UNIVERSITY OF SANTO

TOMAS
Digested by: DC 2016
Members
Editors: Tricia Lacuesta
Lorenzo Luigi Gayya
Cristopher Reyes
Macky Siazon
Janine Arenas
Ninna Bonsol
Lloyd Javier

PROPERTY
First Sem Cases

PROPERTY
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CLASSIFICATION
PROPERTY........2
OWNERSHIP
AND
RIGHTS
SOWER...4

OF

BUILDER,

OF

PLANTER,

QUIETING
OF
TITLE...
..17
CO-OWNERSHIP
POSSESSION...20

EASEMENTS...
30
DONATIONS......
40

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PROPERTY
CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY
LEUNG YEE v. FRANK L. STRONG MACHINERY COMPANY and J. G. WILLIAMSON
G.R. No. L-11658, February 15, 1918, CARSON, J.
The Chattel Mortgage Law contemplates and makes provision for mortgages of
personal property and the sole purpose and object of the chattel mortgage registry is to
provide for the registry of mortgages of personal property.
Facts:
Compaia Agricola Filipina bought rice-cleaning machinery from Frank L. Strong
Machinery Company and to secure the payment of such, it executed a chattel mortgage over
such machineries including the building to which they are installed. This mortgage was
registered in the chattel mortgage registry. Due to its failure to pay, the mortgaged property
was sold and was bought by Strong Machinery Company. Later, Strong Machinery Company
took possession of the said building. Unknown to Strong Machinery Company, the same
buildings are likewise subject of another mortgage executed by Compaia Agricola Filipina in
favor of Leung Yee to secure its outstanding obligation. Compaia Agricola Filipina also
defaulted in his obligation which prompted Yee to levy execution upon the building. Yee
subsequently bought the property in an auction sale and was issued a sheriff's certificate of
the sale which he latter registered.
The defendant machinery company filed with the sheriff a sworn statement setting
up its claim of title and demanding the release of the property from the levy. Upon execution
of the necessary bond, the sheriff sold the property to Yee. Thereafter, Yee instituted an
action to recover possession of the building from the machinery company.The RTC relied on
Article 1473 of the Civil Code and ruled in favor in favor of the machinery company holding
that the company had its title to the building registered prior to the date of registry of the
plaintiff's certificate.
Issue:
Whether or not the annotation of a deed of sale of real property in a chattel mortgage
registry can be given the legal effect of an annotation in the registry of real property.
Ruling:
NO. The registry referred to in Article 1473 is of course the registry of real property,
and it must be apparent that the annotation or inscription of a deed of sale of real property
in a chattel mortgage registry cannot be given the legal effect of an inscription in the
registry of real property. By its express terms, the Chattel Mortgage Law contemplates and

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makes provision for mortgages of personal property; and the sole purpose and object of the
chattel mortgage registry is to provide for the registry of "Chattel mortgages," that is to
say, mortgages of personal property executed in the manner and form prescribed in the
statute. The building of strong materials in which the rice-cleaning machinery was installed
by the "Compaia Agricola Filipina" was real property, and the mere fact that the parties
seem to have dealt with it separate and apart from the land on which it stood in no wise
changed its character as real property. It follows that neither the original registry in the
chattel mortgage of the building and the machinery installed therein, not the annotation in
that registry of the sale of the mortgaged property, had any effect whatever so far as the
building was concerned.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COURT OF APPEALS, MYLO O.
QUINTO, and JESUS CHRISTINE S. CHUPUICO
G.R. No. 109946, February 9, 1996, BELOSILLO, J.
What divests the government of title to the land is the issuance of the sales patent
and its subsequent registration with the Register of Deeds. It is the registration and issuance
of the certificate of title that segregate public lands from the mass of public domain and
convert it into private property.
Facts:
DBP granted a loan to Spouses Olidiana which was secured by a real estate mortgage
on several properties. At the time of the mortgage, the disputed lot was still the subject of a
Free Patent application filed by the Spouses Olidiana with the Bureau of Lands but registered
under their name for taxation purposes. Spouses Olidiana amended their Free Patent
application over several parcels of land, in which they waived all their rights and interests
over the disputed lot in favor of Chupuico and Quinto. Thereafter, each of them obtained
original certificate of title over the subdivided lot. For failure of Spouses Olidiana to comply
with their mortgage contract, DBP extrajudicially foreclosed all their mortgaged properties,
and was awarded as the highest bidder. When DBP tried to register the sale, it was
discovered that the lot had already been divided into 2 parcels, belonging to Chupuico and
Quinto, respectively. DBP then filed an action for quieting of title. RTC ruled against DBP as
the Spouses Olidiana were not yet owners in fee simple when they mortgaged the property
and that the property was still a public land when mortgaged to DBP, thus it could not have
been the subject of a valid mortgage. The CA affirmed such decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the lot was still a public land which could not have been validly
mortgaged.
Ruling:
YES. DBP did not acquire valid title over the land in dispute because it was public
land when mortgaged by the Spouses Olidiana. In Visayan Realty, Inc. v. Meer, the Court
ruled that the approval of a sales application merely authorized the applicant to take
possession of the land so that he could comply with the requirements prescribed by law
before a final patent could be issued in his favor. Meanwhile the government still remained
the owner thereof, as in fact the application could still be cancelled and the land awarded to
another applicant should it be shown that the legal requirements had not been complied
with. What divests the government of title to the land is the issuance of the sales patent and

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its subsequent registration with the Register of Deeds. It is the registration and issuance of
the certificate of title that segregate public lands from the mass of public domain and
convert it into private property. Since the disputed was still the subject of a Free Patent
Application when mortgaged to DBP and no patent was granted to the Spouses Olidiana, the
lot remained part of the public domain.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DAMIAN ERMITAO DE GUZMAN, DEOGRACIAS

ERMITAO DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA ERMITAO DE GUZMAN, ALICIA ERMITAO DE
GUZMAN, SALVADOR ERMITAO DE GUZMAN, DOMINGA ERMITAO DE GUZMAN,
NATIVIDAD ENCARNACION, MELBA E. TORRES, FLORA MANALO, SOCORRO DELA
ROSA, JOSE ERMITAO, ESMERANDO ERMITAO, TRICOM DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION and FILOMENO ERMITAO
G.R. No. 137887, February 28, 2000, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Forest lands are not capable of private appropriation and possession thereof,
however long, cannot convert them into private property, unless and until such lands were
reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.
Facts:
Conflicting applications for confirmation of imperfect title were filed by Norma
Almanzor and Salvador De Guzman over parcels of land. The RTC ruled in favor of De
Guzman. The CA affirmed the RTC decision and the petition for registration of the De
Guzmans. The Republic now contends that the De Guzmans have not overthrown the
presumption that the lands are portions of the public domain belonging to the Republic of
the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject parcels of land are part of the public domain.
Ruling:
YES. The property subject of De Guzmans application was only declared alienable in
1965. Prior to such date, the same was forest land incapable of private appropriation. It was
not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, could not convert it into
private property, unless and until such lands were reclassified and considered disposable
and alienable. Therefore, prior to its declaration as alienable land in 1965, any occupation or
possession thereon cannot be considered in the counting of the thirty year possession
requirement. This is in accord with the ruling in Almeda vs. Court of Appeals, and because
the rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land
classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may
form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.
OWNERSHIP AND RIGHTS OF BUILDER, PLANTER, SOWER

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GERARDO MENDOZA, TRINIA AND IYLENE ALL SURNAMED MENDOZA v. SOLEDAD

SALINAS
G.R. No. 152827, February 6, 2007, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
While a writ of possession may be issued only pursuant to a decree of registration in
an original land registration proceedings, the court cannot issue against possessors under
claim of ownership, as actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable
presumption of ownership, and the true owner must resort to judicial process for the
recovery of the property, not summarily through a motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession.
Facts:
Salinas filed an application for registration over a parcel of land and prayed for the
issuance of a writ of possession in her favor. The Mendozas opposed Salinas application for
the issuance of a writ of possession claiming that they were not oppositors/parties to the
registration case and they have been in actual physical possession of the property for 34
years. The RTC, however, granted Salinas application for the issuance of a writ of
possession. Now, the Mendozas contended that they cannot be ousted of their possession of
the property, having been in actual possession of the property, as evidenced by Gerardo
Mendoza's Sales Application over the land.
Issue:
Whether or not writ of possession should be issued in favor of Salinas.
Ruling:
NO. The issuance of a writ of possession is a ministerial duty of the court in a decree
of registration in an original land registration proceeding. Such ministerial duty, however,
ceases to be so with particular regard to petitioners who are actual possessors of the
property under a claim of ownership. Art. 433 of the Civil Code provides that actual
possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership. The true
owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property. Thus, one who claims
to be the owner of a property possessed by another must bring the appropriate judicial
action for its physical recovery, not summarily through a motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession. It is noted that there already exists a final and executory decision disregarding
Salinas' claim for possession over the property. An action for unlawful detainer was filed by
Salinas against the Mendozas but was dismissed by the MTCC. Salinas did not appeal the
case but filed for a writ of possession in the land registration case. Moreover, the Mendozas
opposed Salinas' application for the issuance of a writ of possession and apprised their
actual, peaceful, physical and uninterrupted possession. The RTC, nevertheless, ruled that a
writ of possession may be issued in a land registration proceeding. Thus, it was erroneous
for the RTC to have issued the writ of possession against the Mendozas.
MARIA TORBELA, represented by her heirs, namely: EULOGIO TOSINO, husband
and children: CLARO, MAXIMINO, CORNELIO, OLIVIA and CALIXTA, ALL SURNAMED
TOSINO, APOLONIA TOSINO VDA. DE RAMIREZ and JULITA TOSINO DEAN; PEDRO
TORBELA, represented by his heirs, namely: JOSE AND DIONISIO, BOTH
SURNAMED TORBELA; EUFROSINA TORBELA ROSARIO, represented by her heirs,
namely: ESTEBAN ROSARIO, MANUEL ROSARIO, ROMULO ROSARIO, and ANDREA

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ROSARIO-HADUCA; LEONILA TORBELA TAMIN; FERNANDO TORBELA, represented
by his heirs, namely: SERGIO TOBELA, EUTROPIA VELASCO, PILAR ZULUEAT,
CANDIDO TORBELA, FLORENTINA TORBELA, and PANTALEON TOBELA; DOLORES
TORBELA TABLADA; LEONORA TORBELA AGUSTIN, represented by her heirs,
namely: PATRICIO, SEGUNDO, CONSUELO, and FELIX, ALL SURNAMED AGUSTIN;
and SEVERINA TOBELA ILDEFONSO v. SPOUSES ANDRES T. ROSARIO AND LENADUQUE-ROSARIO and BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK
G.R. No. 140528, December 7, 2011, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
The builders right to the rents of the improvements shall continue until the
landowner has chosen his option under Art. 448 of the Civil Code. And in case the landowner
decided to appropriate the improvements, the builder shall have the right to retain said
improvements, as well as the rents thereof, until the indemnity for the same has been paid.
Facts:
The Torbela siblings inherited a land from Spouses Torbela. They executed a deed of
absolute quitclaim over a lot in favor of Dr. Andres Rosario, and a TCT was issued in the
Rosarios name. Another deed of absolute quitclaim was executed by Dr. Rosario,
acknowledging that he only borrowed the lot from the Torbela siblings and was already
returning the same to the latter. Dr. Rosario then obtained a loan from DBP secured by a
mortgage constituted on the lot, and the proceeds of the loan were used for the construction
of improvements thereon. Thus, a four-storey commercial building was constructed. Upon
full payment of the loan, Dr. Rosario acquired another loan from Banco Filipino secured by a
mortgage constituted on the same lot. For failure to pay their loan, Banco Filipino
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage as the lone bidder. Torbela siblings then filed a
complaint against Spouses Rosario and Banco Filipino. The RTC ruled that the mortgage
executed by the Spouses Rosario in favor of Banco Filipino is legal and valid. It further
ordered the Torbela siblings to account for the rentals they received from tenants of the
building constructed. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Dr. Rosario is entitled to the rents of the improvements on the lot.
Ruling:
YES. The rules on accession shall govern the improvements on the lot and the rents
thereof. If both the owner and the builder acted in bad faith, they are deemed to have acted
in good faith under Art. 453 of the Civil Code. Thus, under Art. 448, where the builder has
acted in good faith, the landowner has the option to acquire the improvements after
payment of the proper indemnity or to oblige the builder to pay for the land. It is the
landowner who is allowed to exercise the option because his right is older and because, by
the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing. But even as
the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. The owner
is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party
fails to pay for the same.
There is no question that Dr. Rosario only holds the lot in trust for the Torbela siblings
and that he is the builder of the improvements on the lot. When it comes to the
improvements, both the Torbela siblings (as landowners) and Dr. Rosario (as builder) are
deemed in bad faith. The Torbela siblings were aware of the construction of a building by Dr.

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Rosario, while Dr. Rosario proceeded with the said construction despite his knowledge that
the lot belonged to the Torbela siblings. Still following the rules of accession, civil fruits, such
as rents, belong to the owner of the building. Thus, Dr. Rosario has a right to the rents of the
improvements and is under no obligation to render an accounting of the same to anyone. His
right to the rents of the improvements shall continue until the Torbela siblings have chosen
their option under Art. 448. And in case the Torbela siblings decide to appropriate the
improvements, Dr. Rosario shall have the right to retain said improvements, as well as the
rents thereof, until the indemnity for the same has been paid.
FEDERICO GEMINIANO, MARIA GEMINIANO, ERNESTO GEMINIANO, ASUNCION
GEMINIANO, LARRY GEMINIANO, and MARLYN GEMINIANO v. COURT OF APPEALS,
DOMINADOR NICOLAS, and MARY A. NICOLAS
G.R. No. 120303, July 24, 1996, DAVIDE, JR., J.
Art. 448 of the Civil Code, in relation to Art. 546, which allows full reimbursement of
useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, applies
only to a possessor in good faith. It does not apply where one's only interest is that of a
lessee under a rental contract.
Facts:
A parcel of land was originally owned by the petitioners mother, Paulina Geminiano.
On a portion of that lot stood the petitioners unfinished house which was sold to Dominador
and Mary Nicolas with an alleged promise to sell to the latter that portion of the lot.
Subsequently, Paulina leased a portion of the lot, including that portion on which the house
stood, in favor of Nicolas. Nicolas then introduced additional improvements and registered
the house in their names. After the expiration of the lease contract, Paulina refused to
accept the monthly rentals. It turned out that the lot was the subject of a suit, which resulted
in its acquisition by one Maria Lee and later on sold to Lily Salcedo, who in turn sold it to
Spouses Dionisio. Spouses Dionisio waived their rights over the lot in favor of the petitioners,
thus the lot was registered in their names. The petitioners then demanded Nicolas to vacate
the premises and pay the rentals in arrears, but the demand was unheeded. Petitioners then
filed a complaint with the MTCC. MTCC ruled that there was no implied renewal of the lease
between Paulina and Nicolas and that the latter were not builders in good faith, thus not
entitled to reimbursement of the value of the house and improvements. The RTC reversed
the MTCCs decision and ordered the petitioners to reimburse Nicolas for the value of the
house and improvements and allowing the latter to remain in possession of the premises
until they were fully reimbursed for the said value. This was affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not Dominador and Mary Nicolas are builders in good faith.
Ruling:
NO. The Court has held in a long line of cases that Art. 448 of the Civil Code, in
relation to Art. 546 of the same Code, which allows full reimbursement of useful
improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, applies only to a
possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner
thereof. It does not apply where one's only interest is that of a lessee under a rental
contract; otherwise, it would always be in the power of the tenant to "improve" his landlord
out of his property.

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In this case, both parties admit that the land in question was originally owned by
Paulina. The land was allegedly acquired later by Lee by virtue of an extrajudicial foreclosure
of mortgage. Lee, however, never sought a writ of possession in order that she gain
possession of the property in question. Paulina therefore remained in possession of the lot.
Being mere lessees, Nicolas knew that their occupation of the premises would continue only
for the life of the lease. Plainly, they cannot be considered as possessors nor builders in
good faith.

