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CGSC Form 160 Army-CGSC-P3-1966-20 Mar 53-5M

13 Mar 61



After reaching a high level in November,

shipping losses were sharply reduced in December
to the lowest level for any month since last 101------1----1---1---1---+-----1--+---1-11-170


Chart I shows the tonnage lost as the re­

sult of submarine action since the beginning of 5ll

1941 as well as the tonnage loss of tankers and I

cargo-passenger vessels. It includes ships that

may have been used for transporting troops re­

.... 3

gardless of whether or not the ships were classi­ ~
fied as commissioned auxiliaries. - 2D

The shipping losses due primarily to sub­ 'I----I---'-----+-~--/--J~"

marine action but including a small amount of \'"

tonnage lost through air attack are shown in the

following table. Marine casualties and losses
due to enemy mines or surface craft are excluded. CHART I

The figures for November sinking~ hav'e been re-

Sinkings ~j A~~ied and Neut~a~ Me~­
vised upwards from those shown in this Summary c~ant Vesse~s by EnemySubma~ines
last month as more complete information became
available; doubt less the December total will also prove to be somewhat higher when final
figures are avai lab j.e . These totals are based on reports received up to January 12, 1943.


Merchant Vessels SunkBy Enemy Action (ExcludinQ Sfnkings by Surface Craft and Mines)
December November
Ships Tonnage Ships Tonnage
North Atlantic7West of 500 • 7 36,709 27 164,503
North Atlantic-East of 50 0 • 32 191,334 50 289,647
South Atlantic . . . . 7 38,497 12 72,553
East Coast of Africa-Mozambique. 5 21,522 ·21 115,963
North African Coast . . 4 31,440 18 172,232
Other Areas . 1 6,3 2 3 2 15,332
Overdue, Presumed, Lost 10 48,688 9 28,770
Total . . . . . . . . . . . 374,513 139 859,000
Cargo and Passenger Vessels. 325,063
- -
129 784,794
Tankers. . • . 49,450 10 74,206
Total . . . '. . . . . . 139 859,000
NORTH ATLANTIC - WEST OF scoW. Only seven ships were lost in the North Atlantic
west.of scoW during December, due largely to reduced attacks in the Trinidad-Marti­
nique-Caribbean area. In the preceding month, 24 ships were sunk ~n the western
North At1anticsouth·of latitude 20 0N, while in the same region only five ships were
lost in December. The extent to which the enemy has abandoned the Western Atlantic,
at least temporarily, as a theater of submarine war is indicated by the fact that
while only seven ships, with tota~ gross tonnage of 36,709 tons, were lost in Decem­
ber, the losses for the area for the entire year are estimated at 619 ships, total­
ing 3,289,787 tons~

NORTH ATLANTIC - EAST OF scoW. Excluding losses in the North African Coast - Gi­
bralter area, sinkings east of. scoW in the North Atlantic declined sharply. Thirty­
two ships with a tonnage of 191,334 tons were lost, as compared with fifty ships in
the preceding month and forty-three during OctOber. The enemy continued his policy
oJ at tacking convoys with U-boat packs, twenty out of :twenty-three ~hips sunk North
of latitude 30 0 N being in convoys although two of these were stragglers. One convoy
lost four ships, while another that was sUbject to a particularly persistent attack
lost eleven ships, with a possibility that other ships in this latter convoy that
have not as yet been reported sunk may have been lost.

NORTH AFRICAN COAST - GIBRALTAR. Although a substantial amount of shipping has gone
to Africa to supply and reinforce the United States Fifth Army, only four ships are
known to have been lost during December in the North African Coast - Gibraltar area.
Furthermore, three of these were relatively small vessels. The losses in this area
amounted to only 31,440 gross tons, as compared with 172,252 gross tons in November.

SOUTH ATLANTIC. Sinkings in the South Atlantic decreased for the second successive
month, amounting to only seven ships, aggregating 38,497 tons. In November, twelve
ships were lost in this area, and in October -- during which a surprise attack was
made in the Capetown area -- twenty ships were sunk.

OVERDUE AND PRESUMED LOST. Ten ships due in port in December, with a tonnage of
48,688 tons, are so long overdue as to be presumed 10st. While the number is nearly
the same as in the preceding month; the'tonnage is considerably larger. As most of
the overdue ships are of good size, it is probable that they were lost as the result
of enemy action.

LOSSES DURING 1942. Losses of merchant vessels and transports suffered by the Unit­
ed Nations and Neutrals, due to all causes, are believed to have been about 8,100,000
. gross tons, and to have equaled about 44% of the total losses in the three and a
quarter years of war since September, 1939.

Construction of new merchant ships in the United States aggregated approximately
8,200,000 deadw~ight tons, but the loss of 8,100,000 gross tons is approximately the
equivalent of 12,150,000 deadweight tons of new ship construction, since roughly 1.5
deadweight tons is the equivalent of 1.0 gross ton. It is probable, therefore, that
the allied and neutral nations suffered a net loss in shipping during 1942 as it is
unlikely that ship construction outside the United States equaled 4,006,000 tons.
It is also of interest to note the particularly heavy toll that has been taken of
tankers; only sixty-two were constructed in the United States, while the indicated
loss of tankers by allied and neutral nations was two hundred and sixty-eight ves­
sels. It is evident, furthermore, that with the huge military need for petroleum,
the lo'ss of the Far Eastern oil fields and the comparative inaccessibility" of Near­
East oil supply, the need for tankers is greater than ever before.

During December no'depth bombs were dropped in combat by Army aircraft in these
areas. Navy planes and blimps participated in four attacks off possible U-boat con­
tacts. As in November, the lack of allti-submarine activity was due to a lack of
submarines. The record low density Of,l.7 in November was further reduced in Decem­
ber to 0.7, and this figure is based on estimates which include.- some merely "pos­
sible" contacts. There is no positive evidence that there were any enemy submarines
in these frontiers during this month.

A summary of hours flown by Army and Navy aircraft engaged in anti-submarine

operations in ESF and GSF is presented in the following table. A detailed repo~t of
operations for the 25th and 26th A/S Wings is included at th~ end of this Summary.

Recon Escort Special Training Total Hrs.

Army Bomb. and Observ. 3940 457 2235 7235

Army CAP, CP . . 9762 15393
Total Army. 13702 6233 457 2235

Navy Planes. 4551 5493 617 * 10661

Blimps . . * * * * 2272
Total Navy., . * * * * 12933

Total Army and Navy . . * I * * * 35'560

* Complete data not available.


