Pp v Brioso alias Talap-Talap, GR# 209344, 27 June 2016

Special Penal Law: RA 7610

Sec. 5(b), Art. 111 of RA 7610 punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
not only with a child exploited in prostitution, but also with a child subjected to
other sexual abuses. It covers not only a situation where a child is abused for
profit, but also where one - through coercion, intimidation or influence - engages
in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child.
Conviction for rape through sexual assault under Art. 266-A, par. 2 of the RPC,
where the victim was below 12 years old at the time of the commission of the
offense, calls for the application of RA 7610. The proper penalty to be applied is
that provided under Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, which is reclusion
temporal in its medium period, and not prision mayor as provided under the RPC.
Facts: AAA, the victim in this case, was playing at the basketball court near their house
when accused-appellant approached and asked her to go with him to a nearby mango tree
where he promised to give her candies. When AAA agreed, accused-appellant took her hand
and led her to the mango tree which was near his house. Upon reaching the mango tree,
accused-appellant immediately removed AAA's short pants and panty then proceeded to
mash her private organ and inserted his finger into her vagina. Thereafter, accusedappellant made her lie down on the ground and inserted his penis into her vagina. Accusedappellant warned AAA not to tell anybody about what he did to her, otherwise he will kill her.
tricken by fear, AAA went home without telling anybody about her ordeal. However, the next
morning, AAA's mother, BBB, observed that her daughter had difficulty urinating. She
examined AAA's vagina and found that it was swollen. AAA then told BBB that accusedappellant molested her. Upon learning about what happened to her daughter, BBB brought
her child to one of their Barangay Kagawads to report the incident. AAA was then brought to
the Office of the Department of Social Welfare and Development where AAA related her
ordeal and again pointed to accused-appellant as the culprit. They were then brought to the
local police station where a criminal complaint was filed against accused-appellant.
Thereafter, AAA was examined by a medical doctor who prepared a medico-legal report.
An Information was filed charging accused-appellant with the crime of statutory rape, of
which he was found by the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, guilty of rape
through sexual assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code. The
Supreme Court dismissed the accused-appellants appeal for lack of merit.
Issues:
a. Whether Sec. 5(b), Art. 111 of RA 7610 applies only to a child exploited in
prostitution.
b. Whether the imposable penalty should be that under the RPC or RA 7610.
Held:
a. No. With respect to the penalty for rape through sexual assault under paragraph 2,
Article 266-A of the RPC, it is undisputed that at the time of the commission of the sexual
abuse, AAA was four (4) years old. This calls for the application of Republic Act No. 7610
(R.A. 7610), or The Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act, which defines sexual abuse of children and prescribes the penalty
therefor in Section 5 (b), Article 111, to wit:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be
children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed
upon the following:
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited
in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That when the victim is under
twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3,
for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or
lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when
the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period.

The abovequoted paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only
with a child exploited in prostitution, but also with a child subjected to other sexual abuses.
It covers not only a situation where a child is abused for profit, but also where one - through
coercion, intimidation or influence - engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with
a child.
In connection with the above provision of law, Section 2 (h) of the Rules and Regulations on
the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases, which was promulgated pursuant to
Section 32 of R.A. No. 7610, defines "Lascivious conduct" as:

[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin,
breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or
mouth of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate,
harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation,
lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.

b. In the present case, AAA was four years old at the time of the commission of the offense.
Pursuant to the above-quoted provision of law, accused-appellant was aptly prosecuted
under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended, for Rape Through Sexual
Assault. However, instead of applying the penalty prescribed therein, which is prision
mayor, considering that AAA was below twelve (12) years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense, and considering further that accused-appellant's act of
inserting his finger in AAA's private part undeniably amounted to lascivious conduct, the
appropriate imposable penalty should be that provided in Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A.
No. 7610, which is reclusion temporal in its medium period.
Pp v Miranda, GR# 206880, 29 June 2016
Special Penal Law: RA 9165
Section 21 of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law that mandates strict
compliance. Nevertheless, R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rules both state
that non-compliance with the procedures thereby set would not necessarily
invalidate the seizure and custody of the dangerous drugs, provided there were
justifiable grounds for the non-compliance, and provided that the integrity of the
evidence of the corpus delicti was preserved. Where the proffered excuses of the
apprehending team do not justify non-compliance with the required procedures of
R.A. No. 9165, courts have no alternative but to acquit on the ground of
reasonable doubt.
Facts: The police received word from a confidential informant that accused-appellant
Miranda was engaged in illegal drug trade. A buy bust team was formed and proceeded to
Mirandas place. The buy bust operation was completed when accused-appellants Miranda
and Alga were placed under arrest after the sale of shabu and exchange of money took
place. plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance, which were seized during the
operation, were confirmed to be positive for shabu after laboratory examination.