TECNOGAS PHILIPPINES MANUFACTURING CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS

and EDUARDO UY
G.R. No. 108894, February 10, 1997, PANGANIBAN, J.
Art. 527 of the Civil Code presumes good faith, and since no proof exists to show that
the encroachment over a portion of a land was done in bad faith by the builder of the
encroaching structures, the latter should be presumed to have built them in good faith. It is
presumed that possession continues to be enjoyed in the same character in which it was
acquired, until the contrary is proved.
Facts:
Tecnogas purchased a parcel of land from Pariz Industries together with all the
buildings and improvements including the wall existing thereon. Portions of the buildings
and wall bought by Tecnogas together with the land are occupying a portion of Uys
adjoining land. Upon learning of the encroachment or occupation by its buildings and wall of
a portion of Uys land, Tecnogas offered to buy from Uy that particular portion of land
occupied by portions of its buildings and wall, but Uy refused the offer. The parties entered
into an agreement wherein Tecnogas agreed to demolish the wall at the back portion of its
land thus giving to Uy possession of a portion of his land previously enclosed by Tecnogas
wall. Uy later filed a complaint against Tecnogas in connection with the encroachment or
occupation by the latters buildings and walls of a portion of its land but said complaint did
not prosper. Uy then dug a canal along Tecnogas wall, a portion of which collapsed and led
to the filing the latter of the complaint. The RTC ruled in favor of Tecnogas and ordered Uy to
sell to the former the portion of the land owned by him and occupied by portions Tecnogas
buildings and wall. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC, ruling that Tecnogas
cannot be considered in good faith because as a land owner, it is presumed to know the
metes and bounds of his own property, especially if the same are reflected in a properly
issued certificate of title.
Issue:
Whether or not Tecnogas is considered in bad faith.
Ruling:
NO. There is no question that when Tecnogas purchased the land from Pariz
Industries, the buildings and other structures were already in existence. The record is not
clear as to who actually built those structures, but it may well be assumed that Tecnogas
predecessor-in-interest, Pariz Industries, did so. Art. 527 of the Civil Code presumes
good faith, and since no proof exists to show that the encroachment over a
portion of Uys land was done in bad faith by the builder of the encroaching

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structures, the latter should be presumed to have built them in good faith. It is
presumed that possession continues to be enjoyed in the same character in which it was
acquired, until the contrary is proven. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that
the land he is building on is his, and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. Hence,
such good faith, by law, passed on to Parizs successor, which is Tecnogas. Further,
possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in case and from the
moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the
thing improperly or wrongfully. The good faith ceases from the moment defects in the title
are made known to the possessor, by extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of the
property by the true owner.
TECNOGAS PHILIPPINES MANUFACTURING CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS
and EDUARDO UY
G.R. No. 108894, February 10, 1997, PANGANIBAN, J.
Under Art. 448 of the Civil Code, the benefit to the builder is that, instead of being
outrightly ejected from the land, he can compel the landowner to make a choice between
the two options: (1) to appropriate the building by paying the indemnity required by law, or
(2) sell the land to the builder. The landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and
compel instead the owner of the building to remove it from the land.
Facts:
Tecnogas purchased a parcel of land from Pariz Industries together with all the
buildings and improvements including the wall existing thereon. Portions of the buildings
and wall bought by Tecnogas together with the land are occupying a portion of Uys
adjoining land. Upon learning of the encroachment or occupation by its buildings and wall of
a portion of Uys land, Tecnogas offered to buy from Uy that particular portion of land
occupied by portions of its buildings and wall, but Uy refused the offer. The parties entered
into an agreement wherein Tecnogas agreed to demolish the wall at the back portion of its
land thus giving to Uy possession of a portion of his land previously enclosed by Tecnogas
wall. Uy later filed a complaint against Tecnogas in connection with the encroachment or
occupation by the latters buildings and walls of a portion of its land but said complaint did
not prosper. Uy then dug a canal along Tecnogas wall, a portion of which collapsed and led
to the filing the latter of the complaint. The RTC ruled in favor of Tecnogas and ordered Uy to
sell to the former the portion of the land owned by him and occupied by portions Tecnogas
buildings and wall. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC, ruling that Tecnogas
cannot be considered in good faith because as a land owner, it is presumed to know the
metes and bounds of his own property, especially if the same are reflected in a properly
issued certificate of title. Consequently, the builder, if sued by the aggrieved by the
landowner for recovery of possession, could have invoked the provisions of Article 448 of the
Civil Code.
Issue:
Whether or not Tecnogas who is not the builder of the structures can invoke Art. 448.
Ruling:
YES. The benefit to the builder under Art. 448 is that, instead of being outrightly
ejected from the land, he can compel the landowner to make a choice between the two
options: (1) to appropriate the building by paying the indemnity required by law, or (2) sell

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the land to the builder. The landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel
instead the owner of the building to remove it from the land. The Court ruled that first, there
is no sufficient showing that Tecnogas was aware of the encroachment at the time it
acquired the property from Pariz Industries. Thus, contrary proof has not overthrown the
presumption of good faith. Lasltly, upon delivery of the property by Pariz to Tecnogas, the
latter acquired ownership of the property. Consequently, Tecnogas is deemed to have
stepped into the shoes of the seller in regard to all rights of ownership over the immovable
sold, including the right to compel Uy to exercise either of the two options provided under
Art. 448.
PEDRO ANGELES, represented by ADELINA T. ANGELES, Attorney-in-fact v.
ESTELITA B. PASCUAL, MARIA THERESA PASCUAL, NERISSA PASCUAL, IMELDA
PASCUAL, MA. LAARNI PASCUAL and EDWIN PASCUAL
G.R. No. 157150, September 21, 2011, BERSAMIN, J.
Under Art. 448 of the Civil Code, the land being the principal and the building the
accessory, preference is given to the landowner to make the choice as between
appropriating the building or obliging the builder to pay the value of the land.
Facts:
Regidor Pascual and Pedro Angeles were registered owners of adjacent parcels of
land. Pascual owned Lot 4 and Angeles owned Lot 5. Each of them built a house of his
respective lot, believing all the while that his respective lot was properly delineated. It was
not until Metrobank, as the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale of the adjacent Lot 3,
caused the relocation survey of Lot 3 that the geodetic engineer discovered that Pascuals
house had encroached on Lot 3. Consequently, Metrobank successfully ejected Pascual.
Pascual then caused the relocation survey of his own lot and discovered that Angeles house
also encroached on his lot. Pascual demanded rentals for the use of the encroached are of
Lot 4 from Angeles, or the removal of Angeles house. Angeles refused the demand. Pascual
then sued Angeles in the RTC. The RTC ruled that Pascual proved Angeles encroachment on
Lot 4 and the he is entitled to relief. The CA affirmed with modification RTCs decision
applying Art. 448 of the Civil Code, defining the rights of a builder in good faith.
Issue:
Whether or not the CAs application of Art. 448 of the Civil Code was correct and
proper.
Ruling:
YES. The provision contemplates a person building, or sowing, or planting in good
faith on land owned by another. The law presupposes that the land and the building or plants
are owned by different persons, like here. The RTC and CA found and declared Angeles to be
a builder in good faith. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is
building on is his and in his ignorance of a defect or flaw in his title. With the unassailable
finding that Angeles house straddled the lot of Pascual, and that Angeles had built his house
in good faith, Art. 448 of the Civil Code, which spells out the rights and obligations of the
owner of the land as well as of the builder, is unquestionably applicable. Consequently, the
land being the principal and the building the accessory, preference is given to Pascual as the
owner of the land to make the choice as between appropriating the building or obliging
Angeles as the builder to pay the value of the land. Contrary to the insistence of Angeles,
therefore, no inconsistency exists between the finding of good faith in his favor and the
grant of the reliefs set forth in Art. 448 of the Civil Code.

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LUCIANO BRIONES AND NELLY BRIONES v. JOSE MACABAGDAL, FE D. MACABAGDAL
and VERGON REALTY INVESTMENTS CORPORATION
G.R. No. 150666, August 3, 2010, VILLARAMA, JR., J.
Art. 527 of the Civil Code presumes good faith, and since no proof exists to show that
the mistake was done by the builders in bad faith, the latter should be presumed to have
built the house in good faith.
Facts:
Spouses Macabagdal purchased from Vergon Realty a parcel of land. On the other
hand, the Brioneses are the owners of an adjacent lot. The Brioneses then constructed a
house on Spouses Macabagdals lot which they thought was their own. After being informed
of the mix up by Vergons manager, Spouses Macabagdal demanded the Brioneses to
demolish the house and vacate the property. The latter, however, refused. Thus, Spouses
Macabagdal filed an action to recover ownership and possession of the land with the RTC.
The Brioneses insisted that the lot on which they constructed their house was the lot which
was pointed to them as theirs by Vergons agents. They interposed the defense of being
buyers in good faith. The RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Macabagdal and found that the
Brioneses were builders in bad faith. This was affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not the Brioneses are builders in good faith.
Ruling:
YES. Art. 527of the Civil Code presumes good faith, and since no proof exists to
show that the mistake was done by the Brioneses in bad faith, the latter should be presumed
to have built the house in good faith.
Thus, when a person builds in good faith on the land of another, Art. 448 of the Civil
Code governs, in which the builders, sowers or planters believe themselves to be owners of
the land or, at least, to have a claim of title thereto. The builder in good faith can compel the
landowner to make a choice between appropriating the building by paying the proper
indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of the land. The choice belongs to the
owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory
follows the principal and not the other way around. However, even as the option lies with
the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. He must choose one. It is only if
the owner chooses to sell his land, and the builder or planter fails to purchase it where its
value is not more than the value of the improvements, that the owner may remove the
improvements from the land. The owner is entitled to such remotion only when, after having
chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same.
The Brioneses have the right to be indemnified for the necessary and useful
expenses they may have made on the subject property. Consequently, the Spouses
Macabagdal have the option to appropriate the house on the subject land after payment to
the Brioneses of the appropriate indemnity or to oblige them to pay the price of the land,
unless its value is considerably more than the value of the structures, in which case the
Brioneses shall pay reasonable rent.

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PLEASANTVILLE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS, WILSON
KEE, C.T. TORRES ENTERPRISES, INC., and ELDRED JARDINICO
G.R. No. 79688, February 1, 1996, PANGANIBAN, J.
Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his
and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. And as good faith is presumed, the
petitioner has the burden of proving bad faith on the part of the respondent.
Facts:

Jardinico bought a lot from Robillo, who purchase the same from Pleasantville. At that
time, Lot 9 was vacant. When Jardinico secured from the Register of Deeds a TCT in his
name, he discovered that improvements had been introduced on Lot 9 by Wilson Kee, who
had taken possession thereof. Kee bought on installment Lot 8 of the same subdivision from
C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. (CTTEI), the exclusive real estate agent of Pleasantville. CTTEI
then, through its employee, accompanied Kees wife to inspect Lot 8. Unfortunately, the lot
pointed by the employee was Lot 9. Kee then proceeded to construct his residence and other
improvements on the lot. Jardinico then demanded Kee to remove all improvements and
vacate Lot 9. When Kee refused, Jardinico filed with the MTCC a complaint for ejectment.
Kee, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against petitioner and CTTEI. The MTCC held that
the erroneous delivery of Lot 9 to Kee was attributable to CTTEI. However, the MTCC found
that Plesantville had already rescinded its contract with Kee over Lot 8 for the latters failure
to pay the installments due. The MTCC concluded that Kee no longer had any right over the
lot. Consequently, Kee must pay reasonable rentals for the use of Lot 9, and, furthermore, he
cannot claim reimbursement for the improvements he introduced on said lot. On appeal, the
RTC ruled that Pleasantville and CTTEI were not at fault or were not negligent, and that Kee
was a builder in bad faith. The CA however ruled that Kee was a builder in good faith.
Issue:
Whether or not Kee was a builder in good faith.
Ruling:
YES. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is
his and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. And as good faith is presumed,
Pleasantville has the burden of proving bad faith on the part of Kee. At the time he built
improvements on Lot 8, Kee believed that said lot was what he bought from Pleasantville. He
was not aware that the lot delivered to him was not Lot 8. Thus, Kee is in good faith.
Pleasantville failed to prove otherwise. Plesantville points to Kees violation of the contract,
to demonstrate Kees bad faith, however, the Court disagrees. Such violations have no
bearing whatsoever on whether Kee was a builder in good faith, that is, on his state of mind
at the time he built the improvements on Lot 9. These alleged violations may not be bases
to negate the presumption that Kee was a builder in good faith.
SPOUSES RAFAEL BENITEZ AND AVELINA BENITEZ v. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES
RENATO MACAPAGAL AND ELIZABETH MACAPAGAL
G.R. No. 104828, January 16, 1997, PANGANIBAN, J.
Art. 448 of the Civil Code is unequivocal that the option to sell the land on which
another in good faith builds, plants or sows on, belongs to the landowner.

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Facts:
Spouses Benitez purchased a parcel of land with improvement from the Cavite
Development Bank. Subsequently, Spouses Macapagal bought a lot. Later on, they filed a
case with the RTC against Spouses Benitez for the recovery of possession of an encroached
portion of the lot they purchased. The parties were able to reach a compromise in which
Spouses Macapagal sold the encroached portion to Spouses Benitez. Spouses Macapagal
purchased still another property, adjacent to that of Spouses Benitez. After a relocation
survey was conducted, Spouses Macapagal discovered that a portion of their property was
occupied by Spouses Benitezs house. Despite verbal and written demands, Spouses Benitez
refused to vacate. Spouses Macapagal then filed with the MeTC for ejectment .The MeTC
decided in favor of Spouses Macapagal. This was affirmed by the RTC and the CA. Spouses
Benitez now question the denial of their claimed pre-emptive right to purchase the
encroached portion of the Spouses Macapagals land.
Issue:

land.

Whether or not Spouses Benitez have the pre-emptive right to buy the encroached

Ruling:
NO. Art. 448 of the Civil Code is unequivocal that the option to sell the land on which
another in good faith builds, plants or sows on, belongs to the landowner. The option is to
sell, not to buy, and it is the landowner's choice. Not even a declaration of the builder,
planter, or sower's bad faith shifts this option to him per Art. 450 of the Civil Code. This
advantage in Art. 448 is accorded the landowner because "his right is older, and because, by
the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing." There can
be no pre-emptive right to buy even as a compromise, as this prerogative belongs solely to
the landowner. No compulsion can be legally forced on him, contrary to what Spouses
Benitezs asks claim. Such an order would certainly be invalid and illegal. Thus, the lower
courts were correct in rejecting the Spouses Benitez's offer to buy the encroached land.

DESAMPARADO VDA. DE NAZARENO and LETICIA NAZARENO TAPIA v. THE COURT

OF APPEALS, MR. & MRS. JOSE SALASALAN, MR. & MRS. LEO RABAY, AVELINO
LABIS, HON. ROBERTO G. HILARIO, ROLLEO I. IGNACIO, ALBERTO M. GILLERA and
HON. ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR., in their official and/or private capacities
G.R. No. 98045, June 26, 1996, ROMERO, J.

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Accretion requires the concurrence of these requisites: (1) that the deposition of soil
or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the
waters of the river; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the
banks or rivers.
Facts:
A parcel of land was formed as a result of sawdust dumped into the dried-up creek
and along the banks of the Cagayan river. Jose Salasalan and Leo Rabaya leased the subject
lots on which their houses stood from one Antonio Nazareno, petitioners' predecessor-ininterest. The private respondents allegedly stopped paying rentals. As a result, Antonio and
petitioners filed a case for ejectment with the MTC. MTC ruled against private respondents,
which decision was affirmed by the RTC. Before he died, Antonio caused the approval by the
Bureau of Lands of the survey plan to perfect his title over the accretion area being claimed
by him. Before the approved survey plan could be released to the applicant, however, it was
protested by Salasalan and Rabaya before the Bureau of Lands. In compliance with the order
of District Land Officer Gillera, an investigation was conducted and which recommended that
Survey Plan in the name of Antonio, be cancelled and that private respondents be directed
to file appropriate public land applications. Antonio filed a motion for reconsideration with
the Undersecretary of the Department of Natural Resources, but denied the motion.
Petitioners then filed a case before the RTC for annulment of the orders rendered. The RTC
dismissed the complaint. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners can claim the rights of a riparian owner.
Ruling:
NO. Accretion, as a mode of acquiring property under Art. 457 of the Civil Code,
requires the concurrence of these requisites: (1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be
gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river;
and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks or rivers. These
are the rules on alluvion which if present, give to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of
rivers any accretion gradually received from the effects of the current of waters.In this case,
the petitioners admit that the accretion was formed by the dumping of boulders, soil and
other filling materials on portions of the creek and the Cagayan River bounding their land. It
cannot be claimed, therefore, that the accumulation of such boulders, soil and other filling
materials was gradual and imperceptible, resulting from the action of the waters or the
current of the creek and the Cagayan River. In Hilario v. City of Manila, the Court held that
the word "current" indicates the participation of the body of water in the ebb and flow of
waters due to high and low tide. Petitioners, thus, cannot claim the rights of a riparian
owner.

