Conflict of Laws Cases 1950-1960

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Saura Import and Export Co., Inc. v. Bibiano L. Meer

GR No. L-2927 February 26, 1951
Philippine Refining v. Ledesma
GR No. L-2193 April 27, 1951
In re: Testate Estate of the deceased Jose B. Suntay
GR Nos. L-3087 and L-3088 July 31, 1954
Pacific Micronisian Line v. Del Rosario
GR No. L-7154 October 23, 1954
King Mau Wu v. Sycip
GR No. L-5897 April 23, 1954
Arca v. Javier
GR No. L-6768 July 31, 1954
De los Santos and Astraquillo v. Republic
GR No. L-4818 February 28, 1955
Cayetano Liwanag v. Robert Hamill
GR No. L-7881 February 27, 1956
Paul Mac Donald v. National City Bank of NY
GR No. L-7991 May 21, 1956
Cu Unjieng Sons v. Board of Tax Appeals
GR No. L-6296 September 29, 1956
Mamerto Corre v. Guadalupe Corre
GR No. L-10128 November 13, 1956
Lao Ichong et al. v. Jaime Hernandez
101 il 1155 May 31, 1957
Eastboard Navigation v. Juan Ysmael Co.
102 Phil 1 September 10, 1957
Ly Giok Ha et al. v. Galang
101 Phil 459 May 17, 1957
American Bible Society v. City of Manila
101 Phil 386 April 30, 1957
Claudina Vda de Villaruel v. Manila Motor
104 Phil 926 December 13, 1958
Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao v. The Land
Registration Commission
102 Phil 596 December 20, 1957
Lim Siok Huey v. Alfredo Lapiz
103 Phil 930 May 28, 1958
Lee Suan Ay et al. v. Galang
106 Phil 707 December 23, 1959

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Ko Wai Me v. Galang
106 Phil 661 November 28, 1959

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Testate Estate of C.O. Bohanan v. Bohanan et al.,

G.R. No. L-12105 January 30, 1960

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Benito Lim v. Herbert Brownwell

107 Phil 344 March 24, 1960

SAURA IMPORT AND EXPORT CO., INC., vs. BIBIANO L. MEER

G.R. No. L-2927
(2/26/51)

Doctrine: While on army bases of installations within Philippines, the

goods purchased were, in contemplation of law, on foreign soil. The result
was that when Saura, after acquiring title to such goods, brought them
outside of those bases or depots, there was importation in the ordinary
sense.

FACTS: This is an action to recover a tax paid in protest by Saura Import and
Export Co. Inc.
Saura Import and Export Inc bought from the Foreign Liquidation Commission,
a United States Government agency, jeeps, weapons carriers, and trucks, all of
which, at the time of purchase, were located in different United States Army
depots in the Philippines. Immediately thereafter, Saura had the purchases
delivered to it which in turn sold it to third persons in the Philippines.
LOWER COURT: Saura Import and Export Inc is an importer and levied on the
motor vehicles purchased the percentage tax as prescribed in Sections 185 and
186 of Commonwealth Act No. 466.
ISSUE: Whether or not Saura is an importer.
RATIO: Yes, Saura is an importer. The sales it made to third persons were
original sales taxable under the sections mentioned above.
At time of Sauras purchase, the United States Army in the Philippines was a
belligerent occupant, at least of army bases, army depots, and army
installations it was using for the prosecution of the existing war. By section 280
of the Rules of Land Warfare, belligerent occupation (in this case by the United

States Army) ceased only when "the occupant evacuated the district or was
driven out by the enemy, or by levee en massee, and the legitimate government
actually resumed its funtions."
By political relationship between the Philippines and between the United States
and by reason of war, the United States Government on that date enjoyed
jurisdictional rights over certain areas of the Philippine territory and over
military goods brought here and intended for the United States Army. While on
army bases of installations within Philippines those goods were, in
contemplation of law, on foreign soil. The result was that when Saura, after
acquiring title to such goods, brought them outside of those bases or depots,
there was importation in the ordinary sense.

PHILIPPINE REFINING COMPANY, INC. vs. CESAR LEDESMA

GR. No. L-2913
(4/27/51)
Doctrine: Under the Haw Pia doctrine, a pre-war debtor who had paid his debt
during the Japanese occupation with the authorized office/body of the
occupant is released from all his liability to the former creditor.

FACTS: Philippine Refining Corporation is a domestic corporation operating as

an oil manufacturer and refiner, with its capital stock being owned mostly by
British and Dutch interests.chan
On February 15, 1939, the Philippine Refining Company sold to the defendant
Cesar Ledesma, a Filipino citizen, three parcels of land in Paranaque, Rizal for
the amount of P413,644. Ledesma delivered P103,411 in cash, and executed six
promissory notes for the balance, each for the amount of P51,705.50, maturing
successively on February 15 of the years 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943, 1944, and
1945. To secure payment of the notes, Ledesma mortgaged the three parcels of
land. The first two promissory notes were paid. However, during the Japanese
occupation, Ledesma satisfied the remaining four promissory notes to the Office
of the Enemy Property Custodian of the Japanese Army, upon previous demand
by the later. The payment was made in Japanese military notes. Consequently,
the Japanese authorities caused the mortgage to be cancelled and this was duly
noted in proper Registry of Deeds.

LOWER COURT: The payment made by Ledesma is valid as per the Haw Pia
doctrine which absolved a pre-war debtor of the China Banking Corporation
who had paid his debt during the Japanese occupation with Japanese military
notes to the Bank of Taiwan, that had been designated by the Japanese Military
to liquidate the aforesaid bank, an enemy-owned institution established in
occupied territory.
ISSUE: Whether or not the payment is valid as the present controversy involved
different facts from the Haw Pia controversy as the the payment was not
delivered to the Bank of Taiwan, or any other bank.
SUPREME COURT: Yes, the payment made by Ledesma is valid. He is released
from all his liability to his former creditor, the Philippine Refining Corporation.
The CFI is correct in relying in the Haw Pia doctrine. Upon the strength of this
doctrine, the Court had also validated payments under similar circumstances in
HSBC v Samanillo.

IN RE: TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED JOSE B. SUNTAY. SILVINO

SUNTAY VS IN RE: INTESTATE ESTATE
G.R. Nos. L-3087 and L-3088 (7/31/54)
Doctrine: Wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws
of such country, may be allowed, filed, and recorded by the proper Court of First
Instance in the Philippines.
FACTS: Jose Suntay, a Filipino citizen and resident of the Philippines, died in
the city of Amoy, Fookien province, Republic of China, leaving real and personal
properties in the Philippines and a house in Amoy, Fookien province, China,
and children by his first marriage with Manuela T. Cruz namely, Apolonio,
Concepcion, Angel, Manuel, Federico, Ana, Aurora, Emiliano, and children with
his second marriage to Maria Natividad Lim Billian namely Jose, Jr. and
Silvino.
Intestate proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan.
Apolonio Suntay was declared administrator. After his death, Federico C.
Suntay was appointed administrator of the estate. Maria Natividad filed a

petition in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the probate of a last will
and testament claimed to have been executed and signed in the Philippines on
November 1929 by the late Jose B. Suntay. This petition was denied because of
the loss of said will and of the insufficiency of the evidence to establish the loss
of the said will. An appeal was taken from said order denying the probate of the
will and this Court held the evidence before the probate court sufficient to prove
the loss of the will and remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan for the further proceedings.
Silvino Suntay, claiming that he had found among the files, records and
documents of his late father a will and testament in Chinese characters
executed and signed by the deceased on 4 January 1931 and that the same was
filed, recorded and probated in the Amoy district court, Province of Fookien,
China, filed a petition in the intestate proceedings praying for the probate of the
will executed in the Philippines or of the will executed in Amoy, Fookien, China.
Witnesses were presented to prove the existence of the will allegedly left by Jose
Suntay.
LOWER COURT: Dissallowed alleged will and testament executed in Manila on
November 1929, and the alleged last will and testament executed in Kulangsu,
Amoy, China, on 4 January 1931, by Jose B. Suntay.
ISSUE: Whether or not the wills allegedly left by Jose SUntay can be probated.
RATIO: Upheld decision of the Court of First Instance. Granting that there was
a will duly executed by Jose B. Suntay, and that it was in existence at the time
of, and note revoked before his death, the testimonies of the witnesses
presented fall falls short of the legal requirement that the provisions of the lost
will must be "clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses."
Credible witnesses mean competent witnesses and those who testify to facts
from or upon hearsay are neither competent nor credible witnesses.
As to the will claimed to have been executed on 4 January 1931 in Amoy,
China, the law on the point in Rule 78. Section 1 of the rule provides:
Wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to the
laws of such country, may be allowed, filed, and recorded by the
proper Court of First Instance in the Philippines.
Section 2 provides:
When a copy of such will and the allowance thereof, duly
authenticated, is filed with a petition for allowance in the

Philippines, by the executor or other person interested, in the

court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for
the hearing, and cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an
original will presented for allowance.
Section 3 provides:
If it appears at the hearing that the will should be allowed in the
Philippines, the court shall so allow it, and a certificate of its
allowance, signed by the Judge, and attested by the seal of the
courts, to which shall be attached a copy of the will, shall be filed
and recorded by the clerk, and the will shall have the same effect
as if originally proved and allowed in such court.
The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China, is a probate court
must be proved. The law of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of
wills must also be proved. The legal requirements for the execution of a valid
will in China in 1931 should also be established by competent evidence.
However, there was no evidence presented to prove this point. The unverified
answers to the questions propounded by counsel for the appellant to the Consul
General of the Republic of China, objected to by counsel for the appellee, are
inadmissible, because apart from the fact that the office of Consul General does
not qualify and make the person who holds it an expert on the Chinese law on
procedure in probate matters, if the same be admitted, the adverse party would
be deprived of his right to confront and cross-examine the witness. Consuls are
appointed to attend to trade matters. Moreover, it appears that all the
proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy were for the purpose of
taking the testimony of two attesting witnesses to the will and that the order of
the municipal district court of Amoy does not purport to probate the will. In the
absence of proof that the municipal district court of Amoy is a probate court
and on the Chinese law of procedure in probate matters, it may be presumed
that the proceedings in the matter of probating or allowing a will in the Chinese
courts are the a deposition or to a perpetuation of testimony, and even if it were
so it does not measure same as those provided for in our laws on the subject. It
is a proceeding in rem and for the validity of such proceedings personal notice
or by publication or both to all interested parties must be made. The interested
parties in the case were known to reside in the Philippines. The evidence shows
that no such notice was received by the interested parties residing in the
Philippines
The order of the municipal district court of Amoy, China, does not purport to
probate or allow the will which was the subject of the proceedings. In view
thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have been
done in accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and

principles followed in the probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, the

authenticated transcript of proceedings held in the municipal district court of
Amoy, China, cannot be deemed and accepted as proceedings leading to the
probate or allowance of a will and, therefore, the will referred to therein cannot
be allowed, filed and recorded by a competent court of this country.

