Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
150723
Petitioner,
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
That on or about the 11th day of October 1996, in
Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused,
armed with a gun, and with intent to kill, qualified by
treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and employ personal
violence upon the person of one JOSELITO BAUTISTA,
by then and there, shooting him at the back portion
of his body, thereby inflicting upon said JOSELITO
BAUTISTA mortal wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of his untimely death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said
JOSELITO BAUTISTA.[5]
The Case
This is a petition for review [1] of the Decision[2] dated 21 May 2001 and
the Resolution[3] dated 8 November 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 23790. In its 21 May 2001 Decision, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
219 (trial court), finding Ramonito Manaban (Manaban) guilty of the
crime of homicide. In its 8 November 2001 Resolution, the Court of
Appeals modified its Decision by reducing the award for loss of earning
capacity.
The Facts
The facts as narrated by the trial court are as follows:
The Trial
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Based on the examination, Bilgera concluded that the bullet which was
extracted from Bautistas body by the medico-legal officer was fired
from the ARMSCOR 2015 .38 Caliber revolver with Serial No. 28909 [14]
and that the empty shells also came from the same gun. Bilgera
submitted a written report[15] on the result of his examination.
Editha, the widow of Joselito Bautista, testified that she was married to
Bautista on 22 December 1993 in civil rites and that they have four
children, the eldest of whom was 13 years old. Editha stated that her
husband, who was a member of the University of the Philippines Police
Force (UP Police Force) since 1985, was receiving a monthly salary
ofP5,050 at the time of his death. She narrated that on 11 October
1996, about 1:25 a.m., her husband brought their daughter Frinzi who
had an asthma attack to the UP HealthCenter where she was confined
for three days. According to Editha, her husband then left to withdraw
money at BPI Kalayaan for the purchase of medicines. Later, she was
fetched by members of the UP Police Force who informed her that her
husband had been shot. Editha claimed that as a consequence of her
husbands death, she spent more thanP111,000[16] for the nine-day
wake, embalmment and funeral services.[17]
The prosecution and the defense agreed to dispense with the
testimony of Tan, the Assistant Manager of BPI Kalayaan. Instead, they
just agreed to stipulate that on 11 October 1996, about 7:45 a.m., Tan
and BPI Custodian Elma R. Piano retrieved BPI Express Teller Card No.
3085-2616-21 issued to Bautista which was captured by the ATM
because a wrong Personal Identification Number (PIN) was entered. [18]
She also advised Bautista to go back to the bank at 9:00 a.m. to get his
ATM card and also to withdraw money over the counter. Bautista
refused to be pacified and started cursing so Javelona decided to hang
up the phone.[21]
Tan, the Assistant Manager of BPI Kalayaan, testified that when she
reported for work in the morning of 11 October 1996, she discovered
that the ATM was out of order. According to Tan, the ATM keyboard was
not properly mounted and the keys were damaged. Also, the telephone
beside the ATM was hung up. Tan then called Peralta, the technician, to
have the ATM repaired. When Peralta opened the ATM, they found
Bautistas ATM card which was captured by the machine.[22]
Peralta, a Customer Engineer Specialist, testified that on 11 October
1996, BPI Kalayaan sought his assistance regarding their ATM. When
Peralta arrived at BPI Kalayaan, he talked to Tan and then proceeded to
the ATM to assess the damage. According to Peralta, the ATM keyboard
was damaged and mis-aligned.[23]
around.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review. The
reviewing tribunal can correct errors though unassigned in the appeal,
or reverse the lower courts decision on grounds other than those the
parties raised as errors.[26]
Unlawful Aggression is an Indispensable Requisite of SelfDefense
When the accused invokes self-defense, he in effect admits killing the
victim and the burden is shifted to him to prove that he killed the
victim to save his life.[27] The accused must establish by clear and
convincing evidence that all the requisites of self-defense are present.
[28]
The Issues
In his petition for review, Manaban submits that:
1. The Respondent Court gravely erred in affirming
the
erroneous
factual
appreciation
and
interpretation by the trial court a quo in
practically affirming the decision of the latter
court which are based on a clear misappreciation
of facts and findings grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises or conjectures in a way
probably not in accord with law or with the
applicable jurisprudence of the Supreme Court.
2. The Respondent Court gravely erred in ignoring
petitioners self-defense on the sole fact that the
entrance of the deceased victims wound was
from the back.
3. The Respondent Court gravely erred in concluding
that petitioner failed to establish unlawful
aggression just because the holster of the victim
was still in a lock position.
4. Granting arguendo that petitioner made a mistake
in his appreciation that there was an attempt on
the part of the deceased victim to draw his gun
who executed bumalikwas, such mistake of fact
is deemed justified.
ATTY. ANCANAN
Q: Where?
A: Camp Crame, sir.
ATTY. CARAANG
I object, your Honor, it was already answered. He said
he was not given the opportunity to have a second
thought and at that moment he was able to pull the
trigger of his gun.
ATTY. ANCANAN
The witness already admitted that when he fired his
gun, the victims back was towards the witness, so
my last question is just a follow-up.
ATTY. CARAANG
But the witness testified that he was not given the
opportunity to have a second thought, that is why
right then and there, he pulled the trigger of his gun.
ATTY. CARAANG
ATTY. CARAANG
xxxxxxxxx
COURT
Objection noted, witness may answer.
COURT
Witness may answer.
A: No, sir, I shot him only once, not twice.
Q: Please answer the question. When you fired
your second shot . . .
A: Bumalikwas ho yon eh.
Q: Please answer the question.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And because his back was towards you, you
could have easily disabled him by firing at his
leg or at his arms, is that not correct?
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION
ATTY. CARAANG
Q: Mr. Witness, when you and the victim were
facing each other, the gun was already pointed
to him, is it not? Your gun?
A: Yes, sir, I pointed my gun at him.[37]
The allegation of Manaban that Bautista was about to draw his gun
when he turned his back at Manaban is mere speculation. Besides,
Manaban was already aiming his loaded firearm at Bautista when the
latter turned his back. In that situation, it was Bautista whose life was
in danger considering that Manaban, who had already fired a warning
shot, was pointing his firearm at Bautista. Bautista, who was a
policeman, would have realized this danger to his life and would not
have attempted to draw his gun which was still inside a locked holster
tucked in his waist. Furthermore, if Manaban really feared that Bautista
was about to draw his gun to shoot him, Manaban could have easily
disabled Bautista by shooting his arm or leg considering that Manabans
firearm was already aimed at Bautista.
Aggression presupposes that the person attacked must face a real
threat to his life and the peril sought to be avoided is imminent and
actual, not imaginary.[38] Absent such actual or imminent peril to ones
life or limb, there is nothing to repel and there is no justification for
taking the life or inflicting injuries on another.[39]
THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DIOSCORO ALCONGA and ADOLFO BRACAMONTE, defendants.
DIOSCORO ALCONGA, appellant.
HILADO, J.:
On the night of May 27, 1943, in the house of one Mauricio Jepes in the
Municipality of San Dionisio, Province of Iloilo several persons were
playing prohibited games (t.s.n., pp. 95, 125). The deceased Silverio
Barion was the banker in the game of black jack, and Maria de Raposo,
a witness for the prosecution, was one of those playing the game
(t.s.n., p. 95). Upon invitation of the said Maria de Raposo, the accused
Dioscoro Alconga joined her as a partner, each of them contributing the
sum of P5 to a common fund (t.s.n., pp. 95, 125). Maria de Raposo
played the game while the said accused posted himself behind the
deceased, acting as a spotter of the cards of the latter and
communicating by signs to his partner (t.s.n., pp. 95-96, 126). The
deceased appears to have suffered losses in the game because of the
team work between Maria de Raposo and the accused Alconga (t.s.n.,
pp. 96, 126). Upon discovering what the said accused had been doing,
the deceased became indignant and expressed his anger at the former
(t.s.n., pp. 96, 126). An exchange of words followed, and the two would
have come to blows but for the intervention of the maintainer of the
games (t.s.n., p. 96). In a fit of anger, the deceased left the house but
not before telling the accused Alconga, "tomorrow morning I will give
you a breakfast" (t.s.n., p. 96), which expression would seem to signify
an intent to inflict bodily harm when uttered under such circumstances.
The deceased and the accused Alconga did not meet thereafter until
the morning of May 29, 1943, when the latter was in the guardhouse
located in the barrio of Santol, performing his duties as "home guard"
(t.s.n., pp. 98-100). While the said accused was seated on a bench in
the guardhouse, the deceased came along and, addressing the former,
said, "Coroy, this is your breakfast," followed forthwith by a swing of his
"pingahan" (t.s.n., p. 100). The accused avoided the blow by falling to
the ground under the bench with the intention to crawl out of the
guardhouse (t.s.n., pp. 100-101). A second blow was given but failed to
hit the accused, hitting the bench instead (t.s.n., p. 101). The accused
manage to go out of the guardhouse by crawling on his abdomen
(t.s.n., p. 101). While the deceased was in the act of delivering the
third blow, the accused, while still in a crawling position (t.s.n., p. 119),
fired at him with his revolver, causing him to stagger and to fall to the
ground (t.s.n., p. 101). Rising to his feet, the deceased drew forth his
dagger and directed a blow at the accused who, however, was able to
parry the same with his bolo (t.s.n., pp. 101-102). A hand-to-hand fight
ensued (t.s.n., p. 102). Having sustained several wounds, the deceased
ran away but was followed by the accused (t.s.n., p. 6). After running a
distance of about 200 meters (t.s.n., pp. 21, 108), the deceased was
overtaken, and another fight took place, during which the mortal bolo
blow the one which slashed the cranium was delivered, causing
the deceased to fall to the ground, face downward, besides many other
blows deliver right and left (t.s.n., pp. 6, 28). At this instant, the other
accused, Adolfo Bracamonte, arrived and, being the leader of the
"home guards" of San Dionisio, placed under his custody the accused
Alconga with a view to turning him over to the proper authorities (t.s.n.,
pp. 102-105).
On their way to San Dionisio, the two accused were stopped by Juan
Collado, a guerrilla soldier (t.s.n., pp. 80, 104). Adolfo Bracamonte
turned over Alconga to Collado who in turn took him to the
headquarters (t.s.n., pp. 81, 104). In the afternoon of the same day,
Collado delivered Alconga to Gregorio Barredo, a municipal policeman
of San Dionisio, together with the weapons used in the fight: a revolver,
a bolo, and a dagger (t.s.n., pp. 81, 104).
The injuries sustained by the deceased were described by police
sergeant Gil G. Estaniel as follows:
P. Y que hicieron ustedes cuando ustedes vieron a Silverio
Barion? R. Examine sus heridas.
P. Donde ha encontrado usted las heridas, en que parte del
cuerpo? R. En la cabeza, en sus brazos, en sus manos, en la
mandibula inferior, en la parte frente de su cuello, en su pecho
derecho, y tambien en el pecho izquierdo, y su dedo meique
habia volado, se habia cortado, y otras perqueas heridas mas.
P. En la cabeza, vio usted heridas? R. Si, seor.
P. Cuantas heridas? R. Una herida en la region parietal derecha
y una contusion en la corona de la cabeza.
P. Vio usted el craneo? R. En la craneo llevaba una herida, en
quel el craneo se ha roto.
P. En el pecho, herida ha encontrado usted? R. Debajo de la
tetilla derecha, una herida causada por una bala.
P. Y otras heridas en el pecho, puede usted decir que clase de
heridas? R. Heridas causadas por bolo.
P. Como de grande acquellas heridas en el pecho? R. No
recuerdo la dimension de las heridas en el pecho.
P. Pero en la cabeza? R. La cabeza se rajo por aquella herida
causada por el bolo. (T.s.n., p. 25.)
It will be observed that there were two stages in the fight between
appellant and the deceased. The initial stage commenced when the
deceased assaulted appellant without sufficient provocation on the part
of the latter. Resisting the aggression, appellant managed to have the
upper hand in the fight, inflicting several wounds upon the deceased,
on account of which the latter fled in retreat. From that moment there
was no longer any danger to the life of appellant who, being virtually
unscathed, could have chosen to remain where he was. Resolving all
doubts in his flavor, and considering that in the first stage the
deceased was the unlawful aggressor and defendant had not given
sufficient provocation, and considering further that when the deceased
was about to deliver the third blow, appellant was still in a crawling
position and, on that account, could not have effectively wielded his
bolo and therefore had to use his "paltik" revolver his only remaining
weapon ; we hold that said appellant was then acting in self-defense.
But when he pursued the deceased, he was no longer acting in selfdefense, there being then no more aggression to defend against, the
same having ceased from the moment the deceased took to his heels.
During the second stage of the fight appellant inflicted many additional
wounds upon the deceased. That the deceased was not fatally
wounded in the first encounter is amply shown by the fact that he was
still able to run a distance of some 200 meters before being overtaken
by appellant. Under such circumstances, appellant's plea of selfdefense in the second stage of the fight cannot be sustained. There can
be no defense where there is no aggression.
Although the defendant was not the aggressor, he is not exempt
from criminal liability for the reason that it is shown that he struck
several blows, among them the fatal one, after the necessity for
defending himself had ceased, his assailant being then in retreat.
Therefore one of the essential ingredients of self-defense specified
in No. 4, article 8 of the Penal Code is wanting (now article 11,
case No. 1, Revised Penal Code). (United States vs. Dimitillo, 7
Phil., 475, 476; words in parenthesis supplied.)
. . . Even if it be conceded for the moment that the defendants
were assaulted by the four (offended parties), the right to kill in
self-defense ceased when the aggression ceased; and when
Toledo and his brothers turned and ran, without having inflicted so
much as a scratch upon a single one of the defendants,the right
of the defendants to inflict injury upon them ceased absolutely.
They had no right to pursue, no right to kill or injure. A fleeing
man is not dangerous to the one from whom he flees. When
danger ceases, the right to injure ceases. When the aggressor
turns and flees, the one assaulted must stay his hand. (United
States vs. Vitug, 17 Phil., 1, 19; emphasis supplied.)
Upon the foregoing facts, we hold that appellant's guilt of the crime of
homicide has been established beyond reasonable doubt. The learned
trial court appreciated in his favor of two mitigating circumstances:
voluntary surrender and provocation on the part of the deceased. The
first was properly appreciated; the second was not, since it is very clear
that from the moment he fled after the first stage of the fight to the
moment he died, the deceased did not give any provocation for
appellant to pursue much less further to attack him.
The only provocation given by him was imbibed in, and inseparable
from, the aggression with which he started the first stage of the fight.
The evidence, as weighed and appreciated by the learned trial judge,
who had heard, seen and observed the witnesses testify, clearly shows
that said stage ended with the flight of the deceased after receiving a
bullet wound in his right breast, which caused him to stagger and fall to
the ground, and several bolo wounds inflicted by appellant during their
hand-to-hand fight after both had gotten up. The learned trial judge
said:
The evidence adduced by the prosecution and the defense in
support of their respective theories of the case vary materially on
certain points. Some of these facts have to be admitted and some
have to be rejected with the end in view of arriving at the truth. To
the mind of the Court, what really happened in the case at bar, as
can de disclosed by the records, which lead to the killing of the
deceased on that fatal morning of May 29, 1945 (should be 1943),
is as follows:
xxx
xxx
xxx
In the morning of May 29, 1943, while Dioscoro Alconga was alone
in the guardhouse performing his duties as guard or "ronda" in
Barrio Santol, the deceased Silverio Barion passed by with a
"pingahan". That was the first time the deceased and the accused
Alconga had met since that eventful night of May 27th in the
gambling house of Gepes. Upon seeing the accused Alconga, who
was then seated in the guardhouse, the deceased cried: "Coroy,
this is now the breakfast!" These words of warning were
immediately followed by two formidable swings of the "pingahan"
directed at the accused Alconga which failed to hit him. Alconga
was able to avoid the blows by falling to the ground and crawling
on his abdomen until he was outside the guardhouse. The
deceased followed him and while in the act of delivering the third
blow, Dioscoro Alconga fired at him with his revolver thereby
stopping the blow in mid-air. The deceased fell to the ground
momentarily and upon rising to his feet, he drew forth a dagger.
The accused Alconga resorted to his bolo and both persons being
armed, a hand-to-hand fight followed. The deceased having
sustained several wounds from the hands of Alconga, ran away
with the latter close to his heels.
The foregoing statement of the pertinent facts by the learned trial
judge is in substantial agreement with those found by us and narrated
in the first paragraphs of this decision. Upon those facts the question
arises whether when the deceased started to run and flee, or thereafter
until he died, there was any provocation given by him from appellant to
pursue and further to attack him. It will be recalled, to be given with,
that the first stage of the fight was provoked when the deceased said
to appellant "Cory, this is now the breakfast," or "This is your
breakfast," followed forthwith by a swing or two of his "pingahan."
These words without the immediately following attack with the
"pingahan" would not have been uttered, we can safely assume, since
such an utterance alone would have been entirely meaningless. It was
the attack, therefore, that effectively constituted the provocation, the
utterance being, at best, merely a preclude to the attack. At any rate,
the quoted words by themselves, without the deceased's act
immediately following them, would certainly not have been considered
a sufficient provocation to mitigate appellant's liability in killing or
injuring the deceased. For provocation in order to be a mitigating
circumstance must be sufficient and immediately preceding the act.
(Revised Penal Code, article 13, No. 4.)
Under the doctrine in United States vs. Vitug, supra, when the
deceased ran and fled without having inflicted so much as a scratch
upon appellant, but after, upon the other hand, having been wounded
with one revolver shot and several bolo slashes, as aforesaid, the right
of appellant to inflict injury upon him, ceased absolutely appellant
"had no right to pursue, no right to kill or injure" said deceased for
the reason that "a fleeing man is not dangerous to the one from whom
he flees." If the law, as interpreted and applied by this Court in the
Vitug case, enjoins the victorious contender from pursuing his
opponent on the score of self-defense, it is because this Court
considered that the requisites of self-defense had ceased to exist,
principal and indispensable among these being the unlawful aggression
of the opponent (Rev. Penal Code, article 11, No. 1; 1 Viada, 5th ed.,
173).
Can we find under the evidence of record that after the cessation of
said aggression the provocation thus involved therein still persisted,
and to a degree sufficient to extenuate appellant's criminal
responsibility for his acts during the second stage of the fight?
Appellant did not testify nor offer other evidence to show that when he
pursued the deceased he was still acting under the impulse of the
effects of what provocation, be it anger, obfuscation or the like. The
Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 13. Mitigating circumstances:
xxx
xxx
xxx
during her arraignment on March 3, 1997. [6] In due course, she was
tried for and convicted of parricide.
The Case
For automatic review before this Court is the September 25, 1998
Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City (Branch 35) in
Criminal Case No. 5016-0, finding Marivic Genosa guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of parricide. The decretal portion of the Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being duly considered, the Court
finds the accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Parricide as provided under Article 246 of the
Revised Penal Code as restored by Sec. 5, RA No. 7659, and after
finding treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance and none of
mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences the accused with the
penalty of DEATH.
The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of the
deceased the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine
currency as indemnity and another sum of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00), Philippine currency as moral damages. [2]
The Information[3] charged appellant with parricide as follows:
th
The Facts
saw. He was able to get inside through the kitchen door but only after
destroying a window to reach a hook that locked it. Alone, Steban went
inside the unlocked bedroom where the offensive smell was coming
from. There, he saw the lifeless body of Ben lying on his side on the
bed covered with a blanket. He was only in his briefs with injuries at
the back of his head. Seeing this, Steban went out of the house and
sent word to the mother of Ben about his sons misfortune. Later that
day, Iluminada Genosa, the mother of Ben, identified the dead body as
that of [her] son.
Meanwhile, in the morning of the same day, SPO3 Leo Acodesin, then
assigned at the police station at Isabel, Leyte, received a report
regarding the foul smell at the Genosas rented house. Together with
SPO1 Millares, SPO1 Colon, and Dr. Refelina Cerillo, SPO3 Acodesin
proceeded to the house and went inside the bedroom where they found
the dead body of Ben lying on his side wrapped with a bedsheet. There
was blood at the nape of Ben who only had his briefs on. SPO3
Acodesin found in one corner at the side of an aparador a metal pipe
about two (2) meters from where Ben was, leaning against a wall. The
metal pipe measured three (3) feet and six (6) inches long with a
diameter of one and half (1 1/2) inches. It had an open end without a
stop valve with a red stain at one end. The bedroom was not in
disarray.
