LTD Finals Digestss

REPUBLIC vs SANGALANG (the remedy is to file petition for
revalidation pursuant to PD 1271)

The subject property was inherited by the private respondents Kiangs from their father. The old man
Kiang had it surveyed by the Bureau of Lands on October 11, 1916, and filed an application for
registration. The said application was instituted by old man Kiang during the pendency of the land
registration proceedings in Civil Reservation for the compulsory registration of all lands, buildings
and interests within the limits of the Baguio Townsite. The said petition involved the establishment of
the Baguio Townsite Reservation, which included the lands of old man Kiang.
The Court of First Instance of Benquet, Mountain Province, rendered a decision in Civil Reservation
Case declaring as public lands all lands within the limits of the Baguio Townsite Reservation, with
the exception of lands reserved for specific public purposes and those claimed and adjudicated
private property. Among those declared public lands were the lands applied for by old man Kiang,
which was dismissed.
About 31 years later, respondent Kiangs filed with the Court of First Instance of Baguio an
application for registration of the parcels of land in question. The respondent court rendered a
decision adjudicating the aforesaid parcels of land in favor of the respondents. The Register of
Deeds of Baguio City issued the corresponding Original Certificate of Title. Subsequently, the Kiangs
conveyed portion of the lands covered by O.C.T to the other respondents.
On June 24,1977 Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor General, filed a complaint
for the annulment of the decision in Land Registration Case. Petitioner alleged in the petition that the
claim of the respondent Kiangs was barred by the decision of the court in Civil Reservation Case. On
May 26, 1981, the respondent court rendered its decision, dismissing the complaint. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the CFI has jurisdiction over the subject matter Land registration case.
In accordance wih the provisions of Sec. 5 of Act No. 627:

Sec. 5. Upon the filing of claims and application for registration in the Court of Land
Registration, the same procedure shall be adopted as is by the Land Registration Act
provided for other claims and applications; but in case of all claims and applications
which are finally dismissed, the judgment shall be that the lands embraced therein
are public lands.
It is clear, therefore, that the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Banquet, presided over by Judge
Pio R. Marcos, had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of Land Registration Case No. N-30, and
to render a decision awarding title to the land in question to the applicants Mariano Kiang et al. The
decision of Judge Marcos in Land Registration Case No. N-30 was null and void ab initio for want of
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
This exception cannot possibly apply to the respondents Kiangs since the land which was the
subject of Land Registration Case can no longer be considered land "claimed by or belonging to
private parties." By virtue of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Banquet, Mountain
Province, in Civil Reservation Case land was declared public land.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of respondent court in Civil Case is
REVERSED and Original Certificate of Title No. 0-280 of the Registry of Deeds of Baguio City and
all transfer certificates of title therefrom are hereby nullified and cancelled.
Heirs of Dicman vs Carino (PD 628 segragating and reserving

certain igorot claims and prohibiting encumbrance or alienation
therein for 15years from the grant of the patent is not
applicable where vested rights are affected. The executive
issuance can only go as far as to classify public land, but it
cannot be construed as to prejudice vested rights)
FACTS:
The subject land had been part of the land claim of Mateo Cario. Within this site,
buildings were constructed which were bought by Sioco Cario, son of Mateo
Cario and grandfather of private respondent Jose Cario. Sioco Cario then took
possession of the buildings and the land.
Ting-el Dicman, predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners, had been employed by

Sioco Cario as his cattle herder.
On the advice of his lawyers, and because there were already many parcels of
land recorded in his name, Sioco Cario caused the survey of the land in
controversy in the name of Ting-el Dicman.
Ting-el Dicman executed a public instrument entitled "Deed of Conveyance of

Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land" with Sioco Cario, which reads:
That Mr. Sioco Cario has advanced all expenses for said survey xxx, and also all
other expenses for the improvement of said land, to date; That for and in
consideration of said advance expenses, I hereby pledge and promise to convey,
deliver and transfer unto said Sioco Cario, his heirs and assigns, one half (1/2) of
my title, rights, and interest to and in the aforesaid parcel of land; same to be
delivered, conveyed and transferred to him, his heirs and assigns, by me, my
heirs, and assigns, xxx.
After the execution of the foregoing deed, Sioco Cario, who had been in
possession of the land in controversy since 1916, continued to stay thereon.
On January 10, 1938, Sioco Cario executed, as seller, a public instrument entitled
"Deed of Absolute Sale" covering the subject land and its improvements with his
son, Guzman Cario, as buyer. Consequently, Guzman Cario took possession of
the property publicly, peacefully, and in the concept of owner.
Guzman Cario had the entire Lot resurveyed so as to indicate the half portion
that belonged to him and the other half that belonged to the petitioners. The
resurvey evenly divided the lot into Lot 76-A and 76-B
A petition was later filed by the heirs of Ting-el Dicman which sought to establish
ownership over Lot 76-A and Lot 76-B. Guzman Cario opposed the petition
insofar as he insisted ownership over Lot 76-B, the land in controversy.
While the foregoing petition was pending in the trial court, President Carlos P.
Garcia issued Proclamation No. 628 excluding from the operation of the Baguio
Townsite Reservation certain parcels of public land known as Igorot Claims. One
such claim pertained to the "Heirs of Dicman,"
As a consequence, the trial court dismissed the petition insofar as Lot 76-B was
concerned, and the certificate of title issued pursuant to the partial decision
involving Lot 76-A was invalidated.
After the dismissal of the case, Guzman Cario was left undisturbed in his
possession of the subject property until his death. His remains are buried on the
land in question
On April 20, 1983, petitioners, suing as compulsory heirs of Ting-el Dicman,

revived the foregoing case by filing a complaint for recovery of possession with
damages involving the subject property
Private respondent Jose Cario filed his answer and prayed for dismissal. RTC
ruled in favor of respondents Carino
CA affirmed RTC. CA based its ruling on the following reasons: that the petitioners
raised for the first time on appeal the issue on whether the "Deed of Conveyance
of Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land" is void ab initio under Sections
145 and 146 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu
ISSUE: W/N the Deed of Conveyance was invalid, hence, would not make Carino
the lawful owner and possessor of the subject lot
RULING: NO. SC ruled in favor of Carino.
RATIO: The foregoing issue and the incidents thereunder were never raised by the
petitioners during the proceedings before the RTC. Suffice it to say that issues
raised for the first time on appeal and not raised timely in the proceedings in the
lower court are barred by estoppel. Matters, theories or arguments not brought
out in the original proceedings cannot be considered on review or appeal where
they are raised for the first time. To consider the alleged facts and arguments
raised belatedly would amount to trampling on the basic principles of fair play,
justice and due process.
Even if this Court should declare the sale null and void or the agreement merely a
contract to sell subject to a suspensive condition that has yet to occur, private
respondent nonetheless acquired ownership over the land in question through
acquisitive prescription.
The records show that as early as 1938, the land in controversy had been in the
possession of Guzman Cario, predecessor-in-interest of private respondent,
continuously, publicly, peacefully, in concept of owner, and in good faith with just
title, to the exclusion of the petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest, well
beyond the period required under law to acquire title by acquisitive prescription
which, in this case, is 10 years.
As correctly held by the RTC, there is no evidence to the effect that Ting-el
Dicman or his successors-in-interest ever filed any action to question the validity
of the "Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land" after
its execution on October 22, 1928 despite having every opportunity to do so. Nor
was any action to recover possession of the property from Guzman Cario
instituted anytime prior to April 24, 1959, a time when the period for acquisitive
prescription, reckoned from Guzmans occupation of the property in 1938, had
already transpired in his favor. No evidence likewise appears on the record that
Sioco Cario or his Estate ever filed any action to contest the validity of the "Deed
of Absolute Sale" dated January 10, 1938. Though counsel for the Estate of Sioco
Cario tried to assail the deed as a forgery in the trial court, the attempt failed
and no appeal was lodged therefrom.
For over 30 years reckoned from the "Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and
Interests in Agricultural Land" dated October 22, 1928, or 20 years reckoned from
the "Deed of Absolute Sale" dated January 10, 1938, they neglected to take
positive steps to assert their dominical claim over the property. With the
exception of forgery, all other issues concerning the validity of the two
instruments abovementioned, as well as the averment that the former was in the
nature of a contract to sell, were issues raised only for the first time on appeal
and cannot therefore be taken up at this late a stage.
Albano vs CA (It is fundamental principle in land registration

