David Lu v Paterno Ym

Yao v. CA
GR. No. 132428 (October 24, 2000)
FACTS: The MTC convicted petitioner of unfair competition. Petitioner appealed to
RTC. The RTC confirmed his conviction. In its decision, it stated that it found no
cogent reason to disturb the finding of fact of the MTC.

HELD: The decision of the RTC fell short of the constitutional requirement. Parties
to a litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the
factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusion of the court. The decision in
question should be struck close as a nullity.

Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution
is indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play.[37] It is likewise
demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution. [38] The parties to a
litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the
factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot
simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at
that without any justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled
to know why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he
believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and
distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the
dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is
unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal.
[39]
More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching
judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a
safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding ipse
dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by the Constitution but
nonetheless vested with the sovereign prerogative of passing judgment on the life,
liberty or property of his fellowmen, the judge must ultimately depend on the power
of reason for sustained public confidence in the justness of his decision. [40]
Thus the Court has struck down as void, decisions of lower courts and even of the
Court of Appeals whose careless disregard of the constitutional behest exposed
their sometimes cavalier attitude not only to their magisterial responsibilities but
likewise to their avowed fealty to the Constitution.
Thus, we nullified or deemed to have failed to comply with Section 14, Article VIII
of the Constitution, a decision, resolution or order which: contained no analysis of
the evidence of the parties nor reference to any legal basis in reaching its
conclusions; contained nothing more than a summary of the testimonies of the
witnesses of both parties;[41] convicted the accused of libel but failed to cite any
legal authority or principle to support conclusions that the letter in question was
libelous;[42] consisted merely of one (1) paragraph with mostly sweeping
generalizations and failed to support its conclusion of parricide; [43] consisted of five
(5) pages, three (3) pages of which were quotations from the labor arbiters
decision including the dispositive portion and barely a page (two [2] short
paragraphs of two [2] sentences each) of its own discussion or reasoning [44]; was
merely based on the findings of another court sans transcript of stenographic notes;
[45]
or failed to explain the factual and legal bases for the award of moral damages.
[46]

In the same vein do we strike down as a nullity the RTC decision in question.
In sum, we agree with YAO that he was denied due process but not on the grounds
he ardently invoked but on the reasons already extensively discussed above. While
he indeed resorted to the wrong mode of appeal and his right to appeal is statutory,
it is still an essential part of the judicial system that courts should proceed with

caution so as not to deprive a party of the prerogative, but instead afford every
party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his
cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities.[47]
In the interest of substantial justice, procedural rules of the most mandatory
character in terms of compliance, may be relaxed. [48] In other words, if strict
adherence to the letter of the law would result in absurdity and manifest
injustice[49] or where the merit of a partys cause is apparent and outweighs
consideration of non-compliance with certain formal requirements, [50] procedural
rules should definitely be liberally construed. A party-litigant is to be given the
fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than
for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on mere technicalities. [51] We therefore
withhold legal approbation on the RTC decision at bar for its palpable failure to
comply with the constitutional and legal mandates thereby denying YAO of his day
in court. We also remind all magistrates to heed the demand of Section 14, Article
VIII of the Constitution. It is their solemn and paramount duty to uphold the
Constitution and the principles enshrined therein, lest they be lost in the nitty-gritty
of their everyday judicial work.

ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS

G.R. No. 110263, July 20, 2001

(M)

BERHAD

vs.

CA

and

PNCC

Facts: Petitioner Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad is a corporation organized

under the laws of Malaysia while private respondent Philippine National Construction
Corporation is a corporation duly incorporated and existing under Philippine laws.
Petitioner initiated a suit for collection against private respondent, then known as
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines, before the High Court
of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur entitled Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad v.
Asiavest CDCP Sdn. Bhd. and Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines.
Petitioner sought to recover the indemnity of the performance bond it had put up in
favor of private respondent to guarantee the completion of the Felda Project and
the nonpayment of the loan it extended to Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. for the
completion of Paloh Hanai and Kuantan By Pass; Project.
The High Court of Malaya (Commercial Division) rendered judgment in favor of the
petitioner and against the private respondent. Following unsuccessful attempts to
secure payment from private respondent under the judgment, petitioner initiated
the complaint before RTC of Pasig, Metro Manila, to enforce the judgment of the
High Court of Malaya.