About 10:00 that same morning, the cadaver of Ben, because of its
stench, had to be taken outside at the back of the house before the
postmortem examination was conducted by Dr. Cerillo in the presence
of the police. A municipal health officer at Isabel, Leyte responsible for
medico-legal cases, Dr. Cerillo found that Ben had been dead for two to
three days and his body was already decomposing. The postmortem
examination of Dr. Cerillo yielded the findings quoted in the Information
for parricide later filed against appellant. She concluded that the cause
of Bens death was cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe
intracranial hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture of the occipital
[bone].
Appellant admitted killing Ben. She testified that going home after
work on November 15, 1995, she got worried that her husband who
was not home yet might have gone gambling since it was a payday.
With her cousin Ecel Arao, appellant went to look for Ben at the
marketplace and taverns at Isabel, Leyte but did not find him there.
They found Ben drunk upon their return at the Genosas house. Ecel
went home despite appellants request for her to sleep in their house.
That same day, about 12:15 in the afternoon, Joseph Valida was waiting
for a bus going to Ormoc when he saw appellant going out of their
house with her two kids in tow, each one carrying a bag, locking the
gate and taking her children to the waiting area where he was. Joseph
lived about fifty (50) meters behind the Genosas rented house. Joseph,
appellant and her children rode the same bus to Ormoc. They had no
conversation as Joseph noticed that appellant did not want to talk to
him.
On November 18, 1995, the neighbors of Steban Matiga told him about
the foul odor emanating from his house being rented by Ben and
appellant. Steban went there to find out the cause of the stench but
the house was locked from the inside. Since he did not have a duplicate
key with him, Steban destroyed the gate padlock with a borrowed steel
Ben did not have the key to it, he got a three-inch long blade cutter
from his wallet. She however, smashed the arm of Ben with a pipe,
causing him to drop the blade and his wallet. Appellant then smashed
Ben at his nape with the pipe as he was about to pick up the blade and
his wallet. She thereafter ran inside the bedroom.
Appellant, however, insisted that she ended the life of her husband by
shooting him. She supposedly distorted the drawer where the gun was
and shot Ben. He did not die on the spot, though, but in the bedroom. [7]
(Citations omitted)
left arm; the second incident was on November 15, 1994, when Marivic
struck Ben on the forehead using a sharp instrument until the eye was
also affected. It was wounded and also the ear and her husband went
to Ben to help; and the third incident was in 1995 when the couple had
already transferred to the house in Bilwang and she saw that Bens
hand was plastered as the bone cracked.
Both mother and son claimed they brought Ben to a Pasar clinic for
medical intervention.
7.2. Mr. Junnie Barrientos, also a fisherman, and the brother of Mr. Joe
Barrientos, testified that he heard his neighbor Marivic shouting on the
night of November 15, 1995. He peeped through the window of his hut
which is located beside the Genosa house and saw the spouses
grappling with each other then Ben Genosa was holding with his both
hands the neck of the accused, Marivic Genosa. He said after a while,
Marivic was able to extricate he[r]self and enter the room of the
children. After that, he went back to work as he was to go fishing that
evening. He returned at 8:00 the next morning. (Again, please note
that this was the same night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas).
7.3. Mr. Teodoro Sarabia was a former neighbor of the Genosas while
they were living in Isabel, Leyte. His house was located about fifty (50)
meters from theirs. Marivic is his niece and he knew them to be living
together for 13 or 14 years. He said the couple was always quarreling.
Marivic confided in him that Ben would pawn items and then would use
the money to gamble. One time, he went to their house and they were
quarreling. Ben was so angry, but would be pacified if somebody would
come. He testified that while Ben was alive he used to gamble and
when he became drunk, he would go to our house and he will say,
Teody because that was what he used to call me, mokimas ta, which
means lets go and look for a whore. Mr. Sarabia further testified that
Ben would box his wife and I would see bruises and one time she ran to
me, I noticed a wound (the witness pointed to his right breast) as
according to her a knife was stricken to her. Mr. Sarabia also said that
once he saw Ben had been injured too. He said he voluntarily testified
only that morning.
7.4. Miss Ecel Arano, an 18-year old student, who is a cousin of Marivic,
testified that in the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic went to
her house and asked her help to look for Ben. They searched in the
market place, several taverns and some other places, but could not
find him. She accompanied Marivic home. Marivic wanted her to sleep
with her in the Genosa house because she might be battered by her
husband. When they got to the Genosa house at about 7:00 in the
evening, Miss Arano said that her husband was already there and was
drunk. Miss Arano knew he was drunk because of his staggering
walking and I can also detect his face. Marivic entered the house and
she heard them quarrel noisily. (Again, please note that this is the
same night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas) Miss Arano testified
that this was not the first time Marivic had asked her to sleep in the
house as Marivic would be afraid every time her husband would come
home drunk. At one time when she did sleep over, she was awakened
at 10:00 in the evening when Ben arrived because the couple were
very noisy in the sala and I had heard something was broken like a
vase. She said Marivic ran into her room and they locked the door.
When Ben couldnt get in he got a chair and a knife and showed us the
knife through the window grill and he scared us. She said that Marivic
shouted for help, but no one came. On cross-examination, she said that
when she left Marivics house on November 15, 1995, the couple were
still quarreling.
7.5. Dr. Dino Caing, a physician testified that he and Marivic were coemployees at PHILPHOS, Isabel, Leyte. Marivic was his patient many
times and had also received treatment from other doctors. Dr. Caing
testified that from July 6, 1989 until November 9, 1995, there were six
(6) episodes of physical injuries inflicted upon Marivic. These injuries
were reported in his Out-Patient Chart at the PHILPHOS Hospital. The
prosecution admitted the qualifications of Dr. Caing and considered him
an expert witness.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Caings clinical history of the tension headache and hypertention of
Marivic on twenty-three (23) separate occasions was marked at
Exhibits 2 and 2-B. The OPD Chart of Marivic at the Philphos Clinic
which reflected all the consultations made by Marivic and the six (6)
incidents of physical injuries reported was marked as Exhibit 3.
On cross-examination, Dr. Caing said that he is not a psychiatrist, he
could not say whether the injuries were directly related to the crime
committed. He said it is only a psychiatrist who is qualified to examine
the psychological make-up of the patient, whether she is capable of
committing a crime or not.
7.6 Mr. Panfilo Tero, the barangay captain in the place where the
Genosas resided, testified that about two (2) months before Ben died,
Marivic went to his office past 8:00 in the evening. She sought his help
to settle or confront the Genosa couple who were experiencing family
troubles. He told Marivic to return in the morning, but he did not hear
from her again and assumed that they might have settled with each
other or they might have forgiven with each other.
Answering questions from the Court, Marivic said that she threw the
gun away; that she did not know what happened to the pipe she used
to smash him once; that she was wounded by Ben on her wrist with the
bolo; and that two (2) hours after she was whirled by Ben, he kicked
her ass and dragged her towards the drawer when he saw that she had
packed his things.
9. The body of Ben Genosa was found on November 18, 1995 after an
investigation was made of the foul odor emitting from the Genosa
residence. This fact was testified to by all the prosecution witnesses
and some defense witnesses during the trial.
10. Dra. Refelina Y. Cerillo, a physician, was the Municipal Health
Officer of Isabel, Leyte at the time of the incident, and among her
responsibilities as such was to take charge of all medico-legal cases,
such as the examination of cadavers and the autopsy of cadavers. Dra.
Cerillo is not a forensic pathologist. She merely took the medical board
exams and passed in 1986. She was called by the police to go to the
Genosa residence and when she got there, she saw some police officer
and neighbor around. She saw Ben Genosa, covered by a blanket, lying
in a semi-prone position with his back to the door. He was wearing only
a brief.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Cerillo said that there is only one injury and that is the injury
involving the skeletal area of the head which she described as a
fracture. And that based on her examination, Ben had been dead 2 or 3
days. Dra. Cerillo did not testify as to what caused his death.
Dra. Cerillo was not cross-examined by defense counsel.
xxxxxxxxx
Marivic said she did not provoke her husband when she got home that
night it was her husband who began the provocation. Marivic said she
was frightened that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to
make sure she would deliver her baby safely. In fact, Marivic had to be
admitted later at the Rizal Medical Centre as she was suffering from
eclampsia and hypertension, and the baby was born prematurely on
December 1, 1995.
Marivic testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her
husband at least five (5) times, but that Ben would always follow her
and they would reconcile. Marivic said that the reason why Ben was
violent and abusive towards her that night was because he was crazy
about his recent girlfriend, Lulu x x x Rubillos.
On cross-examination, Marivic insisted she shot Ben with a gun; she
said that he died in the bedroom; that their quarrels could be heard by
anyone passing their house; that Basobas lied in his testimony; that
she left for Manila the next day, November 16, 1995; that she did not
bother anyone in Manila, rented herself a room, and got herself a job as
a field researcher under the alias Marvelous Isidro; she did not tell
anyone that she was leaving Leyte, she just wanted to have a safe
delivery of her baby; and that she was arrested in San Pablo, Laguna.
11. The Information, dated November 14, 1996, filed against Marivic
Genosa charged her with the crime of PARRICIDE committed with intent
to kill, with treachery and evidence premeditation, x x x wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound x x x her
legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon x x x which
caused his death.
12. Trial took place on 7 and 14 April 1997, 14 May 1997, 21 July 1997,
17, 22 and 23 September 1997, 12 November 1997, 15 and 16
December 1997, 22 May 1998, and 5 and 6 August 1998.
13. On 23 September 1998, or only fifty (50) days from the day of the
last trial date, the Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona, Presiding Judge, RTCBranch 35, Ormoc City, rendered a JUDGMENT finding Marivic guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide, and further found
treachery as an aggravating circumstance, thus sentencing her to the
ultimate penalty of DEATH.
14. The case was elevated to this Honorable Court upon automatic
review and, under date of 24 January 2000, Marivics trial lawyer, Atty.
Gil Marvel P. Tabucanon, filed a Motion to Withdraw as counsel,
attaching thereto, as a precautionary measure, two (2) drafts of
Appellants Briefs he had prepared for Marivic which, for reasons of her
own, were not conformed to by her.
Dr. Pajarillo said that a woman suffering post traumatic stress disorder
try to defend themselves, and primarily with knives. Usually pointed
weapons or any weapon that is available in the immediate surrounding
or in a hospital x x x because that abound in the household. He said a
victim resorts to weapons when she has reached the lowest rock
bottom of her life and there is no other recourse left on her but to act
decisively.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Pajarillo testified that he met Marivic Genosa in his office in an
interview he conducted for two (2) hours and seventeen (17) minutes.
He used the psychological evaluation and social case studies as a help
in forming his diagnosis. He came out with a Psychiatric Report, dated
22 January 2001.
xxxxxxxxx
On cross-examination by the private prosecutor, Dr. Pajarillo said that
at the time she killed her husband Marivicc mental condition was that
she was re-experiencing the trauma. He said that we are trying to
explain scientifically that the re-experiencing of the trauma is not
controlled by Marivic. It will just come in flashes and probably at that
point in time that things happened when the re-experiencing of the
trauma flashed in her mind. At the time he interviewed Marivic she was
more subdued, she was not super alert anymore x x x she is mentally
stress (sic) because of the predicament she is involved.
xxxxxxxxx
20. No rebuttal evidence or testimony was presented by either the
private or the public prosecutor. Thus, in accord with the Resolution of
this Honorable Court, the records of the partially re-opened trial aquo
were elevated.[9]
Supervening Circumstances
praying that this Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the
reexamination of the cause of his death; (2) the examination of
appellant by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her
state of mind at the time she had killed her spouse; and (3) the
inclusion of the said experts reports in the records of the case for
purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial
reopening of the case for the lower court to admit the experts
testimonies.
On September 29, 2000, this Court issued a Resolution granting in
part appellants Motion, remanding the case to the trial court for the
reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the
battered woman syndrome plea; and requiring the lower court to report
thereafter to this Court the proceedings taken as well as to submit
copies of the TSN and additional evidence, if any.
Acting on the Courts Resolution, the trial judge authorized the
examination of Marivic by two clinical psychologists, Drs. Natividad
Dayan[10] and Alfredo Pajarillo, [11] supposedly experts on domestic
violence. Their testimonies, along with their documentary evidence,
were then presented to and admitted by the lower court before finally
being submitted to this Court to form part of the records of the case. [12]
The Issues
Appellant assigns the following alleged errors of the trial court for
this Courts consideration:
1. The trial court gravely erred in promulgating an obviously hasty
decision without reflecting on the evidence adduced as to self-defense.
2. The trial court gravely erred in finding as a fact that Ben and Marivic
Genosa were legally married and that she was therefore liable for
parricide.
3. The trial court gravely erred finding the cause of death to be by
beating with a pipe.
4. The trial court gravely erred in ignoring and disregarding evidence
adduced from impartial and unbiased witnesses that Ben Genosa was a
drunk, a gambler, a womanizer and wife-beater; and further gravely
erred in concluding that Ben Genosa was a battered husband.
5. The trial court gravely erred in not requiring testimony from the
children of Marivic Genosa.
6. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that Marivics flight to
Manila and her subsequent apologies were indicia of guilt, instead of a
clear attempt to save the life of her unborn child.
7. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that there was an
aggravating circumstance of treachery.
Second, the lower court did not err in finding as a fact that Ben
Genosa and appellant had been legally married, despite the nonpresentation of their marriage contract. In People v. Malabago,[16] this
Court held:
The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the
victim. In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the
relationship between the accused and the deceased is the marriage
certificate. In the absence of a marriage certificate, however, oral
evidence of the fact of marriage may be considered by the trial court if
such proof is not objected to.
Two of the prosecution witnesses -- namely, the mother and the
brother of appellants deceased spouse -- attested in court that Ben had
been married to Marivic.[17] The defense raised no objection to these
testimonies. Moreover, during her direct examination, appellant herself
made a judicial admission of her marriage to Ben. [18] Axiomatic is the
rule that a judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making it,
except only when there is a showing that (1) the admission was made
through a palpable mistake, or (2) no admission was in fact made. [19]
Other than merely attacking the non-presentation of the marriage
contract, the defense offered no proof that the admission made by
appellant in court as to the fact of her marriage to the deceased was
made through a palpable mistake.
Third, under the circumstances of this case, the specific or direct
cause of Bens death -- whether by a gunshot or by beating with a pipe
-- has no legal consequence. As the Court elucidated in its September
29, 2000 Resolution, [c]onsidering that the appellant has admitted the
fact of killing her husband and the acts of hitting his nape with a metal
pipe and of shooting him at the back of his head, the Court believes
that exhumation is unnecessary, if not immaterial, to determine which
of said acts actually caused the victims death. Determining which of
these admitted acts caused the death is not dispositive of the guilt or
defense of appellant.
Fourth, we cannot fault the trial court for not fully appreciating
evidence that Ben was a drunk, gambler, womanizer and wife-beater. Until
this case came to us for automatic review, appellant had not raised the
novel defense of battered woman syndrome, for which such evidence may
have been relevant. Her theory of self-defense was then the crucial issue
before the trial court. As will be discussed shortly, the legal requisites of
self-defense under prevailing jurisprudence ostensibly appear inconsistent
with the surrounding facts that led to the death of the victim. Hence, his
personal character, especially his past behavior, did not constitute vital
evidence at the time.
Fifth, the trial court surely committed no error in not requiring
testimony from appellants children. As correctly elucidated by the
solicitor general, all criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction
and control of the public prosecutor, in whom lies the discretion to
determine which witnesses and evidence are necessary to present. [20]
As the former further points out, neither the trial court nor the
prosecution prevented appellant from presenting her children as
witnesses. Thus, she cannot now fault the lower court for not requiring
them to testify.
Finally, merely collateral or corroborative is the matter of whether
the flight of Marivic to Manila and her subsequent apologies to her
brother-in-law are indicia of her guilt or are attempts to save the life of
her unborn child. Any reversible error as to the trial courts appreciation
of these circumstances has little bearing on the final resolution of the
case.
First Legal Issue:
Self-Defense and Defense of a Fetus
Appellant admits killing Ben Genosa but, to avoid criminal liability,
invokes self-defense and/or defense of her unborn child. When the
accused admits killing the victim, it is incumbent upon her to prove any
claimed justifying circumstance by clear and convincing evidence. [21]
Well-settled is the rule that in criminal cases, self-defense (and
similarly, defense of a stranger or third person) shifts the burden of
proof from the prosecution to the defense.[22]
first place.
However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her effort to
placate him are not usually successful, and the verbal and/or physical
abuse worsens. Each partner senses the imminent loss of control and
the growing tension and despair. Exhausted from the persistent stress,
the battered woman soon withdraws emotionally. But the more she
becomes emotionally unavailable, the more the batterer becomes
angry, oppressive and abusive. Often, at some unpredictable point, the
violence spirals out of control and leads to an acute battering incident.
[29]
xxxxxxxxx
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, going to your finding no. 3 where you were the one
who attended the patient. What do you mean by
abrasion furuncle left axilla?
xxxxxxxxx
[33]
A I did.
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
ATTY. TABUCANON:
A Yes, sir.
A One day.
Q Where?
A At PHILPHOS Hospital.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Lets go back to the clinical history of Marivic Genosa. You
said that you were able to examine her personally on
November 6, 1995 and she was 8 months pregnant.
What is this all about?
A Because she has this problem of tension headache
secondary to hypertension and I think I have a record
here, also the same period from 1989 to 1995, she had
a consultation for twenty-three (23) times.
Q For what?
A Tension headache.
Q Can we say that specially during the latter consultation,
that the patient had hypertension?
A The patient definitely had hypertension. It was refractory
to our treatment. She does not response when the
medication was given to her, because tension
headache is more or less stress related and emotional
in nature.
Q What did you deduce of tension headache when you said
is emotional in nature?
A From what I deduced as part of our physical examination
of the patient is the family history in line of giving the
root cause of what is causing this disease. So, from the
moment you ask to the patient all comes from the
domestic problem.
Q You mean problem in her household?
A Probably.
my children.
Q This is evening of November 15, 1995?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time did Ben Genosa arrive?
A When he arrived, I was not there, I was in Isabel looking
for him.
Q So when he arrived you were in Isabel looking for him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you come back to your house?
A Yes, sir.
Q By the way, where was your conjugal residence situated
this time?
A Bilwang.
Q Is this your house or you are renting?
A Renting.
Q What time were you able to come back in your residence
at Bilwang?
A I went back around almost 8:00 oclock.
Q What happened when you arrived in your residence?
A When I arrived home with my cousin Ecel whom I
requested to sleep with me at that time because I had
fears that he was again drunk and I was worried that
he would again beat me so I requested my cousin to
sleep with me, but she resisted because she had fears
that the same thing will happen again last year.
Q Who was this cousin of yours who you requested to sleep
with you?
A Ecel Arao, the one who testified.
Q Did Ecel sleep with you in your house on that evening?
A No, because she expressed fears, she said her father
would not allow her because of Ben.
Q During this period November 15, 1995, were you
pregnant?
A Yes, 8 months.
Q How advance was your pregnancy?
A Eight (8) months.
Q Was the baby subsequently born?
A Yes, sir.
Q Whats the name of the baby you were carrying at that
time?
A Marie Bianca.
COURT INTERPRETER:
A Yes, sir.
Q What time?
Q You said earlier that he whirled you and you fell on the
bedside?
A Yes, sir.
Q You said that when you arrived, he was drunk and yelling
at you? What else did he do if any?
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to
open the drawer but he could not open it because he
did not have the key then he pulled his wallet which
contained a blade about 3 inches long and I was aware
that he was going to kill me and I smashed his arm and
then the wallet and the blade fell. The one he used to
open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that long,
and when he was about to pick-up the wallet and the
blade, I smashed him then I ran to the other room, and
on that very moment everything on my mind was to
pity on myself, then the feeling I had on that very
moment was the same when I was admitted in
PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
xxxxxxxxx
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Talking of drawer, is this drawer outside your room?
A Outside.
Q In what part of the house?
A Dining.
COURT INTERPRETER:
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me.
A Yes, sir.
[38]
Q Did you ask for a complete example who are the relatives
of her husband that were fond of battering their wives?
A What I remember that there were brothers of her husband
who are also battering their wives.
Q Did she not inform you that there was an instance that she
stayed in a hotel in Ormoc where her husband followed
her and battered [her] several times in that room?
A She told me about that.