that an opposition againsts a partys claim over a property must
be based on the right of dominion, whether it be limited or
absolute; and if the oppositior claims no right over the
property, whatever it may be, then certainly he has no basis to
question such claim.
WITH A THOUSAND AND ONE INQUIETUDES then besetting the Roman Catholic
Church, Monico Albano and Nemesio Albano strayed away from its flock and joined Bishop
Gregorio Aglipay in his newly-founded congregation - the Iglesia Filipina
Independiente ("IFI"). To express their piety and devotion to their new faith, sometime in 1908 the
Albanos allowed the IFI to construct a small iglesiawithin a 1,854-square meter unregistered
property in Vintar, Ilocos Sur, which their family had been occupying for years. In due time, a
modest structure of sawali and cogon rose beside the Albanos' ancestral brick house.
In 1909, Fr. Platon de Villanueva, parish priest of Vintar, pleaded with the Albanos to donate
to the congregation the property occupied by the iglesia. The pleas of Fr. Platon did not fall on
deaf ears. On 21 June 1909 Vicente, son of Nemesio Albano, executed an instrument granting the
assiduous priest with its administration. But Fr. Platon wanted more. He pursued the Albanos until
the latter eventually transferred ownership in his favor.
Thus on 1 May 1910 Monico Albano and Vicente Albano executed a new document whereby
they agreed, in exchange for a parcel of land, to transfer ownership of the Vintar property in favor
of Fr. Platon. They agreed to give him sufficient time after the harvest to look for an arable land
which could yield five (5) "uyones a pagay." It was further agreed that in the event Fr. Platon failed
to deliver the parcel of land after the harvest and a new priest was sent over to manage the Vintar
congregation, their agreement would be considered revoked.
Two (2) years later Fr. Platon de Villanueva passed away.
On 7 April 1916 Elena, Eulogia and Benigno Villanueva, sisters and brother of the deceased,
as his surviving heirs, executed a document donating the Vintar property to the IFI. In December
1916 they executed another document bequeathing several properties of their deceased brother in
favor of the Comite de Caballeros quen Damas of the IFI. In return, they asked that services be
offered for the soul of their departed brother on the 22nd of July, November and December of
every year.
Sometime in 1957 Fr. Loreto Balbas who took over as parish priest spoke before IFI devotees
and inspired them to improve the condition of their chapel. Before long, through the efforts of the
faithful under the leadership of Antonina Albano, Vicente's wife, the chapel was renovated and a
convent was constructed nearby. Antonina capped the iglesia's expansion by donating a new bell.
Thereafter, Antonina appealed to Fr. Balbas that she be allowed to stay in the convent together
with one Jovencia Foronda. Inasmuch as Antonina was an "important member of the church" and
a devotee who had spent much for its improvement, she was given lodging within church
premises. A few months thereafter, Antonina and Jovencia put up a small sari-sari store inside the
ruins of the old brick house.
A decade later, Venancio Albano, son of Vicente and Antonina, appealed to the IFI to allow
his brother Rafael to stay within the old brick house. Upon consultation with church elders, Bishop
Lagasca readily acceded to Venancios request. Forthwith, Rafael repaired the crumbly brick house
and made it habitable. Years later, his son-in-law, Edwin Patricio, came and occupied the
northwestern portion of the lot. Together, they constructed a pig pen within the premises and
extended Rafaels banana plantation which unfortunately destroyed the fence surrounding the
property. Alarmed by the situation, the IFI summoned its elders and decided to write a letter of
protest to Venancio Albano, Rafael Albano and Edwin Patricio telling them to desist from
interfering with the structures built by the IFI.[1]
In his reply, Venancio requested for a dialogue "reminding the church" that the property
belonged to them and was never donated by their predecessors in favor of their church.[2] Upon
hearing such reply, IFI was compelled to file an action for quieting of title against them, asserting
that the disputed property belonged to the IFI by virtue of a donation from Elena, Eulogia and
Benigno Villanueva, and that the donors, in turn, inherited the property from Fr. Platon de
Villanueva who acquired the property from the Albanos in exchange for a parcel of land and an
undetermined amount of money. Since the time of the donation, the IFI had been in possession of
the property and had the lot declared in its name for taxation purposes.[3]
Venancio, Rafael and Edwin denied the allegations in the complaint and claimed that their
ancestors had been occupying the property since the 1800's.[4] Their great grandfather Rafael built
a brick house within the property and it was in this house where his children and his childrens
children were born. In 1909, upon the proddings of Fr. Platon de Villanueva, Monico and Nemesio
Albano allowed the IFI to establish a small chapel within the property. They averred that although
Monico and Vicente indeed donated the property in favor of the church, the donation was never
realized as Fr. Platon failed to comply with its terms. According to Venancio, Rafael and Edwin,
there was no document to support the claim of IFI that Fr. Platon delivered the riceland that could
yield five (5) uyones a pagay in favor of their predecessors as promised. They also declared that a
violent earthquake rendered the house unfit for habitation in 1922 and forced them to transfer to a
new residence. Despite such misfortune, Florentino Espejo, Antonina's brother, stayed within the
premises. After Florentino left, Antonina built a convenience store within the property which she
herself tended until the outbreak of the Pacific War. After the war, they occasionally visited the
brick house to check on its condition.
In 1955 Rafael decided to settle in Vintar and with the consent of his siblings repaired the
dilapidated house and made it his home. Sometime in 1967 the Supreme Bishop of the IFI
conferred with Venancio and pleaded that the property be donated t o the congregation. But
Venancio turned down the request, saying that he was not the sole owner of the property whose
consent alone to the donation should be sought.
Meanwhile, Vicente Albano, brother of Rafael and Venancio, had a 487-square meter portion
of the property declared in his name for taxation purposes. Prior thereto however it appeared that
none of the Albanos paid taxes on the property except that in 1905 Monico had the entire property
declared in his name for purposes of taxation and paid the corresponding taxes thereon.
After trial on the merits, including an ocular inspection of the premises,[5] the trial court
rendered judgment declaring the IFI owner of a portion of the disputed property "from the south
running up to 55 meters to the north, more or less, at a point where the southern wall of the brick
wall stands, including the convent and its immediate yard," and the Albanos "owner of the portion
of the property actually occupied by the ruins of the brick house including the vacant space in front
of the house."[6] The court ratiocinated that since Monico and Venancio Albano had failed to
revoke their agreement with Fr. Platon de Villanueva, a presumption arose that the condition
embodied in their contract had already been fulfilled. According to the court, such abstention on
the part of the Albanos as well as Antonina's devotion to the church despite the alleged invalidity
of the donation was a strong indication that the exchange and sale referred to in the agreement had
really taken place. Furthermore, inasmuch as IFI had been in the possession of the property where
the chapel and the convent stood in the concept of an owner for more than sixty (60) years, it
acquired title thereto by acquisitive prescription. Insofar as the Albanos were concerned, the court
opined that their proprietary right over the disputed property covered only the area where the brick
house stood, measured at roughly 462-square meters, since they had possessed such portion for
many years.
Apparently dissatisfied, both the IFI and the Albanos sought recourse in the Court of Appeals
through a petition for review on certiorari. But the Court of Appeals in its Decision of 22 February
2000, affirmed the trial court thus -
In the case at bar, the inaction of defendants-appellants with regard to the donations
from 1910 to 1972 or a span of 63 years will surely constitute laches. The failure of
Fr. Platon Villanueva to deliver the riceland should have been the proper time to
revoke said donation. But defendants-appellants never lift(ed) a finger to enforce their
rights.[7]
On 8 May 2000 the Albanos filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Attached Motion for
Reconsideration praying that their Motion for Reconsideration be admitted into the records despite
its being filed out of time.[8] Atty. Juanito F. Antonio, counsel for petitioners, explained that
although a copy of the Decision was sent to his old address and received by a reliever guard on 3
March 2000, he was not notified thereof. However, according to his collaborating counsel, Atty.
Edwin Patricio, he heard rumors in Vintar that an unfavorable decision had been rendered against
them. This prompted Atty. Patricio to verify the veracity of the information with the Court of
Appeals. Upon inquiry with the appellate court, he was informed that a copy of the Decision had
already been sent to his collaborating counsel Atty. Antonio; he nevertheless demanded for and
was accordingly furnished by the appellate court with a copy of the Decision on 26 April
2000. Despite their plea for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals denied their motion and held
that the "failure of the counsel for the defendants-appellants can never be considered or would
constitute excusable negligence considering that [a] lawyer[s] should so arrange matters such that
judicial communications sent by mail will reach him promptly and should he fail to do so, not only
he but his clients as well must suffer the consequences of his negligence."[9]
Undaunted, the Albanos moved for a second reconsideration but were once again
rebuffed. Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court where petitioners
pray that their Motion for Reconsideration be admitted into the records and the decision of the trial
court awarding a portion of the property in favor of private respondent IFI be declared a nullity.
Petitioners contend, as a first assignment of error, that the Court of Appeals acted without
authority and jurisdiction in dismissing their Motion for Reconsideration despite its having been
filed on time.Petitioners argue that since one of their lawyers was served with a copy of the
Decision on 26 April 2000 then their Motion for Reconsideration, which was received by the Court
of Appeals on 10 May 2000, was seasonably filed. In support of their position, petitioners assert
that their counsel on record are entitled to separate service of the court's decision. It is further urged
by petitioners that assuming Atty. Antonio had indeed been inattentive to their case then his
negligence should not prejudice their "substantial or property rights" nor should it prevent them
from fully exhibiting their cause.[10]
Lastly, petitioners reiterate their stand in the Court of Appeals and stressed that the judgment
of the trial court awarding a portion of the disputed property in favor of private respondent IFI
should be nullified since private respondent is disqualified from holding lands of the public domain
pursuant to Sec. 3, Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution.[11] Petitioners invoke the ruling of the Court
in Republic v. Iglesia ni Cristo where we held that a religious corporation sole, which has no
nationality, is disqualified to acquire or hold alienable lands of the public domain except by
lease.[12] In support of their position, petitioners admit that the disputed property "has not been
titled under any law."[13]
With regard to their first assignment of error, petitioners are on extremely shaky grounds when
they argue that counsel on record are entitled to separate notices of the court's decision. This
argument is obviously inconsistent with Sec. 2, Rule 13, of the Rules of Court which explicitly
provides that if a party has appeared by counsel, "service upon him shall be made upon his counsel
or one of them"(underscoring supplied). Clearly, notice to any one of the several counsel on record
is equivalent to notice to all and such notice starts the time running for appeal notwithstanding that
the other counsel on record has not received a copy of the decision.
It appearing in the present case that a copy of the Decision of the appellate court was received
by Atty. Juanito F. Antonio on 3 March 2000, then petitioners had until 18 March 2000 within
which to move for reconsideration. As earlier stated, petitioners filed their motion for
reconsideration only on 10 May 2000 or fifty-three (53) days from the expiration of the fifteen
(15)-day reglementary period provided under the Rules of Court.[14]
There is also much discussion by petitioners as to the merits of their petition. For one, they
argue that as between the State and the IFI, the disputed property is still public land and the latter,
as a corporation sole, is disqualified to own the property in view of the prohibition imposed by the
Constitution. Be that as it may, there is still an obstacle to the view advanced by petitioners which
must be recognized. If it is petitioners' opinion that ownership of the disputed parcel of land is still
vested in the State, then it is the State, and the State alone, that is entitled to question the occupation
by IFI of the subject property. It is a fundamental principle in land registration that an opposition
against a party's claim over a property must be based on the right of dominion, whether it be limited
or absolute; and if the oppositor claims no right over the property, whatever it may be, then
certainly he has no basis to question such claim.[15]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. CV 31630 which in turn affirmed the Decision of the RTC-Br. 13, Laoag City, in its Civil
Case No. 6821 "declaring the IFI owner of a portion of the diputed property 'from the south running
up to 55 meters to the north, more or less, at a point where the southern wall of the brick wall
stands, including the convent and its immediate yard,' and the Albanos 'owner of the portion of the
property actually occupied by the ruins of the brick house including the vacant space in front of
the house,'" is in effect SUSTAINED insofar as the parties therein are concerned.
SO ORDERED.
Valisno vs Plan (Motion to dismiss grounded on res judicata is

