly skilful at
negotiating, deal-making, and conflict management (Ferris et al., 2007), and thus are
more likely to influence others, especially key contacts who are instrumental to their
venture performance.
Our interviewees developed and maintained many contacts in their core and extended
networks. Table III shows that they maintained an average of 37 close contacts in their
core networks and 199 more distant contacts in their extended networks. With so many
contacts but with constrained time and energy to invest in social relationships, entrepreneurs are unlikely to contact them all frequently. Furthermore, even if they are aware of
all their contacts, individual entrepreneurs may still differ in their ability to influence
them all. When entrepreneurs have many contacts in their social networks, how can they
identify the key contacts for gathering the right expertise and resources?
Figures 5 and 6 present quotations from the entrepreneurs we interviewed. Interviewees had varied political skills and they used their social networks differently, particularly in mobilizing key social ties. Politically unskilled entrepreneurs tend to consider
their social networks to be less efficient for supplying needed resources (e.g., C2 in
Figure 5) or less crucial for their business needs (e.g., E2 in Figure 6). They are less aware
of key social ties that they could trust (e.g., E2 in Figure 5 and S1 in Figure 6). In contrast,
politically skilled entrepreneurs are more aware of the expertise, backgrounds, and
interests of various contacts. They are better at identifying key, maximally beneficial
contacts, and more skilful at influencing key contacts to obtain crucial resources such as
business information and financial capital. They utilize different dimensions of political
skill in building and using their networks, identifying more relevant key contacts through
their social astuteness, and building strong bonding and trust through their apparent
sincerity. Their interpersonal influence allows them to influence close contacts who are
well-placed as bridges connecting entrepreneurs with potential key clients or investors the
entrepreneurs could not have reached alone. Each case confirms the patterns identified
from the previous case, but each case adds some uniqueness to the pattern.
Next we conducted two within-case analyses ( J1 and P1, Figure 5). Recall that J1 owns
a consulting firm for clients that have annual sales ranging from $500,000 to $15 million.
J1 described herself as highly capable of picking the right (key) contact in both core and
extended networks that are most appropriate for the job given the situation. She said: I
like to go to different events and talk to people of different trades and small business owners
like dry clean owners. I pay attention to what they do, what they need, and what their
interests are . . . Im highly capable of picking the right contact who is most appropriate for
the job given the situation. Her quote demonstrates a high level of social astuteness that
helps her achieve her goals through identifying and using important social relations.
Similar to J1, P1 is also politically skilled, with a self-reported political skill score higher
than those of most other entrepreneurs we interviewed. P1 owns a successful high-end
restaurant chain. With more than 2000 people in his network, he considered his networking ability to be one of his personal strengths. He said: The people who work with me
laugh at me, because if I talk to somebody once, I will create an outlook entry for that
Figure 5. Role of political skill in network use (mobilization of social capital): using key social ties (the original figure uses greengreyred colours to represent
different levels of political skill associated with entrepreneurs. For readers interested in the colour figures, please see http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/
joms.12107/abstract for the original figures)
Note: The original words of the interviewed entrepreneurs suggest that compared to entrepreneurs with low political skill (e.g., E2, C2, and S1), entrepreneurs with
high political skill (e.g., J1, P1, and P2) tend to be more aware of peoples needs, interests, expertise, and value and be more skilful at identifying the key contacts
important for their business needs and mobilizing the right person at the right time for reaching their targeted objective.

