Duero vs. Court of Appeals, 373 SCRA 11, G.R. No.

131282
January 4, 2002

asking for affirmative relief, effectively bars a party by estoppel

from challenging the courts jurisdiction, we note that estoppel
has become an equitable defense that is both substantive and
remedial and its successful invocation can bar a right and not
merely its equitable enforcement. Hence, estoppel ought to be
applied with caution. For estoppel to apply, the action giving rise
thereto must be unequivocal and intentional because, if
misapplied, estoppel may become a tool of injustice.

Xerox copies are obviously without evidentiary weight or value.

At the outset, however, we note that petitioner through
counsel submitted to this Court pleadings that contain
inaccurate statements. Thus, on page 5 of his petition, we find
that to bolster the claim that the appellate court erred in holding
that the RTC had no jurisdiction, petitioner pointed to Annex E
of his petition which supposedly is the Certification issued by
the Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel, Surigao, specifically
containing the notation, Note: Subject for General Revision
Effective 1994. But it appears that Annex E of his petition is not
a Certification but a xerox copy of a Declaration of Real
Property. Nowhere does the document contain a notation,
Note: Subject for General Revision Effective 1994. Petitioner
also asked this Court to refer to Annex F, where he said the
zonal value of the disputed land was P1.40 per sq.m., thus
placing the computed value of the land at the time the complaint
was filed before the RTC at P57,113.98, hence beyond the
jurisdiction of the municipal court and within the jurisdiction of
the regional trial court. However, we find that these annexes are
both merely xerox copies. They are obviously without
evidentiary weight or value.

The fundamental rule is that, the lack of jurisdiction of the court

over an action cannot be waived by the parties, or even cured
by their silence, acquiescence or even by their express
consent; Even if a party actively participated in the proceedings
before the trial court, the doctrine of estoppel cannot still be
properly invoked against him because the question of lack of
jurisdiction may be raised at anytime and at any stage of the
action.Under these circumstances, we could not fault the
Court of Appeals in overruling the RTC and in holding that
private respondent was not estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the regional trial court. The fundamental rule is
that, the lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot be
waived by the parties, or even cured by their silence,
acquiescence or even by their express consent. Further, a party
may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action at any
stage of the proceedings and even on appeal. The appellate
court did not err in saying that the RTC should have declared
itself barren of jurisdiction over the action. Even if private
respondent actively participated in the proceedings before said
court, the doctrine of estoppel cannot still be properly invoked
against him because the question of lack of jurisdiction may be
raised at anytime and at any stage of the action. Precedents tell
us that as a general rule, the jurisdiction of a court is not a
question of acquiescence as a matter of fact, but an issue of
conferment as a matter of law. Also, neither waiver nor estoppel
shall apply to confer jurisdiction upon a court, barring highly
meritorious and exceptional circumstances.

By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and

whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to an
excess or a lack of jurisdiction, and the abuse of discretion must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to
act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility.Coming now to the principal issue,
petitioner contends that respondent appellate court acted with
grave abuse of discretion. By grave abuse of discretion is
meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
which is equivalent to an excess or a lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility. But here we find that
in its decision holding that the municipal court has jurisdiction
over the case and that private respondent was not estopped
from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC, respondent Court
of Appeals discussed the facts on which its decision is
grounded as well as the law and jurisprudence on the matter. Its
action was neither whimsical nor capricious.

Since a decision of a court without jurisdiction is null and void, it

could logically never become final and executory, hence appeal
therefrom by writ of error would be out of the questiona
petition for certiorari would be in order.Since a decision of a
court without jurisdiction is null and void, it could logically never
become final and executory, hence appeal therefrom by writ of
error would be out of the question. Resort by private respondent
to a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was in
order.
Duncano vs. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division), 762 SCRA 663,
G.R. No. 191894 July 15, 2015