Q Did she inform you in what hotel in Ormoc?
A Sir, I could not remember but I was told that she was
battered in that room.
Q Several times in that room?
A Yes, sir. What I remember was that there is no problem
about being battered, it really happened.
Q Being an expert witness, our jurisprudence is not complete
on saying this matter. I think that is the first time that
we have this in the Philippines, what is your opinion?
A Sir, my opinion is, she is really a battered wife and in this
kind happened, it was really a self-defense. I also
believe that there had been provocation and I also
believe that she became a disordered person. She had
to suffer anxiety reaction because of all the battering
that happened and so she became an abnormal person
who had lost shes not during the time and that is why
it happened because of all the physical battering,
emotional battering, all the psychological abuses that
she had experienced from her husband.
Q I do believe that she is a battered wife. Was she extremely
battered?
A Sir, it is an extreme form of battering. Yes.[40]
Parenthetically, the credibility of appellant was demonstrated as
follows:
Q And you also said that you administered [the] objective
personality test, what x x x [is this] all about?
A The objective personality test is the Millon Clinical
Multiaxial Inventory. The purpose of that test is to find
out about the lying prone[ne]ss of the person.
Q What do you mean by that?
A Meaning, am I dealing with a client who is telling me the
[47]
and severe beatings inflicted upon her by her partner or spouse. They
corroborated each others testimonies, which were culled from their
numerous studies of hundreds of actual cases. However, they failed to
present in court the factual experiences and thoughts that appellant
had related to them -- if at all -- based on which they concluded that
she had BWS.
We emphasize that in criminal cases, all the elements of a
modifying circumstance must be proven in order to be appreciated. To
repeat, the records lack supporting evidence that would establish all
the essentials of the battered woman syndrome as manifested
specifically in the case of the Genosas.
BWS as Self-Defense
Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their
childrens bedroom -- and based on past violent incidents, there was a
great probability that he would still have pursued her and inflicted
graver harm -- then, the imminence of the real threat upon her life
would not have ceased yet. Where the brutalized person is already
suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual physical assault at the
time of the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic battery usually
have a predictable pattern. To require the battered person to await an
obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her life would amount to
sentencing her to murder by installment. [65] Still, impending danger
(based on the conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes)
prior to the defendants use of deadly force must be shown. Threatening
behavior or communication can satisfy the required imminence of
danger.[66] Considering such circumstances and the existence of BWS,
self-defense may be appreciated.
We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does
not warrant self-defense.[67] In the absence of such aggression, there
can be no self-defense -- complete or incomplete -- on the part of the
victim.[68] Thus, Marivics killing of Ben was not completely justified
under the circumstances.
In any event, all is not lost for appellant. While she did not raise
any other modifying circumstances that would alter her penalty, we
deem it proper to evaluate and appreciate in her favor circumstances
that mitigate her criminal liability. It is a hornbook doctrine that an
appeal in a criminal case opens it wholly for review on any issue,
including that which has not been raised by the parties. [69]
From several psychological tests she had administered to Marivic,
Dra. Dayan, in her Psychological Evaluation Report dated November 29,
2000, opined as follows:
This is a classic case of a Battered Woman Syndrome. The repeated
battering Marivic experienced with her husband constitutes a form of
[cumulative] provocation which broke down her psychological
resistance and natural self-control. It is very clear that she developed
heightened sensitivity to sight of impending danger her husband posed
continuously. Marivic truly experienced at the hands of her abuser
husband a state of psychological paralysis which can only be ended by
an act of violence on her part. [70]
Dr. Pajarillo corroborates the findings of Dra. Dayan. He explained
that the effect of repetitious pain taking, repetitious battering, [and]
repetitious maltreatment as well as the severity and the prolonged
administration of the battering is posttraumatic stress disorder. [71]
Expounding thereon, he said:
Q What causes the trauma, Mr. Witness?
A What causes the trauma is probably the repetitious
battering. Second, the severity of the battering. Third,
the prolonged administration of battering or the
prolonged commission of the battering and the
psychological and constitutional stamina of the victim
On the one hand, the first circumstance arose from the cyclical
nature and the severity of the battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse
upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time
resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an
illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without depriving her
of consciousness of her acts.
COURT INTERPRETER
A Yes, sir.
A Ben tried to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I pick-up the
pipe and I smashed him and I ran to the other room.
Q What else happened?
A When I was in the other room, I felt the same thing like
what happened before when I was admitted in
PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit. I know my blood
pressure was raised. I was frightened I was about to die
because of my blood pressure.
COURT INTERPRETER:
COURT INTERPRETER
COURT
xxxxxxxxx
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you
please describe this blade about 3 inches long, how
does it look like?
A Three (3) inches long and inch wide.
Q It is a flexible blade?
A Its a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me.
xxxxxxxxx
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said that this blade fell from his grip, is it correct?
A Yes, because I smashed him.
Q What happened?
Proper Penalty
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
G.R. No. 172606
- versus Epilogue
Promulgated:
November 23, 2011
Being a novel concept in our jurisprudence, the battered woman
syndrome was neither easy nor simple to analyze and recognize vis--vis
the given set of facts in the present case. The Court agonized on how
to apply the theory as a modern-day reality. It took great effort beyond
the normal manner in which decisions are made -- on the basis of
existing law and jurisprudence applicable to the proven facts. To give a
just and proper resolution of the case, it endeavored to take a good
look at studies conducted here and abroad in order to understand the
intricacies of the syndrome and the distinct personality of the
chronically abused person. Certainly, the Court has learned much. And
definitely, the solicitor general and appellants counsel, Atty. Katrina
Legarda, have helped it in such learning process.
While our hearts empathize with recurrently battered persons, we
can only work within the limits of law, jurisprudence and given facts.
We cannot make or invent them. Neither can we amend the Revised
Penal Code. Only Congress, in its wisdom, may do so.
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of selfdefense arising from the battered woman syndrome. We now sum up
our main points. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must
be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes
between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute
battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have
produced in the battered persons mind an actual fear of an imminent
harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use
force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the
batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and
actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence
perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these
circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the
existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements
were duly established.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for
parricide is hereby AFFIRMED. However, there being two (2) mitigating
BERSAMIN, J.:
Self-defense is often readily claimed by an accused even if
false. It is time, then, to remind the Defense about the requisites of the
justifying circumstance and about the duty of the Defense to establish
the requisites by credible, clear and convincing evidence.
Melanio Nugas y Mapait appeals the decision promulgated on
March 8, 2006,[1] whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed his
conviction for murder under the decision rendered on August 17, 2000
by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, in Antipolo City (RTC).
Antecedents
On June 25, 1997, the Office of Provincial Prosecutor in Antipolo City
charged Jonie Araneta y Nugas (Araneta) with murder committed as
follows:
That on or about the 26th day of March 1997, in the
Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
Raymond and Genevieve, then 11- and 6-years old, respectively, were
traveling on board their family vehicle, a Tamaraw FX, along Marcos
Highway in COGEO, Antipolo, Rizal. Glen was driving, while Nila sat to
his extreme right because their children sat between them. While they
were passing along Carolina Village, two men waved at them signalling
their request to hitch a ride. Glen accommodated the two men, one of
whom was carrying a maroon plastic bag, allowing them to board the
vehicle at the rear. When the vehicle neared Masinag Market, the two
men suddenly brandished knives that each pointed at Glens and Nilas
necks, warning them not to make any wrong move if they did not want
to be harmed. Considering that the two men demanded to be brought
to Sta. Lucia Mall, Glen continued driving the vehicle. Upon the vehicle
reaching Kingsville Village, the man behind Glen suddenly stabbed
Glen on the neck. Thereafter, the two men alighted and fled. Glen
pulled the knife from his neck and handed it to Nila. He drove to the
nearest hospital, but he collapsed on the way and lost control of the
vehicle, causing it to run over two pedestrians, one of whom died and
the other suffered a broken arm. Once the vehicle hit the railings of a
gas station, Nila cried for help. Concerned citizens immediately rushed
Glen to the nearest hospital, which was about 50 to 60 meters away.
Nila stayed behind to look after their children. When she checked the
vehicle, she found the knife, its scabbard, and the maroon plastic bag
left by the assailants at the rear of the vehicle. She gathered the
articles and later turned them over to the police officer in charge of the
investigation. The maroon plastic bag was found to contain the
following items: a National Bureau of Investigation clearance, [6] a police
clearance,[7] Social Security System papers,[8] and official receipts,[9] all
issued in the name of Araneta, a stainless fork knuckle, and a bunch of
keys.
Despite undergoing treatment, Glen succumbed, [10] and his body was
brought for autopsy to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory.
The autopsy revealed that Glen had sustained a fatal stab wound on
the left side of his neck originating from the front and going towards
the back and downwards towards the center of his body, piercing the
apex of the left lung and transecting the left common carotid artery;
that the stab wound had been inflicted by a single bladed weapon; and
that the immediate cause of his death was the hemorrhage resulting
from the stab wound.[11] It was opined that the position of the stab
wound would suggest that had the assailant used his left hand, he was
probably directly behind the victim; but had he used his right hand, he
had to be somewhere to the extreme left of the victim.
During trial, Nila identified Nugas as the person who had sat behind her
husband and who had stabbed her husband in the neck, and Araneta
as the person who had sat behind her and who had carried the maroon
plastic bag that she had later recovered from the backseat.
Other witnesses presented were the investigating police
officer, the medico-legal officer who had performed the autopsy, and
Atty. Jose S. Diloy, the lawyer who had assisted Araneta in executing a
sworn statement pointing to Nugas, his own uncle, as the person who
had stabbed the driver of the vehicle they were riding on March 26,
1997.
The State adduced object and documentary evidence,
including the knife, the maroon plastic bag and all its contents, Medico
Legal Report No. M-0406-97,[12] and the sworn statement of Araneta.[13]
Evidence of Nugas
Albeit admitting having stabbed Glen, Nugas maintained that
he did so in self-defense. He claimed that the Tamaraw FX driven by
Glen was a passenger taxi, not a family vehicle; that when he and
Araneta boarded the vehicle at Gate 1 in COGEO, Antipolo, about four
other passengers were already on board; that he argued with Glen
about the fare, because Glen was overcharging; that when he was
about to alight in front of Rempson Supermarket, Glen punched him
and leaned forward as if to get something from his clutch bag that was
on the dashboard; that thinking that Glen was reaching for a gun inside
the clutch bag, he stabbed Glen with his left hand from where he was
seated in order to protect himself (Inunahan ko na sya); and that when
asked why he carried a knife, he replied that he needed the knife for
protection because he was living in a squatters area.
Ruling of the CA
Upon review,[15] the CA affirmed the factual and legal conclusions of the
RTC, and declared that Nugas invoking of self-defense shifted the
burden to him to prove the attendance of the elements of self-defense,
but he failed to discharge such burden.
Issue
Nugas has now come to the Court to reverse his conviction, and begs
us to delve into whether the affirmance by the CA was proper, and
whether the attendant circumstance of treachery was duly proven.
Ruling
On August 17, 2000, the RTC convicted Nugas of murder, ruling that his
guilt had been established beyond reasonable doubt.
The RTC found that Nugas did not establish the requisites of
self-defense. The CA concurred.
The Court upholds both lower courts.
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial
element of the justifying circumstance of self-defense. Without unlawful
aggression, there can be no justified killing in defense of oneself. [20] The
test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is
whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or
personal safety of the person defending himself; the peril must not be
an imagined or imaginary threat.[21] Accordingly, the accused must
establish the concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression,
Consequently, Nugas had absolutely no basis for pleading selfdefense because he had not been subjected to either actual or
imminent threat to his life. He had nothing to prevent or to repel
considering that Glen committed no unlawful aggression towards him.
With unlawful aggression, the indispensable foundation of selfdefense, not having been established by Nugas, it is superfluous to still
determine whether the remaining requisites of self-defense were
attendant. As the Court made clear in People v. Carrero:[26]
Unlawful aggression is the main and
most essential element to support the theory
of self-defense and the complete or incomplete
exemption from criminal liability; without such
primal requisite it is not possible to maintain
that a person acted in self-defense within the
terms under which unlawful aggression is
subordinate to the other two conditions named
in article 8, No. 4, of the Penal Code.[27] When an
act of aggression is in response to an insult, affront,
or threat, it cannot be considered as a defense but as
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
- versus Promulgated:
March 21, 2012
The CA Ruling
On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings of the RTC. It held that the
essential and primary element of unlawful aggression was lacking. It
gave credence to the finding of the trial court that no one else saw the
victim drawing his weapon and pointing it at accused Senior Police
Officer 2 (SPO2) Lolito T. Nacnac. The fallo of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for
lack of merit and the challenged Judgment dated May
23, 2007 in Criminal Case No. 10750-14 is AFFIRMED
IN TOTO.[7]
Unlawful Aggression
Unlawful aggression is an indispensable element of self-defense. We
explained, Without unlawful aggression, self-defense will not have a leg
to stand on and this justifying circumstance cannot and will not be
appreciated, even if the other elements are present. [10] It would
presuppose an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent
danger on the life and limb of a personnot a mere threatening or
intimidating attitudebut most importantly, at the time the defensive
action was taken against the aggressor. x x x There is aggression in
contemplation of the law only when the one attacked faces real and
immediate threat to ones life. The peril sought to be avoided must be
imminent and actual, not just speculative. [11]
As We held:
Even the cocking of a rifle without aiming the firearm
at any particular target is not sufficient to conclude
that ones life was in imminent danger. Hence, a
threat, even if made with a weapon, or the belief that
a person was about to be attacked, is not sufficient. It
is necessary that the intent be ostensibly revealed by
an act of aggression or by some external acts
showing the commencement of actual and material
unlawful aggression.[12]
The following exchange showing actual and material unlawful
aggression transpired during the examination of petitioner:[13]
Atty. Lazo: At any rate, when you again prevented
them from getting the tricycle telling them
again that they should not get the tricycle,
what happened next?
Accused: When police officer Basilio alighted from the
tricycle SPO1 Espejo also alighted sir.
Q What did Doddie Espejo do when he alighted from
the tricycle?
A I saw him hold his firearm tucked on his right waist.
(witness demonstrating by placing his right
hand at his right sideways). And he was left
handed, sir.
According to the trial court, petitioners claim that the victim pointed his
gun at petitioner was a mere afterthought. It ruled that petitioners
sworn statement and direct testimony as well as the testimonies of
SPO1 Eduardo Basilio and SPO2 Roosevelt Ballesteros only established
that the victim drew his gun. The trial court went on to differentiate the
act of drawing a gun and pointing it at a target. It held that the mere
act of drawing a gun cannot be considered unlawful aggression. In
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, the CA affirmed the trial
courts findings and further held that petitioner had fuller control of his
physical and mental faculties in view of the victims drunken state. It
concluded that the likelihood of the victim committing unlawful
aggression in his inebriated state was very slim.[14]
Atty. Cajigal:
Q By the way, what kind of firearm did the victim
draw from his waist?
A Cal. 45, sir.
Q What firearm did you use in defending yourself?
A M-16 armalite, sir.
xxxx
Q Alright, you mean to tell the Honorable Court then
that at the time that you pointed or
SO ORDERED.
The means employed by the person invoking selfdefense is reasonable if equivalent to the means of
attack used by the original aggressor. Whether or not
the means of self-defense is reasonable depends
upon the nature or quality of the weapon, the
physical condition, the character, the size and other
circumstances of the aggressor; as well as those of
the person who invokes self-defense; and also the
place and the occasion of the assault.
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ANTERO GAMEZ y BALTAZAR, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
In the instant case, the lone wound inflicted on the victim supports the
argument that petitioner feared for his life and only shot the victim to
defend himself. The lone gunshot was a reasonable means chosen by
petitioner in defending himself in view of the proximity of the armed
victim, his drunken state, disobedience of an unlawful order, and failure
to stand down despite a warning shot.
For review1 is the Decision2 dated May 25, 2011 of the Court of Appeals
CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00671 which affirmed the Judgment 3 dated
May 9, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court RTC) of Burauen, Leyte, Branch
15 convicting and sentencing accused-appellant Antero Gamez y
Baltazar accused-appellant) to reclusion perpetua for the crime of
parricide.
The Facts
Accused-appellant was accused of killing his own father, Apolinario
Gamez (Apolinario) through an Information articulating the following
criminal charges, viz:
That on or about the 21st day of August, 2004, in the Municipality of
Burauen, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and
with treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault, hack and wound one APOLINARIO GAMEZ y AMORILLO,
his father, with the use of a long bladed weapon (sundang) and sickle
(sarad) which the accused provided himself for the purpose, thereby
hitting and inflicting upon Apolinario Gamez y Amorillo multiple hacking
and incised wounds on the different parts of his body which were the
direct and approximate cause of his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
When arraigned, he entered a "Not Guilty" plea. He thereafter desired
to amend his plea to "Guilty" during the pre-trial conference held on
September 26, 2005 but the RTC denied the said plea bargaining. In
view however of the accused-appellants invocation of self-defense, an
inverted trial scheme ensued.5
Through the testimonies of the accused-appellant himself, Dr. Irene
Astilla Dacut, his attending physician, and eyewitness Bienvenido
Buhalog, the defense narrated the events that culminated into the
encounter that claimed Apolinarios life.6
The accused-appellant and 69-year old Apolinario had a less than ideal
father and son relationship with the former claiming that the latter did
not treat him well when he was a child. Their relationship got more
strained when Apolinario meddled with the accused-appellants
personal relationship with his wife. Apolinario apparently told the
Frightened, Maura ran away and hid at a grassy portion near the house.
She then saw her father flee but the accused-appellant gave him a
chase. Apolinario was able to run for about 20 m before the accusedappellant was able to catch up.
The accused-appellant then hacked the unarmed Apolinario on the
right side of his head using the bolo. Apolinario fell down and the
accused-appellant finished him off by slashing his neck with the scythe.
Maura thereafter left to report the incident to the police.
The autopsy conducted on Apolinarios cadaver by Dr. Leonita Azores,
MD,7 showed that he sustained two (2) fatal wounds one of which
almost decapitated his head while the other hit the parietal aspect
thereof exposing the skin and connective tissue. Apolinario also
obtained two (2) incised wounds on his neck and left forearm and two
(2) lacerations on his fingers. He perished at the crime scene. 8
Ruling of the RTC
In its Judgment9 dated May 9, 2006, the RTC found that both the
prosecution and the defense deliberately withheld vital details of the
incident. The prosecution did not reveal that the initial unlawful
aggression was committed by Apolinario who, based on medical
records, hacked the accused-appellant in the parietal area of his head.
The defense, on the other hand, concealed that accused-appellant
pursued the victim after the latter fled. These findings completed the
sequence of the incident and revealed that the accused-appellants
claim of self-defense is unmeritorious.
The RTC held that when accused-appellant hacked and killed
Apolinario, the unlawful aggression which the latter initially perpetrated
has already ceased because he has already ran away for 20 m. Hence,
accused-appellants act was not self-defense but rather one of
retaliation which, in turn, props up the conclusion that he intentionally
killed his father. The decretal portion of the RTC decision thus reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused
ANTERO GAMEZ y Baltazar GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the
crime of Parricide penalized under Art. 246 of the Revised Penal Code
and considering the presence of one (1) mitigating circumstance
without any aggravating to offset it, hereby sentences him to suffer
imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA; to pay the Heirs of Apolinario
Gamez Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity for his death and to pay the
costs of this suit.
The accused who underwent preventive imprisonment since August 21,
2004 shall be credited with the full time during which he was deprived
of his liberty if he agreed voluntarily and in writing to abide by the
same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, otherwise,
he will be entitled to only four-fifths (4/5) thereof. 10
Ruling of the CA
The CA adopted the RTCs findings and similarly concluded that the
accused-appellant put up retaliation and not self-defense because the
aggression proffered by the victim has already ended when the
No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.12
The accused-appellant manifested before the Court that in the present
review, he is adopting the arguments contained in his Brief filed before
the CA whereby he argued that his guilt for the crime of parricide was
not proved beyond reasonable doubt and that the trial court erred in
ruling that he failed to prove self-defense.
The Courts Ruling
The Court affirms the accused-appellants conviction.
The arguments proffered by the accused-appellant essentially attack
the evaluation by the trial court of the testimony of the prosecutions
principal witness, Maura, and its ruling that the same satisfactorily
repudiate his claim of self-defense.
