IMS U U 4 N M C C: Nison Niversity Ational OOT Ourt Ompetition

TEAM CODE- TD-4-R
IMS UNISON UNIVERSITY 4TH NATIONAL MOOT COURT

COMPETITION
IN THE HONBLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
IN THE MATTER OF
RAMAIYA KUMAR & ORS.

(Petitioner)
v.
UNION OF INDIANA
(Respondent)
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT
IMS UNISON UNIVERSITY 4TH NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABBREVIATIONS.......ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES............................................................................ .iii-viii
STATEMENT OF FACTS...ix
STATEMENT OF ISSUES...x
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ..................................................................................... .......xi
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ...................................................................................................1
CONTENTION I SECTION 14-A OF THE PRESS COUNCIL ACT 1978 IS CONSTITUTIONAL ...1
[1.1] SEC. 14-A OF PRESS COUNCIL ACT IS A REASONABLE RESTRICTION UNDER 19(2).........1
[1.1.1] ANTICIPATORY ACTION OF PRESS COUNCIL IS REASONABLE...2
[1.1.2] RESTRICTION UNDER SEC 14-A FALLS WITHIN THE GROUNDS PROVIDED IN ART.
19(2)............................................................................................ ....................................3
[1.2] SECTION 14-A PROVIDES PROCEDURE ESTABLISHED BY LAW FOR APPLICATION OF ART
19(2):-........................................................................................... .................................4
CONTENTION II:-SECTION
124 -A OF IPC IS CONSTITUTIONAL :-.........................................5
[2.1] HONBLE SUPREME COURT ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SEDITION -.....................5

[2.2] RESTRICTION IMPOSED BY SECTION 124-A ON 19(L)(A) ARE IN INTEREST OF PUBLIC
ORDER U /ART. 19(2)................................................................................... .....................7
[2.3] NECESSITY OF THE LAW OF SEDITION U / SECTION 124-A ON PUBLIC ORDER ...............7
[2.4] VARIOUS INSTANCES WHEN LAWS HELD CONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE OF PUBLIC ORDER
U/ART. 19(2)....................................................................................... ...........................8
[2.5] THE GRAVITY OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SEDITION AS UNDER SECTION 124-A
SHOULD BE ADHERED TO WHILE DEALING WITH CAUTION .................................................8
CONTENTION III :-RAMAIYA
KUMAR IS LIABLE UNDER SECTION 124-A OF PENAL CODE.....9
[3.1] ROLE OF INTENTION IN CRIME OF SEDITION .............................................................11

CONTENTION IV :-ACT OF LATHI CHARGE BY POLICE DID NOT INFRINGED THE FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHT UNDER ARTICLE
19 (1) (B) OF TOMAR RASHID..................,...................................15
PRAYER ...........16
ABBREVIATIONS
Paragraph
A.I.R.
All India Reporter
ALL
Allahabad
ALL ER
All England Reporter
Anr.
Another
Art.
Article
Bom.
Bombay
Co.
Company
CriLJ
Criminal Law Journal
Del.
Delhi
Edn.
Edition
Etc.
Etcetera
Guj.
Gujarat
Id.
Ibid
LLJ
Labour Law Journal
Ltd.
Limited
M.P.
Madhya Pradesh
Mad.
Madras
MANU
Manupatra
Ors.
Others
Re.
Reference
S.C.
Supreme Court
S.C.C.
Supreme Court Cases
S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reporter
U.O.I.
Union Of India
U.P.
Uttar Pradesh
U.S.
United States
V.
Versus
Vol.
Volume
W.B.
West Bengal
ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
I.
CONSTITUTION /STATUTES/ RULES REFERRED

CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,1973.
INDIAN PENAL CODE,1860.
PRESS COUNCIL ACT,1978.
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
THE HIGHWAY ACT, 1959.
BOOKS, DIGESTS, COMMENTARIES
II.
A.V. DICEY, THE LAW
OF THE
CONSTITUTION (OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS,
LONDON , 1ST EDN., 2013)
ARVIND P DATAR, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (LEXIS NEXIS,

NEW DEL., 2ND EDN. REPRINT, 2010)
D.D. BASU, COMMENTARY
ON THE
CONSTITUTION
OF INDIA
(LEXIS NEXIS, NEW
DEL., 9 TH EDN., 2008)
GRANVILLE AUSTIN, WORKING A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (OXFORD

UNIVERSITY PRESS, NEW DELHI, 8TH EDN., 2011)
H.M. SEERVAI, CONSTITUTION
OF INDIA
(UNIVERSALS LAW PUBLISHING, NEW
DELHI, 4TH EDN., VOL. 1, 2014)
J AGDISH SWARUP, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (THOMSON REUTERS, NEW DELHI, 3RD

EDN.,
VOL. 1, 2013)
J USTICE BHAGBATI PROSAD BANERJEE
AND
BHASKAR PROSAD BANERJEE ,
J UDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (WADHWA AND CO. NAGPUR, ED.

2001)
J USTICE R.C. LAHOTI , PREAMBLE: THE SPIRIT

CONSTITUTION
OF INDIA
AND
BACKBONE
OF
THE
(UNIVERSALS LAW PUBLISHING, NEW DELHI, 1ST EDN.,
2004)
M.P. J AIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (LEXIS NEXIS, NEW DELHI, 7THEDN.,
2015)
iii
T.K. TOPE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA (EASTERN BOOK CO., NEW DELHI, 3RD
EDN.,
2010)
V.N. SHUKLA , CONSTITUTION

EDN.,
OF INDIA
(EASTERN BOOK CO., NEW DELHI, 12TH
2013)
RATANLAL&DHIRAJLALS, THE INDIA PENAL CODE, 34TH EDITION 2014.
KI VIBHUTESPSA P ILLAIS CRIMINAL LAW, 12TH EDITION.
DR. HARI S INGH GOURS INDIAN PENAL CODE, 14TH EDITION.
III . TABLE OF CASES

INDIAN CASES
1.
Amrita Bazar Patrika Press Ltd. v. Board of (1919) 47 Cal 190 (SB)
11
High School & ors.

2.
Babulal Parate v. State of Maharashtra,
AIR 1961 SC 884 (890)
3.
Bal Gangadhar Tilak v.Queen Empress
(1908) 10 Bom LR 848
11
4.
Bal Gangadhar Tilak v. Queen Empress
(1897) ILR 22 Bom 112 11
5.
Bengal Immunity Co Ltd v. State of Bihar & AIR 1955 SC 661
ors.
6.
Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of A.P ,
(1997) 7 SCC 430
10
7.
Chamarbaugwala v. R M D ,
AIR 1957 SC 628
11
8.
Chintamanrao V. State of M.P.
AIR 1951 SC 118
9.
Commr. Of Police v. C. Anita.
AIR 2004 SC 4423
10.
Debi Soren and Ors. v. The State
AIR 1954 Pat 254.
11.
Mufti Fakkhurl Islam v. Emperor
AIR 1943 All 244
11
12.
Ghosh v. Joseph
AIR 1963 SC 812;
13.
Govt. Of A.P. v. Smt. P. Laxmi Devi ,
AIR 2008 SC 1640.
14.
Hamdard Dawakhana v.UOI
AIR 1960 SC 554
15.
Harichand v. Mizo Dtr. Council
AIR 1967 SC 829
16.
Harishanker v. State of M.P.,
(1955) 1 SCR 380
17.
Harpeet Kaur v. State Of Maharashtra.:
AIR 1992 SC 979
18.
Himmat Lal. V. Police Commr.
AIR 1973 SC 87
19.
I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu,
(1999) 7 SCC 580
20.
In re. .Ramleela Maidan Incident
(2012) 5 SCC 1
21.
In Re: Sojoni Kanta Das
(1930) 57 Cal 1217 (Sb) 12
iv

22.
K.A. Abbas v. UOI ,
(1970) 2 SCC 780
23.
Kamal Bhai v. Commr. Of Police. Nagpur
(1993) 3 SCC 384
24.
Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab
(1994) 3 SCC 569
25.
Karunanidhi v. Asst. Police Commr.
AIR 1968 Mad 54
26.
Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar
AIR 1962 SC 955
1,5 &8
27.
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala
AIR 1973 SC 1461
28.
Kharak Singh v. State of U.P.
AIR 1963 SC 1295
29.
Abaji Annaji v. Luxman Tukaram
(1899) 2 Bom LR 286
12
30.
M.H. Devendrappa v. Karnataka State Small AIR 1998 SC 1064
Industries Development Co.