DESAMPARADO VDA. DE NAZARENO and LETICIA NAZARENO TAPIA v. THE COURT

OF APPEALS, MR. & MRS. JOSE SALASALAN, MR. & MRS. LEO RABAY, AVELINO
LABIS, HON. ROBERTO G. HILARIO, ROLLEO I. IGNACIO, ALBERTO M. GILLERA and
HON. ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR., in their official and/or private capacities

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G.R. No. 98045, June 26, 1996, ROMERO, J.
Where the land was not formed solely by the natural effect of the water current of
the river bordering said land but is also the consequence of the direct and deliberate
intervention of man, it was deemed a man-made accretion and, as such, part of the public
domain.
Facts:
A parcel of land was formed as a result of sawdust dumped into the dried-up creek
and along the banks of the Cagayan river. Jose Salasalan and Leo Rabaya leased the subject
lots on which their houses stood from one Antonio Nazareno, petitioners' predecessor-ininterest. The private respondents allegedly stopped paying rentals. As a result, Antonio and
petitioners filed a case for ejectment with the MTC. MTC ruled against private respondents,
which decision was affirmed by the RTC. Before he died, Antonio caused the approval by the
Bureau of Lands of the survey plan to perfect his title over the accretion area being claimed
by him. Before the approved survey plan could be released to the applicant, however, it was
protested by Salasalan and Rabaya before the Bureau of Lands. In compliance with the order
of District Land Officer Gillera, an investigation was conducted and which recommended that
Survey Plan in the name of Antonio, be cancelled and that private respondents be directed
to file appropriate public land applications. Antonio filed a motion for reconsideration with
the Undersecretary of the Department of Natural Resources, but denied the motion.
Petitioners then filed a case before the RTC for annulment of the orders rendered. The RTC
dismissed the complaint. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the land is a private land being accretion to Antonios titled property.
Ruling:
NO. Petitioners' submission not having met the first and second requirements of the
rules on alluvion, the Court thus concluded that the accretion was man-made or artificial. In
Republic v. CA, the Court ruled that the requirement that the deposit should be due to the
effect of the current of the river is indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the Civil
Code all deposits caused by human intervention. Thus, in Tiongco v. Director of Lands, et al.,
where the land was not formed solely by the natural effect of the water current of the river
bordering said land but is also the consequence of the direct and deliberate intervention of
man, it was deemed a man-made accretion and, as such, part of the public domain. In this
case, the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust. Even if the Court
were to take into consideration petitioners' submission that the accretion site was the result
of the late Antonios labor consisting in the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling
materials into the creek and Cagayan River bounding his land, the same would still be part
of the public domain.

HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and HEIRS OF

SINFOROSO PASCUAL
G.R. No. 68166, February 12, 1997, HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.

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Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Art. 457, requires the concurrence
of the following requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and (3) that
the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river.
Facts:
Sinforoso Pascual filed an application to register a parcel of land, claiming that this
land is an accretion to his property, thus, a riparian owner thereof. It is bounded on the
eastern side by the Talisay River, on the western side by the Bulacan River, and on the
northern side by the Manila Bay. The Talisay River and the Bulacan River flow downstream
and meet at the Manila Bay thereby depositing sand and silt on Pascual's property resulting
in an accretion thereon. Emiliano Navarro opposed such application, claiming that the land
sought to be registered is part of the public domain, it being a part of the foreshore of Manila
Bay and that he was a lessee and in possession of a part of the subject property by virtue of
a fishpond permit and had already converted it into a fishpond. The Court of First Instance
denied Pascuals petition for land registration. The Intermediate Appellate Court, however,
granted the petition, applying Art. 457 of the Civil Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the land sought to be registered be deemed an accretion.
Ruling:
NO. Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Art. 457, requires the
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be
gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river;
and (3) that the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river.
The Court held that first, the northeastern boundary of Pascuals land is the Manila
Bay. Pascuals land, therefore, used to adjoin, border or front the Manila Bay and not any of
the two rivers whose torrential action is to account for the accretion on their land. Moreover,
Pascuals own land lies between the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers. If the accretion were to be
attributed to the action of either or both of the rivers, the alluvium should have been
deposited on either or both of the eastern and western boundaries of Pascuals own tract of
land, not on the northern portion thereof which is adjacent to the Manila Bay. Clearly lacking,
thus, is the third requisite of accretion, which is, that the alluvium is deposited on the portion
of Pascuals land which is adjacent to the river bank. Second, Pascuals own tract of land
adjoins the Manila Bay. Manila Bay is obviously not a river, and jurisprudence is already
settled that Manila Bay is part of the sea, being a mere indentation of the same. The
disputed land, thus, is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what used to
be the foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined Pascuals own tract of land on the northern
side. As such, the applicable law is not Art. 457 of the Civil Code but Art. 4 of the Spanish
Law of Waters of 1866, which provides that lands added to the shores by accretions and
alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part of the public domain.

OFFICE OF THE CITY MAYOR OF PARAAQUE CITY, OFFICE OF THE CITY

ADMINISTRATOR OF PARAAQUE CITY, OFFICE OF THE CITY ENGINEER OF
PARAAQUE CITY , OFFICE OF THE CITY PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT
COORDINATOR, OFFICE OF THE BARANGAY CAPTAIN AND SANGGUNIANG

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PAMBARANGAY OF BARANGAY VITALEZ, PARAAQUE CITY, TERESITA A.
GATCHALIAN, ENRICO R. ESGUERRA, ERNESTO T. PRACALE, JR., MANUEL M.
ARGOTE, CONRADO M. CANLAS, JOSEPHINE S. DAUIGOY, ALLAN L. GONZALES,
ESTER C. ASEHAN, MANUEL A. FUENTES, and MYRNA P. ROSALES v. MARIO D. EBIO
AND HIS CHILDREN/HEIRS namely, ARTURO V. EBIO, EDUARDO V. EBIO, RENATO V.
EBIO, LOURDES E. MAGTANGOB, MILA V. EBIO, and ARNEL V. EBIO
G.R. No. 178411, June 30, 2010, VILLARAMA, JR., J.
While a creek is a property of public dominion, the land which is formed by the
gradual and imperceptible accumulation of sediments along its banks does not form part of
the public domain by clear provision of law.
Facts:
Respondents claim that they are the absolute owners of a parcel of land which was
an accretion of Cut-cut creek. The Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed a
resolution seeking assistance from the City Government of Paraaque for the construction of
an access road along Cut-cut creek. The proposed road would traverse the lot occupied by
the respondents. When they were advised to vacate the said area, they registered their
opposition thereto. However, several officials of the city government proceeded with cutting
trees along the area. Respondents then applied for a writ of preliminary injunction with the
RTC. The RTC denied the application. The CA, however, reversed the RTC decision, applying
Art. 457 of the Civil Code. Now, the petitioners argue that since the creek, being a tributary
of the river, is classified as part of the public domain, any land that may have formed along
its banks through time should also be considered as part of the public domain.
Issue:
Whether or not the alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek form part of the public
domain.
Ruling:
NO. The law that governs ownership over the alluvial deposits along the banks of a
creek is Art. 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters, in relation to Art. 457 of the Civil Code. Art. 84
of the Spanish Law of Waters provides that accretions deposited gradually upon lands
contiguous to creeks, streams, rivers, and lakes, by accessions or sediments from the waters
thereof, belong to the owners of such lands. Art. 457 of the Civil Code also states that to the
owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the waters. Thus, the alluvial property
automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added. The only
restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining property must register it
under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition
through prescription by third persons. Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of
public dominion, the land which is formed by the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of
sediments along its banks do not form part of the public domain by clear provision of law.

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QUIETING OF TITLE
LUCIO ROBLES, EMETERIA ROBLES, ALUDIA ROBLES and EMILIO ROBLES v. COURT
OF APPEALS, SPOUSES VIRGILIO SANTOS and BABY RUTH CRUZ, RURAL BANK OF
CARDONA, INC., HILARIO ROBLES, ALBERTO PALAD, JR., in his capacity as Director
of Lands, and JOSE MAULEON in his capacity as District Land Officer of the Bureau
of Lands
G.R. No. 123509, March 14, 2000, PANGANIBAN, J.
To be entitled to the remedy of quieting of title, petitioners must show that they have
title to the real property at issue, and that some deed or proceeding beclouds its validity or
efficacy.
Facts:
The petitioners inherited the subject land from their father, Silvino Robles. The
petitioners entrusted the payment of the land taxes to their half-brother, Hilario Robles.
However, the tax declaration in the name of Silvino was canceled and transferred to
Exequiel Ballena, Hilarios father-in-law. Thereafter, Ballena secured a loan from a bank using
the tax declaration as security. The tax declaration was transferred to the name of Antipolo
Rural Bank and later on, was transferred to the name of Hilaro and his wife. Hilarios wife
secured a loan from Cardona Rural Bank using the tax declaration as security. For failure to
pay her obligation, foreclosure proceedings were had and the Rural Bank became the
highest bidder. The property was then sold to Spouses Vergel and Ruth Santos, and
consequently, a free patent was issued in their favor. Upon learning the mortgage, the
petitioners tried to redeem the property but were unsuccessful. They then filed an action for
quieting of title with the RTC. The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. But the CA held that
the petitioners no longer had any title to the subject property at the time they filed the
action.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the remedy of quieting of title.
Ruling:
YES. An action to quiet title is a remedy for the removal of any cloud or doubt or
uncertainty on the title to real property. It is essential for the complainant to have a legal or
an equitable title to or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action.
Also, the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that is being alleged as a cloud on
plaintiffs title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie
appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
The CA failed to consider irregularities in the transactions involving the disputed
property. The failure to show the indubitable title of Ballena to the property in question is
vital in this case. It was from him that Hilario had allegedly derived his title thereto as owner,
an allegation which thereby enabled him to mortgage it to the Rural Bank of Cardona. The
occupation and the possession thereof by the petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest
was not disputed, and Ballenas acquisition of the said property by prescription was not
alleged. Thus, the deed of conveyance purportedly evidencing the transfer of ownership and
possession from the heirs of Silvino to Ballena should have been presented as the best proof
of that transfer. No such document was presented, however. Therefore, there is merit to the
contention of the petitioners that Hilario mortgaged the disputed property to the Rural Bank
of Cardona in his capacity as a mere co-owner thereof. Clearly, the said transaction did not

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divest them of title to the property at the time of the institution of the action for quieting of
title.

ANASTACIA VDA. DE AVILES, ET AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS and CAMILO AVILES

G.R. No. 95748, November 21, 1996, PANGANIBAN, J.
An action for quieting of title is not the proper remedy for settling boundary dispute.
Facts:
The petitioners aver that the subject land is the share of their father, Eduardo Aviles
and brother of Camilo Aviles. Such land was mortgaged by Eduardo and was foreclosed, but
was redeemed by Anastacia Vda. De Aviles. Thereafter, Camilo asserted a color of title over
the northern portion of the property by constructing a bamboo fence and moving the
earthen dikes, thus disturbing the possession of the petitioners over said portion. Camilo
then admitted the agreement of partition executed by him and his brothers. The areas
allotted to them was agreed and measured before the execution of the agreement. Camilo
agreed to have a smaller area. The subject portion however is part of the share given to him
in the agreement of partition. Thus, Camilo is only occupying an area which is smaller than
his actual share. An action for quieting of title was thus filed with the RTC. The RTC dismissed
the complaint and ordered the parties to employ the services of a Land Surveyor. On appeal,
the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in part, reasoning that the a special civil action for
quieting of title is not the proper remedy for settling a boundary dispute, and that petitioners
should have instituted an ejectment suit instead.
Issue:
Whether or not an action for quieting of title is the proper remedy for settling
boundary dispute.
Ruling:
NO. To avail the remedy of quieting of title, a plaintiff must show that there is an
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud,
doubt, question or shadow upon the owners title to or interest in real property.
The CA correctly ruled that there was no evidence of any muniment of title,
proceeding, or a written contract. The Agreement of Partition executed by Camilo and his
brothers and the Deed of Sale evidencing the redemption by Anastacia in no way constitute
a cloud or cast a doubt upon the title of petitioners. Rather, the uncertainty arises from the
parties failure to situate and fix the boundary between their respective properties. Both
petitioners and Camilo admitted the existence of the agreement of partition and that the
only controversy is whether these lands were properly measured. There is no adverse claim
by the defendant which is apparently valid, but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective,
voidable, or unenforceable and which constitutes a cloud thereon. The construction of the
bamboo fence enclosing the disputed property and the moving of earthen dikes also are not
the clouds or doubts which can be removed in an action for quieting of title. Thus, an action

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to quiet title or to remove cloud may not be brought for the purpose of settling a boundary
dispute.

PHIL-VILLE DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING CORPORATION v. MAXIMO BONIFACIO,

CEFERINO R. BONIFACIO, APOLONIO B. TAN, BENITA B. CAINA, CRISPINA B.
PASCUAL, ROSALIA B. DE GRACIA, TERESITA S. DORONIA, CHRISTINA GOCO and
ARSENIO C. BONIFACIO, in their capacity as the surviving heirs of the late
ELEUTERIA RIVERA VDA. DE BONIFACIO
G.R. No. 167391, June 8, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.
For an action for quieting of title may prosper, two requisites must concur: (1) the
plaintiff has a legal or equitable title or interest in the real property subject of the action;
and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title
must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of
validity or legal efficacy.
Facts:
Phil-Ville owns three parcels of land of the subdivision plan, which form part of the
Maysilo Estate. Earlier, the heirs of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, including Euleteria Rivera
Vda. De Bonifacio claimed to be the co-owners of certain properties, including Maysilo
Estate, and filed a petition with the CFI praying for the substitution of their names on the
title instead of Vidal, which was granted. Thereafter, the heirs of Vidal filed a petition for
partition of the properties, which was again granted. 31 years later, Euleteria obtained an
order in her favor from the RTC for the partition and segregation of lots of the Maysilo Estate
and a writ of possession which resulted to a demand upon Phil-Ville to vacate the said lots.
But such writ of possession and notice to vacate was rendered void by the CA upon a
petition for certiorari. Nonetheless, Phil-Ville filed an action for quieting of title over the three
lots against the heirs of Euleteria. The RTC rendered in favor of Phil-Ville. However, the CA
set aside the RTC decision and dismissed Phil-Villes complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not the title in the name of Euleteria constitutes a cloud over Phil-Villes
titles over portions of the Maysilo Estate.
Ruling:
YES. In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, two requisites must
concur: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title or interest in the real
property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed
to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its
prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

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The first requisite is present because Phil-Ville was able to establish its title over the
real properties by submitting documentary evidence to support its claim. On the other hand,
the respondents have not adduced competent evidence to establish their title to the
property or to dispute Phil-Villes claim over the same. The Court also found that Euleteria
was 96 years old when she died in 1997, thus she was born in 1901. That makes Euleteria
two years older than Vidal who was born in 1903. Hence, it was physically impossible for her
to be an heir of Vidal. Moreover, the Partition Plan of the Maysilo Estate shows that the lot
was awarded not to Vidal. This was not at all disputed by respondents. The second requisite
is likewise present. While it is true that title in the name of Euleteria is an instrument that
appeared to be valid but was subsequently shown to be invalid, it does not cover the same
parcels of land that are described in Phil-Villes titles and that a comparison of the technical
descriptions of the parties titles negates an overlapping of their boundaries.