25
Figure 6. Role of political skill in network use (mobilization of social capital): using strong ties as network bridges (the original figure uses greengreyred colours to
Note: The original words of the interviewed entrepreneurs suggest that compared to entrepreneurs with low political skill (e.g., E2 and S1), entrepreneurs with high
political skill (e.g., R2, P1, C1, and d3) tend to be better at using strong ties as network bridges to achieve the desired business objectives.
26
R. Fang et al.
27
person and I will capture whatever information I can about that person . . . I particularly
pay attention to building up my database, and my contacts . . . I think its just through
sincere interactions with people, as it happens naturally. . . And Im not afraid to ask for help
and Im also very willing to offer help . . . Its [the relationship is] just there, and I know its there, and if
I need it Im not afraid to use it, but I dont necessarily go through the effort of activating it,
cultivating it, keeping it alive or active, keeping it fresh, exactly . . . I do remember (the name
or face of the contact even when I havent talked to that person for months or years). I can remember the context
within which I met people, things. Again, I talked about the sincerity of the relationship with
people. Like for example, its very important to me that I do my best to pronounce peoples
names the right way and to spell them the right way. If Im going to a party or an event
ahead of time I very much like to get the attendee list ahead of time so that I can review it
ahead of time, so that because I know that when I meet someone for the first time I have
a hard time remembering names, but I know if I see the name ahead of time then when I
meet that person I have a much better chance of actually remembering it. So thats something
I would do to try to help my memory and help myself to connect with people, you know, in that regard. The
interview with P1 vividly demonstrated his three dimensions of political skill. Showing
strong networking ability, he works to remember names and the contexts of meetings so
that he can connect well with the right people and influence them when needed. Showing
high social astuteness, he remembers names and associates people with the context; he is
highly aware of who knows what and when to use them even though he has thousands of
active and inactive contacts. Demonstrating apparent sincerity in interactions and a
willingness to help others, he has many contacts who are willing to help him. Therefore,
his high political skill allows him to identify the key contacts important for his business
needs and to mobilize the right person at the right time for reaching his objective. P1s case
confirms the observations made from J1s case: political skill affects how entrepreneurs
mobilize the contacts in their social networks to meet their needs. We thus propose the
following:
Proposition 3: Given the same level of accessible social capital, politically skilled entrepreneurs will be better at using key social ties to achieve desirable venture performance
than will politically unskilled entrepreneurs.
Importantly, we find that politically skilled entrepreneurs are better at mobilizing strong
ties in their core network to reach key clients or investors outside their personal social
networks. In other words, politically skilled entrepreneurs are better at using strong ties
in their core network as network bridges to reach key people who are otherwise not easily
reachable. Strong bridging ties create network bridges linking entrepreneurs to otherwise
unconnected individuals outside the entrepreneurs immediate personal networks. The
network bridge is a network link providing the only path between two persons (Harary
et al., 1965). A network bridge between two persons A and B provides the only route
along which information or influence can flow from any contact of A to any contact of
B, and consequently, from anyone indirectly connected to A to anyone indirectly connected to B (Granovetter, 1973, p. 1364). A bridge is significant: (a) as a direct tie
between A and B, who are presumably members of different groups; and more broadly
(b) as a network link that joins otherwise unconnected individuals by bridging between A
28
R. Fang et al.
and B (Granovetter, 1973). Both information and influence resources can flow through
network bridges. Furthermore, bridging ties can be strong or weak, differing in the time
spent in interaction, emotional intensity, intimacy, or reciprocity (Granovetter, 1973;
Marsden and Campbell, 1984).
Network scholars argue that strong ties can serve as network bridges linking otherwise
unconnected individuals. For example, Kalish and Robins (2006) examined the ego
network structures of 125 university students and found very few weak structural holes in
ego networks; almost 28 per cent of the triads (on average) were forbidden triads or
strong structural holes. The substantial amount of strong structural holes suggests that
strong ties may serve as network bridges. Kalish (2008) found two psychological network
orientations entrepreneurial orientation and relationship-building orientation associated with individuals who span structural holes and form strong ties linking densely
connected cliques. The findings possibly explain why strong ties can serve as bridges. Tie
strength, weak or strong, is not a precondition for a tie to function as a bridge: a
disconnection between individuals having non-redundant resources or holding different
network positions is, however, critical (Burt, 1992). Bian (1997) further detailed strong ties
as network bridges. In the corporate world, disconnections may be deliberate because
they give strategic players information and control in competing for economic rewards. In
the social world, disconnections are largely non-deliberate, social-cultural processes,
constrained by egos and alters social class and residential location (Bott, 1957).
Several studies have shown that strong ties are better bridges than weak ties when
influence and other social resources (e.g., trust and loyalty) must be transferred through
network bridges. Indirectly connected third parties positively affect trust within strong