PACIFIC MICRONISIAN LINE, INC. vs DEL ROSARIO

G.R. No. L-7154 (10/23/54)

Doctrine: In order that services may be effected upon private corporations, it is

required that the foreign corporation be one which is doing business in the
Philippines. This is a sine qua non requirement. This fact must be first
established in order that summons can be made and jurisdiction acquired.
FACTS: Alfonsa Pelingon filed a claim for compensation for herself and her two
minor children with the Workmen's Compensation Commission against the
Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc., who refused to entertain the claim on the ground
that said company was not the employer of the deceased husband of the
claimant. The Workmen's Compensation Commission, believing that the Pacific
Far East Line, Inc., a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the
Philippines, was an agent of petitioner with authority to receive service of
process, served notice of the claim on an official of said foreign corporation who
in turn forwarded the notice to petitioner even if the latter was not an agent of,
nor was it authorized to accept service of process in behalf of, said petitioner.
Pacific filed a special appearance with the Workmen's Compensation
Commission for the sole purpose of asking for the dismissal of the claim on the
ground that the Commission had no jurisdiction over it because it is a foreign
corporation not domiciled in this country, it is not licensed to engage and is not
engaging in business therein, has no office in the Philippines, and is not
represented by any agent authorized to receive summons or any other judicial
process in its name and behalf.
LOWER COURT: The Workmen's Compensation Commission has jurisdiction
over the petitioner. Hence, the case can be tried on its merits.
ISSUE: Whether or not, petitioner, as a private foreign corporation not doing
business in the Philippines, can be brought within the jurisdiction of our courts
by serving the summons upon the agent who represented it in entering into the
contract of employment with the deceased husband.
RATIO: The pertinent rule to be considered is section 14, Rule 7, of the Rules of
Court, which refers to service upon private foreign corporations. This section
provides:
SEC. 14. Service upon private foreign corporations. If the defendant is a
foreign corporation, or a non-resident joint stock company or association,
doing business in the Philippines, service may be made on its resident

agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or, if there be
no such agent, on the government official designated by law to that
effect, or on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines.
The above section provides for three modes of effecting services upon a private
corporation, namely: (1) by serving upon the agent designated in accordance
with law to accept service of summons; (2) if there be no special agent, by
serving on the government official designated by law to that effect; and (3) by
serving on any officer or agent within the Philippines. But, it should be noted,
in order that services may be effected in the manner above stated, said section
also requires that the foreign corporation be one which is doing business in the
Philippines. This is a sine qua non requirement. This fact must be first
established in order that summons can be made and jurisdiction acquired. This
is not only clear in the rule but is reflected in a recent decision of this Court.
We there said that "as long as foreign private corporation does or engages in
business in this jurisdiction, it should and will be amenable to process and the
jurisdiction of the local courts."
Petitioner is a corporation exclusively engaged in the business of carrying goods
and passengers by sea between the territory of Guam and the Trust Territories
of the Pacific Islands and for that purpose it was operating a fleet of vessels
plying between those ports or territories. Petitioner has no property or office in
the Philippines, nor is it licensed to do business in the Philippines. And the only
act it did here was to secure the services of Luceno Pelingon to act as cook and
chief steward in one of its vessels authorizing to that effect the Luzon
Stevedoring Co., Inc. a domestic corporation. Petitioner engaged the services of
Pelingon not as part of the operation of its business but merely to employ him
as member of the crew in one of its ships. That act apparently is an isolated
one, incidental, or casual, and "not of a character to indicate a purpose to
engage in business" within the meaning of the rule. The Commission has no
jurisdiction over the petitioner and, therefore, the present proceedings cannot
continue and should be dismissed.

KING MAU WU v FRANCISCO SYCIP

GR No. L-5897 (4/23/54)

Doctrine: A non-resident may sue a resident in the courts of this country

where the defendant may be summoned and his property leviable upon
execution in the case of a favorable, final, and executory judgment.

FACTS: This is an action to collect filed by King Maw Wu against Francisco

Sycip for the amount of P59,082.92, together with lawful interests from 14
October 1947, the date of the written demand for payment, and costs.
King Mau Wuu, agent of Francisco Sycip, sold and delivered 1,000 tons of
coconut oil emulsion to Jas Maxwell Fasset. Fasset in turn assigned it to
Fortrade Corporation. Under an agency agreement executed in New York, which
was addresse and accepted by Francisco Sycip on November 22, 1945, King
Mau Wu was made the exclusive agent of Sycip in the sale of coconut oil and its
derivaties outside the Philippines and was to be paid 2 percent on the actual
sale price of sales obtained thru his efforts, in addition to 50 percent of the
difference between the authorized sale price and the actual sale price.
King Mau Wu claims that for the sale to Fasset, he is entitled under the agency
contract to a commission of 2 percent on the total actual sale price of 1,000
tons of coconut oil emulsion and 50 per cent of the difference between the
authorized sale price of $350 per ton and the actual selling price of $400 per
ton. As Sycip already made previous payments, King Mau Wu is just collecting
on balance payments due to him.

Sycip, on the other hand, contends that the sales transaction was not covered
by the agency contract dated November 22 as the sales was agreed upon on
October 16 and that it was an independent and separate transaction for which
King Mau Wu had been duly compensated.
LOWER COURT: Rendered judgment in favor of King Mau Wu and denied both
the motion for reconsideration and new trial filed by Sycip. Sycip filed an
appeal, contending that the Court of First Instance of Manila has no
jurisdiction over the case as the agency contract was executed in New York.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction.
RATIO: CFI has jurisdiction. A non-resident may sue a resident in the courts of
this country where the defendant may be summoned and his property leviable
upon execution in the case of a favorable, final, and executory judgment. It is a
personal action for the collection of a sum of money which the Courts of First
Instance have jurisdiction to try and decide. There is no conflict of laws involved
in the case, because it is only a question of enforcing an obligation created by or
arising from contract; and unless the enforcement of the contract be against
public policy of the forum, it must be enforced.
The plaintiff is entitled to collect P7,589.88 for commission and P50,000 for
one-half of the overprice, or a total of P57,589.88, lawful interests thereon from
the date of the filing of the complaint, and costs in both instances.

SALUD R. ARCA and ALFREDO JAVIER JR., vs. ALFREDO JAVIER,

G.R. No. L-6768: July 31, 1954
Doctrine: One of the essential conditions for the validity of a decree of divorce is
that the court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and in order that this
may be acquired, plaintiff must be domiciled in good faith in the State in which it
is granted
FACTS: Alfredo Javier (Alfredo) was a native born citizen of the Philippines who,
in 1937, married Salud R. Arca (Salud), another Filipino citizen. Before their
marriage they had already a child, Alfredo Javier, Jr., who thereby became
legitimated. In 1927 appellant enlisted in the U.S. Navy and in 1938 sailed for
the United States aboard a navy ship in connection with his service leaving

behind his wife and child, and on August 13, 1940, he filed an action for divorce
in the Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama, U.S.A., alleging as ground
abandonment by his wife. Having received a copy of the complaint, Salud filed
an answer alleging, among other things, that appellant was not a resident of
Mobile County, but of Naic, Cavite, Philippines, and that it was not true that the
cause of their separation was abandonment on her part but that appellant was
in the United States, without her, because he was then enlisted in the U.S.
Navy. Nevertheless, the Circuit Court of Mobile County rendered judgment
granting appellant a decree of divorce on April 9, 1941. After securing a divorce
Alfredo married Thelma Francis, an American citizen. The latter, however,
obtained a divorce from him for reasons not disclosed by the evidence. Alfredo
Javier returned to the Philippines armed with two decrees of divorce one
against his first wife Salud R. Arca and the other against him by his second wife
Thelma Francis. When returned to the Philippines and married Maria Odvina of
Naic, Cavite. At the instance of plaintiff Salud R. Arca an information for
bigamy was filed by the City Fiscal of Manila on July 25, 1950 against
defendant Alfredo Javier.
Lower Court Ruling: Alfredo was acquitted of the charge of Bigamy predicated
on the proposition that the marriage of defendant Alfredo Javier with the Maria
Odvina was made in all good faith and in the honest belief.
Issues:
1. Does this decree have a valid effect in this jurisdiction? NO
2. Whether Alfredo is guilty of bigamy YES
Ratio: This court has had already occasion to pass upon questions of similar
nature in a number of cases and its ruling has invariably been to deny validity
to the decree. In essence, it was held that one of the essential conditions for the
validity of a decree of divorce is that the court must have jurisdiction over the
subject matter and in order that this may be acquired, plaintiff must be
domiciled in good faith in the State in which it is granted (Cousins Hix vs.
Fluemer, 55 Phil., 851, 856).
It is true that Salud R. Arca filed an answer in the divorce case instituted at the
Mobile County in view of the summons served upon her in this jurisdiction, but
this action cannot be interpreted as placing her under the jurisdiction of the
court because its only purpose was to impugn the claim of appellant that his
domicile or legal residence at that time was Mobile County, and to show that the
ground of desertion imputed to her was baseless and false. Such answer should
be considered as a special appearance the purpose of which is to impugn the
jurisdiction of the court over the case.