allowed in land registration cases. Rules of court apply in a
suppletory character whenever applicable or convenient.)
Facts: On August 21, 1964, petitioners-spouses Flordeliza and Honorio Valisno purchased from the legal
heirs of Agapita V. Blanco, namely, Guillermo, Guillermo, Jr., Manuel and Rosario, all surnamed Blanco,
two parcels of land.
Thereafter, petitioners declared the above-described parcels of land in their name for taxation purposes
and exercised exclusive possession thereof in the concept of owners by installing as caretaker one
Fermin Lozano, who had his house built thereon.
On August 12, 1968, private respondent Vicencio Q. Cayaba, claiming to be the owner of the land ousted
Fermin Lozano from possession of the land. He subsequently erected a six-door apartment on said land.
On January 22, 1970, petitioners instituted before the then Court of First Instance of Isabela a complaint
against private respondent for recovery of possession of said parcels of land and was in due time
resolved in favor of petitioners who were declared owners thereof.
The CA reversed the decision of the lower court and dismissed the complaint of petitioners on a finding
that the land in question described in the complaint and sketched in Exhibit C is completely different
from the land appearing in the Subdivision Plan of the appelles appellant, their respective area and
boundaries being completely dissimilar.
Therefore, as the land occupied by the appellant has not been successfully Identified with that described
in the complaint, the instant action should have been dismissed outright, in view of the provision of
Article 434 of the New Civil Code which reads.
Subsequently, on September 25, 1979, private respondent filed before the Court of First Instance of
Isabela an application for registration in his name of the title of the lands in question. Petitioners filed an
opposition to the application. [Annex "B", Petition, p. 41, Rollo] Private respondent, however, moved for
the dismissal of said opposition on the ground that the same is barred by a prior judgment. Despite the
opposition of petitioners to said motion to dismiss, the lower court issued the first of the assailed orders
dismissing the petitioner's opposition on the ground of res judicata.
Issue: W/N res judicata exists in the case at bar assuming arguendo that a motion to dismiss is proper in
a land registration case
Held: The Land Registration Act [Act 496] does not provide for a pleading similar or corresponding to a
motion to dismiss. It must be noted that the opposition partakes of the nature of an answer with a
counterclaim.
In ordinary civil cases, the counterclaim would be considered a complaint, this time with the original
defendant becoming the plaintiff. The original plaintiff, who becomes defendant in the counterclaim
may either then answer the counterclaim or be declared in default, or may file a motion to dismiss the
same.
With respect to the subject matter, there can be no question that the land sought to be recovered by
petitioners are the very same parcels of land being sought to be registered in Cayaba's and Noriega's
names.
While the complaint in the first action is captioned for recovery of possession, the allegations and the
prayer for relief therein raise the issue of ownership. In effect, it is in the nature of an accion
reinvidicatoria. The second case is for registration of title. Consequently, between the two cases there is
identity of causes of action because in accion reinvidicatoria, possession is sought on the basis of
ownership and the same is true in registration cases. Registration of title in one's name is based on
ownership. In both cases, the plaintiff and the applicant seek to exclude other persons from ownership
of the land in question. The only difference is that in the former case, the exclusion is directed against
particular persons, while in the latter proceedings, the exclusion is directed against the whole world.
Nonetheless, the cause of action remains the same.
It does not matter that the first case was decided by a court of general jurisdiction, while the second
case is being heard by one of a limited jurisdiction, such as a registration court. It is enough that the
court which decided the first case on the merits had validly acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties. That both courts should have equal jurisdiction is not a requisite of res judicata.
To our mind, therefore, the better policy, both for practicality and convenience, is to grant the dismissal
of either the application for registration or the opposition thereto, once it has been indubitably shown,
as in the case at bar, that one or the other is barred by a prior judgment.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed. Cost against petitioners.
Republic vs Tayag (Payment in lump sum to cover all past taxes

is irregular and affects the validity of the applicants claim of
ownership.)
Tedita Infante-Tayag (40 in 1977), the applicant testified that the land was first possessed by her
father, Froilan Infante, who died in 1937.
That 11-hectare land was adjudicated to Soledad Infante-Yago who exchanged it in 1975 for another
parcel of coconut land with an area of 23 hectares belonging to her sister, Mrs. Tayag, the applicant
Mrs. Tayag filed the instant application in 1976. She possessed the land in question for barely a
year. She knows that the land is coconut land but she does not know the number of coconut trees
planted therein nor the person who planted the same.
The only other witness, Abraham Morandarte testified that he came to know the land in 1935
because his father was the overseer of Froilan Infante, Mrs. Tayag's father. He lived in the land and
planted coconuts thereon some of which are 80 years old. The land has been administered by Mrs.
Tayag's brother, Antonio.
The trial court and the Appellate Court granted the application. The Director of Lands appealed to
this Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in its ruling.
HELD:
The Solicitor General's first contention, that the application should be denied because Mrs. Tayag
failed to present the original tracing cloth plan, cannot be sustained.
It is indubitably indicated that the "cloth plan of Psu-112106" was attached to the application It was
detached and kept by the Land Registration Commission. It could not be marked as an exhibit.
The second contention is that Mrs. Tayag "miserably failed to prove ownership or possession in the
concept of owner for thirty years" prior to September 7, 1976 when the application was filed. The
testimonies of Mrs. Tayag and Morandarte, her overseer since 1973, are not sufficient to prove the
alleged thirty years' possession in the concept of owner by the applicant, her sister, mother and
father.
The taxes for 31 years, 1946 to 1976, were paid only in 1976, a few months prior to the filing of the
application.
The applicant failed to satisfy the requirements for judicial confirmation of her alleged title. The said
land must be presumed to be still a part of the public domain.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside and the application
for registration is dismissed.
Gabriel vs CA (the jurisdiction of court in cadastral cases over

lands already registered is limited to correction of errors and
resolve overlapping claims.)
Petitioners are the heirs of the late Atty. Crispin F. Gabriel (Atty. Gabriel), who was
designated as the sole executor of the last will and testament of the deceased Genaro
G.
Ronquillo
whose
will
was
probated
in
1978
before
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. On the other hand, respondents are the heirs
of the testator Ronquillo.
At the time of the filing of the present petition, there has been no final liquidation of
the Ronquillo estate. Upon the death of Atty. Gabriel on March 19, 1998, his
uncollected compensation reached Php648,000.00.[5]
While still acting as executor, Atty. Gabriel, with prior approval of the probate court,
sold three parcels of land situated at Quiapo, Manila to William Lee for
Php18,000,000.00. Due to certain disagreements between Atty. Gabriel and the
respondents, a portion of the proceeds in the amount of Php1,422,000.00 was
deposited with the probate court.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari, in the CA. Petitioners questioned the twin
orders of the probate court, particularly (1) the courts refusal to order the release of
the amount of Php648,000.00 representing the compensation of Atty. Gabriel as the
executor of the last will and testament; the courts insistence to hear respondents
allegation of non-payment of taxes resulting from the sale of the properties located
at Quiapo, Manila, for which reason the compensation of Atty. Gabriel should not
be released until resolution by the probate court on this matter.
the first questioned Resolution[11] was rendered by the CA