ties but negatively affect trust within weak ties (Burt and Knez, 1995). In the Chinese
labour market, where recruitment is informal and job information is not readily available, interpersonal connections are essential; thus strong rather than weak ties with
intermediaries provide the network bridges job-seekers need (Bian, 1997). Entrepreneurs
striving to acquire financial capital benefit if they have embedded, strong ties with bank
managers who are then motivated to persuade relevant decision-makers that the entrepreneur is creditworthy (Uzzi, 1999). Overall, the empirical evidence on strong ties as
bridges indicates that trust and reciprocity between individuals can be rolled over to a
new third party, thereby establishing trust and reciprocal obligations between two
parties that lacked a prior history of exchange (Uzzi, 1999, p. 490).
Consistent with those prior arguments and findings of strong ties as network bridges,
evidence from our field interviews reveals that for politically skilled entrepreneurs, crucial
business deals with major clients or major investments are channelled more through
strong ties than through weak ties. In other words, weak ties are used mostly for
transferring publicly available information that otherwise is scattered in the market and
sometimes they are used for obtaining referrals. Instead, entrepreneurs must rely on
strong ties to obtain influence and referrals, which are often more costly and difficult to
obtain. For example, the case of P1 illustrates how politically skilled entrepreneurs use
strong ties as network bridges to obtain financial capital needed for venture development.
At the initial fundraising stage of P1s restaurant business, one of his close uncles
introduced him to ten friends, former executives from the company where his uncle once
worked as an executive. The ten friends became angel investors, each investing $5000 to
29
$10,000 in P1s new restaurant. P1 separately raised more money through close friends.
One woman, a close friend, introduced P1 to her close friend who then invested $50,000.
Another close friend since college introduced P1 to his boss, the CEO of a biotech
company, who also invested $50,000. P1 said, so it was, usually somebody close introducing me to somebody who wasnt close and that was the person who made the
investment. In P1s example, financial capital from key investors was channelled more
through contacts with strong ties who served as bridges connecting the entrepreneur and
the key investors who were otherwise unconnected.
P1 was not the only entrepreneur who described using strong ties to reach key
investors with whom he was not directly connected. Our coding showed that other
entrepreneurs with relatively high levels of political skill gave similar reports (e.g., D3,
C1, R2 in Figure 6). In contrast, the entrepreneurs with relatively low political skill (e.g.,
E2, S1, M2, C2 in Figure 6) failed to use strong ties to reach unconnected key investors
or clients. The observations suggest that politically skilled entrepreneurs show a consistent pattern of network mobilization in which they use strong ties as network bridges. We
reason that political skill influences the mobilization of social capital through strong ties
possibly through several mechanisms. First, as mentioned, politically skilled entrepreneurs tend to develop and maintain a stable core network by developing strong bonding
with key contacts for long durations. Second, politically skilled entrepreneurs tend to be
more competent in the four dimensions of political skill, particularly in social astuteness
and networking ability. They are better at using social ties for achieving desirable
outcomes. For important business tasks and decisions, strong ties are better than weak
ties for exerting influence. Thus, politically skilled entrepreneurs are more likely to use
strong ties to reach and influence key people who may be outside their personal networks
but are important for achieving business objectives. Thus we propose that politically
skilled entrepreneurs are better at using strong ties as network bridges to obtain influence
and referrals for reaching clients or investors. Figure 7 depicts the process.
P1s example suggests the instrumental role of political skill in entrepreneurs use of
strong ties as network bridges, and also suggests the important role of political skill in
strategic or mindful construction of favourable social networks. That is, politically skilled
entrepreneurs are better at managing their networks and positioning themselves favourably for achieving their desirable venture performance. We thus propose:
Proposition 4: Given the same level of accessible social capital, politically skilled entrepreneurs will better use strong ties as network bridges to achieve desirable venture
performance than will politically unskilled entrepreneurs.
An Integrative Model
Figure 8 shows our integrative model summarizing our findings. We suggest two propositions describing the role of political skill in influencing entrepreneurial processes within
social networks. On one hand, political skill affects whether entrepreneurs construct
resource-rich networks that provide access to social capital. On the other hand, political
skill influences how well entrepreneurs can leverage the network resources available.
30
R. Fang et al.
Information
Channels
Information
Channels
Extended Network,
fluid type
Entrepreneur
Contact
Social Influence
Strong tie as a bridge
or Referral
Core Network,
stable type
Key Client
or Key investor
Information
Channels
Information
Channels
Figure 7. Strong ties as network bridges for entrepreneurs with high political skill
Note: Network resources include information, influence, referral, as well as network ties; strong ties serve as
bridge between entrepreneurs and key clients or investors.
Political Skill
- Social astuteness
- Networking ability
- Interpersonal influence
- Apparent sincerity
Propositions 1 and 2
ACCESS TO SOCIAL CAPITAL
Network Building Process
- Networking / Development of
resource-rich networks
- Opportunity recognition of
building/developing relationships
Social Capital
- Number of social ties
- Strength of social ties
- Extensity of social ties
Propositions 3 and 4
MOBILIZATION OF SOCIAL CAPITAL