In deciding the Canson case, this court did not overlook the other cases
previously decided on the matter, but precisely took good note of them. Among
the cases invoked are Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855; Cousins Hix vs. Fluemer,
55 Phil., 851, and Barretto Gonzales vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil., 67.
In the cases just mentioned, this court laid down the following doctrines:
It is established by the great weight of authority that the court of a
country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and to which one or
both of them may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce
has no jurisdiction to determine their matrimonial status; and a divorce
granted by such a court is not entitled to recognition elsewhere. (See
Note to Succession of Benton, 59 L. R. A., 143) The voluntary
appearance of the defendant before such a tribunal does not invest the
court with jurisdiction. (Andrews vs. Andrews, 188 U. S., 14; 47 L. ed.,
366.)
It follows that, to give a court jurisdiction on the ground of the plaintiff's
residence in the State or country of the judicial forum, his residence
must be bona fide. (14 Cyc. 817, 181.)" (Ramirez vs. Gmur, 82 Phil.,
855.)
But even if his residence had been taken up is good faith, and the court
had acquired jurisdiction to take cognizance of the divorce suit, the
decree issued in his favor is not binding upon the appellant; for the
matrimonial domicile of the spouses being the City of Manila, and no
new domicile having been acquired in West Virginia, the summons made
by publication, she not having entered an appearance in the case, either
personally or by counsel, did not confer jurisdiction upon said court over
her person. (Cousins Hix vs. Fluemer, 55 Phil., 851.)
At all times the matrimonial domicile of this couple has been within the
Philippine Islands and the residence acquired in the State of Nevada by
the husband for the purpose of securing a divorce was not a bona fide
residence and did not confer jurisdiction upon the court of the State to
dissolve the bonds of matrimony in which he had entered in 1919.
(Barretto Gonzales vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil., 67.)
In the
Mobile
simple
in the
Mobile

light of the foregoing authorities, it cannot therefore be said that the

County Court of Alabama had acquired jurisdiction over the case for the
reason that at the time it was filed appellant's legal residence was then
Philippines. He could not have acquired legal residence or domicile at
County because at that time he was still in the service of the U.S. Navy

and merely rented a room where he used to stay during his occasional shore
leave for shift duty. That he never intended to live there permanently is shown
by the fact that after his marriage to Thelma Francis in 1941, he moved to New
York and after his divorce from Thelma in 1949 and his retirement from the U.S.
Navy, he returned to the Philippines and married Maria Odvina of Naic, Cavite,
where he lived ever since. It may therefore be said that appellant went to Mobile
County, not with the intention of permanently residing there, or of considering
that place as his permanent abode, but for the sole purpose of obtaining divorce
from his wife. Such residence is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the
court.

APOLINARIO G. DE LOS SANTOS and ISABELO ASTRAQUILLO, vs. J.

HOWARD MCGRATH ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
SUCCESSOR TO THE PHILIPPINE ALIEN PROPERTY ADMINISTRATION OF
THE UNITED STATES, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. L-4818, February 28, 1955
Doctrine: The failure of the Philippine government to incorporate its provisions in
our statute books, for a period of almost 45 years, is, to our mind, clear proof of
the unwillingness of our department to change the policy set forth in section 35 of
Act No. 1459.
FACTS:
This action involves the title to 1,600,000 shares of stock of the Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Co., Inc. Plaintiffs contend that De los Santos bought
55,000 shares from Juan Campos, in Manila, early in December, 1942; that he
bought 300,000 shares from Carl Hess; and that, before Christmas of 1942, he
bought 800,000 shares from Carl Hess, this time for the account and benefit of
Astraquillo. By virtue of vesting P-12, dated February 18, 1945, title to the
1,600,000 shares of stock in dispute was, however, vested in the Alien Property
Custodian of the U. S. (hereinafter referred to as the Property Custodian) as
Japanese property. Hence, plaintiffs filed their respective claims with the
Property Custodian. In due course, the Vested Property Claims Committee of
the Philippine Alien Property Administration made a "determination," dated
March 9, 1948, allowing said claims, which were considered and heard jointly
as Claim No. 535, but, upon personal review, the Philippine Alien Property
Administration made by said Committee and decreed that "title to the shares in
question shall remain in the name of the Philippine Alien Property
Administrator." Consequently, plaintiffs instituted the present action to
establish title to the aforementioned shares of stock and pray that judgment be
rendered declaring them lawful owners of said shares of stock, with such
dividends, profits and rights as may have accrued thereto; requiring the
defendant to render accounts and to transfer said shares of stock to plaintiffs'
names; and sentencing the former to pay the costs.
The defendant herein, Attorney General of the U. S., successor to the
"Administrator", contends that prior to the outbreak of the war in the Pacific,
said shares of stock were bought by Vicente Madrigal, in trust for, and for the

benefit of, the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha (hereinafter referred to as the "Mitsuis"), a
corporation organized in accordance with the laws of Japan, the true owner
thereof, with branch office in the Philippines; that on or before March, 1942,
Madrigal delivered the corresponding stock certificates, with his blank
indorsement thereon, to the Mitsuis, which kept said certificates, in the files of
its office in Manila, until the liberation of the latter by the American forces early
in 1945; that the Mitsuis had never sold, or otherwise disposed of, said shares
of stock; and that the stock certificates aforementioned must have been stolen
or looted, therefore, during the emergency resulting from said liberation.
Lower Court Ruling: Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs
Issue:
1. Whether plaintiffs had purchased the shares of stock in question.- NO
Ratio: It appears from the evidence presented that the only evidence on the
alleged sale of the shares of stock in question to the plaintiffs the main issue
in the case at bar is the testimony of Apolinario de los Santos, who now
claims to be the sole owner thereof.
Thus, the issue is based, and must stand or fall, therefore, upon the
uncorroborated testimony of plaintiff Apolinario de los Santos, and the credence
and weight that may be given thereto. Upon a review of the record, we find,
however, that said testimony is highly improbable and inherently weak.
The status of quasi-negotiability generally accorded to, and at present enjoyed
by, certificates of stock, under the Philippine law, is in itself a recognition of the
fact that the certificates are non-negotiable. Instead of sustaining appellees'
claim, section 5 of the uniform Stock Transfer Act, which "gives full negotiability
to certificates of stock," refutes said claim and confirms the non-negotiable
character of stock certificates in the absence of said Unifrom Act, for, obviously,
the same could not have given, negotiability to an instrument already
possessing this attribute prior thereto. Again, apart from being distinct from the
general Corporation Law, the aforementioned Uniform Act is not in force in the
Philippines. In this connection, it should be noted that this special piece of
legislation was adopted in some states of the union as early as the year 1910.
The failure of the Philippine government to incorporate its provisions in our
statute books, for a period of almost 45 years, is, to our mind, clear proof of the
unwillingness of our department to change the policy set forth in section 35 of
Act No. 1459. Needless to say, this fact negates our authority which is limited
to the interpretation of the law, and its application, with all its imperfections
to abandon what the dissenting opinion characterizes as the "civil law

standpoint," and substitute, in lieu thereof, the commercial viewpoint, by

applying said section 5 of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, although not a part of
the law of the land. Indeed, even in matters generally considered as falling
within "commercial territory", the Roman Law concept has not given way in the
Philippines to the Common Law approach, except when there is explicit
statutory provision to the contrary.

CAYETANO B. LIWANAG, vs. ROBERT S. HAMILL, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-7881. February 27, 1956.

Doctrine: Laws of the Philippines continue to be in force in said bases except

when otherwise agreed upon in an agreement.
FACTS: Robert S. Hamill, Major, USAF, Assistant Base Provost Marshal, Clark
Air Force Base, province of Pampanga, filed an amended complaint against
Liwanag for violation of section 174 of the Internal Revenue Code. It is alleged in
the amended complaint that Liwanag, a private individual, without authority
whatsoever, and without paying the corresponding specific tax of TWO PESOS
(P2) per cartoon, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
possess and have in his control seventeen cartoons of imported free of tax
American cigarettes for use only of the US Military and Naval Forces stationed
in the Philippines. The complaint was subscribed and sworn to before Judge
Lorenzo D. Licup. Counsel for Liwanag moved to quash the complaint in the
Justice of the Peace Court, but this was denied. Thereupon Liwanag filed a
petition for prohibition with the Court of First Instance, alleging that Robert S.
Hamill has no personal capacity to subscribe to the complaint and the Justice
of the Peace court, therefore, acquired no jurisdiction to conduct the
preliminary investigation.

Lower Court Ruling: Robert S. Hamill is not a peace officer of the Republic of
the Philippines and, therefore, is not authorized to file a complaint in
accordance with section 2, Rule 106 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
2. Whether a Provost Marshal of Clark Field is a peace officer of the
Republic of the Philippines who is authorized to file a complaint for
violation of the Internal Revenue Code. YES.
Ratio: It is admitted that the Provost Marshal of Clark Field is a peace officer.
Provost Marshals in Army bases are police officers, and they have the powers
and duties of chiefs of police in municipalities.
Under the agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United
States of America, for the establishment of bases by the latter within the
territory of the former, laws of the Philippines continue to be in force in said
bases except when otherwise agreed upon in the agreement. And for the
purpose of hearing cases therein, justices of the peace are appointed and hold
office. They are not appointed by the United Stated of America, but by the
President of the Philippines, subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. But other than justices of the peace, no other officers of the
Republic of the Philippines are appointed in the bases, much less peace officers,
although agents of the Republic of the Philippines may have access in the bases
to see that the laws of the Philippines are enforced.
But the question of peace and order within the bases is left to peace officers of
the United States of America, the chief of whom is the provost marshal. To allow
peace officers of said Republic to go therein and make arrests or institute
prosecutions for violation of Philippine laws would certainly give occasion for
conflicts of authority. So no provision is made for the appointment of peace
officers of the Republic of the Philippines within the bases, and it is understood
that the enforcement of Philippines laws is left to the officers of the United
States of America.
It is illogical to deny to these peace officers (of the United States) the power to
prosecute violations of Philippine laws in the military bases. Since these bases
were established the Republic of the Philippines has abstained from appointing
peace officers of its own; this must have been with the understanding that the
execution of Philippine laws would be taken care of therein by the peace officers
of the United States of America. The absence of peace officers of the Republic of
the Philippines in these bases is due to the fact that the enforcement and
prosecution of offenses against Philippine laws was intended to be lodged with
the peace officers of the United States of America.