WHEREFORE, premises considered, for being insufficient in form and
substance, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is
hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED.
Petitioners on appeal presented the following issues in their Memorandum: 1)

whether there was substantial compliance with the certification of non-forum
shopping before the CA; 2) whether the written explanation of why personal service
was not done is a mandatory requirement in pleadings filed before the CA; 3)
whether the remaining balance of compensation of Atty. Gabriel should be released;
and 4) whether the probate court can take cognizance of the tax controversies.
ISSUE:
The petition is devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible error in issuing the
assailed Resolutions.
To deserve the Court's consideration, petitioners must show reasonable cause for
failure to personally sign the certification. They must convince the Court that the
outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of justice. In this
case, the petitioners did not give any explanation to warrant their exemption from
the strict application of the rule. Downright disregard of the rules can
In numerous decisions,[19] this Court has been consistent in stringently enforcing the
requirement of verification. When there is more than one petitioner, a petition signed
solely by one of them is defective, unless he was authorized by his co-parties to
represent them and to sign the certification.
In the instant case, the records are bereft of anything that would show that Teresa
was authorized by the other petitioners to file the petition.
not justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.
JM Tuason vs CA (right to recover possession is imprescriptible)

Facts:
Petitioner JM Tuason & Co., Inc. executed a contract to sell in favor of Ricardo De Leon
At the execution of the contract, Ricardo paid the DP (4,190.86) and agreed to pay the balance in
the monthly installment (498.63) including 10% annual interest.
Meanwhile, in another civil case, Petitioner signed a Compromise agreement with the Deudors.
Ricardo De Leon transferred all his rights to the lot in favor of his parents, Alfonso and Rosario De
Leon (Private respondents).
Private Respondents paid the outstanding balance of the purchase price.
Petitioner executed the deed of sale over the lot in favor of the private respondents.
At the time of the execution of the contract to sell, contracting parties knew that a portion of the lot
in question was actually occupied by Ramon Rivera. However, it was their understanding that the
Petitioner will be the one who will remove Ramon Rivera.
Petitioner filed a complaint on ejectment against Ramon Rivera before the CFI of Rizal.
Lower Court: Ejectment complaint was dismissed.
CA: Affirmed the decision of the lower court.
Decision of the CA became final and executory in September 1971, when rhe De Leons were
evicted from the premises in question.
Hence, this case
Issue:
Whether or not Respondents De Leon are entitled to the vendors warranty against eviction and
damages? NO
Ruling:
The appellate court found that Petitioner failed to comply with its obligation to transfer ownership
over the lot to the De Leons due to the Compromise agreement it entered with the Deudors. And that he is
guilty of Wilful deception, intentional forsaking of one to whom defendant was bound in a contract to
convey and after the compromise, defendant still continued to collect installments from buyer.
According to the SC, the compromise agreement was sanctioned by the court after the Deudors
filed an action against Petitioner in a civil case. The prior right of Ramon Rivera to purchase the lot in
question was based more on his prior occupancy to the same since 1949, Respondents De Leon were
informed by Petitioner at the time of the execution of the contract to sell. The execution of the Compromise
agreement merely recognized this prior right.
Paragraph "SEVENTH" of the compromise agreement:
It shall be the joint and solidary obligation of the Deudors to make the buyers of
the lots purportedly sold by them recognize the title of the OWNERS over the property
purportedly bought by them, and to make them sign, whenever possible, new contracts of
purchase for the said property at the current prices and terms specified by the OWNERS
in their sales of lots in their subdivision known as Sta. Mesa Heights Subdivision ... "
In their brief as appellants in CA, Private Respondents stated that it was not the intention of the
signatories of the agreement to include within its coverage those parcels of land already sold by Petitioner
to third parties.
The agreement discloses an understanding that the buyers of lots from the Deudors, like Ramon
Rivera, may acquire lots from the subdivision being sold by Petitioner and sign new contracts of purchase
with the latter whenever possible, or only when the said lots have not already been sold to third parties.
The collection of the monthly installment payments terminated upon the full payment of the
purchase price on July 19, 1965, long before the ejectment case against Ramon Rivera was finally resolved
by the appellate court in September, 197.). As properly claimed by the petitioner, it had the right to hopefully
expect to win the ejectment case. It was not exactly its fault that it lost the case. Private respondents joined
in a common cause with it.
We have no hesitation to give to petitioner the benefit of the doubt of its having acted in good faith,
which is always presumed, without any intention of taking advantage of the other party dealing with it. "Good
faith consists in an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another. Good
faith is an opposite of fraud and of bad faith and its non-existence must be established by competent proof."
At the time of the execution of the contract to sell it is an admitted fact that Ricardo de Leon knew
that a third party was occupying a part of the lot subject of the sale. Ricardo de Leon knowingly assumed
the risk when he bought the, land, and was even called a vendee in bad faith by the Court of Appeals in
doing so, clearly not an innocent purchaser in good faith. If petitioner assumed that it would eject Ramon
Rivera, he did so, not knowing that the compromise agreement would stand on the way, as it had thought,
in all good faith, that paragraph 7 of the compromise agreement excluded the lot in question, having been
already sold to Ricardo de Leon before the agreement was executed in court.
One who purchases real estate with knowledge of a defect or lack of title in his vendor cannot claim
that he has acquired title thereto in good faith, as against the true owner of the land or of an interest therein;
A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard and then
claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor.
Without being shown to be vendees in good faith, Respondents are not entitled to the warranty
against eviction nor are they on titled to recover damages.
Sterling Investment vs Ruiz 1969 (actual or extrinsic fraud

defined)
The subject matter of the controversy is a parcel of land originally owned by one Teodorico
Cabasbas, who obtained a homestead patent thereon on December 27, 1940. The deceased was
the father of respondent Alejandro Cabasbas. Petitioners Sterling Investment Corporation, Pacific
Equipment Corporation, Regional Investment Corporation and Golden Hills Development
Corporation, started by alleging that on February 18, 1958, respondent Alejandro Cabasbas filed a
complaint in Branch VI of the Court of First Instance of Rizal against the spouses Jose A. de Kastro
and Estanislawa de Kastro, spouses Lutgardo Reyes and Elisa A. Reyes, and Demetrio de Jesus, to
recover the land originally owned by the late Teodorico Cabasbas, as evidenced by Original
Certificate of Title No. 815. On May 3, 1958 Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered a decision in
said case. spouses Lutgardo Reyes and Elisa A. Reyes, and Demetrio de Jesus were declared to be
the registered owners of the western portion of the land originally owned by the late Teodorico
Cabasbas
respondent Alejandro Cabasbas filed his second amended complaint, praying that the decision in
the previous Civil Case, based on a compromise agreement, be declared null and void with the
allegation that it was obtained through fraud as it was made to appear before the court of first
instance that the conveyance of title was made on February, 1946 when in fact it took place on
September 14, 1944, in violation of the Homestead Law.3
Petitioners Sterling Investment Corporation and Pacific Equipment Corporation alleged as affirmative
and special defenses that the sale to them were in good faith and for valuable consideration they
being innocent purchasers for value thus negating any cause of action against them.4
In an order of January 14, 1969, respondent Judge Ruiz denied such motion. Then came an
omnibus motion for reconsideration by petitioners as defendants stressing that respondent Judge
should dismiss the then pending suit on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction. The judge then dismiss
the omnibus motion for reconsideration.
After an order denying such omnibus motion of June 24, 1969, the present petition was filed on July
10 this year. In a resolution we gave due course to this petition for certiorari, we granted the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for.
The three-page answer of respondent Judge to dismiss but alleged that he has jurisdiction, that the
complaint states sufficient cause of action and that the suit is not barred by the doctrine of res
judicata.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether Judge Ruiz has jurisdiction on the merit.
The plea of petitioners must be granted. There is merit in the petition.
Insofar, however, as the petition is predicated on an absence of a cause of action, the ground relied
upon to annul the 1958 decision based on a compromise agreement being intrinsic and not extrinsic
fraud, there is unanimity in the view entertained by the Court that petitioners' stand must be
sustained.
Fraud to be ground for nullity of a judgment must be extrinsic to the litigation. In fact, under the
opposite rule, the losing party could attack the judgment at any time by attributing imaginary
falsehood to his adversary's proofs. But the settled law is that judicial determination however
erroneous of matters brought within the court's jurisdiction cannot be invalidated in another
proceeding. It is the business of a party to meet and repel his opponent's perjured evidence."
Not every kind of fraud, however, is sufficient ground to set aside a judgment. This Court has held
that only extrinsic or collateral, as distinguished from intrinsic, fraud is a ground for annulling a
judgment. Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the successful party in a litigation which is
committed outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or
witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of the
case. On the other hand, intrinsic fraud refers to acts of a party in a litigation during the trial, such as
the use of forged instruments on perjured testimony, which did not affect the presentation of the
case, but did prevent a fair and just determination of the case."
Centeno vs CA 1985 ( Rule that buyer is not required to go

