1. Social Security System Employees Association (SSEA) vs.

CA
Facts: The SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and
members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing
non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the
SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor-Management Council, which ordered the
strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered
damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued
to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners
herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.
It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the unions demands. The court a
quo issued a temporary restraining order pending resolution of the application for a writ of preliminary
injunction. In the meantime, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the trial courts lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. To this motion, the SSS filed an opposition, reiterating its prayer for
the issuance of a writ of injunction. The court a quo denied the motion to dismiss and converted the
restraining order into an injunction upon posting of a bond, after finding that the strike was illegal.
Issue: Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike. --NONE
Held: A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution
would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners
intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to
strike.
By itself, this provision would seem to recognize the right of all workers and employees, including those
in the public sector, to strike. But the Constitution itself fails to expressly confirm this impression, for in
the Sub-Article on the Civil Service Commission, it provides, after defining the scope of the civil service
as all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, that [t]he right to selforganization shall not be denied to government employees [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(1) and (5)].
Parenthetically, the Bill of Rights also provides that [t]he right of the people, including those employed
in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to
law shall not abridged [Art. III, Sec. 8]. Thus, while there is no question that the Constitution
recognizes the right of government employees to organize, it is silent as to whether such recognition
also includes the right to strike.
On June 1, 1987, to implement the constitutional guarantee of the right of government employees to
organize, the President issued E.O. No. 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to
organize of government employees. In Section 14 thereof, it is provided that [t]he Civil Service law and
rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed, subject to
any legislation that may be enacted by Congress. The President was apparently referring to
Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission under date April 21, 1987 which,
prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees. . .
enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging
strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in
temporary stoppage or disruption of public service. The air was thus cleared of the confusion. At
present, in the absence of any legislation allowing government employees to strike, recognizing their
right to do so, or regulating the exercise of the right, they are prohibited from striking, by express
provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6 and as implied in E.O. No. 180.
Employees of the SSS are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil Service
Commissions Memorandum prohibiting strikes.The Court is of the considered view that they
are. Considering that under the 1987 Constitution [t]he civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters [Art. IX (B), Sec. 2(1); see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180
where the employees in the civil service are denominated as government employees] and that the
SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under
R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil Service
Commissions memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the
employees of the SSS was illegal.
The general rule in the past and up to the present is that the terms and conditions of employment in
the Government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof are governed by law
(Section 11, the Industrial Peace Act, R.A. No. 875, as amended and Article 277, the Labor Code, P.D.

No. 442, as amended). Since the terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by law,
government workers cannot use the same weapons employed by workers in the private sector to
secure concessions from their employers. The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that
industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by law. Relations between private employers
and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum requirements of
wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of employment in the
unionized private sector are settled through the process of collective bargaining. In government
employment, however, it is the legislature and, where properly given delegated power, the
administrative heads of government which fix the terms and conditions of employment. And this is
effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through collective
bargaining agreements.

2. Bangalisan vs. CA
Facts: Petitioners, except Rodolfo Mariano, were among the 800 public school teachers who staged
mass actions on September 17 to 19, 1990 to dramatize their grievances concerning, in the main, the
alleged failure of the public authorities to implement in a just and correct manner certain laws and
measures intended for their material benefit.
On September 17, 1990, the Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS)
issued a Return-to-Work Order. Petitioners failed to comply with said order, hence they were charged by
the Secretary with grave misconduct; gross neglect of duty; gross violation of Civil Service law, rules
and regulations and reasonable office regulations; refusal to perform official duty; gross
insubordination; conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service; and absence without official
leave in violation of PD 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines. They were
simultaneously placed under preventive suspension.
Despite due notice, petitioners failed to submit their answer to the complaint. On October 30, 1990, the
DECS Secretary rendered a decision finding petitioners guilty as charged and dismissing them from the
service effective immediately.
Acting on the motions for reconsideration filed by petitioners Bangalisan, Gregorio, Cabalfin, Mercado,
Montances and Pagpaguitan, the Secretary subsequently modified the penalty of dismissal to
suspension for nine months without pay.
Petitioner Gomez likewise moved for reconsideration with the DECS and then appealed to the Merit
Systems Protection Board (MSPB). The other petitioners also filed individual appeals to the MSPB, but all
of their appeals were dismissed for lack of merit.
Not satisfied with the aforestated adjudication of their respective cases, petitioners appealed to the
Civil Service Commission (CSC). Thereafter, the CSC issued Resolution No. 94-1765 finding Cabalfin
guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and imposing on him a penalty of six
months suspension without pay. The CSC also issued Resolutions Nos. 94-2806 and 94-2384 affirming
the penalty of nine months suspension without pay theretofore imposed on petitioners Montances and
Pagpaguitan. With respect to the appeals of the other petitioners, the CSC also found them guilty of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. It, however, modified the penalty of nine months
suspension previously meted to them to six months suspension with automatic reinstatement in the
service but without payment of back wages.
All the petitioners moved for reconsideration of the CSC resolutions but these were all denied,2 except
that of petitioner Rodolfo Mariano who was found guilty only of a violation of reasonable office rules and
regulations because of his failure to inform the school of his intended absence and to file an application
for leave therefor. This petitioner was accordingly given only a reprimand.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit.5 Petitioners motion for reconsideration
was also denied by respondent court.
Issue: whether or not the mass action launched by the public school teachers was a strike. --YES
Held: The issue of whether or not the mass action launched by the public school teachers during the
period from September up to the first half of October, 1990 was a strike has been decided by this Court
in a resolution, dated December 18, 1990, in the herein cited case of Manila Public School Teachers
Association, et al. vs. Laguio, Jr., supra. It was there held that from the pleaded and admitted facts,
these mass actions were to all intents and purposes a strike; they constituted a concerted and
unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from, work which it was the teachers duty to perform,
undertaken for essentially economic reasons.
It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that employees in the public service may not engage in strikes.
While the Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, they are prohibited
from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will
result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public services. The right of government employees to
organize is limited only to the formation of unions or associations, without including the right to strike.
It is an undisputed fact that there was a work stoppage and that petitioners purpose was to realize
their demands by withholding their services. The fact that the conventional term strike was not used