PAUL MACDONALD, ET AL., vs. NATIONAL CITY BANK OF NEW YORK

G.R. No. L-7991: May 21, 1956.

Doctrine: While an unregistered commercial partnership has no juridical

personality, nevertheless, where two or more persons attempt to create a
partnership failing to comply with all the legal formalities, the law considers them
as partners and the association is a partnership in so far as it is a favorable to
third persons, by reason of the equitable principle of estoppel.

FACTS: Prior to June 3, 1949, Defendant Stasikinocey had an overdraft

account with The National City Bank of New York, a foreign banking association
duly licensed to do business in the Philippines. On June 3, 1949, the overdraft
showed a balance of P6,134.92 against Stasikinocey or the Cardinal Rattan,
which account, due to the failure of the partnership to make the required
payment, was converted into an ordinary loan for which the corresponding
promissory joint note non-negotiable was executed by Louis F. da Costa for and
in the name of the Cardinal Rattan, Louis F. da Costa and Alan Gorcey. This
was secured on June 7, 1949, by a chattel mortgage executed by Louis F. da
Costa, Jr., General Partner for and in the name of Stasikinocey, alleged to be a
duly registered Philippine partnership, doing business under the name and
style of Cardinal Rattan.
The mortgage deed was fully registered by the mortgagee on June 11, 1949, in
the Office of the Register of Deeds for the province of Rizal, at Pasig and among
other provisions it contained the following: (a) That the mortgagor shall not sell
or otherwise dispose of the said chattels without the mortgagees written
consent; and (b) That the mortgagee may foreclose the mortgage at any time,
after breach of any condition thereof, the mortgagor waiving the 30- day notice
of foreclosure.
The National City Bank of New York, Respondent herein learned that the
partnership Stasikinocey transferred to William Shaeffer, from the latter to Paul
McDonald, and from Paul McDonald to Benjamin Gonzales, of the vehicles
previously pledged by Stasikinocey to the Respondent. Thus Respondent filed an
action against Stasikinocey and its alleged partners Gorcey and Da Costa, as
well as Paul McDonald and Benjamin Gonzales, to recover its credit and to
foreclose the corresponding chattel mortgage. McDonald and Gonzales were
made Defendants because they claimed to have a better right over the pledged
vehicle.
Lower Court Ruling: Judgment in favor of the Respondent, annulling the sale
of the vehicles in question to Benjamin Gonzales; sentencing Da Costa and
Gorcey to pay to the Respondent jointly and severally the sum of P6,134.92,
with legal interest from the debt of the promissory note involved; sentencing the
Petitioner Gonzales to deliver the vehicles in question to the Respondent for sale
at public auction if Da Costa and Gorcey should fail to pay the money
judgment; and sentencing Da Costa, Gorcey and Shaeffers to pay to the
Respondent jointly and severally any deficiency that may remain unpaid should
the proceeds of the sale not be sufficient; and sentencing Gorcey, Da Costa,
McDonald and Shaeffer to pay the costs.
Appellate Court Ruling: The decision appealed from is affirmed but modified
as to Appellant William Shaeffer in the obligation of paying, jointly and severally,

together with Alan W. Gorcey and Louis F. da Costa, Jr., any deficiency that may
remain unpaid after applying the proceeds of the sale of the said motor vehicles
which shall be undertaken upon the lapse of 90 days from the date this
decision becomes final, if by then Defendants Louis F. da Costa, Jr., and Alan
W. Gorcey had not paid the amount of the judgment debt.
Issue:
3. Whether an unregistered commercial co-partnership which has no
independent juridical personality can have a domicile so that a chattel
mortgage registered in that domicile would bind third persons who are
innocent purchasers for value YES
Ratio: While an unregistered commercial partnership has no juridical
personality, nevertheless, where two or more persons attempt to create a
partnership failing to comply with all the legal formalities, the law considers
them as partners and the association is a partnership in so far as it is a
favorable to third persons, by reason of the equitable principle of estoppel. In
Hung-Man Yoc vs. Kieng-Chiong-Seng, 6 Phil., 498, it was held that although it
has no legal standing, it is a partnership de facto and the general provisions of
the Code applicable to all partnerships apply to it.

CU UNJIENG SONS V. BOARD OF TAX APPEALS

G.R. No. L-6296 (09/29/56)
Doctrine: Commonwealth Act No. 466 (National Internal Revenue Code) does not
authorize deductions for war losses which were compensated by the War
Damage Commission since such compensation does not fall within the purview
of compensation by insurance or otherwise, as the U.S. Government was not
under any legal obligation to do so, until U.S. Congress passed the Philippine
Rehabilitation Act of 1946 (Public Law 370).
FACTS: Cu Unjieng Sons (CUS) is a domestic corporation. More than 70% of its
capital stock is owned by Filipino citizens.
On February 1948, CUS filed with the Philippine War Damage
Commission (Commission) a claim for compensation in accordance with the
Philippine Rehabilitation Act of 1945. The P1,079,388.05 claim is based on
alleged losses sustained during the battle of liberation of Manila and other
parts of the Philippines. Of the sum claimed, only P671,770.19 was approved by
the Commission and P470,239.19 will be paid.
On June 15, 1950, CSU received a U.S. Treasury Warrant for P202,
531.06 as partial payment of the approved claim. Another Treasury Warrant for
P151,14.31 was transmitted on November 8, 1950. Together with the second
check, CUS was notified that it would be the last payment to be made by the
Commission covering CUSs claim unless the U.S. Congress makes further
appropriation therefore.
In its income tax returns for the years 1945-1950, CUS did not pay
income tax for the years 1945-1946 and it deducted war losses in the years
1945-1947. However, the Commissioner on Internal Revenue (CIR) disallowed
deductions for war losses claimed by CUS for the years 1946 and 1947 on the
ground that all war losses sustained by CUS should have been claimed as a
deduction for the year 1945 when the said losses were actually sustained,
pursuant to the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).
CUS maintains that
the said losses were compensated by insurance or otherwise, and that since
notice was given by the Commission in 1950, it follows that the losses in
question were not chargeable as deductions in the year 1945.
CIR Ruling: The losses were not compensated for by insurance or otherwise,
and that, accordingly, the corresponding deduction was permissible in 1945
only.
Board of Tax Appeals Ruling: Affirmed CIR Ruling.

ISSUE: Whether the losses suffered by CUS in 1945 were deductible, for income
tax purposes, in 1945, when the losses were physically sustained, or in 1950,
when CUS was advised by the Commission that no payments, other than those
made by the Commission in June and November 1950, would be made for said
losses.
RATIO: The determination of this question hinges on the interpretation and
construction of Sec. 30 of the NIRC, as implemented by Revenue Regulation No.
2. According to the law, the losses in question could only be charged off in the
income tax return for the year 1945, unless compensated for by insurance or
otherwise.
With regard to the question on whether the losses aforementioned were
compensated for by insurance in 1945, CUS relies upon Section 5(g) of an Act
of Congress of the United States of March 27, 1942 (Public Law 506). The
provision authorizes the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to empower the
War Damage Corporation to use its fund to provide, through insurance,
reinsurance or otherwise, reasonable protection against loss of, or damage to,
property which may result from enemy attack and that such protection shall
be made available upon payment of such premium or other charge as the
Commission may establish. In order to come under said provision, there must
be (1) insurance, reinsurance, or otherwise and (2) payment of such premium
or other charge as the War Damage Corporation may establish. Neither
requirement is present in the case at bar. Hence, CUS is not entitled to the
benefits of the Public Law 506.
CUS insists that its property were, in effect, covered by a special
statutory insurance, regardless of any legislation thereon, because: (1) on Dec.
13, 1941, the Federal Loan Agency of the U.S. announced that the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation had created the War Damage Corporation to
provide protection against losses resulting from enemy attack which might be
sustained by owners of property in continental U.S.; (2) on Dec. 23, 1941, said
Agency further announced that the War Insurance Corporation would extend
the same protection to property owners in the Philippines; these
announcements were published in the Manila Day Bulletin and were
subsequently confirmed in radio broadcasts of the Voice of America; (4) Jesse
Jones, the Federal Loan Administrator of the U.S. declared that said
announcement was intended as insurance policy; and, (5) compliance
therewith, according to Senator Tydings, was a legal obligation on the part of
the U.S. CUS admits that losses sustained later than July 1, 1942, does not
cover losses or property damage which may result from enemy attack (including
any action taken by military, naval, or air forces of the U.S. in resisting enemy
attack).