Preliminary reports indicate that the decrease in the number of /attacks on mer­
chant vessels during the month of December was accompanied by a considerable drQP in
the number of attacks on U-boats.
In the U. S. Strategic Area (an irregular area, extending roughly half way
across the North and South Atlantic) there were fourteen attacks, as compared with
forty-six in November, on which the evidence obtained to date indicates that a U­
boat was present. Of these fourteen attacks, six were made by aircraft and eight by
surface craft·.
Four of the aircraft attacks are believed to have caused damage. Two of these
attacks took place off Natal, Brazil, a region in which the U-boats were operating
in some number during December. Another was east of Trinidad, while the fourth oc­
curred south of Iceland in the North Atlantic convoy lanes. Three of the attacks
by· surface craft also appear to have produced 'd~mage, bringing· to seven the· total
number of attacks on U-boats in the U. S~ Strategic Area believed to have resuited
in damage.
The only information now available concerning attacks in the Eastern ~tlantic
consists of brief reports from the Coastal Command, stating that their planes made
forty-one attacks in the period between the first and the twentieth of December. No
assessment of these attacks was included so it is not possible to determine the total
number causing damage to enemy submarines.
The number of. successful attacks on U-boats during December appears to be quite
low, but in view of the fact that the weather was bad during the month and that an
unusually large proportion of the· U-boats were operating in the mid-ocean regions of
the North Atlantic convoy· area, out-of range ()f aircraft operating from established
bases, the low number of known successful attacks is not surprising.

The November issue of this Summary showed the. enemy strategy in the disposition
of submarines by plotting the positions of vessels sunk by submarines during six­
month periods s.ince the beginning of the war. The accompanying Charts numbered III
to ,IX show the s inkings by months from June to December 1942, inclus i ve, as indic­
ative of the changes in enemy strategy that have occurred in recent months.

The months of heaviest enemy sinkings off the Atlantic Coast of the United
States ended in May and coincided with the organization of adequate air and surface
defense. The first air aw:t.. surface escorted ship movements began in April, 1942,
and the f.ormal convoy systeJ'twas inaugurated on May 14. The chart for June shows the
pattern of sinkings moving of Mexico and the Caribbean areas.
Adequate defense of shipping was provided thereafter in the Gulf by the Navy and by
units of the I Bomber Command, which began operations in this area as the Gulf Task
Force. By August the/ Gulf was practically free of sinkings, which were then concen­
t rated around Cuba and in the Trinidad area (chart V). By September, the enemy had
given up attacking around Cuba, Haiti, and Puerto Rico (chartVI). Enemy attacks
continued in the Trinidad area from June to November, but air and surface protection
of shipping has been gradually increased and the low number of sinkings in this area
in December indicates that it is becoming effective.

,In general, the disposition of enemy submarines as shown by the record of sink­
ings from July to December, 1942, reveals a steady departure of submarines from the
coasts of the Americas.

As outlined in this report a month ago, this movement was believed to be due to
the increasing hazards to submarines in'these areas resulting from better defenses
and to the growing strategic importance of intercepting transatlantic traffic.

The chart of sinkings during December, as well as the estimated distribution of

U~boats, as of January 8, shown in chart· II, justify the tentative conclusion that
the enemy followed the capabili ty outlined in last month's Summary "to intercept
North Atlantic and African Convoys by mld-ocean screens and pack attacks." In fact,
Admiral Doenitz has been quoted in the press as saying in a Christmas Eve broadcast

Estimated of Enemy Submarines _. '7 8, 19lJ.3

IIJ. ".~:


o 0

o 0





~: o 0


o 0

CHART V August CHART VI Sept embe r

fhe accompanying cha-rts

show by months the LOC4­
o <;>
tion of sinkings of aL­
o 0 8" Lied and neut-ral me-rchant
vessels, including ships
used as t-roopt-ranspo -rts.
1-rom them, the month~to­
month changes in enemy
st-rategy in aLte-ring the
disposition of ~is sub­
'laa-rines a-re evident. Lo­
cations, as shown on the
cha-rts, a-re app-roximate


that U-boats are forming a defensive ring rather than operating offensively. Whether
or not the enemy intends to follow out the capability, also mentioned a month ago,
of attacking high speed convoys off ~he coast of North Africa, is not yet etident~

.The mid-ocean screen tactics were comparatively unsuccessful in December, how­

ever, andfri'endl:y, shi;ppi"ng losses have continued at a low level in the first two
weeks of Januar~. In the absence of complete information, it is difficult to weigh
the factors wh~ch may have been involved in the failure of enemy submarines in De­
cember. Important submarine bases in France were sUbjected to heavy bombardment
during November and December (see section IV). However, the effect on the operations

of German submarines in December cannot be precisely evaluated. It is estimated
that the number of enemy sUb~arines operating at sea in December was no less than in
Novemb~r, but the extent and duration of U-boat trips may have been restricted by
the bombing of enemy bases. Final appraisal of the effect on submarine operations
of the continued bombing of bases must be necessarily suspended until more complete
data can be obtained.

On the basis of information received from Naval sources, it is believed that

the volume of transatlantic merchant shipping was not reduced in December or the
strength of surface escort increased.

Factors bearing on the reduction of losses can probably be found in the fact
that the enemy chose to employ the strategy of defensive mid-ocean screens. These
screens were generally spread over an area :f:rom 56 0 north latitude to slightly south
of the equator. With the exception of th~ sinkings off the bulge of Brazil (which
might be vtewed as defensive screen operations) there was no successful offensive
series of attacks in a relatively undefended coastal area as lias been customary in
previous months. The enemy's reliance on defensive screens over such a large area
gave a wide margin of possible error in intercepting convoys and during Decem~er the
enemy was, in fact, unwise or unlucky in the disposition of submarines. Finally,
bad weather conditions were enco"untered in the North Atlantic. Although there is
disagreement among Naval experts as to the effect of bad weather ~n submarine war­
fare - some contending that the submarine's offensive. operat~ons are more adversely
affected than the defensive activities of the convoy and others making the opposite
contention - it would seem that in mid-ocean screen operations submarines are more
affected by ad~erse weather conditions. Mid-ocean areas are generally outside the
range of aircraft protection so that regardless of weather, the battle is between
submarine and surface escort. In good weather, submarines should be able visually
to detect a convoy thirty-five to fifty miles away. This great advantage to the
submarine is lost in bad weather and, in their effort to intercept convoys in mid­

ocean over a wide area of possible convoy routes, the loss of this advantage is a
serious restriction on, submarine success.

Although a month is too brief a period on which to base conclusions as to prob­

able success and probable continuance of German mid-ocean screen strategy, the com­
parative failure of this strategy in December can be attributed tentatively to the
general difficulty of interception in areas offering wide opportunities for the
,avoidance of sUbmarines, to the faulty disposition of enemy submarines in December
aRd the impairment of enemy operations by adverse weather conditions.

