HAZOP

Hazard &
Operability
Studies
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HAZARD STUDY
HAZAN
SAFETY AUDIT
DOW INDICES (HAZARD RANKING)
ACCIDENT ANALYSIS

EIA

HAZOP
HAZARD & OPERABILITY

SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT

QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT (QRA)

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PLAN (EMP)

The above diagram of inter-relationships shows that there are there are four main areas of hazard study namely :
Hazard analysis (HAZAN), Hazard and Operability study (HAZOP), Scenario development, Quantitative Risk
Assessment (QRA) and finally Emergency Management Plan (EMP). These inter-relationships are more
elaborated in the following diagram :

HAZARD CHECK LIST

SAFETY AUDIT

SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

HAZAN

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

DOW INDICES
ACCIDENT ANALYSIS

SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT

ACCIDENT PROBABILITY

HAZOP

ACCIDENT CONSEQUENCE

RISK DETERMINATION
RISK AND/OR HAZARD ACCEPTABILITY

QRA
NO

YES

EIA

BUILD AND/OR OPERATE

EMP

ADAPTED FROM GUIDELINES FOR HAZARDS EVALUATION PROCEDURES,

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CHEMICAL ENGINEERS, NEW YORK, 1985, P 1-9

Introduction & Overview

"....the application of a formal systematic critical examination of the process
and engineering intentions of new or existing facilities, to assess the hazard
potential of mal-operation or malfunction of individual items of equipment
and the consequential effects on the facility as a whole.
[courtesy: Chemical Industries Association]

Formal, structured approach to identification

of potential hazards and operability problems

Line by line / by equipment evaluation of the
design
Team exercise - input from all engineering and
design disciplines, plus operations
Structured brainstorming to look for deviations
from the design intent.
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Introduction & Overview

(Contd.)

The HAZOP method has been widely used in the

process industries, particularly in the 1980s and

90s, and has developed a strong reputation as
being an effective and thorough means of
identifying hazards in process plants
A synthetic experience that makes it almost as

easy to spot problems in prospect as it is in

retrospect.
Technique formalized by ICI (UK) in late 60s
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HAZOPS - What ?
THE BASIC CONCEPT
Essentially the HAZOPS procedure involves taking a full

description of a process and systematically questioning

every part of it to establish how deviations from the
design intent can arise. Once identified, an assessment is
made

as

to

whether

such

deviations

and

their

consequences can have a negative effect upon the safe

and efficient operation of the plant.

If considered

necessary, action is then taken to remedy the situation.

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HAZOPS - What ?

(Contd.)

This critical analysis is applied in a structured way by the

HAZOP team, and it relies upon them releasing their

imagination in an effort to discover credible causes of
deviations.
In practice, many of the causes will be fairly obvious, such as
pump failure causing a loss of circulation in a cooling water facility .
The great advantage of this technique is that it encourages
the team to consider other less obvious ways in which a
deviation may occur, however unlikely they may seem at first
consideration.
Much more than a mechanistic check-list type of review.
The result is that there is a good chance that potential failures
and problems will be identified which had not previously been
experienced in the type of plant being studied.

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HAZOPS - Why ?
HAZOP studies are mainly intended to :

Check the design and consider whether any of

the conditions which may occur from either a

mal-function or mal-operation, which may
cause a general hazard to people working on
the installation, to the general public or to
plant and equipment;
Check whether the precautions incorporated
into the design are sufficient to either prevent
the
hazard
occurring or
reduce
any
consequence to an acceptable level;
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HAZOPS - Why ?

(Contd.)

HAZOP studies are mainly intended to :

consider any safety interfaces which exist with other

installations or parts of this installation;

ensure that the plant can be started, maintained and

shutdown safely, and;

where appropriate recommend changes to the process

design or its operation that increase process safety or

enhance unit operability.