CUS suffered its aforementioned losses in 1945, during the battle for the
liberation of the Philippines by the Allied, especially American Forces. Those
losses were not the result of enemy attack, or of action by the armed forced of
the U.S. in resisting enemy attack. The main enemy was Japan, and neither
Japan nor any of its associates, was attacking in the Philippines. It is clear
therefore that the losses of CUS do not come within the purview either of Public
Law 506 or of the announcements abovementioned, and are not compensated
for by insurance, as the term is used in the NIRC.
Whether the said losses could not be deducted in 1945, because they
were compensated for by insurance or otherwise, CUS invokes the Philippine
Rehabilitation Act of 1946 (Public Law 370). The law was approved, and became
effective, on April 30, 1946. In order to be entitled to defer deductions for losses
materially sustained within a given year, the right to compensation therefor, by
way of insurance or otherwise, if any, must exists, prior to the end of said year.
Consequently, the approval of the Philippine Rehabilitation Act of 1946 did not
constitute in 1945 a compensation by way or insurance and did not authorize
CUS herein to postpone, to another year, its claim for deduction arising from
the war losses in question.
It is also claimed that the acts and declarations of responsible officials
and organs of the U.S. Government before the end of 1945 were such as to
constitute conclusive assurance that property owners had reasonable
expectation that their war losses would be compensated for. Allegedly, this
reasonable expectation sufficed to place the losses of CUS, during 1945,
within the purview of the phrase compensated for otherwise than by
insurance under the NIRC. The contention is untenable. Otherwise in the
clause compensated for by insurance or otherwise should be construed to
refer to compensation due under a title analogous or similar to insurance.
Inasmuch as the latter is a contract establishing a legal obligation, it follows
that in order to be deemed compensation for otherwise, the losses
sustained by the taxpayer must be covered by a judicially enforceable right,
springing from any of the juridical sources of obligation: law, contract, quasicontract, torts, or crime.
It is not contended that indemnity was due to CUS by reason of tort,
crime, or quasi-contract. Upon the other hand, CUS, in 1945, no right to
indemnity springing from law, for the Philippine Rehabilitation Act was not
approved until April 1946. The press releases and announcements were merely
expressions of a policy of the Executive Department of the U.S. They did not
imply any intent to invest, in the owners of property damages or destroyed in
the Philippines during the war, a legal right to demand indemnity from the U.S.
Moreover, the payment of indemnity by the U.S. necessarily required an
appropriation of public funds which could be made only by an act of Congress
of the U.S., and, as regards war losses or damages sustained in the Philippines
later than July 1, 1942, no such appropriation law existed at the close of 1945

or before. The theory that the announcements resulted in an implied contract is

clearly devoid of merit.
Moreover, the Government of the U.S. was under no legal obligation to
pay indemnity for losses caused by the enemy in the Philippines. Neither was it
liable for damages caused by the American forces during its war operations
therein, in conformity with the laws and customs of war. Consequently, the
indemnity provided for in the Philippine Rehabilitation Act of 1945 was purely
an obligation voluntarily assumed solely for moral considerations, and did not
exist as a legal obligation prior to the approval of said Act on April 30, 1946.

MAMERTO CORRE V. GUADALUPE CORRE

G.R. No. L-10128 (10/13/56)
Doctrine: The term residence as used in the rules of court is synonymous with
domicile. Thus, merely sojourning in a certain area or temporary residence
cannot serve as basis for the purpose of determining the venue in civil cases.
FACTS: Mamero Corre, plaintiff, is a 44 year old American citizen and a
resident of Las Vegas, U.S. He is a master sergeant in the U.S. Army.
Guadalupe, defendant, is 40 years old and a resident of Samar, Philippines.
Mamero brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila
seeking his legal separation from Guadalupe, his wife, and the placing of their
minor children under the care and custody of a reputable womens dormitory or
institution as the court may recommend. Guadalupe moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that the venue is improperly laid. She claims that
since it appears in the complaint that neither Mamero nor Guadalupe is a
resident of the City of Manila in the court where the action was filed is not the
proper court to take cognizance of the case.

Lower Court Ruling: The

pronouncements as to costs.

court

dismissed

the

complaint

without

Appellate Court Ruling: Not applicable.

ISSUE: Whether the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint.
RATIO: CFI affirmed. For purposes of filing civil actions, the Rules of Court
provide that the plaintiff can elect to file the action in court he may choose if
both the plaintiff and defendant have their residence in the Philippines.
Otherwise, the action can only be brought in the place were either one resides.
In the present case, complainant/plaintiff Mamero is a resident of Las Vegas,
U.S. while defendant Guadalupe is a resident of Catbalogan, Samar. Such being
the case, Mamero has no choice other than to file the action in the court of first
instance of Guadalupes province.
The allegation of Mamero for purposes of filing and maintaining this
suit, temporarily resides at Santa Mesa, Manila cannot serve as basis for the
purpose of determining the venue for that is not the residence contemplated by
the rule. Otherwise, it would create a situation where a person may have his
residence in one province and, to suit his convenience, or to harass the
defendant, may bring the action in the court of any other province.
Residence, as used in said rule, is synonymous with domicile. This is
defined as the permanent home, the place to which, whenever absent for
business or pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and
circumstances, in the sense that they disclose intent.

LAO ICHONG ET AL. V. JAIME HERNANDEZ

101 Phil 1155 (05/31/57)
Doctrine: A law distinguishing aliens from residents does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the
distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated.
It also does not violate the due process of law clause, because the law is
prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged
in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege.
FACTS: Republic Act No. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business) was
passed to effectively nationalize the retail trade business. The main provisions
of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines,

and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are

not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or
indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor
of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to
continue to engaged therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance
with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural
persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of
term in case of juridical persons; (3) an exception therefrom in favor of citizens
and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of
licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation of the laws on
nationalization, control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating
to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment or
opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or
branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in
the retail business to present for registration with the proper authorities a
verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters,
the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and
principal offices of judicial entities; and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of
aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to continue such business
for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.
Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien
residents, corporations, and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of
R.A. No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act
is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other
persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from
enforcing its provisions. Among other things, petitioner contends that the Act
denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their
liberty and property without due process of law and violates international and
treaty obligations of the Philippines.
Lower Court Ruling: Not applicable.
Appellate Court Ruling: Not applicable.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is unconstitutional.
RATIO: The law is constitutional.
1.
Equal Protection Clause: The main point for determination is whether
alienage is the root and cause of the distinction between the alien and the
national as a trader. The alien resident owes allegiance to the country of his
birth or his adopted country; his stay here is for personal convenience; he is
attracted by the lure of gain and profit. While his aim or purpose is neither
illegitimate nor immoral, he naturally lacks the spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm

for this country where he temporarily stays and makes his living, or of spirit of
regard, sympathy, and consideration for his Filipino customers as would prevent
him from taking advantage of their weakness and exploiting them. Another
objection to the alien retailer in this country is that he never really makes a
genuine contribution to national income and wealth since the gains and profits
he makes are not invested in industries that would help the countrys economy
and increase national wealth.
The above objectionable characteristics of the exercise of the retail trade
by the aliens, which are actual and real, furnish sufficient grounds for
legislative classification of retail traders into nationals and aliens. Some may
disagree with the wisdom of the legislature's classification. To this we answer,
that this is the prerogative of the law-making power. Since the Court finds that
the classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are
treated alike, and as it cannot be said that the classification is patently
unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty bound to declare that the legislature
acted within its legitimate prerogative and it cannot declare that the act
transcends the limit of equal protection established by the Constitution.
2.
Due Process: Petitioners main argument is that retail is a common,
ordinary occupation, one of those privileges long ago recognized as essential to
the orderly pursuant of happiness by free men; that it is a gainful and honest
occupation and therefore beyond the power of the legislature to prohibit and
penalized. However, the real question at issue is whether the exclusion in the
future of aliens from the retail trade unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious
taking into account the illegitimate and pernicious form and manner in which
the aliens have heretofore engaged therein? As thus correctly stated the answer
is clear. The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the
desired legislative objective, i.e., to free national economy from alien control and
dominance. It is not necessarily unreasonable because it affects private rights
and privileges. The test of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or
adequacy under all circumstances of the means adopted to carry out its
purpose into effect. Judged by this test, the disputed legislation, which is not
merely reasonable but actually necessary, must be considered not to have
infringed the constitutional limitation of reasonableness.
3.
Alleged violation of international treaties and obligations: Another
subordinate argument against the validity of the law is the supposed violation
thereby of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Declaration of the
Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. We find no
merit in the Nations Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the
rights and freedom of their subjects, and the Declaration of Human Rights
contains nothing more than a mere recommendation or a common standard of
achievement for all peoples and all nations. That such is the import of the
United Nations Charter aid of the Declaration of Human Rights can be inferred

the fact that members of the United Nations Organizations, such as Norway and
Denmark, prohibit foreigners from engaging in retail trade, and in most nations
of the world laws against foreigners engaged in domestic trade are adopted.
The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the
Republic of China of April 18, 1947 is also claimed to be violated by the law in
question. All that the treaty guarantees is equality of treatment to the Chinese
nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country." But the
nationals of China are not discriminating against because nationals of all other
countries, except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by
the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But even
supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always
subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law, and the same may
never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State.

EASTBOARD NAVIGATION V. JUAN YSMAEL CO., INC.

No. L-9090 (09/01/57)
Doctrine: The law of the forum governs procedural matters (such as notice
requirements). The law of the state where a foreign judgment is sought to be
enforced cannot be invoked to impugn the validity of the proceedings where the
foreign judgment was made.
FACTS: Juan Ysmael Co., Inc (defendant), through K. H. Hemady (its president
and general manager), chartered Eastboard Navigations (plaintiff) vessel to load
a cargo of scrap iron in the Philippines for Buenos Aires. The charter party
agreement contained, besides the regular charter party printed form, a
typewritten clause providing for compulsory arbitration in the state of New York,
U.S. in case of any disputes that may arise of said agreement. Juan Ysmael,
through K.H. Hemady, signed not only the printed portion of the charter party
but the typewritten portion. It appears that after the dispute as to the liability
of Juan Ysmael (for the payment freight and demurrage) arose, K.H. Hemady
appointed New York Attys. Manning, Harnisch, and Hollinger to represent Juan
Ysmael in the arbitration proceedings to be held in New York. On May 23, 1959,
Messrs. Manning, Harnisch, and Hollinger, acting as attorneys for Juan Ysmael
executed with the attorney for Eastboard Navigation an arbitration agreement.
The arbitration agreement was presented by Eastboard Navigation to the U.S.
District Court, Southern District, Southern District of New York, for
confirmation and said Court (acting as an admiralty court) confirmed the said
arbitration decision in its Order and Final Decree of August 15, 1950 (Order
and Final Decree).
Eastboard Navigation brought this action to enforce the aforesaid Order
and Final Decree pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which
provides that in case of a judgment against a person, the judgment Is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of
a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact. Juan Ysmael sets up the defense that the judgment
cannot be enforced in the Philippines because when the New York District Court
acted on the case, it did not have jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
Lower Court Ruling: Decision of the New York District Court affirmed and that
the Order and Final Decree should be enforced.