beyond the COT; purchaser in good faith)
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court
of Appeals promulgated on December 4, 1974, reversing the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, based on the
following Stipulation of Facts:
STIPULATION OF FACTS AND STATEMENT OF ISSUES
chanroble s virtual law lib rary
COME NOW the plaintiffs and the defendant thru their undersigned
counsels, and to this Honorable Court respectfully submit the
following Stipulation of Facts and Statement of the Issues:
chanrobles vi rtua l law lib rary
1. The personal circumstances of the plaintiffs and the defendants

are admitted.
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2. In June 1969, the spouses Pedro M. Cruz and Rosanna Villar

offered to purchase from the defendantsspouses and the latter
agreed to sell to the former, a parcel of unregistered land situated
in Hagonoy, Taguig, Rizal, covered and evidenced by Tax
Declaration No. 5685. In making the offer to purchase, the spouses
Pedro M. Cruz and Rosanna Villar disclosed to the defendants their
intention to subdivide the said property into residential lots to be
sold later on as much.
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3. On July 10, 1969, defendants executed a Contract to Sell in favor

of the spouses Pedro M. Cruz and Rosanna Villar the abovedescribed parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 5685. Xerox
copy of said Contract to Sell is hereto attached as ANNEX 'A'.
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4. The spouses Pedro M, Cruz and Rosanna Villar in fact caused to

be subdivided the said property subject of the Contract to Sell into
residential lots to be offered for sale to individual purchasers.
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5. The said Pedro M. Cruz entered into separate 'Contracts of Sale'

involving thirty-one (31) residential lots with various persons,
among them whom are the plaintiffs. The separate 'Contracts of
Sale' entered into by the said Pedro M. Cruz with the plaintiffs are
hereto attached and marked as follows:
Nestor Centeno
- Annex 'B'
BonifacioGutierrez
- Annex 'B-1'
Artemio Gutierrez
- Annex 'B-2'
GregorioFernandez
- Annex 'B-3'
Zenaida de la Cruz
- Annex 'B-4'
Francisco Gomez
- Annex 'B-5'
Ricardo Adrao
- Annex 'B-6'
Ricardo Adrao
- Annex 'B-7'
Amparo Rayos
- Annex 'B-8'
Ofelia Santos
- Annex 'B-9'
6. In Annexes 'B-2', 'B-3', 'B-4' 'B-5', 'B-6', 'B-7', 'B-8','B-9', the

said Pedro M. Cruz represented himself 'as attorney-in-fact of the
owner of a parcel of land situated in Hagonoy, Taguig, Rizal, which
is more particularly described in Tax Declaration No. 5685' when in
truth and in fact he has never been appointed as Attorney-in-Fact
by either or both of the defendants.
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7. On March 11, 1970, defendants executed 'Deed of Sale with First

Mortgage' in favor of the land subject matter of the Contract to Sell
(ANNEX 'A') and ownership of said property passed from defendants
to the Cruz spouses, subject to the said first mortgage, Xerox copy
of said Deed of Sale with First Mortgage hereto attached as ANNEX
'C'.
chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra ry
8. The spouses Pedro M. Cruz and Rosanna Villar thereafter applied

for the registration of the subject land with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal and after due hearing on August 14, 1970, a
Decision was rendered in Land Registration Case No. N-129-M (N66) L.R.C. Rec. No. N-38492, granting their application for
registration and once final, Original Certificate of Title No. 8626 was
issued in the name of the Cruz spouses, In said Original Certificate
of Title No. 8626, it is expressly stated that the parcel of land so
registered is subject 'to a first mortgage in favor of Rufina Cruz
Victoria in the amount of P72,000.00 Philippine Currency, payable in
four (4) equal installments of P18,000.00 each on July 31, 1970,
December 31, 1970, May 31, 1971 and October 31, 1971,
respectively'. Xerox copy of the said Original Certificate of Title No.
8626 is hereto attached as Annex 'D'.
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9. In view of the failure of Pedro M. Cruz and Rosanna Villar to

comply with the terms and conditions of the mortgage on the land
covered in and evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. 8626,
defendants caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage on
January 9, 1971 the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal gave written notice of
the Sheriff's sale at public auction of said property set for February
15, 1971. Xerox copy of the Notice of Sheriff's Sale hereto attached
as ANNEX 'E'.
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10. On February 9, 1971 after the 'Notice of the Sheriff's Sale'

(ANNEX 'E') was published and before the sale at public auction,
Pedro M. Cruz filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of
Rizal for the approval of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-132057 of the
property covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 8626 and for the
cancellation of said title for each of the resulting lots in the
approved subdivision plan.
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11. On February 15, 1971, the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of

Original Certificate of Title No. 8626 was hold and the defendantsspouses, being the highest bidders, were awarded the property and
the corresponding Certificate of Sale was executed in their favor by
the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal Copy of said Certificate of Sale is
attached hereto as ANNEX 'F'.
12. The 'Contract of Sale' between the said Pedro M. Cruz and the
plaintiffs (ANNEXES 'B', 'B-l', to 'B-9', inclusive) were not registered
with the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, nor annotated
in Original Certificate of Title No. 8626 issued in the name of the
spouses Pedro M. Cruz and Rosalina Villar, nor annotated in the new
and individual Transfer Certificate of Title issued also in the name of
the Cruz spouses for each (A the lots of the abovementioned
plan.
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13. On April 17, 1971, defendants spouses on one hand and Pedro
M. Cruz and Rosalina Villar on the other, entered into an 'Interim
Agreement Pending Expiration of Redemption Period' consisting of
four (4) pages and entered in the Notarial Register of Notary Public
for Rizal, Gil M. Madarang, as Document No. 208, Page No. 43,
Book No. 1, series of 1971. Xerox copy of which Agreement is
hereto attached and marked as ANNEX 'G', Annex A therein being
marked as ANNEX 'G-l'.
chan roblesv irtualawl ibra ry
14. On April 19, 197 1, defendants thru their attorney-in-fact, Atty.

Alfonso C. Roldan, wrote the Register of Deeds of Rizal expressing
their conformity and lack of objection to the approval of the
subdivision plan and the issuance of separate titles, subject to the
conditions therein specified. Xerox copy of said letter is hereto
attached as ANNEX 'H'.
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15. On the basis of the Order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
dated February 27, 1971 in Land Recskadon Case No. N-129-M
approving the subdivision plan and directing the issuance of new
and separate titles for the resulting lots, Original Certificate of Title
No. 8626 was cancelled and individual titles were issued by the
Register of Deeds of Rizal Copy of the said Order of the CFI of Rizal
is hereto attached as ANNEX 'I'.
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Each of the new and separate Transfer Certificates of Title issued in

the name of the Cruz spouses for the subdivision Lots uniformly
contained the following encumbrances or annotations.
(a) A First Mortgage in favor of Rufina Cruz Victoria in the amount

of P72,000.00, Philippine Currency, payable in four equal
installments of P18,000.00 each on July 31, 1970, December 31,
1970, May 31, 1971 and October 31, 1971 respectively. (Fr. OCT
No. 8626/A-79).
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(b) Entry No. 39329/0-8626-CERTIFICATE OF SALE in favor of

RUFINA CRUZ VICTORIA Vendee; covering the property described
herein for the sum of P78,082.88 in accordance with the Certificate
of Sale issued by the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal.
Date of the instrument-Feb. 15, 197 1.
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Date of the inscription-Feb. 16. 1971 at 11:40 a.m.

