The Clarion Brief

Supported by:

Surkov leaks: Glimpse into Russias Management of

Georgias Occupied Regions
by

David Batashvili

October 2016
1

About the Research

The research has been carried out David Batashvili for The Clarion, with the financial support of
the Black Sea Trust of the German Marshall Fund. David Batashvili worked at the National
Security Council of Georgia in 2008-2013. He is an author of opinion articles in Georgian and
Ukrainian outlets.

About the Organisation

The Clarion Brief is a part of the experimental media and research platform The Clarion
(www.theclarion.eu), where we look for ways to empower and engage Georgia in an ongoing
discussion about Europe. The Clarion is powered by Civil Georgia (www.Civil.ge) a source of
reference on Georgias current affairs since 2001.
The United Nations Association of Georgia (UNAG - www.una.ge) is the institutional parent for
these media initiatives. A veteran of Georgias non-governmental scene, UNAG works since
1995 to engage youth, protect the rights of the vulnerable, inform the public about the world
and strengthen countrys institutions.

Dolidze str. 2, Tbilisi 0183, Georgia

Tel.: +995 32 332 516
clarion@una.ge
http://www.theclarion.eu/

Executive Summary
In late October-early November 2016 a

particularly Georgia and Ukraine, and offer a

coalition

groups

glimpse into the daily routine of some of

announced it had taken over several e-mail

these policies. The Georgian government

accounts of Vladislav Surkov - a close adviser

and Georgias foreign friends and partners

of Vladimir Putin, and published some of

should take heed of this reminder of the

their contents. Several sources confirmed

enduring Russian threat to the sovereignty

the e-mails authenticity. Many materials

of Georgia:

of

Ukrainian

hacker

from one of the accounts concern Russias

activities in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.

Georgias foreign friends and partners

should unambiguously recognize the reality,

The Surkov leaks reveal that the Russian

depth and breadth of direct Russian control

government dictates what laws must be

over the occupied regions of Abkhazia and

adopted by the local regimes in both

Tskhinvali.

Abkhazia and Tskhinvali, micromanages

governance of the two territories in great
detail, and generally operates in a manner
which betrays assumption that for all
practical purposes the two occupied regions
are considered to be parts of the Russian
Federation.

Georgias partners and aid agencies should

take note of the fact that a potential
investment

in

strengthening

proxy

administration in Abkhazia through financial

aid, training, etc. will effectively be
conducted within the framework of the
administrative

the two provinces as independent states.

neutrality and impartiality of these agencies.

into

daily

business

of

government in these areas. The documents

also show Moscows persistence in the
aggressive policies against its neighbors,

undermining

space

imposed

administration

Russia,

regulatory

The leaks belie Kremlins claims that it treats

They reveal the deep reach of the Russian

by

and

the

Russias creeping occupation of additional

areas in Georgia should be recognized as a
consistent, centrally coordinated policy,
rather than a simple demonstration of
military expediency on the ground.
3

Abstract
This policy brief looks at the revelations from the hacked and leaked e-mail accounts of Vladislav
Surkov close adviser of Vladimir Putin on the Russian policy in Ukraine and the two regions of
Georgia under the Russian occupation. The brief mostly draws upon primary sources in the form
of the materials from one of Surkovs hacked e-mail accounts. It focuses on the parts of these
materials that are dedicated to the occupied regions of Georgia Abkhazia and Tskhinvali. The
Surkov leaks provide useful glimpse on the extent of direct engagement from Moscow to manage
the legislative, regulatory and administrative routines of these entities, as well as some specific
details of the routine of the Russian control over the two regions.

Background
After the Western recognition of Kosovos

The Russian diplomacy failed in its attempt

independence in February 2008, Russia

to legitimize the occupation internationally

engaged in a quick succession of political and

through recognition of the Georgian regions

military steps in preparation for military

independence by a considerable number of

campaign against Georgia.

other nations. The European Union nations

In August 2008 following a pattern of regular

and mounting military escalation on the
ground, Russian army invaded Georgia
through both Tskhinvali and Abkhazia
regions and defeated Georgian military
forces.

Moscow

then

proceeded

to

and the United States formally assert and

support Georgias territorial integrity. None
of the former Soviet states, including
Russias close allies, went along with
Moscow in recognizing independence of
either Abkhazia or Tskhinvali.

recognize independence of the two regions

But while it is generally acknowledged that

under the local regimes it controls, and

Moscow does exercise some control over

established

the regions, the degree of such control has

significant

military bases there.

and

permanent

been disputed. The Georgian position is that

4

Russia is occupying the regions, meaning

whether Moscow is in fact occupying the

that it exercises effective military control of

regions, arguing that the military did not

the territories as well as administrative

exercise direct administrative control, and

control over day-to-day governance. This

that

view has been backed by several political

administrations whose existence precedes

statements from Georgias partners, but that

full-scale Russian deployment and which are

did not lead to either consolidation of the

elected through

legal view on this matter, or the political

process.

sanctions akin to the ones imposed on Russia

following the annexation of Crimea.

this

is

done

by

local

contested

proxy

political

Surkov leaks point to the flaws of such view.