The strategic necessity for enemy interference with the support of Allied of­
fensives in Russia and Africa obviously remains. A continued failure to interfere
successfully during winter months in mid-ocean operations would make it probable
that the enemy would exercise either or both of his capabilities of concentrating
'attacks nearer the transatlantic shipping points of origin or points of destination.
In addition, sporaqic attacks in coastal areas, both for the purpose of sinking
unescorted shipping and for the purpose of inducing us to hold air and surface
forces for the defense of th~se areas, is an enemy capability which cannot be dis­

,~,_.I[ &




An enemy submarine was attacked on January 11th in the Bay Qf Biscay by the
crew of a B-24, piloted by 1st Lieutenant Walter Thorne of Marietta, Ohio, of the
1st Antisubmarine Squadron, now on detached service.

Although complete details of the attack are not available at present, prelim­
inary dispatches indicate that the submarine was sighted on the surface. As the
plane approached for a bomb run, the U-boat started to crash dive. However, before
it disappeared from view, 1st Lieutenant Brent F. Walker, of Jefferson City, Mo.,
attacked with machine gun fire. It is presumed that the B-24 was armed with the
British 250- lb. Torpex depth bombs. The approach on the first run apparently was
frDm the stern, since the first three depth bombs are reported to have exploded
fifty, thirty and sixteen feet from the submarine's stern, while others straddled
the conning tower. Private R. R. \Villiamson, of Austin, Texas, reported seeing a
part of the IT-boat in the explosion geyser and fired another burst of "machine gun
fire into it. On a second run, Lieutenant Thorne saw an oil patch, 200 yards wide,
which spread from a geyser-like center.

1st Lieutenant Irving T. Colburn, of Chicago, was Bombardier, and other crew
members included Co-pilot James Anderson, of Austin, Texas; Staff Sergeant George
,Fowler, of Spartanburg, S.C.; Staff Sergeant Hollander of Indiana; and Technical
Sergeants Engles of Hazleton, Pa., L. T. Figg of Crew, Va., and J. Bristow of
Evansville, Ind.

After six months of anti-submarine patrol without sighting a U-Boat, tbe crew
of a Navy PBY made' six sight ings in one da'y and sank one enemy submarine.

The aircraft was on an escort mission about 500 miles south of Iceland when
the sightings were made. However, only one attack could be delivered as the subs
had submerged too long in all other cases.
The plane was flying through clouds at 2200 feet when the sixth sighting was
made at six miles distance. The bow of the submarine was throwing up spray and
there was a definite wake. Approach was made, taking advantage of cloud cover, and
the run started from two miles away. At 1200 yards the sub opened fire with its
bridge AA gun. The plane banked sharply, replied with its waist gun, turned back
again and, from about 100 feet, dropped one MK 29 depth bomb set for 25 feet. The
bomb exploded just aft of the still visible conning tower.

f.:l·17l fJ\ fl ;/~''''


Immediately after, a man and some wob\aen',debris were seen in the water.
The conning tower had disappeared in theb~rst;hf the exploding depth bomb. Several
minut~s later two more men and objects resembling escape lungs were observed. Air
bubbles, large quantities of oil and more debris appeared. All three men drowned.
It was intended to drop a full stick in this attack but, because of faulty
m~chanism, all but one bomb failed to release.


. On December 17 in 0636 S, 33LJ.O W, a PBY-S(A) made what may have been a "kill"
on an enemy submarine. Timely employment of baiting tactics figured significantly
in the success of the attack.

The aircraft was flying at 2,000 feet, with unlimited visibility and scattered
clouds with base at 1,800 feet. At 1335Q. awake was sighted about 10 miles ahead,
slightly· to port and on a parallel course. The plane nosed down and increased power,
but arrived over the swirl too late to deliver an attack. A smoke float was ~ropped
and the plane climbed to 3,500 feet, flying through the tops of the clouds.

After circ1ing- in a wide arc for 30 minutes 'a small black object and a wake
were sighted in approximately the same position. The pilot throttled back and dove
into the nearest cloud, heading for the submarine. He emerged at 2,500 feet to see
the still surfacing U-boat about 2 miles dead ahead. Approach was made without
power and two Mark 29 and one Mark 17 depth bombs were dropped from less than 50
feet while the submarine's decks were st'ill awash. Explosions were estimated as
being well within lethal range, apparently just beneath the sub.

Results of' the attack are indicated in the accompanying sequence of photographs.

Photo NO.1 - A few seconds before bombs were dropped. Sub with decks awash
and still coming up. Altitude of plane was forty feet.

Photo NO.2 - 210 seconds after drop. Picture shows sub rising. Large air
bubble patch, which appeared about 2 minutes after attack, is
fading somewhat but there is still evidence of escape of air.
About 30 feet of bow emerged at a LJ.5 degree angle, extending 15
to 20 feet in the air and settling back as the conning tower
appeared. Residue of the TNT charge is seen behind the damaged

Photo NO.3 - 235 seconds after drop. Despite time interval of about 25 sec­
onds since Photo NO.2, conning tower is in 'almost the same po­
Photo No.1 -- Run on Surfacing U-Boat.

Photo No.2 -- Bow Rising After Attack.

Photo No.3 -- Finis?


sition relative to residue and air bUbbles, indicating almost

complete loss of forward motion. A considerable escape of air is
indicated just behind the conning tower and at the stern. For­
ward gun and bo~ are also visible. Sub is settling, stern low.

About one minute later the U-boat settled slowly beneath the surface, still
without forward motion and still emitting patches of air bubbles.

It is the pilot's opinion that the sub thought it had not been sighted by the
plane ,on the first run. Even if the plane was seen after this run, was started, it
is possible that the submarine did not realize it had been seen by the plane.

By not dropping his bombs on an indistinct target and by withdrawing and using'
cloud cover, the pilot was offered a more favorable opportunity to deliver a suc-'
cessful attack.


While on anti-submarine patrol in the Trinidad are~ a U. S', plane had the un~
usual experience of flying over a completely surfaced enemy U-boat with ,the right
wing clearing the periscope by less than eight feet. The aircraft was flying through
scattered thunder s·howers at 5000 feet when an object was sighted at a distance of
5 miles. Using cloud cover and flying out of the sun, the plane approached on
course 70 0 , apparently unobserved. A run was made on the fully surfaced U-boat
which was on course 350 0 and which had several men on deck and conning tower. Bombs
were released at approximately 50 feet, but, by error, mousetrap bombs were re­
leased instead of depth bombs. No explosions were noted.

A slight vertical turn'was made to the left and· another run was made with the

plane on course 055 0 and·the U-boat on course 3500 • One man was still visible in

the conning tower and the decks were just.begin-ning to be awash as the plane flew

over. Again the 9-epth bombs ~ailed to drop, though· both pickle and manual release

were used. The plane circled and made'a third run on the same course as the sub­

marine 10 to IS' seconds after the conning tower had disappeared. Again the . depth

bombs failed to release.