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HAZOPS - When ?
HAZOP studies are best performed on:

new plants where the design is nearly firm

and documented;
existing plants as part of a periodic hazard

analysis or a management of change

process. (as for e.g. changes initiated through PCOs
etc)

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FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTION

When a process is operating within its

design envelope, the potential for
hazards or operability problems does
not exist.
It is also a primary assumption that
the original process design and the
equipment standards applied are
correct.
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HAZOPS - How ?
HAZOP studies the stages in the conduct of the study
Select a section (node)
Select a Parameter
Apply guidewords to identify potential deviations
Brainstorm all possible causes (stay within the section)
Select the first identified cause
Develop ultimate potential consequence(s) (look inside and outside

the section)
List existing safeguards (look inside and outside the section)
Develop risk ranking
Propose recommendations (weigh consequences and safeguards)

Repeat for each cause / deviation / parameter / section

Follow up and recording

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How To Lead A HAZOP

His role is to:

Organize a team
Act as a facilitator to bring to bear the
expert knowledge of the team members in
a structured interaction.
Get the team to think the unthinkable.
Focus more on the human element.
Not to identify hazards and operability
problems, but rather to ensure that such
identification takes place.

Manage the personal interactions between the team members.

Obtain balanced contributions and to minimize the effect on
individuals when the design is subject to criticism.
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Organizing a HAZOP Study

Persons needed:
Chairman
Scribe
Process & Systems Engineer(s)
Operations Representative(s)
Other engineering disciplines (Control, Electrical, etc.)

Documents needed:
Design Basis
P&IDs
Cause & Effects Diagrams
Operating Philosophy/ Instructions..

Dedicated room and facilities

Dedicated (available full time) team members
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Organizing a HAZOP Study

(Contd.)

Roles and responsibilities:

Chairman ensures all are:
familiar with technique,
directs on selection of nodes, parameters, etc.
ensures meeting stays on track
Produces report

Scribe:
records proceedings,
prepares action lists after each session

Team members actively and freely participate

Recording of Study (HAZOP Software or

Manually)
Assigning and close out of recommendations
Follow up by Chairman/ designated Project Engineer
Prepare close out report
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Selection of a Team Leader

there needs to be a person appointed who will be in overall
charge; with Hazop Studies this person is usually called the
Chairman or Study Leader.....
Ideally, he should not have been too closely associated
with the project under review as there might be a risk
of him not being sufficiently objective in his direction of
the team.

He should be carefully chosen and be fully conversant

with the Hazop methodology and is capable of ensuring
smooth and efficient progress of the study

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Selection of a Scribe
Another important member of the team will be the Scribe or
the Secretary.....

His contribution to the discussion may be minimal, as

his main function during the sessions will be to record
the study as it proceeds. He will therefore need to have
sufficient technical knowledge to be able to understand
what is being discussed.
He helps organise the various meetings, takes notes
during the examination sessions and circulates the
resultant lists of actions or questions.
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Typical HAZOPS Ground Rules

Start on time

All

peers

No bad ideas

Safe environment

Everyone contributes

Do not design it here

Leader/facilitator limits opinions

Frequent breaks
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Supplementary Ground Rules

Diversity is good
Present your views but avoid arguing for them
Listen to others
Look for compromise
Do not change your views to avoid conflict
Be suspicious of agreements reached too
easily
Avoid majority votes, seek consensus

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Terminology
Section/Node

Study reference section of the process: used to organize the

study into manageable segments
Intentions
How the process sections are expected to operate
Parameters
Process and operating variables such as flow, pressure and
temperature
Guidewords
no more less as well as part of reverse and other than
Deviations
Departures from the design and operating intentions
(Guide word + Parameter)
Causes
Reasons why deviations may occur (possible causes)
Consequences
Results of the unique cause - a hazard causing damage,
injury, or other loss (potential consequences)
Safeguards
Design and operating features that reduce the frequency or
mitigate the consequences (existing systems and
procedures)
Risk Ranking
Evaluation of the possibility that an identified consequence
will occur, and will cause harm
Recommendations Recommendations for design or operating changes, or
further study

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Keywords/ Guidewords
An essential feature in this process of questioning and systematic analysis
is the use of keywords to focus the attention of the team upon deviations
and their possible causes. These keywords are divided into two sub-sets:

Primary Keywords which focus attention upon

a particular aspect of the design intent or an
associated process condition or parameter.
Secondary Keywords which, when combined
with a primary keyword, suggest possible
deviations.
The entire technique of Hazops revolves around the effective use of
these keywords, so their meaning and use must be clearly understood
by the team.
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Keywords/ Guidewords
Primary Keywords:
These reflect both the process design intent and operational aspects of the
plant being studied. Typical process oriented words might be as follows.
Flow
Pressure
Separate (settle, filter, centrifuge)
Composition
React
Reduce (grind, crush, etc.)
Corrode