This Court has consistently adhered to the rule that the matter of
assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most
competently performed by the trial judge, who had the unmatched
opportunity to observe the witnesses and to assess their credibility by
the various indicia available but not reflected on the record. Hence, the
corollary principle that absent any showing that the trial court
overlooked substantial facts and circumstances that would affect the
final disposition of the case, appellate courts are bound to give due
deference and respect to its evaluation of the credibility of an
eyewitness and his testimony as well as its probative value amidst the
rest of the other evidence on record.13
We see no compelling reason to depart from the foregoing tenets
especially in view of the accused-appellants failure to identify
significant details, which if considered, will alter the outcome of the
trial courts judgment and the affirmation accorded it by the CA. At any
rate, an examination of the records at hand shows that the factual
basis of accused-appellants plea of self-defense cannot relieve him
from criminal liability.
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to annul and set aside the May 7, 2009 Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 89257, finding petitioner Sherwin
Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide,
and its August 19, 2009 Resolution 2 denying his motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner was charged with the crime of Homicide in an Information 3
dated March 2, 2005, which alleged:
That on or about the 1st day of January 2005, in the City of Makati,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent to kill and with the use of an
unlicensed firearm, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot one JEFFREY WERNHER
GONZALES Y LIM on the head, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious
and moral gunshot wound which directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
defense
recounted
different
version
of
the
facts.
to
three
(3)
more
times.
Again,
the
gun
did
not
fire.
Petitioner was able to wrest away the gun from Jeffrey and tried to run
away to avoid any further confrontation with the latter. However,
Jeffrey immediately blocked petitioner's path and shouted, "Guard!
Guard!" Immediately then, Jeffrey took hold of a big fire extinguisher,
aimed and was about to smash the same on petitioner's head.
Acting instinctively, petitioner parried the attack while still holding the
gun. While in the act of parrying, the gun accidentally fired due to the
reasonable force and contact that his parrying hand had made with the
fire extinguisher and the single bullet discharged hit the forehead of
Jeffrey, which caused the latter to fall on the floor and die.
Petitioner left the gun and went out of the premises of Sykes Asia and
proceeded towards the elevator. On his way to the elevator, he heard
Darlene shout, "Sherwin anong nangyari? ", but he was not able to
answer.
After said incident, Darlene abandoned petitioner and brought with her
their two (2) young children. Petitioner later learned that Darlene and
Jeffrey had an illicit relationship when he received a copy of the blog of
Darlene,
dated
January
30,
2005,
sent
by
his
friend.
During his arraignment, on August 22, 2005, petitioner, with the
assistance of counsel, pleaded "Not Guilty" to the charge. Thereafter,
pre-trial conference was conducted on even date and trial on the
merits
ensued
thereafter.
During the trial of the case, the prosecution presented the oral
testimonies of Marie Antonette Managbanag (Managbanag), Maria
Angelina Pelaez (Pelaez) and Carlos Alberto Lim Gonzales (Gomales),
respectively. The prosecution likewise formally offered several pieces of
documentary
evidence
to
support
its
claim.
For its part, the defense presented as witnesses, petitioner himself; his
brother, Simeon Sander Dela Cruz III (Cruz), Greg Lasmarias
Elbanvuena (Elbanvuena) and Managbanag, who was recalled to the
witness
stand
as
witness
for
the
defense.
On February 26, 2007, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 147, rendered a Decision5 finding petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, as defined and penalized
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the fallo thereof
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, Judgment is rendered finding herein accused Sherwin
Dela Cruz y Gloria Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide as defined and penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal
Code, and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Eight
(8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor medium as Minimum to
Fourteen (14) years eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal medium as Maximum; to indemnify the Heirs of Jeffrey
Wernher Gonzales y Lim in the amount of P50,000.00 plus moral
damages in the amount of P1 Million, and to pay the costs.
2
WHETHER THE FIRING OF THE GUN WHEREIN ONLY A SINGLE
BULLET WAS DISCHARGED THEREFROM WAS MERELY ACCIDENTAL
WHICH OCCURRED DURING THE TIME THAT THE PETITIONERAPPELLANT WAS STILL IN THE ACT OF DEFENDING HIMSELF FROM
THE CONTINUOUS UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION OF THE DECEASED
VICTIM.
4
WHETHER THE PRIVILEGED MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
SELF-DEFENSE
IS
APPLICABLE
IN
THIS
CASE.
Even assuming arguendo that the gun originated from Jeffrey and an
altercation transpired, and therefore, danger may have in fact existed,
the imminence of that danger had already ceased the moment
petitioner disarmed Jeffrey by wresting the gun from the latter.
After petitioner had successfully seized it, there was no longer any
unlawful aggression to speak of that would have necessitated the need
to kill Jeffrey. As aptly observed by the RTC, petitioner had every
opportunity to run away from the scene and seek help but refused to
do so, thus:
5
WHETHER PETITIONER-APPELLANT MAY BE HELD CIVILLY
LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM ARISING FROM THE
In this case, accused and the victim grappled for possession of the gun.
Accused admitted that he wrested the gun from the victim. From that
point in time until the victim shouted "guard, guard", then
3
WHETHER THE PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO PROVE ALL THE
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS CONSTITUTING THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE.
SO ORDERED.6
after
that,
if
any?
A: After they struggled, the gun clicked three times and then after
that Jeff tried to get hold of the fire extinguisher and the fourth shot
went
off
and
then
Jeffrey
fell
down.
Accused alleged that the victim was about to smash the fire
extinguisher on his (accused's) head but he parried it with his hand
holding the gun. This is doubtful as nothing in the records is or would
be corroborative of it. In contrast, the two (2)Prosecution
witnesses whose credibility was not impeached, both gave the
impression that the victim got the fire extinguisher to shield
himself from the accused who was then already in possession
of the gun.18
Atty.
Q:
A:
And
who
Sherwin
(TSN,
Oct.
was
was
17,
2005,
EXAMINATION
Atty.
Q:
Mariano:
Can you relate to the Court, Ms. Witness, how did this incident
gun.
pp.
12-14)
Objection,
your
Honor,
witness
on
cross
already
answered
that.
examination,
your
Honor.
COURT
You didn't not see when he approached Jeffrey? A: No, as I said, I saw
him point the gun at the back of Jeff and he did
not
come
from
my
side
so
that
means...
COURT
No, the question is, You did not actually see Sherwin approached
Jeffrey? A:
saw him already at the back of Jeffrey.
Atty.
Q: And then after pulling the fire extinguisher from the wall Jeffrey
again faced the person who was holding the gun already?
A:
He
was
holding
the
Agoot
fire
extinguisher
like
this.
COURT
For
Agoot:
am
Agoot
Witness:
Agoot:
Atty.
Atty.
the
Atty.
record.
Mariano:
left
hand
would
support
the
weight
Atty.
basically.
Agoot
Yes,
And
then
after
that
there
was
sir.
Agoot
again
grappling?
Witness
then
what
happened?
A: And then Jeff parried the gun and they started struggling for the
possession
of
the
gun.
Q:
A:
gun?
the
happen?
Q:
the
CROSS-EXAMINATION:
Atty.
Thus, when an unlawful aggression that has begun no longer exists, the
one who resorts to self-defense has no right to kill or even wound the
former aggressor.19 To be sure, when the present victim no longer
persisted in his purpose or action to the extent that the object of his
attack was no longer in peril, there was no more unlawful aggression
that would warrant legal self-defense on the part of the offender. 20
Undoubtedly, petitioner went beyond the call of self-preservation when
he proceeded to inflict excessive, atrocious and fatal injuries on Jeffrey,
even when the allegedly unlawful aggression had already ceased.
holding
holding
that Jeffrey aimed and intended to smash the big fire extinguisher on
petitioner's head. Alternatively, the prosecution witnesses maintained
an impression that Jeffrey used the same to shield himself from
petitioner who was then in possession of the gun, a deadly weapon. An
excerpt of the testimony of Managbanag bares just that, to wit:
How far were you from this struggle when you witnessed it?
Probably
10
to
12
feet.
Q: Going back to your story, Ms. Witness, you mentioned that after
Jeffrey warded off the gun, they started to struggle, what happened
holding the fire extinguisher at that time. And then he fell holding
on
Atty.
to
the
fire
extinguisher.
Agoot
Agoot
Q: You said that the gun clicked, how many times did the gun click
without
firing?
Witness
A:
Three
(3)
times,
sir.
Atty.
Agoot
Q: And what did the late Jeffrey do when the gun clicked but did not
fire?
Witness
A:
They
were
still
pushing
Atty.
Q:
each
other
at
that
time.
Agoot
Using the
person...
Witness
A: Basically trying to cover himself and trying to push away the
person
who
was
pointing
the
gun
at
him.
Atty.
Agoot
Q: And why do you know that Jeffrey was trying hard to push the fire
extinguisher?
Witness
A: Because I was seated roughly about 5 to 6 feet away from
them. So I clearly saw what was going on at that time.
(Direct Examination of Marie Antonette Managbanag for the Defense,
TSN dated 04 September 2006, pp. 12-17, emphasis supplied) 23
Petitioner's
continuous
contention that
and
imminent
If petitioner had honestly believed that Jeffrey was trying to kill him, he
should have just run, despite any obstruction, considering that he was
already in possession of the gun. He could have also immediately
sought help from the people around him, specifically the guard
stationed at the floor where the shooting incident happened. In fact, he
could have reported the incident to the authorities as soon as he had
opportunity to do so, if it was indeed an accident or a cry of selfpreservation.
Yet,
petitioner
never
did
any
of
that.
We find it highly specious for petitioner to go through the process of
tussling and hassling with Jeffrey, and in the end, shooting the latter on
the forehead, not only once, but four times, the last shot finally
killing him, if he had no intention to hurt Jeffrey. Thus:
Moreover, the Prosecution's eyewitnesses were consistent in declaring
that while there was prior struggle for the possession of the gun, it was
nevertheless accused who was holding the gun at the time of the
actual firing thereof (TSN, p. 30, October 10, 2005; TSN, p. 14, October
17, 2005). Witness Managbanag even alleged that while the victim
(Jeffrey), who was in possession of the fire extinguisher, and the
accused were pushing each other, accused pointed the gun at the
victim. She heard three (3) clicks and on the 4 th, the gun fired
(TSN, p. 12, October 10, 2005). Under the circumstances, it cannot
be safely said that the gun was or could have been fired
accidentally. The discharge of the gun which led to the victim's
death was no longer made in the course of the grapple and/or
struggle for the possession of the gun27
The observation of the RTC dispels any doubt that the gun may have
been shot accidentally to the detriment of Jeffrey. The fire was neither a
disaster nor a misfortune of sorts. While petitioner may not have
intended to kill Jeffrey at the onset, at the time he clicked the trigger
thrice consecutively, his intent to hurt (or even kill) Jeffrey was too
plain to be disregarded. We have held in the past that the nature and
number of wounds are constantly and unremittingly considered
important indicia which disprove a plea of self-defense. 28 Thus,
petitioner's contention that an accident simultaneously occurred while
he was in the act of self-defense is simply absurd and preposterous at
best. There could not have been an accident because the victim herein
suffered a gunshot wound on his head, a vital part of the body and,
thus, demonstrates a criminal mind resolved to end the life of the
victim.
Besides, petitioner's failure to inform the police of the unlawful
aggression on the part of Jeffrey and to surrender the gun that he used
to kill the victim militates against his claim of self-defense.
In view of the foregoing, we find it illogical to discuss further the third
element of self-defense since it is recognized that unlawful aggression
is a conditio sine qua non for upholding the justifying circumstance of
sell-defense.30 If there is nothing to prevent or repel, the other two
requisites of self-defense will have no basis. 31 Hence, there is no basis
to entertain petitioner's argument that a privileged mitigating
circumstance of self-defense is applicable in this case, because unless
the victim has committed unlawful aggression against the other, there
can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, on the part of the
latter.
Anent petitioner's argument that the RTC erred when it failed to
consider as suppression of evidence the prosecution's alleged
deliberate omission to present the testimonies of the security guardson-duty at the time of the shooting incident, the same fails to
persuade. We concur with the decision of the CA on this point, to wit:
Having admitted the killing of the victim, the burden of evidence that
he acted in self-defense, shifted to accused-appellant Dela Cruz. He
must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness
of the prosecution's evidence, for, even if the latter were weak, it could
not be disbelieved after his open admission of responsibility for the
killing.
The security guards on duty at the time of the subject incident were at
the disposal of both the prosecution and the defense. The defense did
not proffer proof that the prosecution prevented the security guards
from testifying. There is therefore no basis for it to conclude that the
prosecution
is
guilty
of
suppression
of
evidence.
It is worthy to note that the question of whether petitioner acted in selfdefense is essentially a question of fact.34 It is the peculiar province of
the trial court to determine the credibility of witnesses and related
questions of fact because of its superior advantage in observing the
conduct and demeanor of witnesses while testifying. 35 This being so
and in the absence of a showing that the CA and the RTC failed to
appreciate facts or circumstances of such weight and substance that
would have merited petitioner's acquittal, this Court finds no
compelling reason to disturb the ruling of the CA that petitioner did not
act
in
self-defense.36chanrobleslaw
In this regard, we do not subscribe to petitioner's contention that since
the incident transpired in Jeffrey's office, and the witnesses presented
by the prosecution are known officemates of Jeffrey, the witnesses are
expected to testify in favor of Jeffrey and against petitioner. As
correctly pointed out by respondent, there appears no motive on the
part of the prosecution witnesses to falsely testify against petitioner. 37
The fact that they are officemates of Jeffrey does not justify a
conclusion that Managbanag and Pelaez would concoct or fabricate
stories in favor of Jeffrey for the mere purpose of implicating petitioner
with such a serious crime, especially since they are testifying under
oath.
All told, we find no basis to doubt or dispute, much less overturn, the
findings of the RTC and the C A that the elements of homicide are
present in the instant case as amply shown by the testimonies of the
prosecution eyewitnesses, and they constitute sufficient proof of the
guilt
of
petitioner
beyond
cavil
or
doubt.
Nevertheless, with regard to the appreciation of the aggravating
circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm, we deviate from the
findings of the CA. A perusal of the Information will show that the use
of unlicensed firearm was expressly alleged in the killing of Jeffrey. This
allegation was further proved during trial by the presentation of the
Certification from the PNP Firearms and Explosives Division, dated
November 11, 2005, certifying that petitioner is not a
licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and calibre, per
verification from the records of the said Division. Accordingly, under
Paragraph 3 of Section 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8294, amending
Section 1 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance,
to wit:
x
5
the amount of P3,022,641.71 as damages for loss of earning
capacity;
6
for the civil indemnity and the damages for loss of earning
capacity, an interest of six percent (6%) per annum, computed
from the time of finality of this Decision until full payment thereof;
and
7
SO ORDERED.
Promulgated:
January 25, 2012
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
An indispensable requisite of self-defense is that the victim
must have mounted an unlawful aggression against the accused.
Without such unlawful aggression, the accused cannot invoke selfdefense as a justifying circumstance.
The accused prays for the review and reversal of the decision
promulgated on June 29, 2006, [1] whereby the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed his conviction for murder handed down by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 34, in Balaoan, La Union.
Antecedents
At around 9:30 p.m. on October 29, 1996, Jose Olais was
walking along the provincial road in Butubut Oeste, Balaoan, La Union
when Alfonso Fontanilla suddenly struck him in the head with a piece of
wood called bellang.[2] Olais fell facedown to the ground, but Fontanilla
hit him again in the head with a piece of stone. Fontanilla desisted from
hitting Olais a third time only because Joel Marquez and Tirso Abunan,
the sons-in-law of Olais, shouted at him, causing him to run away.
Marquez and Abunan rushed their father-in-law to a medical clinic,
where Olais was pronounced dead on arrival.[3]
On April 25, 1997, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of La
Union filed an information for murder against Fontanilla in the RTC, viz:
That on or about the 29th day of October
1996, along the Provincial Road at Barangay Butubut
Oeste, Municipality of Balaoan, Province of La Union,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
intent to kill and with evident premeditation and
treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and strike with a long
coconut night stick and thereafter hit with a stone the
head of Jose Olais, thereby inflicting on the latter
head wounds which caused the death of the latter, to
the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Ruling
We affirm the conviction.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC, holding that Fontanilla did not
establish the indispensable element of unlawful aggression; that his
failure to report the incident to the police at the earliest opportunity, or
even after he was taken into custody, negated the plea of self-defense;
and that the nature of the victims injury was a significant physical proof
to show a determined effort on the part of Fontanilla to kill him, and not
just to defend himself.[16]
III.
FURTHERMORE, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
NOT APPRECIATING THE SPECIAL PRIVILEGE[D]
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF INCOMPLETE SELFDEFENSE AND THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER.
imposed in criminal cases as part of the civil liability when the crime
was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. [36] The
Civil Code permits such damages to be awarded by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages.[37] In light of such legal
provisions, the CA and the RTC should have recognized the entitlement
of the heirs of the victim to exemplary damages on account of the
attendance of treachery. It was of no moment that treachery was an
attendant circumstance in murder, and, as such, inseparable and
absorbed in murder. As well explained in People v. Catubig:[38]
The term aggravating circumstances used by
the Civil Code, the law not having specified
otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic
sense. The commission of an offense has a twopronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the
social order and the other upon the private victim as
it causes personal sufferings, each of which is
addressed by, respectively, the prescription of
heavier punishment for the accused and by an award
of additional damages to the victim. The increase of
the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores
the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of
aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or
qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal
liability which is basically a State concern, the
award of damages, however, is likewise, if not
primarily, intended for the offended party who
suffers thereby. It would make little sense for
an award of exemplary damages to be due the
private offended party when the aggravating
circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld
when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or
qualifying
nature
of
an
aggravating
circumstance is a distinction that should only
be of consequence to the criminal, rather than
to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine,
relative to the civil aspect of the case, an
aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or
qualifying, should entitle the offended party to
an award of exemplary damages within the
unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of theCivil
Code.
For the purpose, P30,000.00 is reasonable and proper as exemplary
damages,[39] for a lesser amount would not serve result in genuine
exemplarity.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated on June 29, 2006
by the Court of Appeals, subject to the MODIFICATION of the civil
damages, by ordering accused Alfonso Fontanilla y Obaldo to pay to
the heirs of Jose Olais P25,000.00 as temperate damages and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages in addition to the P50,000.00 as
death indemnity and the P50,000.00 as moral damages, plus interest
of 6% per annum on such amounts from the finality of the judgment.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 214883, September 02, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CRISTINA
SAMSON, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
For review in this appeal is the May 6, 2014 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 05832, which affirmed the
September 27, 2012 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65,
Tarlac City (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 12285, convicting accusedappellant Cristina Samson (Cristina) for parricide committed against
her husband, Gerry Delmar (Gerry), and sentencing her to suffer the
penalty
of
reclusion
perpetua.
The
Antecedents
On August 14, 2002, Cristina was charged with the crime of Parricide,
defined and penalized under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC). The Information articulates the following criminal charges, viz:
th
of
the
Defense
face twice. While Gerry was still holding the knife, Cristina pushed him
and he fell on the ground. She took the knife which Gerry was holding
and begged him not to come near her. She was holding the knife near
her chest pointed at Gerry when he suddenly grabbed her and that was
the time that the knife went in contact with his chest. When she saw
her husband bloodied, she shouted for help and her father (Rodolfo
Samson) and brother (Allan Samson) came and brought Gerry to the
hospital. Her relatives told her that Gerry died in the hospital. (TSN,
September
6,
2006,
pp.
14-27)
On June 27, 2002, ALLAN SAMSON (Allan) was at home watching
television with his father. He heard yelling and shouting from the house
of his sister Cristina and brother-in-law Gerry. Since it was just ordinary
for him to hear his sister and brother-in-law fight, he and his father just
ignored it. After fifteen (15) minutes of listening to their quarrel, they
heard Cristina cry for help. Upon hearing this, he immediately went to
the house of his sister and saw her holding Gerry and she requested
him and his father to bring Gerry to the hospital. They called a tricycle
and he, together with his father, brought Gerry to Talon General
Hospital. The doctor, however, declared that Gerry was already dead.