(c) Entry No. 47353/PA-11343. SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY
executed by RUFINA CRUZ VICTORIA, in favor of ALFONSO C.
ROLDAN, an attorney-in-fact, among other powers to act for and in
behalf in connection with the obligations of the herein registered
owners, and to enter into and execute any agreement or contract
with the said owners involving the property herein described. (Doc.
No. 126, Page 27, Bk. I., S. of 1971 of Not. Pub. for Rizal, Gil. M.
Madarang)
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Date of the instrument-March 18, 197 1.
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Date of the inscription-April 21, 1971 at 11.59 a.m.
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(d) Entry No. 47354/T-No. 322-281-INTERIM AGREEMENT PENDING

EXPIRATION OF REDEMPTION PERIOD duly executed by the herein
registered owners and ALFONSO C. ROLDAN, as attorney-in-fact,
covering the property herein described subject to the terms and
conditions set forth in Doc. No. 208, Page No. 43, Bk. I., S. of 1971
of Not. Pub. for Rizal, Gil M. Madarang)
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Date of the instrument-April 17, 1971.
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Date of inscription-April 21, 1971 at 12:00 a.m.
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16. The spouses Pedro M. Cruz and Rosalina Villar failed to redeem
the subject property within the reglementary and redemptive period
of one year or on February 15, 1972 and defendants-spouses cause
ownership of said realty to be consolidated with them thereafter
obtaining the issuance to them of new Transfer Certificates of Title

with them appearing as the registered owners, free from any liens
and encumbrances.
chanrob lesvi rtualaw lib raryc han robles v irt ual law l ibra ry
17. The ten (10) residential lots involved in the 'Contracts of Sale'
(ANNEXES 'B', 'B-l' to 'B-9', inclusive) are presently registered in the
name of defendants, free from any liens and encumbrances, as
evidenced by the Transfer Certificates of Title, xerox copies of which
are hereto attached as ANNEXES, as follows:
T.C.T. NO.
LOT & BLOCK NO.
355816
Lot 4, Block II
ANNEX 'J'
355809
Lot 9, Block I
ANNEX 'J-l'
355810
Lot 10, Block I
ANNEX 'J-2'
355829
Lot 18, Block II
ANNEX 'J-3'
355811
Lot 11, Block I
ANNEX 'J-4'
355802
Lot 2, Block I
ANNEX 'J-5'
355812
Lot 1, Block II
ANNEX 'J-6'
355814
Lot 3, Block II
ANNEX 'J-7'
355801
Lot 1. Block I
ANNEX 'J-8'
355830
Lot 19, Block II
ANNEX 'J-9'
17. On April 11, 1972 and May 29, 1972, defendants thru their
attorney-in-fact, Alfonso C. Roldan, gave individual written notices
to all persons in whose favor the said Pedro M. Cruz had executed
contracts to sell for lots in St. Michael subdivision II, Hagonoy,
Taguig, Rizal, including herein plaintiffs, granting the said persons
the option or privilege to purchase the lots involved under the terms
and conditions as therein stated. Copy of said letters of April 11,
1972 and May 29, 1972 are hereto attached as ANNEXES 'K' and 'L',
respectively.
18. The defendants came to know from said Pedro M. Cruz himself
of the 'Contracts of Sale' executed by the latter in favor of various
persons, including the plaintiffs only after the Certificate of Sale

executed by the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal(ANNEX 'F') was
issued.
19. The present Complaint was filed on June 28, 1972 and
summons was served upon the defendants on July 14.1972.
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20. Plaintiffs have not made any demand. oral or written, upon the
defendants, prior to the filing of their Complaintchanroble s virtual law l ibra ry
21. Lot 4, Block 11, involved in the 'Contract of Sale' (ANNEX 'B')
executed by Pedro M, Cruz in favor of plaintiff Nestor Centeno, was
the subject of an earlier 'Contract of Sale' executed by said Pedro M.
Cruz in favor of Conrado P. Uy on May 26. 1969. xerox copy of
which is hereto attached as 'ANNEX M'.
cha nrob les vi rtual law lib rary
Subsequently, said Conrado P. Uy, for consideration paid to him by

plaintiff Nestor Centeno, assigned and transferred rights and
interests on said Lot 4, Block 11 to the said plaintiff, with the
conformity of Pedro M, Cruz. Thus Pedro M. Cruz executed the
Contract of Sale (ANNEX 'B') in favor of plaintiff Nestor Centeno.
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law libra ry
22. From February 1972 up to the present, plaintiffs have not paid
the installments specified under the 'Contract of Sale (ANNEXES 'B1 ' to 'B-9', inclusive) either to the spouses Pedro M, Cruz and
Rosalina Villar, or to the defendants. Plaintiffs have not made any
tender of payment of the said installments as they fell due to the
spouses Pedro M. Cruz and Rosalina Villar or to the defendants after
consolidation of ownership of the foreclosed property in favor of the
defendants. Neither have the plaintiffs made consignation of the
said installments as they fell due with the court of proper
jurisdiction, also after consolidation of ownership of said property in
favor of the defendants. ....
(Sgd.) ALFONSO C. ROLDAN
Counsel for Defendants
Rm. 701 Madrigal Building
Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal
(Sgd.) PROSPERO CRESCINI Counsel for Plaintiffs

Rm. 511 Madrigal Building
Escolta, Manila (pp. 124-137, A)
On the basis of the aforequoted stipulation of facts, the lower court
rendered judgment on April 11, 1973, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby renders
judgment directing defendants to respect, recognize and abide by
the terms and conditions of the contracts of sale, Annexes B, B-1 to
B-9; for plaintiffs to continue the payments of the installment due
thereunder; for defendants to credit plaintiffs for all the installment
payments heretofore made by them on their respective lots; and for
defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum of P2,000.00 byway of
attorney's fees. The rest of the prayer for damages is denied for
lack of sufficient basis.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed said judgment and
dismissed plaintiffs' complaint. In reversing the lower court, the
Court of Appeals held that the disclosure by the spouses Cruz to the
Victorias of their intention to subdivide the property into residential
lots was merely simple talk on preliminaries attendant to a contract
of sale, and its non-compliance does not affect the rights and
obligations embodied in their contract; that the statement made by
Cruz spouses that they were the attorney in fact of Victorias was
not at all binding upon Victoria, as it was expressly stated in
paragraph 6 of the Stipulation of Facts that the Cruz spouses were
never been appointed as such; that when the spouses Cruz and the
Victorias formally executed a deed of sale with mortgage on March
1 1,1970, the contracts of sale in favor of the lot buyers were not
mentioned in the said deed considering that the contracts of sale
were made prior to the execution of the said deed, hence, the lot
buyers could not compel the Victorias to recognize their contracts
with the spouses Cruz; that there is no stipulation and evidence that
the lot buyers upon the execution of the con-tracts in their favor
took possession, openly and publicly of the property in question so
as to give notice to the Victorias of their prior rights; that the
separate titles issued on each lot were all in the name of Cruz with
the mortgage in favor of the Victorias annotated, but no notation

was made as to the interests of the lot buyers; that there is no
evidence on record to show that the Victorias were in estoppel; that
there is no stipulation that any of the money paid by the lot buyers
to the spouses Cruz had been illegally appropriated by the Victorias
and that the spouses Victoria were clearly mortgagees with real
right to foreclose the same when their mortgage credit was not paid
on time.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari, petitioner

assigned to this Court for resolution five (5) errors, to wit:
I
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THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT FROM THE

COMBINATION OF THE UNDISPUTED CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS
CASE, THE VICTORIAS KNEW OF THE SALE BY PEDRO M. CRUZ OF
THE SUBDIVIDED LOTS TO THE PETITIONERS.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE

VICTORIAS MERELY STEPPED INTO THE SHOES OF THE CRUZ
SPOUSES.
chanroblesvi rtualaw lib raryc han robles v irt ual law l ibra ry
III
c han robles v irt ual law li bra ry
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE

EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE OF THE MORTGAGE HERE
INVOLVED IS A TOTAL NULLITY BECAUSE THE DEED OF MORTGAGE
DID NOT CONTAIN A SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY IN FAVOR OF
THE MORTGAGEES TO SELL THE PROPERTY AT PUBLIC
AUCTION.
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IV
chanro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE VICTORIAS

WERE NOT UNJUSTLY ENRICHED AT THE EXPENSE OF THE
PETITIONERS.
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THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT MOTU PROPRIO HOLDING

THAT IT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PRESENT APPEAL AND
IN NOT ELEVATING THE APPEAL TO THIS HONORABLE COURT FOR
DETERMINATION.
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We find no merit in the present appeal. The property in question

was originally owned by the Victories. On July 10,1969, they
executed in favor of the spouses Pedro M. Cruz and Rosalina Villar a
contract to sell said property, which at that time was still
unregistered and was covered by Tax Declaration No. 5685, Under
said agreement, it was stipulated that while possession of the
property shag be considered delivered to the buyers Pedro M. Cruz
and Rosalina Villar, the ownership thereof shall remain with the
Victorias until the downpayment of P70,000.00 shag have been
paid, in which event the necessary deed of transfer of ownership of
the property will be executed together with a first mortgage on the
property in favor of the Victorias to secure payment of the balance
of the purchase price. On March 11, 1970, said deed of transfer with
first mortgage on the property was executed between the Victorias
and Pedro M. Cruz and Rosalina Villar. Thereafter the Cruzes
registered the property and were issued Original Certificate of Title
No. 8626 with the mortgage constituted on the property in favor of
the Victorias annotated thereon.
Because the Cruzes failed to pay the balance of the purchase price
of the property the Victorias foreclosed extrajudicially the mortgage
in their favor and at the auction sale they were the highest bidder.
Before the expiration of the period of redemption with the consent
of the Victorias the property was subdivided into several lots and
individual titles were issued covering said lots in the name of Pedro
M. Cruz. Each of new certificate of transfer for the lots to which the
property was subdivided was issued in the name of Pedro M. Cruz
with the mortgage and sheriffs certificate of sale in favor of the
Victorias duly annotated thereon.
chanrob les vi rtual law lib rary
When the property was sold at public auction in view of the default
of the Cruzes to pay their mortgage indebtedness there was no
annotation of any sale executed by the Cruzes in favor of the
petitioners which would have placed on notice the bidders including

the Victories at said public auction sale. Well settled is the rule that
all persons dealing with property covered by torrens certificate of
title are not required to go beyond what appears on the face of the
title. When there is nothing on the certificate of title to indicate any
cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or any encumbrance
thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore further than what
the torrens title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden
defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right
thereto. (William Anderson vs. Garcia, 64 Phil.,
506; Fulle vs. Legare, 7 SCRA 351).
chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan roble s virtual law lib rary
As a matter of fact, there is no evidence nor any statement in the