Network Use Process
- Opportunity recognition of mobilizing
resources and influences from contacts
Venture
Performance
Figure 8. Integrative model of political skill and social capital in the entrepreneurial process
31
DISCUSSION
Our field interviews with entrepreneurs suggest that political skill is an important individual characteristic that influences access to and mobilization of social capital. We find
that politically skilled entrepreneurs more strategically construct resource-rich networks
and position themselves advantageously in their networks. They are also more attentive
to available network resources, more skilful at influencing key contacts, and more
effective in using strong ties as network bridges to achieve favourable outcomes.
Theoretical Implications
First, our study has important implications for entrepreneurship research, which has
often taken either sociological or behavioural perspectives. Although we are increasingly
recognizing that individual characteristics affect access and mobilization of social capital
in organizational settings, we know little about how individual differences influence
processes of building and using social networks to achieve desirable venture performance. In this study, we integrate sociological and behavioural perspectives by examining how political skill, an important individual-level factor, influences entrepreneurs
access to and mobilization of social capital for achieving desirable performance. We find
that political skill does indeed play a crucial role in the social network context. Politically
skilled entrepreneurs, compared with politically unskilled entrepreneurs, are more likely
to develop stable core networks with stronger ties and dynamically update their extended
network to extend their social ties. Furthermore, given the same level of accessible social
capital, politically skilled entrepreneurs are better at using key contacts and strong ties as
network bridges to enhance venture performance. Overall, by focusing on the entrepreneurial process in the social network context, we answer the calls for more processoriented studies to advance current understandings of entrepreneurs social network
development (Hoang and Antoncic, 2003; Jack, 2010; Stuart and Sorenson, 2007). We
also provide in-depth insight into how entrepreneurs leverage their individual political
skill to strategically develop and effectively mobilize their social networks for enhancing
venture performance. Thus, we add to emerging research that highlights the importance
of understanding how entrepreneurs create and develop their personal social networks
(e.g., Hallen and Eisenhardt, 2012; Vissa, 2012).
Furthermore, responding to calls in the entrepreneurship literature for more qualitative work to construct informative theories (Hoang and Antoncic, 2003; Jack, 2010), we
expand previous research by building theory from cases (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Eisenhardt
and Graebner, 2007). The qualitative data drawn from our field interviews goes beyond
quantitative data in providing a richer and more in-depth understanding of the composition and structure of the social networks that entrepreneurs develop and manage. For
example, previous research, although valuable, did not attempt to disentangle the different types of social networks that entrepreneurs develop. In contrast, our study reveals
that entrepreneurs simultaneously develop and manage different structural characteristics of the core and extended networks, which, in turn, give them access to various rich
resources critical for attaining their performance goals.
Our qualitative data show that politically skilled entrepreneurs tend to develop a more
stable core network of strongly tied contacts with similar backgrounds and interests, and
32
R. Fang et al.
a more dynamic extended network of weakly tied contacts with more extensive backgrounds. This finding has a particular implication for understanding homophily theory
within the entrepreneurship context. Homophily, a basic tenet of sociology, is the
tendency of people to interact with and form connections with similar others in terms of
demography (e.g., gender, ethnicity) or other attributes (e.g., personality, values)
(McPherson et al., 2001). On the one hand, homophily contributes to individual and
group performance outcomes by avoiding potential conflicts, simplifying coordination,
and facilitating transmission of resources such as information and tacit knowledge. On
the other hand, homophily may prevent individuals and groups from reaping diversity
benefits by limiting communication with dissimilar others (Borgatti and Foster, 2003).
We find that politically skilled entrepreneurs are better at managing and balancing
homophily in their different social networks they reap homophily benefits by developing strong ties with similar contacts in their core network and simultaneously overcome
the constraints of homophily by dynamically updating dissimilar contacts in their
extended network. As such, we answer calls for unveiling characteristics of entrepreneurs network partners to better understand whether homophily applies to entrepreneurs who strategically construct their social networks (Stuart and Sorenson, 2007).
Although our quantitative data reveal that the number and strength of social ties in the
extended network do not significantly differ across entrepreneurs with contrasting levels
of political skill, our semi-structured interviews reveal that politically skilled entrepreneurs dynamically update social contacts and develop more extensive social ties in their
extended network. Although diverse and extensive social networks expand access to
various resources (Dubini and Aldrich, 1991; Renzulli and Aldrich, 2005), widespread
involvement in diverse and multiple networks may simultaneously cause network overload given the costs (e.g., time, effort, and money) of various networking activities (Steier
and Greenwood, 2000; Watson, 2007). We suggest that entrepreneurs must balance the
imperatives of network diversity with the challenge of network overload. We find that
