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In essence, the sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to
pending judicial proceedings.
TO WHOM DOES IT APPLY?
The restriction applies not only to participants in the pending case, i.e., to
members of the bar and bench, and to litigants and witnesses, but also to the
public in general, which necessarily includes the media.
WHAT IS THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE SUB JUDICE RULE?
Although the Rules of Court does not contain a specific provision imposing
the sub judice rule, it supports the observance of the restriction by punishing its
violation as indirect contempt under Section 3(d) of Rule 71:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. x x x
a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect
contempt:
x x x x
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice[.]
WHAT IS THE USUAL DEFENSE OF PERSONS FACING CHARGES FOR
INDIRECT CONTEMPT FOR VIOLATION OF THE SUB JUDICE RULE?
Persons facing charges for indirect contempt for violation of the sub judice rule
often invoke as defense their right to free speech and claim that the citation for
contempt constitutes a form of impermissible subsequent punishment.
IS THIS A VALID DEFENSE?
We have long recognized in this jurisdiction that the freedom of speech under
Section 4, Article III of the Constitution is not absolute. A very literal construction
of the provision, as espoused by US Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black, [1][1] may
lead to the disregard of other equally compelling constitutional rights and
principles. In Vicente v. Majaducon,[2][2] this Court declared that [the freedom of
speech] needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the
requirements of equally important public interests such as the maintenance of the
integrity of courts and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. Courts,
both within and outside this jurisdiction, have long grappled with the dilemma of
balancing the publics right to free speech and the governments duty to
administer fair and impartial justice. While the sub judice rule may be considered
as a curtailment of the right to free speech, it is necessary to ensure the proper
administration of justice and the right of an accused to a fair trial. [3][3] Both these
latter concerns are equally paramount and cannot lightly be disregarded.
determinations, and indisposes their minds to obey them[.] [17][17] If the speech
tends to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of
the court and its members, and lowers or degrades the administration of justice,
then the speech constitutes contempt.[18][18] Unwarranted attacks on the dignity
of the courts cannot be disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said right
cannot be used to impair the independence and efficiency of courts or public
respect therefore and confidence therein.[19][19] Without the sub judice rule and
the contempt power, the courts will be powerless to protect their integrity and
independence that are essential in the orderly and effective dispensation and
administration of justice.
This, of course, is not meant to stifle all forms of criticism against the court. As
the third branch of the government, the courts remain accountable to the people.
The peoples freedom to criticize the government includes the right to criticize the
courts, their proceedings and decisions. This is the principle of open justice,
which is fundamental to our democratic society and ensures that (a) there is a
safeguard against judicial arbitrariness or idiosyncrasy, and that (b) the publics
confidence in the administration of justice is maintained. [20][20] The criticism must,
however, be fair, made in good faith, and not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety.[21][21] And to enhance the open court principle and allow the people to
make fair and reasoned criticism of the courts, the sub judice rule excludes from
its coverage fair and accurate reports (without comment) of what have actually
taken place in open court.
In sum, the court, in a pending litigation, must be shielded from embarrassment
or influence in its all-important duty of deciding the case. [22][22] Any publication
pending a suit, reflecting upon the court, the parties, the officers of the court, the
counsel, etc., with reference to the suit, or tending to influence the decision of the
controversy, is contempt of court and is punishable. The resulting (but
temporary) curtailment of speech because of the sub judice rule is necessary and
justified by the more compelling interests to uphold the rights of the accused and
promote the fair and orderly administration of justice.
[1][1] See Justice Blacks concurring opinion in Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147
(1959), part of which reads:
Certainly the First Amendments language leaves no room for inference
that abridgments of speech and press can be made just because they are slight.