Temperature
Level

Mix
Absorb
Erode

Other operational words that may be added are:

Drain
Vent
Inspect
Start-up

Isolate
Purge
Maintain
Shutdown
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Keywords/ Guidewords
Secondary Keywords:
when applied in conjunction with a Primary Keyword, these suggest potential
deviations or problems. They tend to be a standard set as listed below
No
Less

More
Reverse
Also

The design intent does not occur (e.g. Flow/No), or the

operational aspect is not achievable (Isolate/No)
A quantitative decrease in the design intent occurs (e.g.
Pressure/Less)
A quantitative increase in the design intent occurs (e.g.
Temperature/More)
The opposite of the design intent occurs (e.g.
Flow/Reverse)
The design intent is completely fulfilled, but in addition
some other related activity occurs (e.g. Flow/Also indicating

contamination in a product stream, or Level/Also meaning

material in a tank or vessel which should not be there)

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Keywords/ Guidewords
Secondary Keywords: (Contd.)
Other

The activity occurs, but not in the way intended (e.g.

Fluctuation

The design intention is achieved only part of the time (e.g.

an air-lock in a pipeline might result in Flow/Fluctuation)

Early

Usually used when studying sequential operations, this

would indicate that a step is started at the wrong time or
done out of sequence

Late

As for Early

Flow/Other could indicate a leak or product flowing where

it should not, or Composition/Other might suggest
unexpected proportions in a feedstock)

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Selecting Nodes, Parameters and

Guidewords
Nodes:(discrete location on the P&ID at which the process parameters are investigated
for deviations)
Lines between major pieces of equipment
Equipment items (tanks/vessels, columns, reactors)
Packages (compressors, chemical injection)
Utilities/Services (Air, N2, Steam, Drains,Vents Flare,
Sewers..)

Parameters: :(Physical or chemical property associated with the process)

Flow, Pressure, Temperature, reaction others
Applicable to the Node

Guidewords:(Simple words used to qualify or quantify the intention and to guide and
stimulate the process for identifying process hazards)

No, More, Less, As well as, others

Applicable to the Parameter

Parameter + Guideword = Potential Deviation

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HAZOP Review Guideline Table

Typical Nodes
Deviations
Column,
Departure from Design
Reactor
Fired
Exchanger
Vessel,
Pump &
Intention
Heater
Tank
Compressor
USE THE DEVIATIONS BELOW FOR ALL NODES INDICATED
FLOW
No, Low, More, Reverse
X
X
X
X
PRESSURE
No, Lower, Higher
X
X
X
X
X
TEMPERATURE
Lower, Higher
X
X
X
X
X
LEVEL/INTERFACE
No, Lower, Higher
X
X
START-UP/SHUTDOWN
Using All the Above
X
X
X
X
X

Lines

X
X
X

CONSIDER THE FOUR DEVIATIONS BELOW FOR ALL NODES INDICATED

CONTAMINANT
More
REACTION
Low, High
TOXICITY
Sampling, Maintenance
CORROSION/EROSION
More

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Brainstorming Causes
Deviations are used to help team identify causes of
upsets, i.e. how does the process break down ?
The same cause may apply to two or more deviations
Do not criticize causes during brainstorming
Do not argue about whether or not a cause belongs in a
particular deviation (no flow, less flow); develop it

when it comes up
Do not list the same cause twice; develop it the first
time; if a new deviation triggers some thoughts for
additional consequences of a previously developed
scenario, go back and revise the scenario
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Common Deviations and Their Causes

Guide Words
No, Not, None
Process Parameters
Flow

Pressure

Temperature

Level

Less, Low, Short

Part of

More, High

Wrong routing, blockage,

blind flange left in, faulty
non-return valve, burst
pipe, control valve,
isolation valve, pump or
vessel failure.

Partial blockage (filters),

vessel or valves failing,
leaks, loss of pump
efficiency.

N/A

More than 1 pump

operating, reduced
delivery head, increased
suction pressure, other
routes, exchanger tube
leaks.

Open to atmosphere.

Generation of vacuum by
pump drain out of
vessels, cooling or
condensation from
vapour or gas dissolving
in a liquid.
Pump/compressor
suction lines blocked.

N/A

Surge, relief, leakage

from HP connection (lines
and flanges), thermal,
rate of pressurising lines.

Freezing, loss of
pressure, loss of heating,
failed exchanger tubes.

