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Abstract
Background: In the absence of other evidence, modelling has been used extensively to help policy makers plan for a
potential future influenza pandemic.
Method: We have constructed an individual based model of a small community in the developed world with detail down to
exact household structure obtained from census collection datasets and precise simulation of household demographics,
movement within the community and individual contact patterns. We modelled the spread of pandemic influenza in this
community and the effect on daily and final attack rates of four social distancing measures: school closure, increased case
isolation, workplace non-attendance and community contact reduction. We compared the modelled results of final attack
rates in the absence of any interventions and the effect of school closure as a single intervention with other published
individual based models of pandemic influenza in the developed world.
Results: We showed that published individual based models estimate similar final attack rates over a range of values for R0
in a pandemic where no interventions have been implemented; that multiple social distancing measures applied early and
continuously can be very effective in interrupting transmission of the pandemic virus for R0 values up to 2.5; and that
different conclusions reached on the simulated benefit of school closure in published models appear to result from
differences in assumptions about the timing and duration of school closure and flow-on effects on other social contacts
resulting from school closure.
Conclusion: Models of the spread and control of pandemic influenza have the potential to assist policy makers with
decisions about which control strategies to adopt. However, attention needs to be given by policy makers to the
assumptions underpinning both the models and the control strategies examined.
Citation: Milne GJ, Kelso JK, Kelly HA, Huband ST, McVernon J (2008) A Small Community Model for the Transmission of Infectious Diseases: Comparison of
School Closure as an Intervention in Individual-Based Models of an Influenza Pandemic. PLoS ONE 3(12): e4005. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004005
Editor: Joel Mark Montgomery, U.S. Naval Medical Research Center Detachment/Centers for Disease Control, United States of America
Received June 16, 2008; Accepted November 20, 2008; Published December 23, 2008
Copyright: 2008 Milne et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: Funding from the National Health and Medical Research Council, Australia (grant number 404189), and from the Commonwealth Department of Health
and Ageing, Australia, is acknowledged. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the
manuscript.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: joel@csse.uwa.edu.au
Introduction
With continuing concern about the possibility of another
influenza pandemic, many models have been developed to predict
the course of the pandemic and the effect of potential intervention
strategies. Approaches to modelling the spread of infectious
respiratory diseases have included deterministic [1,2], stochastic
[35] and individual-based models [612]. These models have
ranged in focus from the whole world [1,3,4], through large [8,10]
and small [7,9] countries, to synthetic small communities [11].
However, while there are many individual-based models, no model
constructed to date has focused on a precise replication of a small
community, with detail down to individual schools, employers, and
the exact make-up of households as extracted from census datasets.
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org
Methods
Population model construction
We constructed a geographic and demographic model of
Albany, Western Australia using a location-based connected
spatial structure [3,1416]. Australian Bureau of Statistics Census
Collection Districts (CCD) were the finest level of spatial detail
used, with each CCD consisting of approximately 200 physically
adjacent households. Each such area was populated with a
number of households according to the 2001 census data [17]; the
constituent households each being uniquely populated with
individuals whose specific ages matched the demographics and
household age-structure of each CCD.
The model was further populated with a set of schools and
workplaces, referred to collectively as contact hubs. Data from the
state government of Western Australia were used to obtain a
comprehensive list of schools, childcare facilities, adult education
institutions (provided by the Department of Education and
Training; Frankland D, personal communication) and employers,
Results
Pandemic characteristics with no interventions
We conducted baseline simulations (assuming no intervention
measures) for epidemics with R0 values of 1.5, 2.0 and 2.5 As our
simulations are stochastic in nature, the outcome of a simulated
epidemic for a fixed set of model parameters varied depending, for
example, on the choice of individuals who were seeded as
infectious index cases; the outcome of possibly infectious contact;
and the probabilistic contact behaviour of individuals. All results
were averages of 40 independent simulation runs made with
different random number seeding sequences. As we assumed a
continuous influx of infectious cases from outside the simulation
boundary at a rate of one per day, we achieve a sustained epidemic
for every simulation. Final attack rates ranged from 33% to 65%
corresponding to R0 values of 1.5 and 2.5, while peak daily attack
rates ranged from 89 to 474 cases per 10,000 (Table 1).