Neither the mousetrap bombs nor .30 and .50 calibre machine gunfire, which
,''las 'directed at thesubm~tHE(h had any visible effect. The plane ~emained in the
area for 3 hours and 45 ~*~fe~, using theexce)jl~'n( qloud cover, but saw no further
t race of the enemy craft F~i~~~nce.
fuf ~-;' t~ of'~,,"~.anY;fl~~~~~;J~;J!.:
i:;;.OJ ..•_.' ',:.,--~.- ~_. .; ;~ l~ ~':'/';": ;i~ ~-. :D:. i,.J'r
..-.. .. J __

Initial Splash of Depih Bombs. Subsiding Splash of Depth Bombs.

Detonations of Depth Bosbs.

The U-boat was seen by every man aboard the plane and all agree that it was a
7Lt-0 ton German submarine. There were 8-10 men on the conning tower and 3 or Lt­
, around the bow and stern gun. They appeared to be engaged in work of some kind
but they made no attempt to man the guns. The attack was evidently a complete sur­
prise, as during the first run all enemy personnel seemed almost stunned. No one
made a move, they just stared at 'the plane.

The color of the submarine was a fairly dark brownish green overlaid in blended
patches of a lighter shade. The crew thought this was excellent camouflage ;for
those waters. It was definitely stated by the crew of the plane that no anti-air­
craft gun was mounted in the basket aft of the conning tower. A black swastika was
seen o~ the side.
Failure of the depth bombs to release was caused -by failure to turn on ,the in­
dividual wing torpedo release switches.


On November 17, about 75 miles east of Martinique, an RAF' Hudson was patrol-,
ling at 5000 feet over scattered clouds 'with base at Lt-ooo-feet. Between the clduds,
a fully surfaced submarine was sighted at a distance of 8 miles. The pilot im­
mediately dived to attack and, from an altitude of 50 feet, dropp~d four 250 pound
torpex filled Brit ish depth bombs set at 25 feet and spaced for 36 feet. 'According"
to the estimate of the crew, one bomb entered the water slightly astern and to
starboard of, the sUbmarine, one directly astern, and one slightly to port and with­
in 10 feet of the hull. Ninety seconds later the U-boat submerged at an estimated
speed of less than 5 knots~ However, no evidence of damage was observed.

It is evident from the accompanying photographs made during this attack that
the impacts occurred considerably further astern than estimated by the crew and the
explosions were probably outside lethal range. Only one impact and burst are shown,
which suggests that the actual spacing was clo$er together than the s pacing set.

The fact that the U-boat remained on the surface 90 seconds after explosion

of the bomb and then sUbmerged slowly indicates some damage or difficulty.




The development of the flat nose depth bomb was described briefly in the Novem­
ber, 19~2, issue of this Summary. The full report of the tests is now available.
They were c~nducted by the Aircraft Armament Unit of the U. S. Naval Air Station at
Norfolk, Virginia, assisted by the Anti-Submarine Warfare Operations Research Group,
and resulted i~ the adoption of the new type of nose.

The tests of round nose and flat nose depth bombs were exhaustive. Nearly ~oo
Mark 17 and Mark 29 depth bombs were dropped from airplanes flying at varying speeds
and altitudes. The Atlantic Fleet Camera Party, in conjunction wlth surface vessels
furnished by the Fifth Naval District, took still and motion pictures of the drops.
Pictures taken from a tug towing the target, as well as pictures made from a second
vessel 1000 feet abeam of the target and from, a plane circling over the target, re­
corded the height of the airplane, the point of impact, the point of explosion, and
the time interval between impact and explosion. From these, by means of triangula­
tion, it was possible to compute the exact underwater trajectory of the bomb, both
as to range and deflection. In addition, valuable information was obtained concern­
ing ricochets and broaches at various airplane speeds and altitudes.

As a result of the tests, the following conclusions were reached by the Air­
craft Armament Unit:

(a) That the underwater travel of the service (round nose) Mark 17 depth bomb
using a 25 ft. depth spring in the Mark 2~ hydrostatic fuse, measured in yards
from point of impact, ave'raged approximately one-fifth the ground speed in
knots but, when equipped with the flat nose, the underwater travel averaged
only one-fifteenth the ground speed in knots.

(b) That the underwater travel of the service (round nose) Mark 29 depth bomb
using a 25 ft. depth spring in the Mark 2~ hydrostatic "fuse, measured in yards
from the point of impact, averaged approximately one-seventh the ground speed
in knots,but, when equipped with the flat nose, the underwater travel averaged
only one-twelfth the ground speed in knots.

(c) That both the service type Mark 17 and Mark 29 will ricochet or broach
at ground speeds in excess of 130-1~0 knots, even when dropped from an ,altitude
as high as 270 feet.

(d) That when equipped with flat noses, the ricochets and broaches are reduced
but will occur at speeds in excess of 180~190 knots, even when dropped from an
altitude as high as 250 feet.

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The accompanying tharts spow the range and dispersion of the service Mark 17
and the Mark 17 equipped with the modified flat nose. The bunching of the explo­
sions of the flat nose bombs stands out in sharp contrast to the dispersion of the
round nose bombs, both as to range and deflection to the right and l~ft. Further­
more, it should be noted that a large proportion of the round nose bombs broached,
or broached and jumped, while no broaches occurred with the flat nose bombs.

As the result of tests made in July, 19~2, it had been learned that the serv­
ice type depth charge would invariably ricochet at altitudes of les$ than 100 feet
and ground speeds in excess of 130 knots. A majority of the drops in this test,
therefore, were dropped at airspeeds and altitudes that would not result in rico­
chets. Richochets are not shown on either of the ,accompanying charts, but the re­
duction in tendency to richochet on the lower speed ranges by using the flat nose
seems clear from the following table:
Knot Forward Travel Knot Forward Travel
Speed Altitude of Ricochet Speed Altitude of Ricochet 91 114
155 175 111
162 153 84
162 142 No Ricoch~ts in this
180 141 105 speed range ..
181 160 117
182 177 135
185 256 153
. 196 162 111 195 196 159
232 205 244 318
205 309 90
213 48 279
No tests in 213 247 234
this speed range. 223 212 198
232 76 .

If the arparent results of these tests are borne out in actual use against sub­
marines, the development of the flat nose depth bomb should increase the number of
'kills to a very material extent. These more accurate bombs, combined with the more
powerful Torpex explosive, look like very bad news to U-boat crews.