N/A

Fouled cooler tubes,

cooling water failure,
failed exchanger tubes.
Exothermic reaction.

N/A

Empty tank, vessel.

Composition viscosity, Mixing failure. Additive

density, phase
(e.g. chemical injection)
failure.

Control valve failure,

manual error, pump out.

High or Low interface

level.

Poor mixing, or
Passing through
interruption during mixing. isolations, leaking
exchanger tubes, phase
change, out of spec.

Control valve failure,

manual error, blocked
outlet.
Excessive additives,
mixing.

EXIT

Develop Consequences without

Safeguards
Identify ultimate potential consequences for
each deviation
Common error by process hazards review
teams is to take credit for safeguards when
developing consequences
When developing consequences consider the
following:
Operator is not available or is not paying attention
Control valves are in manual
Alarms and safety interlocks do not function
Procedures are not followed or are not understood

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Deviation from design intent

Design Intent
defines how a plant or just a part of it is expected

to operate. It may be to produce a certain tonnage per year

of a particular chemical, to manufacture a specified number of
cars, to process and dispose of a certain volume of effluent
per annum, etc

but in the vast majority of cases it would also be

understood that an important subsidiary intent
would be to conduct the operation in the safest and
most efficient manner possible.
EXIT

Deviation from design intent

(Contd.)

To illustrate, let us imagine that as part of the overall

production requirement we needed a cooling water facility. A
much simplified statement as to the design intent of this small
section of the plant would be "to continuously circulate cooling

water at an initial temperature of xC and at a rate of xx liters

per hour".
Fan
Cooler

Heat Exchanger

A deviation or departure from the

design intent in this case would be
a cessation of circulation, or the
water being at too high an initial
temperature. Note the difference
between a deviation and its cause.
In this case, failure of the pump
would be a cause, not a deviation.

Pump

EXIT

Priority for Safeguards

Cause elimination first, Consequence
mitigation second
Inherent design cushion (better than
minimum consensus standards)
Written procedures for :
Operations
Maintenance
Inspection
Testing

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Priority for Safeguards (cont.)

Training
History
Previous incidents (lack of)
Equipment inspection (i.e. clean or non corrosive
service)

Equipment
PSVs
Redundant/ voting systems
Independent alarms/ shutdowns
Control instruments
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Qualitatively Estimating Risk

SLR
R = risk is an assessment of how serious and how

credible is each identified deviation, its causes

and consequences; a combination of the
likelihood and the severity of the predicted or
ultimate consequences
R=S*L

S
L

= The severity of the predicted consequences

= The likelihood of the predicted consequences
developing given the safeguards that are
currently in place

EXIT

RISK RANKING MATRIX

Likelihood

1
2
3
4
5

1
1
2
3
4
5

2
2
4
6
7
8

Severity
3
3
6
7
8
9

4
4
7
8
9
10

5
5
8
9
10
10

SEVERITY - FIVE POINT SCHEME FOR SEVERITY LEVEL

Class

Definition

In plant fatality; Public fatalities; Extensive

property damage; environmental damage;
Extended downtime ( > or = 2 days )

Class
1 V High

Possible to occur ( < 5 years )

Lost time injury; Public injuries or public

impact; Significant property damage; Exceeds
MEPA standards; Downtime ( 1 to 2 days )

2 High

Possible to occur ( 5 < 15 years )

V High

High

Medium

Minor injury; Moderate property damage; No

environmental impact; Downtime ( 4 to 24
hours ); Off-spec product

Low

No worker injuries; Minor property damage;

No environmental impact; Downtime ( < 4
hours )

V Low

No worker injuries; No property damage; No

environmental impact; Recoverable
operational problem

LIKELIHOOD - FIVE POINT SCHEME FOR LIKELIHOOD

Frequency of Occurrence

3 Medium Possible to occur under unusual circumstances

( 15 < 30 years )
4 Low

Possible to occur over the lifetime of the plant

( 30 < 100 years)

5 V Low

Could occur, however not likely over plant life

(1 / 100 years)

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HAZOPS Study Methodology

In simple terms, the HAZOP study process involves applying in a
systematic way all relevant keyword combinations to the plant in
question in an effort to uncover potential problems. The results are
recorded in columnar format under the following headings:

DEVIATION

CAUSE

CONSEQUENCE

SAFEGUARDS

ACTION

In considering the information to be recorded in each of these

columns, it may be helpful to take as an example the following
simple schematic.