While participation in all stages of a case before the trial court,

including invocation of its authority in asking for affirmative
relief, effectively bars a party by estoppel from challenging the
courts jurisdiction, the Court notes that estoppel has become
an equitable defense that is both substantive and remedial and
its successful invocation can bar a right and not merely its
equitable enforcement; For estoppel to apply, the action giving
rise thereto must be unequivocal and intentional because, if
misapplied, estoppel may become a tool of injustice.Was
private respondent estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of
the RTC? In this case, we are in agreement with the Court of
Appeals that he was not. While participation in all stages of a
case before the trial court, including invocation of its authority in

The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated by Section

5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution.The creation of the
Sandiganbayan was mandated by Section 5, Article XIII of the
1973 Constitution. By virtue of the powers vested in him by the
Constitution and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, dated
September 21, 1972, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos
issued P.D. No. 1486. The decree was later amended by P.D.
No. 1606, Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, P.D. No.
1860, and P.D. No. 1861. With the advent of the 1987
Constitution, the special court was retained as provided for in
Section 4, Article XI thereof. Aside from Executive Order Nos.
14 and 14-a, and R.A. 7080, which expanded the jurisdiction of

the Sandiganbayan, P.D. No. 1606 was further modified by R.A.

No. 7975, R.A. No. 8249, and just this year, R.A. No. 10660.

supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the factual milieu of

Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 (1968).The Court, thus,
wavered on when to apply the exceptional circumstance in
Sibonghanoy and on when to apply the general rule enunciated
as early as in De La Santa and expounded at length in
Calimlim. The general rule should, however, be, as it has
always been, that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by
waiver or by estoppel. Estoppel by laches, to bar a litigant from
asserting the courts absence or lack of jurisdiction, only
supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the factual milieu of
Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. Indeed, the fact that a person attempts to
invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not estop him
from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over the subject
matter, since such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by
mere consent of the parties. This is especially true where the
person seeking to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of the court
does not thereby secure any advantage or the adverse party
does not suffer any harm.

Jurisdiction; Those that fall within the original jurisdiction of the

Sandiganbayan are: (1) officials of the executive branch with
Salary Grade 27 or higher, and (2) officials specifically
enumerated in Section 4(A)(1)(a) to (g), regardless of their
salary grades.Those that fall within the original jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan are: (1) officials of the executive branch
with Salary Grade 27 or higher, and (2) officials specifically
enumerated in Section 4(A)(1)(a) to (g), regardless of their
salary grades. While the first part of Section 4(A) covers only
officials of the executive branch with Salary Grade 27 and
higher, its second part specifically includes other executive
officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and
higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The legislative intent is to allow the Sandiganbayan to devote
its time and expertise to big-time cases involving the so-called
big fishes in the government rather than those accused who
are of limited means who stand trial for petty crimes, the socalled small fry, which, in turn, helps the court decongest its
dockets.The legislative intent is to allow the Sandiganbayan
to devote its time and expertise to big-time cases involving the
so-called big fishes in the government rather than those
accused who are of limited means who stand trial for petty
crimes, the so-called small fry, which, in turn, helps the court
decongest its dockets. Yet, those that are classified as Salary
Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, provided that they hold the positions
enumerated by the law. In this category, it is the position held,
not the salary grade, which determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. The specific inclusion constitutes an exception
to the general qualification relating to officials of the executive
branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

Delay alone, though unreasonable, will not sustain the defense

of estoppel by laches unless it further appears that the party,
knowing his rights, has not sought to enforce them until the
condition of the party pleading laches has in good faith become
so changed that he cannot be restored to his former state, if the
rights be then enforced, due to loss of evidence, change of title,
intervention of equities, and other causes.Applying the said
doctrine to the instant case, the petitioner is in no way estopped
by laches in assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC, considering
that he raised the lack thereof in his appeal before the appellate
court. At that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for
laches to attach. True, delay alone, though unreasonable, will
not sustain the defense of estoppel by laches unless it further
appears that the party, knowing his rights, has not sought to
enforce them until the condition of the party pleading laches has
in good faith become so changed that he cannot be restored to
his former state, if the rights be then enforced, due to loss of
evidence, change of title, intervention of equities, and other
causes. In applying the principle of estoppel by laches in the
exceptional case of Sibonghanoy, the Court therein considered
the patent and revolting inequity and unfairness of having the
judgment creditors go up their Calvary once more after more or
less 15 years. The same, however, does not obtain in the
instant case.

