M. Asztalos Boethius As A Transmitter

Department of the Classics, Harvard University
Boethius as a Transmitter of Greek Logic to the Latin West: The Categories

Author(s): Monika Asztalos
Source: Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, Vol. 95 (1993), pp. 367-407
Published by: Department of the Classics, Harvard University
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/311393
Accessed: 19-10-2016 19:59 UTC
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted
digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about
JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms
Department of the Classics, Harvard University is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve
and extend access to Harvard Studies in Classical Philology
This content downloaded from 168.96.255.161 on Wed, 19 Oct 2016 19:59:52 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
BOETHIUS AS A TRANSMITTER OF
GREEK LOGIC TO THE LATIN WEST:
THE CATEGORIES
MONIKA ASZTALOS
TO students
of literature Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius (ca.
482-ca. 526) is above all the author of Philosophiae consolatio.
Historians of mathematics and musicologists are familiar with his
treatises on the quadrivial sciences. Historians of ideas study his philo-
sophical and theological works mainly for their impact on medieval

thinkers. But not many scholars study Boethius' commentaries on
Greek philosophical treatises for their own sake or investigate his prolix expositions of the third-century Neoplatonist Porphyry's Isagoge or
introduction to Aristotle's Categories, of the Categories itself, and of
Aristotle's De interpretatione. Classicists are often repelled by

Boethius' inelegant Latin, awkwardly influenced by the Greek, and his-
torians of philosophy complain about his lack of originality. While

acknowledging the essential fairness of these two judgments, my purpose in this paper is to bring out what these commentaries, and espe-
cially the ones on the Isagoge and the Categories,1 reveal about
Boethius' working methods in his earliest works on Greek logic. I
intend to deal less with the end product than with the road to it, and to
point to the stages of development and improvement exhibited within
these early works.
1 This paper is a byproduct of my present work on a critical edition of Boethius' Com-
mentary on Aristotle's Categories. Its contents were first presented in a session on

Boethius and the Greeks during the annual meeting of the American Philological Associ-
ation, Chicago, December 1991. The paper has benefited from the careful reading of the
other participants of that session: John Dillon, John Magee, and Steven Strange, as well
as from Jan Oberg, John Murdoch, and Gisela Striker. I also wish to thank Frank Bernstein for generous help with its technical production.
368 Monika Asztalos
Boethius devoted his first effort in

Isagoge, and later, in the year of hi
all likelihood in his late twenties, he
ing for the first time on a work by
Samuel Brandt attempted a chronol
of their internal references, it ha
Boethius began commenting on the

both his expositions of Porphyry's
2), the first one a dialogue in two b
apparently incomplete Latin version
tary on his own, complete translati

for a full discussion of the chronolo
arguments of this paper it is necess
Isag. 2 and the commentary onthe C

Brandt's assumption that Isag. 2 w
single passage in the former work, w
demonstration of how a comparis
species, proprium, differentia, and

different combinations.3 At the end
2 S. Brandt, "Entstehungszeit und zeitlich
logus 62 (1903), 141-154 and 234-275. See
to Anicii Manlii Severini Boethii In Isagogen P
Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum 48,

and the Chronology of the Works of Boeth
18 (1907), 123-156, A. P. McKinley's conclus
Isag. 2, and the commentary on the Categor
McKinley studied the frequency of certain p
Boethius' translations of the Isagoge and Ca
was influenced by his translations of Porphy
data corroborate Brandt's chronology wher

below. Furthermore, McKinley's tests were
Paluello's critical editions of Boethius' translations in the Aristoteles Latinus and would
therefore have to be remade. I also believe that a necessary preliminary stage in examining whether Boethius' translating activities influenced his choice of particles is to compare his Latin commentaries with the extant Greek sources. Since there is no adequate
source apparatus in any of the editions of Boethius' commentaries, this would mean a
great deal of work. Concerning the question whether Boethius wrote Isag. 2 before or
after CC, L. M. De Rijk follows Brandt's view on pp. 125-127 of "On the chronology of
Boethius' works on logic," Vivarium 2 (1964), 1-49 and 125-162, on exactly the same
grounds as the ones on which Brandt based his conclusions and without corroborating
them further.
3 Porphyrii Isagoge et in Aristotelis Categorias commentarium, ed. A. Busse, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca (=CAG) IV:1, Berlin, 1887, pp. 17,14-18,9. Boethius'
Boethius as a Transmitter of Greek Logic 369

Boethius presents a rule (not given by Porphyry) by which one can calculate the number of different combinations of any given number of
things. The rule (subtract 1 from the number of things combined, multiply the rest with the original number, and divide the product by 2) is
also given by Ammonius, teacher of philosophy in fifth-century Alexandria, and it is therefore likely that Boethius found the rule in a Greek
comment on the Isagoge.4 By way of example, Boethius further adds
that if you have four things, subtract one, multiply the remaining three
by four, and divide the product by two, you get six combinations; he
concludes: atque hanc quidem regulam simpliciter ac sine demonstra-
tione nunc dedisse sufficiat, in Praedicamentorum uero expositione

ratio quoque cur ita sit explicabitur. This has been taken by Brandt as
a reference to CC and, consequently, as evidence for CC's posteriority
to Isag. 2. Brandt drew attention to the fact that it is toward the end of
CC that each of the four types of opposition are compared with each
other.5 From this he was forced to conclude that at the time when
Boethius wrote Isag. 2 he had already conceived his entire commentary

on the Categories in detail.
I propose instead that Boethius had written his entire commentary
on the Categories before beginning his second commentary on the