31.
Madhu Limaya v. S.D.M. Monghyar
(1970) 3 SCC 746
32.
Maneka Gandhi v. UOI
(1978) 2 SCR 621
33.
Maneklal Chotana V. Makwana,
AIR1967 SC 1373
34.
Manubhai A. Sheth & ors. v. N.D. Nirgudkar
(1981) 22 CTR (Bom) 2

41
35.
Md. Yaqub and Alok Biswas v. State of West 2004 (4) CHN 406
Bengal,
36.
Mustakmiyajahharmiya
Shaikh
v.
M.M. (1995) 3 SCC 237
Mehta
37.
Nagen Murmu V. State Of W.B.
AIR 1973 SC 884
38.
Nazir Khan v. State of Delhi,
(2003) 8 SCC 461
10
39.
Niharendu Dutt Majumdar v. The King AIR 1942 FC 22
11
Emperor
40.
Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa,
(1993) 2 SCC 746
41.
O.K. Ghosh v. E.X. Joseph,
AIR1962 SC 812
42.
Odyssey
Communications
(P)
Ltd.
v. 1988 Supp (1) SCR 486
Lokvidayan Sanghatana
43.
Om Prakash v. Emperor
AIR 1948 Nag 109
44.
Pebam NingoMikoi Devi v. State of Manipur,
(2010) 9 SCC 618
45.
Printers (Mysore) Ltd. v. Asstt. CTO,
(1994) 2 SCC 434
46.
Pushpadevi M. Jatia v. M.L. Wadhawan,
AIR 1987 SC 1748
47.
Queen-Emprees v. Jogendra Chunder Bose,
I.L.R. (1892) Cal. 35

48.
Queen-Empress v. Balgangadhar Tilak ,
I.L.R. (1898) 22 Bom.
112
49.
Queen-Empress vs Amba Prasad
(1898) ILR 20 All 55
11
50.
R.C. Cooper v. UOI
AIR 1970 SC 564
51.
R.V. Board v. Niranjan,
AIR 1969 SC 966
52.
Radhey Sham v. P.M.G ,
AIR 1965 SC 311
13
53.
Railway Board v. Chandrima Das,
AIR 2000 SC 988
54.
Ram Singh v. State of Delhi,
AIR 1951 SC 270
55.
Ramjilal v. State ofU.P.,
AIR 1957 SC 620 (623)
56.
Romesh Thappar v. The State of Madras,
AIR 1950 SC 124
57.
S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram,
(1989) 2 SCC 574
58.
Emperor v. Sadashiv Narayan
(1944) 46 Bom LR 459
11
59.
Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. and Ors. v. UOI
AIR 1962 SC 305
60.
Santokh Singh v. Delhi Administration,
AIR 1973 SC 1901
61.
Ramnarayan Satya Pal v. Carey & ors.
AIR 1930 Lah 309
11
62.
Satya Rajan Bakshi v. Emperor
AIR 1929 Cal 309
11 & 12
63.
Satyendra Nath Majumdar v. Emperor
AIR 1931 Cal 337
64.
Emperor v. Shankar Shrikrishna Dev
(1910) 12 Bom LR 675
11
65.
Sri Indra Das v. State of Assam
2011 (2) S.C.A.L.E 312
66.
Stale of U P. v. Lalji Singh Yadav.
AIR 1977 SC 202
67.
State of Bihar v. Kamla Kant Misra
AIR 1971 SC 1667
68.
State of Bihar v. Shailbala
AIR1952 SC 329
69.
State of Bombay v. R. M. D. Chamarbaugwala 1957 1SCR 874
70.
State of Karnataka v. Gowri Narayana Ambiga AIR.1995 SC 1691
71.
State Of Karnataka V. Praveen Bhai Thogadia AIR 2004 SC 2081
15
72.
State of T.N. v. Nabila,
73.
State of Travancore & Ors. v. Bombay Co. Ltd. 1952 1 SCR 1112
74.
State of UP v. Kamal Kishore
AIR 1988 1 SCC 287
75.
Sunil Fulchand Shaw v. UOl
AIR 2000 SC 1023
76.
Supt. Central Prison v. Ram Manohar Lohia
AIR 1960 SC 633
77.
Tata Press Ltd. v. MTNL
(1995) 5 SCC 139
78.
Tara Singh v. State of Punjab
AIR 1951 Punj. 27
(2015) 12 SCC 127
vi

79.
UOI v. Paul Manickam
(2003) 8 SCC 342
80.
UOI v. Arvind Sherrill
AIR2000 SC 377
US CASES
81.
Abrams v. U.S.
(1919) US 616
82.
Beauhranis v. Illinois
(1952) 343 US 250
1&2
83.
Branderburg v. Ohio
395 US 444 (1969)
84.
Brawn v. Oklahoma
408 US 914 (1972)
85.
Bridges v. California
314 US 252 (1941)
86.
Cantwell v. Connecticut
310 US 296 (1940)
1&2
87.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire
315 US 568 (1942)
1&2
88.
Cox v. Columbia
(1975) 420 US 469
89.
Debs v. United States
249 US 211 (1919)
90.
Dennis v. Untied States
341 US 494 (1951)
91.
Feiner v. New York
340 US 315 (1951)
92.
Frohwerk v. United States
249 US 204 (1919)
93.
Gitlow v. New York
268 US 652 (1925)
94.
Gooding v. Wilson
405 US 518 (1972)
95.
Irohwerk v. U.S.
(1919) 249 US 204
96.
ISKCON v. Lee
505 U.S. 672 (1992)
14
97.
Konigsberg v. Stale of Bark II
(1961) 366 US 36
98.
Kunz v. N.Y.
(1951) 340 US 290
13
99.
Lewis v. New Orleans
408 US 913 (1972)
100.
Near v. Minnesota
(1930) 283 US 697
101.
Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of 290 F 3d 1058 (9th Cir. 1

Life Activists
20(L)
102.
Roth v U.S
(1956) 354 US 476
103.
Schenck v. U.S.
(1919) US 47 (52)
1&2
104.
Shaffer v. United States,
255 F 886 (9th Cire 1

1919)
1.
Saia v. N.Y.
(1948) 334 US 444
2.
Smith v. California,
(1959) 361 US 147
3.
Teminiello v. Chicago
337 US 1 (1949)
vii