Both Miranda and Alga were jointly charged with violation of Sections 5 of Article II of R.A.
No. 9165. Appellants pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. The trial court rendered
judgment convicting the accused for the offense charged. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial courts judgment ruling that despite non-compliance with the requirements under Sec.
21, the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized drugs have been preserved.
Issue: Whether the conviction of appellants are correct despite non-compliance with the
requirements of Sec. 21 of RA 9165.
Held: No. The lower courts failed to consider the serious infirmity of the buy-bust team's
non-observance of the rules of procedure for handling illegal drug items, particularly the
requirement of an inventory and photographs of the same.
The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs embodied in Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165 ensures the identity and integrity of dangerous drugs seized. The provision
requires that upon seizure of the illegal drug items, the apprehending team having initial
custody of the drugs shall (a) conduct a physical inventory of the drugs and (b) take
photographs thereof (c) in the presence of the person from whom these items were seized or
confiscated and (d) a representative from the media and the Department of Justice and any
elected public official (e) who shall all be required to sign the inventory and be given copies
thereof.
The Court has emphasized the import of Section 21 as a matter of substantive law that
mandates strict compliance. The Congress laid it down as a safety precaution against
potential abuses by law enforcement agents who might fail to appreciate the gravity of the
penalties faced by those suspected to be involved in the sale, use or possession of illegal
drugs. Only by such strict compliance may the grave mischiefs of planting or substitution of
evidence and the unlawful and malicious prosecution of the weak and unwary that the law
intended to prevent may be eliminated. Under the principle that penal laws are strictly
construed against the government and liberally in favor of the accused, stringent
compliance therewith is fully justified.
Patently, the apprehending team never conducted an inventory nor did they photograph the
seized drugs in the presence of the appellants or their counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice, or an elective official either at the place of the seizure,
or at the police station.
R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations both state that non-compliance
with the procedures thereby delineated and set would not necessarily invalidate the seizure
and custody of the dangerous drugs, provided there were justifiable grounds for the noncompliance, and provided that the integrity of the evidence of the corpus delicti was
preserved. The Court however, finds that the proffered excuses do not justify noncompliance with the required procedures of R.A. No. 9165.
Considering that the non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21 in the case at bar
is inexcusable, the identity and integrity of the drugs used as evidence against appellants
are necessarily tainted. x x x When the courts are given reason to entertain reservations
about the identity of the illegal drug item alleged seized from the accused, the actual crime
charged is put into serious question. Courts have no alternative but to acquit on the ground
of reasonable doubt. Unexplained non-compliance with the procedures for preserving the
chain of custody of the dangerous drugs has frequently caused the Court to absolve those
found guilty by the lower courts.
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside CAs decision and acquitted both accusedappellants.

Lopez v Pp, GR# 212186, 29 June 2016

Special Penal Law: PD No. 533 (THE ANTI-CATTLE RUSTLING LAW OF 1974)
To sustain a conviction for cattle-rustling, the identity of the stolen cattle must be
proven with certainty. Otherwise, the accused must be acquitted on the ground of
reasonable doubt.
Facts: Petitioner was charged with violation of PD No. 533. The female carabao allegedly
stolen was owned by Mario Perez, as evidenced by a Certificate of Transfer of Large Cattle.
The Court of Appeals, in affirming the trial courts conviction of petitioner, ruled that the
Certificate of Transfer of Large Cattle and Alderetes (prosecution witness) testimony were
sufficient to prove the ownership of the lost carabao.
Issue: Whether all the elements of the crime of cattle-rustling were proven
Held: No. The prosecution failed to prove one of the elements of cattle-rustling, specifically,
that the lost carabao of Perez is the same carabao allegedly stolen by petitioner. Sec. 2 of
Presidential Decree No. 533 defines cattle-rustling as:

the taking away by any means, method or scheme, without the consent of the owner/raiser, of any
of the abovementioned animals whether or not for profit or gain, whether committed with or
without violence against or intimidation of any person or force upon things. It includes the
killing of large cattle, or taking the meat or hide without the consent of the owner/raiser.

The elements of cattle-rustling are: (1) large cattle is taken; (2) it belongs to another; (3) the
taking is done without the consent of the owner or raiser; (4) the taking is done by any
means, method or scheme; (5) the taking is done with or without intent to gain; and (6)
the taking is accomplished with or without violence or intimidation against persons or
force upon things.
Not all of the elements of cattle-rustling were proven by the prosecution. The carabao
transported by petitioner and Alderete was not sufficiently proven to be the same carabao
owned by Perez.
Alderetes description of the carabao is too generic. Alderete did not mention any
distinguishing mark on the carabao that petitioner allegedly stole. In other cases
involving cattle-rustling, the identity of the stolen cattle was proven with certainty because
of distinguishing marks on the cattle.
In Pil-ey v. People, the cow was specifically described as white-and-black-spotted cow.
In Canta v. People, the stolen cow was identified by all four (4) caretakers, based on the
location of its cowlicks, its sex, and its color. In addition, the reverse side of the Certificate
of Ownership of Large Cattle had a drawing of the cow, including the location of its
cowlicks. Thus, the identity of the stolen cow was proven.
Perez claims that he owns the carabao allegedly taken by petitioner because he has a
Katibayan ng Paglilipat ng Pagmamay-ari ng Malalaking Baka. However, the Certificate
only proves that he owns a carabao. It does not prove that he owns the carabao allegedly
stolen by petitioner.