Figueroa vs. People, 558 SCRA 63, G.R. No. 147406 July 14,
2008
Applied uniformly is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the
court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force
at the time of the institution of the action, unless such statute
provides for a retroactive application thereof.Applied
uniformly is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to
hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the
time of the institution of the action, unless such statute provides
for a retroactive application thereof. In this case, at the time the
criminal information for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide with violation of the Automobile Law (now Land
Transportation and Traffic Code) was filed, Section 32(2) of
Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 had already been amended by
Republic Act No. 7691.

Estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by

lawit is to be applied rarely, only from necessity, and only in
extraordinary circumstances; When misapplied, the doctrine of
estoppel may be a most effective weapon for the
accomplishment of injustice.We note at this point that
estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by
law. It is to be applied rarelyonly from necessity, and only in
extraordinary circumstances. The doctrine must be applied with
great care and the equity must be strong in its favor. When
misapplied, the doctrine of estoppel may be a most effective
weapon for the accomplishment of injustice. Moreover, a
judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter is
void. Hence, the Revised Rules of Court provides for remedies
in attacking judgments rendered by courts or tribunals that have
no jurisdiction over the concerned cases. No laches will even
attach when the judgment is null and void for want of
jurisdiction.

Estoppel by Laches; The general rule should be, as it has

always been, that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by
waiver or by estoppelestoppel by laches, to bar a litigant from
asserting the courts absence or lack of jurisdiction, only

from the whole text of the law and every part of the act is to be
taken into view. In other words, petitioners interpretation lies in
direct opposition to the rule that a statute must be interpreted as
a whole under the principle that the best interpreter of a statute
is the statute itself. Optima statuti interpretatrix est ipsum
statutum. Ang isang batas ay marapat na bigyan ng kahulugan
sa kanyang kabuuan sa ilalim ng prinsipyo na ang
pinakamainam na interpretasyon ay ang mismong batas.

Serana vs. Sandiganbayan, 542 SCRA 224, G.R. No. 162059

January 22, 2008
Well-established is the rule that when a motion to quash in a
criminal case is denied, the remedy is not a petition for
certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial, without prejudice to
reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to
quash.We would ordinarily dismiss this petition for certiorari
outright on procedural grounds. Well-established is the rule that
when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the
remedy is not a petition for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to
trial, without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses
invoked in their motion to quash. Remedial measures as
regards interlocutory orders, such as a motion to quash, are
frowned upon and often dismissed. The evident reason for this
rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action.

Estafa; Plainly, estafa is one of those felonies within the

jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, subject to the twin
requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public officials
and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to
their office.The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other
felonies committed by public officials in relation to their office.
We see no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as
one of the offenses included in Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606.
Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is
simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is
committed by public officials and employees mentioned in
Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the
offense is committed in relation to their office.

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019);

Jurisdictions; It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended, rather than R.A.
No. 3019, as amended, that determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.We first address petitioners contention that
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is determined by Section
4 of R.A. No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as
amended). We note that petitioner refers to Section 4 of the
said law yet quotes Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in
her motion to quash before the Sandiganbayan. She repeats
the reference in the instant petition for certiorari and in her
memorandum of authorities. We cannot bring ourselves to write
this off as a mere clerical or typographical error. It bears
stressing that petitioner repeated this claim twice despite
corrections made by the Sandiganbayan. Her claim has no
basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended, rather than R.A.
No. 3019, as amended, that determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. A brief legislative history of the statute creating
the Sandiganbayan is in order. The Sandiganbayan was
created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to
attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public
officers and employees, based on the concept that public
officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at
all times accountable to the people.