Then, the tanod arrives and Allan instructed the tanod to call the
siblings and relatives of Gerry. When the relatives arrived, they went
home. (TSN, November 18, 2006, pp. 4-6)
Version
of
the
Prosecution
In its Brief for the Appellee, 6 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
provided the following as its Counter-Statement of Facts:
On January 25, 1994, appellant Cristina Samson and victim Jerry
Delmar were married. They were blessed with two (2) daughters
namely Christine and Cherrie Lou. The couple lived in their own house
which is just adjacent to the house of appellant's family. The union of
the two was never a peaceful one. Constant quarrels filled their
household and occurred in front of their children and other relatives.
On June 27, 2002, appellant and the victim had one of their usual
fights. As testified by appellant herself, she and her two children were
watching television in their home when the victim arrived drunk. Victim
asked for his dinner but appellant was not able to cook food which led
to the fight. Christine, the youngest daughter of the appellant and the
victim, narrated that she witnessed the fight between her parents, that
as the fight escalated, appellant was able to get hold of the knife which
was placed on the roof and stabbed the victim. The victim fell on the
ground and crawled until he reached the door. Cristine remembered
that people arrived in their home, helped the victim board a tricycle
and brought him to the hospital. Appellant, on the other hand, ran out
and went to her father and asked for money and left. That was the last
night
that
Christine
and
Cherry
Lou
saw
their
mother.7ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The
Ruling
of
the
RTC
In its September 27, 2012 Decision, the RTC found the proffered selfdefense of Cristina to be untenable. In its view, there was no longer
any threat to her life before she stabbed her husband Gerry. Though
there was an existent danger as there was an altercation before the
stabbing incident, the imminence of such danger ceased when, as
admitted by her, Gerry already put down the knife. The RTC even
concluded that it was she who provoked him when she suddenly
pushed him to the ground. She then took the knife and told him not to
come near her. When he grabbed her, she stabbed him. After she took
hold of the knife, there was no longer any unlawful aggression to speak
of that would necessitate the need to kill Gerry. 8 Thus, the decretal
portion of the RTC decision reads in this wise:
WHEREFORE, finding accused CRISTINA SAMSON guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the felony of Parricide defined and penalized under
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, accused CRISTINA SAMSON is
hereby sentenced to suffer a penalty of "Reclusion Perpetua" pursuant
to R.A. 9346 (An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
Philippines).
Accused is also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Christine
S. Delmar and Cherrie Lo S. Delmar the amount of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages
and
costs
of
suit.
SO ORDERED.9ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The
Ruling
of
the
CA
The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. It stated that although there
could have been an unlawful aggression at the start when Gerry
repeatedly slapped Cristina and held a knife at her throat, it already
disappeared when he put down the knife. According to the CA, it was
this precise act that gave Cristina the opportunity to push her husband
and gain control of the knife. Moreover, the fact that she fled and
evaded arrest for four (4) years contradicted her claim of innocence. 10
The CA disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 27, 2012 of the RTC,
Branch 65, Tarlac City in Criminal Case No. 12285, finding accusedappellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide and
sentencing her to reclusion perpetua and to pay damages and the cost
of
suit,
is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE
Court
answers
in
the
affirmative.
The Court hesitates to share the observation of the RTC and the CA that
Cristina failed to discharge the burden of proving that unlawful
aggression
was
present
when
she
killed
her
husband.
Contrary to the conclusion of the CA that Gerry's aggression had
already ceased when he was disarmed, it is the Court's view that the
aggression still continued. Her perceived peril to her life continued and
persisted
until
she
put
an
end
to
it.
It must be noted that after she was able to take hold of the knife from
her husband, he did not stand down but, instead, continued to move
towards her despite her plea that he should not come nearer. He
grabbed her by the arm which could have precipitated her wellgrounded belief that her life was still in danger if he would be able to
wrest the weapon from her. It was not farfetched to presume that,
being stronger, he could have easily overpowered her and eventually
killed
her.
A similar situation was presented in the case of People v. Rabandaban18
(Rabandaban), wherein the Court ruled that despite the fact that the
accused succeeded in wresting the bolo from his wife, he was still
justified in using the weapon against her because his life was still in
danger. The Court explained:
xxx When appellant got possession of the bolo he already must
have been in a precarious condition because of his wounds, one of
which was described by the sanitary inspector as "fatal" since the large
intestine came out of it. And appellant, we think, was justified in
believing that his wife wanted to finish him off because,
according to the evidence, she struggled to regain possession
of the bolo after he had succeeded in wresting it from her. With
the aggressor still unsubdued and showing determination to
fight to the finish, it would have been folly on the part of
appellant, who must already have been losing strength due to
loss of blood, to throw away the bolo and thus give his
adversary a chance to pick it up and again use it against him.
Having the right to protect his life, appellant was not in duty bound to
expose himself to such a contingency.19 [Emphases Supplied]
In Rabandaban, the victim, instead of running away from the accused
husband after the bolo was wrested from her, continued to struggle
with him to regain possession of the bolo. This fact, together with her
husband's compromised condition, being already badly wounded,
justified him in finally neutralizing his wife who was then determined in
putting an end to his life. In the case at bench, the unlawful aggression
would have ceased if he just walked away from the scene considering
that Cristina had gained the upper hand, being the one in possession of
the knife. Instead, Gerry chose to ignore her plea not to come near her
and continued moving towards her without regard to his safety despite
the fact that the knife was pointed towards his direction.
In both Rabandaban and the present case, the victims, despite having
been disarmed, still posed a threat to the lives of the accused. The
danger to their lives persisted leaving them with no other choice but to
defend themselves lest they be the ones to be victimized.
In that situation, Cristina had reasons to believe that her life was still in
danger. It is to be noted that before she was able to take hold of the
weapon, her husband held the same knife and pointed it at her throat.
So when he, who was taller and stronger, approached her and grabbed
her by the arm, it was instinctive for her to take the extreme
precautionary measure by stabbing him before he could get back the
knife and make good his earlier threat of putting a hole in her throat.
Contrary to the trial court's assessment, she did not show aggression
towards her husband when she pushed him after he pointed the knife
away from her. She was, in fact, manifesting a passive attitude towards
him when she just stood her ground, with the knife in hand, asking him
not
to
come
near
her.20
It would have been a different story if Gerry, after dropping the knife,
walked away and Cristina still went after him. If that were the case, she
could not assert self-defense. She was no longer acting in self-defense
but in retaliation for the earlier aggression. Retaliation is inconsistent
with self-defense and in fact belies it. In retaliation, the aggression that
was begun by the injured party already ceased when the accused
attacked him; while in self-defense the aggression still existed when
the
aggressor
was
injured
by
the
accused. 21
Now that unlawful aggression has already been established, it is well to
consider the other two requisites in order to determine whether the
self-defense
is
complete
or
incomplete.
Reasonable
Necessity
of
the
Means
Employed
and the instinct more than reason, that moves or impels his defense;
and the proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the harm
done,
but
upon
the
imminent
danger
of
such
injury. 27
Lack
of
Sufficient
Provocation
as
an
Indication
of
Guilt
or
Non-guilt
The CA took the fact of Cristina's flight and evasion of arrest for four (4)
years against her. To the appellate court, it belied her claim of
innocence.
Under the attendant circumstances, the Court cannot subscribe to that
view.
Generally, flight, in the absence of a credible explanation, would be a
circumstance from which an inference of guilt might be established, for
a truly innocent person would normally grasp the first available
opportunity to defend himself and assert his innocence. 29 It has been
held, however, that non-flight may not be construed as an indication of
innocence either. There is no law or dictum holding that staying put is
proof of innocence, for the Court is not blind to the cunning ways of a
wolf which, after a kill, may feign innocence and choose not to flee. 30 In
Cristina's case, she explained that she took flight for fear of her safety
because of possible retaliation from her husband's siblings. 31 The Court
finds such reason for her choice to flee acceptable. She did not hide
from the law but from those who would possibly do her harm.
The RTC and the CA might have some hesitation in accepting her
explanation for her choice of action. Nevertheless, under the
circumstances, a cloud of uncertainty lingers. In such a case, it is the
duty of the Court to resolve the doubt in favor of the accused.
Considering that Cristina was justified in killing her husband under
Article 11, paragraph 1 of the RPC, she should be exonerated of the
crime charged. For the same reason, the Court finds no act or omission
from
which
a
civil
liability
may
arise.
SO ORDERED.
petitioner followed the victim. The victim turned around and told the
petitioner, Kung hindi lang kita inaanak. The victim then hacked the
petitioner, hitting the latter on the left side of his head and thigh.
Believing that the victim would attack him anew, the petitioner stabbed
the victim frontally several times. [22] He also stabbed the victim on the
left buttock. The petitioner could not recall how many times he stabbed
the victim and what parts of the latters body had been hit.
The first episode inside the hut had been completed with the
protagonist, the victim, and the petitioner reconciled. The second
episode commenced inside the hut and continued outside, and ended
with the petitioner stabbing the victim several times.
The trial and the appellate courts gave no credence and
probative weight to the testimony of the petitioner. So do we.
First. The findings of fact of the trial court and its conclusions
based on the said findings are accorded by this Court high respect, if
not conclusive effect, especially when affirmed by the CA. This is
because of the unique advantage of the trial court of having been able
to observe, at close range, the demeanor and behavior of the
witnesses as they testify. This rule, however, is inapplicable if the trial
court ignored, overlooked, or misinterpreted cogent facts and
circumstances which, if considered, will alter or reverse the outcome of
the case. We have reviewed the records and found no justification for a
reversal of the findings of the trial court and its conclusions based
thereon.
Second. The victim sustained six hack wounds and one
lacerated wound. This is gleaned from the Necropsy Report of Dr. Pura
Uy, to wit:
FINDINGS: The victim lies in supine position, stocky in
built; his clothing completely soaked with fresh blood.
CHEST:
(+) stab wound 2 inches below the L nipple 4 inches
deep running medially to the anterior median
line.
(+) stab wound 2 inches to the L of the anterior
median line at the level of the L nipple 5 inches
deep running posteriorly.
(+) stab wound 1 inch above the L nipple 4 inches
deep running inferomedially.
(+) stab wound 2 inches to the left of the anterior
median
line
4
inches
deep
running
inferoposteriorly.
(+) stab wound 1 inch to the right of the anterior
median line at the level of the second right
intercostal space 0.5 inch in depth.
(+) stab wound inch to the right of the anterior
median line at the level of the xyphoid process
3 inches deep running superiorly.
(+) stab wound at the level of the L nipple L anterior
axillary line 4 inches in depth running superiorly
to the left armpit.
(+) hack wound at the left armpit 3 inches long
drunk.[34]
that this impelled the latter to stab the former. But the testimony of
Dulay contradicted the testimony of the petitioner:
Q When Exequiel Senoja stabbed Leon Lumasac
several times, he immediately fell to the ground
and was fatal[ly] wounded, immediately died
because of several stabs and lay (sic) down?
A I did not see that scene because Exequiel Senoja
stabbed Leon Lumasac, I turn (sic) back upon
seeing Leon Lumasac hack Exequiel Senoja, I
turn (sic) back because I was afraid then. When
I turn (sic) back I saw them embracing each
other, Sir.
Q And that is the time when Exequiel Senoja stabbed
Leon Lumasac?
A I did not see the stabbing. What I only saw was that
they were embracing each other, Sir.
Q So you are now changing your answer, you actually
saw Exequiel Senoja stabbing Leon Lumasac
several times, after he was hack[ed] by Leon
Lumasac?
A I did not see that Exequiel Senoja stab Leon
Lumasac, Sir.[33]
Seventh. The bare fact that the petitioner sustained a five-centimeter
wound at the left temporal region and an eight-centimeter hack wound
on the anterior portion of his right thigh does not preclude the fact that
he was the unlawful aggressor; nor buttress his plea that he acted in
self-defense. The petitioner failed to inform the doctor that he
sustained the wounds to defend himself. Moreover, the doctor testified
that the wounds the petitioner sustained were slight:
Pros. Ronquillo:
Q Does (sic) the wound at the right anterior thigh
vertical, diagonal or what?
A I did not place it, Sir.
Q So, you dont know?
A It is vertical, Sir, but I did not place it on the record.
And the hack wound on the temporal region
is oblique.
The doctor gave the petitioner due medications for 30 minutes and the
petitioner then went home:
Q How did it happen that you were able to kill the
victim in this case Mr. Leon Lumasac?
A Because when I went out, he hacked me, Sir.
Q Were you hit by the hack made by the victim in this case?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Where?
A Here, Sir.
And Witness is pointing to his left head.
Q Where else?
A (His) right thigh.
Q In what place did this incident happen?
A In the hut of Tata Santos, Sir.
Q What is his real name?
A Crisanto Reguyal, Sir.[35]
Q Where?
A Here, Sir.
Q Where else?
A (His) right thigh.
Q In what place did this incident happen?
A In the hut of Tata Santos, Sir.
arm measuring 5 cm. with one end blunt and the other end sharp
having an approximate depth of about 1 cm.; and a stab wound on the
right buttock 1.3 cm. long with a depth of about 4 cm. The stab wound
on the abdomen killed Gonzalo, as it penetrated the small intestines,
pancreas and the abdominal aorta, causing massive hemorrhage and
loss of blood. Abrasions and contusions were also found on the body of
Gonzalo, located on the left ear lobe, on the chest, on the left
anterolateral side, on the mid-posterior aspect and on the lumbar
region of the back.[6]
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
With the failure of Razon to comply with the said directives, the CA on
January 31, 2001, issued the herein assailed Resolution dismissing his
appeal as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is deemed ABANDONED and
DISMISSED on authority of Section 8, Rule 124 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.[20]
On July 25, 2001, the CA received a Motion for Reconsideration filed by
Razon stating that he could not read and understand English and that
Atty. Gallardo was negligent of his duties to him, as said lawyer filed his
withdrawal of appearance even without his (Razon's) knowledge and
conformity.[21]
The CA denied Razon's motion for reconsideration through its
Resolution dated April 14, 2003, thus:[22]
1.
2.
3.
Petitioner now comes before this Court claiming that the CA erred in
declaring his appeal as abandoned and dismissed. [24] He claims that he
is not bound by the actions of Atty. Gallardo who was negligent of his
duties to him; Atty. Gallardo failed to file the required appeal brief
before the CA despite the many extensions given him; worse, Atty.
Gallardo filed a motion to withdraw his appearance as petitioner's
counsel without petitioner's knowledge; it was only when he received
the CA Resolution dated January 31, 2001 that he learned of the
withdrawal of Atty. Gallardo as his counsel, and it was only then that
Atty. Gallardo advised him to get another lawyer; petitioner received
the records of the case from Atty. Gallardo, only on March 9, 2001;
petitioner failed to comply with the CA resolutions because he could
not understand the same due to his educational deficiency; and given
the chance to ventilate his appeal, petitioner would be absolved of the
charge against him as he truly acted in self defense. [25]
For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contended that
petitioner himself is guilty of negligence; the CA gave him ample
opportunity to secure the services of counsel or manifest his desire to
have a counsel de oficio appointed by the court, but petitioner ignored
said directives; petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the CA's
Resolution dated January 31, 2001 was also filed out of time; and Sec.
8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court provides that the appellate court may
dismiss an appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief within the time
prescribed by the said Rule.[26]
Petitioner filed a Reply and both parties filed their memoranda
reiterating their respective arguments.[27]
Sifting the arguments raised, it is clear that only two questions need to
be answered: (1) whether the CA erred in dismissing petitioner's appeal
for failure to file appellant's brief; and (2) whether petitioner acted in
self-defense in killing Gonzalo.
The Court answers both questions in the negative.
The first issue. Whether the CA erred in dismissing petitioner's appeal
for failure to file appellant's brief.
While appeal is an essential part of our judicial system, a party must
strictly comply with the requisites laid down by the Rules of Court on
appeals, mindful of the fact that an appeal is purely a statutory right.
Procedural rules are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases.
Both courts and litigants are therefore enjoined to abide strictly by the
getting a new counsel, or had he simply notified the court of his desire
to have a counsel de oficio assigned to him, then he would not have to
contend with the predicament he is presently in. For the resolution of
the CA dismissing his appeal on the ground of abandonment, petitioner
has no one else to blame but himself.
The second issue. Whether petitioner acted in self-defense.
While the CA did not rule on the merits of the case, it is best not to
remand the case to the CA. All the records and evidence necessary for
the determination of the innocence or guilt of the petitioner are before
this Court. Thus, for a complete and full disposition of the case and to
avert further delay in the disposition of the same, the Court shall
hereby resolve the case on the merits. [37]
It is settled that when an accused admits killing the victim but invokes
self-defense to escape criminal liability, the accused assumes the
burden to establish his plea by credible, clear and convincing evidence;
otherwise, conviction would follow from his admission that he killed the
victim.[38] Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when
uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence or when it is
extremely doubtful by itself.[39] Indeed, in invoking self-defense, the
burden of evidence is shifted and the accused claiming self-defense
must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness
of the prosecution.[40]
Here, petitioner admitted having inflicted the wound which killed
Gonzalo.[41] The burden is therefore on him to show that he did so in
self-defense. As correctly found by the RTC, however, petitioner failed
to prove the elements of self-defense.
To escape liability, the person claiming self-defense must show by
sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence that: (1) the victim
committed unlawful aggression amounting to actual or imminent threat
to the life and limb of the person claiming self-defense; (2) there was
reasonable necessity in the means employed to prevent or repel the
unlawful aggression; and (3) there was lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person claiming self-defense or at least any provocation
executed by the person claiming self-defense was not the proximate
and immediate cause of the victim's aggression.[42]
The condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of selfdefense is the element of unlawful aggression. [43] There can be no selfdefense unless the victim committed unlawful aggression against the
person who resorted to self-defense. [44] Unlawful aggression
presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent
danger thereof and not just a threatening or intimidating attitude. [45] In
case of threat, it must be offensive, strong and positively showing the
wrongful intent to cause injury.[46] For a person to be considered the
unlawful aggressor, he must be shown to have exhibited external acts
clearly showing his intent to cause and commit harm to the other. [47]
Petitioner claims that Gonzalo, who was seated behind him in the
taxicab, declared a hold-up and poked a knife at the base of his neck.
Granting that this is true, what transpired next, changed the nature of
the roles played by petitioner and Gonzalo.
As correctly found by the trial court:
Such findings are well supported by the records. During his direct
testimony, Razon admitted that he followed the three men, including
Gonzalo, after they got out of the cab. Then he went back to his cab to
get his knife.[49] On cross-examination, Razon admitted the same thing,
and added the following:
Q. And you said that you swung the knife from left to
right, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you were able to hit Benedict Kent Gonzalo, Jr.?
A. Yes, sir.
xxx
Q. So you admitted that the injuries sustained by
Benedict Kent Gonzalo in front of his abdomen was due
to your act of swinging the knife from left to right in
front of him?
A. Yes, sir.
xxx
Q. And tell the Court if this is the one that you used, this colonial
knife, previously marked as Exh. A.
A. This is the one, sir.
Q. Yes, you testified the last time that you have to go back to
your taxi cab and get this knife marked as Exh. A?
A. Yes, sir.[50] (Emphasis supplied)
aggression was still existing when the aggressor was injured by the
accused.[53]
is the duty of the Court to correct such errors as may be found in the
judgment appealed from, since an appeal in a criminal case throws the
whole case wide open for review.[66]
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, * respondents.
Even assuming that some danger did in fact exist, the imminence of
that danger had already ceased the moment petitioner was able to
disarm the victim by wresting the knife from the latter. After the former
had successfully seized the weapon, and he as well as his companions
went out of the cab, there was no longer any unlawful aggression to
speak of that would have necessitated the need to kill the victim.[54]
The Court notes that the RTC failed to award the heirs of Gonzalo,
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for his death.[67] Civil indemnity is
automatically imposed upon the accused without need of proof other
than the fact of commission of murder or homicide. [68]
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Anent actual damages, the Court resolves to delete the same and in
lieu thereof imposes temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00.
This is consistent with the ruling of the Court in People v. Werba,[69]
citing People v. Villanueva[70] which held that in instances where actual
expenses amounting to less than P25,000.00 are proved during the
trial, the award of temperate damages of P25,000.00 is justified in lieu
of the actual damages of a lesser amount. [71] In this case, Gonzalo's
heirs were only able to present receipts amounting to P4,925.00.[72]
As to moral damages, the RTC correctly awarded the amount of
P50,000.00, as the prosecution was able to show that the father of the
victim, Benedicto Gonzalo, Sr., suffered mental and emotional anguish
due to the untimely death of his son. Gonzalo Sr., who was 74 years old
at the time of his testimony, said that he had special affection for his
son, not only because he was the youngest among all his children, but
also because he was a polio victim. He said that he could not eat and
sleep thinking that his son could not have put up a fight due to his
physical disability.[73] Indeed, moral damages may be awarded in favor
of the heirs of a victim upon sufficient proof of mental anguish, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings and similar
[74]
injury.