CO-OWNERSHIP / POSSESSION
CAROLINA (CARLINA) VDA. DE FIGURACION, HEIRS OF ELENA FIGURACIONANCHETA, namely: LEONCIO ANCHETA, JR., and ROMULO ANCHETA, HEIRS OF
HILARIA A. FIGURACION, namely: FELIPA FIGURACION-MANUEL, MARY
FIGURACION-GINEZ, and EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA, AND HEIRS OF QUINTIN
FIGURACION, namely: LINDA M. FIGURACION, LEANDRO M. FIGURACION, II, and
ALLAN M. FIGURACION v. EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA
G.R. No. 151334, February 13, 2013, Reyes, J.
A co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share; hence, a sale of the entire property
by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void and only
the rights of the co-owner/seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of
the property.
Facts:
Subject of the dispute is Lot No. 707 originally owned by one Eulalio Adviento
(Eulalio). Eulalilo begot two children, Agripina Adviento (Agripina) with his first wife and
herein petitioner Carolina, with his second wife. Faustina Upon the death of Eulalilo, the
ownership over Lot No. 707 passed unto his two daughters Agripina and Carolina. In 1961,
Agripina executed a Deed of Quitclaim over the eastern half of Lot No. 707 in favor of her
niece, herein respondent Emilia. Subsequently however, Carolina executed an Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication adjudicating unto herself the entire Lot No. 707. Carolina likewise executed
a Deed of Absolute Sale over Lot No. 707 in favor of petitioners Hilaria and Felipa. Relying on
the Deed of Quitclaim, Emilia built a house on the eastern half of Lot No. 707. The present
controversy started in 1994 when Hilaria and her agents threatened to demolish the house
of Emilia who, in retaliation, was prompted to seek the partition of Lot No. 707.
Issue:
707.

Whether or not respondent Emilia is the owner of the eastern half portion of Lot No.

Ruling:

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YES. The status of Agripina and Carolina as the legitimate heirs of Eulalio is an
undisputed fact. As such heirs, they became co-owners of Lot No. 707 upon the death of
Eulalio on July 20, 1930. Since Faustina was predeceased by Eulalio, she likewise became a
co-owner of the lot upon Eulalios death. Faustinas share, however, passed on to her
daughter Carolina when the former died on October 18, 1949. The Affidavit of SelfAdjudication executed by Carolina did not prejudice the share of Agripina because it is not
legally possible for one to adjudicate unto himself an entire property he was not the sole
owner of. A co-owner cannot alienate the shares of her other co-owners nemo dat qui non
habet. Hence, Lot No. 707 was a co-owned property of Agripina and Carolina. As co-owners,
each of them had full ownership of her part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto.
Each of them also had the right to alienate the lot but only in so far as the extent of her
portion was affected. Thus, when Carolina sold the entire Lot No. 707 on December 11, 1962
to Hilaria and Felipa without the consent of her co-owner Agripina, the disposition affected
only Carolinas pro indiviso share, and the vendees, Hilaria and Felipa, acquired only what
corresponds to Carolinas share.

REY CASTIGADOR CATEDRILLA v. MARIO and MARGIE LAURON

G.R. No. 179011, April 15, 2013, Peralta, J.
Art. 487 of the NCC provides that a co-owner may bring an action for ejectment,
without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is
deemed to be instituted for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession
for himself and not for the co-ownership, the action will not prosper.
Facts:
The subject land of the present controversy is Lot No. 5 which was originally owned
by one Lilia Castigador (Lilia). Upon the death of Lilia, Lot No. 5 was inherited by her heirs
which included herein petitioner Rey. Sometime in 1980, respondents Mario and Margie
Lauron, through the tolerance of the heirs of Lilia, constructed a residential building on the
northwest portion of Lot No. 5. Subsequently thereafter, the heirs of Lilia asked respondents
to vacate Lot No. 5. When the respondents refused, petitioner Rey filed a Complaint for
Ejectment against the respondents. The respondents argue that petitioner should have
impleaded his other co-heirs they being considered as indispensable parties.
Issue:
Whether or not the co-heirs of petitioner Rey are considered indispensable parties
which are required to be impleaded pursuant to Section 1, Rule 7 and Section 7, Rule 3 of
the ROC.
Ruling:
NO. In the more recent case of Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman, this Court
declared that a co-owner is not even a necessary party to an action for ejectment, for
complete relief can be afforded even in his absence, thus:

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In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest.
However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and the relevant jurisprudence, any one
of them may bring an action, any kind of action for the recovery of co-owned properties.
Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the
recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners
are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can
be afforded in the suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed to have
been filed for the benefit of all co-owners. In this case, although petitioner alone filed the
complaint for unlawful detainer, he stated in the complaint that he is one of the heirs of the
late Lilia Castigador, his mother, who inherited the subject lot, from her parents. Petitioner
did not claim exclusive ownership of the subject lot, but he filed the complaint for the
purpose of recovering its possession which would redound to the benefit of the co-owners.
Since petitioner recognized the existence of a co-ownership, he, as a co-owner, can bring
the action without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs.
SPOUSES MANUEL and SALVACION DEL CAMPO v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
HEIRS OF JOSE REGALADO, SR.
G.R. No. 108228, February 1, 2001, QUISUMBING, J.
A co-owner cannot rightfully dispose of a particular portion of a co-owned property
prior to partition among all the co-owners. However, this should not signify that the vendee
does not acquire anything at all in case a physically segregated area of the co-owned lot is
in fact sold to him. Since the co-owner/vendors undivided interest could properly be the
object of the contract of sale between the parties, what the vendee obtains by virtue of such
a sale are the same rights as the vendor had as co-owner, in an ideal share equivalent to the
consideration given under their transaction. In other words, the vendee steps into the shoes
of the vendor as co-owner and acquires a proportionate abstract share in the property held
in common.
Facts:
Salome, Consorcia, Alfredo, Maria, Rosalia, Jose, Quirico and Julita, all surnamed
Bornales, were the original co-owners of Lot 162. In 1940, Salome sold part of her 4/16 share
in Lot 162 to Soledad Daynolo. A few years later, Soledad and her husband, Simplicio
Distajo, mortgaged the subject portion of Lot 162 as security for a debt to Jose Regalado, Sr.
This transaction was evidenced by a Deed of Mortgage. Meanwhile, three of the eight coowners of Lot 162, specifically, Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo, sold 24,993 square meters of
said lot to Jose Regalado, Sr. On May 4, 1951, Simplicio Distajo, heir of Soledad Daynolo who
had since died, paid the mortgage debt and redeemed the mortgaged portion of Lot 162
from Jose Regalado, Sr. The latter, in turn, executed a Deed of Discharge of Mortgage in
favor of Soledads heirs. On same date, the said heirs sold the redeemed portion of Lot 162
to herein petitioners, the spouses Manuel Del Campo and Salvacion Quiachon.
Subsequently, Jose Regalado, Sr. subdivided Lot 162 into smaller lots, each covered
by a respective title in his name. One of these small lots is Lot No. 162-C-6 with an area of
11,732 square meters which was registered under the name of Jose Regalado, Sr. Alleging
that they own an area of 1,544 square meters located within Lot 162-C-6 which was
erroneously registered in the name of Regalado, petitioners Manuel and Salvacion del
Campo brought a complaint for repartition, resurvey and reconveyance against the heirs of
the now deceased Jose Regalado, Sr.
Issue:

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Whether or not Salome, as co-owner of Lot 162, could validly sell a definite or
concrete portion of the co-owned lot.
Ruling:
NO, however, the mere fact that Salome purportedly transferred a definite portion of
the co-owned lot by metes and bounds to Soledad, does not per se render the sale a nullity.
Resultantly, Soledad became a co-owner of Lot 162 as of the year 1940 when the
sale was made in her favor. It follows that Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could not have sold
the entire Lot 162 to Jose Regalado, Sr. on April 14, 1948 because at that time, the ideal
shares held by the three co-owners/vendors were equivalent to only 10/16 of the undivided
property less the aliquot share previously sold by Salome to Soledad. Based on the principle
that no one can give what he does not have, Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could not legally
sell the shares pertaining to Soledad since a co-owner cannot alienate more than his share
in the co-ownership. The SC have ruled many times that even if a co-owner sells the whole
property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners
who did not consent to the sale. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a
sale of the entire property by one co-owner will only transfer the rights of said co-owner to
the buyer, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
In this case, Regalado merely became a new co-owner of Lot 162 to the extent of the
shares which Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could validly convey. Soledad retained her
rights as co-owner and could validly transfer her share to petitioners in 1951. The logical
effect of the second disposition is to substitute petitioners in the rights of Soledad as coowner of the land. Needless to say, these rights are preserved notwithstanding the issuance
of TCT No. 14566 in Regalados name in 1977.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. JOSE GARCIA AND CHILDREN NORA GARCIA, JOSE
GARCIA, JR., BOBBY GARCIA AND JIMMY GARCIA AND HEIRS OF ROGELIO GARCIA
NAMELY: CELEDONIO GARCIA, DANILO GARCIA, ELSA GARCIA, FERMIN GARCIA,
HEHERSON GARCIA, GREGORIO GARCIA, IMELDA GARCIA AND JANE GARCIA
G.R. No. 182839, June 02, 2014, Brion, J.
Each co-owner has the full ownership of his part or share in the co-ownership and
may alienate, assign or mortgage it except when personal rights are involved. Should a coowner alienate or mortgage the co-owned property itself, the alienation or mortgage shall
remain valid but only to the extent of the portion which may be allotted to him in the
division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Facts:
The subject of the present controversy is a parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-44422
under the name of Jose Garcia Sr. (Jose Sr.) who acquired the subject property during his
marriage with Ligaya Garcia (Ligaya). Ligaya died on January 21, 1987. Respondents Nora,
Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy are the children of Jose Sr. and Ligaya. Sometime in 1989, the
spouses Rogelio and Celedonia Garcia (Spouses Garcia) obtained a loan from petitioner PNB.
Jose Sr., who agreed to accommodate the Spouses Garcia, offered the land covered by TCT
No. T-44422 as security for the loan. For this purpose, Jose Sr. executed Special Powers of
Attorney (SPAs) dated April 14, 1992 and October 6, 1993, respectively, expressly
authorizing the Spouses Garcia to apply for, borrow, or secure any loan from PNB, and to
convey and transfer the subject property by way of mortgage. All of these transactions,

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however, were without the knowledge and consent of Jose Sr.s children. Claiming that the
Real Estate Mortgage Contract was null and void as to them, respondents Nora, Jose Jr.,
Bobby and Jimmy filed a Complaint for Nullity of the Real Estate Mortgage against PNB and
the Spouses Garcia.
Issue:
Whether or not Jose Sr. could validly mortgage the entire property without the
consent of his children.
Ruling:
NO. Because of the petitioner banks failure to rebut the allegation that the subject
property was acquired during the formers marriage to Ligaya, the legal presumption of the
conjugal nature of the property, in line with Article 160 of the Civil Code, applies to this
property. Proof of the subject propertys acquisition during the subsistence of marriage
suffices to render the statutory presumption operative. Upon the death of Ligaya on January
21, 1987, the conjugal partnership was automatically dissolved and terminated pursuant to
Article 175(1) of the Civil Code, and the successional rights of her heirs vest, as provided
under Article 777 of the Civil Code, which states that [t]he rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.
Consequently, the conjugal partnership was converted into an implied ordinary coownership between the surviving spouse, on the one hand, and the heirs of the deceased,
on the other. This resulting ordinary co-ownership among the heirs is governed by Article
493 of the Civil Code.
In the present case, Jose Sr. constituted the mortgage over the entire subject
property after the death of Ligaya, but before the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
While under Article 493 of the Civil Code, even if he had the right to freely mortgage or even
sell his undivided interest in the disputed property, he could not dispose of or mortgage the
entire property without his childrens consent. As correctly emphasized by the trial court,
Jose Sr.s right in the subject property is limited only to his share in the conjugal partnership
as well as his share as an heir on the other half of the estate which is his deceased spouses
share. Accordingly, the mortgage contract is void insofar as it extends to the undivided
shares of his children (Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy) because they did not give their
consent to the transaction. Accordingly, the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage constituted
by Jose Sr. over the entire property without his co-owners consent is not necessarily void in
its entirety. The right of the petitioner bank as mortgagee is limited though only to the
portion which may be allotted to Jose Sr. in the event of a division and liquidation of the
subject property.
VILMA QUINTOS, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact FIDEL I. QUINTOS, JR.;
FLORENCIA I. DANCEL, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact FLOVY I. DANCEL; and
CATALINO L. IBARRA v. PELAGIA I. NICOLAS, NOLI L. IBARRA, SANTIAGO L. IBARRA,
PEDRO L. IBARRA, DAVID L. IBARRA, GILBERTO L. IBARRA, HEIRS OF AUGUSTO L.
IBARRA, namely CONCHITA R., IBARRA, APOLONIO IBARRA, and NARCISO IBARRA,
and the spouses RECTO CANDELARIO and ROSEMARIE CANDELARIO
G.R. No. 210252, June 16, 2014, Velasco, Jr., J.

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Art. 494 of the New Civil Code is an exception to Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court
to the effect that even if the order of dismissal for failure to prosecute is silent on whether
or not it is with prejudice, it shall be deemed to be without prejudice.
Facts:
Petitioners Vilma, Florencia, and Catalino, and respondents Pelagia, Noli, Santiago,
Pedro, David, Gilberto, and the late Augusto are siblings. Their parents, Bienvenido and
Escolastica Ibarra, were the owners of the subject property, a parcel of land covered by TCT
No. 318717. When Bienvenido and Escolastica died, the ownership of the subject property
passed to their 10 children. Respondents, in 2002 filed an action for partition against
petitioners. The action was however dismissed by the trial court due to the failure of the
parties to appear despite due notice. Having failed to secure a favorable decision for
partition, respondent siblings instead resorted to executing a Deed of Adjudication to
transfer the property in favor of the ten (10) siblings. As a result, TCT No. 318717 was
cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 390484 was issued in the name of the ten siblings.
Thereafter, respondent siblings sold their 7/10 undivided share over the property in favor of
their co-respondents, the spouses Recto and Rosemarie Candelario. As a consequence
thereof, TCT No. 390484 was partially cancelled and TCT No. 434304 was issued in the name
of the Candelarios, covering the 7/10portion.
Alleging that the subject property was given to them by their parents during the
lifetime of the latter, petitioners filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages against
respondents. Respondents countered that petitioners cause of action was already barred by
estoppel when sometime in 2006, one of petitioners offered to buy the 7/10 undivided share
of the respondent siblings. They point out that this is an admission on the part of petitioners
that the property is not entirely theirs. Lastly, respondents sought, by way of counterclaim,
the partition of the property.
Issue:
Whether or not the counterclaim of respondents for partition is already barred by res
judicata.

Ruling:
NO. In the case at bar, respondent siblings admit that they filed an action for
partition docketed as Civil Case No. 02-52, which the RTC dismissed through an Order dated
March 22, 2004 for the failure of the parties to attend the scheduled hearings. Respondents
likewise admitted that since they no longer appealed the dismissal, the ruling attained
finality. Moreover, it cannot be disputed that the subject property in Civil Case No. 02-52 and
in the present controversy are one and the same, and that in both cases, respondents raise
the same action for partition. And lastly, although respondent spouses Candelario were not
party-litigants in the earlier case for partition, there is identity of parties not only when the
parties in the case are the same, but also between those in privity with them, such as
between their successors-in-interest.

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With all the other elements present, what is left to be determined now is whether or
not the dismissal of Civil case No. 02-52 operated as a dismissal on the merits that would
complete the requirements of res judicata.
Rule 17, Section 3 enumerates the instances when a complaint may be dismissed
due to the plaintiff's fault: (1) if he fails to appear on the date for the presentation of his
evidence in chief on the complaint; (2) if he fails to prosecute his action for an unreasonable
length of time; or (3) if he fails to comply with the Rules or any order of the court. The
dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute has the effect of adjudication on the merits, and
is necessarily understood to be with prejudice to the filing of another action, unless
otherwise provided in the order of dismissal. Stated differently, the general rule is that
dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute is to be regarded as an adjudication on the merits
and with prejudice to the filing of another action, and the only exception is when the order of
dismissal expressly contains a qualification that the dismissal is without prejudice. In the
case at bar, petitioners claim that the Order does not in any language say that the dismissal
is without prejudice and, thus, the requirement that the dismissal be on the merits is
present.
Truly, the SC have had the occasion to rule that dismissal with prejudice under the
above-cited rule amply satisfies one of the elements of res judicata. It is, thus,
understandable why petitioners would allege res judicata to bolster their claim. However,
dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court cannot defeat the right
of a co-owner to ask for partition at any time, provided that there is no actual adjudication of
ownership of shares yet.
Between dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 and the right granted to coowners under Art. 494 of the Civil Code, the latter must prevail. To construe otherwise would
diminish the substantive right of a co-owner through the promulgation of procedural rules.
Such a construction is not sanctioned by the principle, which is too well settled to require
citation, that a substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural rule.
HEIRS OF QUIRICO SERASPI AND PURIFICACION R. SERASPI v. COURT OF APPEALS
AND SIMEON RECASA
G.R. No. 135602. April 28, 2000, Mendoza, J.
Good faith consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom the possessor
received the thing was its owner but could not transmit the ownership thereof.
Facts:
The two parcels of land subject of the present case were originally owned by one
Marcelino Recasa (Marcelino). During his lifetime, Marcelino contracted 3 marriages. When
he died, Marcelino had 15 children from his 3 marriages. Marcelinos intestate estate was
partitioned into 3 parts, each part corresponding to the share of the heirs in each marriage.
Subsequently thereafter, the heirs from the first marriage and second marriage sold their
shares in the estate of Marcelino to Quirico and Purificacion Seraspi (the Seraspis), whose
heirs are the present petitioners. Using the lands in question as security, the Seraspis
obtained a loan from Kalibo Rural Bank, Inc. (KRBI). When the Seraspis failed to pay the loan,
the lands mortgaged were foreclosed and the same were sold to KRBI being then the highest
bidder. The lands were subsequently sold to Manuel Rata (Manuel) Quiricos brother-in-law.
Manuel, as owner of the property, allowed Quirico to administer the property.