Stipulation of Facts to show that petitioners had actually taken
possession of portions of the property in question sold to them
which would have at least called the attention of the Victorias that
the Cruzes had sold said portions to petitioners. The contracts of
sale in favor of some petitioners executed in 1959 stated that Pedro
M. Cruz was merely the attorney-in-fact of the owner of the
property. (Annexes A-2, Contract of Sale in favor of Artemio
Gutierrez; Annex A-3, Contract of Sale in favor of Gregorio
Hernandez, A-4, Contract of Sale in favor of Zenaida de la Cruz; A5, Contract of Sale in favor of Francisco Gomez: A-6. Contract of
Sale in favor of Ricardo Adrao: A-7, Contract of Sale in favor of
Amparo Rayos; A-8, Contract of Sale in favor of Ofelia Santos), At
the time Pedro M. Cruz executed said deeds of sale, he was not yet
the owner of the property. Said, buyers should have known that the
owners of the property were the Victorias as the deeds of sale in
their favor described the property as property described in Tax
Declaration No. 8685 of the municipality of Taguig, Rizal. Had they
investigated in whose name Tax Declaration No. 5685 was issued,
they would have found out that it was in the name of the
Victorias.
chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry
chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry
After Pedro M. Cruz had obtained a certificate of title over the

property in his name said title was subject to the mortgage in favor
of the Victorias. Any sale executed by the Cruzes in favor of the
petitioners would then be subject to the rights of the mortgages of
said property. Even if the petitioners had registered the deed in
their favor, which they did not, their rights under said deed of sale
can not prevail over the rights of the mortgagee which have been
annotated on said property from the beginning, that is to say when
original certificate of title 8626 was issued in February 1971.
chanroblesv irtualawli bra ry
Moreover, the petitioners cannot bind the Victorias under the deeds
of sale executed in their favor by Cruz allegedly as an attorney-infact of the Victorias because it is not true that Pedro M. Cruz was
the attorney-in-fact of the Victorias. According to paragraph 6 of the
Stipulation of Facts, Pedro M. Cruz had never been appointed as
their attorney-in-fact by the Victorias. Neither can they compel the
Victories to recognize the deeds of sale in their favor the ground of
estoppel in allowing Pedro M. Cruz to sell the properties in question
to petitioners. According to paragraph 18 of the Stipulation of Facts
Victorias came to know of the sales made by Pedro M. Cruz in favor
of petitioners only after property was sold to the them the
foreclosure sale.
18. The defendants came to know from said Pedro M. Cruz himself
of the "Contract of Sale" executed by the latter in favor of various
persons, including the plaintiffs only after the Certificate of Sale
executed by the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal (Annex 'F') was issued:
Pan 2 of the Stipulation of Facts wherein it is stated that when the
Victorias agreed to sell the property to the Cruzes in 1969 the latter
informed the former that their intention was to subdivide the
property for resale is cited by petitioners as proof that the Victorias
had knowledge of the sales of the lots to which the property had
been subdivided. That is not necessarily so. Moreover, even
granting that the Cruzes had told the Victorias of their plan to
subdivide the property they were buying, that did not impose any
legal obligation upon the Victorias to be bound by any sales made
by Cruz before they become the owner of the property. Neither did
that imply that subdivision of the property and subsequent sale of
the lots to which it be subdivided would in any way bar them from
asserting their legal rights to sail property as the owners thereof
before they are fully paid the purchase price or their rights under
any mortgage executed in their favor to secure the balance of the
payment of the purchase price of the property.
chanroblesv irtualawli bra rycha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary
As the Victories were not parties to the contracts of sale in favor of

petitioners, the same having been executed by Pedro M. Cruz and
petitioners and according to the Stipulation of Facts Pedro M. Cruz
had never been appointed attorney-in-fact of the Victories, there is
no privity of contract between petitioners and the Victorias.
Petitioners have no cause of action against the Victories since there
is no evidence whatsoever to show that petitioners by acts or
omissions of the Victorias had been induced to buy lots to which the
property had been subdivided by the Cruzes. Neither is there any
evidence that the Victorias had received any of the money paid by
said petitioners to the Cruzes for the lots bought by them.
Petitioners recourse must be against the Cruzes.
chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry
chan robles v irt ual la w libra ry
In view of the foregoing, the present petition is DISMISSED for lack

of merit and the decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED with
costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
chan roble s virtual law l ib rary
Medida vs CA 1992 (Mortgagor may still execute another

mortgage contract during redemption period.)
Facts: Private respondents, Spouses Dolino, alarmed of losing their right of redemption over the
subject parcel of land from Juan Gandiocho, purchaser of the aforesaid lot at a foreclosure sale of
the previous mortgage in favor of Cebu City Development Bank, went to Teotimo Abellana,
President of the City Savings Bank (formerly known as Cebu City Savings and Loan Association,
Inc.), to obtain a loan of P30, 000. Prior thereto, their son Teofredo filed a similar loan application
and the subject lot was offered as security. Subsequently they executed a promissory note in favor
of CSB.
The loan became due and demandable without the spouses Dolino paying the same, petitioner
association caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. The land was sold at a public
auction to CSB being the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was subsequently issued which was
also registered. No redemption was being effected by Sps. Dolino, their title to the property was
cancelled and a new title was issued in favor of CSB.
Sps. Dolino then filed a case to annul the sale at public auction and for the cancellation of certificate
of sale issued pursuant thereto, alleging that the extrajudicial foreclosure sale was in violation of
Act 3135, as amended. The trial court sustained the validity of the loan and the real estate
mortgage, but annulled the extrajudicial foreclosure on the ground that it failed to comply with the
notice requirement of Act 3135.
Not satisfied with the ruling of the trial court, Sps. Dolino interposed a partial appeal to the CA,
assailing the validity of the mortgage executed between them and City Savings Bank, among
others. The CA ruled in favor of private respondents declaring the said mortgage as void.
Issue: Whether or not a mortgage, whose property has been extrajudicially foreclosed and sold at
a corresponding foreclosure sale, may validly execute a mortgage contract over the same property
in favor of a third party during the period of redemption.
Held: It is undisputed that the real estate mortgage in favor of petitioner bank was executed by
respondent spouses during the period of redemption. During the said period it cannot be said that
the mortgagor is no longer the owner of the foreclosed property since the rule up to now is the
right of a purchaser of a foreclosure sale is merely inchoate until after the period of redemption
has expired without the right being exercised. The title to the land sold under mortgage foreclosure
remains in the mortgagor or his grantee until the expiration of the redemption period and the
conveyance of the master deed.
The mortgagor remains as the absolute owner of the property during the redemption period and
has the free disposal of his property, there would be compliance with Article. 2085 of the Civil
Code for the constitution of another mortgage on the property. To hold otherwise would create an
inequitable situation wherein the mortgagor would be deprived of the opportunity, which may be
his last recourse, to raise funds to timely redeem his property through another mortgage.
Magdalena Homeowners Association vs CA 1990 (The