Appellate Court Ruling: Not applicable.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in enforcing the Order and Final
Decree issued by the New York District Court
RATIO: CFI affirmed.
1.
As to whether Juan Ysmael agreed to submit to compulsory arbitration
its dispute with Eastboard Navigation in the charter party agreement executed
between them, the Court held that it intended to submit its dispute with
Eastboard Navigation to arbitration. Otherwise, the logical step that Juan
Ysmael should have taken would be to repudiate the act of its president and
general manager. Far from doing so, Juan Ysmael ratified it by subsequent acts
which clearly indicate that it was agreeable to said arbitration. Consequently,
said arbitration proceedings as well as the arbitration decision rendered
pursuant thereof, as confirmed by the District Court of New York, are valid;
hence, enforceable in this jurisdiction.
2.
As to whether the decision rendered by the U.S. District court of New
York sitting as an Admiralty Court, which ratified the award made by the
arbitrators, has no binding effect on defendant corporation or whether it can be
enforced in this jurisdiction as the U.S. District court did not acquire
jurisdiction over Juan Ysmael, the Court held that such contention was
unmeritorious. The claim is predicated on the alleged fact that defendant was
never served with notice, summons, or process relative to the submission of the
award of the arbitrators to said court, invoking U.S. Arbitration Act of February
12, 1925 under which the New York District court confirmed the arbitrators
award. The law invoked, however, does not sustain defendants pretense since
the Arbitration Act does not necessarily require that service of notice of the
application for confirmation be made on the adverse party himself (in case of a
non-resident), it being sufficient that it be made upon his attorney. In this case,
a copy of notice of submission of the award to the District Court of New York
was served upon defendants counsel who in due time made of record their
appearance and actually appeared when the case was heard. It is also
significant that defendants counsel never impugned the jurisdiction of the
court over defendant nor did they ever plead before it that they were bereft of
authority to represent defendant. Defendant cannot therefore in this distance
defeat the effect of this decision by alleging want of jurisdiction, or want of
notice, as provided for in Sec. 48, Rule 39 of the Philippine Rules of Court.

LY GIOK HA ET AL. V. GALANG

G.R. No. L-10760 (5/17/57)
Doctrine: Any foreigner who posted a bond to make his/her entry feasible in the
country and thereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines will be entitled
to the return of the said bond.
FACTS:
Petitioner Ly Giok Ha, alias Wy Giok Ha, entered the Philippines as a citizen of
the Nationalist Republic of China and a temporary visitor, extended up to March
14, 1956. In order to make said entry feasible, her sister and co-petitioner Wy
Hong Eng, had, on March 28, 1955, made with the Bureau of Immigration, a
cash deposit of P10,000. Ly Giok Ha, alias Wy Giok Ha, married Restituto
Lacasta, a Filipino. This notwithstanding, on March 16, 1956, respondent
Emilio L. Galang, as Commissioner of Immigration declared said cash deposit
forfeited. Ly Giok Ha, her husband Restituto Lacasta, the former's sister, Wy
Hong Eng, and the latter's husband, Ngo In, instituted the present action
against Emilio L. Galang.
Lower Court Ruling: The Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment
for the petitioners.
Appellate Court Ruling: N/A
ISSUE: W/N her marriage to a Filipino justified or excused the failure of Ly
Giok Ha to depart from the Philippines and thus the forfeiture of the cash bond
posted was a violation of her right. - Yes

RATIO: On this issue of violating her bond which states, the undersigned, with
full knowledge that Ly Giok Ha, a temporary visitor whose authorized stay in
this country is limited only up to and including August 14, 1955, do hereby
undertake that said Ly Giok Ha will actually depart from the Philippines on or
before said date so specified, or within such period as in his discretion the
Commissioner of immigration or his authorized representative may properly
allow, asking for an extension did not violate the bond on four reasons: (a)
Competent authorities granted said requests; (b) the bond clearly indicates that
the Commissioner of Immigration, or his authorized representative, may
properly allow an extension; (c) The requests for extension involved in the case
at bar do not, in any manner whatever, run counter to any of the purposes
sought to be served by the bond in question; (d) Respondent Galang did not
regard said requests for extension as a breach of said undertaking
On the issue of whether her marriage to a Filipino justified or, at least, excused
the aforesaid failure of Ly Giok Ha to depart from the Philippines on or before
March 14, 1956, The pertinent part of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No.
473, upon which petitioners rely, reads, Any woman who is now or may
hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be
lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines. By reason of
such naturalization through marriage, section 40 (c) of Commonwealth Act No.
613 provides that "in the event of the naturalization as a Philippine citizen . . .
of the alien on whose behalf the bond deposit is given, the bond shall be
cancelled or the sum deposited shall be returned to the depositor or his legal
representative.
Considering, however, that neither in the administrative proceedings, nor in the
lower court, had the parties seemingly felt that there was an issue on whether
Ly Giok Ha may "be lawfully naturalized," and this being a case of first
impression in our courts, The SC is of the opinion that, in the interest of equity
and justice, the parties should be given an opportunity to introduce evidence, if
they have any, on said issue. The decision appealed from is hereby set aside and
let the records of this case be remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings

AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY V. CITY OF MANILA

G.R. No. L-9637 (4/30/57)
Doctrine: Corporations or associations organized and operated exclusively for
religious, charitable, or educational purposes, are exempt from corporate
income taxes.
FACTS:
Plaintiff-appellant is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary
corporation duly registered and doing business in the Philippines through its

Philippine agency established in Manila. The defendant appellee is a municipal

corporation with powers that are to be exercised in conformity with the
provisions of Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised Charter of the City of
Manila.
In the course of its ministry, plaintiff's Philippine agency has been distributing
and selling bibles and/or gospel portions throughout the Philippines. On May
29 1953, the acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed plaintiff that
it was conducting the business of general merchandise since 1945, without
providing itself with the necessary Mayor's permit and municipal license, in
violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028
and 3364, and required plaintiff to secure, within three days, the corresponding
permit and license fees, in the total sum of P5,821.45.
Plaintiff paid to the defendant under protest the said permit and license fees in
the aforementioned amount, giving at the same time notice to the City Treasurer
that suit would be taken in court to question the legality of the ordinances
under which, the said fees were being collected. With regard to Ordinance No.
2529, as amended by Ordinances Nos. 2779, 2821 and 3028, appellant
contends that it is unconstitutional and illegal because it restrains the free
exercise and enjoyment of the religious profession and worship of appellant.
Lower Court Ruling: For the purpose of taxing the merchandise mentioned in
said legal provisions and that the taxes to be levied by said ordinances is in the
nature of percentage graduated taxes, the RTC held that the case be dismissed
for lack of merit.
Appellate Court Ruling: Verified the case to the SC for the reason that the
errors assigned to the lower Court involved only questions of law.

ISSUE: W/N the sale and distribution of bibles by the appellant is taxable. - No
RATIO: It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and
other religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than the
actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that appellant was engaged in the
business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this reason
the Court believe that the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as
amended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in doing so it would impair its free
exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its
rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.
With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, which requires the obtention
the Mayor's permit before any person can engage in any of the businesses,
trades or occupations enumerated therein, it does not find that it imposes any

charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, nor tax the
exercise of religious practices.
The Court thus reverse the decision appealed from, sentencing defendant
return to plaintiff the sum of P5,891.45 unduly collected from it.

CLAUDINA VDA DE VILLARUEL V. MANILA

G.R. No. L-10394 (12/13/58)
Doctrine: Manila Motor Co. should not be held liable for the rentals of the
premises leased corresponding to the lapse of time that they were occupied as
quarters or barracks by the invading Japanese army.
FACTS:
The plaintiff Claudina Villaruel and the defendant Manila Motor Co., Inc.
entered into a contract (Exhibit "A") whereby, the former agreed to convey by
way of lease to the latter the property. The term of the lease was five (5) years,
renewable for an additional period of five (5) years. The leased premises were
placed in the possession of the lessee on the 31st day of October, 1940. The
Manila Motor Co., Inc. and its branch manager enjoying the premises, and the
lessors receiving the corresponding rentals as stipulated, continued until the
invasion of 1941; the enemy forces held and used the properties leased as part
of their quarters from June 1, 1942 to March 29, 1945, ousting the lessee
therefrom. No payment of rentals were made at any time during the said period.
Upon the liberation of the said city in 1945, the American Forces occupied the
same buildings that were vacated by the Japanese, until October 31, 1945.
Monthly rentals were paid by the said occupants. When the United States Army
finally gave up the occupancy the premises, the Manila Motor Co., Inc., decided
to exercise their option to renew the contract for the additional period of five (5)
years. Simultaneously with such renewal, the company sublet the same
buildings, except that used for the residence of the branch manager, to the
other defendant, Arturo Colmenares. However, before resuming the collection of
rentals, Dr. Alfredo Villaruel, consulted Atty. Luis Hilado on whether they had
the right to collect, from the defendant company, rentals corresponding to the
time during which the Japanese military forces had control over the leased
premises. Upon being advised that they had such a right, Dr. Villaruel
demanded payment thereof, but the defendant company refused to pay. As a
result, Dr. Villaruel gave notice seeking the rescission of the contract of lease
and the payment of rentals. The lessors commenced this action on April 26,
1947 with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental against the
appellants herein. During the pendency of the case, a fire originating from the
projection room of the City Theatre, into which Arturo Colmenares, had
converted the former repair shop of the Manila Motor Co. Inc., completely razed
the building. Plaintiffs demanded reimbursement but the defendants refused.
Lower Court Ruling: The case was accordingly heard and thereafter, judgment
was rendered in plaintiffs' favor.