While it is elementary that an error in computing ~ltitude has a pronounced ef­

fect on the accurac,y ~f bombing, the supreme importance of accurate knowledge of
altitude in low level bombing is not always kept in mind. A small error in judging'
altitude in high.level bombing will make but little difference in the accuracy of
aim but at low levels, at 136 m.p.h., an error of as little as 20 feet from a pre­
sumed altitude o~ 100 feet will cause a range error of as much as 50 feet, often the
difference between a kill and a miss. At about 20~ m.p.h. the error in impact will
be about 75 feet. Similarly, from the 50 foot level, an error of only ten feet in
al~itude will produce range errors of 35 feet and ~5feet, respect ively t at the as­
sumed speeds Of.136 and 204 m.p.h. From the accompanying chart the error in impact
related to' error in judging altitude may be computed.
The common form of altimeter, which depends ot} air pressure, is a reliable in­
strument provided it is correctly set for the true barometic pressure, but - as
every' flyer knows - an airplane on patrol frequently passes through areas of varying
pressure and, .unless th is is realized and ,the altimeter readj usted, an incorrect
reading will be obtained. This fallibility has caused inaccurate bombing and has
been a frequent cause of plane crashes in bad weather.
~ tt

,,~ 5

~K 3

~~ 2
~~. J,



A new radio altimeter has been developed which not only is more accurate but
operates entirely independently of barometric pressures as it utilizes radar prin­
ciples. These altimeters are of two types: one is known as the AYA and the other
as the AYB or AYD. Th~ AYA is useful up to an altitude of 20,000 feet, is accurate
to within 50 feet at low altitudes and weighs about 951bs. It is relatively sim­
ple to operate, requiring only about two hours of trainin~ and may be used on all

A new and improved model, the AYB or AYD, is useful up to qao feet, is accu­
rate to within 10 feet and may be used right down to sea or land level. The weight
is only 25 lbs; it is simple to operate and suitable for any plane. An added
feature of the AXB or AYD is a control, tied into flight control equipment, to pre­
vent the plane\ going below any specified altitude.

It is planned that all aircraft engaged in anti-submarine warfare will be

equipped with these low altitude radio altimeters, and it is expected that they

~ only improve bombing accuracy but
in bad weather.
wiui~~~\~~w~~)~tj'Y flying


Delivery of Torpex filled Mark 17 depth bombs for use against submarines has
begun although the initial output is being sent to the areas of greatest U-boat ac­
tivity. While production will not be in quantity prior to April 1, 1943, it is ex­
pected that the Torpex depth bomb will soon become the standard attack weapon.

Torpex has long been used by the British and experience has proved it superior
to T.N.T. It is slightly heavier but nearly 50% more powerful than r.N.T. Unfor­
tunately an increase in explosive power does not mean a directly proportionate in­
crease in lethal range and, in fact, the whole question of lethal range, irrespec­
tive of the explosive used, is subject to controversy. Naval authorities estimate,
however, that the Torpex-filled Mark 17 depth bomb, which weighs 33 Ibs. more than
the Mark 17 filled with T.N.T., has a lethal range of 24 feet. ' This compares with
an estimated 17 to 19 foot lethal range on the Mark 17 filled with T.N.T.

Night illumination of targets in anti-submarine warfare remains a difficult

problem. The Navy is experimenting with the development of ,searchlights but, to
provide adequate illumination sufficiently far ahead of the airplane, searchlights
have to be large and involve considerable weight. An additional disadvantage of the
searchlight is that it spots the airplane and makes it an excellent target for AA
fire from the submarine.

The Army Air Forces has experimented with rocket-mqtor flares, which have been
tested .by the Sea Search Group at Langley Field. Initial tests indicated satis­
factory results with star sheli flares igniting 1.1 miles ahead of the plane and
providing excellent illumination of the target. Deyelopment and procurement dif....
ficulties have been encountered, but efforts are being made to expedite this project
since it appears to be an adequate solution of the night illumination problem.



On October 21, 1942, the first raid was made on German U-boat bases by United
\ '

States Army Air 'Forces planes, when B-17 Flying Fortresses and B-2LJ. Liberators car­
ried out a heavy attack on the submarine base at Lorient. The results included two
submarines believed to be sunk or damaged, the des'truc t ion of mechanics 'work shops,
many bomb hits on the U-boat pens, nearby buildings and docks, and between two hurr­
, (

dred and three hundred people killed. On November 9, United States pilots flew two
hundred and fifty miles through the heavy opposition of German fighters and stiff
anti-aircraft barrages to blast the sub.m.arinebase at St. Nazaire. This heavily
defended port at the mouth of the Loire River had been pounded thirty-eight times
before by -the Royal Air Force. The American planes reported many hits on "the docks,
causing severe damage. Buildings, work shops and railroad depots'were also hit and
the port was reported. to have been put out of action for several days.

Since these first two 'attacks, nine more air raids have been carried out by
United States forces against German submarine bases on the West Coast of France. The
importance of these bases in U-boat operations cannot be overemphasized. They act as
the home ports of almost all the submarines operating in the Atlantic and U-boats re­
turn to them f~r supplies, repairs and for the necessary rest of submarine crews.
The impression seems to be widespread that these bases are practically invul­
nerable. Discouraging stories about tremendous submarine p'ens protected by concrete
roofs twelve feet thick have been emphasized. The Germans are naturally anxious to
create this impression. It is probably true that the pens themselves are extremely
well protected. However, the base facilities must of necessity be so large and so
intricate that they'cannot all be covered by concrete. Every base is surrounded by
innumerable machine shops, warehouses, railroads, living quarters, and other units,
all directly tied in~to the U-boat organization and all more or less vulnerable to
While it is very difficult at this t,ime to evaluate the results of the ,raids

on the U~boat bases, the reports of severe damage to enemy installations, numerous

bomb bursts on targets and vast fires indicate successes of some importance. The

possible effect of these raids on the German U-boat offensive cannot be overlooked

in any study of enemy submarine activities.

The accompanying photographs show two vIews of. the October 21st attack on


LORIENT. Bombs away, during a dayZight attack, (10/21/42) by fortress
22 aircraft oj llSAAF on the -rJ)a~t,rshe Zter at Lorient.
LORIENT. A. Late'r stage dU'ring the attack $ho'Ws a stick of bombs bU'rsting
ac'ross the ent'rance. channe L to the U-boat s'he lte'rs, (a'r'ro'W). 23


The following account illustrates the importance and necessity of knowing all
the safety procedures and checking to make certain that all prescribed equipment is
aboard the plane before taking off.
On a recent mission a B-25 aircraft from this Command sighted a lifeboat with
31 survivors from a vessel which had foundered in heavy seas about 60 miles off the
Atlantic Coast. The pilot immediately called the NCS arid.forwarded a form Sail,
reporting the location of the sighting. The crew then discovered that there was no
emergency kit aboard, although a pre-flight check to determine the status of safety
equipment is prescribed by AAFAC standing orders. This omission was reported to NCS
and the pilot was instructed to send out homing signals on his regular patrol fre­
quency. The signals were sent out and very shortly thereafter a Naval PBY arrived
on the scene.