political skill enables entrepreneurs to develop and manage resource-rich networks while
avoiding network overload.
Second, this study has important implications for political skill research. Although many
previous studies have examined political skill in conventional organizational settings to
understand behaviour and job performance, little is known about how political skill may
function in influencing entrepreneurs venture performance. To our best knowledge, no
previous research has examined the role of political skill in entrepreneurial processes from
a social network perspective. Our field interviews reveal that political skill is an important
individual factor that influences how entrepreneurs build and use their social networks for
achieving desirable venture performance. Given that entrepreneurs are generally leaders
of their business ventures, this finding provides some insights into the literature on the
potential underlying relationship between political skill and leadership effectiveness.
Political skill is known to positively influence leadership effectiveness through its impact on
leadermember exchange (Brouer et al., 2013) and leader reputation (e.g., Ammeter
et al., 2002; Blass and Ferris, 2007). Our finding suggests that the patterns of network
relationships which leaders develop and construct may be another mechanism that
explains why politically skilled leaders are more effective in terms of employee reactions
and work unit performances. Future studies might consider that direction.
33
Our findings also add to the literature noting that political skill plays dual roles as
antecedent (e.g., Ferris et al., 2005) and as moderator (e.g., Perrewe et al., 2004;
Treadway et al., 2007) of individual behaviour and job performance in organizations.
For example, politically skilled managers are better at achieving desirable managerial
outcomes (Smith et al., 2009). Additionally, political skill moderates the negative relationship between perceived role conflict and strain: greater political skill neutralizes the
negative impacts of role conflict on all types of strain (Perrewe et al., 2004).
Third, our findings have important implications for social capital research. Although
entrepreneurship researchers have acknowledged that social capital has beneficial effects
on venture performance (e.g., Aldrich and Ruef, 2006; Batjargal and Liu, 2004; Hoang
and Antoncic, 2003; Jack, 2005; Shane and Cable, 2002; Uzzi, 1999), they have paid less
attention to the determinants of social capital development. In other words, they have
not fully investigated how entrepreneurs build the social networks that create the social
capital critical for venture performance. We show that political skill is an individual-level
factor that enables entrepreneurs to develop resource-rich networks for access to social
capital critical for achieving desired venture performance. This finding adds to the
literature suggesting that individual-level characteristics such as self-monitoring (e.g.,
Mehra et al., 2001) and proactive actions (e.g., Fang et al., 2011) contribute to individual
social capital development.
Practical Implications
From a practical perspective, our field study results provide useful guidelines for multiple
practitioners. For entrepreneurs seeking growth opportunities, it is beneficial to understand that political skill is important for building, maintaining, and using social networks.
Political skill influences how extensively entrepreneurs capitalize on or mobilize available
social capital embedded in their social networks. Consider three important components of
social networks: number, extent, and strength of social ties. Establishing many ties with
contacts of diverse backgrounds is useful for accessing critical information that is otherwise
difficult and costly to obtain in a timely manner. In addition, establishing a core network
that includes social contacts with strong relationships is particularly valuable in obtaining
influence and referrals to secure major business deals and key clients or investors.
Given the importance of the four dimensions of political skill networking ability,
social astuteness, apparent sincerity, and interpersonal influence in building and
mobilizing networks, entrepreneurs who seek to develop resource-rich networks may
well benefit from consciously monitoring their behaviour and carefully observing
nuances and hidden agendas when they interact with others. We suggest they: (a)
approach people with diverse backgrounds on a conversational basis, and avoid trying to
sell or conduct transactions; (b) show genuine interest in others; (c) try to bring benefits
and value to others; and (d) cultivate close relationships of mutual interests and trust to
achieve influence through strong ties. Entrepreneurs may also benefit from dynamically
updating their extended network; for example, by developing new relationships, refreshing inactive relationships, or terminating less-meaningful relationships. Dynamic updates
will bring new information and resources into the network. Note that political skill
can be trained, developed, and improved through practice (Ferris et al., 2007, 2012);
34
R. Fang et al.
entrepreneurs who seek to construct favourable social networks and effectively utilize
network resources may develop their political skill through mentoring, practicing, and
other training methods (Ferris et al., 2007, 2012). For example, mentoring can enhance
each of the four political skill dimensions. In particular, individuals who are mentored to
understand the environmental landscape (e.g., workplace and organizations) can become
better networkers (Blass et al., 2007). Training for social astuteness, apparent sincerity,
and interpersonal influence could involve aspects of active empathetic listening (Ferris
et al., 2012).
Directions for Future Research
In addition to empirically testing our integrative model (Figure 8) through a large-scale
survey investigation, future research may pursue several potentially fruitful avenues.
First, future studies may investigate various dynamics underlying the entrepreneurial