Private respondent sought the dismissal of the case via a Motion to Dismiss,
contending that the alleged judgment of the High Court of Malaya should be denied
recognition or enforcement since on in face, it is tainted with want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to private respondent, collusion and/or fraud, and there is a clear
mistake of law or fact. Dismissal was, however, denied by the trial court considering
that the grounds relied upon are not the proper grounds in a motion to dismiss
under Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Subsequently, private respondent filed its Answer with Compulsory Counter claims
and therein raised the grounds it brought up in its motion to dismiss. In its Reply
filed, the petitioner contended that the High Court of Malaya acquired jurisdiction
over the person of private respondent by its voluntary submission the courts
jurisdiction through its appointed counsel. Furthermore, private respondents
counsel waived any and all objections to the High Courts jurisdiction in a pleading
filed before the court.
In due time, the trial court rendered its decision dismissing petitioners complaint.
Petitioner interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, but the appellate court
dismissed the same and affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in denying recognition and enforcement to the
Malaysian Court judgment.
Ruling: Yes.
Generally, in the absence of a special compact, no sovereign is bound to give effect
within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country;
however, the rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a
usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of
competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under
certain conditions that may vary in different countries.
In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be
recognized insofar as the immediate parties and the underlying cause of action are
concerned so long as it is convincingly shown that there has been an opportunity
for a full and fair hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction; that the trial
upon regular proceedings has been conducted, following due citation or voluntary
appearance of the defendant and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure
an impartial administration of justice; and that there is nothing to indicate either a
prejudice in court and in the system of laws under which it is sitting or fraud in
procuring the judgment.
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it
comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of
proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum Under Section 50(b),
Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which was the governing law at the time the
instant case was decided by the trial court and respondent appellate court, a
judgment, against a person, of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to

pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by a subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be
assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. In addition, under Section 3(n), Rule 131 of
the Revised Rules of Court, a court, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys
the presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction. Hence,
once the authenticity of the foreign judgment is proved, the party attacking a
foreign judgment, is tasked with the burden of overcoming its presumptive validity.
In the instant case, petitioner sufficiently established the existence of the money
judgment of the High Court of Malaya by the evidence it offered. Petitioners sole
witness, testified to the effect that he is in active practice of the law profession in
Malaysia; that he was connected with Skrine and Company as Legal Assistant up to
1981; that private respondent, then known as Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines, was sued by his client, Asiavest Merchant Bankers
(M) Berhad, in Kuala Lumpur; that the writ of summons were served on March 17,
1983 at the registered office of private respondent and on March 21, 1983 on Cora
S. Deala, a financial planning officer of private respondent for Southeast Asia
operations; that upon the filing of the case, Messrs. Allen and Gledhill, Advocates
and Solicitors, with address at 24th Floor, UMBC Building, Jalan Sulaiman, Kuala
Lumpur, entered their conditional appearance for private respondent questioning
the regularity of the service of the writ of summons but subsequently withdrew the
same when it realized that the writ was properly served; that because private
respondent failed to file a statement of defense within two (2) weeks, petitioner
filed an application for summary judgment and submitted affidavits and
documentary evidence in support of its claim; that the matter was then heard
before the High Court of Kuala Lumpur in a series of dates where private
respondent was represented by counsel; and that the end result of all these
proceedings is the judgment sought to be enforced.
In addition to the said testimonial evidence, petitioner also offered the documentary
evidence to support their claim.
Having thus proven, through the foregoing evidence, the existence and authenticity
of the foreign judgment, said foreign judgment enjoys presumptive validity and the
burden then fell upon the party who disputes its validity, herein private respondent,
to prove otherwise. However, private respondent failed to sufficiently discharge the
burden that fell upon it to prove by clear and convincing evidence the grounds
which it relied upon to prevent enforcement of the Malaysian High Court judgment.

Rev. Fr. Dante Martinez vs CA

contract with petitioner Fr. Dante Martinez, then Assistant Parish Priest of
Cabanatuan City for the sale of a certain lot located at Villa Fe Subdivision.

At the time of the sale, the lot was still registered under the name of Claudia
Dela Paz, private respondents mother although the latter had already sold it to
private respondent Manuela Dela Paz by virtue if a Deed of Absolute Sale.

Private respondent subsequently registered the lot under her name and was
issued a Transfer Certificate Title.

When the land was offered for sale to petitioner, private respondents Dela Paz
were accompanied by their mother since petitioner dealt with the Dela Pazes as
a family and not individually.

He was assured by them that the lot belonged to Manuela.

It was agreed that petitioner will pay 3000 downpayment and the balance would
be payable in installments.

Petitioner started the construction of a house on the lot with the written consent
if the then registered owner, Claudia.

Construction on the house was completed and since them, petitioner and his
family have maintained their residence there.

On January 1983, petitioner completed payment of the lot for which private
respondents Dela Paz executed two documents.

The first document was a promise that the Deed of Sale shall be delivered to
petitioner on February 25, 1983 and the second document was a certification
that Freddie Dela Paz has agreed to sign the affidavit of sale of lot sold to
petitioner.

However, private respondents Dela Paz never delivered the Deed of Sale as they
promised to petitioner.

In the meantime, in a Deed of Absolute Sale with right to repurchase, private

respondents Dela Paz sold three lots with right to repurchase the same within
one year to private respondents spouses Veneracion. One of the lots sold was
the lot previously sold to petitioner.

Spouses Veneracion never took actual possession of any of these lots during the
period of redemption, but all the titles to the lots were given to him.