The Wing Controller called another B-25 , which was on patrol approximately
twenty-five miles South of the' estimated 'position of the life boat. This second
plane was directed to the scene and the first plane was t,old to send MO's on the
homing frequency. The radio operator of the first p~ane was unable to adjust his
transmitter to the homing frequency and as a result the effort to home the second
plane failed. Arriving by dead reckoning at the estimated position withotit seeing
t,he lifeboat or ei ther of the other two planes, the pilot immediately started a square
search, ~nd' as he was turning on to the third -leg heard MO's, which were being sent
out by the PEY. By using his radio compass, he homed on this signal and spotted
the two planes and the lifeboat.
Arriving on the scene, this second B-25 dropped an emergency, kit, flares and
an S.O.S. machine. Although a parachute was available in the plane for the purpose,
it was not used,and the equipment broke up on striking the water.
A Coast Guard plane, which also reached the location, dropped emergency kits
and emergency rations, and then departed to direct a nearby vessel to the scene.
The {survivors retrieved and opened'these emergency kits and, by using the flash­
light, were picked up that same night by this vessel.
It is interesting to note that the first B-25 reported its posi tion as
39° 50' N, 71 0 la' W; the F.C.C. submitted a preliminary fix based on the MO's at
q.oo 00' N, 71 0 30' Wand a later fix at 39 0 50' N, 71 0 50' W; the second B-25 re­

ported the position by dead reckoning as 39 0 43' N, 71 0 15' W. The proxlmlty of all
the$e positions attests to the accuracy of the navigation and the value of the F.C.C.


A future addition to the safety devices already in use in this Command will be
one man life rafts which attach to parachutes. It is intended that these will be
worn by crews of planes which have poor water landing characteristics. The accbm-:
panying photographs illustrate the raft folded in the 'chute harness, and also
opened with its equipment.

It is reported that squadrons have, on occasion, experienced difficulty in the

operation of check valves incorporated in the CO2 bottle attached to life rafts,
particularly from the formation of ice in the valve. The valve is said to clog
with ice because of insufficient diameter. Fortunately most difficulties of this
type have been encountered during inspection tests by maintenance personnel.

If the manufacturer's instructions are followed, no difficulty should ·be- ex­

perienced. The cylinders are designed to operate in a horizontal position, with the

New one-man life rafts.

valve end down. If placed in this posit ion and the valve opened quickly,
little ice should form. However, in actual use, even though the valve end should
not be down, the taft would ordinarily be about 90% inflated before complete icing
took place. This wQuldgive sufficient buoyancy to the raft and, as the water warms
up the cylinder, complete inflation w~uld occur. Even though the gas should be re­
leased slowly, there is little liklihood of failure of the CO2 to inflate the raft.

It is well to remember that the CO2 valve should be opened quickly and turned
as far as possible. Failure to follow these inst,ructions is quite certain to re­
sult in the formation of ice, due to the fact that the slow expansion at the small
valve opening absorbs the heat available at this point, freezing any CO2 or water
vapor which may be present. Squadrons should be able to eliminate trouble due to
ice formation at the valve by following the instructions summarized above.


A communication from Wright Field has stated that the new Emergency Kits re­
quested by this Command will be delivered to the units between January 10 and Feb­
ruary 14. These kits are buoyant cylindrical shaped metal containers. approximately
48" by 15", fittedwithfel"t;, padding and a canvas cover. A sofoot length of rope, with
balsa wood blocks, all painted yellow, is fastened to the container. The kits will
be carried by all Ant isubmarine"Comma'nd ~quadrons and will c,on tain the following

24 pts. Drinking Water 1 Sponge

6 (~8 pkgs.) K Ration 1 Fishing Ki t~

4 Heat Pads 1 Knife (Scout Type)

2 First Aid Kits 1 Package of Bait

4 (cans) Fluorescein Dye Check 1 Water Storage Bag

4 Smoke Candles 2 Blankets ·

2 Whistles 2 Can Openers

2 Bailing Cups 6 Yellow KnIt Helmets

1 Mirror (Polished Reflecting) 1 Very Pistol and Six' Cartridges

1 Pocket Compass (Waterproof) 1 Large Tube (Grease) Sulphathiazole

2 Waterproof Match Cases and 1 Paulin, Blue One Side, Reflecting

Matches. Orange-Yellow on the Other Side



In accordance with, the· training directive contained in AAFAC Circular No~ 50-1,
dated December 7, 19~2, the 18th A/S Squadron (M) at Langley Field, Va., ha~ been
relieved of its operational mission and has been designated an operational training
squadron (OTS).

The major purpose of the OTS is to furnish trained combat crews to squadron com­
manders and thus relieve them of the responsibility of initial training of combat
crews.' I t is true that squadron commanders will still have the responsibili ty for
the maintenance of .combat crew proficiency and for accomplishing the training neces­
sitated by new developments in A/S·tactics and technique, but they will be free from
the slow and arduous work of initial training .

. This is especially important when it is realized that this CoIfunand is the only
component of the Army Air Forces within the continental limits of the U. S. with a
major operational mission. Experience has demonstrated that training for the main- \
tenance of combat crew proficiency' is in itself a big problem, which becomes even
more difficult when it must be carried out in conjunction with a primary operational
Standardization of training is an equally important reason for establishing an
operational tra.ining squadron. At the beginning of the war, squadrons of the I
Bomber Command were .placed on A/S patrol with little instruction in the tactics and
technique of this sort of mission. Prior to this time, the I Bomber Command had
concentrated upon training for the normal missions of bombardment aviation.

The use of the airplane in hunting and destroying submarines is still in an

early stage of development. New methods and new weapons, several of which are des­
cribed in this Summary, are being developed and tested-constantly. Suggestions for
changes in tact ics and technique are welcomed at Command Headquarters, are studied
with the aid of statisticians and scientists o~ the A/S Warfare Unit of the National
Defense Research Committee and tested through actual use. To make full use of these
new developments and to insure that all units are familiar with their use, standard­
ized'training -through OTS is essential.

The enemy has made effective use of submarine forces through shifting them

rapidly from one area to another and to meet these tactics the Command must ta~e

full advantage of the mobility inherent to the airplane by shifting squadrons or

even individual personnel from time to time ·to new areas of submarine activity.

, _

\ . . •

To do this efficiently, all training should be stJ-ndardized in order that new a: r ­
rivals in a theater of. operations can· ~it into~ew outfits immediately without fur­

ther"training. The preiiminatyt'~aining'in OTS'and the uniformity of AAFAC Stand­

ing Operating Prpcedure ~hould achieve this result'.

The, first class. for transition'and:<familiarization OR the B-2Q,ftfrplane began

at Langley FIeld, Va., on December 27; 19Q,2 ...Twelveair....ground· crews and one,tech­

n iC'al detail comprised thef irst class. Each air-grQund crew consisted of fa combat

. crew,. a .crewchief' and four . m~cha~ics., . ,The technical detail consisted ,Of .a proper­
lerspecialist, . instrument specialist, electrical specia~ist!·,. at"~dio
mec.hanie and atec~nical supply clerk of the 'Ors. is relatively
limited at the'" present time, but will" Itlcreasein scope for fut.llre\c'1~s~e~. Forthe
present, only one technical <:letai'l.fromeach AlB squadron will be 'trained .