That Amendment provides, in simple words, that Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. I read no law . . .
abridging to mean no law abridging. The First Amendment, which is the
supreme law of the land, has thus fixed its own value on freedom of speech and
press by putting these freedoms wholly beyond the reach of federal power to
abridge. No other provision of the Constitution purports to dilute the scope of
these unequivocal commands of the First Amendment. Consequently, I do not
believe that any federal agencies, including Congress and this Court, have
power or authority to subordinate speech and press to what they think are
more important interests. The contrary notion is, in my judgment, courtmade, not Constitution-made. (361 U.S. 147, 157-159).
[2][2] A.M. No. RTJ-02-1698, June 23, 2005, 461 SCRA 12, 24-25, citing Choa v.
Chiongson, A.M. No. MTJ-95-1063, August 9, 1996, 260 SCRA 477, 484-485.
[3][3] Law Reform Commission New South Wales, Discussion Paper 43 (2000)
Contempt
by
Publication, http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lrc.nsf/pages/dp43chp02, last visited
December 9, 2010.
[4][4] Ibid.; the Discussion Paper 43 (2000) of the Law Reform Commission of
New South Wales has identified some high-risk publications against which
the sub judice rule applies. These include:
a. A photograph of the accused where identity is likely to be an issue;
b. Suggestions that the accused has previous criminal convictions, has been
previously charged for committing an offense and/or previously acquitted, or has
been involved in other criminal activity;
c. Suggestions that the accused has confessed to committing the crime in
question;
d. Suggestions that the accused has confessed to committing the crime in
question;
e. Suggestions that the accused is guilty or innocent of the crime for which he or
she is charged, or that the jury should convict or acquit the accused; and
f. Comments which engender sympathy or antipathy for the accused and/or
which disparage the prosecution, or which make favorable or unfavorable
references to the character or credibility of the accused or a witness.
[5][5] Ibid.
[6][6] Nestle v. Sanchez, Nos. L-75209 and 78791, September 30, 1987, 154
SCRA 542, 546.
[7][7] Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the
Plunder Cases Against the Former President Joseph E. Estrada, A.M. No. 01-403-SC, June 29, 2001, 360 SCRA 248, 259-260.
[8][8] People v. Godoy, G.R. Nos. 115908-09, March 29, 1995, 243 SCRA 64,
81, citing U.S. v. Sullen, 36 F. 2d 220.
[9][9] Supra note 3.
[10][10] See Wayne Overbeck, Major Principles in Media Law, p. 298.
[11][11] Supra note 6, at 546.
[12][12] Supra note 3.
[13][13] Supra note 7, at 260.
[14][14] Separate Opinion of the author in Louis Barok C. Biraogo v. The
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. Nos. 192935 & 193036, December 7,
2010, part of which reads:
Where the government simply wants to tell its story, already labeled as
true, well ahead of any court proceedings, and judicial notice is taken of the kind
of publicity and the ferment in public opinion that news of government scandals
generate, it does not require a leap of faith to conclude that an accused brought
to court against overwhelming public opinion starts his case with less than equal
chance of acquittal. The presumption of innocence notwithstanding, the playing
field cannot but be uneven in a criminal trial when the accused enters trial with a
government-sponsored badge of guilty on his forehead. The presumption of
innocence in law cannot serve an accused in a biased atmosphere pointing to
guilt in fact because the government and public opinion have spoken against the
accused. [Citations omitted]
[15][15] Supra note 3.
[16][16] Supra note 7, at 259-260.
[17][17] Supra note 8, at 82, citing J. Perfectos dissenting opinion in In re
Francisco Brillantes, 42 O.G. 59.
[18][18] Id. at 94.
[19][19] In the Matter of the Allegations Contained in the Columns of Mr. Amado
P. Macasaet Published in Malaya Dated September 18, 19, 20, and 21,
2007, A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC, August 8, 2008, 561 SCRA 395, 448, citing Roxas
v. Zuzuarregui, G.R. Nos. 152072 & 152104, July 12, 2007, 527 SCRA 446.
[20][20] Id.at 434.
[21][21] Tiongco v. Savillo, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1719, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA
48, 64, citing In re Almacen, infra note 22.
[22][22] In re Almacen, No. L-27654, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 562.