While Mr. Surkovs portfolio does not cover

In part, this ambiguity has been caused by

military/security aspects of cooperation

the desire of the international organizations

with

to remain engaged in conflict resolution

correspondence

efforts and maintaining a degree of dialogue

legislative, regulatory, and administrative

with Moscow on this matter. However, some

control.

Abkhazia

and
reveals

Tskhinvali,
a

picture

the
of

international commentators have disputed

The Surkov Leaks

On 23 October 2016 Ukrainian hacker group

The Russian government dismissed the

CyberHunta 1 published on its website a

leaks, but their authenticity was confirmed

material headlined CyberHunta Says Hello

by a number of sources. Several people who

to Surkov 2 . The group claimed that it had

corresponded with Surkov confirmed that

gained control over an e-mail account

the messages of theirs released by the

(v14691@yandex.ru) of Vladislav Surkov a

hackers were the ones they sent, while the

close adviser of Vladimir Putin and

Atlantic Council analyzed the emails and

published some of its contents.

determined them to be genuine5.

On 25 October 2016 CyberHunta uploaded

The

the contents of Surkovs another account

conducted by this Washington think tanks

prm_surkova@gov.ru to Google Drive, also

Digital Forensic Research Lab

revealing that it was operating in coalition

Ukrainian security agency - also stated that

with other Ukrainian hacker groups 3 . On 3

documents released by CyberHunta were

November they uploaded a new portion of

real 7 . A senior U.S. official told NBC News

e-mails, this time from Surkovs third

that there was nothing to indicate the

account - pochta_mg@mail.ru4.

material was not authentic8.

Atlantic

Councils

analysis

was

. SBU -

Hunta is an alternate spelling of the word junta, included in the groups name in mockery of the message used
by the Russian propaganda that Ukrainian government after the revolution of 2014 is an illegitimate junta
2
Kiberhunta Peredaet Privet Surkovu CyberHunta, last accessed 21 November 2016 (in Russian),
http://cyberhunta.com/news/kiberhunta-peredaet-privet-surkovu/
3
Den Surka, CyberHunta, last accessed 21 November 2016 (in Russian), http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
4
SurkovLeaks (part 2), CyberHunta, last accessed 21 November 2016 (in Russian),
http://cyberhunta.com/news/surkovleaks2/
5
Andrew E. Kramer, Ukrainian Hackers Release Emails Tying Top Russian Official to Uprising, The New York
Times,
27
October
2016,
last
accessed
21
November
2016,
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/28/world/europe/ukraine-russia-emails.html?_r=1
6
Simon Shuster, Hacked Kremlin Emails Could Signal a Turn in the U.S.-Russia Cyberwar, Time, 7 November
2016, last accessed 21 November 2016, http://time.com/4558167/cyberwar-us-russia-vladislav-surkov/
7
Reid Standish, Hacked: Putin Aides Emails Detail Alleged Plot to Destabilize Ukraine, Foreign Policy, 25
October 2016, last accessed 21 November 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/10/25/hacked-putin-aides-emailsdetail-alleged-plot-to-destabilize-kiev-surkov-ukraine-leaks/
8
Robert Windrem, Payback? Russia Gets Hacked, Revealing Putin Aides Secrets, NBC News, 27 October 2016,
last accessed 21 November 2016, http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ukraine-crisis/payback-russia-gets-hackedrevealing-putin-aide-s-secrets-n673956
1

While

Ukrainian

understandably

hackers

interested

mostly

were
in

Surkovs e-mails containing information

about Russias Ukraine policy, a large portion
of e-mails from the prm_surkova@gov.ru
account is dedicated to Georgias Russianoccupied regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.