Public Office; University of the Philippines (U.P.); Words and

Phrases; A University of the Philippines (UP) Student Regent is
a public officer; A public office is the right, authority, and duty
created and conferred by law, by which for a given period,
either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating
power, an individual is invested with some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise by him
for the benefit of the public.Petitioner also contends that she
is not a public officer. She does not receive any salary or
remuneration as a UP student regent. This is not the first or
likely the last time that We will be called upon to define a public
officer. In Khan, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, 495 SCRA 452
(2006), We ruled that it is difficult to pin down the definition of a
public officer. The 1987 Constitution does not define who are
public officers. Rather, the varied definitions and concepts are
found in different statutes and jurisprudence. In Aparri v. Court
of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231 (1984), the Court held that: A public
office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by
law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring
at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested
with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government,
to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public ([Mechem
Public Offices and Officers,] Sec. 1). The right to hold a public
office under our political system is therefore not a natural right.
It exists, when it exists at all only because and by virtue of
some law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it
(Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such thing as a vested
interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to
hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for
special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be
said to have any vested right in an office or its salary (42 Am.
Jur. 881).

The rule is well established in this jurisdiction that statutes

should receive a sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust
or an absurd conclusionthe intention of the legislator must be
ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of the
act is to be taken into view.The rule is well-established in this
jurisdiction that statutes should receive a sensible construction
so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion. Interpretatio
talis in ambiguis semper fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et
absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will
avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. Kung saan
mayroong kalabuan, ang pagpapaliwanag ay hindi dapat
maging mahirap at katawa-tawa. Every section, provision or
clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to each
other in order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the
legislature. The intention of the legislator must be ascertained

It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of

the Sandiganbayanthe Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction
over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606.Petitioner
claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she
is, in fact, a regular tuition fee-paying student. This is likewise

bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade that determines

the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also
has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606.
In Geduspan v. People, 451 SCRA 187 (2005), We held that
while the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with
Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically
includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of
Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of
law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner
falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is
placed there by express provision of law. Section 4(A)(1)(g) of
P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with
jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers
of government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner
falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the
BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees
of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of law,
petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D.
No. 1606.

name Pedro D.D. Ramos in connection with a criminal case.

The Court ruled that Atty. Ramos resorted to deception by using
a name different from that with which he was authorized. We
severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a repetition
may warrant suspension or disbarment. We admonish
petitioners counsel to be more careful and accurate in his
citation. A lawyers conduct before the court should be
characterized by candor and fairness. The administration of
justice would gravely suffer if lawyers do not act with complete
candor and honesty before the courts.
Pat-og, Sr. vs. Civil Service Commission, 697 SCRA 567,
G.R. No. 198755 June 5, 2013
Civil Service Commission (CSC); Department of Education
(DepEd); Board of Professional Teachers-Professional
Regulatory Commission (PRC); Teachers; In Puse v. SantosPuse, 615 SCRA 500 (2010), it was held that the Civil Service
Commission (CSC), the Department of Education (DepEd) and
the Board of Professional Teachers-Professional Regulatory
Commission (PRC) have concurrent jurisdiction over
administrative cases against public school teachers.In Puse
v. Santos-Puse, 615 SCRA 500 (2010), it was held that the
CSC, the Department of Education (DepEd) and the Board of
Professional Teachers-Professional Regulatory Commission
(PRC) have concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases
against public school teachers. Under Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution, the CSC is the body charged with the
establishment and administration of a career civil service which
embraces all branches and agencies of the government.
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 (the Administrative Code of
1987) and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 807 (the Civil Service
Decree of the Philippines) expressly provide that the CSC has
the power to hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases
instituted with it or brought to it on appeal. Thus, the CSC, as
the central personnel agency of the government, has the
inherent power to supervise and discipline all members of the
civil service, including public school teachers.