4.
Stromberg v. California
(1931) 283 US 359
5.
Watts v. United States
394 US 705(1969)
6.
Whitney v. California
(1927) 278 US 357
UK CASES
7.
DPP v. Broome
(1974) AC 587
15
8.
Harrison v. Rutland
(1893) 1 QB 142 (154)
15
9.
Masses Publication Co. v. Pattern
244 F 535 (SDNY 1917) 1
10.
Rex. v. Aldred
(1909) 22 CCLC 1
11.
Tynan v. Balmer
(1967) 1 QB 91
15
V. DICTIONARIES
BRYAN A. GARNER, BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY (9th edn., 2009)
P.R. AIYAR, THE LAW LEXICON (2nd edn., 1997)
WEBSTERS NEW ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY (1993)
VI.
ONLINE AUTHORITES
scconline.com
manupatra.com
westlawindia.com
heinonline.com
lexisnexis.com
bloomsburycollection.com
viii
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Indiana is a federal republic country situated in south-east Asia ,New Delporto is the capital
as well as an education hub of the country. The city has some of the best colleges & universities
of the nation. One such university is Great Northern University (GNU). GNU has a very active
culture of student politics.
2. The Great Northern University Students Union (GNUSU) is the largest Student Union of GNU.
The GNUSU is a branch of the AISU (All Indiana Students Union), a left inclined organization.
In 2015 the Indiana Peoples Party (IPP) came to power which subscribes to right wing
ideologies. After coming to power, the government embarked on an economic reform mission
which looked to liberalize the economy to bring more foreign investments. These ideas did not
go well with the GNUSU and as a result country wide protests were held by them.
3. On June 8, 2016 a countrywide strike was called by the parent body of GNUSU in Utkal,
another Union Territory in Indiana. The protestors were lathi charged by the police and some
of them were seriously injured. The protestors were just sitting peacefully on the road and that
they were not given any warning by the police before the lathi charge. One of the injured
students, Tomar Rashid filed a writ petition against the Union government claiming that his
right to peaceful assembly was infringed by the state and claimed adequate compensation for
his injuries.
4. The GNUSU led the protest in capital city and its president Ramaiya Kumar became the face
of the movement. On 16th of June, 2016 a rally was organized in Delporto by GNUSU to show
solidarity to the injured students
5. Some of the incidents of the rally were recorded by various news agencies. Although the rally
ended peacefully, some videos began to circulate in social media about the speeches given by
Ramaiya Kumar. This video became viral and soon the government arrested Ramaiya Kumar
late at night and slapped him with the charges of sedition.
6. The session court held Ramaiya guilty and. He filed an appeal in the High Court of Delporto
which was rejected and hence the present appeal in this court came.
7. As the monsoon session began, the government by virtue of its majority made an amendment
to the Press Councils Act, 1978. Section 14A was incorporated into the Act, whose
constitutionality is challenged in the present petition
8. The Constitution, Press Councils Act & other laws of Indiana are pari materia with the
Constitution, Press Councils Act & other laws of India.
ix
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. WHETHER
SECTION
14-A
OF
THE
PRESS
COUNCIL
ACT
1978
IS
CONSTITUTIONAL ?
2. WHETHER SECTION 124A IS CONSTITUTIONAL ?
3. WHETHER RAMAIYA KUMAR WILL BE LIABLE UNDER SECTION 124A UNDER
INDIAN PENAL C ODE?
4. WHETHER LATHI CHARGE DONE BY POLICE INFRINGED RIGHT TO PEACEFUL
ASSEMBLY OF TOMAR RASHID UNDER ARTICLE 19(1)(B) OF CONSTITUTION OF
INDIA?
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
[1] SECTION 14-A OF THE PRESS COUNCIL ACT 1978 IS CONSTITUTIONAL :It is humbly submitted before this Honble Court that section 14-A of Press Council Act (herein
after referred as PCA) is constitutional, because it is a Reasonable Restriction under Art. 19(2)
of Indian Constitution (1.1) and anticipatory action of Press council is also reasonable. (1.1.1).
Moreover, restriction under Sec 14-A falls within the grounds provided in 19(2) (1.1.2) and it
provides Procedure established by Law for application of Art 19(2). (1.2)
CONTENTION II:-SECTION 124 -A OF IPC
IS
CONSTITUTIONAL :-It is humbly submitted
before this court that Section 124-A of IPC is constitutional because Honble supreme court
has declared it so(2.1).Moreover, restrictions imposed by section 124-A on 19(l)(a) are in
interest of public order u/art. 19(2)(2.2). Again there is necessity of the law of sedition u/
section 124-A on public order(2.3). Also sedition has been held as valid on many instances
(2.4). And lastly the gravity of unconstitutionality of sedition on national interest is too
much(2.5)
[3.]ACCUSED RAMAIYA KUMAR WILL BE LIABLE FOR SEDITION
It is submitted that the statement made by Ramaiya Kumar will come within the ambit of
Section 124A of Indian Penal Code, as the statement made by him, tried to arose the feeling of
hatred against the nation and government established by law, among the general public. He is
also liable for sedition as he has intention of same. (3.1)
[4.] LATHI
CHARGE DONE BY POLICE
ASSEMBLY OF
DID NOT
INFRINGED
RIGHT
TO PEACEFUL
T OMAR RASHID
It is submitted that in the present case, the strike done by the supporters on highway will lead
to causing problem to passer-by, thus will come under the ambit of Section 8B of Highway
Act, and hence assembly on Highway will be held unlawful. So the act of Police, to vacate the
protestors from the Highway, is totally lawful, and in no way infringed the Right to Peaceful
Assembly of Tomar Rashid.
xi
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
[1] SECTION 14-A OF THE PRESS COUNCIL ACT 1978 IS CONSTITUTIONAL :It is humbly submitted before this Honble Court that section 14-A of Press Council Act (herein
after referred as PCA) is constitutional, because it is a Reasonable Restriction under Art. 19(2)
of Indian Constitution (1.1) and anticipatory action of Press Council is also reasonable. (1.1.1).
Moreover, restriction under Sec 14-A falls within the grounds provided in 19(2) (1.1.2) and it
provides Procedure established by Law for application of Art 19(2). (1.2)
[1.1] SEC. 14-A OF PRESS COUNCIL ACT IS A REASONABLE RESTRICTION UNDER 19(2)
Respondent contends that no right under Part III of constitution is absolute.1 It is right to
observe that the fundamental right to the freedom of speech and expression enshrined in Art.
19(1)(a) of our Constitution is based on Amendment I of the Constitution of the United States
of America.2 Even the American constitution which is considered as guardian of liberty3 does
not give freedom of speech as an absolute right4, and restrictions are placed on speech that may
induce hearers or listeners to engage in unlawful conduct5; speech that threatens' harm to
others;6 speech that provokes a hostile audience response7. Hence we can say that reasonable
restrictions can be placed on the freedom of speech and expression and Sec. 14-A of Press
Council Act 1978 is one such restriction.
Reasonability Test:-The reasonableness has got to be tested both from procedural and
substantive aspects.8 For adjudging the reasonableness of a restriction, factors such as the
Kesavananda Bharativa v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 S.C. 1461; Ram Singh v. State of Delhi, AIR 1951 S.C.
270; Railway Board v. Chandrima Das, AIR 2000 S.C. 988
2
State of Travancore-Cochin & Ors. v. Bombay Co. Ltd., 1952 1 SCR 1112; State of Bombay v. R. M. D.
Chamarbaugwala, 1957 1 SCR 874.
3
Konigsberg v. Stale of Bark II,(1961) 366 US 36; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 US 568 (1942); Schenck
v. U.S., (1919) 249 US 97; Irohwerk v. U.S.,(1919) 249 US 204; Roth v. U.S., (1957) 354 US 476; Smith v.
California, (1959) 361 US 147; Cox v. Colm, (1975) 420 US 469.
4
Roth v U.S.,(1956) 354 US 476; Schenck v. U.S.(1919) US 47 (52); Abrams v. U.S. (1919) US 616; Beauharnis
v. Illinois, (1952) 343 US 250 (266); Near v. Minnesota (1930) 283 US 697.
5
Shaffer v. United States, 255 F 886 (9th Cire 1919); Masses Publication Co. v. Pattern, 244 F 535 (SDNY 1917);
Schenck v. United States, 249 US 47 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 US 204 (1919); Debs v. United
States, 249 US 211 (1919); Abrams v United, 250 US 616 (1919); Gitlow v. New York, 268 US 652 (1925);
Whitney v. California, (1927) 278 US 357; Dennis v. Untied States, 341 US 494 (1951); Branderburg v. Ohio,
395 US 444 (1969).
6
Bridges v. California, 314 US 252 (1941); Watts v. United States, 394 US 705(1969); Planned Parenthood v.
American Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F 3d 1058 (9 th Cir. 20(L).
7
Teminiello v. Chicago,337 US 1 (1949); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 US 296 (1940); Feiner v. New York,340
US 315 (1951); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,315 US 568 (1942).
8
DURGA DAS BASU , COMMENTRY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA , 3879 (Vol 4th, 9th Ed. , Lexis Nexis ,2007).