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HAZOPS Study Methodology

Mixer

V1
Dosing
Tank T1

P1
Strainer S1

Pump P1

Note that this is purely representational, and not intended to illustrate an actual
system.

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HAZOPS Study Methodology

(Contd.)

Deviation

The keyword combination being applied (e.g.

Flow/No).

Cause

Potential causes which would result in the deviation

occurring. (e.g. "Strainer S1 blockage due to
impurities in Dosing Tank T1" might be a cause of
Flow/No).

Consequence

The consequences which would arise, both from the

effect of the deviation (e.g. "Loss of dosing results in
incomplete separation in V1") and, if appropriate,
from the cause itself (e.g. "Cavitation in Pump P1,

with possible damage if prolonged").

EXIT

HAZOPS Study Methodology

(Contd.)

Safeguards
Any existing protective devices which either prevent
the cause or safeguard against the adverse
consequences would be recorded in this column. For
example, you may consider recording "Local pressure

gauge in discharge from pump might indicate problem

was arising".
Note that safeguards need not be restricted to hardware where
appropriate, credit can be taken for procedural aspects such as
regular plant inspections (if you are sure that they will actually be
carried out!).

Action
Actions fall into two groups:
1.Actions that remove the cause.
2.Actions that mitigate or eliminate the consequences.
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HAZOPS Study Methodology

(Contd.)

Always investigate removing the cause first, and

only where necessary mitigate the consequences.
For example "Strainer S1 blockage due to impurities
etc". we might approach the problem in a number of
ways:
Ensure that impurities cannot get into T1 by fitting a strainer in the
road tanker offloading line.
Consider carefully whether a strainer is required in the suction to the
pump. Will particulate matter pass through the pump without
causing any damage, and is it necessary to ensure that no such
matter gets into V1. If we can dispense with the strainer altogether,
we have removed the cause of the problem.
Fit a differential pressure gauge across the strainer, with perhaps a
high dP alarm to give clear indication that a total blockage is
imminent.
Fit a duplex strainer, with a regular schedule of changeover and
cleaning of the standby unit.
EXIT

Preparatory Work
This preparatory work will be the responsibility of the

Chairman, and the requirements can be summarized as

follows:

1.Assemble the data (PFDs, P&IDs, Layouts, C&E diagrams etc...)

2.Understand the subject (enable him to plan a sensible strategy, duration of the
review, etc.......)

3.Subdivide the plant and plan the sequence (Split into manageable sections,
endeavour to group smaller items into logical units...)

4.Mark-up the drawings (use distinctive and separate colours, when node spans
two or more drawings, the colours used should remain constant)

5.Devise a list of appropriate Keywords

6.Prepare Table Headings and an Agenda ( like reference drawings, parameter,
node intention, session no.etc...)

7.Prepare a timetable
8.Select the team (chairman also to ensure the core team members are available for
the duration of the review,)

EXIT

RUNNING A HAZOP STUDY

After the preparatory work, the chairman should be in a
position to easily guide an efficient and comprehensive
study through to a successful conclusion.
However, there are certain guideline to remember:
Forbid team members to illustrate their ideas on the master P&IDs.(
Establish the rule right at the beginning of the session)
Resist temptation to hasten the process by listing potential cause/
consequences if schedule is slipping.
Do not allow a separate meeting to develop, with two team members
conversing in low voices at the corner of the table.
Ensure that all team members participate, even those who might feel
unsure of themselves.
Recognize and reward with praise the team member/s who contribute
to the discussion wholeheartedly and sensibly. However, do not allow
them to overshadow the rest of the team.
EXIT

RUNNING A HAZOP STUDY

(Contd.)

If discussion wanders away from the matter under consideration, refocus the attention of the team either by requesting that the Secretary
read out what he has recorded, or by asking for an action to be
formulated.
The Chairman should be independent and unbiased, and should not be
perceived as constantly favoring one section of the team as opposed to
another

Take as an example the situation where the client wishes to have an additional High Level Alarm, but the
contractor strongly disputes its necessity. Consider the following actions:

"Fit a High Level Alarm". In the view of the contractor, the Chairman has sided with the client. He may,
wrongly or otherwise, perceive this to be a biased decision.