Legislative and regulatory control

The laws adopted by Sukhumi and
Tskhinvali are defined and at least partly
written by the Russian government agencies,
belying the claims of factual administrative
independence

of

these

entities

from

Moscow, and also weakening their claims to

Georgias occupied territories in

Surkov leaks

legitimacy, grounded on representing the

Surkov has been in charge of Putins policy in

Surkovs letter to Prime Minister Dmitry

Georgias occupied regions since September

Medvedev, dated 21 October 2013, informs

20139. It came, therefore, as no surprise to

him that the Russian Presidential Executive

find in Surkovs mail daily digests about

Office had developed a plan for adopting

developments in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali, as

legislation in Abkhazia under President

well as systematically received information

Vladimir Putins orders and requests the

about interactions of Russian officials with

government ministries to work on specific

the Sukhumi (Abkhazia) and Tskhinvali

bills10. Other e-mails in Surkovs inbox for 21

regimes, as well as their financing by Russia

and 23 October contains this legislative plan,

and other Russian government activities in

which is detailed and includes deadlines for

both occupied regions. More remarkably,

each stage of the bills adoption process.11

the e-mails indicate just how tightly and

directly Russia controls these two territories.

will of the governed.

Another document dated 21 October 2013 is

dedicated to the work of intergovernmental

Valery Dzutsev, Vladislav Surkov to Oversee Russian Policies Toward Abkhazia and South Ossetia, The
Jamestown Foundation, 26 September 2013, last accessed 21 November 2016, https://jamestown.org/vladislavsurkov-to-oversee-russian-policies-toward-abkhazia-and-south-ossetia/
10
Prm_Govoruna@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, , 2013-10-21 (in Russian),
last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
11
Prm_Govoruna@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, - 16 10 13,
2013-10-21 (in Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
prm_surkova@gov.ru, e-mail message to mamonov_mv@gov.ru,
(), 2013-10-23 (in Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
9

commission

that

includes

Russian

government and Tskhinvali regime.

plans for both Sukhumi and Tskhinvali

It reveals that Russian government agencies

had 13 working groups preparing the bills to
be adopted by Tskhinvali regime. It also
obligates Tskhinvali regime to present to the
Russian

government

timetable

These legislation development and adoption

for

legislation adoption by the deadline of 15

November 2013, so that these working

regimes specify participation in the bills

development

process

by

the

Russian

government agencies, including Ministries of

Justice, Economic Development, Finance,
Regional Development and Foreign Affairs,
as well as Federal Migration Service of the
Russian Federation16.

groups can proceed with their work in a

On 4 November 2013 the head of the

timely manner12.

Russian Presidential Executive Office Sergei

A letter from 23 October includes a list of

bills for Tskhinvali regime, development of
which must be prioritized 13 and a plan for
the bills development 14 . Letters from 1
November

contain

timetable

Ivanov wrote to Prime Minister Dmitry

Medvedev, requesting from him to task the
Russian government agencies with ensuring
development and adoption of legislation

with

deadlines for the bills adoption by Tskhinvali

regime15.

Prm_Govoruna@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, , 2013-10-21 (in Russian),

last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
13
Prm_Govoruna@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, , 2013-10-23
(in Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
14
Prm_Govoruna@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, , 2013-10-23
(in Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
15
Prm_Govoruna@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, ,

01.11.13,
2013-11-04
(in
Russian),
last
accessed
21
November
2016,
http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
Prm_Govoruna@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, ,
01.11.13, 2013-11-04 (in Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/densurka/
16
Prm_Govoruna@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, ,
01.11.13, 2013-11-04 (in Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/densurka/
prm_surkova@gov.ru, e-mail message to mamonov_mv@gov.ru,
(), 2013-10-23 (in Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
12

for Tskhinvali, in conjunction with the

Besides giving Abkhazia and Tskhinvali their

entitys relevant agencies17.

laws,

That same day Surkov himself wrote official

requests

to

several

Russian

Russian

officials

and

agencies

micromanage their governance.

cabinet

The extent of this phenomenon is evident

members for their agencies to ensure

from the protocols of official meetings of the

development and adoption of bills for both

intergovernmental commission working

Sukhumi and Tskhinvali18.

with Tskhinvali. The tasks which several

Other Russian official documents directly

state that Russian government sends
Tskhinvali regime ready bills to be rubber-

Russian ministries are charged with in these

documents include preparation of inventory
checking of Tskhinvali regimes institutions,
and of a timetable for transfer to a new

stamped by the latters parliament19.

system of salary payments for Tskhinvali

Involvement

in

administration

and

regime employees20.

governance
Meanwhile, Russian Ministry of Finance is
tasked with creation of Tskhinvali regimes
Treasury21.

Prm_Govoruna@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, , 2013-11-04 (in

Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
18
Prm_Govoruna@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, , 2013-11-04 (in
Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
Prm_Govoruna@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, , 2013-11-04 (in Russian),
last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
Prm_Govoruna@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, , 2013-11-04 (in
Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
Prm_Govoruna@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, , 2013-11-04 (in
Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
Prm_Govoruna@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, , 2013-11-04 (in
Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
Prm_Govoruna@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, - , 2013-11-04 (in
Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
19
Prm_Govoruna@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, , 10.
_ (), 2013-10-24 (in Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016,
http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
20
Prm_Govoruna@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, , 3.
, 2013-10-24 (in Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
21
Prm_Govoruna@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, , 6.