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In 1974, private respondent Simeon Recasa (Simeon), Marcelinos child by his third
wife, taking advantage of the illness of Quirico, forcibly entered the lands in question and
took possession thereof. Meanwhile, the Seraspis purchased the lands from Manuel and
afterwards filed a complaint against Simeon for recovery of possession of lands.
Issue:
Whether or not private respondent Simeon Recasa acquired ownership of the
properties in question through acquisitive prescription.
Ruling:
NO. Article 1117 of the New Civil Code provides that acquisitive prescription of
dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary, depending on whether the
property is possessed in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law. Private
respondent contends that he acquired the ownership of the questioned property by ordinary
prescription through adverse possession for ten (10) years. The contention has no merit,
because he has neither just title nor good faith. Art. 1129 provides that: For the purposes of
prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the
property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or
other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right.
In the case at bar, private respondent did not acquire possession
through any of the modes recognized by the Civil Code, to wit: (1)
intellectual creation, (3) law, (4) donation, (5) succession, (6) tradition in
certain contracts, and (7) prescription. Neither can private respondent claim
favor. Private respondent entered the property without the consent of the
For all intents and purposes, he is a mere usurper.

of the property
occupation, (2)
consequence of
good faith in his
previous owner.

DOMINGO R. CATAPUSAN, MINELIO R. CATAPUSAN, and FILOMENO R. CATAPUSAN

vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, VICENTE CATAPUSAN, JR., CIPRIANO CATAPUSAN,
GREGORIA CATAPUSAN, SEGUNDA BAUTISTA CATAPUSAN, NICANOR T. CATAPUSAN,
NARCISA T. CATAPUSAN, GREGORIO T. CATAPUSAN, BENIGNO T. CATAPUSAN,
REYNALDO T. CATAPUSAN, CATALINA T. CATAPUSAN, GERTRUDES CATAPUSAN and
FLORA DIAZ CATAPUSAN
G.R. No. 109262, November 21, 1996, Francisco J.

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In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to divide the
property, unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of co-ownership. The
court must initially settle the issue of ownership, the first stage in an action for partition.
Needless to state, an action for partition will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest
over the subject property.
Facts:
The property under controversy is a parcel of land located in Wawa, Tanay, Rizal.
Domingo Catapusan (Domingo et al) herein petitioners, are the children of one Bonifacio
Catapusan (Bonifacio) with one Paula Reyes (Paula). Their marriage was contracted
sometime in 1927. On the other hand, private respondents, Vicente Catapusan Jr (Vicente et
al) are the children of Bonifacio from a prior marriage with one Narcissa Tanjuatco (Narcissa)
and only surviving heir of one Dominga Piguing (Dominga). When Narcissa died, Bonifacio
married Paula. The Wawa property originally belonged to Dominga and upon her death was
transferred to Narcissa. Thereafter, Domingo et al filed an action for partition over the Wawa
property which they allegedly co-own with their half-brothers and half-sisters. Domingo et al
presented tax declarations as their only piece of evidence. The RTC dismissed the complaint
filed by Domingo et al. On appeal with the CA, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. The CA
opined that the evidence of Domingo et al was insufficient in proving ownership of the same
over the Wawa property. Now, Domingo et al comes before the Supreme Court assailing the
decision of the CA. Domingo et al among others, argue that an action for partition does not
include question of ownership. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not an action for partition includes question of ownership.
Ruling:
YES. In fact, Section 1 of Rule 69 requires the party filing the action to state in his
complaint the nature and extent of his title to the real estate. Until and unless the issue of
ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the properties.

ZOSIMA VERDAD v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SOCORRO C. ROSALES, AURORA

ROSALES, NAPOLEON ROSALES, ANTONIO ROSALES, FLORENDA ROSALES, ELENA
ROSALES AND VIRGINIA ROSALES
G.R. No. 109972, April 29, 1996, Vitug, J.
When a co-owner sells his interest over a co-owned property the co-owner/vendor is
mandated by law to send a written notice to his co-owners, notwithstanding actual

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knowledge of the latter. A written notice is required in order to remove all uncertainties
about the sale, its terms and conditions, as well as its efficacy and status.
Facts:
The parcel of land subject of the present controversy was originally owned by one
Macaria, who, during her lifetime contracted two marriages. At the time of her death,
Macaria was survived by her son Ramon and her grandchild Estela of the first marriage and
her children of the second marriage, namely, David Rosales (David), Justo Rosales, Romulo
Rosales, and Aurora Rosales. Private respondent Socorro Rosales (Socorro) is the widow of
David who himself, sometime after Macarias death, died intestate without an issue.
Subsequently, the heirs of Ramon, without the knowledge of their co-heirs, sold their interest
on the disputed land to petitioner Zosima Verdad (Zosima). Wanting to redeem the
property, Socorro tendered the sum of P23,000.00 to Zosima. The latter refused to accept
the amount for being much less than the lots current value. No settlement having been
reached before the Lupong Tagapayapa, private respondents initiated against Socorro an
action for "Legal Redemption with Preliminary Injunction".
Issue:
Whether or not private respondent Socorro has the capacity to redeem the property,
she not being a co-heir herself in the intestate estate of Macaria.
Ruling:
YES. The Court ruled that Socorro can. It is true that Socorro, a daughter-in-law (or,
for that matter, a mere relative by affinity), is not an intestate heir of her parents-in-law;
however, Socorro s right to the property is not because she rightfully can claim heirship in
Macarias estate but that she is a legal heir of her husband, David Rosales, part of whose
estate is a share in his mothers inheritance. David Rosales, incontrovertibly, survived his
mothers death. When Macaria died on 08 March 1956 her estate passed on to her surviving
children, among them David Rosales, who thereupon became co-owners of the property.
When David Rosales himself later died, his own estate, which included his undivided interest
over the property inherited from Macaria, passed on to his widow Socorro and her co-heirs
pursuant to the law on succession. Socorro and herein private respondents, along with the
co-heirs of David Rosales, thereupon became co-owners of the property that originally
descended from Macaria. When their interest in the property was sold by the Burdeos heirs
to petitioner, a right of redemption arose in favor of private respondents as provided under
Article 1619 and Article 1620 of the NCC.

ANDREA TABUSO and RENATO BISMORTE v. COURT OF APPEALS and the HEIRS OF
ESTEBAN ABAD represented by Nemesio Abad and Ana Abad Paghubasan,
G.R. No. 108558, June 21, 2001, PANGANIBAN, J.
Actual stay on the property is not necessary in order to prove ownership of the same.

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Facts:
Andrea Tabuso and Renato Bismorte filed a petition for declaration of ownership
involving an unregistered land before the RTC of Naval Leyte. Tabuso alleged that they have
been paying the land taxes of the property and that they had built a house in the subject
property. For their part, the respondents presented evidence of their ownership which
consist of tax declaration and testimony of the owner of the adjacent land. The trial court
ruled in favor of respondents holding that there was abundant proof of private respondents'
ownership of the lot in question and even if the latter had built a house thereon, such action
was only tolerated by private respondents. On appeal, the CA upheld the ruling of the RTC in
toto.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent is the owner of the subject property.
Ruling:
YES. For a period of more than 60 years, private respondents have been able to
establish that they are the owners of the lot; and that for said period, they have been in
open, continuous and uninterrupted possession of the same. The occupation of the property
by petitioners is not in the concept of owners, because their stay is merely tolerated. An
owner's act of allowing another to occupy his house, rent-free, does not create a permanent
and indefeasible right of possession in the latter's favor. Lastly, the claim of petitioners that
private respondents are not in actual possession of the land is unsubstantiated. Besides, it is
not necessary that the latter actually stay on the property in order to prove ownership of the
same. As found by both the trial and the appellate courts, since the acquisition of the
subject property by private respondents, they had religiously paid the taxes due thereon.
Further, one of the co-owners executed a lease contract over it in favor of a tenant. These
acts are clearly consistent with ownership.
FERNANDA MENDOZA CEQUENA AND RUPERTA MENDOZA LIRIO v. HONORATA
MENDOZA BOLANTE
G.R. No. 137944, April 06, 2000, Panganiban, J.
Tax receipts and declarations are prima facie proofs of ownership or possession of
the property for which such taxes have been paid. Coupled with proof of actual possession
of the property, they may become the basis of a claim for ownership. By acquisitive
prescription, possession in the concept of owner -- public, adverse, peaceful and
uninterrupted -- may be converted to ownership. On the other hand, mere possession and
occupation of land cannot ripen into ownership.
Facts:
The land subject of the present controversy was originally declared for taxation
purposes in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza (Sinforoso) father of respondent Honorata
Mendoza (Honorata). When Sinforoso died in 1930, Margarito Medoza (Margarito), brother of
Sinforoso, and father of herein petitioners, took possession of the land and cultivated it with
his son Miguel. Despite this, Honorata and her mother continued residing on the lot. When

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Honorata came of age in 1948, she paid realty taxes for the years 1932-1948. In 1953,
however, Margarito declared the lot for taxation in his name. When Margarito died, Miguel
continued to cultivate the disputed land until he was physically ousted by Honorata in 1985.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners are the real owners of the disputed land being the heirs of
their father Margarito in whose name the disputed land is declared for taxation purposes.
Ruling:
NO. Ownership of immovable property is acquired by ordinary prescription through
possession for ten years. Being the sole heir of her father, respondent showed through his
tax receipt that she had been in possession of the land for more than ten years since 1932.
When her father died in 1930, she continued to reside there with her mother. When she got
married, she and her husband engaged in kaingin inside the disputed lot for their livelihood.
Respondent's possession was not disturbed until 1953 when the petitioners' father
claimed the land. But by then, her possession, which was in the concept of owner -- public,
peaceful, and uninterrupted -- had already ripened into ownership. Furthermore she herself,
after her father's demise, declared and paid realty taxes for the disputed land. Tax receipts
and declarations of ownership for taxation, when coupled with proof of actual
possession of the property, can be the basis of a claim for ownership through
prescription.
In contrast, the petitioners, despite thirty-two years of farming the subject land, did
not acquire ownership. It is settled that ownership cannot be acquired by mere occupation.
Unless coupled with the element of hostility toward the true owner, occupation and use,
however long, will not confer title by prescription or adverse possession. Moreover, the
petitioners cannot claim that their possession was public, peaceful and uninterrupted.
Although their father and brother arguably acquired ownership through extraordinary
prescription because of their adverse possession for thirty-two years (1953-1985), this
supposed ownership cannot extend to the entire disputed lot, but must be limited to the
portion that they actually farmed. Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence
of ownership. At most, they constitute mere prima facie proof of ownership or possession of
the property for which taxes have been paid. In the absence of actual public and adverse
possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership. In sum,
the petitioners' claim of ownership of the whole parcel has no legal basis.

EASEMENTS
SPS. MANUEL AND VICTORIA SALIMBANGON v. SPS. SANTOS AND ERLINDA TAN
G.R. No. 185240, January 20, 2010, Abad, J.
The existence of a dominant estate and a servient estate is incompatible with the
idea that both estates belong to the same person.
Facts:
Guillermo Ceniza (Ceniza) died intestate leaving a parcel of land to his children
Benedicta, Guillermo, Jr., Victoria, Eduardo, and Carlos. Subsequently thereafter, Cenizas
children adjudicated and divided among themselves the parcel of land left by Ceniza. The
heirs of Ceniza agreed that Lot A will be given to petitioner Victoria and Lots B, C, D and E to

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Eduardo, Carlos, Guillermo and Benedicta respectively. The heirs likewise agreed that Lot B
would be subjected to a perpetual and gratuitous road right of way of 1.50 m. wide along its
SW boundary in favor of Lots A, D & E of the subdivision. Subsequently, however,
respondent spouses Santos and Erlinda Tan (the Tans) bought Lots B, C, D, and E from all
their owners. The Tans built improvements on Lot B that spilled into the easement
area. Unable to use the old right of way, petitioners Spouses Manuel and Victoria
Salimbangon (the Salimbangons) lodged a complaint with the City Engineer of Mandaue
against the Tans. For their part, the Tans filed an action with the RTC against the
Salimbangons for the extinguishment of the easement on Lot B.
Issue:
Whether or not the easement of right of way on Lot B has been extinguished when
the Tans bought Lots B, C, D and E.
Ruling:
YES. As Eduardo Ceniza testified, the true agreement of the heirs was for the
establishment of an easement of right of way for the benefit solely of the lots that did not
have direct access to the street, namely Lots D and E. As originally constituted in that
agreement, each of Lots A and B was to contribute a strip of 1.5 meters between them that
when combined formed a 3-meter wide alley leading from Lots D and E to the street. To the
extent that Lots A and B retained the right to use the 1.5-meter portion that they
contributed to the establishment of the easement, the agreement gave their owners the
right to use the common alley as well. As Eduardo testified, however, the true intent of the
heirs was to give Lots D and E access to the street. Lots A and B did not need this alley since
they were facing the street. Consequently, when the owner of Lots D and E also became the
owner of Lot B, the easement of right of way on Lot B became extinct by operation of law.
The existence of a dominant estate and a servient estate is incompatible with the idea that
both estates belong to the same person.
ANASTACIA QUIMEN v. COURT OF APPEALS and YOLANDA Q. OLIVEROS
G.R. No. 112331, May 29, 1996, BELLOSILLO,J.
In easement of right of way that easement where the way is shortest and will cause
least prejudice shall be chosen. However, if the two circumstances do not concur in a single
tenement, the way where damage will be least shall be used even if not the shortest route.
Facts:
A piece of property was inherited by petitioner Anastacia, her brothers Sotero,
Sulpicio, Antonio and sister Rufina. The siblings agreed to subdivide the property equally
among themselves, as they did, with the shares of Anastacia, Sotero, Sulpicio and Rufina
abutting the municipal road. The share of Anastacia, was designated as Lot No. 1448-B- 1. It
is bounded on the right by the property of Sotero designated as Lot. No. 1448-B-2. Located
directly behind the lots of Anastacia and Sotero is the share of their brother Antonio
designated as Lot No. 1448-B-C which the latter divided into two equal parts, now Lots Nos.
1448-B-6-A and 1448-B-6-B. Lot No. 1448-B-6-A is located behind Anastacias Lot, while Lot
No. 1448-B-6-B is behind the property of Sotero, father of respondent Yolanda. In 1982
Yolanda purchased Lot No. 1448-B-6-A from her uncle Antonio through her aunt
Anastacia. According to Yolanda, when petitioner offered her the property for sale she was
hesitant to buy it as it had no access to a public road. But Anastacia assured her that she

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would give her a right of way on her adjoining property. Thereafter, Yolanda constructed a
house on the lot she bought using as her passageway to the public highway a portion of
Anastacias property. But when Yolanda finally offered to pay for the use of the pathway
Anastacia refused to accept the payment. In fact she was thereafter barred by Anastacia
from passing through her property.
Issue:
Whether or not a right of way should be granted in favor of Yolanda over the property
of petitioner Anastacia.
Ruling:
YES. In applying Art. 650 of the New Civil Code, respondent Court of Appeals
declared that the proposed right of way of Yolanda, which is one (1) meter wide and
five (5) meters long at the extreme right of petitioners property, will cause the least
prejudice and/or damage as compared to the suggested passage through the property of
Yolandas father which would mean destroying the sari-sari store made of strong
materials. Absent any showing that these findings and conclusion are devoid of factual
support in the records, or are so glaringly erroneous, this Court accepts and adopts them. As
between a right of way that would demolish a store of strong materials to provide egress to
a public highway, and another right of way which although longer will only require an
avocado tree to be cut down, the second alternative should be preferred. After all, it is not
the main function of this Court to analyze or weigh the evidence presented all over again
where the petition would necessarily invite calibration of the whole evidence considering
primarily the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding
circumstances, their relation to each other, and the probabilities of the situation. In sum, the
Court found that the decision of respondent appellate court is thoroughly backed up by law
and the evidence.

