Holy Trinity Realty vs.

Abacan
April 17, 2013

G.R. No. 183858

Facts:

Petitioner Holy Trinity Realty Development Corporation (HTRDC) acquired a

property from Santiago located in Malolos City, but later found that the lot was
already occupied by some individuals, among them respondent-spouses Carlos
and Elizabeth Abacan. HTRDC then filed a complaint for forcible entry against
respondent-spouses and the other occupants. It withdrew the complaint,
however, because it needed to verify the exact location of the property, which
the occupants claimed was covered by emancipation patents issued by the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). DARAB granted the
cancellation of the emancipation patent of the occupants of the and filed by
HTRDC. Subsequently, HTRDC filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and
damages with the MTCC of Malolos against the occupants of the subject land for
the failure to vacate the property. MTCC decided in favor of HTRDC and ordered
the occupants to vacate the premises and to pay reasonable rent, attorneys
fees and costs of suit. The MTCC then ordered the issuance of a writ of execution
and the Decision became final and executory.
Meanwhile, the provincial agrarian reform officer (PARO) filed an action for
annulment of sale against HTRDC. Respondents thereafter moved to stay
execution on the ground that a supervening event had transpired. The MTCC
denied the motion, ruling that the mere filing of an action by the PARO did not
materially change the situation of the parties, and hence, may not be considered
as a supervening event. Furthermore, the MTCC denied the respondents motion
on the ground that respondents acquisition of ownership is not a supervening
event that will bar the execution of the judgment in the unlawful detainer case.
On appeal, the CA held that the MTCC had no jurisdiction over the unlawful
detainer case. Aggrieved by the decision of the CA, petitioner HTRDC filed the
instant petition for review before this Court.

Issue: Whether or not MTCC has jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case?
Ruling:

The CA committed reversible error in ruling that the MTCC had no jurisdiction
over the unlawful detainer case. What was before it was a petition for certiorari
against the MTCCs denial of respondents motion to quash. The petition was not
directed at the MTCCs Consolidated Decision, nor could it be, because a Rule 65
petition for certiorari must be filed not later than 60 days from notice of the
judgment. Since respondents failed to timely appeal the Consolidated Decision,
it has long attained finality and has become immutable and unalterable pursuant
to the doctrine on finality of judgment. Thus, as respondents sole argument in
their motion to quash was the existence of a material supervening event, and as
the MTCCs denial of their motion was premised on the conclusion that their
subsequent acquisition of ownership was not a supervening event, the resolution
of the present case should be limited to that issue. Furthermore, MTCC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in denying respondents motion to quash. The
MTCC correctly denied their motion to the effect that the subsequent acquisition
of ownership is not a supervening event that will bar the execution of the
judgment in the unlawful detainer case.

Republic vs. Caguioa

February 20, 2013
G.R. No. 174385
Facts:

Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A) No. 7227 or the Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992 which created the Subic Special Economic and Freeport
Zone (SBF) and the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA). Section 12 of R.A No.
7227 of the law provides that no taxes, local and national, shall be imposed within
the
Subic
Special
Economic
Zone.
Pursuant
to
the
law,
Indigo Distribution Corporation, et al., which are all domestic corporations doing
business at the SBF, applied for and were granted Certificates of Registration and
Tax Exemption by the SBMA.
Congress subsequently passed R.A. No. 9334, which provides that all
applicable taxes, duties, charges, including excise taxes due thereon shall
be applied to cigars and cigarettes, distilled spirits, fermented liquors and wines
brought directly into the duly chartered or legislated freeports of the Subic
Economic Freeport Zone. On the basis of Section 6 of R.A. No. 9334, SBMA issued

a Memorandum declaring that, all importations of cigars, cigarettes, distilled spirits,