9 , 2013-10-24 (in Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016,

http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
17

This

intergovernmental

responsible

for

the

commission

management

of

Tskhinvali exists under direction of Putins

regional representative in North Caucasus
and Deputy Prime Minister Alexander
Khloponin. 22

Besides, in 2013 and 2014 (e-

mails from later time had not been uploaded

at the time of writing) Surkov regularly
hosted meetings with ministers and other
leading figures of Sukhumi and Tskhinvali

would help formation of Ossetian ethnic

majority in the district24.
Both proxy regimes exist at the expense of
the Russian Federation. Official documents
regarding

financing

of

Tskhinvali

regimes

by

Sukhumi
the

and

Russian

government betray assumption that for all

practical

purposes

the

two

occupied

territories are considered to be autonomous

regions of the Russian Federation.

regimes, dedicated to the management of

the two regions.23

The Russian government chides Tskhinvali

regime for incomplete and inadequate

A notable example of Russian policies in the

occupied territories is a Russian document
found in Surkovs e-mails, dedicated to high
schools in the Akhalgori district. The district

budgetary financing documentation sent to

Moscow, and engages in detailed analysis of
employment

and

infrastructure

development policies in Tskhinvali.25

had been conquered by the Russian army in

2008 and added to the occupied Tskhinvali

Russian government controls appointments

region. Georgians are ethnic majority in

in the occupied regions. Surkovs inbox

Akhalgori. The document in question openly

includes reports casually discussing specific

discusses which policies concerning schools

candidacies for official appointments in the

Stanislav.Panchenko@minregion.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, : .. , 201403-21 (in Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
23
There are numerous letters in Surkovs inbox with lists of participants of such meetings in 2013 and 2014. See
examples:
07.31, 2014-07-28 (in Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016,
http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
mamonov_mv@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, , 2013-10-22 (in Russian), last accessed
21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
24
Avdeenko_VN@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, __6, 2013-12-16 (in
Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
22

Prm_Govoruna@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, , 11.

( 2014-2016), 2013-10-24 (in Russian), last accessed 21 November
2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
25

10

Sukhumi proxy administration - suggesting

Besides political and military control, Russia

for instance to satisfy political ambitions of a

is also proceeding with economic takeover

certain official by proposing him a position in

of

an oversight agency, instead of appointing as

government coordinates expansion of the

deputy prime-minister.26

Russian companies into both regions.

Russia is also engaged in more general

Surkovs e-mail account contains reports of

management of the political situation in

specific plans each participating Russian

Abkhazia. Materials in Surkovs e-mails

company has in the occupied territories.

reveal

Among many examples there are Rosneft

that

Russian

systematically

uses

government

inducements

Abkhazia

and

Tskhinvali.

Russian

and

plans to find and exploit oil on the

pressure points on Abkhazian public figures

continental shelf off Ochamchire, as well as

to achieve political and power balance

Russian Railways and Rosatom investments

outcomes it desires. A list of local prominent

in Abkhazia.28

figures in Surkovs inbox includes their

exploited. One of the persons in the list is

The Relevance of the Surkov

Leaks

designated

for

Before Russias annexation of Crimea and

neutralization of [Raul] Khajimba, while

intervention in Donbass, Russias military

other two individuals are said to be both

involvement

needed

considered an outlier, while the very

personal motivations that are to be

for

as

an

splitting

Coordinating Council27.

instrument

the

oppositions

existence

in

of

Georgia

Kremlins

was

often

aggressive

geopolitical designs was disputed by many

mamonov_mv@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru,

, 2013-10-22 (in Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016,
http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
pavlov.as.one@gmail.com, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, 3, 2014-10-03 (in Russian), last
accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
27
mamonov_mv@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, , 2014-05-06 (in
Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
28
avdeenko.vn@yandex.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, , _
_2410, 2013-10-24 (in Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
avdeenko.vn@yandex.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, ,
__2410, 2013-10-24 (in Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
26

11

Western politicians and pundits. Russian

should also take into account that, due to

foreign strategy is presently much better

Surkovs personal role, the leaks deal only

understood in the West than it was few

with political and economic matters. Russian

years ago. Today, its aggressive posture is

military control over the two regions is an

rarely denied with actual conviction.

additional key aspect not covered in the

Yet the Surkov leaks shed additional light on

Surkov leaks.