The RTC also did not err in awarding P10,000.00 as attorney's fees to
the heirs of the victim. As provided for in Art. 2208 (11) [75] of the Civil
Code, attorney's fees may be awarded where the court deems it just
and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be
recovered. In this case the award of attorney's fees is proper as it is
borne by the records that the family of the victim hired the services of
a private lawyer to prosecute the case. [76]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 60,
Baguio City, in Criminal Case No. 12245-R, entitled People of the
Philippines v. Edwin Razon y Lucea isAFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
to the effect that petitioner is ordered to pay the heirs of Benedict Kent
Gonzalo, Jr. the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity andP25,000.00
as temperate damages in addition to P50,000.00 as moral damages
and P10,000.00 as attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.
NOLI
ESLABON, petitioner,
November 7, 1935
party acquired by us, and the right to honor which is not the least
prized of man's patrimony." (1 Viada, 172, 173, 5th edition.) "Will the
attempt to rape a woman constitute an aggression sufficient to put her
in a state of legitimate defense?" asks the same commentator. "We
think so," he answer, "inasmuch as a woman's honor cannot but be
esteemed as a right as precious, if not more, cannot her very
existence; this offense, unlike ordinary slander by word or deed
susceptible of judicial redress, in an outrage which impresses an
indelible blot on the victim, for, as the Roman Law says: quum
virginitas, vel castitas, corupta restitui non protest (because virginity or
chastity, once defiled, cannot be restored). It is evident that a woman
who, imperiled, wounds, nay kills the offender, should be afforded
exemption from criminal liability provided by this article and subsection
since such killing cannot be considered a crime from the moment it
became the only means left for her to protect her honor from so great
an outrage." (1 Viada, 301, 5th edition.)
Similar to the present question was the one determined the Supreme
Court of Spain in a decision of February 21, 1911: "This court in due
homage to the principles of morality and in strict observance of the
provision of law justly interpreted, has always held that one of the
rights referred to in article 8, subsection 4, of the Penal Code, is that
which assists a woman in defense of her honor when an attempt is
made to repel the aggression or to avoid in time the imminent danger
of its consummation; and in view of this, it must be conceded upon the
findings of the trial court, that the accused Maria Sanchez Caistro
acted in legitimate self-defense, because the conduct of Diego
Cardenas, who made love to her, in blowing in at midnight, knocking at
the door and demanding admittance and against Maria's refusal,
insisting in his purpose and threatening to break open the door, in the
light of prior events and the circumstances of the case, implies the
imminence of an affront against honor, involving an actual and certain
danger to the person so threatened, while at the same time the fact
that she was alone that no help was forthcoming; her founded fear that
the door might give way and the dreaded evil wrought, her consequent
helplessness on the advent of that crisis, and her natural desire to
attest openly her conjugal fidelity by foiling all suspicious aspersions,
show the reasonableness of the defensive measures availed of by her
and warrant her complete exemption from liability, inasmuch as, aside
from all these, it does not appear from the decision that said accused
had previously committed any act deserving of censure or marring the
just motive which obviously induced her to repel, as she did, a violence
unprovoked by her. Thus viewed, all the requisites of the exempting
circumstance above mentioned are present and should be taken into
consideration, etc." (1 Viada, 304, 5th edition.)
The theory the prosecution, which we consider a trifle unsubstantial is
as follows: The accused Wenceslao Alcansare, thinking that Paulino
importuned his wife with unchaste advances, out of jealousy, decided
to get rid of him. His chance to bring about his plan can when, in the
morning of the crime, Paulino happened to pass in front of the house of
the spouses with his friend Olimpio Libosada. The accused wife invited
Paulino to drop in, which the letter and his friend did. The spouses met
them at the threshold. The accused wife asked Paulino whether he had
a knife and as the latter answered in the affirmative, she asked him to
lend it to lend it to her because she wanted to cut her nails, to which
Paulino willingly acceded, while the accused wife was cutting her nails,
she asked Paulino where he came from and the latter answered,
turning his head around, that he came from the house of one Inting,
whereupon the accused wife slashed him in the abdomen. Paulino tried
to return the blow but the accused husband picked up a stone and
struck him in the forehead. Wounded in the abdomen and in the
forehead, Paulino fled therefrom.
The government presented three witnesses to establish this theory.
Pablo Alvarez, barrio lieutenant of Cabugahan, testified that on his
way to "communal" the day before the crime, he met the accused wife
who told him that she had wanted to see him and ask his help because
her husband, who was jealous of Paulino, was maltreating her and he
was furthermore resolved to assault Paulino at sight. On the following
day, Alvarez, in his way to Bacacay, dropped in the house of the
accused spouses to inquire whether they had tobacco seeds and, as
they answered him in the negative, he went his way. He had hardly left
the place when Paulino and Olimpio arrived, the accused wife inviting
the former to drop in. Paulino and Olimpio went to the threshold of the
house and the accused spouses, in turn, went down, and the four
engaged in a conversation which, to Alvarez, seemed a friendly one.
The witness left and when he returned to the place sometime later, he
was informed that Paulino had been stabbed.
The accused were from the barrio of Agpagi and not from Cabugahan
where the witness was the barrio lieutenant. Had the accused wife
gone to complain against the alleged conduct of her husband, she
would have sought the lieutenant of Agpagi, her barrio. The accused
wife, by reporting the incident directly to the municipal authorities
without seeking the intervention of any barrio lieutenant, showed that
she knew where to go in a difficulty.
Were it true that the accused husband, prompted by jealousy, designed
to do away with Paulino, it would have been because he observed that
his wife somehow returned Paulino's attentions, for otherwise he would
not have indulge in tragic cogitations. From any point of view, however,
it is quite incomprehensible why the wife would take upon herself and
the husband would charge her with, the execution of the plan. The
observation is no less true if the spouses plotted in common for it
would have been patently disgraceful and cowardly of the husband to
thrust its execution upon the wife at the hazard of her life, and liberty
to shield his own, in the event of prosecution; and there is the husband
was thus minded. Under the theory of the prosecution, whether the
accused husband doubted his wife's fidelity or was sure of it, in
connection with Paulino's attentions, the natural thing in either case
would be for him, unaided by his wife, to avenge the affront or punish
the offender. In the case at bar, we must assume that, if the motive
attributed to him by the prosecution were true, the accused would
have acted, as would the great majority of men in identical
circumstances.
The witness Alvarez, himself testified that he was informed the day
before by the wife of the accused husband that the latter would get
even with Paulino at the first opportunity. The witness saw them
together in the morning of the crime and he should have surmised that
the announced tragedy might take place. Rather than foil it, as an
agent of the law, if for no other reason, he went his way unconcerned,
as if nothing serious was impending.
We find his conduct, or that which he claims to have followed, so
extremely strange to be considered true. When the truth is beyond our
THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NICOLAS JAURIGUE and AVELINA JAURIGUE, defendants.
AVELINA JAURIGUE, appellant.
DE JOYA, J.:
Nicolas Jaurigue and Avelina Jaurigue were prosecuted in the Court of
First Instance of Tayabas, for the crime of murder, of which Nicolas
Jaurigue was acquitted, but defendant Avelina Jaurigue was found
guilty of homicide and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging
from seven years, four months and one day of prision mayorto thirteen
years, nine months and eleven days of reclusion temporal, with the
accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased, Amando Capina, in the sum of P2,000, and to pay one-half of
the costs. She was also credited with one-half of the period of
preventive imprisonment suffered by her.
From said judgment of conviction, defendant Avelina Jaurigue appealed
to the Court of Appeals for Southern Luzon, and in her brief filed
therein on June 10, 1944, claimed
(1) That the lower court erred in not holding that said appellant
had acted in the legitimate defense of her honor and that she
should be completely absolved of all criminal responsibility;
(2) That the lower court erred in not finding in her favor the
additional mitigating circumstances that (a) she did not have the
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that actually committed,
and that (b) she voluntarily surrendered to the agents of the
authorities; and
(3) That the trial court erred in holding that the commission of the
alleged offense was attended by the aggravating circumstance of
having been committed in a sacred place.
The evidence adduced by the parties, at the trial in the court below,
has sufficiently established the following facts:
That both the defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue and the
deceased Amado Capina lived in the barrio of Sta. Isabel, City of San
Pablo, Province of Laguna; that for sometime prior to the stabbing of
the deceased by defendant and appellant, in the evening of September
20, 1942, the former had been courting the latter in vain, and that on
one occasion, about one month before that fatal night, Amado Capina
snatched a handkerchief belonging to her, bearing her nickname
and upon seeing his daughter still holding the bloody knife, he
approached her and asked: "Why did you do that," and answering him
Avelina said: "Father, I could not endure anymore." Amado Capina died
from the wound a few minutes later. Barrio lieutenant Casimiro Lozada,
who was also in the same chapel, approached Avelina and asked her
why she did that, and Avelina surrendered herself, saying: "Kayo na po
ang bahala sa aquin," meaning: "I hope you will take care of me," or
more correctly, "I place myself at your disposal." Fearing that Amado's
relatives might retaliate, barrio lieutenant Lozada advised Nicolas
Jaurigue and herein defendant and appellant to go home immediately,
to close their doors and windows and not to admit anybody into the
house, unless accompanied by him. That father and daughter went
home and locked themselves up, following instructions of the barrio
lieutenant, and waited for the arrival of the municipal authorities; and
when three policemen arrived in their house, at about 10 o'clock that
night, and questioned them about the incident, defendant and
appellant immediately surrendered the knife marked as Exhibit B, and
informed said policemen briefly of what had actually happened in the
chapel and of the previous acts and conduct of the deceased, as
already stated above, and went with said policemen to the police
headquarters, where her written statements were taken, and which
were presented as a part of the evidence for the prosecution.
The high conception of womanhood that our people possess, however
humble they may be, is universal. It has been entertained and has
existed in all civilized communities.
A beautiful woman is said to be a jewel; a good woman, a treasure; and
that a virtuous woman represents the only true nobility. And they are
the future wives and mothers of the land. Such are the reasons why, in
the defense of their honor, when brutally attacked, women are
permitted to make use of all reasonable means available within their
reach, under the circumstances. Criminologists and courts of justice
have entertained and upheld this view.
On the other hand, it is the duty of every man to protect and show
loyalty to womanhood, as in the days of chivalry. There is a country
where women freely go out unescorted and, like the beautiful roses in
their public gardens, they always receive the protection of all. That
country is Switzerland.
In the language of Viada, aside from the right to life on which rests the
legitimate defense of our own person, we have the right to property
acquired by us, and the right to honor which is not the least prized of
our patrimony (1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 5th ed., pp. 172, 173).
The attempt to rape a woman constitutes an unlawful aggression
sufficient to put her in a state of legitimate defense, inasmuch as a
woman's honor cannot but be esteemed as a right as precious, if not
more, than her very existence; and it is evident that a woman who,
thus imperiled, wounds, nay kills the offender, should be afforded
exemption from criminal liability, since such killing cannot be
considered a crime from the moment it became the only means left for
her to protect her honor from so great an outrage (1 Viada, Codigo
Penal, 5th ed., p. 301; People vs. Luague and Alcansare, 62 Phil., 504). .
As long as there is actual danger of being raped, a woman is justified in
killing her aggressor, in the defense of her honor. Thus, where the
deceased grabbed the defendant in a dark night at about 9 o'clock, in
an isolated barrio trail, holding her firmly from behind, without warning
and without revealing his identity, and, in the struggle that followed,
touched her private parts, and that she was unable to free herself by
means of her strength alone, she was considered justified in making
use of a pocket knife in repelling what she believed to be an attack
upon her honor, and which ended in his death, since she had no other
means of defending herself, and consequently exempt from all criminal
liability (People vs. De la Cruz, 16 Phil., 344).
Defendant and appellant further claims that she had not intended to
kill the deceased but merely wanted to punish his offending hand with
her knife, as shown by the fact that she inflicted upon him only one
single wound. And this is another mitigating circumstance which should
be considered in her favor (United States vs. Brobst, 14 Phil., 310;
United States vs. Diaz, 15 Phil., 123).
The claim of the prosecution, sustained by the learned trial court, that
the offense was committed by the defendant and appellant, with the
aggravating circumstance that the killing was done in a place
dedicated to religious worship, cannot be legally sustained; as there is
no evidence to show that the defendant and appellant had murder in
her heart when she entered the chapel that fatal night. Avelina is not a
criminal by nature. She happened to kill under the greatest
provocation. She is a God-fearing young woman, typical of our country
girls, who still possess the consolation of religious hope in a world
where so many others have hopelessly lost the faith of their elders and
now drifting away they know not where.
The questions raised in the second and third assignments of error
appear, therefore, to be well taken; and so is the first assignment of
error to a certain degree.
In the mind of the court, there is not the least doubt that, in stabbing to
death the deceased Amado Capina, in the manner and form and under
the circumstances above indicated, the defendant and appellant
committed the crime of homicide, with no aggravating circumstance
whatsoever, but with at least three mitigating circumstances of a
qualified character to be considered in her favor; and, in accordance
with the provisions of article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, she is
entitled to a reduction by one or two degrees in the penalty to be
imposed upon her. And considering the circumstances of the instant
case, the defendant and appellant should be accorded the most liberal
consideration possible under the law (United States vs. Apego, 23 Phil.,
391; United States vs. Rivera, 41 Phil., 472; People vs. Mercado, 43
Phil., 950)..
The law prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for the crime of
homicide; and if it should be reduced by two degrees, the penalty to be
imposed in the instant case is that of prision correccional; and pursuant to
the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 4103 of the Philippine Legislature,
known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, herein defendant and appellant
should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from arresto
mayor in its medium degree, to prision correccional in its medium degree.
Consequently, with the modification of judgment appealed from, defendant
and appellant Avelina Jaurigue is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from two months and one day of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to two years, four months, and one day ofprision correccional, as
maximum, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased Amado Capina, in the sum of P2,000, and to suffer the
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, not to exceed 1/3 of the principal
penalty, in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. Defendant and
appellant should also be given the benefit of 1/2 of her preventive
imprisonment, and the knife marked Exhibit B ordered confiscated. So
ordered..
M A N U E L O. O R I E N T E ,
Pe t i t i o n e r ,
the
parties,
Pr o m u l g a t e d :
Re s p o n d e n t .
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
A U S T R I A - M A RT I N E Z , J . :
Fo r r e v i e w b e f o r e t h e C o u r t a r e t h e D e c i s i o n [ 1 ]
d a t e d Fe b r u a r y 1 4 , 2 0 0 2 o f t h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l s ( C A )
w h i c h a ffi r m e d t h e D e c i s i o n o f t h e Re g i o n a l Tr i a l C o u r t o f
Q u e z o n C i t y , B r a n c h 1 0 3 ( RTC ) , d a t e d N o v e m b e r 1 5 ,
1 9 9 9 , i n C r i m i n a l C a s e N o . 9 6 - 6 5 3 1 3 , fi n d i n g M a n u e l
Oriente(petitioner) guilty of the crime of Homicide; and
t h e C A Re s o l u t i o n [ 2 ] d a t e d S e p t e m b e r 9 , 2 0 0 2 w h i c h
d e n i e d p e t i t i o n e r s M o t i o n f o r Re c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
A n I n f o r m a t i o n d a t e d M a r c h 1 8 , 1 9 9 6 w a s fi l e d
w i t h t h e RTC c h a r g i n g t h e p e t i t i o n e r w i t h t h e c r i m e o f
Murder, committ ed as follo ws:
That on or about the 16 th day of March 1996, in
Quezon
City,
Philippines,
the
said
accused
conspiring, confederating wi th three other persons
whose true names and whereabouts have not as y et
been ascertained and mutually helping one another,
with
intent
to
kill,
q u a l i fi e d
by
evident
Pe e p i n g t h r o u g h p o t t e d p l a n t s ( a b o u t 3 f e e t h i g h )
perched on top of a neighbors fence (about 2 fe et
high), and at a distance of more or less eight (8)
m e t e r s , h e s a w Ro m u l o C a r i o , [ p e t i t i o n e r ] M a n u e l
Oriente, the la tters daughter Marilou Lopez and the
l a t t e r s h u s b a n d , Pa u l L o p e z a n d o n e Ro g e l i o G a s c o n
arguing along the alle y beside the concrete fence in
front of Manuel Orientes house where there was a
l i g h t e d fl u o r e s c e n t l i g h t . H e h e a r d Pa u l L o p e z
t e l l i n g Ro m u l o C a r i o , I ka w C a r i o , a n d l i i t - l i i t m o , a n d
y a b a n g m o ! T h e n A r n e l Ta n a e l s a w M a r i l o u c o m i n g
out from their house with a lead pipe and handed i t
o v e r t o Pa u l . Pa u l t h e n h i t Ro m u l o w i t h a l e a d p i p e
at his right arm . Accused-appellant got the lead
p i p e f r o m Pa u l a n d h i t Ro m u l o o n h i s l e f t e y e b r o w.
Ro m u l o r e e l e d a n d f e l l d o w n . U p o n s e e i n g Ro m u l o
fall down, Arnel got confused, hence, he went back
as
i n s i d e t h e h o u s e a n d s w i t c h e d o ff t h e l i g h t a n d
t u r n e d t h e t e l e v i s i o n o ff . H e w e n t o u t s i d e a g a i n a n d
s a w Ro m u l o m o a n i n g . A t t h i s p o i n t , Pa u l L o p e z w a s
a l r e a d y p o k i n g a g u n a t Ro m u l o , t h e n p u l l e d t h e
t r i g g e r t w i c e b u t t h e g u n d i d n o t fi r e . A r n e l t h e n
s h o u t e d , Pu t a n g i n a n i n y o , b a k i t n i y o g i n a g a w a i y a n
s a b a y a w ko , b a k i t n i n y o g i n a g a n i t o s i y a , a n o b a
a n g ka s a l a n a n n i y a s a i n y o . O r i e n t e a n d h i s
c o m p a n y d i d n o t s a y a n y t h i n g . A r n e l c a r r i e d Ro m u l o
and brought the lat ter inside the house. He called
u p M a r i o a t t h e Pa n a b u i l t Tr a n s p o r t o ffi c e t o g e t a
c a b . W h e n t h e c a b a r r i v e d , Ro m u l o C a r i o w a s
b r o u g h t b y A r n e l t o t h e E a s t Av e n u e M e d i c a l C e n t e r
w h e r e Ro m u l o , t w o h o u r s a f t e r , p a s s e d a w a y.
D r. Ro b e r t o G a r c i a , t h e N B I M e d i c o - L e g a l O ffi c e r
who conducted the post-mortem examination on the
vic tims cadaver declared that the cause of death
o f Ro m u l o C a r i o w a s t r a u m a t i c h e a d i n j u r y. H e
opined that even with immediate and adequate
medical attendance, the victim would not have
survived due to the ext ensiv e nature of hemorrhage
s u ff e r e d b y Ro m u l o .
I n a n a t t e m p t t o e xc u l p a t e [ t h e p e t i t i o n e r ] ,
the defense gave the following version:
On the night of the commission of the crime,
[ p e t i t i o n e r ] M a n u e l O r i e n t e w a s f e t c h e d b y Ta n o d
m e m b e r s i n t h e i r a r e a t o a t t e n d a w a ke . I t w a s
a l r e a d y t h e Ta n o d s o ff - d u t y. W h i l e h e w a s o n h i s w a y
o u t o f t h e h o u s e , h e s a w s p o u s e s Pa u l a n d M a l o u
and his granddaughter inside the car going out of
the garage . The three went to visi t Malous in-laws .
At
the
gate
of
his
house,
while
having
a
c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h t h e Ta n o d m e m b e r s w h o f e t c h e d
him, the y heard two gunshots coming from downhill.
T h e y n o t i c e d t h a t t h e p e r s o n w h o fi r e d t h e s h o t s
was wal king towa rds them. They wait ed for him to
p a s s b y. T h i s p e r s o n w a s Ro m u l o C a r i o . W h e n t h e
lat ter reached a store, which is a fence away from
O r i e n t e s h o u s e , t h e l a t t e r a s ke d Ro m u l o w h a t w a s
h i s p r o b l e m . S u d d e n l y , C a r i o ex t e n d e d h i s a r m s a n d
p o ke d [ h i s ] g u n t o O r i e n t e a n d h i s c o m p a n i o n s .