The action "Justify the requirement for a High Level Alarm" is addressed to the client. The Chairman
favors the contractor's argument, but is not dismissing altogether the views of the client. Both parties are
likely to be content with this formula.

The action "Justify the absence of a High Level Alarm" is addressed to the contractor. The Chairman
favors the client's argument, but is not dismissing altogether the views of the contractor. As before, neither
party will have cause to feel aggrieved.

EXIT

The Report
The HAZOP Report is a key document pertaining to the safety of the plant.
It is crucial that the benefit of this expert study is easily accessible and
comprehensible for future reference in case the need arises to alter the plant
or its operating conditions.
The major part of such a report is the printed Minutes, in which is listed
the team members, meeting dates, Keywords applied, and every detail of
the study teams findings.
However, with this is included a general summary. The contents of such a
summary might typically be:
- An outline of the terms of reference and the scope of study
- A very brief description of the process which was studied
- The procedures and protocol employed.
- A brief description of the Action File should be included
- General comments
- Results. (usually states the number of recommended actions)
- Appendix (master copies of dwgs., studied, tech data used, cals produced,
C&E charts, corr. bet contractor to vendor, or client to contractor etc. )
EXIT

HAZOP Method Flow Chart

Explain
design intent

Select Process
Parameter

Apply
Guidewords

Identify
credible
Deviations

Identify
credible
Causes

Examine
Consequences
Select a Node
Identify
existing
Safeguards

Repeat for all

Nodes

Repeat for all

Parameters

Repeat for all

Guidewords

Develop
Recommended
Actions

Assess Risk

EXIT

HAZOP : DETAILED SEQUENCE OF EXAMINATION

(COURTSEY: Chemical Industry Safety and Health Council, 1977/3)
Beginning

Select a vessel

11

Repeat 6-10 for all meaningful deviations

derived from the first guide words

11

Explain the general intention of the

vessel and its lines

12

Repeat 5-11 for all the guide words

12

Repeat 5-12
Mark vessel as
completed
Repeat 1-22 for all vessels
on flow sheet

Select a line

13

Mark line as having been examined

13

Explain the intention of the

line

14

Repeat 313 for each line

14

Mark flow sheet as

completed

Apply the first guide words

15

Select an auxiliary (e.g.

heating system)

15

Repeat 1-24 for

all flow sheets

Develop a meaningful deviation

16

Explain the intention of the

auxiliary

Examine Possible causes

17

Repeat 5-12 for auxiliary

Examine Consequences

18

Mark auxiliary as having

examined

Detect Hazards

19

Repeat 5-18 for all

auxiliaries

10

Make suitable record

20

Explain intention of the vessel

End

EXIT

HAZOP Procedure: Flow diagram

Select a section of the Plant
Have all the relevant Primary Keywords for this plant section been considered ?

Yes

No
Select a Primary Keyword not previously considered. (e.g. pressure)
Have all the relevant Secondary Keywords for this Primary Keyword been considered ?

Yes

No
Select a Secondary Keyword not previously considered. (e.g. More)
Are there any causes for this deviations not previously
discussed and recorded ?

No

Yes
Record this new cause.
No

Are associated consequence of any significance?

Yes
Record the consequence/s
Record any Safeguards identified.

No

Having regard to the Consequences and Safeguards, is an action necessary?

Yes
Record the agreed action

EXIT

The reasons for such widespread use of

HAZOPS
Although no statistics are available to verify the
claim, it is believed that the HAZOP methodology
is perhaps the most widely used aid to loss
prevention. The reason for this can most probably
be summarized as follows:
It is easy to learn.
It can be easily adapted to almost all the operations
that are carried out within process industries.
No special level of academic qualification is
required. One does not need to be a university graduate
to participate in a study.

EXIT

HAZOP Summary
HAZOP is a qualitative, verbal and an interactive group
process

that

attempts

to

identify

hazards

and

subsequently recommend modifications in order to

eliminate unacceptable risk situations
Provides a means to reveal potential hazards and
operability problems at design stage
Creative approach to identifying hazards
Systematic and thorough
EXIT

HAZOP Summary
Formal Record of Study
Minimizes cost to implement appropriate
safeguards in new or modified facilities
Participants gain a thorough understanding of
the facility

Always Remember the primary assumption

in a HAZOP study is that the original process
design and the equipment standards applied
are correct.
EXIT

EXIT