duration and extent of restriction, the circumstances under which and the , manner in which
that imposition has been authorised, the nature of right infringed, the underlying purpose in the
restriction imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied, must be
considered.9 So it is humbly contended that the restriction placed by Section 14-A of PCA is
placed in view of current situations prevailing in the state of Mashkir, which is on the verge of
volatility. Moreover, a restriction must not be vague or uncertain or in excess of the
requirement,10which in present case is not ambiguous because a clear provision with procedure
is provided. Again it must be temporary
11
and confined to situations of emergency
situations12which again in present case is done to solve the problem of Mashkir. Again it must
offer a standard or policy for the guidance of the administrative authority in the matter of
exercising his subjective power13 which in present case is provided by an exhaustive procedure
for Press council to exercise its power. Therefore, the restriction is reasonable.
[1.1.1] ANTICIPATORY ACTION OF PRESS COUNCIL IS REASONABLE :-
It is humbly submitted that the main purpose of the Sec. 14-A of PCA is to prevent the
circulation of news like that of Ramaiya Kumar, or more specifically the fighting words uttered
by him as it is anticipated by the Govt. that it can lead to disturbance of peace and tranquillity
and public order. In Chaplinsky14 Court defined the unprotected category of fighting words as
words which by their very utterances inflict injury or tend jo incite an immediate breach of
peace.15The utterance of 'fighting words that plainly tend to excite the person addressed to a
breach of the peace is not protected.16 So it would be correct to say that the Govt. wants to
prevent the circulation of the fighting words which it anticipates can lead to disturbances in
peace.
Anticipatory action has accordingly been held to be valid in respect of the freedom of
expression by a series of judgements.17 Injunction may be issued by a court against uttering
words which have the effect of force and incite acts of violence. 18The legislature could not rest
9
In re. RamleelaMaidan Incident, (2012) 5 SCC 1; Chintamanrao v. State of M.P., AIR 1951 SC 118.
Ramjilal v. State of U.P., AIR 1957 SC 620 (623).
11
Babulal Parate v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1961 SC 884 (890).
12
Harishanker v. State of M.P.,(1955) 1 SCR 380; State Of Bihar v. Kamla Kant Misra, AIR 1971 SC 1667.
13
Harichand v. Mizo Dtr. Council, AIR 1967 SC 829; Maneklal Chotana v. Makwana, AIR 1967 SC 1373;
Himmat Lal v. Police Commissioner., AIR 1973 SC 87.
14
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire., (1942) 315 US 568.
15
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 US 568 (1942); Cantwell v. Connecticut,310 US 296 (1940).
Gooding v. Wilson,405 US 518 (1972); Lewis v. New Orleans, 408 US 913 (1972); Brawn v. Oklahoma, 408 US
914 (1972).
16
Schenck v. U.S., (1919) US 47 (52); Beauhranis v. Illinois (1952) 343 US 250.
17
Virendra v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 896 : Babulal v. State of Maharshtra, AIR 1961 SC 884 ; State of
Karnataka v. Praveen Bhai Thogadia, AIR 2004 SC 2081; Ramleela Maidan Incident, In re., (2012) 5 SCC 1.
18
Gompers V. Bucks Stove (1911) 221 US 418; Near v. Minnesota (1930) 283 US 697
10

in peace, finding itself helpless to impose any restriction upon this freedom for the prevention
of fighting words19causing a public disorder when even the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (Art. 19) and the Draft Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [Art. 16(3)] permitted
restrictions on such ground. The expression 'in the interests of20 enables the Legislature to curb
tendencies to create a breach of public order, even though no breach of the peace has actually
taken place.21 It follows that where there is a likelihood of immediate danger of breach of peace,
an anticipatory action, e.g., under s. 144 of the CrPC would be justified under the present
clause.22 Hence the anticipatory action of Press Council for curbing the spread of fighting
words of Ramaiya Kumar is valid.
[1.1.2] RESTRICTION UNDER SEC 14-A
FALLS WITHIN THE GROUNDS PROVIDED IN
ART.
19(2):-It is humbly submitted that the freedom of speech and expression can be restricted only
on the grounds23 provided under Art 19 (2) of the Constitution.24 And the restriction provided
in Sec. 14-A of PCA comes under these following grounds:Sovereignty and Integrity of India:-This ground was added as a ground of restriction of the
freedom of expression by 16th Amendment of the Constitution. The object was to enable the
State to combat cries for secession and the like from organisations such as the David Kazhagam
is the South and Plebiscite Front in Kashmir, and activities in pursuance thereof which might
not possibly be brought within the fold of the expression security of the State. 25 No
independent country will tolerate any agitation on the part of any unit of its territory either to
secede and form an independent State or to integrate with a foreign State.26 In the present case
the Section 14-A of PCA aims at curtailing such views only hence it comes under this ground.
Security of the State :- No State can tolerate utterances which threaten the overthrow of
organized Government by unlawful or unconstitutional means.27 The reason is that the security
of the State organized Government is the very foundation of the freedom of speech. 28And in
the present case the speech of Ramaiya Kumar on the most volatile topic of Mashkir asking
19
Cf. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, (1942) 315 US 568.

Art. 19(2) Of Constitution of India.
21
Ramjilal v. State of U.P., AIR 1957 S.C. 620 (623).
22
Babulal Parate v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1961 S.C. 884 (890).
23
Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. and Ors. v. Union of India AIR 1962 S.C. 305; Tata Press Ltd. v. Mahanagar Telephone
Nigam Ltd., (1995) 5 S.C.C. 139, AIR 1995 S.C. 2438; Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf), Lai Kuan v. Union of
India, AIR 1960 S.C. 554; Odyssey Communications (P) Ltd. v. Lok vidayan Sanghatana, 1988 Supp (1) SCR
486.
24
S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram,(1989) 2 S.C.C. 574; Printers (Mysore) Ltd. v. Asstt. CTO, (1994) 2 S.C.C.
434; K.A. Abbas v. Union of India, (1970) 2 S.C.C. 780 : (1971) 2 SCR 446.
25
DURGA D AS B ASU, COMMENTRY ON T HE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 3749 (Vol 4th, 9th Ed., Lexis Nexis ,2007)
26
H.M. SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW O F INDIA,715( Vol I, 4thedn., Universal Law Publishing,2014)
27
Stromberg v. California (1931) 283 Us 359.
28
J AGDISH S WARUP, CONSTITUTION O F INDIA,P. 386 (Vol. 1, 3rd Edn., Thomson Reuters, 2013)
20