Isagoge. The reference to Praedicamentorum expositione is, in my
opinion, not a reference to CC. First, Boethius' demonstration in CC of
how one gets six different combinations out of the four types of opposi-
tion occupies a few paragraphs - a brisk treatment in comparison with
the several pages long exposition in Isag. 2. If one accepts Brandt's

chronology, one would surely expect a reference in the brief comment
in CC to the much fuller treatment in Isag. 2 instead of the other way
around. Secondly, and more importantly, what Boethius says in the

passage from Isag. 2 quoted above is that he has judged it sufficient at
this point to present the combination rule without proving it but that he
comment: ed. Brandt (see above, note 2), pp. 319,15-325,7.
4 Ammonius In Porphyrii Isagogen sive V voces, ed. A. Busse, CAG IV:3, Berlin,
1891, pp. 115,20-116,11 and 122,22-123,6. In his Prolegomena to the edition of
Boethius' commentaries on the Isagoge (see note 2 above), p. XXVI, Brandt suggests that
the similarities between Boethius' and Ammonius' commentaries on Porphyry's treatise
can be accounted for by assuming either that Boethius had access to Ammonius' work or
that they both depend on the same source. The latter assumption seems to me the more
likely one. However, the question of dependency is hard to determine, since Ammonius'
work is the only extant Greek commentary on the Isagoge from late antiquity.
5 Patrologia Latina (= PL) 64, 272C-273A.
370 Monika Asztalos
will demonstrate it in a commentar

sage in CC that Brandt assumed Boe
does contain a consideration of thes
not even mention the general rule
Boethius to be referring to is theref
tary on the Categories that we kno

below, p. 378) but which (if it was e
When dealing with the chronol
works, which in many cases are ha

Greek sources, one has to consider
to other works or to other place
translated from Greek (several insta
pp. 376 and 378). Therefore it is rel

in discussing the combination rule
Ammonius has no reference to a

Furthermore, he does not mention
combinations. This example may

because he knew that the rule could be demonstrated later on in a
second commentary on the Categories in connection with the discussion of the four types of opposition that he had become familiar with
while working on CC. Whether or not Boethius became acquainted

with the rule by studying Greek comments on the Isagoge already
while composing Isag. 1, he had no use for it in that work, since Victorinus' translation as quoted by Boethius does not include the passage
in which Porphyry mentions the different combinations that result from
a comparison of the five predicables with each other. If Boethius met

the rule in a Greek commentary on the Categories while composing CC
(this part of Porphyry's extant commentary, the so-called Kata peusin,
is lost, but Simplicius, Ammonius' pupil and a contemporary of

Boethius, gives the rule in his commentary on the Categories 6), he
must have decided not to use it in that work.
For the purpose, then, of establishing the chronology between CC

and Isag. 2, the reference in Isag. 2 is of little value. Were there indubitably clear internal references in Boethius' earlier works, one could
establish the probable sequence of the latter in terms of these references, but as it is, in this case the only reliable method to employ in
6 Simplicii in Aristotelis Categorias commentarium, ed. C. Kalbfleisch, CAG VIII,
Berlin, 1907, pp. 397,31-398,22.

dealing with the chronology is to study the doctrinal and terminological
development within Boethius' works. As I will show in this paper, it is
not only a safe method, but a fruitful one, and one that allows us to
draw new conclusions as to Boethius' own methods of approaching

Greek material and presenting it in Latin.
For the time being, I will abstain from giving further support (such
will emerge on pp. 373 (with note 12) and 375 (with notes 20 and 25)
below) in favor of the chronology I have proposed here and simply take
it for granted that Boethius began commenting on Aristotle's

Categories immediately after having completed his commentary on
Marius Victorinus' translation of Porphyry's Isagoge, and, consequently, at a time when Isag. 2 was still in the offing.
How did Boethius go about his new project of commenting for the
first time on a book by Aristotle, using as a basis, also for the first time,
a translation of his own?
I. The Translations of the Categories Ascribed to

Boethius and their Transmission
Let me begin by summarizing some conclusions arrived at by
Lorenzo Minio-Paluello in his introduction to the critical edition of the
Latin translations of Aristotle's Categories7: Boethius' translation of

the Categories occurs, Minio-Paluello maintains, both in an incomplete
form (representing ca. two thirds of the Greek) as lemmata in CC,

which he calls b, and in a complete form, transmitted without the commentary (a). There is also a composite text (c) consisting partly of a,
partly of an otherwise unknown, anonymous translation (x). MinioPaluello has concluded on stylistic grounds that x cannot be attributed
to Marius Victorinus. His cautiously forwarded hypothesis is that since
x is a cruder translation than the one that can be attributed with cer-
tainty to Boethius, and since no other person is known from before the
ninth century (the date of the earliest extant manuscript of c)

knowledgeable enough in Greek and Latin to have been able to produce a translation such as x, it probably represents an early effort by
Boethius.
Minio-Paluello assumes that whoever put together c had a defective