SPOUSES CESAR and RAQUEL STA. MARIA and FLORCERFIDA STA. MARIA v. COURT
OF APPEALS, and SPOUSES ARSENIO and ROSLYNN FAJARDO
Where there are several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, and the
easement may be established on any of them, the one where the way is shortest and will
cause the least damage should be chosen. But if these two circumstances do not concur in a
single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will
not be the shortest. And if the conditions of the various tenements are the same, all the
adjoining owners should be cited and experts utilized to determine where the easement
shall be established
Facts:
Private respondents Arsenio and Roslynn Fajardo (Spouses Fajardo) are the registered
owners of a piece of land denominated as Lot No. 124. Spouses Fajardos Lot 124 is
surrounded by several immovables, some of which are Lot 6-A and a portion of Lot 6-B
owned respectively by petitioners Cesar and Raquel Sta. Maria and Florcerfida Sta. Maria
(Sta. Marias). Alleging that their lot, Lot 124, is surrounded by properties belonging to other
persons, including those of Sta. Marias and that Spouses Fajardo have no adequate outlet to
the provincial road, an easement of a right of way passing through either of the properties
owned by Sta. Marias which are directly abutting the provincial road would be private

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respondents only convenient, direct and shortest access to and from the provincial road.
Thus, private respondents filed an action praying that an easement of right of way on the
lots of petitioners be established in their favor.

Issue:
Whether or not a compulsory right of way can be granted to private respondents over
the properties of petitioners.
Ruling:
YES. All told, the findings of fact of both courts satisfied the following requirements
for an estate to be entitled to a compulsory servitude of right of way under the Civil Code, to
wit: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet
to a public highway (Art. 649, par. 1); (2) there is payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649,
par. 1); (3) the isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate (Art.
649, last par.); and (4) the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest (Art. 650).
As to such requisites, the Court of Appeals made the following disquisitions: Anent
the first requisite, there is no dispute that the plaintiffs-appellees property is surrounded by
other immovables owned by different individuals. The second requisite for the establishment
of an easement of right way, i.e., payment of indemnity, is likewise present in this
case. Plaintiff-appellee spouse Roslynn Fajardo testified on direct examination that they are
willing to pay the corresponding damages provided for by law if granted the right of way
(TSN, November 5, 1992, p. 11). The third requisite is that the isolation of plaintiffs-appellees
property should not have been due to their own acts. In the case under consideration, the
isolation of their lot is not due to plaintiffs acts. The property they purchased was already
surrounded by other immovables leaving them no adequate ingress or egress to a public
highway. Going now to the fourth requisite of least prejudice and shortest distance, the Court
agrees with the lower court that this twin elements have been complied with in establishing
the easement of right of way on defendants-appellants properties.
In the case at bar, the ocular inspection disclosed that there are three options open
to the plaintiffs-appellees as a route to reach the national road. Among the three (3) possible
servient estates, it is clear that defendants-appellants property would afford the shortest
distance from plaintiffs-appellees property to the provincial road. Moreover, it is the least
prejudicial since as found by the lower court, it appears that there would be no significant
structures to be injured in the defendants property and the right-of-way to be constructed
thereon would be the shortest of all the alternative routes pointed to by the defendants.

CRESENCIA CRISTOBAL, ROBERTO MAKIMKIM, DAMASO MAKIMKIM,

SPOUSES SALVADOR HERMALINO and PONCIANA MAKIMKIM, MILAGROS
MAKIMKIM, REMEDIOS MAKIMKIM, SPOUSES FRANCISCO ESTANISLAO
and FLORDELIZA MAKIMKIM, ERLINDA MAKIMKIM, JOSE MAKIMKIMand GINA
MAKIMKIM v. COURT OF APPEALS, CESAR LEDESMA, INC., SPOUSES JESUS C.
PACIONE and LERMA B. PACIONE

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G.R. No. 125339, June 22, 1998, BELLOSILLO, J.
It is not enough that the easement be where the way is shortest. It is more important
that it be where it will cause the least prejudice to the servient estate.
Facts:
Petitioners own a house and lot situated at No. 10 Visayas Avenue Extension, Quezon
City. In going to and from the nearest public road, petitioners used Road Lot 2 which road
was exclusively owned by respondent Cesar Ledesma, Inc. When Visayas Avenue became
operational as a national road, Cesar Ledesma, Inc., filed a petition before the RTC praying
that he be allowed to convert Road Lot 2 into residential lots. The petition was granted,
hence, Road Lot 2 was converted into residential lots designated as Lot 1 and Lot
2. Subsequently, Cesar Ledesma, Inc., sold both lots to respondent Spouses Pacione. When
the Pacione spouses, who intended to build a house on Lot 1, visited the property, they
found out that a portion of the lot was was being used as a passageway by petitioners to
and from Visayas Avenue. Accordingly, the spouses complained about the intrusion into their
property to the Barangay Office. At the barangay conciliation proceeding, petitioners offered
to pay for the use of a portion of Lot 1 as passageway but the Pacione spouses rejected the
offer. Alleging that their property was bounded on all sides by residential houses belonging
to different owners and had no adequate outlet and inlet to Visayas Avenue except through
the property of the Spouses Paciones, petitioners instituted an action for easement of right
of way with the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not an easement of right of way should be granted in favor of petitioners
over the property of the Paciones spouses.
Ruling:
NO. To be entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way, the preconditions
provided under Arts. 649 and 650 of the Civil Code must be established. These are: (1) that
the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a
public highway; (2) that proper indemnity has been paid; (3) that the isolation was not due
to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) that the right of way claimed is at a
point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, in so far as consistent with this rule, where
the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
In the present case, the first element is clearly absent. As found by the trial court and
the Court of Appeals, an outlet already exists, which is a path walk located at the left side of
petitioners property and which is connected to a private road about five hundred (500)
meters long. The private road, in turn, leads to Ma. Elena Street which is about 2.5 meters
wide and, finally, to Visayas Avenue. This outlet was determined by the court a quo to be
sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate, hence petitioners have no cause to complain
that they have no adequate outlet to Visayas Avenue. Further, no evidence was adduced by
petitioners to prove that the easement they seek to impose on private respondents property
is to be established at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate.
Admittedly, the proposed right of way over private respondents property is the most
convenient, being the shorter and the more direct route to Visayas Avenue. However, it is
not enough that the easement be where the way is shortest. It is more important that it be

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where it will cause the least prejudice to the servient estate. As discussed elsewhere,
petitioners failed to sufficiently demonstrate that the proposed right of way shall be at a
point least prejudicial to the servient estate.

CAMARINES NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (CANORECO) vs. COURT OF

APPEALS, HON. LUIS L. DICTADO, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 39, Daet,
Camarines Norte, EDUARDO R. MORENO, LT. COL. RUFINO CHAVEZ, CAPT. ALFREDO
BORJA, CONRAD C. LEVISTE and VINES REALTY CORPORATION
G.R. No. 109338, November 20, 2000, Pardo, J.
The power of eminent domain may be used to subject a real property to an easement
of right of way.
Facts:
Respondent Vines Realty is the owner of the two parcels of land wherein the power
lines and electric posts of petitioner CANORECO are standing. Wanting to use its property,
Vines Realty filed a motion for an order of demolition and removal of improvements on the
subject land, which improvements included the power lines and electric posts of CANORECO.
Contending that it had subsisting right-of-way agreements over said properties, CANORECO
opposed the motion of Vines Realty. The trial court ruled in favor of Vines Realty and a Writ
of Demolition was issued in its favor. The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court, hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not CANORECO is entitled to an easement of right of way over the lands
of Vines Realty.
Ruling:
YES. Electric cooperatives, like CANORECO, are vested with the power of eminent
domain. The acquisition of an easement of a right-of-way falls within the purview of the
power of eminent domain. However, a simple right-of-way easement transmits no rights,
except the easement. Vines Realty retains full ownership and it is not totally deprived of the
use of the land. It can continue doing what it wants to do with the land, except those that
would result in contact with the wires. The acquisition of this easement, nevertheless, is
not gratis. Considering the nature and effect of the installation power lines, the limitations
on the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of its ordinary
use. For these reasons, Vines Realty is entitled to payment of just compensation, which must
be neither more nor less than the money equivalent of the property.

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BRYAN U. VILLANUEVA v. HON. TIRSO D.C. VELASCO in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 88, JULIO N. SEBASTIAN
and SHIRLEY LORILLA
G.R. NO. 130845, November 27, 2000, QUISUMBING, J.
A legal easement is one mandated by law, constituted for public use or for private
interest, and becomes a continuing property right. As a compulsory easement, it is
inseparable from the estate to which it belongs.
Facts:
Petitioner Bryan Villanueva is the registered owner of the parcel of land subject of the
present controversy. He bought it from Pacific Banking Corporation. The bank had acquired it
from the spouses Maximo and Justina Gabriel (the Gabriels) at a public auction. When
petitioner bought the parcel of land there was a small house on its southeastern portion. It
occupied one meter of the two-meter wide easement of right of way the Gabriels granted to
the Espinolas, predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, in a Contract of Easement of
Right of Way. Wanting to enforce the contract of easement, private respondents Sebastian
and Lorilla, as successors-in-interest of the Espinolas, filed a complaint against the Gabriels
praying that they recognize the easement of right of way granted by them to the Espinolas.
The case was decided in favor of private respondents and a right of way was granted to
them. Consequently, a Writ of Demolition was issued in favor of private respondent and the
spouses Gabriels were ordered to demolish the small house encroaching on the easement.
Arguing that he is not bound by the decision in the case between the Gabriels and private
respondents, petitioner filed a third party claim praying that the Writ of Demolition be
quashed.
Issue:
Whether or not the easement on the subject property binds petitioner.
Ruling:
YES. At the outset, the subject easement (right of way) originally was voluntarily
constituted by agreement between the Gabriels and the Espinolas. But as correctly observed
by the Court of Appeals, the easement in the instant petition is both (1) an easement by
grant or a voluntary easement, and (2) an easement by necessity or a legal easement. A
legal easement is one mandated by law, constituted for public use or for private interest,
and becomes a continuing property right. As a compulsory easement, it is inseparable from
the estate to which it belongs, as provided for in said Article 617 of the Civil Code. The
essential requisites for an easement to be compulsory are: (1) the dominant estate is
surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper
indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the
dominant estate; (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient
estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. The trial court and the Court of
Appeals have declared the existence of said easement (right of way). This finding of fact of
both courts below is conclusive on the Court, hence there is no need to further review, but
only to re-affirm, this finding. The small house occupying one meter of the two-meter wide
easement obstructs the entry of private respondents cement mixer and motor vehicle. One
meter is insufficient for the needs of private respondents. It is well-settled that the needs of
the dominant estate determine the width of the easement. Conformably then, petitioner

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ought to demolish whatever edifice obstructs the easement in view of the needs of private
respondents estate.

COSTABELLA CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 80511, January 25, 1991, Sarmiento, J.
The owner of the dominant estate may validly claim a compulsory right of way only
after he has established the existence of four requisites, to wit: (1) the (dominant) estate is
surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public highway; (2)
after payment of the proper indemnity; (3) the isolation was not due to the proprietor's own
acts; and (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate.
Additionally, the burden of proving the existence of the foregoing pre-requisites lies on the
owner of the dominant estate.
Facts:
Petitioner owns real property where its beach hotel is located. Adjacent to the said
property are the properties of private respondents. Private Respondents alleged that there
was a right of way provided when the construction of the beach hotel began but it was
subsequently closed by the petitioner, thus, preventing them from traversing any part of it.
As a direct consequence of these closures, an action for injunction with damages was filed
against the petitioner by the private respondents. The RTC ruled in favor of private
respondents. On appeal, the CA held as without basis the RTC finding that the private
respondents had acquired a vested right over the passageway in question by virtue of
prescription but nevertheless, in the interest of justice, grant the right of way. Hence, the
case.
Issue:
Whether or not the private respondents had acquired an easement of right of way, in
the form of a passageway, on the petitioner's property.
Ruling:
NO. There is absent any showing that the private respondents had established the
existence of the four requisites mandated by law. For one, they failed to prove that there is
no adequate outlet from their respective properties to a public highway. On the contrary, as
alleged by the petitioner in its answer to the complaint, and confirmed by the appellate
court, "there is another outlet for the plaintiffs to the main road." Thus, the respondent Court
of Appeals likewise admitted that "legally the old road could be closed." Yet, it ordered the
re- opening of the old passageway on the ground that "the existing outlet is inconvenient to
the plaintiff." To be sure, the true standard for the grant of the legal right is
"adequacy." Hence, when there is already an existing adequate outlet from the dominant
estate to a public highway, the need to open up another servitude is entirely unjustified.
Further, the private respondents failed to indicate in their complaint or even to manifest
during the trial of the case that they were willing to indemnify fully the petitioner for the
right of way to be established over its property. Neither have the private respondents been
able to show that the isolation of their property was not due to their personal or their
predecessors-in-interest's own acts. Finally, the private respondents failed to allege, much

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more introduce any evidence, that the passageway they seek to be re-opened is at a point
least prejudicial to the petitioner. Considering that the petitioner operates a hotel and beach
resort in its property, it must undeniably maintain a strict standard of security within its
premises. Otherwise, the convenience, privacy, and safety of its clients and patrons would
be compromised. That indubitably will doom the petitioner's business. It is therefore of great
importance that the claimed right of way over the petitioner's property be located at a point
least prejudicial to its business.
TOMAS ENCARNACION v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 77628, March 11, 1991, Fernan, C.J.
Generally, the right of way may be demanded: (1) when there is absolutely no access
to a public highway, and (2) when, even if there is one, it is difficult or dangerous to use or is
grossly insufficient.
Facts:
Petitioner Encarnacion and private respondent Heirs of the late Aniceta Magsino
Viuda de Sagun are the owners of two adjacent estates in Batangas. Petitioner owns the
dominant estate while Private Respondents owned the servient estate. The private
respondents, without any compensation, provided a road path to provide access to the
highway. However, petitioners plant nursery business, where he uses the pathway as
passage to the highway for his family and for his customers, flourished. He then bought a
jeep for transporting his plants but that jeep could not pass through the roadpath. He
approached the servient estate owners and requested that they sell to him one and one-half
meters of their property to be added to the existing pathway so as to allow passage for his
jeepney but his request was denied. Petitioner then instituted a case to seek the issuance of
a writ of easement of a right of way over an additional width of at least two (2) meters over
the De Saguns' land but the RTC and the CA rendered judgment dismissing petitioner's
complaint. Hence, the case.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the easement.
Ruling:
YES. While there is a dried river bed less than 100 meters from the dominant
tenement, that access is grossly inadequate. In the present case, the river bed route is
traversed by a semi-concrete bridge and there is no ingress nor egress from the highway. For
the jeep to reach the level of the highway, it must literally jump four (4) to five (5) meters
up. Moreover, during the rainy season, the river bed is impassable due to the floods. Thus, it
can only be used at certain times of the year. With the inherent disadvantages of the river
bed which make passage difficult, if not impossible, it is as if there were no outlet at all.
Where a private property has no access to a public road, it has the right of easement over
adjacent servient estates as a matter of law.
TOMAS ENCARNACION v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 77628, March 11, 1991, Fernan, C.J.