the freedom of it at any cost29 would obviously include unconstitutional means. The speeches
and expressions which encourage violent crimes including crimes of violence intended to
overthrow the Government.30 are related to security of the State.31And in the instant case
Ramaiya Kumar is asking to commit crime of sedition by asking to seek freedom of Mashkir
at any cost. Hence security of state is endangered and the present restriction in Sec. 14-A of
PCA tries to prevent such condition and will come under this ground.
Public Order: -Disturbance of Public order is the potentiality of the act to disturb even tempo32
of the life of the community33 which makes its prejudicial to the maintenance of public order34.
Public order would be synonymous with Public Safety35 and tranquillity36 and would also refer
to public disorders of a local significance as distinguished from national upheavals such as
revolution, civil strife and war.37 Anything that disturbs public tranquillity disturbs public
peace38. In the present case the speech of Ramaiya Kumar is of such nature whose circulation
for sure can lead to disturbance of Public order in the country. Given the conditions of Mashkir
where , in normal circumstances, stones are pelted on the soldiers, such speeches, if allowed to
be circulated , then the obvious result will be disturbance in public peace and tranquillity and
hence disturbance of public order. Public order implies an orderly state of affairs in which
citizens can peacefully pursue their normal avocations of life39. But if public peace is disturbed,
no one can peacefully pursue their normal avocations of life. Hence Sec-14-A of PCA which
tries to save the Public Order by restricting circulation of volatile speeches comes under this
ground.
[1.2] SECTION 14-A PROVIDES PROCEDURE ESTABLISHED BY LAW FOR APPLICATION OF
ART 19(2):-It is argued that, in the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India40it was held that
the procedure contemplated by Article 21 must answer the test of reasonableness (Articles 14
and 19) and must also be in conformity with principles of natural justice. And even if a law
29
Moot Problem 11
Santokh Singh v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1973 S.C. 1901.
31
State of Bihar v. Shail bala, AIR 1952 S.C. 329; Madhulimaya v. S.D.M. Monghyar, (1970) 3 SCC 746.
32
State of U.P. v. Kamal Kishore, AIR 1988 1 SCC 287; Kamal Bhai v. Commissioner of Police. Nagpur,
(1993) 3 S.C.C. 384; Harpeet Kaur v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1992 S.C. 979;
33
UOI v. Arvind Sherrill, AIR 2000 S.C. 377; Sunil Fulchand Shaw v. UOl, AIR 2000 S.C. 1023; Commr. Of
Police v. C. Anita, AIR 2004 S.C. 4423.
34
Mustakmiyajahharmiya Shaikh v. M.M. Mehta, Commissioner Of Police, (1995) 3 S.C.C. 237.; Pushpadevi M.
Jatia v. M.L. Wadhawan, AIR 1987 S.C. 1748; Nagen Murmu v. State Of W.B. AIR 1973 S.C. 884.
35
Romesh thapar v. State Of Madras AIR 1950 S.C. 124.
36
Madhulimaya v. S.D.M. Monghyar (1970) 3 S.C.C. 746; Ghosh v. Joseph, AIR 1963 S.C. 812.
37
Karunanidhi v. Asst. Police Commr., AIR 1968 Mad 54.
38
Om Prakash v. Emperor, AIR 1948 Nag 109; Stale of U P. v. Lalji Singh Yadav, AIR 1977 SC 202.
39
Supt. Central Prison v. Ram Manohar Lohia,: AIR 1960 S.C. 633.
40
(1978) 2 SCR 621.
30

does not infringe Article 21, it has to meet challenges of Articles 14 and 19,41 the golden
triangle rule.42 Liberty is a compendious term and includes all varieties of rights make up
the 'personal liberties' of man other than those dealt within the several clauses of Article 19(1).43
Hence it can be said that these three are intricately connected and any law of punitive or
preventive detention has to be tested on the touchstone of the constitutional assurance to every
person that he shall not be deprived of his liberty except in accordance with procedure
established by law. 44
In the present case Section 14-A is taking away the liberty of speech granted under Art. 19(1)(a)
by virtue of grounds given in Art 19(2) of Constitution. Again any liberty can be taken only by
a procedure established by law
45
, Section 14-A provides reasonable and fair procedure
established by law for taking away this liberty under 19(1)(a) which has a comprehensive
system and proper mechanism for taking away the liberty.
CONTENTION II:-SECTION 124 -A OF IPC
IS
CONSTITUTIONAL :-It is humbly submitted
before this court that Section 124-A of IPC is constitutional because Honble supreme court
has declared it so (2.1).Moreover, restrictions imposed by section 124-A on 19(l)(a) are in
interest of public order u/art. 19(2) (2.2). Again there is necessity of the law of Sedition u/
section 124-A on public order (2.3). Also sedition has been held as valid on many instances
(2.4). And lastly the gravity of unconstitutionality of sedition on national interest is too much
(2.5)
[2.1] HONBLE SUPREME COURT ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SEDITIONThe first case in India that arose under the section is what is known as the Bangobasi case
Queen-Emprees v. Jogendra Chunder Bose46, then the case of Queen-Empress v.
Balgangadhar Tilak47 But starting from there till Kedar Nath case48, there was a lot of issue
and debate regarding the validity of Section 124A, which was lastly sorted out in Kedar Nath49
case.
41
Id.
I.R. Coelho (Dead) by LRs. v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1999) 7 S.C.C. 580; R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, AIR
1970 SC 564.
43
Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1963 S.C. 1295.
44
Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569; Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, (1993) 2 SCC 746 ;State
of T.N. v. Nabila,(2015) 12 SCC 127; Pebam Ningo Mikoi Devi v. State of Manipur,(2010) 9 SCC 618; Union of
India v. Paul Manickam, (2003) 8 SCC 342.
45
Id.
46
I.L.R. (1892) Cal. 35
47
I.L.R. (1898) 22 Bom. 112.
48
KedarNath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 S.C. 955.
49
KedarNath Singh v. State of Bihar,AIR 1962 S.C. 955.
42

In Kedar nath case50 it was held that- Every State, whatever its form of Government, has to be
armed with the power to punish those who, by their conduct, jeopardise the safety and stability
of the State, or disseminate such feelings of disloyalty as have the tendency to lead to the
disruption of the State or to public disorder. But that should be within the ambit, in which that
would not interfere with any of the fundamental right of the person. So as per this case, the
restriction imposed is well within the constitution, it would not amount to unreasonableness.
Also in the case of Rex. v. Aldred
51
it was held that-"Nothing is clearer than the law on this
head - namely, that whoever by language, either written or spoken incites or encourages other
to use physical force or violence in some public matter connected with the State, is guilty of
publishing a seditions libel. The word "sedition" in its ordinary natural signification denotes a
tumult, an insurrection, a popular commotion, or an uproar; it implies violence or lawlessness
in some form. And if any of the issue is there as mentioned, then it would be totally legal to
curb that"
But one thing that need to be given special focus is that of word, the expression "the
Government established by law" which needs to be distinguished from the person's for the time
being engaged in carrying on the administration. "Government established by law" is the visible
symbol of the State. The very existence of the State will be in jeopardy if the Government
established by law is subverted. Hence the continued existence of the Government established
by law is an essential condition of the stability of the State. That is why 'sedition', as the offence
in s. 124A has been characterised, comes under Chapter VI relating to offences against the
State.
It is very well established that every citizen should be provided with some of the fundamental
rights, but that freedom has to be guarded against becoming a licence for vilification and
condemnation of the Government established by law, in words, which incite violence or have
the tendency to create public disorder. A citizen has a right to say or write whatever he likes
about the Government, or its measures, by way of criticism or comment, so long as he does not
incite people to violence against the Government established by law or with the intention of
creating public disorder.
Also it is humbly submitted before this Honble Supreme court that, even if, on the other hand,
we were to hold that even without any tendency to disorder or intention to create disturbance
of law and order, by the use of words written or spoke which merely create disaffection or
50
51
KedarNath Singh v. State of Bihar,AIR 1962 S.C. 955.

(1909) 22 CCLC 1.

feelings of enmity against the Government, the offence of sedition is complete, then such an
interpretation of the sections would make then unconstitutional in view of Art. 19(1)(a) read
with clause (2). It is well settled that if certain provisions of law construed in one way would
make them consistent with the Constitution, and another interpretation would render them
unconstitutional, the Court would lean in favour of the former construction.
[2.2] RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY SECTION 124-A ON I9(l)(a) ARE IN INTEREST OF PUBLIC
ORDER U/ART. 19(2) :-Art. 19(1)(a) - (g) of the Constitution guarantee to the citizens, six
fundamental freedoms. These fundamental freedoms are not absolute but are subject to the
restrictions contained in Art. 19(2) to Art.19 (6) of the Constitution. Any restriction on the
freedoms u/Art. 19(1) must not only be for the benefit of the public but must be reasonable.
Section 124-A of I.P.C. punishes any person who by words, spoken or written attempts to bring
into hatred or contempt, or excites disaffection towards the government established by law. In
Tara Singh v. State of Punjab52, this section was struck down as unconstitutional by Punjab
HC for violating the Freedom of Speech and Expression guaranteed under Art 19(1)(a). To
overcome the constitutional difficulty as a result of the above referred case the Constitutional
1st (Amendment) Act, 1951 added in Art. 19(2) two words of widest importance, i.e. in the
interest of and public order. Thus, Section 124A imposes reasonable restrictions on Art.
19(1)(a) in the interest of public order which is laid down in Art. 19(2).
[2.3] NECESSITY OF THE LAW OF SEDITION U/ Section 124A ON PUBLIC ORDER
Art. 19(1)(a) guarantees the freedom of speech and expression which includes the right to
express ones views through any medium.53This freedom can be reasonably restricted by
resorting to grounds provided u/Art. 19(2). These restrictions may be imposed in the interests
of the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency,
morality, sovereignty and integrity of India, or in relation to contempt of Court, defamation or
incitement to an offence54 Public order u/Art. 19(2) is wide in scope and is virtually
synonymous with public peace, safety and tranquility.55There should be some element of
disturbance of peace to bring a matter under public order.56 Sedition restricts Art. 19(a) so
that public order can be effectively maintained.57Therefore, Section 124A is extremely
52
AIR 1951 Punj. 27