fermented liquors and wines into the SBF, shall be treated as ordinary importations
subject to all applicable taxes, duties and charges, including excise taxes.
Upon its implementation, Indigo et al., sought for a reconsideration of
the directives on the imposition of duties and taxes, particularly excise taxes by
the Collector of Customs and the SBMA Administrator. Their request was
subsequently denied prompting them to file with the RTC of Olongapo City a special
civil action for declaratory relief to have certain provisions of R.A. No. 9334 declared
as unconstitutional. They prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and preliminary mandatory injunction.
The respondent judge granted the lower court petitioners application for
preliminary injunction despite the Republics opposition, and he issued the
preliminary injunction.
The Republic filed in the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition to
annul the respondent judges order and the writ issued pursuant to this order. The
petition asked for the issuance of a TRO and/or a writ of preliminary injunction.
Without acting on the Republics motion to suspend the proceedings, the
respondent judge granted on August 11, 2005 the private respondents motions and
complaints-in-intervention.
The Republic moved to reconsider the respondent
judges August 11, 2005 order, arguing that it had been denied due process
because it never received copies of the private respondents motions and
complaints-in-intervention.
On July 5, 2006, the respondent judge denied the Republics motion for
reconsideration and the previously filed motion to suspend the proceedings. The
Republic responded to the respondent judges actions by filing the present petition.
The present petition charges that the respondent judge acted with manifest
partiality and with grave abuse of discretion when he issued his August 11, 2005
and July 5, 2006 orders
Further, the Republic posits that the respondent judge abused his discretion when
he extended to the private respondents the benefits of the preliminary injunction
earlier issued to the lower court petitioners under the same P1,000,000.00 bond the
lower court petitioners posted. The Republic labels this action as a violation of
Section 4, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, claiming at the same time that the bond is
manifestly disproportionate to the resulting damage the Republic stood to incur
considering the number of the original and the additional lower court petitioners. On
the other hand, In their defense, the private respondents point to the procedural
defects in the petition.
ISSUES:
Whether or not public respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess in jurisdiction in peremptorily and unjustly issuing
the injunctive writ in favor of private respondents despite the absence of the
legal requisites for its issuance?
Ruling

First, the present petition was filed within the reglementary period. Contrary to
the private respondents position, the 60- day period within which to file the petition
for certiorari is counted from the Republics receipt of the July 5, 2006 order denying
the latters motion for reconsideration. Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
clear on this point "In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely
filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be
counted from notice of the denial of said motion."
Second, while the principle of hierarchy of courts does indeed require that
recourses should be made to the lower courts before they are made to the higher
courts, this principle is not an absolute rule and admits of exceptions under welldefined circumstances. In several cases, we have allowed direct invocation of this
Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari on the ground of special and
important reasons clearly stated in the petition; 16 when dictated by public welfare
and the advancement of public policy; when demanded by the broader interest of
justice; when the challenged orders were patent nullities; 17 or when analogous
exceptional and compelling circumstances called for and justified our immediate
and direct handling of the case. 18 The demonstrated extent of the respondent
judges actions and their effects constitute special and compelling circumstances
calling for our direct and immediate attention.
Lastly, under our rules of procedure,19 service of the petition on a party, when
that party is represented by a counsel of record, is a patent nullity and is not
binding upon the party wrongfully served. 20 This rule, however, is a procedural
standard that may admit of exceptions when faced with compelling reasons of
substantive justice manifest in the petition and in the surrounding circumstances of
the case.21 Procedural rules can bow to substantive considerations through a liberal
construction aimed at promoting their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. 22 Under circumstances, the
Court was satisfied with the Republics explanation on why it failed to initially
comply with the rule on service of the present petition; its subsequent compliance
with the rule after being informed of the presence of counsels of record sufficiently
warrants the rules relaxed application. 23 The lack of a proper service unlike the
situation when the Republic was simply confronted with already-admitted
complaints-in-intervention did not result in any prejudice; the private respondents
themselves were actually served with, and duly received, their copies of the present
petition, allowing them to comment and to be heard on the petition.