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Article 651 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)he width of the easement of right of
way shall be that which is sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate, and may
accordingly be changed from time to time." This is taken to mean that under the law, it is
the needs of the dominant property which ultimately determine the width of the passage.
And these needs may vary from time to time.
Facts:
Petitioner Encarnacion and private respondent Heirs of the late Aniceta Magsino
Viuda de Sagun are the owners of two adjacent estates in Batangas. Petitioner owns the
dominant estate while Private Respondents owned the servient estate. The private
respondents, without any compensation, provided a roadpath to provide access to the
highway. However, petitioners plant nursery business, where he uses the pathway as
passage to the highway for his family and for his customers, flourished. He then bought a
jeep for transporting his plants but that jeep could not pass through the roadpath. He
approached the servient estate owners and requested that they sell to him one and one-half
meters of their property to be added to the existing pathway so as to allow passage for his
jeepney but his request was denied. Petitioner then instituted a case to seek the issuance of
a writ of easement of a right of way over an additional width of at least two (2) meters over
the De Saguns' land but the RTC and the CA rendered judgment dismissing petitioner's
complaint. Hence, the case.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the easement.
Ruling:
YES. When petitioner started out as a plant nursery operator, he and his family could
easily make do with a few pushcarts to tow the plants to the national highway. But the
business grew and with it the need for the use of modern means of conveyance or transport.
Manual hauling of plants and garden soil and use of pushcarts have become extremely
cumbersome and physically taxing. To force petitioner to leave his jeepney in the highway,
exposed to the elements and to the risk of theft simply because it could not pass through
the improvised pathway, is sheer pigheadedness on the part of the servient estate and can
only be counter-productive for all the people concerned. Petitioner should not be denied a
passageway wide enough to accommodate his jeepney since that is a reasonable and
necessary aspect of the plant nursery business.
Since petitioner has expressed willingness to exchange an equivalent portion of his
land to compensate private respondents for their loss; perhaps, it would be well for
respondents to take the offer of petitioner seriously. But unless and until that option is
considered, the law decrees that petitioner must indemnify the owners of the servient estate
including Mamerto Magsino from whose adjoining lot 1/2 meter was taken to constitute the
original path several years ago. Since the easement to be established in favor of petitioner is
of a continuous and permanent nature, the indemnity shall consist of the value of the land
occupied and the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate pursuant to Article
649 of the Civil Code.
ADRIANA DIONISIO, ET AL. v. JUDGE RODOLFO ORTIZ OF THE RTC OF QUEZON CITY

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G.R. No. 95738 December 10, 1991, Gutierrez, Jr., J.
This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the
proprietor's own acts.
Facts:
The petitioners are co-owners of lots contiguous to each other in Quezon City while
private respondents, who are members of Quezon City Industrial Estates Association
(QCIEA), are also co-owners of lots which are adjacent to the lots owned by the petitioners. A
right of way was granted over Howmart Road which is a private road traversing the
contiguous lots owned by the petitioners, among others, in favor of the QCIEA members by
virue of an agreement entered by them. Eventually, under the instructions of Maxima
Dionisio, certain persons commenced the digging of four holes in front of the newly
constructed gate of private respondents amidst the latter's protestations. The petitioners
claim that they surreptitiously constructed gate opened directly into the house of Maxima
Dionisio, exposing them to air and noise pollution arising from the respondents' delivery
trucks and service vehicles. The private respondents instituted a civil action for damages
against the petitioners. The complaint sought the immediate issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction ordering the petitioner to remove the barricade erected by them in
front of the iron gate. The Respondent Judge granted the writ thus petitioners filed a petition
for certiorari before the CA; however, 15 days later, petitioners removed the barricade in
front of the private respondents after they failed to obtain a TRO. The CA dismissed the
petition. Hence, the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the private respondents have an easement of right of way over
Howmart Rd.
Ruling:
NO. There is no question that a right of way was granted in favor of the private
respondents over Howmart Road but the records disclose that such right of way expired in
December, 1988. The continued use of the easement enjoyed by QCIEA including the private
respondents is by the mere tolerance of the owners pending the renegotiation of the terms
and conditions of said right of way. This is precisely shown by the two letters to the QCIEA
requesting for an increase in compensation for the use of Howmart Road. Absent an
agreement of the parties as to the consideration, among others, no contract of easement of
right of way has been validly entered into by the petitioners and QCIEA. Thus, the private
respondents' claim of an easement of right of way over Howmart Road has no legal or
factual basis. Not having any right, the private respondents are not entitled to the injunctive
relief granted by the lower court. Also, the private respondents have not shown that there is
an urgent and paramount necessity for the issuance of the writ. The records show that there
are two (2) gates through which the private respondents may pass to have direct access to
EDSA: (1) the northern gate which opens directly to EDSA; and (2) the southern gate along
Howmart Road. The records also disclose that the petitioners and the other lot owners
previously prohibited and prevented members of QCIEA from opening new gates. The claim
that they were forced to open a new gate by reason of the subdivision of Lot 272 where a
wall was constructed between these 2 lots is untenable. The private respondents cannot

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assert a right of way when by their own or voluntary act, they themselves have caused the
isolation of their property from the access road.

DONATIONS

GONZALO VILLANUEVA, represented by his heirs v. SPOUSES BRANOCO

G.R. No. 172804, January 24, 2011, Carpio, J.
Post-mortem dispositions typically (1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee
before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor
should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive; (2) That
before the [donors] death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad
nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the
donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; (3) That the transfer should be void if the
transferor should survive the transferee. [4] [T]he specification in a deed of the causes
whereby the act may be revoked by the donor indicates that the donation is inter vivos,
rather than a disposition mortis causa[;][5] That the designation of the donation as mortis
causa, or a provision in the deed to the effect that the donation is "to take effect at the
death of the donor" are not controlling criteria; such statements are to be construed
together with the rest of the instrument, in order to give effect to the real intent of the
transferor[;] [and](6) That in case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed
donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the
ownership of the property subject of the deed.
Facts:
Petitioner sued respondents in the RTC to recover a 3,492 square-meter parcel of land
in Leyte and collect damages. Petitioner claimed ownership over the Property through
purchase from Vere, who, in turn, bought the Property from Rodrigo. Petitioner declared the
Property in his name for tax purposes soon after acquiring it while respondents also claimed
ownership over the Property through purchase from Rodriguez to whom Rodrigo donated the
Property in May 1965. The question arises as to the nature of the transfer of the property
between Rodrigo and Rodriguez. If it is a donation, respondents hold superior title, having
bought the Property from Rodriguez. If it is a devise, petitioner prevails, having obtained title
from Rodrigo under a deed of sale the execution of which impliedly revoked the earlier
devise to Rodriguez. The RTC ruled for petitioner while the CA set aside the said decision.
Hence, the case.
Issue:
Whether the contract between the parties predecessors-in-interest, Rodrigo and
Rodriguez, was a donation or a devise.

Ruling:

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It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked title to Rodriguez under a
perfected donation inter vivos. First. Rodrigo stipulated that "if the herein Donee
predeceases me, the [Property] will not be reverted to the Donor, but will be inherited by the
heirs of x x x Rodriguez," signaling the irrevocability of the passage of title to Rodriguezs
estate, waiving Rodrigos right to reclaim title. This transfer of title was perfected the
moment Rodrigo learned of Rodriguezs acceptance of the disposition which, being reflected
in the Deed, took place on the day of its execution on 3 May 1965. Rodrigos acceptance of
the transfer underscores its essence as a gift in presenti, not in futuro, as only
donations inter vivos need acceptance by the recipient. Indeed, had Rodrigo wished to retain
full title over the Property, she could have easily stipulated, as the testator did in another
case, that "the donor, may transfer, sell, or encumber to any person or entity the properties
here donated x x x" or used words to that effect. Instead, Rodrigo expressly waived title over
the Property in case Rodriguez predeceases her.

MA. ESTELA MAGLASANG v. THE HEIRS OF CORAZON CABATINGAN

G.R. No. 131953, June 5, 2002, Austria-Martinez, J.
In a donation mortis causa, the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee
while the donor is still alive. In determining whether a donation is one of mortis causa, the
following characteristics must be taken into account: (1) It conveys no title or ownership to
the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that
the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while
alive; (2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad
nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the
donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and (3) That the transfer should be void if the
transferor should survive the transferee.
Facts:
Conchita Cabatingan executed in favor of her brother, petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan,
a Deed of Conditional Donation Inter Vivos for House and Lot covering one-half portion of the
formers house and lot. Four other deeds of donation were subsequently executed by
Conchita Cabatingan. The deeds of donation contain similar provisions that it will be become
effective upon the death of the donor provided that in the event that the done should die
before the donor, the present donation shall be deemed automatically rescinded. When
Conchita died, respondents filed with the RTC an action for Annulment of said four (4) deeds
of donation alleging that the documents are void for failing to comply with the provisions of
the Civil Code regarding formalities of wills and testaments, considering that these are
donations mortis causa. The RTC ruled that the donations are donations are mortis causa.
Hence, the case.
Issue:

vivos.

Whether the donations made by the late Conchita Cabatingan are donations inter

Ruling:

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NO. The nature of the donations as mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that the
donations do not contain any clear provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to
petitioners prior to Cabatingans death. The phrase to become effective upon the death of
the DONOR admits of no other interpretation but that Cabatingan did not intend to transfer
the ownership of the properties to petitioners during her lifetime. As the donation is in the
nature of a mortis causa disposition, the formalities of a will should have been complied with
under Article 728 of the Civil Code, otherwise, the donation is void and would produce no
effect. The deeds in question although acknowledged before a notary public of the donor
and the donee, the documents were not executed in the manner provided for under Article
805 and 806 of the Civil Code, thus it is void.
IGNACIO GONZALES v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 110335, June 18, 2001, Melo, J.
Article 749 of the Civil Code provides inter alia that "in order that the donation of an
immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public document, specifying therein the
property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy." Corollarily,
Article 709 of the same Code explicitly states that "the titles of ownership, or other rights
over immovable property, which are not duly inscribed or annotated in the Registry of
property shall not prejudice third persons."
Facts:
Spouses Ignacio Gonzales and Marina Gonzales were the registered owners of the
subject agricultural land. They donated the said land to herein petitioners who are the
children and grandchildren of said Gonzales spouses. However, the donation was not
registered. Thus, when P.D. No. 27 took effect, the landholdings of the spouses Gonzales
were placed under Operation Land Transfer by virtue of said decree, and private
respondents, who are farmers and tenants of said spouses, were accordingly issued the
corresponding Certificates of Land Transfer and Emancipation Patents. Later on, the
administratrix Lilia Gonzales filed an application for retention requesting that their property
be excluded from the coverage of Operation Land Transfer but it was denied and later
affirmed by Assistant Secretary of Agrarian Reform Labayen. Apparently, however, a
reinvestigation was conducted and the DAR Secretary Leong issued an order exempting the
land from Operation Land Transfer, and cancelling the Certificates of Land Transfer issued in
favor of private respondents. The CA, on appeal by private respondents, reversed the action
of the DAR. Hence, the case.
Issue:
Whether the property subject of the deed of donation which was not registered when
P.D. No. 27 took effect, should be excluded from the Operation Land Transfer.
Ruling:
NO. From the foregoing provisions, it may be inferred that as between the parties to
a donation of an immovable property, all that is required is for said donation to be contained
in a public document. Registration is not necessary for it to be considered valid and
effective. However, in order to bind third persons, the donation must be registered in the
Registry of Property (now Registry of Land Titles and Deeds). Although the non-registration

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of a deed of donation shall not affect its validity, the necessity of registration comes into
play when the rights of third persons are affected, as in the case at bar. It is undisputed in
this case that the donation executed by Ignacio Gonzales in favor of his grandchildren,
although in writing and duly notarized, has not been registered in accordance with law. For
this reason, it shall not be binding upon private respondents who did not participate in said
deed or had no actual knowledge thereof. Hence, while the deed of donation is valid
between the donor and the donees, such deed, however, did not bind the tenants-farmers
who were not parties to the donation. So it is of no moment that the right of the tenantsfarmers in this case was created by virtue of a decree or law. They are still considered "third
persons" contemplated in our laws on registration, for the fact remains that these tenantsfarmers had no actual knowledge of the deed of donation. From the foregoing, the
ineluctable conclusion drawn is that the unregistered deed of donation cannot operate to
exclude the subject land from the coverage of the Operation Land Transfer of P.D. No. 27.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LEON SILIM and ILDEFONSA MANGUBAT

G.R. No. 140487, April 2, 2001, Kapunan, J.

Of all the foregoing classifications, donations of the onerous type are the most
distinct. This is because, unlike the other forms of donation, the validity of and the rights
and obligations of the parties involved in an onerous donation is completely governed not by
the law on donations but by the law on contracts.
Facts:
Respondents donated a 5,600 square meter parcel of land in favor of the Bureau of
Public Schools with a condition that the said property should "be used exclusively and
forever for school purposes only." However, the Bagong Lipunan school building that was
supposed to be allocated for the donated parcel of land in Barangay Kauswagan could not be
released since the government required that it be built upon a one (1) hectare parcel of land.
To remedy this predicament, Assistant School Division Superintendent of the Province of
Zamboanga del Sur entered into a transaction for the exchange of the one-half (1/2)
hectare old school site of Kauswagan Elementary School to a new and suitable location
which would fit the specifications of the government. Pursuant to this, District Supervisor
Buendia and Teresita Palma entered into a Deed of Exchange whereby the donated lot was
exchanged with the bigger lot owned by the latter. Upon knowledge of Respondent that the
Vice Mayor Palma was constructing a house on the property he donated to BPS, the former
filed a Complaint for Revocation and Cancellation of Conditional Donation, Annulment of
Deed of Exchange and Recovery of Possession and Ownership of Real Property with
damages. The RTC dismissed the case for lack of merit which was overturned by the CA;
hence, the case.
Issue:
Whether or not the donation was valid in view of the fact that the school, which it
was conditioned on, was never built thereon.

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Ruling:
YES. What does the phrase "exclusively used for school purposes" convey? "School"
is simply an institution or place of education. "Purpose" is defined as "that which one sets
before him to accomplish or attain; an end, intention, or aim, object, plan, project. Term is
synonymous with the ends sought, an object to be attained, an intention, etc." "Exclusive"
means "excluding or having power to exclude (as by preventing entrance or debarring from
possession, participation, or use); limiting or limited to possession, control or use. Without
the slightest doubt, the condition for the donation was not in any way violated when the lot
donated was exchanged with another one. The purpose for the donation remains the same,
which is for the establishment of a school. The exclusivity of the purpose was not altered or
affected. In fact, the exchange of the lot for a much bigger one was in furtherance and
enhancement of the purpose of the donation. The acquisition of the bigger lot paved the
way for the release of funds for the construction of Bagong Lipunan school building which
could not be accommodated by the limited area of the donated lot.

RICKY Q. QUILALA v. GLICERIA ALCANTARA

G.R. No. 132681, December 3, 2001, Ynares-Santiago, J.
Under Article 749 of the Civil Code, the donation of an immovable must be made in a
public instrument in order to be valid, specifying therein the property donated and the value
of the charges which the donee must satisfy. As a mode of acquiring ownership, donation
results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee, and is
perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee, provided the
donee is not disqualified or prohibited by law from accepting the donation. Once the
donation is accepted, it is generally considered irrevocable, and the donee becomes the
absolute owner of the property. The acceptance, to be valid, must be made during the
lifetime of both the donor and the donee. It may be made in the same deed or in a separate
public document, and the donor must know the acceptance by the donee.
Facts:
Catalina Quilala executed a Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" in favor of Violeta
Quilala over a parcel of land located in Sta. Cruz, Manila. The said deed of donation was
registered with the Register of Deeds. Subsequently, Catalina Quilala died. Violeta Quilala
likewise died. Petitioner Ricky Quilala alleges that he is the surviving son of Violeta Quilala.
Meanwhile, Respondents, claiming to be Catalina's only surviving relatives within the fourth
civil degree of consanguinity, executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate, dividing
and adjudicating unto themselves the above-described property. They instituted an action
for the declaration of nullity of the donation inter vivos, and for the cancellation of TCT No.
143015 in the name of Violeta Quilala. The RTC found that the deed of donation, although
signed by both Catalina and Violeta, was acknowledged before a notary public only by the
donor, Catalina. Consequently, there was no acceptance by Violeta of the donation in a

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public instrument, thus rendering the donation null and void. Said decision was affirmed by
the CA. Hence, the case.
Issue:
Whether or not the donation made by Catalina to Violeta valid?
Ruling:
YES. In the case at bar, the deed of donation contained the number of the
certificate of title as well as the technical description of the real property donated. It
stipulated that the donation was made for and in consideration of the "love and affection
which the DONEE inspires in the DONOR, and as an act of liberality and generosity." This was
sufficient cause for a donation. Indeed, donation is legally defined as "an act of liberality
whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts
it." Simply put, the specification of the location of the signature is merely directory. The fact
that one of the parties signs on the wrong side of the page, does not invalidate the
document. The purpose of authenticating the page is served, and the requirement in the
above-quoted provision is deemed substantially complied with. In the same vein, the lack of
an acknowledgment by the donee before the notary public does not also render the donation
null and void. The instrument should be treated in its entirety. It cannot be considered a
private document in part and a public document in another part. The fact that it was
acknowledged before a notary public converts the deed of donation in its entirety a public
instrument.