by the striking employees to describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since the
substance of the situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be controlling. The ability to strike
is not essential to the right of association. In the absence of statute, public employees do not have the
right to engage in concerted work stoppages for any purpose.
Further, herein petitioners, except Mariano, are being penalized not because they exercised their right
of peaceable assembly and petition for redress of grievances but because of their successive
unauthorized and unilateral absences which produced adverse effects upon their students for whose
education they are responsible. The actuations of petitioners definitely constituted conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service, punishable under the Civil Service law, rules and regulations.
It bears stressing that suspension of public services, however temporary, will inevitably derail services
to the public, which is one of the reasons why the right to strike is denied government employees. It
may be conceded that the petitioners had valid grievances and noble intentions in staging the mass
actions, but that will not justify their absences to the prejudice of innocent school children. Their
righteous indignation does not legalize an illegal work stoppage.

3. NFSW vs. Ovejera

Facts: NFSW has been the bargaining agent of CAC rank and file employees (about 1200 of more than
2000 personnel) and has concluded with CAC a collective bargaining agreement effective February 16,
1981February 15, 1984. Under Art. VII Sec. 5 of the said CBA BonusesThe parties also agree to
maintain the present practice on the grant of Christmas bonus, milling bonus, and amelioration bonus
to the extent as the latter is required by law. The Christmas and milling bonuses amount to 1-1/2
months salary.
NFSW struck allegedly to compel the payment of the 13th month pay under PD 851, in addition to the
Christmas, milling and amelioration bonuses being enjoyed by CAC workers.
To settle the strike, a compromise agreement was concluded between CAC and NFSW on November 30,
1981. Under paragraph 4 thereof The parties agree to abide by the final decision of the Supreme
Court in any case involving the 13th Month Pay Law if it is clearly held that the employer is liable to pay
a 13th month pay separate and distinct from the bonuses already given.
After the Marcopper case decision had become final, NFSW renewed its demand that CAC give the 13th
month pay. CAC refused. NFSW filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) Reginal Office
in Bacolod
City a notice to strike based on non-payment of the 13th month pay. Six days after, NFSW struck.
One day after the commencement of the strike, or on January 29, 1982, a report of the strike-vote was
filed by NFSW with MOLE. CAC filed a petition with the Regional Arbitration Branch VI-A, MOLE, at
Bacolod City to declare the strike illegal, principally for being violative of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, that
is, the strike was declared before the expiration of the 15-day cooling-off period for unfair labor practice
(ULP) strikes, and the strike was staged before the lapse of seven days from the submission to MOLE of
the result of the strike-vote. After the submission of position papers and hearing, Labor Arbiter Ovejera
declared the NFSW strike illegal.
Issue: Whether the strike declared by NFSW is illegal, the resolution of which mainly depends on the
mandatory or directory character of the cooling-off period and the 7-day strike ban after report to MOLE
of the result of a strike-vote, as prescribed in the Labor Code. --YES
Held: The foregoing provisions hardly leave any room for doubt that the cooling-off period in Art.
264(c) and the 7-day strike ban after the strike-vote report prescribed in Art. 264(f) were meant to be,
and should be deemed, mandatory.
When the law says the labor union may strike should the dispute remain unsettled until the lapse of
the requisite number of days (cooling-off period) from the mandatoryfiling of the notice, the
unmistakable implication is that the union may not strike before the lapse of the cooling-off period.
Similarly, the mandatory character of the 7-day strike ban after the report on the strike-vote is manifest
in the provision that in every case, the union shall furnish the MOLE with the results of the voting at
least seven (7) days before the intended strike, subject to the (prescribed) cooling-off period. It must
be stressed that the requirements of cooling-off period and 7-day strike ban must both be complied
with, although the labor union may take a strike vote and report the same within the statutory coolingoff period.
The cooling-off period and the 7-day strike ban after the filing of a strike-vote report, as prescribed in
Art. 264 of the Labor Code, are reasonable restrictions and their imposition is essential to attain the
legitimate policy objectives embodied in the law. We hold that they constitute a valid exercise of the
police power of the state.

4. Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc. vs. NLRC

Facts:
Issue: Should separation pay and backwages be awarded by public respondent NLRC to participants of an

illegal strike?
Held: From the foregoing, it is patent that the strike on April 30, 1985 was illegal for failure to comply with the

requirements of the law.

A strike, considered as the most effective weapon of labor, is defined as any temporary stoppage of work by the
concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. A labor dispute includes any controversy or
matter concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employers and employees.
Private respondents and their co-workers stopped working and held the mass action on April 30, 1985 to press for their
wages and other benefits. What transpired then was clearly a strike, for the cessation of work by concerted action
resulted from a labor dispute. The complaint before the Labor Arbiter involved the legality of said strike. The Arbiter
correctly ruled that the strike was illegal for failure to comply with the requirements of Article 264 (now Article 263)
paragraphs (c) and (f) of the Labor Code.
A union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly
participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost their employment status. An
ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he
committed illegal acts during a strike. A union officer, on the other hand, may be terminated from work when he
knowingly participates in an illegal strike, and like other workers, when he commits an illegal act during a strike.