R0 = 1.5
R0 = 2.0
R0 = 2.5
mean
(95% CI)
mean
(95% CI)
mean
(95% CI)
39.6
(60.5)
66.7
(60.2)
79.6
(60.1)
33.2
(60.4)
54.9
(60.2)
64.8
(60.1)
5.3
(60.17)
17.1
(60.17)
28.3
(60.17)
89
(63.0)
279
(63.6)
474
(65.8)
58
(62.3)
37
(61.0)
28
(60.7)
2.97
(60.005)
2.87
(60.004)
2.74
(60.003)
Model parameters for the R0 = 1.5 epidemic were determined as described in the text. The fundamental transmission probability b was increased to give epidemics with
measured R0 values of 1.5, 2.0 and 2.5. The statistics given for each baseline epidemic are means of 40 independent randomly seeded simulation runs (95% confidence
intervals for the 40-run means are given in parentheses).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004005.t001
Table 2. Simulated final and peak daily attack rates for epidemics with non-pharmaceutical interventions.
Intervention scenario
R0 = 1.5
R0 = 2.0
R0 = 2.5
Final
attack
rate %
Peak daily
attack rate
(cases per 10000)
Final
attack
rate %
Peak daily
attack rate
(cases per 10000)
Final
attack
rate %
Peak daily
attack rate
(cases per 10000)
Baseline
33
89
55
279
65
474
School Closure
13
20
45
146
60
321
Case Isolation
9.0
30
78
49
221
Workplace Nonattendance
24
54
48
210
60
389
16
25
41
142.
55
291
4.0
12
30
67
10
34
80
54
25
5.0
12
17
36
89
All Measures
3.0
Final attack rates and peak daily attack rates are given as percentages of the population, for epidemics with baseline R0 values of 1.5, 2.0 and 2.5. For each measure or
combination of measures, results are given for optimal application (pre-emptive activation and indefinite duration). All results are means of 40 independent randomly
seeded simulation runs.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004005.t002
Discussion
The scale of our model (approximately 30,000 individuals) is
both small enough to allow the collection of detailed information
and large enough to encompass the level at which public health
planning and response might take place.
The model of Albany was constructed using a large number of
parameters and is sensitive to the values assigned to them. We
have utilised data from studies of past pandemics, from seasonal
influenza epidemics and from related modelling work to set
parameters but some parameters remain difficult to estimate.
Sensitivity analyses, reported in Supporting Information Text S2,
suggest that the model is most sensitive to assumptions regarding
mixing group sizes in schools; the relative number of community
Figure 2. Simulated final infection rates plotted against basic reproduction number R0 for a number of epidemic models, assuming
no intervention.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004005.g002
Low R0
Higher R0
R0
R0
Ferguson 2006
1.7
54 / 48
2.0
68 / 64
Germann 2006
1.6
48 / 1.5
1.9
65 / 44
Glass 2006
1.6
51 / 41 (4)
2.0
75 / 73 (50)
Milne 2008
1.5
41 / 16
2.0
67 / 55
Simulated effects of school closure on final infection rate for four individual-based influenza epidemic models. For each model results are given for moderate (R#1.7)
and severe (R$1.9) epidemics. Each models assumptions about the timing of the imposition of school closure and changes in mixing behaviour are summarised.
Abbreviations: IR = Infection Rate.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004005.t003
Supporting Information
Text S1 Additional model details.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004005.s001 (0.07 MB
DOC)
Text S2 Sensitivity analysis
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004005.s002 (0.55 MB
DOC)
Table S1 Baseline simulation parameters
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004005.s003 (0.06 MB
DOC)
Acknowledgments
The authors thank Professor John Mathews for his input to this work.
Author Contributions
Conceived and designed the experiments: GJM JK SH. Performed the
experiments: JK SH. Analyzed the data: GJM JK HK. Wrote the paper:
GJM JK HK SH JM. Provided biological and epidemiological input: HK
JM. Sourced demographic data: SH.
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