State of Karnataka v. Gowri Narayana Ambiga, AIR.1995 S.C. 1691.
54
M.P. J AIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1104 (6th Edn., Lexis Nexis Butterworths Wadhwa Publication).
55
O.K. Ghosh v. E.X. Joseph, AIR 1962 S.C. 812; Cantewell v. Connecticut, (1940) 310 US 296 (308).
56
Madhu Limaye v. S.D.M. Monghyr, AIR 1971 S.C. 2486.
57
Niharendu Dutt Majumdar v. The King Emperor, 1942 FCR 38.
53

necessary. In Aloke Biswas58 case, few Pakistani spies were caught destabilizing internal
security by spreading hatred against government established by law in India. Similarly, it was
observed that sedition law was necessary to charge anti-social elements in the society who were
trying to disrupt the public order.59 Shri H. V. Kamath in his speech in Constituent Assembly
Debates Official Report Vol. VII60, talked about imposing restrictions by way of sedition in the
interest of public order, peace and tranquility.
[2.4] VARIOUS
INSTANCES WHEN LAWS HELD CONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE OF PUBLIC
ORDER U /ART.
19(2):-Public order under Art. 19(2) is wide in scope and is virtually
synonymous with public peace, safety and tranquility.61 There should be some element of
disturbance of peace to bring a matter under public order.62 There have been a multiplicity of
cases where constitutionality of a part of legislation restrictive under Public Order of Art.
19(2) has been challenged. In the case of KedarNath Singh v. State of Bihar,63 constitutional
validity of Sedition was discussed in detail by Constitution Bench and it was held that Section
124A is constitutionally valid and imposes reasonable restrictions on fundamental freedom of
speech and expression in interest of the public order and is within the ambit of permissible
legislative interference with the fundamental right.64
In Ramji LalModi65 case, another Constitution Bench upheld the validity of Section 295A of
I.P.C. as it was also protected by Art. 19(2) of Constitution of India for maintenance of public
order.66 The same view was taken in the case of Madhu Limaye,67 a seven judge bench sustained
the constitutional validity of Chapter VIII of Cr.P.C which is basically about prevention of
crimes and disturbance of public tranquility and breach of peace. It was held that said
provisions essentially conceived in interest of public order and in interest of general public and
was within restrictions under Art. 19(2), (3), (4) and(5).
[2.5] THE GRAVITY OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SEDITION AS UNDER SECTION 124A
SHOULD BE ADHERED TO WHILE DEALING WITH CAUTION :-Apex court held in the case
of Sri Indra Das v. State of Assam68 that attempt should always be made to sustain the
58
Md. Yaqub and Aloke Biswas v. State of West Bengal, 2004(4)CHN406.

Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1997 SC 3483; Nazir Khan and Ors. v. Delhi,
2004(1)ACR34(SC).
60
Statement of H.V. Kamath, CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES, Vol. VII, 34 (December 01, 1948).
61
O.K. Ghosh v. E.X. Joseph, AIR 1962 S.C. 812; Cantewell v. Connecticut,(1940) 310 US 296 (308).
62
Madhu Limaye v. S.D.M. Monghyr, AIR 1971 SC 2486.
63
KedarNath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955.
64
Debi Soren and Ors. v. The State, AIR 1954 Pat 254.
65
Ramji Lal Modi v.The State of U.P., AIR 1957 SC 620.
66
M.H. Devendrappa v. The Karnataka State Small Industries Development Corporation, AIR1998SC1064.
67
Madhu Limaye v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr and Ors., AIR 1971 SC 2486.
68
2011 (2) S.C.A.L.E 312.
59

constitutionality of a piece of legislation by reading it down and if the plain meaning of the
provision is making it constitutional then we should depart from its plain meaning to upheld it
constitutional. Similarly, Apex court also held in Govt. Of A.P. v. Smt. P. Laxmi Devi69 case,
invalidating a legislation is a grave step and should never be taken lightly. It should only be
done in rare and exceptional circumstances.
While adjudicating on the constitutionality of Section 124-A in the case of Debi Soren & Ors.
v. The State,70Patna HC held the validity of the aforementioned section and stated that the
restrictions imposed by Section 124-A are reasonable restrictions in the interest of public order.
It also observed that where two interpretations can be given to the words of an existing law,
the Court should accept that interpretation which is in favour of constitutionality rather than an
interpretation which will make the law unconstitutional.71 Misuse of law is not a criterion to
declare it unconstitutional.72
Hence it is humbly submitted before this Honble Court to uphold the validity of Section 124A of IPC.
CONTENTION III:-RAMAIYA KUMAR
IS LIABLE UNDER
SECTION 124-A
OF
IPC:- It is
humbly submitted before the Honble Supreme Court that Ramaiya Kumar is liable under
Section 124-A of Penal Code 1860. As according to Section 124A of IPCWhoever, by words, either spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or
otherwise, brings or attempts to bring into hatred or contempt, or excites or attempts to excite
disaffection towards, the Government established by law in India, shall be punished with
imprisonment for life, to which fine may be added, or with imprisonment which may extend to
three years, to which fine may be added, or with fine.73
It is humbly contended before this Honble Supreme Court that in present matter after lathi
charge the movement gathered momentum and soon more students joined in and Political
colours were also added to the movement by the fiery speeches of the GNUSU leaders. On 16th
of June, 2016 a rally was organized in Delporto by GNUSU to show solidarity to the injured
students of Utkal. Meanwhile some posters were put up across the campus of GNU which
claimed that the rally was also in solidarity of the hanging of Chengiz Khan, who was hanged
3 years ago on the same date. All such posters had the signature of Ramaiya Kumar.74 As the
69
AIR 2008 S.C. 1640.