Appellate Court Ruling: N/A

ISSUE: W/N Manila Motor Co. should be held liable for the rentals of the
premises leased corresponding to the lapse of time that they were occupied as
quarters or barracks by the invading Japanese army. - No
RATIO: On the issue of the amendment in the complaint from the non-payment
of the rentals during the Japanese occupation, to the non-payment of the
burned property, this cannot be considered as already altering the theory of the
case which is merely a change in the relief prayed for, brought about by
circumstances occurring during the pendency of the action, and is not
improper. Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court states, "to the end that the
real matter in dispute and all matters in the action in dispute between the
parties may, as far as possible be completely determined in a single proceeding".
On the issue of the non-payment during the Japanese occupation, the first
paragraph of article 1560, the lessor does not answer for a mere act of trespass
(perturbacion de mero hecho) as distinguished from trespass under color of title (
perturbacion de derecho). Upon the basis of the distinction thus established
between the perturbacion de hecho and the perturbacion de derecho, it is
demonstrable that the ouster of the appellant by the Japanese occupying forces
belongs to the second class of disturbances, de derecho. For under the generally
accepted principles of international law, a belligerent occupant may legitimately
billet or quarter its troops in privately owned land and buildings for the
duration of its military operations, or as military necessity should demand. We
are thus forced to conclude that in evicting the lessee, Manila Motor Co., Inc.
from the leased buildings and occupying the same as quarters for troops, the
Japanese authorities acted pursuant to a right recognized by international and
domestic law. Its act of dispossession, therefore, did not constitute perturbacion
de hecho but a perturbacion de derecho for which the lessors Villaruel were
liable and for the consequences of which said lessors must respond, since the
result of the disturbance was the deprivation of the lessee of the peaceful use
and enjoyment of the property leased. Wherefore, the latter's corresponding
obligation to pay rentals ceased during such deprivation. Consequently, it was
reversible error to sentence the appellants to pay P2,165 a month as reasonable
value of the occupation of the premises from July 1946, and the value of the
destroyed buildings amounting to P30,000.

ROMAN CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC ADMINISTRATOR OF DAVAO V. THE LAND

REGISTRATION
G.R. No. L-8451 (12/20/57)

Doctrine: A corporation sole, irrespective of the citizenship of its incumbent, is

not prohibited or disqualified to acquire and hold real properties in the
Philippines.
FACTS:
Mateo L. Rodis, a Filipino citizen and resident of the City of Davao, executed a
deed of sale of a parcel of land located in the same city, in favor of the Roman
Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao Inc., corporation sole organized and
existing in accordance with Philippine Laws, with Msgr. Clovis Thibault, a
Canadian citizen, as actual incumbent. When the deed of sale was presented to
Register of Deeds of Davao for registration, the latter required said corporation
sole to submit an affidavit declaring that 60 per cent of the members thereof
were Filipino citizens.
As the Register of Deeds entertained some doubts as to the registerability of the
document, the matter was referred to the Land Registration Commissioner en
consulta for resolution. Proper hearing on the matter was conducted by the
Commissioner and after the petitioner corporation had filed its memorandum, a
resolution was rendered, holding that in view of the provisions of Section 1 and
5 of Article XIII of the Philippine Constitution, the vendee was not qualified to
acquire private lands in the Philippines in the absence of proof that at least 60
per centum of the capital, property, or assets of the Roman Catholic Apostolic
Administrator of Davao, Inc., was actually owned or controlled by Filipino
citizens, there being no question that the present incumbent of the corporation
sole was a Canadian citizen. It was also the opinion of the Land Registration

Commissioner that section 159 of the corporation Law relied upon by the
vendee was rendered operative by the aforementioned provisions of the
Constitution with respect to real estate, unless the precise condition set therein
that at least 60 per cent of its capital is owned by Filipino citizens be
present, and, therefore, ordered the Registered Deeds of Davao to deny
registration of the deed of sale in the absence of proof of compliance with such
condition.
Land Registration Commissioner Ruling: The vendee was not qualified to
acquire private lands in the Philippines in the absence of proof that at least 60
per centum of the capital, property, or assets of the Roman Catholic Apostolic
Administrator of Davao, Inc., was actually owned or controlled by Filipino
citizens.
ISSUE: W/N a corporation sole, irrespective of the citizenship of its incumbent,
is not prohibited or disqualified to acquire and hold real properties. Yes

RATIO: Although a branch of the Universal Roman Catholic Apostolic Church,

every Roman Catholic Church in different countries, if it exercises its mission
and is lawfully incorporated in accordance with the laws of the country where it
is located, is considered an entity or person with all the rights and privileges
granted to such artificial being under the laws of that country, separate and
distinct from the personality of the Roman Pontiff or the Holy See, without
prejudice to its religious relations with the latter which are governed by the
Canon Law or their rules and regulations.
As provided by law, lands held in trust for specific purposes me be subject of
registration (section 69, Act 496), and the capacity of a corporation sole, like
petitioner herein, to register lands belonging to it is acknowledged, and title
thereto may be issued in its name (Bishop of Nueva Segovia vs. Insular
Government, 26 Phil. 300-1913).
The framers of the Constitution intended certain provisions as barrier for
foreigners or corporations financed by such foreigners to acquire, exploit and
develop our natural resources. But that is not the case of corporations sole in
the Philippines, for, they are mere administrators of the "temporalities" or
properties titled in their name and for the benefit of the members of their
respective religion composed of an overwhelming majority of Filipinos. Hence,
respondent Register of Deeds of the City of Davao is ordered to register the deed
of sale executed by Mateo L. Rodis in favor of the Roman Catholic Apostolic
Administrator of Davao.

LIM SIOK HUEY ET AL. V. ALFREDO LAPIZ ET AL.,

G.R. No. L-12289, (5/28/58)
In case of foreign plaintiffs, the authorization given to the counsel must
be clear, specific, and unequivocal.
FACTS: This is an action by the spouse and the children of Chua Pua Lun to
recover damages from Alfredo Lapiz, the driver of the Jaguar jeepney which
collided with a bus, resulting to the death of Chua. As two of the children are
minors, the court, upon motion of their counsel, appointed Chua Pua Tam, a
brother of the deceased, as guardian ad litem to represent them in this case.
After trial, however, the lower court dismissed the complaint on the theory that
plaintiffs failed to authorize anyone to file the complaint on their behalf, which
is fatal to their cause as they are all citizens and residents of Communist
China. In fact, Chua Pua Tam, the guardian ad litem, testified that the plaintiffs
had not written to him nor had he communicated with them.
Lower Court Ruling: the lower court dismissed the complaint.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the plaintiffs have have authorized anyone to file the
present case against the defendants No.
RATIO: The Supreme Court found that there was no error in the findings made
by the trial court. It appears that the plaintiffs are all citizens and residents of
Communist China and notwithstanding the fact that they have been informed
of the death of the deceased, they have not sent any communication to anyone
in the Philippines giving authority to take whatever action may be proper to
obtain an indemnity for his death.
The present action was initiated by plaintiffs represented merely by their
counsel and the question arose as to whether the latter had the proper
authority to represent the former in view of the fact that they are all residents of
a foreign country. While a lawyer is presumed to be properly authorized to
represent any cause in which he appears, he may however be required by the
court on motion of either party to produce his authority under which he
appears and counsel for the plaintiffs failed.
The appointment of Chua Pua Tam as guardian ad litem would not
suffice to meet the requirement of the rule which provides that every action
must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. Again, it must be
shown that Chua Pua Tam was authorized by the heirs abroad to act as such in
behalf of the minors. But when in the course of the trial, it was found that he
never had any communication with any of the heirs and, much less, received
any authority from them the trial court acted accordingly in considering his
representation ineffective.

LEE SUAN AY, ALBERTO TAN, & LEE CHIAO V. EMILIO GALANG ET AL.,
G.R. No. L-1185, (12/13/59)
The facts in obtaining citizenship, all
disqualifications, must be proved before the court.

the

qualifications

and

FACTS: In 1954, Lee Suan Ay, a Chinese citizen, arrived in the Philippines and
was admitted and authorized to stay as a temporary visitor for period of three
months. This was extended until 25 March 1955. Before her arrival, her father

posted a cash bond amounting to P10,000 as guarantee for her compliance with
the terms and conditions of her stay in the Philippines. On 18 March 1955,
Alberto Tan, a Filipino, and Lee Suan Ay requested the Justice of the Peace of
Las Pias, Rizal, to join them in marriage. He refused to do so as she had to
obtain parental advice, being less than 23 years old.
On 28 March 1955, the bondsman wrote a letter informing the
Commissioner of Immigration that his daughter was ill and confined at the
Chinese General Hospital since 21 March 1955 and that as she might collapse
during the return trip to Hongkong, she deferred her departure set for 23
March, and requesting that she be granted ten days extension of her authorized
period of temporary stay in the Philippines to enable her to rest and recuperate.
On 1 April 1955, Lee Suan Ay and Alberto Tan were joined in marriage by the
Justice of the Peace of Las Pias. After their marriage, they received a letter
from the Commissioner of Immigration denying their petition for extension of
her temporary stay in the Philippines and declaring the cash bond forfeited in
favor of the Government. Her father asked for reconsideration on the ground
that having married a Filipino citizen, Le Suan Ay follows the Citizenship of her
husband and ceased to be an alien temporary visitor, and that reason the cash
bond filed should be returned to him; and that her failure to present herself to
the Commissioner of Immigration within 24 hours from receipt of notice was
due to illness and loss of weight. Thus, this case was filed.
Lower Court Ruling: The Court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint but left the
reduction of the bond to the sound discretion of the Commissioner of
Immigration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the P10,000 bond originally filed should be returned
No.