Ro m u l o t o l d t h e m n o t t o g e t n e a r h i m o r h e w i l l
shoot and kill all of them. Surprised by the victims
response and for fear of being shot, [peti tioner]
Oriente stepped back towards his yard and was able
t o t a ke h o l d o f a p i e c e o f w o o d a n d h i t Ro m u l o .
[ Pe t i t i o n e r ] O r i e n t e m e n t i o n e d t h a t h e d o e s n o t
know if he hit Carios hands, e yebrow and other
parts of his body with that single blow but he saw
Ro m u l o C a r i o l o s e h i s b a l a n c e , f a l l a n d h i t h i s h e a d
on the ground. The victim was still holding the gun.
Af t e r fi v e s e c o n d s , Ro m u l o C a r i o s t o o d u p a n d r a n
( p a s u r a y- s u r a y ) t o w a r d s t h e d i r e c t i o n o f h i s h o u s e .
Fe a r i n g t h a t C a r i o w i l l s h o o t t h e m i f t h e y w o u l d g o
a ft e r h i m , [ p e t i t i o n e r ] O r i e n t e t o l d t h e Ta n o d s t h a t
t h e y w i l l j u s t a t t e n d t o h i m t h e f o l l o w i n g d a y.
[ Pe t i t i o n e r ] O r i e n t e f u r t h e r t e s t i fi e d t h a t h e h a d n o
intention of killing Cario and that his purpose was
only to disarm him. [4]
T h e RTC r e n d e r e d a D e c i s i o n d a t e d N o v e m b e r 4 ,
1999 convicting the petitioner of the crime of Homicide.
The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
A C C O R D I N G LY , t h e c o u r t r e n d e r s j u d g m e n t fi n d i n g
t h e a c c u s e d M A N U E L O R I E N T E Y O R I L LO G U I LT Y
b e y o n d r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t a s Pr i n c i p a l o f t h e c r i m e
o f H O M I C I D E a s d e fi n e d a n d p e n a l i z e d b y t h e
Re v i s e d Pe n a l C o d e w i t h t w o ( 2 ) m i t i g a t i n g
circumstances of lack of intent to commit so grave
a w r o n g a n d s u ffi c i e n t p r o v o c a t i o n a n d s o h e i s
h e r e b y s e n t e n c e d t o s u ff e r a j a i l t e r m o f S i x ( 6 )
M o n t h s o f A r r e s t o M a y o r a s m i n i m u m a n d Fo u r
Ye a r s a n d O n e ( 1 ) D a y o f P r i s i o n C o r r e c t i o n a l a s
maximum.
On the civil aspect, the accused Manuel Oriente y
Orillo is ordered to pay the la wful heirs of the
victim
Ro m u l o
Carino
y
Orillo
the
sum
of
P41,500.00 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as
i n d e m n i fi c a t i o n d a m a g e s .
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.[5]
How ever, on November 12, 1999, before the foregoing
j u d g m e n t b e c a m e fi n a l a n d e xe c u t o r y , t h e RTC i s s u e d a n
Order motu proprio sett ing aside the said judgment
b e c a u s e o f a m i s t a ke i n t h e j u d g m e n t p r o p e r a n d
requiring both peti tioner and his counsel to appear
before the court on November 17, 1999. [6]
O n t h e l a t t e r d a t e , t h e RTC p r o m u l g a t e d
Decision dated November 15, 1999, the
portion of which states:
its second
dispositive
A C C O R D I N G LY , t h e c o u r t r e n d e r s j u d g m e n t
fi n d i n g t h e a c c u s e d M A N U E L O R I E N T E y O r i l l o
G U I LT Y b e y o n d r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t a s Pr i n c i p a l o f t h e
c r i m e o f H O M I C I D E a s d e fi n e d a n d p e n a l i z e d b y t h e
Re v i s e d
Pe n a l
Code
with
two
(2)
mitigating
circumstances of lack of intent to commit so grave
a w r o n g a n d s u ffi c i e n t p r o v o c a t i o n a n d s o , a p p l y i n g
A r t i c l e 6 4 , p a r a g r a p h 5 , o f t h e Re v i s e d Pe n a l C o d e
and also the Indeterm inate Sentence Law, [the]
accused
is
hereby
sentenced
to
s u ff e r
an
i n d e t e r m i n a t e j a i l t e r m o f Fo u r ( 4 ) Ye a r s , Tw o ( 2 )
Months and One (1) Day of Prision Corr ec cional
a s m i n i m u m a n d E i g h t ( 8 ) Ye a r s a n d O n e ( 1 )
D ay o f P r i s i o n M ay o r a s m a x i m u m .
T R I A L C O U RT B E LO W E R R E D I N N O T A P P R E C I AT I N G
T H AT T H E R E WA S A N U N L AW F U L A G G R E S S I O N O N
T H E PA RT O F T H E V I C T I M , A N D T H E M E A N S
E M P LOY E D BY P E T I T I O N E R T O P R E V E N T T H E S A M E
WA S
REASONABLE
AND
FA L L S
UNDER
THE
J U S T I F Y I N G C I RC U M S TA N C E S O R S E L F - D E F E N S E ;
C.
T H E H O N . C O U RT O F A P P E A L S A N D T H E LO W E R
C O U RT G RAV E LY E R R E D I N G I V I N G C R E D E N C E T O
THE
TESTIMONY
OF
THE
LO N E
ALLEGED
EYE
WITNESS, WHEN SAID TESTIMONY HAS FULL OF
INCONSISTENCIES; AND
D.
T H E H O N . C O U RT O F A P P E A L S H A S C O M M I T T E D
G RAV E A B U S E O F D I S C R E T I O N TA N TA M O U N T T O
L ACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT MODIFIED THE
DECISION
OF
THE
REGIONAL
TRIAL
C O U RT ,
I N C R E A S I N G T H E P E N A LT Y T H E R E O F W I T H O U T A N Y
D I S C U S S I O N O R E X P L A N AT I O N I N T H E D E C I S I O N
I T S E L F W H Y S A I D M O D I F I C AT I O N O F P E N A LT Y I S
N E C E S S A RY A N D I N A C C O R D A N C E W I T H L AW.
T h e C o u r t a ffi r m s t h e c o n v i c t i o n o f t h e p e t i t i o n e r
except as to damages and the penalty imposed.
The
petitioner
emphasizes
that
the
victim,
a l l e g e d l y a t r o u b l e m a ke r i n t h e v i c i n i t y , w a s d r u n k , fi r e d
his gun twic e, and then proceeded to wards the peti tioner
a n d h i s c o m p a n i o n s . Pe t i t i o n e r a r g u e s t h a t t h e v i c t i m s
act of poking the gun at him constitutes unlawful
a g g r e s s i o n s u ffi c i e n t t o w a r r a n t h i s c l a i m o f s e l f- d e f e n s e .
The Court is not convinced.
W h e n s e l f- d e f e n s e i s i n v o ke d , t h e b u r d e n o f
e v i d e n c e s h i ft s t o t h e a c c u s e d t o s h o w t h a t t h e k i l l i n g
w a s l e g a l l y j u s t i fi e d . H a v i n g o w n e d t h e k i l l i n g o f t h e
vic tim, the accused should be able to prove to the
s a t i s f a c t i o n o f t h e C o u r t t h e e l e m e n t s o f s e l f- d e f e n s e i n
o r d e r t o a v a i l o f t h i s ex t e n u a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e . H e m u s t
discharge this burden by clear and convincing evidence .
When successful, an otherwise felonious deed would be
excused, mainly predicated on the lack of criminal intent
of the accused.
S e l f- d e f e n s e r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e r e b e ( 1 ) a n u n l a w f u l
aggression by the person injured or kil led by the
o ff e n d e r ,
(2)
reasonable
necessity
of
the
means
employed to prevent or repel that unlaw ful aggression,
a n d ( 3 ) l a c k o f s u ffi c i e n t p r o v o c a t i o n o n t h e p a r t o f t h e
p e r s o n d e f e n d i n g h i m s e l f. A l l t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s m u s t
c o n c u r. [ 9 ] T h e r e c a n b e n o s e l f- d e f e n s e , w h e t h e r c o m p l e t e
M e d i c o - L e g a l O ffi c e r ,
from his post-mortem
victim that the cause
viz:
[ C ] o n s i d e r i n g t h e ex t e n s i v e i n j u r i e s s u ff e r e d
by the victim several contusions on the face and
head fractures it is doubtful that a person in that
condition, aggravated by what the defense claimed
t o b e C a r i o s s t a t e o f s t u p o r ( d r u n k a n d p a s u r a ysuray), could still run, much less hold a handgun
while running.[18]
T h u s , t h e d e f e n s e f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h t h e ex i s t e n c e o f t h e
gun being pointed at petitioner to constitute unlawful
aggression on the part of the vict im.
While petitioner avers that the testimony of Arnel
Ta n a e l
is
burdened
with
improbabil ities
and
inconsistencies, after having owned the crime, however,
the burden of proof is reversed and, therefore, he cannot
simply protest that the evidence of the prosecution is
wea k. It then becomes incumbent upon peti tioner to rel y
on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
wea kness of the evidence of the prosecution, for ev en if
t h e l a t t e r w e r e w e a k , i t c o u l d n o t b e d i s b e l i e v e d a ft e r h e
had admitted the killing. Hence, if the accused fails to
d i s c h a r g e t h e b u r d e n o f p ro o f , h i s c o n v i c t i o n m u s t e n s u e
as a matter of consequence. [19]
The petit ioner insists that the CA erred in
m o d i f y i n g t h e RTC s d e c i s i o n b y i n c r e a s i n g t h e p e n a l t y
imposed upon him. It is settled that in a criminal case, an
appeal throws the whole case
open for revie w, and it becomes the duty of the appella te
court to correc t such errors as may be found in the
judgment appealed from, whether they are made the
subjec t of assignment of errors or not, [20] including the
p r o p r i e t y o f t h e i m p o s a b l e p e n a l t y. [ 2 1 ]
There is also no point in considering petit ioners
a r g u m e n t t h a t t h e RTC p r o m u l g a t e d t w o d e c i s i o n s a n d , b y
d o i n g s o , h e w a s p l a c e d i n d o u b l e j e o p a r d y.
Courts have the inherent power to amend their
d e c i s i o n s t o m a ke t h e m c o n f o r m a b l e t o l a w a n d j u s t i c e .
This prerogativ e, however , is not absolut e. The rules do
not contempla te amendments that are substantial in
nature. [22] They merel y cover formal changes or such that
w i l l n o t a ff e c t t h e c r u x o f t h e d e c i s i o n , l i ke t h e c o r r e c t i o n
of typographical or cler ical errors. Courts will viola te due
p r o c e s s i f t h e y m a ke s u b s t a n t i a l a m e n d m e n t s i n t h e i r
d e c i s i o n s w i t h o u t a ff o r d i n g t h e o t h e r p a r t y t h e r i g h t t o
contest the new ev idence presented in a mot ion for
r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n . [ 2 3 ] T h e C o u r t fi n d s t h a t t h e c h a n g e i n t h e
p e n a l t y b y t h e RTC i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e d i d n o t i n v o l v e t h e
consideration of any new evidence but a mere correction
o f t h e p e n a l t y i m p o s e d t o c o n f o r m w i t h t h e Re v i s e d Pe n a l
C o d e a n d T h e I n d e t e r m i n a t e S e n t e n c e L a w.
And as the Solicitor General correct ly noted, the
t r i a l c o u r t m o d i fi e d t h e p e n a l t y i n i t s D e c i s i o n d a t e d
November 15, 1999 before the peti tioner could perfec t
h i s a p p e a l f r o m t h e fi r s t D e c i s i o n d a t e d N o v e m b e r 4 ,
O n t h e s e c o n d c i r c u m s t a n c e , t h e RTC p o i n t e d t o
the fact that the incident was preceded by an intense
argument betwe en the victim and the accused so as to
qualify the situation as a mit igating circumstance of
s u ffi c i e n t p r o v o c a t i o n o r t h r e a t o n t h e p a r t o f t h e
o ff e n d e d p a r t y w h i c h i m m e d i a t e l y p r e c e d e d t h e a c t . [ 2 7 ]
P r o v o c a t i o n i s d e fi n e d t o b e a n y u n j u s t o r
i m p r o p e r c o n d u c t o r a c t o f t h e o ff e n d e d p a r t y , c a p a b l e o f
exciting, inciting, or irri tating anyone. In order to be
m i t i g a t i n g , p r o v o c a t i o n m u s t b e s u ffi c i e n t a n d s h o u l d
i m m e d i a t e l y p r e c e d e t h e a c t . Pr o v o c a t i o n i s s u ffi c i e n t i f
i t i s a d e q u a t e t o ex c i t e a p e r s o n t o c o m m i t t h e w r o n g ,
w h i c h m u s t a c c o r d i n g l y b e p r o p o r t i o n a t e i n g r a v i t y. T h a t
the provocat ion must immediate ly precede the act means
that there should not be any int erval of t ime betw een the
p r o v o c a t i o n b y t h e o ff e n d e d p a r t y a n d t h e c o m m i s s i o n o f
t h e c r i m e b y t h e p e r s o n p r o v o ke d . [ 2 8 ]
The fact that a heat ed or intense argument
p r e c e d e d t h e i n c i d e n t i s n o t b y i t s e l f t h e s u ffi c i e n t
p r o v o c a t i o n o n t h e p a r t o f t h e o ff e n d e d p a r t y a s
c o n t e m p l a t e d b y l a w. M o r e o v e r , p e t i t i o n e r f a i l e d t o
establish by competent evidence that the victim had a
g u n a n d u s e d i t t o t h r e a t e n p e t i t i o n e r.
Wi t h r e s p e c t t o t h e o t h e r a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f
treacher y, e vident premedita tion, and grave abuse of
s u p e r i o r s t r e n g t h , t h e C o u r t l i ke w i s e a g r e e s w i t h t h e
fi n d i n g s o f t h e RTC , a s a ffi r m e d b y t h e C A , t h a t n o n e o f
these circumstances are present for lack of evidence .
T h u s , t h e C A i s p a r t l y c o r r e c t i n m o d i fy i n g t h e
p e n a l t y i m p o s e d b y t h e RTC . T h e RTC i m p o s e d a n
indete rminate prison term of four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional as
minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as maximum, while the CA adjusted the sentence
upwards since no mitigating circumstances attended the
crime , and imposed an indete rminate prison term of six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal
a s m a x i m u m . A r t i c l e 2 4 9 o f t h e Re v i s e d Pe n a l C o d e
provides that any person found guilty of homicide shall
be punished by reclusion temporal, i.e., twelve (12) years
and one (1) day to twenty (20) years.Applying Section 1
of the Inde terminat e Sentence Law, the minimum term of
the sentence shall be within the range of the penalty
next lower, which
is prision
mayor , i.e ., any where
between six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years.
T h e C A a p p r o p r i a t e l y e xe r c i s e d i t s d i s c r e t i o n w h e n i t
imposed six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
the minimum te rm.
How ever, the CA erred in imposing tw elv e (12)
years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as the
maximum te rm of the indete rminate sentence .In the
computation of the maximum te rm, the law prescribes
that the attending circumstances should be considered.
There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance in
this case, the penalty that should be imposed is the
medium period of the penalty prescribed by law , [29] that
is, reclusion temporal in its medium period, or, any where
between fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months.
And last, the CA, wi thout reason, omit ted a
p o r t i o n o f t h e a w a r d o f d a m a g e s b y t h e RTC i n t h e c i v i l
aspect of the case, namely, the amount of actual
d a m a g e s w h i c h c o m p r i s e d t h e ex p e n s e s f o r t h e c e m e t e r y
l o t a n d r e l i g i o u s s e r v i c e s . I n p a r t i c u l a r , t h e RTC h e l d t h a t
the prosecution was able to prove actual damages
amounting to P41,500.00 based on supporting evidence,
[30]
in addition to the death indemnity of P50,000.00 as
required by current jurisprudence . [31] On the other hand,
the disposi tive portion of the CA judgment merely
ordered peti tioner to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
victim in the amount of P50,000.00.
The Court restores the full amount
d a m a g e s o r i g i n a l l y a w a r d e d b y t h e RTC .
of
actual
He then showed the two wounds - one in each side of the spinal column
- which wounds were circular in form and a little bigger than a quarter
of an inch, according to the medical report of Dr. Mananquil. Petras
died of the wounds he sustained. The defendant surrendered to the
authorities immediately after the incident and gave a sworn statement
(Exhibit F) before the Justice of Peace of Umingan on December 23,
1936.
Issue:
WON the killing of Petras was justified by defense of property
Held:
No; the right to property is not of such importance as right to life, and
defense of property can be invoked as a justifying circumstance only
when it is coupled with an attack on the person of one entrusted with
said property.
________________________________________________________________________
G.R. No. L-5318 December 23, 1909
THE
UNITED
STATES,
plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAFAEL BUMANGLAG, ET AL., defendants. - GREGORIO BUNDOC,
appellant.
Iigo
Bitanga
Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.
for
appellant.
TORRES, J.:
On the night of January 2, 1909, Rafael Bumanglag, an inhabitant of
the pueblo of San Nicolas, Province of Ilocos Norte, missed 4 baares or
40 bundles of palay which were kept in his granary, situated in the
place called "Payas," barrio No. 16 of the said pueblo, and on
proceeding to search for them on the following morning, he found them
in an inclosed filed which was planted with sugar cane, at a distance of
about 100 meters from his granary; thereupon, for the purpose of
ascertaining who had done it, he left the palay there, and that night,
accompanied by Gregorio Bundoc, Antonio Ribao, and Saturnino
Tumamao, he waited near the said field for the person who might
return to get the palay. A man, who turned out to be Guillermo Ribis,
made his appearance and approaching the palay, attempted to carry it
away with him, but at that instant Bumanglag, Bundoc, and Ribao
assaulted the presumed thief with sticks and cutting and stabbing
weapons; as a result of the struggle which ensued the person attacked
fell down and died instantly, Bumanglag and his companions believing
that Guillermo Ribis was the author of several robberies and thefts that
had occurred in the place.
plaintiff-appellee,
MAKASIAR, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
South Cotabato, Branch I, in Criminal Cases Nos. 1815 and 1816 for
murder which, after a joint trial, resulted in the conviction of the
accused in a decision rendered on September 8, 1970, with the
following pronouncement:
Thus, we have a crime of MURDER qualified by treachery
with the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation
offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
The proper penalty imposable, therefore, is RECLUSION
PERPETUA (Arts. 248 and 64, Revised Penal Code).
Accordingly, finding Mamerto Narvaez
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder,
guilty
beyond
their three laborers, were doing the fencing and chiselling of the walls
of appellant's house. The fence they were putting up was made of
bamboo posts to which were being nailed strands of barbed wire in
several layers. Obviously, they were using tools which could be lethal
weapons, such as nail and hammer, bolo or bamboo cutter, pliers,
crowbar, and other necessary gadgets. Besides, it was not disputed
that the jeep which they used in going to the place was parked just a
few steps away, and in it there was a gun leaning near the steering
wheel. When the appellant woke up to the sound of the chiselling on
his walls, his first reaction was to look out of the window. Then he saw
the damage being done to his house, compounded by the fact that his
house and rice mill will be shut off from the highway by the fence once
it is finished. He therefore appealed to hiscompadre, the deceased
Rubia, to stop what they were doing and to talk things over with him.
But deceased Fleischer answered angrily with 'gademit' and directed
his men to proceed with what they were doing.
The actuation of deceased Fleischer in angrily ordering the continuance
of the fencing would have resulted in the further chiselling of the walls
of appellant's house as well as the closure of the access to and from his
house and rice mill-which were not only imminent but were actually in
progress. There is no question, therefore, that there was aggression on
the part of the victims: Fleischer was ordering, and Rubia was actually
participating in the fencing. This was indeed aggression, not on the
person of appellant, but on his property rights.
The question is, was the aggression unlawful or lawful? Did the victims
have a right to fence off the contested property, to destroy appellant's
house and to shut off his ingress and egress to his residence and the
highway?
Article 30 of the Civil Code recognizes the right of every owner to
enclose or fence his land or tenements.
However, at the time of the incident on August 22, 1968, Civil Case no.