It is well-established that compensation is not an essential

element of public office.It is well established that
compensation is not an essential element of public office. At
most, it is merely incidental to the public office. Delegation of
sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An
investment in an individual of some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the
benefit of the public makes one a public officer.
The administration of the University of the Philippines (UP) is a
sovereign function in line with Article XIV of the Constitution.
The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with
Article XIV of the Constitution. UP performs a legitimate
governmental function by providing advanced instruction in
literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and giving
professional and technical training. Moreover, UP is maintained
by the Government and it declares no dividends and is not a
corporation created for profit.
Criminal Procedure; Jurisdictions; Pleadings and Practice; It is
axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the
information.It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by
the averments in the information. More than that, jurisdiction is
not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by defendant or
respondent in an answer, a motion to dismiss, or a motion to
quash. Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost
entirely upon the whims of defendant or respondent.

Republic Act No. 4670; Republic Act No. 7836; Teachers; Under
Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670, the jurisdiction over administrative
cases of public school teachers is lodged with the investigating
committee constituted therein. Also, under Section 23 of R.A.
No. 7836 (the Philippine Teachers Professionalization Act of
1994), the Board of Professional Teachers is given the power,
after due notice and hearing, to suspend or revoke the
certificate of registration of a professional teacher for causes
enumerated therein.Indeed, under Section 9 of R.A. No.
4670, the jurisdiction over administrative cases of public school
teachers is lodged with the investigating committee constituted
therein. Also, under Section 23 of R.A. No. 7836 (the Philippine
Teachers Professionalization Act of 1994), the Board of
Professional Teachers is given the power, after due notice and
hearing, to suspend or revoke the certificate of registration of a
professional teacher for causes enumerated therein.

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; A lawyer owes candor, fairness and

honesty to the Courta lawyer should not misquote or
misrepresent; Petitioners counsel admonished to be more
careful and accurate in his citation.Petitioners counsel,
Renato G. dela Cruz, misrepresented his reference to Section 4
of P.D. No. 1606 as a quotation from Section 4 of R.A. No.
3019. A review of his motion to quash, the instant petition for
certiorari and his memorandum, unveils the misquotation. We
urge petitioners counsel to observe Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 10.02 of the Rules
stating that a lawyer shall not misquote or misrepresent. The
Court stressed the importance of this rule in Pangan v. Ramos,
93 SCRA 87 (1979), where Atty. Dionisio D. Ramos used the

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; Concurrent

Jurisdiction; Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed
over the same parties or subject matter at the same time by two
or more separate tribunals.Concurrent jurisdiction is that
which is possessed over the same parties or subject matter at

the same time by two or more separate tribunals. When the law
bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed
that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that
another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in
which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the
matter.

to or be connected with the performance of the official functions

and duties of a public officer. In grave misconduct, as
distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of
an established rule must be manifest.
Teachers; Teachers are duly licensed professionals who must
not only be competent in the practice of their noble profession,
but must also possess dignity and a reputation with high moral
values.Teachers are duly licensed professionals who must
not only be competent in the practice of their noble profession,
but must also possess dignity and a reputation with high moral
values. They must strictly adhere to, observe, and practice the
set of ethical and moral principles, standards, and values laid
down in the Code of Ethics of Professional Teachers, which
apply to all teachers in schools in the Philippines, whether
public or private, as provided in the preamble of the said Code.
Section 8 of Article VIII of the same Code expressly provides
that a teacher shall not inflict corporal punishment on offending
learners.

Where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the

body that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.Where concurrent
jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the body that first takes
cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of the others. In this case, it was CSC which first
acquired jurisdiction over the case because the complaint was
filed before it. Thus, it had the authority to proceed and decide
the case to the exclusion of the DepEd and the Board of
Professional Teachers.
The Supreme Court has time and again frowned upon the
undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision
and then accepting the judgment only if favorable, but attacking
it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.At any rate, granting
that the CSC was without jurisdiction, the petitioner is indeed
estopped from raising the issue. Although the rule states that a
jurisdictional question may be raised at any time, such rule
admits of the exception where, as in this case, estoppel has
supervened. Here, instead of opposing the CSCs exercise of
jurisdiction, the petitioner invoked the same by actively
participating in the proceedings before the CSC-CAR and by
even filing his appeal before the CSC itself; only raising the
issue of jurisdiction later in his motion for reconsideration after
the CSC denied his appeal. This Court has time and again
frowned upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his
case for decision and then accepting the judgment only if
favorable, but attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.