RATIO: The fact that Lee Suan Ay was married to a Filipino citizen does not
relieve the bondsman from his liability on the bond. The marriage took place
on 1 April 1955, and the violations of the terms and conditions of the
undertaking in the bond failure to depart from the Philippines upon
expiration of her authorized period of temporary stay in the Philippines (25
March 1955) and failure to report to the Commissioner of Immigration within
24 hours from receipt of notice were committed before the marriage.
Moreover, for a valid citizenship acquired by marriage, it must be shown that
she possesses the qualifications required by law to become a Filipino citizen by
naturalization. There is no showing that Lee Suan Ay possesses all the

qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided for by law to become a

Filipino citizen by naturalization. Thus, the order appealed from is affirmed.

TESTATE ESTATE OF C. O. BOHANAN V. BOHANAN ET AL.,

G.R. No. L-12105 (1/30/60)
The Philippine Civil Code provides that in determining the law applicable
in the opening of an individuals succession, regard must be had in the national
law of such individual. If the will and testamentary dispositions have been done
pursuant to the individuals national laws, then they must be regarded as valid
here in this jurisdiction as well notwithstanding the fact that they may be in
contrast to those provided by the Philippine Code.
FACTS: The decedents executor filed a project of partition, making, in
accordance with the provisions of the will, the following adjudications: (1) onehalf of the residuary estate, to the Farmers and Merchants National Bank of Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A. in trust only for the benefit of testator's grandson
Edward George Bohanan, which consists of several mining companies; (2) the
other half of the residuary estate to the testator's brother, F.L. Bohanan, and
his sister, Mrs. M. B. Galbraith, share and share alike. This consist in the same
amount of cash and of shares of mining stock similar to those given to testator's
grandson; (3) legacies of P6,000 each to his son, Edward Gilbert Bohana, and
his daughter, Mary Lydia Bohanan, to be paid in three yearly installments; (4)
legacies to Clara Daen, in the amount of P10,000.00; Katherine Woodward,
P2,000; Beulah Fox, P4,000; and Elizabeth Hastings, P2,000;
The former wife Magadalena C. Bohanan, which the decedent divorced in
Reno, and her two children question the validity of the testamentary provisions.
They claim that they have been deprived of the legitime that the laws of the
forum concede to them. They contend that the testator was born in Nebraska
and therefore a citizen of that state, or at least a citizen of California where
some of his properties are located.
Lower Court Ruling: The Court found that the testator was, at the time of his
death, a citizen of the United States and of the State of Nevada and declares
that his will and testament, is fully in accordance with the laws of the state of
Nevada and admits the same to probate.
ISSUE:
W/N the laws of Nevada must be applied.

RATIO: His permanent residence or domicile in the United States depended

upon his personal intent or desire, and he selected Nevada as his homicide and
therefore at the time of his death, he was a citizen of that state. Nobody can
choose his domicile or permanent residence for him. That is his exclusive
personal right.

The first question refers to the share that the wife of the testator,
Magdalena C. Bohanan, should be entitled to received. The will has not given
her any share in the estate left by the testator. It is argued that it was error for
the trial court to have recognized the Reno divorce secured by the testator from
his Filipino wife Magdalena C. Bohanan, and that said divorce should be
declared a nullity in this jurisdiction. The court below refused to recognize the
claim of the widow on the ground that the laws of Nevada, of which the
deceased was a citizen, allow him to dispose of all of his properties without
requiring him to leave any portion of his estate to his wife.
Besides, the right of the former wife of the testator, Magdalena C.
Bohanan, to a share in the testator's estafa had already been passed upon
adversely against her in an order dated June 19, 1955 which had become final,
as Magdalena C. Bohanan does not appear to have appealed therefrom to
question its validity.
Moreover, the court below had found that the testator and Magdalena C.
Bohanan were married on January 30, 1909, and that divorce was granted to
him on May 20, 1922; that sometime in 1925, Magdalena C. Bohanan married
Carl Aaron and this marriage was subsisting at the time of the death of the
testator. Since no right to share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife
exists in the State of Nevada and since the court below had already found that
there was no conjugal property between the testator and Magdalena C.
Bohanan, the latter can now have no longer claim to pay portion of the estate
left by the testator.
The most important issue is the claim of the testator's children, Edward
and Mary Lydia, who had received legacies in the amount of P6,000 each only,
and, therefore, have not been given their shares in the estate which, in
accordance with the laws of the forum, should be two-thirds of the estate left by
the testator. The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the
testator died in 1944, expressly provides that successional rights to personal
property are to be earned by the national law of the person whose succession is
in question. In the proceedings for the probate of the will, it was found out and
it was decided that the testator was a citizen of the State of Nevada because he
had selected this as his domicile and his permanent residence.
So the question at issue is whether the testamentary dispositions,
especially those for the children which are short of the legitime given them by
the Civil Code of the Philippines, are valid. As in accordance with Article 10 of
the old Civil Code, the validity of testamentary dispositions are to be governed
by the national law of the testator, and as it has been decided that the national
law of the testator is that of the State of Nevada, which allows a testator to
dispose of all his property according to his will, as in the case at bar, the order
of the court approving the project of partition made in accordance with the
testamentary provisions, must be affirmed.

BENITO E. LIM V. HERBERT BROWNWELL, JR.,

G.R. No. L-8587 (3/24/60)
A foreign government cannot be sued without its consent.
FACTS: The property in dispute consists of four parcels of land situated in
Tondo Manila with a total area of 29,151 square meters. The lands were, after
the world war, found by the Alien Property Custodian of the United States to be
registered in the name of Asaichi Kagawa, national of an enemy country. The
Philippine Alien Property Administrator and the President of the Philippines
then executed two formal agreements with the United States to transfer all four
lots to the Republic of the Philippines with an undertaking to indemnify the
United States for all claims in relation to the property transferred.
Benito Lim, filed a formal notice of claim with the Philippine Alien
Property Administrator, contending that the lots in question still belonged to the
estate of her mother, Arsenia Enriquez. He alleged that the lots were once the
property of Arsenia Enriquez; that they were mortgaged by her to the Mercantile
Bank of China; that the mortgage having been foreclosed, the property was sold
at public auction during the war to the Japanese Asaichi Kagawa, who
succeeded in preventing Arsenia Enriquez from exercising her right of
redemption; and that Kagawa never acquired any valid title to the property
because he was ineligible under the Constitution to acquire residential land in
the Philippines by reason of alien age.
The Vested Property Claims Committee of the Philippine Alien Property
Administrator disallowed the claim. The order became final as Lim did not
appeal therefrom. Thus, Lim, as administrator of the intestate estate of Arsenia
Enriquez, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the
Philippine Alien Property Administrator (later substituted by the Attorney
General of the United States) for the recovery of the property in question with
back rents. The complaint was later amended to include Asaichi Kagawa as

defendant. He was summoned by publication, but having failed to file an answer

to the complaint, he was declared in default.
Lower Court Ruling: The court dismissed the complaint on the ground that it
had no jurisdiction over the subject matter since the claim constituted a suit
against the United States to which it had not given its consent.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the complaint was a suit against the Government of the
United States Yes, but there was consent.
2. Whether or not damages must be paid No, the consent of the United
States was limited to filing of suit and does not extend to the payment of
damages.
RATIO: The order of dismissal cannot be sustained in its entirety. Although the
action is in substance against the United States, the immunity of the state from
suit, cannot be invoked where the action is instituted by a person who is neither
an enemy or ally of an enemy for the purpose of establishing his right, title or
interest in vested property, and of recovering his ownership and possession. The
consent to such suit has expressly been given by the United States in Sec. 3 of
the Philippine Property Act of 1946.
Turning to the claim of damages, the order of dismissal must be upheld.
The relief available to a person claiming enemy property which has been vested
by the Philippines Alien Property Custodian is limited to those expressly
provided for in the Trading with the Enemy Act, which does not include a suit
for damages for the use of such vested property..
With respect to the recovery or return of the properties vested, section 33
of the Trading with the Enemy Act provides a prescriptive period: the claim
should not be filed later than April 30, 1949, or within two years from the date
of vesting, whichever is later. In computing the two years, however, the period
during which there was pending a suit or claim for the return of the said
property shall be excluded.
Here, insofar as lots 3 and 4 of the land in dispute are concerned, vesting
occurred on July 6, 1948 and consequently the two-year period within which to
file the action for their recovery expired on July 7, 1950. But in computing that
the two-year period, the time during which plaintiff's claim with the Philippine
Alien Property Administration was pending from November 16, 1948 when
the claim was filed to March 7, 1950 when it was dissallowed should be
excluded. The complaint thereof filed on November 13, 1950 is well within the
prescribed period.

On the other hand, lots 1 and 2 were vested by the Alien Property
Custodian on March 14, 1946. The two-year period, therefore, within which to
file a suit for their return expired on March 14, 1948.
Plaintiff contends that section 33 of the Trading with the Enemy Act
cannot prevail over section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides
that an action to recover real property prescribes after 10 years, on the theory
that under international law questions relating to real property are governed by
the law of the place where the property is located and that prescription, being
remedial, is likewise governed by the laws of the forum. But the trading with the
Enemy Act, by consent of the Philippine Government, continued to be in force in
the Philippines even after July 4, 1946 and consequently, is as much part of the
law of the land as section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Thus, the order appealed from insofar as it dismisses the complaint with
respect to Lots 1 and 2 and the claim for damages against the Attorney General
of the United States and the Republic of the Philippines, is affirmed, but
revoked insofar as it dismisses the complaint with respect to Lots 3 and 4, as to
which the case is hereby remanded to the court below for further proceedings.