process in social network contexts. Our interviews with entrepreneurs provided many
rich verbal descriptions of the dynamics of the entrepreneurial process. Yet, our data
offer a one-time snapshot, which limits full exploration of process operations over time.
Future studies incorporating longitudinal research designs may clarify how political skill
influences network formation and characteristics in timing and evolution. For example,
such work can address how entrepreneurs develop political skill over time and the related
question of how political skill affects the evolution and development of social networks.
Future studies may also extend our focus on political skill and explore how other
individual characteristics such as cognition and personality influence strategic construction of social networks. As described previously, network scholars are increasingly considering individual characteristics when they explain network formation and
development in organizational settings (e.g., Klein et al., 2004; Mehra et al., 2001).
Second, we started our inquiry from the dyadic structure of social networks and
examined its interplay with entrepreneurs individual characteristics in affecting venture
performance. Although our study did not focus on the triadic structure of social networks, it did touch on some triadic aspects. That is, we observed that politically skilled
entrepreneurs tended to use strong ties as bridges to reach key investors or clients who
were outside their immediate personal networks. This observation goes beyond the
dyadic structure of social networks and concerns the roles of entrepreneurs close contacts in connecting entrepreneurs and key investors or clients who were otherwise
unconnected parties. This observation of triadic aspects in social networks enriches our
understanding of how entrepreneurs with different levels of political skill differentially use
their network resources of embedded social ties to achieve desirable outcomes. Future
research may further examine the triadic structure, the basic unit of network analysis for
many complex social processes (Granovetter, 1973; Kalish, 2008). Thus, future studies of
the interplay between triadic network structure of social networks and political skill will
provide in-depth insights into how entrepreneurs leverage their individual characteristics
to develop and use their social networks to affect venture performance.
Third, future studies may examine how individuals, including entrepreneurs and
leaders, leverage the four dimensions of political skill to build and use their
social networks. Politically skilled individuals can increase others trust, support, and
35
commitment in social interactions, which are important for building high-quality relationships in organizations and other social situations (Ferris et al., 2012). Politically
skilled individuals tend to occupy central positions in workplace influence networks
(Treadway et al., 2011). However, empirical evidence is still limited as to how political
skill influences the construction and development of social networks. Moreover, less is
known regarding whether and how networking ability, social astuteness, apparent sincerity, and interpersonal influence differentially affect network building and use. Social
astuteness and apparent sincerity should generate richer and more expansive social
networks (Ferris et al., 2012). Our interviews with entrepreneurs suggest that politically
skilled entrepreneurs use different dimensions of political skill in building and using their
social networks. They emphasize their social astuteness for identifying relevant and key
contacts, their apparent sincerity and networking ability for building strong ties and trust
with contacts, and their interpersonal influence for exerting influence for achieving
objectives. Therefore, future research can further explore how individuals leverage the
four dimensions in their personal network building and use as well as their occupation of
central or peripheral positions in large social networks.
CONCLUSION
In this study, we integrate the sociological and behavioural perspectives on entrepreneurship to address two fundamentally important questions: (1) Why are some entrepreneurs better than others at developing resource-rich networks that provide them access to social capital
critical for venture performance? Do individual characteristics influence network construction? (2) Given
the same level of accessible social capital, why do some entrepreneurs mobilize social capital better than
others to achieve desirable venture performance? Do individual characteristics affect the use of networks?
Our findings suggest that those questions are answered partly by the fact that entrepreneurs differ considerably in their political skill for building effective social networks
and extracting resources once they exist. Even for politically skilled individuals, however,
considerable effort is required because constructing social networks involves meeting and
interacting with many people in a wide range of contexts. Barbara Bush, former first lady
of the United States, once remarked: You dont just luck into things as much as you
would like to think you do. You build step by step, whether it is friendships or opportunities. For entrepreneurs, developing effective political skill may often be an initial and
important part of this building process.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This research was financially supported by the Entrepreneurship Grant of Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
(RPI) and partially initiated by the Vice Provost of Entrepreneurship, Robert A. Chernow, while the second
author was on faculty at RPI. We would like to thank Mr Chernow very much for his generous financial
support and enthusiastic encouragement, which made this research possible. We would also like to thank
three anonymous reviewers and the editors for their constructive comments and suggestions, which have
helped us greatly improve our paper and insights from the study.
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Journal of Management Studies : 2014