Air training C01J'ers three phases: ( 1) Ini t ialtrans it ipn and familiarization ,
bot'h ~ay and night; (2) bombing and gunnery and (3) navigation, th'e tactical use
of radar and the conduct Of the,A/Smissi6~.. It-~ is8.1so contemp1ated that all hew
B....2Q,airplanes will be d~li1J'eredtothe 18th·A/S Squadron and wil1 'be. ferried to
their home i~tationsiby graduating crews.

The present class completed training January 21; 19Q,3 ,and a new class of six­
teen air~ground etews.and one ortwotechnlcaf details will begin training January 25,
19Q,3. The number of' crews will incr~ase with each succeeding 'class until Q,8 crews
are being. trained in each class.

In line with the policy of fllrnlsli'fng initially trained personnel to the

squadrons,. t.he.fi1t~t. class of .new. pilots. repor\~d . to. the· orB, .01\ January 9, . 19~3,

for a co~rsei.n~/S indoctrinatioll.t~lLining. The class consist~ of seventy-eight

recently graduated pilots. The present course will be completed on January· 31, 19if3,
and a new class of . about· seventy ]?ilotswill start Februa.tY1, 19Q,3. This· course
will su'pply ·.the:necessary ground· t.ral:ning.for ~he_new co.~pil~t insofar-as·AlS opeta~
t ions . 'are ·concerned. In .addition.,it wilL complete' the basic officer training· whi'ch
was initiated while the new pilot was still at flying school.

While the start bf the AAFAGibPerat,~Bna'i ,trainingsquadrol\ has .not been pre­
tentious, it is ev;ident that 'progress is being made and tha:tthe, specialized train­
ing requirement of this'C9mmand now has a Vleans of fulfil1meIlt.

~;j. ,~.
'I 'Ii


At 0915 on D~cember 10" 19LJ.2, First Lieutenant J~ssie McFerrin a.nd hIS crew,
in aB-3q.from'the8thAntisubmarine' Squadron,.flying·a convoy mission, were forced/
down at sea about 3 miles off Key Largo, Florida.' Lieutenant McFerrin was able to
land the.planesnccessfully, thu~ saviJ1ghi~:()w~ life and the lives of two of the
members of the crew. Unfortunately, the Radar operator, Pvt. Clarence'taug,hlin,
and Jhe bbmbardier, Pvt'.W1l1iam R .MccOrmi~k, ~e~t down ~ith the$hip.
,_. " .' ~,,'." ". - '. '. . . ' } . '-.' " "';,

At 'the' time of. the·<·accident thep11luewas:flying at an altitud'eof 800.feet.

The'sky was ov~rcast>, with ceiling 220o.feet a.nd visibility U'nli~ited'•. Lieutena.nt
McFerrin was circling the convoy when.ct possible target was sighted lq. miles away .
Making a steep right t~llrn, he leveled off and f.leWfor a few ,seconds when· sUddenly
the left engine'quit. Almost immediately the'right engine cut out. Ue instantly
put the nose of ~he plane down, turned the fuel selector valves for' right and left
rear ~ain tanks, \e~gaged the auxllitaryfuel 'pumps ,and set props forward to low
pitch, me8:nwhi;Leus,lngtR~handmi~~ t'Qwarn~hei~rew to pr.~J?al!e.fora.<:f~.h.:land~ ,
ingpn, the. wate.r. Du.r~ng these qpera,tiq'Psthe.plane ,1qsta~proxim~telY,30G,feet.
!' ,. . ". .,... . f .' . .... . ..•.. . .', ...•. " , ,,'

UpoIlreCeivln,gtihe'pilot's warnirtg the'bombardier,tooknp his :'statlon:lnthe

rear 'of }he .spi-p .. "The depth bombs were relea$ . . the .co:p'ilp,t.'r:Se~oIL4iLi~lJten:aqt
.. .'.... , , '. ;. -,', -.' :, ... .,; . :: .', M. 'Pen~()yer,. 'who t-hen closeci 'the homb bay doors and ende.iivored· ioa,sslst the
• • ' • :.... • • • • -.-' • • , • .. • .. '. -:. .' /' -:-, ' ~ .. '

/',', . • • " _, . . . " ' " ;::~:_~:' . e_ " _ ~ •

pilot, in landJILg.
;- . .,." ",". - ",' .:(

,About -50fe~'tabovethe watetbothmotors started andCt'.he: <'pilia;ne,tlimbe'(j tb

about 'l()ofeet. Then ,the-left'engine,'quitagaiIl and thep'rane' start'eo ito ·sWi~g ·to
the .left ,despite ,the:~Jf:pr'ts of,the .<; .tQkeepthe <~hip.()n i tSrqourse'. ,:.H~,was
able to leve,1 off. befo#~,the,;right.~ngin~.~l$Q fa~ledJ6r Ctbe'p~cqnd.,time .. Mean­
while, therad'io operator, Sgt. Warren' G. Cook" continued to send SOS\ He was thrown
.from, his seat w.nen .the. pletne, landed, but esc,aped wit~. np..nor b~lJ.,ises and ~sucqeeded in
leaying the ship Q;V t~~, ,rear d0O-T.

~he' landing wa.s' 'mad~downthe trough·'bfth.ewaves·,·,wi' ·Of!f laps, wheels

,up! ' bombs away, and the-bomb bay doors close~.Thetailwas Idwanatheshbckof .'
lan4ing did not,pre.yent,,~he pilot frorn,, h()ldingbackthe stick.: i'he_pottoI1lW~§.ripped
out. of the plane from the ,reetrgunner"s PQsition:to the bomb b~y'(ioor$.andit ,s;:tp.k
within thirty seconds.

Both the pilot and co~pilot had 'properly braced th'emsel~~;S"\:andkePt't'heirsaie­

ty belts buckled until the ship struckthe'water . . Neither '~*p\'eti~:Ilqe·(i.muchshoCk
'and they wer~ forced;/forwardonly slightly .•. Th~lmp(3.qt ()f' w~s~aken af-t of iCi,riding
(t,t~\ .l.\ (4~:(:~:~~~~l
'j;','. . . . ,~.,;,) . ~...,'1~ \.\Ii
the qomb bay doors. The co-pilot opened _ "~-:-- atch~ and he and the pilot float­
ed out easily by using their life vests which they had inflated prior to landing.

Th~ radar operator and bombardier were not seen after the landing and were prob­
ably knocked unconscious andburiedunde.r.the.considerableam6unt ofequipmeilf which
shifted. Only theskiJl of the pilot, in affecting a good landing ·prevented the loss

The cause of the; crash' is believed'fo have been an air lock' in. the fuel line~
The c~bin tanks have since,be~n. remo~ed\fromB-3~·rs'.andtwo hea~y plYwoo~bUlkheadS
have been installed fore and aft· of the positions formerly occupied by them. The re­
mov,alof the cabin tanks will elimiriateoneof the chiefcause.s of accidents due to
airlocks·in the fn,el dine and the new bulkheads' will afford> a greater and more sub';';
st~Jltialbracing area for members .ofthecrew wnosecrash position is in·the rear·of
thepJiane .