755 for annulment of the order of award to Fleischer and Company was
still pending in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato. The parties could
not have known that the case would be dismissed over a year after the
incident on August 22, 1968, as it was dismissed on January 23, 1970
on ground of res judicata, in view of the dismissal in 1965 (by the Court
of Appeals) of Civil Case No. 240 filed in 1950 for the annulment of the
award to the company, between the same parties, which the company
won by virtue of the compromise agreement in spite of the subsequent
repudiation by the settlers of said compromise agreement; and that
such 1970 dismissal also carried the dismissal of the supplemental
petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines on November 28, 1968
to annul the sales patent and to cancel the corresponding certificate of
title issued to the company, on the ground that the Director of Lands
had no authority to conduct the sale due to his failure to comply with
the mandatory requirements for publication. The dismissal of the
government's supplemental petition was premised on the ground that
after its filing on November 28, 1968, nothing more was done by the
petitioner Republic of the Philippines except to adopt all the evidence
and arguments of plaintiffs with whom it joined as parties-plaintiffs.
Hence, it is reasonable to believe that appellant was indeed hoping for
a favorable judgment in Civil Case No. 755 filed on November 14, 1966
and his execution of the contract of lease on February 21, 1967 was
just to avoid trouble. This was explained by him during crossexamination on January 21, 1970, thus:
It happened this way: we talked it over with my Mrs. that we
better rent the place because even though we do not know
who really owns this portion to avoid trouble. To avoid
trouble we better pay while waiting for the case because at
that time, it was not known who is the right owner of the
place. So we decided until things will clear up and determine
who is really the owner, we decided to pay rentals (p. 169,
t.s.n., Vol.6).
In any case, Fleischer had given him up to December 31, 1968 (Exh.10,
p. 2, Defense Exhibits) within which to vacate the land. He should have
allowed appellant the peaceful enjoyment of his properties up to that
time, instead of chiselling the walls of his house and closing appellant's
entrance and exit to the highway.
The following provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines are in point:
Art. 536. In no case may possession be acquired through
force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who
objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or a
right to deprive another of the holding of a thing must invoke
the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to
deliver the thing.
Art. 539. Every possessor has a right to be respected in his
possession; and should he be disturbed therein he shall be
protected in or restored to said possession by the means
established by the laws and the Rules of Court (Articles 536
and 539, Civil Code of the Philippines).
Conformably to the foregoing provisions, the deceased had no right to
destroy or cause damage to appellant's house, nor to close his
accessibility to the highway while he was pleading with them to stop
and talk things over with him. The assault on appellant's property,
therefore, amounts to unlawful aggression as contemplated by law.
Illegal aggression is equivalent to assault or at least
threatened assault of immediate and imminent kind (People
vs. Encomiendas, 46 SCRA 522).
In the case at bar, there was an actual physical invasion of appellant's
property which he had the right to resist, pursuant to Art. 429 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:
Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the
right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal
thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be
reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or
threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his
property (Emphasis supplied).
The reasonableness of the resistance is also a requirement of the
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-4160
ANITA
TAN,
plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
STANDARD VACUUM OIL CO., JULITO STO DOMINGO, IGMIDIO
RICO, and RURAL TRANSIT CO.,defendants-appellees.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Anita Tan is the owner of the house of strong materials based in the
City of Manila, Philippines. On May 3, 1949, the Standard Vacuum Oil
Company ordered the delivery to the Rural Transit Company at its
garage at Rizal Avenue Extension, City of Manila, of 1,925 gallons of
gasoline using a gasoline tank-truck trailer. The truck was driven by
Julito Sto. Domingo, who was helped Igmidio Rico. While the gasoline
was being discharged to the underground tank, it caught fire,
whereupon Julito Sto. Domingo drove the truck across the Rizal Avenue
Extension and upon reaching the middle of the street he abondoned
the truck with continued moving to the opposite side of the first street
causing the buildings on that side to be burned and detroyed. The
house of Anita Tan was among those destroyed and for its repair she
spent P12,000.
As an aftermath of the fire, Julito Sto. Domingo and Imigidio Rico were
charged with arson through reckless imprudence in the Court of First
Instance of Manila where, after trial, both were acquitted, the court
holding that their negligence was not proven and the fire was due to an
unfortunate accident.
Anita Tan then brought the action against the Standard Vacuum Oil
Company and the Rural Transit Company;, including the two
employees, seeking to recover the damages she has suffered for the
destruction of her house.
Defendants filed separate motions to dismiss alleging in substance that
(a) plaintiff's action is barred by prior judgment and (b) plaintiff's
complaint states no cause of action; and this motion having been
sustained, plaintiff elevated the case to this Court imputing eight errors
to the court a quo.
The record discloses that the lower court dismissed this case in view of
the acquittal of the two employees of defendant Standard Vacuum Oil
Company who were charged with arson through reckless imprudence in
the Court of First Instance of Manila. In concluding that accused were
not guilty of the acts charged because of the fire was accidental, the
court made the following findings: "the accused Imigidio Rico cannot in
any manner be held responsible for the fire to the three houses and
goods therein above mentioned. He was not the cause of it, and he
took all the necessary precautions against such contingency as he was
confronted with. The evidence throws no light on the cause of fire. The
witnesses for the prosecution and for the defense testified that they did
not know what caused the fire. It was unfortunate accident for which
the accused Iigmidio Rico cannot be held responsible." And a similar
finding was made with respect to the other accused that the
xxx
xxx
that the damage caused to the plaintiff was brought about mainly
because of the desire of driver Julito Sto. Domingo to avoid greater evil
or harm, which would have been the case had he not brought the tanktruck trailer to the middle of the street, for then the fire would have
caused the explosion of the gasoline deposit of the company which
would have resulted in a conflagration of much greater proportion and
consequences to the houses nearby or surrounding it. It cannot be
denied that this company is one of those for whose benefit a greater
harm has been prevented, and as such it comes within the purview of
said penal provision. The acquittal of the accused cannot, therefore, be
deemed a bar to a civil action against this company because its civil
liability is completely divorced from the criminal liability of the accused.
The rule regarding reservation of the right to file a separate civil action
does not apply to it.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby modified as follows: it is
affirmed with regard to defendants Julito Sto. Domingo and Igmidio
Rico; but it is reserved with regard to defendants Standard Vacuum Oil
Company and Rural Transit Company, with costs.
G.R. No. L-47722
THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and
appellants.
PHILIPPINES,
ALBERTO
plaintiff-appellee,
GALANTA,
defendants-
MORAN, J.:
Charged with the crime of murder of one Serapio Tecson, the accused
Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta, chief of police of Cabanatuan
and corporal of the Philippine Constabulary, respectively, were, after
due trial, found guilty by the lower court of homicide through reckless
imprudence and were sentenced each to an indeterminate penalty of
from one year and six months to two years and two months of prison
correccional and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the
deceased in the amount of P1,000. Defendants appealed separately
from this judgment.
In the afternoon of December 24, 1938. Captain Godofredo Monsod,
Constabulary Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received
from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information
received escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in
Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." Captain Monsod accordingly called
for his first sergeant and asked that he be given four men. Defendant
corporal Alberto Galanta, and privates Nicomedes Oralo, Venancio
Serna and D. Fernandez, upon order of their sergeant, reported at the
office of the Provincial Inspector where they were shown a copy of the
above-quoted telegram and a newspaper clipping containing a picture
of Balagtas. They were instructed to arrest Balagtas and, if
overpowered, to follow the instruction contained in the telegram. The
same instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis who was
likewise called by the Provincial Inspector. When the chief of police was
asked whether he knew one Irene, a bailarina, he answered that he
knew one of loose morals of the same name. Upon request of the
Provincial Inspector, the chief of police tried to locate some of his men
to guide the constabulary soldiers in ascertaining Balagtas'
facts as they then appeared to him, and such facts justified his act of
killing. In the instant case, appellants, unlike the accused in the
instances cited, found no circumstances whatsoever which would press
them to immediate action. The person in the room being then asleep,
appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity
without hazard to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest
if any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim was
unarmed, according to Irene Requinea. This, indeed, is the only
legitimate course of action for appellants to follow even if the victim
was really Balagtas, as they were instructed not to kill Balagtas at sight
but to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive only if resistance or
aggression is offered by him.
Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such
force as is reasonably necessary to secure and detain the offender,
overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he
escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm (People vs. Delima, 46
Phil, 738), yet he is never justified in using unnecessary force or in
treating him with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means
when the arrest could be effected otherwise (6 C.J.S., par. 13, p. 612).
The doctrine is restated in the new Rules of Court thus: "No
unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest,
and the person arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint
than is necessary for his detention." (Rule 109, sec. 2, par. 2). And a
peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses
unnecessary force or violence in making an arrest (5 C.J., p. 753;
U.S.vs. Mendoza, 2 Phil., 109). It may be true that Anselmo Balagtas
was a notorious criminal, a life-termer, a fugitive from justice and a
menace to the peace of the community, but these facts alone
constitute no justification for killing him when in effecting his arrest, he
offers no resistance or in fact no resistance can be offered, as when he
is asleep. This, in effect, is the principle laid down, although upon
different facts, in U.S. vs. Donoso (3 Phil., 234, 242).
It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal "must be taken by
storm" without regard to his right to life which he has by such notoriety
already forfeited. We may approve of this standard of official conduct
where the criminal offers resistance or does something which places
his captors in danger of imminent attack. Otherwise we cannot see
how, as in the present case, the mere fact of notoriety can make the
life of a criminal a mere trifle in the hands of the officers of the law.
Notoriety rightly supplies a basis for redoubled official alertness and
vigilance; it never can justify precipitate action at the cost of human
life. Where, as here, the precipitate action of the appellants has cost an
innocent life and there exist no circumstances whatsoever to warrant
action of such character in the mind of a reasonably prudent man,
condemnation not condonation should be the rule; otherwise we
should offer a premium to crime in the shelter of official actuation.
The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence,
the killing being intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence,
the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply
the incident of another act performed without malice. (People vs. Sara,
55 Phil., 939). In the words of Viada, "para que se celifique un hecho de
imprudencia es preciso que no haya mediado en el malicia ni intencion
alguna de daar; existiendo esa intencion, debera calificarse el hecho
del delito que ha producido, por mas que no haya sido la intencion del
agente el causar un mal de tanta gravedad como el que se produjo."
(Tomo 7, Viada Codigo Penal Comentado, 5.a ed. pag. 7). And, as once
THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MANUEL BERONILLA, FILIPINO VELASCO, POLICARPIO PACULDO,
and JACINTO ADRIATICO, defendants-appellants.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This is an appeal by accused Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo,
Filipino Velasco, and Jacinto Adriatico from the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Abra (Criminal Case No. 70) convicting them of murder
for the execution of Arsenio Borjal in the evening of April 18, 1945, in
the town of La Paz , Province of Abra.
Arsenio Borjal was the elected mayor of La Paz, Abra, at the outbreak
of war, and continued to serve as Mayor during the Japanese
occupation, until March 10, 1943, when he moved to Bangued because
3RD
MILITARY
INFANTRY,
DISTRICT
USAFIP
R.
H.
15th
Inf.,
(Sgd.)
MANUEL
Military Mayor, La Paz, Abra
ARNOLD
PA
BERONILLA
(Exhibit 8, 8-a)
and on the night of the same day, April 18, 1945, Beronilla ordered the
execution of Borjal. Jacinto Adriatico acted as executioner and Antonio
Palope as grave digger. Father Luding of the Roman Catholic Church
was asked to administer the last confession to the prisoner, while
Father Filipino Velasco of the Aglipayan Church performed the last rites
over Borjal's remains. Immediately after the execution, Beronilla
reported the matter to Col. Arnold who in reply to Beronilla's report,
sent him the following message:
HEADQUARTERS
15TH
In the Field
Charges
337
Against
3RD
MILITARY
INFANTRY,
DISTRICT
USAFIP
22 April 1945
Msg.
Subject:
Report
and
To: Military Mayor Beronilla
(Sgd.)
Lieut.-Colonel,
Commanding
BERONILLA
No.
information
Re
Borjal
398
case
16 April 1945
Msg.
No.
Subject:
Arsenio
Borjal,
To: Military Mayor of La Paz, Abra.
(Sgd.)
Lieut.-Colonel,
Commanding
R.
H.
15th
Inf.,
ARNOLD
PA
Trial proceeded against the rest of the defendants; and on July 10,
1950, the Court below rendered judgment, acquitting the members of
the jury and the grave digger Antonio Palope on the ground that they
did not participated in the killing of Arsenio Borjal; acquitting
defendants Jesus Labuguen, Felix Alverne, Severo Afos, and Lauro
Parado upon insufficiency of evidence to establish their participation in
the crime; but convicting defendants Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio
Paculdo, Filipino Velasco, and Jacinto Adriatico as conspirator and coprincipals of the crime of murder, and sentencing them to suffer
imprisonment of from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day ofreclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of Arsenio Borjal
jointly and severally in the amount of P4,000 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and each to pay one fourth of the
costs. In convicting said defendants the Court a quo found that while
the crime committed by them fell within the provisions of the Amnesty
Proclamation, they were not entitled to the benefits thereof because
the crime was committed after the expiration of the time limit fixed by
the amnesty proclamation;: i.e., that the deceased Arsenio Borjal was
executed after the liberation of La Paz, Abra.
In view of the sentence meted by the Court below, the accused
Beronilla, Paculdo, Velasco and Adriatico appealed to this Court.
The records are ample to sustain the claim of the defense that the
arrest, prosecution and trial of the late Arsenio Borjal were done
pursuant to express orders of the 15th Infantry Headquarters. (Exhibit
9 and 12-a), instructing all military mayors under its jurisdiction to
gather evidence against puppet officials and to appoint juries of at
least 12 bolomen to try the accused and find them guilty by two thirds
vote. It is to be noted that Arsenio Borjal was specifically named in the
list of civilian officials to be prosecuted (Exhibit 12-b).
In truth, the prosecution does not seriously dispute that the trial and
sentencing of Borjal was done in accordance with instructions of
superior military authorities, altho it point to irregularities that were
due more to ignorance of legal processes than personal animosity
against Borjal. The state, however, predicates its case principally on
the existence of the radiogram Exhibit H from Col. Volckmann, overall
area commander, to Lt. Col. Arnold, specifically calling attention to the
illegality of Borjal's conviction and sentence, and which the prosecution
claims was known to the accused Beronilla. Said message is as follows:
"Message:
VOLCKMANN TO ARNOLD CLN UNDERSTAND THAT MUNICIPALITIES
OF ABRA HAVE ORGANIZED JURY SYSTEM PD BELIEVE THAT THIS
BODY IS ILLEGAL AND CANNOT TRY PUNISHMENTS THEREOF PD
SPECIFIC INSTANCE IS BROUGHT TO YOUR ATTENTION FRO
PROPER AND IMMEDIATE ACTION ON ONE ARSENIO BORJAL OF LA
PAZ WHO HAS BEEN TRIED CMA CONVICTED AND SENTENCED TO
BE HANGED PD REPORT ACTION TAKEN BY YOU ON THIS MATTER
PD MSG BEGINS CLN"
(EXH. H)
The crucial question thus becomes whether or not this message,
originally sent to Arnold's quarters in San Esteban, Ilocos Sur, was
relayed by the latter to appellant Beronilla in La Paz, Abra, on the
morning of April 18, 1945, together with the package of records of
Borjal's trial that was admittedly returned to and received by Beronilla
on that date, after review thereof by Arnold (Exhibit 8-8-a). Obviously,
if the Volckmann message was known to Beronilla, his ordering the
execution of Borjal on the night of April 18, 1945 can not be justified.
We have carefully examined the evidence on this important issue, and
find no satisfactory proof that Beronilla did actually receive the
radiogram Exhibit H or any copy thereof. The accused roundly denied
it. The messenger, or "runner", Pedro Molina could not state what
papers were enclosed in the package he delivered to Beronilla on that
morning in question, nor could Francisco Bayquen (or Bayken), who
claimed to have been present at the delivery of the message, state the
contents thereof.
The only witness who asserted that Beronilla received and read the
Volckmann message, Exhibit H, was Rafael Balmaceda, a relative of
Borjal, who claimed to have been, as Beronilla's bodyguard, present at
the receipt of the message and to have read it over Beronilla's
shoulder. This testimony, however, can not be accorded credence, for
the reason that in the affidavit executed by this witness before Fiscal
Antonio of Abra (Exhibit 4), Balmaceda failed to make any mention of
Barrioquinto,* G. R. Nos. L-2011 and 2267, June 30, 1951). Actually, the
conduct of the appellants does not dispose that these appellants were
impelled by malice (dolo). The arrest and trial of Borjal were made
upon express orders of the higher command; the appellants allowed
Borjal to be defended by counsel, one of them (attorney Jovito
Barreras) chosen by Borjal's sister; the trial lasted nineteen (19) days;
it was suspended when doubts arose about its legality, and it was not
resumed until headquarters (then in Langangilang, Abra) authorized its
resumption and sent an observer (Esteban Cabanos, of the S-5) to the
proceedings, and whose suggestions on procedure were followed; and
when the verdict of guilty was rendered and death sentence imposed,
the records were sent to Arnold's headquarters for review, and Borjal
was not punished until the records were returned eight days later with
the statement of Arnold that "whatever disposition you make of the
case is hereby approved" (Exhibit 8), which on its face was an assent to
the verdict and the sentence. The lower Court, after finding that the
late Arsenio Borjal had really committed treasonable acts, (causing
soldiers and civilians to be tortured, and hidden American officers to be
captured by the Japanese) expressly declared that "the Court is
convinced that it was not for political or personal reason that the
accused decided to kill Arsenio Borjal" (Decision, p. 9; Record, p. 727).
It appearing that the charge is the heinous crime of murder, and that
the accused-appellants acted upon orders, of a superior officers that
they, as military subordinates, could not question, and obeyed in good
faith, without being aware of their illegality, without any fault or
negligence on their part, we can not say that criminal intent has been
established (U. S. vs. Catolico, 18 Phil., 507; Peo. vs. Pacana, 47 Phil.,
48; Sent. of the Tribunal Supremo of Spain, 3 July 1886; 7 January 1901;
24 March 1900; 21 Feb. 1921; 25 March 1929). Actus non facit reum
nisi mens si rea.
To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made
such by statute, be accompanied by a criminal intent, or by such
negligence or indifference to duty or to consequence, as, in law, is
equivalent to criminal intent. The maxim is, actus non facit reum,
nisi mens rea-a crime is not committed if the minds of the person
performing the act complained of be innocent. (U. S. vs. Catolico,
18 Phil., 507).
But even assuming that the accused-appellant did commit crime with
they are charged, the Court below should not have denied their claim
to the benefits of the Guerrilla Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 (42 Off.
Gaz., 2072)on the ground that the slaying of Arsenio Borjal took place
after actual liberation of the area from enemy control and occupation.
The evidence on record regarding the date of liberation of La Paz, Abra,
is contradictory. The Military Amnesty Commission that decided the
case of one of the original accused Jesus Labuguen, held that La Paz,
Abra, was liberated on July 1, 1945, according to its records; and this
finding was accepted by Judge Letargo when he dismissed the case
against said accused on March 15, 1949. On the other hand, Judge
Bocar and Hilario, who subsequently took cognizance of the case,
relied on Department Order No. 25, of the Department of the Interior,
dated August 12, 1948, setting the liberation of the Province of Abra on
April 4, 1945, fifteen days before Borjal was slain. The two dates are
not strictly contradictory; but given the benefit of the Presidential
directive to the Amnesty Commissions (Adm. Order No. 11, of October
2, 1946) that "any reasonable doubt as to whether a given case falls
within the (amnesty) proclamation shall be resolved in favor of the
accused" (42 Off. Gaz., 2360), as was done in People vs. Gajo, Phil.,
107 46 Off. Gaz., (No. 12) p. 6093.
For the reasons stated, the judgment appealed from is reversed and
the appellants are acquitted, with costs de oficio.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-31563 January 16, 1930
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.
LUCIANO BARROGA Y SALGADO, Defendant-Appellant.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
Convicted of the crime of falsification of a private document, the
defendant appeals from the judgment sentencing him to one year,
eight months and twenty-one days of prision correccional, to indemnify
the Compaia General de Tabacos de Filipinas in the sum of
P10,857.11, with subsidiary imprisonment, the accessaries of law, and
the costs.
The errors attributed by the appellant to the trial court are: