Chapter: ECOLINK Anti-Corruption and Transparency Project

CSO:
Years:

Environmental Cooperation
and Linkages Inc. (Ecolink)
2006-2007(Phase 1) and
2008 (Phase 2)
Philippines

Countr
y:
Amoun $16,500 and $29,868
t:
Sector Local Government
:

Corruptio
n
Problem:
Tools
employe
d:

Corruption in the use and

procurement of
government vehicles in
local government
Capacity Building,
Constructive
Engagement, Awareness
Raising, Community
Empowerment, Third
Party Monitoring

Introduction
Millions and even billions of pesos of local government funds are allegedly lost due to
corruption in the procurement and use of vehicles. Corruption in these cases cited
apparently amounted to the use of government vehicles for private purposes (the
Ombudsman) and the diversion of public funds for gasoline to purchase fuel for officials
private vehicles (Misamis Oriental). The 2003 Government Procurement Reform Law
sought to reform government procurement procedures in order to eliminate or minimize
procurement-related corruption by mandating a more transparent process. This includes
the presence of third party observers in the activities of the Bids and Awards Committees
that approves these procurements.
Corruption Problem Addressed
Problem: Corruption in government, including local governments, has resulted in illegal
expenditures for and use of government vehicles representing financial leakages that
have allegedly reached billions of pesos. Rampant corruption is said to be abetted by
the fact that mechanisms in preventing corruption . . . are weak if not totally absent.
Phase I of this project focused on the local government of Oroquieta City, which also
allegedly failed to invite third party observers in its vehicle procurement process resulting
in overpricing and dubious bid awards. Phase II of the project was an extension of
phase I with coverage expanded to include the cities of Pagadian and Dapitan.
Causes. Corruption is apparently endemic in government, which a historic lack of
transparency and accountability mechanisms has allowed to flourish.
Consequences. This corruption has allegedly led to huge amounts of money (billions of
pesos) being lavishly spent by local governments on motor vehicles. Local officials use
of these vehicles for their personal needs exacerbates these loses.
Methods to Address Problem
The project, in both its phase I and phase II extension, actually addresses two problems:
one is the local government corruption related to motor vehicle purchase and use, as

described above; the other has to do with the transparency requirement of the
procurement reform law. The law seeks to promote greater transparency and one
provision for doing so was the promotion of public participation to monitor the
procurement process and implementation. However, the law defines the public in a
limited sense, that is, an observer from a private group or association familiar with
whatever was being purchased and another from a non-governmental organization
(NGO).
ECOLINK sought to confront these problems by:
1. Determining the amount of government money wasted and lost by corruption in motor
vehicle procurement and use and reducing this by a targeted amount.
2. Enabling ECOLINK and its network partners to monitor government procurement
processes by sitting as observers in BAC activities as mandated by law.
3. Raising public awareness of the problem of corruption and initiating an advocacy
campaign for institutional reforms with public participation.
Results Achieved
1. ECOLINK did not actually provide an estimate of how much corruption in motor
vehicle procurement and use has cost the government. Instead it compared current
expenditures on gasoline and lubricants relative to the appropriations for those
expenditures from a year ago. ECOLINK noted that the apparent lower level of
expenditures over the six months of the project period may not have been a direct
consequence of the project but may have been due to other factors. It is, therefore,
difficult to have complete confidence that the data support the achievements cited.
ECOLINK believed its vehicle monitoring program achieved the desired result of
reducing the misuse of government vehicles. It also claimed that the incidence of
reselling of gasoline stolen from the government vehicles had been completely stopped.
It cited both the reduction in reports of misuse and the results of a perception survey
conducted among 100 respondents as proof of these achievements.
[Arent there already laws or departmental directives that regulate the use of government
vehicles? It would have been useful to get details of how the vehicle monitoring program
was done and how the volunteers were recruited. Were they trained? Does citizen
reporting of vehicle location constitute sufficient proof of wrongdoing that will stand up in
a formal judicial process? Were all the reported text messages (over 3,000 in phase II)
valid reports of misuse? Were they all validated or was there a way to validate even a
sample? Does the sample of 100 respondents give a statistically valid and significant
result? How was the survey done?]
2. ECOLINK had better success in its goal of monitoring the work of the citys BAC. A
member of the Citizens Coalition against Corruption has been enabled to sit and
monitor the BAC while ECOLINK itself sits in a key position in the Project Monitoring
Committee. It also pursued policy reforms by urging the city and its barangays to draft
ordinances regulating the use of government vehicles.
[It is not clear who the participants were in the BAC trainings that ECOLINK conducted.
Did ECOLINK also train government officials, particularly in phase II?]

3. ECOLINK also seems to have raised the level of public awareness regarding the need
for vigilance against corruption using a variety of methods. Its Bantay Kurapsyon radio
program has supposedly become the provinces most respected and credible public
affairs radio program that has become a venue for the public to air grievances. The
publication of a newsletter and the holding of competitions with an anti-corruption theme
were also cited as having contributed to this effort. The youth seemed to be a particular
target with festivals and competitions geared to their interests.
[Was the radio program only made possible by the project or was it existing before the
project? What about in the other cities? How were students and youth and other
participants recruited or enticed to join in the festivals and contests? What exactly was
the arrangement with the Junior Graft Watch in implementing this project? Did JGW
produce most of the volunteers?]
What worked well and what did not work well?
Public Awareness Raising. The most significant effect of the project seems to have been
raising public awareness of local corruption and what citizens can do to help alleviate the
problem. The project received a number of reports from the public, many of them
students and young people, who reported apparent misuse of official vehicles. What is
not clear is the effect was on the wider public and whether the campaign was actually
enough in such a short period to create a culture of anti-corruption among the city
residents.
Minimizing Corruption. This public monitoring system was deemed by ECOLINK to have
directly caused a significant decrease in misuse as evidenced by the decreasing number
of reports of misuse by the public. The project, however, only cited two cases of vehicle
misuse, one by a barangay official and the other by a city councilor. It is not clear
whether or not the officials were actually sanctioned for their deeds. The barangay
official was even given a chance to explain her behavior. It is important for people to
actually see democracy at work and that its institutions, in this case its accountability
mechanisms not only claim to prevent corruption but also to make those caught red
handed account for what they did.
Quantifying Corruption. The intention of ECOLINK to quantify the waste that corruption
has inflicted on the city, particularly with regard to vehicle procurement and use, was a
good one. Quantifying the effect of corruption makes it a more pressing concern given
the poor financial situation of most LGUs. ECOLINKs use of a proxy indicator, however,
was inadequate to show the actual extent of money lost to corruption. As also pointed
out, the opportunity for corruption seems greatest in procurement with higher sums of
money involved rather than in maintenance and use. It may be that these concerns are
addressed by the monitoring handbook prepared by ECOLINK. However, the handbook
was unavailable for inspection.
Monitoring the LGU. Citizen participation in BAC proceedings is an institutional means
for dealing with one form of corruption in government. ECOLINKs creation of the
Citizens Coalition against Corruption as well as its participation in the Project Monitoring
Committee are positive developments. It is unclear, however, what steps or actual plan
ECOLINK has taken or made to ensure that this participation is sustained and is an
effective deterrent for further corruption.

Effective Engagement. The Department of the Interior and Local Governments knows
that public participation in government procurement required for implementing the law
and that it support citizen initiatives for doing so. ECOLINK has taken this opportunity to
try to be an effective monitor of government and to broaden the anti-corruption
campaign. It also seems imperative to deepen this involvement and ensure NGOs have
an effective presence not just to ensure transparency in government procurement but
also to make sure that those who engage in corrupt activities are appropriately
sanctioned. ECOLINK has done well to engage in policy reform at the LGU level by its
participation in the crafting of barangay and city ordinances regulating the use of
government vehicles.
[Was ECOLINK asked to draft the ordinances or in exactly what way did ECOLINK
contribute to these ordinances? Did ECOLINK do other work that was supposed to have
been the responsibility of the LGUs?]
Lessons Learned
1. One substantial contribution of this project to institutional reform was the crafting of
ordinances at both the city and the barangay level to regulate the use of official vehicles.
Institutional reform or improvement is a must in order to guarantee that the changes in
behavior and practices sought are going to be sustained. However, this is only one side
of the equation; the other side to make these changes stick means that the sanctions for
corrupt behavior have also to be effective and that the offending officials are taken to
account; otherwise, corrupt officials will continue to find ways of going around
regulations without fear of effective sanctions. One way of doing so in a democracy is
the possibility for the people to recall an elected official and to vote him or her out of
office.
2. This poses a question regarding the role of the public participation in BAC
proceedings. While NGOs are supposed to sit as observers in BAC processes, what will
make this participation effective in a way that actually prevents corruption or is able to
expose corrupt practices and their perpetrators? ECOLINK reported that it conducted
trainings so it would be interesting to know what the content of these trainings were. It
may also be imperative on PTFs part to help their partners design training that prepares
NGO observers to be effective monitors of government procurement and to be
knowledgeable about possible corrupt practices in these activities so that this
participation becomes more than just a pro forma exercise.
3. ECOLINKs targeting of a 20 percent reduction of corruption is a laudable attempt to
quantify the impact of NGO interventions. However, such quantifiable targeting should
be closely looked at. For example, what was the rationale for specifying the target? What
was the baseline being used? Is this a realistic expectation? What methodology was
employed to produce the number and then to measure impact at the end of the project?
These are concerns that both project proponents and the PTF should carefully consider
so that they can be assured that scientifically valid measures are being used.
4. In awareness raising campaigns, an oft cited accomplishment is the production of
campaign materials, such as posters, for example. However, it would seem that the
proper measure of accomplishment should rather be how the message was conveyed
and received and what impact it had on the actual level of public awareness. This is of

course not easy to measure but if a campaign puts significant weight on a particular
measure for accomplishing an objective, then its effectiveness should be measured.
5. In phase II of the project, the goal of developing a Vehicle Monitoring Information
System (VMIS) was not met, the reason given being that the LGUs concerned were
unwilling to cooperate in the endeavor. The lesson here, it would seem, is that when
factors crucial to attaining a goal are beyond the control of the implementer, then the risk
for failure is significant, in this case probably 50 percent. This should be considered by
both project proponents and PTF when considering whether or not to undertake a
particular endeavor.
6. The project showed the positive effect that mass media can have when on public
awareness and participation. This is, of course, not a new phenomenon. Public service
programs by many radio stations are traditionally recognized by the public as venues for
airing complaints and grievances, and the people running these programs see to it that
such problems are resolved one way or another, otherwise they lose credibility. There
can, therefore, be significant positive results when advocacy groups partner with media
people on common goals. However, advocacy groups also need to recognize that there
are limitations to this approach. One is that people use public service programs to air a
whole gamut of complaints, many of which the advocacy NGOs might not have the
interest or the capacity to respond to.
7. Given that voluntarism and public participation are such important aspects of this
project, and were cited as indicators of its successful implementation, it would have been
useful to have gotten more information on how the project recruited volunteers, what the
motivation was for volunteers to join in the projects activities and particularly to sign up
as accredited monitors, and whether the volunteers came from other organized groups
or signed on as individuals. Such information would have been useful for other NGOs
and could have generated important lessons for project implementation.
[It would also have been interesting to find out how significant the misuse of official
vehicles is in generating waste and as a source of corruption in local government,
compared to the other possible ways that corruption is operating at this level. This is to
answer the question of why focus on vehicle misuse given scarce resources rather than
other possible venues of corruption that may be more significant.]