In measuring the size or wei~ht()fsltiPS, many, diffete~t trres of"td~nag:" are

quoted' whichoft'en.cahse confu'sio~ part'icur~rly in studying ship losses and cohstrtic­
t ion. <J::he:f.ol10wtng· are.brief .d~fiIlitipIls',of the ,moreCOIllIJlon~ tonnag~measures.
",. . .' ..• ' . ...• •.... .....' "" .• ". .•....•. • ••.• "c ..•.•... .........••................•..•••..'. ,'. ,. •...• .•.•. ....• ...•... ...• ......'( ..• ' ••'

G~OSS.REGISTERED!9~N~~E- The .,t?n~'ag~,: stc:tistics u.~e.d in'thisr~p'o~t~andmost~ther"

publications' are/'unl~ss otherwise stated, gr'oss registeredtonnag'e'whith is usually
• \ ••••• , •.•. '.• '\ . • . . . . . . . .' .•..•.•. 1

abbreviated to the term "gross tonnage." Grosstorinage is not a measure ·of weight,
but. an arb itrary·.·y~ras't~ck,Qfspace. One,· hundred cubic .feet. ,ofNolume ~quals . one
grosstq,n. Aves,sel 0].10', oop grosston.s encloses 1,,000,000 cupIC feet ot space .
. NET TONNAG-E'~e;qllalsgrbsstonnagernihusdeductions Of sp'aCe;ocqUpied'by, crew'squar­
te.~, power'plant', engine room;t'uel aridother'·cessarY·for,operatin,g the
DISPLACEMENT:'iis a measure of weight'fin-tons of· 2,240 .,.lb5.)0£· ayessel and its' coiIl­
tents. Disp';J..acement"light"
is the. weight of the' vessel without stores, Bunkerfllel
, ' . (

or ,cargo. Dlspla.c~ment
. ' ,
"loaded';" is thewei'ghtofI theyessel plug ,cargo, fueL and ~'.

.' . stores wh~nsJ1bmergedtothe ],qad "Iin~.,~l)

* .
DEADWETGHT"TONN1\GE- is likewise a m.eas life of weight· firi: tons Of.;a',240 1bs.) of car-to

storesand.buIike'r'·fliel· that the vess¢F'Cah carry.: It is'the difference between dis­

placement ."loaded" and displacement ,"light."
* .
Ahand,y "ruleof-thumb}'.todet e f"minedea,dw.eigAt Net Tonnage'., • . • • 4,000
, t onnctg~ .trQm~·f"Osst9r.zna.gei.s:: . pne an~ipn~ha If qrols sT9;nnage ... '.. ..• . 6~000
timesgrosstonnage.equa ls .approximatl( ly dead­ Deadweight . Tonnage c..• 9-'OOQ
wei,ght tonnage." . Relativ'et onnq-ge figures are..;... Displacemen~ Loaded. 13,00'0

' '. .•
-_.•. .·.• i·
...,'.N._ .
~~- ""':.



3 ARON • 112:20 158:23 39:42 182:50 493:15

4 ARON • 162:23 153:46 94:80 26:,0.5 426:44
5 ARON • 251:35 5:45 62:40 . -109:45 429: 45
6 ARON • • • • 165: 10 7:.01 72:03 ' 10.8::30 342:4.4
11 ARON • • • • 238:40 28:15 148:00 414:00
12· ARO,N • 244:28 32:07 29:50 306:25,
13 ARON • • • II • • • • • 127:20 68':45 196:05
14 ARON 1Q7:12 160:00 267:12
16 ARON • 16: 1,1 .(56:.25 72:36

19 ARON • .- 124: 06­ 42:22 130:33 29:05 326:06

46'BS • • • • 439: 49 < 12:4;.1 . 20:35 96:65 . 570,:00

TOTAL BOMBARDMENT 1969:14 440:20 420:03 1016:·10 3845:67



• 1 ATLANTIC CITY, N.J. • 13:65 837:50 851:45

• 2 R~HOBOTH, DELAWARE~ • 382:50 179:10 662 :00
• 4, PARKSLEY, -'VIRGINIA. • '292: 35 43:05 335:40
* 6 ST.SIMqN'S ISLE,.GA. 296:19 90: 0,9 386:28
• 8 ST. J AME S IS LE , S. C•• 322:43 170:45 493:28
.16 MANTEO, N. C•• 477:40 477:40
, ,
.17 SUFFOLK" L. I. .. • 303 :20 303;20
.18 FALMOUTH, MASS. 191:44 217: 40 . 409:.24
.19, PORTLAND, MAINE. 520:00 167:10 687:10
.20 BAR HARBOR, MAINE 261: 10 48:10 309: 20
*21 BEAUFORT, N. C~ • 376: 00 79: 10 465:10

TOTAL CAP, CPo 3438:16 1833:09 5271:25

TOTAL 25TH WING 540~:30 2273:29 420:03 1016: 10



~NIT • • • • ...• • • • • • • • • • •• • 260:30



. 7 ARON • 200:43 16:28 23:54 92:55 334:00

8 'ARON • . ... . 382:00 81:25 463:25
10 ARON '. '.' . 284:,25 20:40 215:45 520:50
15 ARON • • • • 107:09~
4:35 12:49 38:10 162:43
17 ARON • • 286:05 49:15 335:20
76BS , 287:30 104: 50 ' 95:45 ' 488:05

',TOTAL BOMBA~DMENT 1547:52 146:33 36:43 573:15 2304:'23


124, aBSN. • • .' I 178:06 4:15 380:45 563:05

128 OBSN. 244:60' 11:50 .4:00 260:40'

~OTAL OBSERVATION ".422: 55 16:05 384:46 823:45

AND' ,OBSERVATION '1970:47 162:38 36:43 958:00 3128:08



*'3 LANTANA, FLA. 1089:55 227:05 1317:00


* 5.DAYTONA, FLA. 1010:20 236:05 1246:25,


~IAMI, FLA•• 637:00 653:43 1290:40

* 9 GRA~D 1SLE, LA. ·202:20 308:45 511:05
*10 BEA.UMONT, TEXAS 614:10 507:35 1121;45
*11 PASCAGOULA, MISS. • 434:50 369:15 80~:05

.*12 BROWNSVILLE, TEXAS. 598:25 201:50 800:15"

_13 TAMPA, FLA.. • • • • 791:40 .286:00 1077:40
*14 .PANAMA CITY, FLA •• 487:55 385:40. 873 :,3.5
*15 CORPUS CHR;I:STI, TEXAS 457:25 621:20 1078:45

TOTAL CAP, CP 6324:00

3797:15 10121:15

,TOTAL 26TH WING 8294:47,
3959:53 36:43 '·958: 00 13248:43

Col. ,Air Corps, A. G. of S., A-2.