AIR 1954 PAT 254.
71
Manubhai A. Sheth and others v. N.D. Nirgudkar, 2nd Income Tax Officer, A-II Ward, Bombay and another,
(1981)22CTR(Bom)41.
72
RomeshThappar v. The State of Madras, AIR 1950 S.C. 124.
73
Section 124-A of Indian Penal Code, 1860.
74
Moot Problem 9
70

rally began, the protestors who were high in energy and enthusiasm began to shout slogans
against the so called dictatorship of the government and pledged to fight against the
government till the date. Some videos began to circulate in social media where it was seen that
the Ramaiya Kumar in his speech claimed that Mashkir deserved to be independent and that
they will seek independence at any cost.75
The offence of Sedition consists in the making use of any means for the purpose of bringing
the Government into hatred or contempt. Whether any disturbance or outbreak was caused by
any speech or article, is absolutely immaterial if the accused intended by the speech to excite
any disturbance, his act would doubtless fall within Section 124-A and would probably fall
within other section of the Penal Code.76
In Nazir Khan v. State of Delhi,77 the Supreme Court explained that Sedition is a crime against
society nearly allied to that of treason, and it embraces all those practices, whether by word,
deed or writing, which are calculated to disturb the tranquility of the state, and lead ignorant
persons to endeavour to subvert the Government and laws of the country. The objects of
sedition generally are to induce discontent and insurrection, and stir up opposition to the
Government, and bring the administration of justice into contempt; and the very tendency of
the sedition is to incite disruption of public order and public peace.
In landmark case of Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State ofA.P78 Honble Court has observed that The
decisive ingredient for establishing the offence of sedition under S.124-A IPC is the doing of
certain acts which would bring to the Government established by law in India hatred or
contempt etc. The same was happened in this case by Ramaiya Kumar, when he tried to raise
hatred against government by giving such speech.
"Sedition has been described as disloyalty in action, and the law considers as sedition all those
practices which have for their object to excite discontent or dissatisfaction, to create public
disturbance, or to lead to civil war; to bring into hatred or contempt the sovereign or the
Government, the laws or constitutions of the realm, and generally all endeavors to promote
public disorder.79
According to Per Strachey J. Even if the accused neither excited nor intended to excite any
disturbance or outbreak or forcible resistance to the authority of the Government still if he tried
to excite feelings of enmity to the Government or dissatisfaction towards the Government, that
75
Moot Problem 11
Ratanlal Dhirajlals Law of Crimes Vol. 1 27th Ed. Pg. No.593
77
(2003) 8 S.C.C. 461.
78
(1997) 7 S.C.C. 430
79
Nazir Khan v. State of Delhi (2003) 8 S.C.C. 461.
76
10

is sufficient to make him guilty under the Section.80 So in this particular matter, intention of
Ramaiya Kumar is not important.
The acts or words must either incite to disorder or must be such as to satisfy reasonable man
that that was their intention or tendency.81 This decision of Honble Court was reluctantly
followed by the Allahabad High Court82 and Bombay High Court83 and further Supreme Court
in case of Bengal Immunity Co Ltd84 held that It is only when the words spoken which have
the pernicious tendency or intention of creating public disorder or disturbance of law and order
that the law steps in to prevent such activities in the interest of public order.
[3.1] ROLE OF INTENTION IN CRIME OF SEDITION
The essence of the crime of sedition consists in the intention with which the language is used.
But this intention must be judged primarily by the language itself. When a person is charged in
respect of anything he has written or said, the meaning of what he said or wrote must be taken
to be its intention and that meaning is what his language would be understood to mean by the
people to whom it is addressed.85 So in this case, the words used by Ramaiya Kumar will be
taken as his intention, even if he pleads that he never intended to raise contempt by those words.
The intention of a speaker, writer may be inferred from the particular speech, article or letter.
Where it is ascertained that the intention of the speaker, writer was to excite feelings of
disaffection towards the Government established by law, it is immaterial whether or not the
words spoken, written could have the effect of exciting such feelings of disaffection, and it is
immaterial whether the words true or were false, it is immaterial whether or not the words did
in fact excite such feelings or disaffection86 So even if there was no violent effect of speech
given by Ramaiya Kumar, he will be liable for the charge of Sedition.
The intention of Ramaiya Kumar can be inferred from the wordings of his speech given by him
in rally i.e. We will take independence of Mashkir at any cost and the matters of Mashkir
was much controversial from 1960 at international level and to this add on Ramaiya Kumars
speech against the Government as well as the posters signed by him for solidarity of the hanging
of Chengiz Khan, who was hanged 3 years ago on the same date, clearly shows that the
intention of Ramaiya Kumar was to excite feeling of hatred and disaffection towards
80
Bal Gangadhar Tilak v. Queen Empress, (1897) ILR 22 Bom 112; Emperor v. Satya Rajan Bakshi AIR 1929
Cal 309; Ramnarayan Satya Pal v. Carey & ors. AIR 1930 Lah 309
81
Niharendu Dutt Majumdar v. King Emperor, AIR 1942 FC 22.
82
Mufti Fakkhurl Islam v. Emperor, AIR 1943 All 244.
83
Emperor v. Sadashiv Narayan,(1944) 46 Bom LR 459.
84
AIR 1955 S.C. 661 ; Chamarbaugwala R M D AIR 1957 S.C. 628.
85
Bal Gangadhar Tilak, (1908) 10 Bom LR 848; Shankar Shrikrishna Dev (1910) 12 Bom LR 675; Amrita Bazar
Patrika Press Ltd. (1919) 47 Cal 190 (SB); Satyendra Nath Majumdar AIR 1931 Cal 337.
86
Queen-Empress vs Amba Prasad, (1898) ILR 20 All 55.
11

Government established by law.This act of Ramaiya Kumar has a very high tendency to create
public disorder and disturbance in public peace and tranquillity which the law very well seeks
to curb. The court must judge intention having regard to the time at which it was written or
spoken, the place and circumstances. In judging the question of intention of course the language
of speech or article itself is of the utmost importance in enabling the court to decide what the
intention of the writer or speaker was.87
In case of Satya Ranjan Bakshi vs Emperor88Jenkins C.J rules that To determine whether the
intention of the accused was to call into being hostile feelings, the rule a man must be taken to
intend the natural and reasonable consequences of his act must be applied: so that if on reading
through the articles the reasonable and natural and probable effect of the articles on the minds
of those to whom they are addressed appears to be that feelings of hatred, contempt, or
disaffection would be excited towards the Government, then it is justifiable to say that the
speech or article was spoken or written with intent and that they are an attempt to create the
feelings against which law seeks to provide.
In case of Bal Gangadhar Tilak vs. The Queen-Empress89 Court observed that Disaffection
means hatred, enmity, dislike, hostility, contempt, and every form of ill-will to the Government.
Disloyalty perhaps the best general term, comprehends every possible form of bad feeling to
the Government.
Where disapprobation of measures of Government it is motivated throughout by a desire to
excite, hatred, contempt and disaffection towards it. Any advocacy regarding change in form
of government or hatred or contempt or exciting disaffection towards the present Government
comes within the mischief of this Section.90
So by looking various case laws, it is humbly submitted before the Honble Supreme Court that
the taking the cloak of rally which was organized in Delporto by GNUSU to show solidarity to
the injured students of Utkal, Ramaiya Kumar in his speech stated that Mashkir deserved to be
independent and that they will seek independence at any cost, shows that the Ramaiya Kumar
intended of creating public disorder or disturbance of law and dissatisfaction towards the
Government and hence should be liable under Section 124A of Indian Penal Code.
CONTENTION IV:-ACT
FUNDAMENTAL
OF LATHI CHARGE BY POLICE DID NOT INFRINGED THE
RIGHT UNDER
ARTICLE 19 (1) (B)
OF
TOMAR RASHID:- It is humbly
Ratanlal Dhirajlals Law of Crimes Vol. 1, 27th Ed. Pg. No.598.