Administrative Law; Grave Misconduct; Penalties; Uniform

Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS);
Under Section 52(A)(2) of Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, the penalty for grave
misconduct is dismissal from the service, which carries with it
the cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits and
perpetual disqualifica tion from reemployment in the
government service.Under Section 52(A)(2) of Rule IV of the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, the
penalty for grave misconduct is dismissal from the service,
which carries with it the cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of
retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification from
reemployment in the government service. This penalty must,
however, be tempered with compassion as there was sufficient
provocation on the part of Bang-on. Considering further the
mitigating circumstances that the petitioner has been in the
government service for 33 years, that this is his first offense and
that he is at the cusp of retirement, the Court finds the penalty
of suspension for six months as appropriate under the
circumstances.

Administrative Proceedings; Due Process; The essence of due

process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain ones
side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of; In administrative proceedings, a formal or
trial-type hearing is not always necessary and technical rules of
procedure are not strictly applied.The essence of due
process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, a fair and rea sonable opportunity to explain ones
side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. Administrative due process cannot be fully
equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. In
administrative proceedings, a formal or trial-type hearing is not
always necessary and technical rules of procedure are not
strictly applied. Hence, the right to cross-examine is not an
indispensable aspect of administrative due process. The
petitioner cannot, therefore, argue that the affidavit of Bang-on
and his witnesses are hearsay and insufficient to prove his guilt.

Boston Equity Resources, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 699

SCRA 16, G.R. No. 173946 June 19, 2013
Remedial Law; Certiorari; Motion to Dismiss; Well-settled is the
rule that the special civil action for certiorari is not the proper
remedy to assail the denial by the trial court of a motion to
dismiss; The proper remedy in such a case is to appeal after a
decision has been rendered.The Court of Appeals erred in
granting the writ of certiorari in favor of respondent. Well-settled
is the rule that the special civil action for certiorari is not the
proper remedy to assail the denial by the trial court of a motion
to dismiss. The order of the trial court denying a motion to
dismiss is merely interlocutory, as it neither terminates nor
finally disposes of a case and still leaves something to be done
by the court before a case is finally decided on the merits.
Therefore, the proper remedy in such a case is to appeal after
a decision has been rendered.

Administrative Law; Misconduct; To constitute an administrative

offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the
performance of the official functions and duties of a public
officer.Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or
deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behaviour. To
constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate

Jurisdiction; Estoppel by Laches; The aspect of jurisdiction

which may be barred from being assailed as a result of estoppel
by laches is jurisdiction over the subject matter.The aspect of
jurisdiction which may be barred from being assailed as a result
of estoppel by laches is jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Thus, in Tijam, the case relied upon by petitioner, the issue
involved was the authority of the then Court of First Instance to
hear a case for the collection of a sum of money in the amount
of P1,908.00 which amount was, at that time, within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the municipal courts. In
subsequent cases citing the ruling of the Court in Tijam, what
was likewise at issue was the jurisdiction of the trial court over
the subject matter of the case. Accordingly, in Spouses
Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals, 394 SCRA 472 (2002), the issue
for consideration was the authority of the regional trial court to
hear and decide an action for reformation of contract and
damages involving a subdivision lot, it being argued therein that
jurisdiction is vested in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board pursuant to PD 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium
Buyers Protective Decree). In Lee v. Presiding Judge, MTC,
Legaspi City, 145 SCRA 408 (1986), petitioners argued that the
respondent municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the
complaint for ejectment because the issue of ownership was
raised in the pleadings. Finally, in People v. Casuga, 53 SCRA
278 (1973), accused-appellant claimed that the crime of grave
slander, of which she was charged, falls within the concurrent
jurisdiction of municipal courts or city courts and the then courts
of first instance, and that the judgment of the court of first
instance, to which she had appealed the municipal courts
conviction, should be deemed null and void for want of
jurisdiction as her appeal should have been filed with the Court
of Appeals or the Supreme Court. In all of these cases, the
Supreme Court barred the attack on the jurisdiction of the
respective courts concerned over the subject matter of the case
based on estoppel by laches, declaring that parties cannot be
allowed to belatedly adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking
the jurisdiction of a court to which they submitted their cause
voluntarily.