Before the expiration of the one year period, private respondet Godofredo Dela
Paz informed private respondent Reynaldo Veneracion that he was selling the
three lots to another person.

Indeed, Veneracion received a call from Mr. Tecson verifying if he had the titles ti
the properties as the Dela Pazes were offering to sell the two lots. The offer
included the lot purchased by petitioner.

Private respondent Veneracion offered to purchase the same two lots from Dela
Paz and so a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed over these lots.

Sometime in January 1984, Reynaldo Veneracion asked a certain Renato Reyes,

petitioners neighbor, who the owner of the building erected on the subject lot
was.

Reyes told him that it was Feliza Martines, petitioners mother, who was in
possession of the property.

Veneracion told Godofredo about the matter and was assured by the latter that
he would talk to Feliza.

Based on that assurance, private respondents Veneracion registered the lots

with the Register of Deeds.

Petitioner discovered that the lot he was occupying with his family had been sold
to the spouses Veneracion after receiving a letter from private respondent
Reynaldo Veneracion, claiming ownership of the land and demanding that they
vacate the property and remove their improvements thereon.

Petitioner, in turn, demanded through counsel the execution of the deed of sale
from private respondents Dela Paz and informed Reynaldo Veneracion that he
was the owner of the property as he had previously purchased the same from
private respondents Dela Paz.

The matter was then referred to the Katarungang Pambarangay for conciliation
but the parties failed to reach an agreement.

As a consequence, private respondent Reynaldo Veneracion brought an action

for ejectment in the MTC against petitioner and his mother.

On the other hand, petitioner caused a notice of lis pendens to be recorded in

the TCT.

The TC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner.

The TCs decision where respondents Veneracion objected by the private and
these cases were forwarded to the RTC.

RTC rendered a decision finding private respondents Veneracion as the true

owner of the lot in dispute by virtue of their prior registration with the Register
of Deeds.

Meanwhile, while the ejectment case was pending before the MTC, petitioner
Martinez filed a complaint for annulment of sale with damages against the
Veneracions and Dela Pazez with the RTC.

RTC rendered a decision finding private respondents Veneracion owners of the

land in dispute.

Petitioner then filed a petition for review for the ejectment case before the CA.

As to the case for annulment of sale and damages, the petitioner likewise
appealed the TCs decision before the CA.

CA rendered a decision in favor of respondents.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this case.

Issue:
1. Whether or not private respondents Veneracion are buyers in good faith of the lot
in dispute as to make them the absolute owners thereof in accordance with Art.
1544 of the Civil Code on double sale of immovable property.
2. Whether or not payment of the appellate docket fee within the period to appeal is
not necessary for the perfection of the appeal after a notice of appeal has been filed
within such period.
3. Whether or not the resolution of the Court of Appeals denying petitioners motion
for reconsideration is contrary to the constitutional requirement that a denial of a
motion for reconsideration must state the legal reasons on which it is based.

Held:
First. It is apparent from the first and second assignment of errors that
petitioner is assailing the findings of fact and the appreciation of the evidence made
by the trial courts and later affirmed by the respondent court. While, as a general
rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, review may nevertheless be granted under certain exceptions,
namely: (a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd, or impossible; (c) where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (f) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the
issue of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (g) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the
trial court; (h) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (i) when the facts set forth in the petition as
well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents;
(j) when the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed
absence of evidence but is contradicted by the evidence on record; and (k) when
the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by
the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. [25]

In this case, the Court of Appeals based its ruling that private respondents
Veneracion are the owners of the disputed lot on their reliance on private
respondent Godofredo De la Pazs assurance that he would take care of the matter
concerning petitioners occupancy of the disputed lot as constituting good faith. This
case, however, involves double sale and, on this matter, Art. 1544 of the Civil Code
provides that where immovable property is the subject of a double sale, ownership
shall be transferred (1) to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it
to the Registry of Property; (2) in default thereof, to the person who in good faith
was first in possession; and (3) in default thereof, to the person who presents the
oldest title.[26] The requirement of the law, where title to the property is recorded in
the Register of Deeds, is two-fold: acquisition in good faith and recording in good
faith. To be entitled to priority, the second purchaser must not only prove prior
recording of his title but that he acted in good faith, i.e., without knowledge or
notice of a prior sale to another. The presence of good faith should be ascertained
from the circumstances surrounding the purchase of the land. [27]
1. With regard to the first sale to private respondents Veneracion, private
respondent Reynaldo Veneracion testified that on October 10, 1981, 18 days before
the execution of the first Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase, he inspected the
premises and found it vacant.[28] However, this is belied by the testimony of Engr.
Felix D. Minor, then building inspector of the Department of Public Works and
Highways, that he conducted on October 6, 1981 an ocular inspection of the lot in
dispute in the performance of his duties as a building inspector to monitor the
progress of the construction of the building subject of the building permit issued in
favor of petitioner on April 23, 1981, and that he found it 100 % completed (Exh.
V).[29] In the absence of contrary evidence, he is to be presumed to have regularly
performed his official duty.[30] Thus, as early as October, 1981, private respondents
Veneracion already knew that there was construction being made on the property
they purchased.
2. The Court of Appeals failed to determine the nature of the first contract of
sale between the private respondents by considering their contemporaneous and
subsequent acts.[31] More specifically, it overlooked the fact that the first contract of
sale between the private respondents shows that it is in fact an equitable mortgage.
The requisites for considering a contract of sale with a right of repurchase as an
equitable mortgage are (1) that the parties entered into a contract denominated as
a contract of sale and (2) that their intention was to secure an existing debt by way
of mortgage.[32] A contract of sale with right to repurchase gives rise to the
presumption that it is an equitable mortgage in any of the following cases: (1)
when the price of a sale with a right to repurchase is unusually inadequate; (2)
when the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise; (3) when, upon or
after the expiration of the right to repurchase, another instrument extending the
period of redemption or granting a new period is executed; (4) when the purchaser
retains for himself a part of the purchase price; (5) when the vendor binds himself

to pay the taxes on the thing sold; (6) in any other case where it may be fairly
inferred that the real intention of the parties is that the transaction shall secure the
payment of a debt or the performance of any other obligation. [33] In case of doubt, a
contract purporting to be a sale with right to repurchase shall be construed as an
equitable mortgage.[34]
In this case, the following circumstances indicate that the private respondents
intended the transaction to be an equitable mortgage and not a contract of sale: (1)
Private respondents Veneracion never took actual possession of the three lots; (2)
Private respondents De la Paz remained in possession of the Melencio lot which was
co-owned by them and where they resided; (3) During the period between the first
sale and the second sale to private respondents Veneracion, they never made any
effort to take possession of the properties; and (4) when the period of redemption
had expired and private respondents Veneracion were informed by the De la Pazes
that they are offering the lots for sale to another person for P200,000.00, they
never objected. To the contrary, they offered to purchase the two lots
for P180,000.00 when they found that a certain Mr. Tecson was prepared to
purchase it for the same amount. Thus, it is clear from these circumstances that
both private respondents never intended the first sale to be a contract of sale, but
merely that of mortgage to secure a debt of P150,000.00.
With regard to the second sale, which is the true contract of sale between the
parties, it should be noted that this Court in several cases, [35] has ruled that a
purchaser who is aware of facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard
cannot turn a blind eye and later claim that he acted in good faith. Private
respondent Reynaldo himself admitted during the pre-trial conference in the MTC in
Civil Case No. 9523 (for ejectment) that petitioner was already in possession of the
property in dispute at the time the second Deed of Sale was executed on June 1,
1983 and registered on March 4, 1984. He, therefore, knew that there were already
occupants on the property as early as 1981. The fact that there are persons, other
than the vendors, in actual possession of the disputed lot should have put private
respondents on inquiry as to the nature of petitioners right over the property. But
he never talked to petitioner to verify the nature of his right. He merely relied on
the assurance of private respondent Godofredo De la Paz, who was not even the
owner of the lot in question, that he would take care of the matter. This does not
meet the standard of good faith.
3. The appellate courts reliance on Arts. 1357 and 1358 of the Civil Code to
determine private respondents Veneracions lack of knowledge of petitioners
ownership of the disputed lot is erroneous.
Art. 1357[36] and Art. 1358,[37] in relation to Art. 1403(2)[38] of the Civil Code,
requires that the sale of real property must be in writing for it to be enforceable. It
need not be notarized. If the sale has not been put in writing, either of the
contracting parties can compel the other to observe such requirement. [39] This is

what petitioner did when he repeatedly demanded that a Deed of Absolute Sale be
executed in his favor by private respondents De la Paz. There is nothing in the
above provisions which require that a contract of sale of realty must be executed in
a public document. In any event, it has been shown that private respondents
Veneracion had knowledge of facts which would put them on inquiry as to the
nature of petitioners occupancy of the disputed lot.
Second. Petitioner contends that the MTC in Civil Case No. 9523 (for
ejectment) erred in denying petitioners Motion for Execution of the Judgment,
which the latter filed on June 6, 1989, two years after private respondents
Veneracion filed a notice of appeal with the MTC on March 3, 1987 without paying
the appellate docket fee. He avers that the trial courts denial of his motion is
contrary to this Courts ruling in the cases of Republic v. Director of Lands,
[40]
and Aranas v. Endona[41] in which it was held that where the appellate docket fee
is not paid in full within the reglementary period, the decision of the MTC becomes
final and unappealable as the payment of docket fee is not only a mandatory but
also a jurisdictional requirement.
Petitioners contention has no merit. The case of Republic v. Director of
Lands deals with the requirement for appeals from the Courts of First Instance, the
Social Security Commission, and the Court of Agrarian Relations to the Court of
Appeals. The case of Aranas v. Endona, on the other hand, was decided under the
1964 Rules of Court and prior to the enactment of the Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1981 (B.P. Blg. 129) and the issuance of its Interim Rules and Guidelines by this
Court on January 11, 1983. Hence, these cases are not applicable to the matter at
issue.
On the other hand, in Santos v. Court of Appeals,[42] it was held that although
an appeal fee is required to be paid in case of an appeal taken from the municipal
trial court to the regional trial court, it is not a prerequisite for the perfection of an
appeal under 20[43] and 23[44] of the Interim Rules and Guidelines issued by this
Court on January 11, 1983 implementing the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981
(B.P. Blg. 129). Under these sections, there are only two requirements for the
perfection of an appeal, to wit: (a) the filing of a notice of appeal within the
reglementary period; and (b) the expiration of the last day to appeal by any
party. Even in the procedure for appeal to the regional trial courts, [45] nothing is
mentioned about the payment of appellate docket fees.
Indeed, this Court has ruled that, in appealed cases, the failure to pay the
appellate docket fee does not automatically result in the dismissal of the appeal,
the dismissal being discretionary on the part of the appellate court. [46] Thus, private
respondents Veneracions failure to pay the appellate docket fee is not fatal to their
appeal.

Third. Petitioner contends that the resolution of the Court of Appeals denying
his motion for reconsideration was rendered in violation of the Constitution because
it does not state the legal basis thereof.
This contention is likewise without merit.
Art. VIII, Sec. 14 of the Constitution provides that No petition for review or
motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or
denied without stating the basis therefor. This requirement was fully complied with
when the Court of Appeals, in denying reconsideration of its decision, stated in its
resolution that it found no reason to change its ruling because petitioner had not
raised anything new.[47] Thus, its resolution denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration states:
For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration of Our Decision filed by the
petitioners.
Evidently, the motion poses nothing new. The points and arguments raised by the
movants have been considered and passed upon in the Decision sought to be
reconsidered. Thus, We find no reason to disturb the same

Lenido Lumanog v. People of the Philippines (and other consolidated cases), G.R.
No. 182555, September 7, 2010

I.

THE FACTS

Appellants were the accused perpetrators of the ambush-slay of former Chief of the
Metropolitan Command Intelligence and Security Group of the Philippine
Constabulary (now the Philippine National Police), Colonel Rolando N. Abadilla. The
principal witness for the prosecution was Freddie Alejo, a security guard employed
assigned at 211 Katipunan Avenue, Blue Ridge, Quezon City, where the ambushslay happened. As a purported eyewitness, he testified on what he saw during the
fateful day, including the faces of the accused. All the accused raised the defense
of alibi, highlighted the negative findings of ballistic and fingerprint examinations,
and further alleged torture in the hands of police officers and denial of
constitutional rights during custodial investigation. The trial court however
convicted the accused-appellants. The CA affirmed with modification the decision of
the trial court. The CA upheld the conviction of the accused-appellants based on the
credible eyewitness testimony of Alejo, who vividly recounted before the trial court

their respective positions and participation in the fatal shooting of Abadilla, having
been able to witness closely how they committed the crime.

II.

THE ISSUES

1. Did the CA decision comply with the constitutional standard that [n]o decision
shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based?
2.
Was the extra-judicial confession of accused Joel de Jesus taken during the
custodial investigation valid?
3.

Was the right to speedy disposition of cases of the accused violated?

4.
Was the eyewitness testimony of security guard Alejo against the accused
credible?
5.
Was the out-of-court identification of the accused-appellants made by the
eyewitness, security guard Alejo, in a police line-up was reliable?
6.
Were the results of the ballistic and fingerprint tests conclusive of the
innocence of the accused-appellants?
7. Can the defense of alibi of the accused prevail over their positive identification
in this case?
Ruling :
1. YES, the CA decision complied with the constitutional standard that
[n]o decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
Perusing the CA decision, we hold that it cannot be deemed constitutionally
infirm, as it clearly stated the facts and law on which the ruling was based, and
while it did not specifically address each and every assigned error raised by
appellants, it cannot be said that the appellants were left in the dark as to how the
CA reached its ruling affirming the trial courts judgment of conviction. The principal
arguments raised in their Memorandum submitted before this Court actually
referred to the main points of the CA rulings, such as the alleged sufficiency of
prosecution evidence, their common defense of alibi, allegations of torture,
probative value of ballistic and fingerprint test results, circumstances qualifying the
offense and modification of penalty imposed by the trial court. What appellants
essentially assail is the verbatim copying by the CA of not only the facts narrated,
but also the arguments and discussion including the legal authorities, in disposing
of the appeal. On such wholesale adoption of the Office of the Solicitor Generals
position, as well as the trial courts insufficient findings of fact, appellants anchor
their claim of failure of intermediate review by the CA.

2. NO, the extra-judicial confession of accused Joel de Jesus taken

during the custodial investigation was NOT valid.
Police officers claimed that upon arresting Joel, they informed him of his
constitutional rights to remain silent, that any information he would give could be
used against him, and that he had the right to a competent and independent
counsel, preferably, of his own choice, and if he cannot afford the services of
counsel he will be provided with one (1). However, since these rights can only be
waived in writing and with the assistance of counsel, there could not have been
such a valid waiver by Joel, who was presented to Atty. Sansano at the IBP Office,
Quezon City Hall only the following day and stayed overnight at the police station
before he was brought to said counsel.
Even assuming that custodial investigation started only during Joels
execution of his statement before Atty. Sansano on June 20, 1996, still the said
confession must be invalidated. To be acceptable, extrajudicial confessions must
conform to constitutional requirements. A confession is not valid and not
admissible in evidence when it is obtained in violation of any of the rights of
persons under custodial investigation.
Atty. Sansano, who supposedly interviewed Joel and assisted the latter while
responding to questions propounded by SPO2 Garcia, Jr., did not testify on whether
he had properly discharged his duties to said client. While SPO2 Garcia, Jr. testified
that Atty. Sansano had asked Joel if he understood his answers to the questions of
the investigating officer and sometimes stopped Joel from answering certain
questions, SPO2 Garcia, Jr. did not say if Atty. Sansano, in the first place, verified
from them the date and time of Joels arrest and the circumstances thereof, or any
previous information elicited from him by the investigators at the station, and
if said counsel inspected Joels body for any sign or mark of physical torture.
3. No, the right to speedy disposition of cases of the accused was
NOT violated.
Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that all persons
shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasijudicial, or administrative bodies. This protection extends to all citizens and covers
the periods before, during and after trial, affording broader protection than Section
14(2), which guarantees merely the right to a speedy trial. However, just like the
constitutional guarantee of speedy trial, speedy disposition of cases is a flexible
concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon the circumstances. What
the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays, which
render rights nugatory.
It must be stressed that in the determination of whether the right to speedy
disposition of cases has been violated, particular regard must be taken of the facts
and circumstances peculiar to each case. A mere mathematical reckoning of the
time involved would not be sufficient. Under the circumstances, we hold that the

delay of (4) four years during which the case remained pending with the CA and
this Court was not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive.
In several cases where it was manifest that due process of law or other rights
guaranteed by the Constitution or statutes have been denied, this Court has not
faltered to accord the so-called radical relief to keep accused from enduring the
rigors and expense of a full-blown trial. In this case, however, appellants are not
entitled to the same relief in the absence of clear and convincing showing that the
delay in the resolution of their appeal was unreasonable or arbitrary.
4. YES, the eyewitness testimony of security guard Alejo against
the accused was credible.
In giving full credence to the eyewitness testimony of security guard Alejo,
the trial judge took into account his proximity to the spot where the shooting
occurred, his elevated position from his guardhouse, his opportunity to view
frontally all the perpetrators for a brief time -- enough for him to remember their
faces (when the two [2] lookouts he had earlier noticed walking back and forth in
front of his guard post pointed their guns at him one [1] after the other, and later
when the four [4] armed men standing around the victims car momentarily
looked at him as he was approached at the guardhouse by the second lookout),
and his positive identification in the courtroom of appellants as the six (6) persons
whom he saw acting together in the fatal shooting of Abadilla on June 13,
1996. The clear view that Alejo had at the time of the incident was verified by
Judge Jose Catral Mendoza (now an Associate Justice of this Court) during the
ocular inspection conducted in the presence of the prosecutors, defense counsel,
court personnel, and witnesses Alejo and Maj. Villena.
The trial judge also found that Alejo did not waver in his detailed account of
how the assailants shot Abadilla[,] who was inside his car, the relative positions of
the gunmen and lookouts, and his opportunity to look at them in the face. Alejo
immediately gave his statement before the police authorities just hours after the
incident took place. Appellants make much of a few inconsistencies in his statement
and testimony, with respect to the number of assailants and his reaction when he
was ordered to get down in his guard post. But such inconsistencies have already
been explained by Alejo during cross-examination by correcting his earlier
statement in using number four (4) to refer to those persons actually standing
around the car and two (2) more persons as lookouts, and that he got nervous only
when the second lookout shouted at him to get down, because the latter actually
poked a gun at him. It is settled that affidavits, being ex-parte, are almost always
incomplete and often inaccurate, but do not really detract from the credibility of
witnesses. The discrepancies between a sworn statement and testimony in court do
not outrightly justify the acquittal of an accused, as testimonial evidence carries
more weight than an affidavit.
5. YES, the out-of-court identification of the accused-appellants
made by the eyewitness, security guard Alejo, in a police line-up was
reliable.

Applying the totality-of-circumstances test, we reiterate that Alejos outcourt-identification [of the accused] is reliable, for reasons that, first, he was very
near the place where Abadilla was shot and thus had a good view of the gunmen,
not to mention that the two (2) lookouts directly approached him and pointed their
guns at them; second, no competing event took place to draw his attention from
the event; third, Alejo immediately gave his descriptions of at least two (2) of the
perpetrators, while affirming he could possibly identify the others if he would see
them again, and the entire happening that he witnessed; and finally, there was no
evidence that the police had supplied or even suggested to Alejo that appellants
were the suspects, except for Joel de Jesus whom he refused to just pinpoint on the
basis of a photograph shown to him by the police officers, insisting that he would
like to see said suspect in person. More importantly, Alejo during the trial had
positively identified appellant Joel de Jesus independently of the previous
identification made at the police station. Such in-court identification was positive,
straightforward and categorical.
6. NO, the results of the ballistic and fingerprint tests were NOT
conclusive of the innocence of the accused-appellants.
[T]he negative result of ballistic examination was inconclusive, for there is no
showing that the firearms supposedly found in appellants possession were the
same ones used in the ambush-slay of Abadilla. The fact that ballistic examination
revealed that the empty shells and slug were fired from another firearm does not
disprove appellants guilt, as it was possible that different firearms were used by
them in shooting Abadilla. Neither will the finding that the empty shells and slug
matched those in another criminal case allegedly involving ABB members, such that
they could have been fired from the same firearms belonging to said rebel group,
exonerate the appellants who are on trial in this case and not the suspects in
another case. To begin with, the prosecution never claimed that the firearms
confiscated from appellants, which were the subject of separate charges for illegal
possession of firearms, were the same firearms used in the ambush-slay of
Abadilla. A ballistic examination is not indispensable in this case. Even if another
weapon was in fact actually used in killing the victim, still, appellants Fortuna and
Lumanog cannot escape criminal liability therefor, as they were positively identified
by eyewitness Freddie Alejo as the ones who shot Abadilla to death.
The negative result of the fingerprint tests conducted by fingerprint examiner
Remedios is likewise inconclusive and unreliable. Said witness admitted that no
prints had been lifted from inside the KIA Pride and only two (2) fingerprints were
taken from the car of Abadilla.
7. NO, the defense of alibi of the accused CANNOT prevail over
their positive identification in this case.
Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to
disprove, and it is for this reason that it cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the accused by the witnesses. To be valid for purposes of

exoneration from a criminal charge, the defense of alibi must be such that it would
have been physically impossible for the person charged with the crime to be at
the locus criminis at the time of its commission, the reason being that no person
can be in two places at the same time. The excuse must be so airtight that it would
admit of no exception. Where there is the least possibility of accuseds presence at
the crime scene, the alibi will not hold water.
Deeply embedded in our jurisprudence is the rule that positive identification
of the accused, where categorical and consistent, without any showing of ill motive
on the part of the eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the alibi and denial of
appellants, whose testimonies are not substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence. However, none of the appellants presented clear and convincing excuses
showing the physical impossibility of their being at the crime scene between 8:00
oclock and 9:00 oclock in the morning of June 13, 1996. Hence, the trial court and
CA did not err in rejecting their common defense of alibi.
Maceda v. Vasquez
Facts: Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of
the Ombudsman against petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent
Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda has falsified his certificate of service by
certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision for
a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31,
1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no decision had been
rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have been submitted for decision.
Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service
for 17 months.
Issue: Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an
encroachment into the SCs constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts
Held: A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the
SC for serious misconduct and under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and
criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with
regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the
Ombudsman encroaches into the Courts power of administrative supervision over
all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative
supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA
down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the
SC that can oversee the judges and court personnels compliance with all laws, and
take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation
thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without
running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from
their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint
and refer the same to the SC for determination whether said judge or court
employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.

IN RE CUNANAN
94 PHIL. 534

FACTS:
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in
1952. The title of the law was, An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar
Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.
Section 1 provided the following passing marks:
1946-195170%
1952 .71%
1953..72%
1954..73%
1955..74%
Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.
Section 2 of the Act provided that A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in
any subject shall be deemed to have already passed that subject and the
grade/grades shall be included in the computation of the general average in
subsequent bar examinations.
ISSUE:
Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.
RULING:
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being
embraced in the title of the Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar
flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. Section2 establishes a permanent
system for an indefinite time. It was also struck down for allowing partial passing,
thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and jurisprudence are not
stationary.

As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that
for 1953 to 1955 was declared in force and effect. The portion that was stricken
down was based under the following reasons:
1. The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar
from 1946 to 1952 had inadequate preparation due to the fact that this was
very close to the end of World War II;
2. The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the
petitions of the said candidates;
3. The law is an encroachment on the Courts primary prerogative to determine
who may be admitted to practice of law and, therefore, in excess of
legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of Court. The
rules laid down by Congress under this power are only minimum norms, not
designed to substitute the judgment of the court on who can practice law;
and
4. The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough
votes to declare it void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in
1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme Court resolutions denying
admission to the bar of an petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within the
power to Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules of admission to the practice
of law.

IN re: Edillion
FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in
the Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal
of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay
his membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the
provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the
organization of IBP, payment ofmembership fee and suspension for failure to pay
the same.
Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of
hisconstitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to
maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to
pay the corresponding dues, and that as aconsequence of this compelled financial
support of the said organization to which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he
is being deprived of the rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to him by
the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes the above provisions of the
Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay
hismembership fee to the IBP.
HELD: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a
member of as distinguished from bar associations in which membershipis merely
optional and voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply with the rules prescribed
for the governance of the Bar including payment a reasonable annual fees as one of
the requirements. The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and
it is not in violation of hisconstitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does
not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not the
meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he
chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment
ofannual dues. The Supreme Court in order to further the States legitimate interest
in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require thet the cost of
the regulatory program the lawyers.
Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The
right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter
subject to regulation and inquiry. And if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory
measure is recognize then a penalty designed to enforce its payment is not void as
unreasonable as arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over matters
of admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and their
regulation as part of its inherent judicial functions and responsibilities thus the
court may compel all members of the Integrated Bar to pay their annual dues.

AGUIRRE vs. RANA

FACTS: Respondent
2000 Bar

Edwin

L.

Rana was

among

those

who

passed

the

Examinations. Respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a

candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of
Election Canvassers of Mandaon, Masbate and filed with the MBEC a pleading
dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of
Votes in some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent
represented himself as "counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate,
George Bunan," and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan.
Furthermore, respondent also signed as counsel for Emily Estipona-Hao on 19 May
2001 in the petition filed before the MBEC praying for the proclamation
of
Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.

On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of

successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna
Marie Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar.
On 22 May 2001, respondent was allowed to take the lawyers oath but was
disallowed from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges
against him.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent shall be denied Admission to the Bar.

RULING: Respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the
proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so.
Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law.
Respondent called himself "counsel" knowing fully well that he was not a member of
the Bar. Having held himself out as "counsel" knowing that he had no
authority
to
practice
law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a
member of the Philippine Bar.
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It
is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly
ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of
integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust since a
lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to
practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a
privilege that can be withheld even from one
who
has
passed
the
bar
examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without
a license. True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations
and took the lawyers oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of
Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent
passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the
only
qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that
two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed,
namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by this Court and his signature
in the Roll of Attorneys.
Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service
Insurance System from Payment of Legal Fees, 612 SCRA 193
FACTS:
In a Petition dated 24 October 2011, Perpetual Help Community Cooperative
(PHCCI), through counsel, requests for the issuance of a court order to clarify and
implement the exemption of cooperatives from the payment of court and sheriffs

fees pursuant to Republic Act No. 6938, as amended by Republic Act No. 9520,
otherwise known as the Philippine Cooperative Act of 2008.
PHCCI contends that as a cooperative it enjoys the exemption provided for
under Section 6, Article 61 of Republic Act No. 9520, which states:
(6) Cooperatives shall be exempt from the payment of all court and sheriffs
fees payable to the Philippine Government for and in connection with all actions
brought under this Code, or where such actions is brought by the Authority before
the court, to enforce the payment of obligations contracted in favor of the
cooperative.
It avers that despite the exemptions granted by the aforesaid laws and
issuances, PHCCI had been continuously assessed and required to pay legal and
other fees whenever it files cases in court.
PHCCI reports that it filed with the Office of the Executive Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, a Motion to
implement the exemption of cooperatives from the payment of court and sheriffs
fees in cases filed before the courts in his jurisdiction, but the Executive Judge ruled
that the matter is of national concern and should be brought to the attention of the
Supreme Court for it to come up with a straight policy and uniform system of
collection. In the meantime, the MTCC has continued the assessment of filing fees
against cooperatives.
ISSUE:
Whether cooperatives are exempt from the payment of court and sheriffs fees.
RULING:
Court citing Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, stressed that the 1987
Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary; took away
the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure; and held that the power to promulgate these Rules is no
longer shared by the Court with Congress, more so, with the Executive, thus:
Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules
promulgated by this Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it
cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As one of the
safeguards of this Courts institutional independence, the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the
Courts exclusive domain. That power is no longer shared by this
Court with Congress, much less with the Executive.

xxxx
The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches
of our government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the
power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within
the sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this
prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or
modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by this Court. Viewed from
this perspective, the claim of a legislative grant of exemption from the
payment of legal fees under Section 39 of R.A. 8291 necessarily fails.
With the foregoing categorical pronouncements of the Supreme Court, it is
evident that the exemption of cooperatives from payment of court and sheriffs fees
no longer stands. Cooperatives can no longer invoke Republic Act No. 6938, as
amended by Republic Act No. 9520, as basis for exemption from the payment of
legal fees.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the petition of PHCCI
requesting for this Court to issue an order clarifying and implementing the
exemption of cooperatives from the payment of court and sheriffs fees is
hereby DENIED.
The Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to issue a circular
clarifying that cooperatives are not exempt from the payment of the legal fees
provided for under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.