the detail of Russias management of areas

An important part of the security dimension

under its control. Information contained in

of the Russian activities in Georgia is the

the leaked e-mails is important in both

process known as creeping occupation. The

narrowly Georgian context, and as a glimpse

term describes movement of the occupation

of the broader Russian modus operandi that

line, claimed by Russia to be national

involves gradual and full-scale takeover of

border, deeper into Georgia. It additionally

legislative, regulatory and administrative

disrupts lives of farmers living near the

functions behind the veil of official

occupation line and potentially threatens

recognition of sovereignty of Abkhazia and

some of the Georgian infrastructure located

Tskhinvali regions.

in the non-occupied part of the country.

Surkovs

e-mails

constitute

vivid

illustration of just how directly Russia

controls the occupied territories and actions
of proxy regimes. The leaked documents
provide a picture of sustained, systematic

Russias total control over the actions of

Sukhumi and Tskhinvali regimes, additionally
demonstrated by the Surkov leaks, means
that the creeping occupation is a policy
originating in Kremlin.

political control, governance and even

The fact that Moscow determines and

micromanagement of the occupied regions

manages political, security and military

by the Russian government.

activities taking place in Abkhazia and

Arguably, some parts of the Russian

Federation, such as Chechnya under Ramzan
Kadyrov, have considerably greater degree
of self-rule than Abkhazia and Tskhinvali. We

Tskhinvali has even broader implications. It

indicates gradually diminishing space for
Sukhumi and Tskhinvali as well as the
inhabitants of these provinces to act

12

independently of Moscows will or to resist

More generally, the Surkov leaks testify to

its instructions.

Kremlins mindset about the neighbors it

The glimpse into Russias mode of operation

in civilian field allows us to infer that Russian
military and security commanders deployed
in the field exercise much tighter control and

targets. Materials in the e-mails concerning

both Georgia and Ukraine demonstrate
Russias strategic intent in its operations
against targeted nations.

management over military and security

The

matters.

considered to be permanent additions to the

The entry into force of the agreements on

creation of the joint armed forces of Russia
with Abkhazia and Tskhinvali thus represents
a heightened threat to Georgia. The two
regions are located very close to the
Georgian heartlands in both eastern and
western parts of the country.

occupied

territories

are

casually

area under Russian governance. In the

Russians view, they are to be directly
managed, their economic resources to be
exploited. The portions of e-mails dedicated
to Ukraine also show Moscows immediate,
short-term willingness to go beyond Crimea
and

Donbass,

deeper

into

Ukrainian

territory.
Tskhinvali region borders the main Georgian
highway that connects the nations two
halves. At one geographic point the
occupation line runs less than 500 meters
from the highway, while, as mentioned
above, the capital Tbilisi is situated just 40

To

summarize,

Surkovs

revealed

correspondence offers a glimpse into the

daily routine of Russias ongoing effort to
expand and consolidate a zone of control
beyond its borders.

kilometers from this occupied region.

13

Conclusion and recommendations:

Foreign partners of Georgia should reinforce vigilance regarding the potential threats Russian
control over Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions poses to the non-occupied Georgia. Current focus
on the Baltic states and Ukraine, often overshadows the real threats to Georgia. Such
complacency could be dangerous.
Moscow is exercising considerable daily control over administration and governance of Abkhazia
and Tskhinvali regions, which is backed up by near-complete financial dependence of these
regions on capital inflows from Russia, as well as the integration of the local forces into the
Russian command and control systems. Both Georgian government and its foreign partners
should take heed:

Georgias foreign friends and partners should unambiguously recognize the reality, depth and
breadth of the direct Russian control over the occupied regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.

Tbilisi and its partners shall engage in cooperative effort to identify the realistic means for
reducing such dependence, which would be by definition rather limited. At the same time,
a sustainable and concerted strategy for monitoring and protecting the rights of
Georgian-speakers and other minorities is required.

Georgias partners and aid agencies should take note of the fact that a potential investment in
strengthening the proxy administration in Abkhazia through financial aid, training, etc. will
effectively be conducted within the framework of the administrative and regulatory space
imposed by Russia. Such engagement would have implications for the neutrality and

impartiality of these agencies. The European Union shall engage in strategic dialogue with
Georgian authorities to adapt its policies and engagement accordingly.

Russian creeping occupation of additional areas in Georgia must be recognized a matter of

Kremlins strategy, rather than isolated actions driven by military imperatives. These actions

should be consistently and vocally confronted by the Western nations diplomacy. Russia
attempts to present creeping occupation as a local and technical issue should be rebuffed.

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