cannot be made without affecting [that] interest or leaving the

controversy in such a condition that its final determination may
be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. It has
also been considered that an indispensable party is a person in
whose absence there cannot be a determination between the
parties already before the court which is effective, complete or
equitable. Further, an indispensable party is one who must be
included in an action before it may properly proceed.
Section 11 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court states that [n]either
misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of
an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the
court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage
of the action and on such terms as are just.Section 11 of Rule
3 of the Rules of Court states that [n]either misjoinder nor nonjoinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties
may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of
any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and
on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party
may be severed and proceeded with separately. Based on the
last sentence of the afore-quoted provision of law, a misjoined
party must have the capacity to sue or be sued in the event that
the claim by or against the misjoined party is pursued in a
separate case. In this case, therefore, the inclusion of Manuel in
the complaint cannot be considered a misjoinder, as in fact, the
action would have proceeded against him had he been alive at
the time the collection case was filed by petitioner. This being
the case, the remedy provided by Section 11 of Rule 3 does not
obtain here. The name of Manuel as party-defendant cannot
simply be dropped from the case. Instead, the procedure taken
by the Court in Sarsaba v. Vda. de Te, 594 SCRA 410 (2009),
whose facts, as mentioned earlier, resemble those of this case,
should be followed herein.
Where the defendant is neither a natural nor a juridical person
or an entity authorized by law, the complaint may be dismissed
on the ground that the pleading asserting the claim states no
cause of action or for failure to state a cause of action pursuant
to Section 1(g) of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, because a
complaint cannot possibly state a cause of action against one
who cannot be a party to a civil action.Where the defendant is
neither a natural nor a juridical person or an entity authorized by
law, the com plaint may be dismissed on the ground that the
pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action or for
failure to state a cause of action pursuant to Section 1(g) of
Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, because a complaint cannot
possibly state a cause of action against one who cannot be a
party to a civil action. Since the proper course of action against
the wrongful inclusion of Manuel as party-defendant is the
dismissal of the case as against him, thus did the trial court err
when it ordered the substitution of Manuel by his heirs.

If the objection to the jurisdiction is not raised either in a motion

to dismiss or in the answer, the objection to the jurisdiction over
the person of the plaintiff or the defendant is deemed
waived.Since the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of a party to a case is not one of those defenses which
are not deemed waived under Section 1 of Rule 9, such
defense must be invoked when an answer or a motion to
dismiss is filed in order to prevent a waiver of the defense. If the
objection is not raised either in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer, the objection to the jurisdiction over the person of the
plaintiff or the defendant is deemed waived by virtue of the first
sentence of the above-quoted Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules
of Court.

Substitution of Parties; Substitution is proper only where the

party to be substituted died during the pendency of the case, as
expressly provided for by Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court.Substitution is proper only where the party to be
substituted died during the pendency of the case, as expressly
provided for by Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which
states: Death of party; duty of counsel.Whenever a party to a
pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished,
it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty
(30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the

An indispensable party is one who has such an interest in the

controversy or subject matter of a case that a final adjudication
cannot be made in his or her absence, without injuring or
affecting that interest.An indispensable party is one who has
such an interest in the controversy or subject matter of a case
that a final adjudication cannot be made in his or her absence,
without injuring or affecting that interest. He or she is a party
who has not only an interest in the subject matter of the
controversy, but an interest of such nature that a final decree

name and address of his legal representative or

representatives. x x x The heirs of the deceased may be
allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator x x x. The court
shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives

to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days

from notice. (Emphasis supplied.) Here, since Manuel was
already dead at the time of the filing of the complaint, the court
never acquired jurisdiction over his person and, in effect, there
was no party to be substituted.