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 77425, June 19, 1991, Regalado, J.
When a deed of donation expressly provides for automatic revocation and reversion
of the property donated, the rules on contract and the general rules on prescription should
apply, and not Article 764 of the Civil Code. Since Article 1306 of said Code authorizes the
parties to a contract to establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, we are of the opinion
that, at the very least, that stipulation of the parties providing for automatic revocation of
the deed of donation, without prior judicial action for that purpose, is valid subject to the
determination of the propriety of the rescission sought.
Facts:
Private respondents alleged that the spouses Eusebio de Castro and Martina Rieta,
executed a deed of donation in favor of therein defendant Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila covering a parcel of land with a condition that the done shall not dispose the property
within a period of one hundred years from execution of the deed otherwise it would render
ipso facto null and void the deed of donation. However, while still within the prohibitive
period, petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, in whose administration of the properties
in Cavite was transferred, executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Petitioner Ignao. The

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RTC ruled that the action had already prescribed and dismissed the complaint but was
reversed by the CA; hence, the case.
Issue:
Whether or not the action has prescribed.
Ruling:
NO. Although it is true that under Article 764 of the Civil Code an action for the
revocation of a donation must be brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance of
the conditions of the donation, the same is not applicable in the case at bar. The deed of
donation involved herein expressly provides for automatic reversion of the property donated
in case of violation of the condition therein, hence a judicial declaration revoking the same is
not necessary. Article 732 of the Civil Code provides that donations inter vivos shall be
governed by the general provisions on contracts and obligations in all that is not determined
in Title III, Book III on donations. The rationale for the foregoing is that in contracts providing
for automatic revocation, judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a
judicial declaration rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded by virtue of an
agreement providing for rescission even without judicial intervention, but in order to
determine whether or not the rescission was proper. On the foregoing ratiocinations, the
Court of Appeals committed no error in holding that the cause of action of herein private
respondents has not yet prescribed since an action to enforce a written contract prescribes
in ten (10) years. Article 764 was intended to provide a judicial remedy in case of nonfulfillment or contravention of conditions specified in the deed of donation if and when the
parties have not agreed on the automatic revocation of such donation upon the occurrence
of the contingency contemplated therein.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DAMIAN ERMITAO DE GUZMAN

G.R. No. 137887, February 28, 2000, Ynares_Santiago, J.
There are three (3) essential elements of a donation: (a) the reduction of the
patrimony of the donor; (b) the increase in the patrimony of the donee; and, (c) the intent to
do an act of liberality or animus donandi. When applied to a donation of an immovable
property, the law further requires that the donation be made in a public document and that
there should be an acceptance thereof made in the same deed of donation or in a separate
public document. In cases where the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, it is
mandated that the donor should be notified thereof in an authentic form, to be noted in both
instruments.
Facts:
David Rey Guzman, a natural-born American citizen, is the son of the spouses Simeon
Guzman (naturalized American) and Helen Meyers Guzman (American citizen). In 1968,
Simeon died leaving to his heirs, Helen and David, an estate consisting of several parcels of

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land in Bulacan. Thereafter, Helen and David executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of
the Estate, dividing and adjudicating to themselves all of the property, and registered it to
the RD a year after. In order to retain the property under their bloodline, Helen executed a
Deed of Quitclaim, assigning, transferring and conveying her share of the properties to
David. But since it was not registered, she executed another Deed of Quitclaim to confirm
the first. Subsequently, Atty. Batongbacal reported to the OSG that Davids ownership of
of the estate was defective claiming that the Deeds of Quitclaim executed by Helen were
really donations inter vivos. Republic filed with RTC a Petition for Escheat praying that of
Davids interest be forfeited in its favor but it was dismissed and later on affirmed by the CA.
Hence, the case.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a donation inter vivos.
Ruling:
NO, not all the elements of a donation are present. Helens intention to perform an
act of liberality in favor of David was not sufficiently established. The 2 Quitclaims reveal
that Helen intended to convey to her son certain parcels of land and to re-affirm it through a
waiver and renouncing her rights over the properties. It is clear that Helen merely
contemplated a waiver of her rights, title, and interest over the lands in favor of David, not a
donation. She is aware that the transfer through donation is not legally possible. Also, the
essential element of acceptance in the proper form and registration to make the donation
valid is lacking. The SPA executed by David in favor of Atty. Abela was not his acceptance,
but is merely an acknowledgment that David owns the property referred to and that he
authorizes Atty. Abela to sell the same in his name.

SPS. GESTOPA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MERCEDES DANLAG y PILAPIL

G.R. No. 111904, October 5, 2000, Quisumbing, J.

Acceptance clause is a mark that the donation is inter vivos. Acceptance is a

requirement for donations inter vivos. Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will,
are not required to be accepted by the donees during the donors' lifetime.
Facts:

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Spouses Diego and Catalina Danlag were the owners of six parcels of land. They
executed three deeds of donation mortis causa in favor of respondent Mercedes DanlagPilapil, reserving donor's rights to amend, cancel, or revoke the donation and to sell or
encumber such properties. Years later, they executed another donation, this time inter vivos,
to six parcels of land in favor of respondents, reserving their rights to the fruits of the land
during their lifetime and for prohibiting the donee to sell or dispose the properties donated.
Subsequently, the spouses sold 2 parcels to herein petitioners, spouses Gestopa.
Respondent Mercedes Pilapil filed a petition to quiet title which ruled against her but on
appeal reversed the said decision; hence, the case.
Issue:
Whether or not the donation was an inter vivos donation.
Ruling:
YES. The granting clause shows that Diego donated the properties out of love and
affection for the donee. Such is a mark of a donation inter vivos. Second, the reservation of
lifetime usufruct indicates that the donor intended to transfer the naked ownership over the
properties. As correctly posed by the Court of Appeals, what was the need for such
reservation if the donor and his spouse remained the owners of the properties? Third, the
donor reserved sufficient properties for his maintenance in accordance with his standing in
society, indicating that the donor intended to part with the six parcels of land. Lastly, the
donee accepted the donation.
The attending circumstances in the execution of the subject donation also demonstrated
the real intent of the donor to transfer the ownership over the subject properties upon its
execution. Prior to the execution of donation inter vivos, the Danlag spouses already
executed three donations mortis causa. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the
Danlag spouses were aware of the difference between the two donations. If they did not
intend to donate inter vivos, they would not again donate the four lots already
donated mortis causa.

RODOLFO NOCEDA v. COURT OF APPEALS and AURORA ARBIZO DIRECTO

G.R. No. 119730, September 2, 1999, Gonzaga-Reyes, J.

The action to revoke by reason of ingratitude prescribes within one (1) year to be
counted from the time (a) the donor had knowledge of the fact; (b) provided that it was
possible for him to bring the action. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show proof of the
concurrence of these two conditions in order that the one (1) year period for bringing the
action be considered to have already prescribed.

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Facts:

Plaintiff Aurora Directo, defendant Rodolfo Noceda, and Maria Arbizo, the daughter,
grandson, and widow, respectively, of the late Celestino Arbizo extrajudicially settled a
parcel of land located in Zambales, which was said to have an area of 66,530 square meters.
Plaintiff Directos share was 11,426 square meters, defendant Noceda got 13,294 square
meters, and the remaining 41,810 square meters went to Maria Arbizo. Plaintiff Directo
donated 625 square meters of her share to defendant Noceda, who is her nephew. However,
another extrajudicial settlement-partition of Lot 1121 was executed by plaintiff Directo,
defendant Noceda, and Maria Arbizo. Three fifths of the said land went to Maria Arbizo while
plaintiff Directo and defendant Noceda got only one-fifth each. In said extrajudicial
settlement-partition, the said parcel of land was said to have an area of only 29,845 square
meters. Thereafter, defendant Noceda constructed his house on the land donated to him by
plaintiff Directo. The latter fenced the portion allotted to her in the extrajudicial settlement,
excluding the donated portion, and constructed thereon three huts. But defendant Noceda
removed the fence earlier constructed by plaintiff Directo, occupied the three huts and
fenced the entire land of plaintiff Directo without her consent. Plaintiff Directo demanded
from defendant Noceda to vacate her land, but the latter refused. Plaintiff then filed a
complaint for the annulment of donation against defendant before the RTC which rendered
the decision ordering the revocation of the donation. Hence, the case.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a sufficient reason to grant the revocation of donation.
Ruling:
YES. The action to revoke by reason of ingratitude prescribes within one (1) year to
be counted from the time (a) the donor had knowledge of the fact; (b) provided that it was
possible for him to bring the action. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show proof of the
concurrence of these two conditions in order that the one (1) year period for bringing the
action be considered to have already prescribed. No competent proof was adduced by
petitioner to prove his allegation. In Civil Cases, the party having the burden of proof must
establish his case by preponderance of evidence. He who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.
ELOY IMPERIAL v. COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LEGASPI CITY
G.R. No. 112483, October 8, 1999, Gonzaga-Reyes, J.

What is brought to collation is not the donated property itself, but the value of the
property at the time it was donated. The rationale for this is that the donation is a real
alienation which conveys ownership upon its acceptance, hence, any increase in value or
any deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or donee.

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Facts:
Leoncio Imperial was the registered owner of a 32,837-square meter parcel of land.
He then sold it to his acknowledged natural son, petitioner, for a 1 peso per sq. m. Despite
the contracts designation as one of Absolute Sale, the parties admit that the transaction was
in fact a donation. However, barely two years after the donation, Leoncio filed a complaint
for annulment of the said Deed of Absolute Sale on the ground that he was deceived by
petitioner herein into signing the said document but it was later on resolved through
compromise. Subsequently, Leoncio died and was substituted by his adopted son Victor who
later on died survived by his natural father Ricardo. Years after, Ricardo died, leaving as his
only heirs his two children, Cesar and Teresa Villalon. Five years thereafter, Cesar and Teresa
filed a complaint for annulment of the donation. The RTC held the donation to be inofficious
and impairing the legitime of Victor, on the basis of its finding that at the time of Leoncios
death, he left no property other than the 32,837-square meter parcel of land which he had
donated to petitioner. The said decision was affirmed by the CA; hence, the case.

Issue:
Whether or not the donation made by Leoncio Imperial in favor of petitioner
inofficious and should be reduced.
Ruling:
NO, unfortunately for private respondents, a claim for legitime does not amount to a
claim of title. What is brought to collation is not the donated property itself, but the value of
the property at the time it was donated. The rationale for this is that the donation is a real
alienation which conveys ownership upon its acceptance, hence, any increase in value or
any deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or donee.

SPOUSES EDUARTE v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEDRO CALAPINE

G.R. No. 105944, February 9, 1996, Francisco, J.

All crimes which offend the donor show ingratitude and are causes for
revocation. There is no doubt, therefore, that the donee who commits adultery with the wife
of the donor, gives cause for revocation by reason of ingratitude. The crimes against the
person of the donor would include not only homicide and physical injuries, but also illegal
detention, threats, and coercion; those against honor include offenses against chastity; and
those against the property, include robbery, theft, usurpation, swindling, arson, damages,
etc.
Facts:

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PROPERTY
Pedro Calapine was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in San Pablo City;
he executed a deed entitled Pagbibigay-Pala ceding one-half portion thereof to his niece
Helen S. Doria (Exhibit B) but another identical deed was purportedly executed by Pedro
Calapine ceding unto Helen S. Doria the whole of the parcel of land (Exhibits C and D), was
issued in her name. Helen then donated a portion the land to the Calauan Christian
Reformed Church, Inc. She also sold, transferred and conveyed unto the spouses Romulo
and Sally Eduarte the parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-24445, save the portion of 700
square meters on which the vendors house had been erected. Upon noticing that the
signature to the deed of donation (Exhibits C and D) was a forgery and that, she was
unworthy of his liberality, Pedro Calapine brought suit against Helen S. Doria, the Calauan
Christian Reformed Church, Inc. and the spouses Romulo and Sally Eduarte to revoke the
donation made in favor of Helen S. Doria (Exhibit B), to declare null and void the deeds of
donation and sale. The RTC ruled in favor of private respondent. Only the defendants
Eduarte spouses took an appeal which was denied. Hence, the case.
Issue:
Whether or not Helen Doria committed an act of ingratitude which is a valid ground
for revocation of the donation made in her favor in accordance with Article 765 of the Civil
Code.
Ruling:
YES. Petitioners, in support of its contention, cite the following portions found in
Tolentinos Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code: Offense against Donor - x x
x. The crimes against the person of the donor would include not only homicide and physical
injuries, but also illegal detention, threats and coercion; and those against honor include
offenses against chastity and those against the property, include robbery, theft, usurpation,
swindling, arson, damages, etc. This assertion, however, deserves scant consideration. The
full text of the very same commentary cited by petitioners belies their claim that falsification
of the deed of donation is not an act of ingratitude.
Obviously, the first sentence was deleted by petitioners because it totally controverts
their contention. As noted in the aforecited opinion all crimes which offend the donor show
ingratitude and are causes for revocation. Petitioners attempt to categorize the offenses
according to their classification under the Revised Penal Code is therefore unwarranted
considering that illegal detention, threats and coercion are considered as crimes against the
person of the donor despite the fact that they are classified as crimes against personal
liberty and security under the Revised Penal Code.

THE CITY OF ANGELES v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 97882, August 28, 1996, Panganiban, J.

Any condition may be imposed in the donation, so long as the same is not contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.

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PROPERTY
Facts:
Private Respondent donated to the City of Angeles 51 parcels of land in the City of
Angeles. The donation was subject to number of conditions. Petitioners started the
construction of a drug rehabilitation center on a portion of the donated land. Upon learning
thereof, private respondent protested such action for being violative of the terms and
conditions of the amended deed and prejudicial to its interest and to those of its clients and
residents. Petitioners claim they have the right to construct and operate a drug rehabilitation
center on the donated land in question, contrary to the provisions stated in the amended
Deed of Donation. On the other hand, private respondent, owner/developer of the Timog
Park residential subdivision in Angeles City, opposed the construction. The RTC and the CA
ruled in favor of private respondent; hence, the case.
Issue:
Whether private respondent as subdivision owner/developer may validly impose
conditions in the Amended Deed of Donation regarding the use of the open space allocated
exclusively for parks and playgrounds.
Ruling:
YES. The general law on donations does not prohibit the imposition of conditions on
a donation so long as the conditions are not illegal or impossible. In regard to donations of
open spaces, P.D. 1216 itself requires among other things that the recreational areas to be
donated be based, as aforementioned, on a percentage (3.5%, 7%, or 9%) of the total area
of the subdivision depending on whether the subdivision is low -, medium -, or highdensity. It further declares that such open space devoted to parks, playgrounds and
recreational areas are non-alienable public land and non-buildable. However, there is no
prohibition in either P.D. 957 or P.D. 1216 against imposing conditions on such donation. The
contention of petitioners that the donation should be unconditional because it is mandatory
has no basis in law. P.D. 1216 does not provide that the donation of the open space for parks
and playgrounds should be unconditional. To rule that it should be so is tantamount to
unlawfully expanding the provisions of the decree.
In the case at bar, one of the conditions imposed in the Amended Deed of Donation is
that the donee should build a sports complex on the donated land. Since P.D. 1216 clearly
requires that the 3.5% to 9% of the gross area allotted for parks and playgrounds is nonbuildable, then the obvious question arises whether or not such condition was validly
imposed and is binding on the donee. It is clear that the non-buildable character applies only
to the 3.5% to 9% area set by law. If there is any excess land over and above the 3.5% to 9%
required by the decree, which is also used or allocated for parks, playgrounds and
recreational purposes, it is obvious that such excess area is not covered by the nonbuildability restriction. In the instant case, if there be an excess, then the donee would not
be barred from developing and operating a sports complex thereon, and the condition in the
amended deed would then be considered valid and binding.

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