Bringing Political Skill into Social Networks: Findings

Ruolian Fang, Lei Chi, Manli Chen and Robert A. Baron

Keywords: entrepreneurship, political skill, social capital, venture performance

performance, two fundamentally important questions remain largely unanswered. The

Bringing Political Skill into Social Networks

Bringing Political Skill into Social Networks

Bringing Political Skill into Social Networks

Table I. Venture industries and venture performances of interviewed

Note: Three entrepreneurs, D4 in strategic planning consulting industry, G1 in

Bringing Political Skill into Social Networks

Bringing Political Skill into Social Networks

behavioural tendencies (e.g., sensitivity to subtleties in interaction and ability to read

AN INTEGRATIVE MODEL OF POLITICAL SKILL AND

Bringing Political Skill into Social Networks

Table III. Contacts in core network vs. extended network

Core network vs.

Number of contacts 36.56 52.53 198.56 242.93 3.98**

Figure 2. Core network vs. extended network

Bringing Political Skill into Social Networks

Bringing Political Skill into Social Networks

Bringing Political Skill into Social Networks

Table V. Cross-case comparison between entrepreneurs S1 and D3

S1 (entrepreneur with low

D3 (entrepreneur with high

Restaurant (information is publicly

About 5060: I think the key word in here was large, I

Online gaming (information in the market is very

M2 (entrepreneur with low political skill)

Table VI. Cross-case comparison between entrepreneurs M2 and A2

A2 (entrepreneur with high political skill)

A2 (entrepreneur with high political skill)

M2 (entrepreneur with low political skill)

No-so-close: Outside of that core network, here locally,

Mostly local people

Table VI. Continued

Bringing Political Skill into Social Networks

developers obtained mainly through referrals. Although he realizes the importance of

Bringing Political Skill into Social Networks

Bringing Political Skill into Social Networks

Bringing Political Skill into Social Networks

Bringing Political Skill into Social Networks

MOBILIZATION OF SOCIAL CAPITAL

Bringing Political Skill into Social Networks

Bringing Political Skill into Social Networks

Bringing Political Skill into Social Networks

Bringing Political Skill into Social Networks

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