AIR 1929 Cal 309; Abaji Annaji v. Luxman Tukaram, (1899) 2 Bom LR 286.
89
(1897) Ilr 22 Bom 112.
90
In Re: Sojoni Kanta Das; In Re: India In Bondage, (1930) 57 Cal 1217 (Sb).
87
88
12

submitted before this Honble Supreme Court that the Fundamental right under Article 19 (1)
(b) of Tomar Rashid is not violated as the act of police is saved under Article 19 (3) of the
Constitution.
The first thing that needs to be taken into concern is that, the assembly whether peaceful or not
peaceful, cannot be done on Highway, so on the prima facie, it becomes unlawful, and thus the
act done by police is not violative. For same Section 8B of Highway Act, needs to be taken
into concern.
Section 8 B91-Punishment for mischief by injury to highway. Whoever commits mischief by
doing any act which renders or which he knows to be likely to render any national highway
referred to in sub-section (1) of section 8A impassable or less safe for travelling or conveying
property, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to five years, or with a fine, or with both.
So it will amount to mischief in two conditions
Any act which makes it impassable and;
Any act which makes it less safe for travelling or conveying property
So to prove that act of Police was lawful, it is very important to prove that, act done by
protestors was wrong and thus, act of police in doing lathi charge was within the ambit of law.
In case of Radhey Sham v. P.M.G92 it was observed by the Honble Supreme Court that The
right of public meeting or of procession is not specifically guaranteed by the Constitution but
will follow from the Right of Assembly. In the interests of public order, the time, place and the
like of speeches in public places may be regulated.93
But there is no right to hold a meeting anywhere as the citizens please,94 e.g., on private
property or even on Government property.95 The right to hold meetings in public places is
subject to control by the appropriate authority regarding the time and place of the meeting.
96
In furtherance to this Honble Supreme Court also observed that The power of appropriate
authority to impose reasonable regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of the
people in the use of public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with the
fundamental right of assembly.97
91
Highway Act, 1959

AIR 1965 S.C. 311; Kedar Nath v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 S.C. 955.
93
Kunz v. N.Y. (1951) 340 US 290; Saia v. N.Y. (1948) 334 US 444.
94
Board v. Niranjan, AIR 1969 S.C. 966.
95
Himmat Lal. V. Police Commr., AIR 1973 S.C. 87.
96
Himmat Lal. V. Police Commr., AIR 1973 S.C. 87.
97
Himmat Lal. V. Police Commr., AIR 1973 S.C. 87
92
13

In the present matter the protesters were protesting against the government by blocking the
public highway which would directly endanger the public disorder and prevent the public to
pass by and make it less safe for travellers. To disperse the protesters, the police rightly lathi
charged and as a result Tomar Rashid got injured. It is humbly contended before this Honble
Supreme Court that the act of lathi charge by police was to disperse the protestors in order to
prevent any mischief or chance of violence on the public highway.
In case of ISKON v. Lee.98 U.S. Supreme Court held that The activities of ISKON for raising
fund for movement while making Sahkritan within the area could be prohibited since free
flow of traffic is likely to be disrupted and solicitation of money in the busy area which makes
visitors to stop is not permissible.
In another landmark case of Schneider v. State99 it was held that The right to assembly should
be so exercised as not to conflict with other lawful rights of individuals or the public. Thus,
there is no constitutional right to assemble or make a speech on a highway or near about so as
to cause a crowd to gather and to obstruct the highway.
Justice Beg in case of Himmat Lal. V. Police Commr.100Observed that If any such meeting
held on a public highway, must necessarily interfere with the user of the highway by others
who want to use it for the purpose for which highway must be deemed to be dedicated
There is no right to hold meetings on the public highways as the public rights therein are a right
to pass and re-pass; any lingering thereon is technically an obstruction and so constitute
trespass or nuisance against adjoining owners. Nor it is a defence to show that a clear passage
around the obstructing meeting was left: prima facie a meeting in a street or open space may
be a trespass, nuisance or contrary to some statute or by law.101
In the present matter before this Honble Court it is submitted that the protesters were blocking
and obstructing a public highway which they were not legally entitled to and as a result of
which the police rightly did its duty and lathi charged in order to clear the obstruction on the
highway. Also it was said in the case that, if the police feel that the presence or participation
of any person in a meeting or congregation would be objectionable, for some patent or latent
reasons as well as the past track record of such happenings in other places involving such
participants, necessary prohibitory order can be issued preventing the person from entering any
particular area or from holding any meeting.102
98
(1992) 120l. Ed. 2nd 541.

(1939) 308 147 (160).
100
AIR 1973 S.C. 87.
101
Ridges Constitutional Law, 8th Edition, Page 338
102
State Of Karnataka v. Praveen Bhai Thogadia, AIR 2004 S.C. 2081.
99
14

Under the common law, which is followed in commonwealth, including India, the primary
purpose for which a highway is supposed to be dedicated to the public is their right to pass and
re -pass and to make any other use which may be regarded as incidental to passage. 103 But in
this present case, protest on Highway, is in no way incidental to it.
A public meeting is a static assembly of people and therefore the members are not exercising
their right as individuals over the Highway. Stationary gatherings on highways are regarded
as trespass at common law against the person or body in whom the highway is vested, unless
sanction of owner or local authority is obtained.104
Under the Indian Constitution, any action taken by police (including anticipatory action) to
regulate the holding of meetings on highways to prevent obstructions to the traffic would be
reasonable restriction under Art. 19(3).105 The fact that under the Indian Constitution the right
of assembly is a guaranteed fundamental right would not, therefore confer any right to assemble
on a highway for holding a meeting for any purpose.106Also it is humbly pleaded before this
Honble court that, if there will be any kind of assembly on Highway, that will lead to problem
to passer-by, and also an analogy can be drawn from the case of DPP v. Broome107 in which
the House of Lords held that everyone has the right to use the highway free from the risk of
being compulsorily stopped by any private citizen and compelled to listen to what he does not
want to hear. There is no such right of pickets to stop vehicles and to compel the drivers and
their occupants to listen to what they have to say. In Tynan v. Balmer108 it was held that when
the organiser had directed 40 pickets to walk in a circle in the highway near the factory
entrance, this amounts to an obstruction of the highway and not protected by the statute. Hence
it is humbly submitted before the Honble Court that in light of above authorities it can be said
that the Assembly of the protesters were illegal and was not under the purview of Article 19
(1) (b) of the Constitution and the police did its duty well under its authority and power to
disperse such illegal assembly by the protestors as it was causing mischief and public disorder
on highway by obstructing the public highway.
103
Harrison v. Rutland, (1893) 1QB 142 (154).

DURGA D AS B ASU COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, (8th Edition 2007, Wadhwa
Publication, Pg No. 2686.)
105
Himmat Lal. v. Police Commr., AIR 1973 S.C. 87.
106
Himmat Lal. v. Police Commr., AIR 1973 S.C. 87.
107
(1974) AC 587.
108
(1967) 1 QB 91.
104
15
PRAYER
Wherefore, in the light of the facts stated, issues raised, authorities cited and arguments
advanced, it is most humbly prayed before this Honble Court that it may be pleased to adjudge
and declare that:
1. Section 14A of the Press Councils Act, as Constitutional.
2. Section 124-A of Indian Penal Code, 1860 as Constitutional.
3. Conviction of Ramaiya Kumar for act of Sedition under Section 124-A of Indian Penal
Code, 1860
4. The act of Police lawful as it is in within the ambit of Article 19(1) (b) of the
Constitution.
Or give any other order which the Supreme Court may deem fit in the ends of Justice, Equity
and Good Conscience.
All of which is most humbly and respectfully submitted.
PLACE-
Indiana
s/d
DATE-
COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
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IMS UNISON UNIVERSITY 4TH NATIONAL MOOT COURT

RAMAIYA KUMAR & ORS.

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

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124 -A OF IPC IS CONSTITUTIONAL :-.........................................5

[2.1] HONBLE SUPREME COURT ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SEDITION -.....................5

KUMAR IS LIABLE UNDER SECTION 124-A OF PENAL CODE.....9

[3.1] ROLE OF INTENTION IN CRIME OF SEDITION .............................................................11

19 (1) (B) OF TOMAR RASHID..................,...................................15

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III . TABLE OF CASES

High School & ors.

Babulal Parate v. State of Maharashtra,

AIR 1961 SC 884 (890)

Bal Gangadhar Tilak v.Queen Empress

(1908) 10 Bom LR 848

Bal Gangadhar Tilak v. Queen Empress

(1897) ILR 22 Bom 112 11

Bengal Immunity Co Ltd v. State of Bihar & AIR 1955 SC 661

Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of A.P ,

(1997) 7 SCC 430

AIR 1957 SC 628

Chintamanrao V. State of M.P.

AIR 1951 SC 118

Commr. Of Police v. C. Anita.

AIR 2004 SC 4423

Debi Soren and Ors. v. The State

AIR 1954 Pat 254.

Mufti Fakkhurl Islam v. Emperor

AIR 1943 All 244

AIR 1963 SC 812;