continuance or the removal of the notice of lispendens is not
contingent on the existence of a final judgment and ordinarily
has no effect on the merits thereof.)
The subdivision was owned by the Magdalena Estate, Inc.. It originally had a total area of 355,490
square meters. A part of this Lot 15, measuring 7,100 square meters, had initially been set aside as
the subdivision's "open space," i.e., reserved for use as a park, playground or recreational zone.
The Council authorized the subdivision for disposition to the public of the former open
space. Subsequently, the Court of First Instance of Quezon City also approved the same amended
subdivision plan in accordance with Republic Act No. 44, subject to the condition "that all the roads,
alleys, drainage and open space, dedicated for public use, delineated therein, shall be made subject
to the limitations imposed by law.
Some time afterwards, by virtue of a deed executed by MEI and accepted by the City Mayor of
Quezon City, MEI donated to the City Government certain lots in its subdivision for use as parks and
playgrounds; and the donation was ratified by the Council.8
After the donation of the parks and playgrounds, MEI disposed of the entire Lot 15, Block 18 An area
of' 15,778 square meters within this Lot 15, was subsequently conveyed to the Development Bank of
the Philippines (DBP) by way of dacion en pago. The rest, residential lots with an aggregate area of
5,688 square meters, were sold to third parties who thereafter constructed houses thereon. 10
Magdalena Homeowners Association, Inc., believed that the act of the Quezon City Government of
authorizing the release of said Lot 15 as open space, after it had been so declared and earlier
dedicated as such was beyond the City Government's authority. They therefore brought suit against
the Magdalena Estate, Inc. MEI in the Court of First Instance at Quezon City for the recovery of said
Lot 15 as "open space" for public use of the residents of the subdivision.
While the case was pending, notices of lis pendens were, at the plaintiffs' instance, inscribed by the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City on the Torrens is titles of all the lots embraced within Block 12
Judgment was rendered by the Trial Court that the plaintiffs have no cause of action against
defendant Quezon City government, the complaint against it is hereby DISMISSED.
While the case was pending adjudgment, MEI and DBP filed separate motions with the Court of
Appeals praying for cancellation of the notice of lis pendens. 18These motions were granted by
resolution. Hence, the petition at bar, for nullification of the resolutions.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion if not indeed without or in excess
of its jurisdiction in cancelling the notice of lis pendens.
HELD:
The notice of lis pendens i.e., that real property is involved in an action is ordinarily recorded
without the intervention of the court where the action is pending. The notice is but an incident in an
action, an extra judicial one, to be sure. It does not affect the merits thereof. The cancellation of such
a precautionary notice is therefore also a mere incident in the action, and may be ordered by the
Court having jurisdiction of it at any given time.
In the case at bar, the case had properly come within the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals in virtue of the perfection of the plaintiffs' appeal. It therefore had power to deal with and
resolve any incident in connection with the action subject of the appeal, even before final judgment.
The rule that no questions may be raised for the first time on appeal have reference only to those
affecting the merits of the action, and not to mere incidents thereof, e.g., cancellation of notices of lis
pendens, or, to repeat, the grant or dissolution of provisional remedies.
1w phi 1
That determination, and the conclusion that Presidential Decree No. 1529 "authorizes the
cancellation of notices of lis pendens before final judgment upon order of the Court, upon the
grounds previously mentioned," are not whimsical or capricious, despotic, arbitrary or oppressive in
the premises so as to call for correction by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
LBP vs Heirs of Cruz 2008

Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) is a government banking
institution designated under Section 64 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6654 as the
financial intermediary of the agrarian reform program of the government.
Respondent Heirs of Eleuterio Cruz is the registered owner of an unirrigated
riceland situated in Lakambini, Tuao, Cagayan per Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-368. Of the total 13.7320 hectares of respondents landholding, an area of 13.5550
hectares was placed by the government under the coverage of the operation land
transfer program under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27.[6]
Petitioner pegged the value of the acquired landholding at P106,935.76

Respondents rejected petitioners valuation and instituted an action for a summary
proceeding for the preliminary determination of just compensation before the
PARAD. On 23 November 1999, the PARAD rendered a decision fixing the just
compensation in the amount of P80,000.00 per hectare.[9] Petitioner sought
reconsideration but was unsuccessful.
Thus, on 28 January 2000, petitioner filed a petition for the determination of
just compensation before the RTC of Tuguegarao City.
RTC, sitting as an Special Agrarian Court (SAC), rendered a decision fixing
the amount of P80,000.00 to be the just compensation of the land subject of this case and ordering
Land Bank of the Philippines to pay respondent represented by Lorna Cruz-Felipe the amount
of P1,098,560.00 in the manner provided by R.A. No. 6657 by way of full payment of the said just
compensation.
The SAC did not accept petitioners valuation as it was based on P.D. No. 27,
in which just compensation was determined at the time of the taking of the
property.[16]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in a
Resolution prompting petitioner to elevate the matter to the CA.
On 17 August 2006, the CA rendered the assailed decision partly granting
petitioners appeal. The appellate court affirmed the SAC decision fixing just
compensation at P80,000.00 per hectare. Petitioner sought consideration but was
denied in the assailed Resolution dated 30 October 2006.
Hence, the instant petition,
ISSUE:
Whether the SAC and CA uses the correct formula in computing just
compensation.
Petitioner insists that the values in E.O. No. 228 are applicable to lands
acquired under P.D. No. 27 in cognizance of the well-settled rule that just
compensation is the value of the property at the time of the taking.
The petition lacks merit.
The Court laid down in Paris v. Alfeche, there the Court explained that while
under P.D. No. 27 tenant farmers are already deemed owners of the land they till,
they are still required to pay the cost of the land before the title is transferred to them
and that pending the payment of just compensation, actual title to the tenanted land
remains with the landowner.
The decisive backdrop of the instant case coincides with that in Paris, that is,
the amount of just compensation due to respondents had not yet been settled by the
time R.A. No. 6657 became effective.
Stating that no evidence was presented by respondents on the aforementioned

parameters, the SAC ruled that it was constrained to adopt the finding of the
PARAD, which fixed the value of the land at P80,000.00 per hectare. On appeal, the
CA adopted the same finding.
The general rule is that factual findings of the trial court, especially when
affirmed by the CA, are binding and conclusive on the Court. However, the rule
admits of exceptions, as when the factual findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises, or conjectures or when the findings are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based.[34]
A perusal of the PARAD decision, which was adopted by both the SAC and
the CA, shows that its valuation of P80,000.00 per hectare is sorely lacking in any
evidentiary or legal basis. While the Court wants to fix just compensation due to
respondents if only to write finis to the controversy, the evidence on record is not
sufficient for the Court to do so in accordance with DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and
the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Agrarian Case No. 0058 is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court.

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REPUBLIC vs SANGALANG (the remedy is to file petition for

revalidation pursuant to PD 1271)

In accordance wih the provisions of Sec. 5 of Act No. 627:

Heirs of Dicman vs Carino (PD 628 segragating and reserving

Ting-el Dicman, predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners, had been employed by

Ting-el Dicman executed a public instrument entitled "Deed of Conveyance of

On April 20, 1983, petitioners, suing as compulsory heirs of Ting-el Dicman,

RULING: NO. SC ruled in favor of Carino.

Albano vs CA (It is fundamental principle in land registration

Valisno vs Plan (Motion to dismiss grounded on res judicata is

Republic vs Tayag (Payment in lump sum to cover all past taxes

Gabriel vs CA (the jurisdiction of court in cadastral cases over

the first questioned Resolution[11] was rendered by the CA

Petitioners on appeal presented the following issues in their Memorandum: 1)

JM Tuason vs CA (right to recover possession is imprescriptible)

Sterling Investment vs Ruiz 1969 (actual or extrinsic fraud

Centeno vs CA 1985 ( Rule that buyer is not required to go

chanroble s virtual law lib rary

1. The personal circumstances of the plaintiffs and the defendants

c hanro bles vi rt ual law li b rary

2. In June 1969, the spouses Pedro M. Cruz and Rosanna Villar

chan robles vi rt ual law li bra ry

3. On July 10, 1969, defendants executed a Contract to Sell in favor

chan roble s virtual law lib rary

4. The spouses Pedro M, Cruz and Rosanna Villar in fact caused to

cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

5. The said Pedro M. Cruz entered into separate 'Contracts of Sale'

6. In Annexes 'B-2', 'B-3', 'B-4' 'B-5', 'B-6', 'B-7', 'B-8','B-9', the

chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

7. On March 11, 1970, defendants executed 'Deed of Sale with First

chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

8. The spouses Pedro M. Cruz and Rosanna Villar thereafter applied

c hanro bles vi rt ual law li bra ry

9. In view of the failure of Pedro M. Cruz and Rosanna Villar to

chan roble s virtual law l i brary

10. On February 9, 1971 after the 'Notice of the Sheriff's Sale'

chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

11. On February 15, 1971, the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of

chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

14. On April 19, 197 1, defendants thru their attorney-in-fact, Atty.

cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

cha nroble s virtual law l ib rary

Each of the new and separate Transfer Certificates of Title issued in

cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

(a) A First Mortgage in favor of Rufina Cruz Victoria in the amount

cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib ra ry

(b) Entry No. 39329/0-8626-CERTIFICATE OF SALE in favor of

chanroblesvi rtualaw lib rary

cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

Date of the inscription-Feb. 16. 1971 at 11:40 a.m.

Date of the instrument-March 18, 197 1.

Date of the inscription-April 21, 1971 at 11.59 a.m.

chanroblesvi rt ualawlib rary

cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

(d) Entry No. 47354/T-No. 322-281-INTERIM AGREEMENT PENDING

Date of the instrument-April 17, 1971.

chan robles v irt ual law li bra ry

Date of inscription-April 21, 1971 at 12:00 a.m.

obtaining the issuance to them of new Transfer Certificates of Title

LOT & BLOCK NO.

Lot 10, Block I