7Aristoteles Latinus (=AL) 1:1-5. Categoriae vel Praedicamenta, ed. L. MinioPaluello, Bruges/Paris, 1961, esp. pp. XII-XXII.
372 Monika Asztalos
copy of x and supplied what was lac

seem to fit with another observati
behind c mistakenly inserted into h
mentary, a word that follows imm
me more likely that the redactor of
b. He probably had copies of x and

that the translation exhibited in th
to x and improved the latter with t
ported by the fact that the parts o
in CC often share textual errors

against b.
Since Minio-Paluello, who is also the editor of the Greek text of the
Categories in the OCT,9 was able to observe that a and x do not

correspond to one and the same Greek version of the text, he assumed
that Boethius (identified as the translator of x) may actually have composed his second translation (a) "from scratch," using another Greek
copy of the Categories than when he produced x.
A. Boethius' Translation a Not Written Before CC
I would like to argue that Boethius translated Aristotle's Categories

while providing it, at the same time, with a commentary. Thus, the
Greek commentaries on the Categories that he made extensive use of
in his own expository work aided him not only in writing CC but also
in interpreting Aristotle's text. I will exemplify my claim with an

account of how Boethius modified his interpretation of Aristotle's doc-
trine on homonymous and synonymous things. Aristotle presents the
doctrine in the opening paragraphs of the Categories (la 1-12), in

Boethius' translation (given also in c, the composite text):
Aequivoca dicuntur quorum nomen solum commune est, secundum nomen vero substantiae ratio diversa, ut animal homo et quod
pingitur. Horum enim solum nomen commune est, secundum

nomen vero substantiae ratio diversa; si enim quis assignet quid est
utrique eorum quo sint animalia, propriam assignabit utriusque

rationem. Univoca vero dicuntur quorum et nomen commune est
8 The word ordine, PL 64, 269B. Minio-Paluello, p. XVI.
9 Aristotelis Categoriae et Liber de interpretatione, rec. L. Minio-Paluello, Oxford,
1949.

et secundum nomen eadem substantiae ratio, ut animal homo atque
bos. Communi enim nomine utrique animalia nuncupantur, et est
ratio substantiae eadem; si quis enim assignet utriusque rationem,
quid utrique sit quo sint animalia, eandem assignabit rationem.
On the other hand, Boethius had quoted the incipit of Aristotle's

Categories already in Isag. I in the following way: Aequiuoca sunt
quorum nomen solum commune est, secundum nomen uero substantiae
ratio alia.10 According to Minio-Paluello," Boethius is using almost

the same words here as in his translation of the Categories. The only
divergence that Minio-Paluello draws attention to is that Isag. I has

alia where the Categories translation (both in the form of a and b)
reads diversa. This is indeed a minor variant. But what is more
significant is that Isag. 1 renders Aristotle's TyEat with sunt, wh
a and b have the correct dicuntur. One might object that may
Isag. 1 Boethius was not quoting the Latin definition of homonym

things exactly, just giving the general idea of it. But when Boeth
quotes a passage from the Categories in Isag. 2, a work that, as I h
argued above, was written after CC, he follows his own trans
(both in the form of a and b) to the letter.12 Furthermore, the foll
comment in the CC (paralleled in Simplicius' commentary13) o

appropriateness of the word dicuntur shows that it is unlikely
Boethius would have expressed the definition as loosely as he d
Isag. I if he had been familiar with the Greek comments on the b

ning of the Categories: Res per se ipsae aequiuocae non sunt, nisi
nomine praedicentur. Quare, quoniam, ut aequiuocae sint, ex c
muni uocabulo trahunt, recte ait 'Aequiuoca dicuntur'. Non enim s

aequiuoca sed dicuntur. Thus, it was most likely the acquaintance
a Greek comment that made Boethius aware of the fact that Aristotle
had a purpose in writing yerTatt instead of zortv (or rather, made him
aware of the fact that the Greeks ascribed this purpose to Aristotle).
10 Ed. Brandt, p. 17,21-23.
11 AL 1:1-5, p. X, note 2.
12 Ed. Brandt, p. 152,8-10. Boethius quotes Aristotle's Cat. 1 b 16-17. One might
argue that a reads secundum speciem whereas the quote in Isag. 2 has secundum species,
but several manuscripts of Boethius' CC exhibit the latter reading in the lemma. The
nasal stroke for m is easily confused in manuscripts with s following a final vowel.
13 PL 64, 164B. I quote from my own forthcoming critical edition. Simplicius: CAG
VIII, p. 25,5-9.
374 Monika Asztalos
Furthermore, he had neither produc
the Greek comments on the Cate

This is not shocking news. But the
strate that he had not even written a before he started to work on the
CC, and what may indeed seem surprising, that he had not yet done so
when he wrote the introduction to the CC (i.e., before he came to the
first lemma).
In Isag. I and in the introduction of CC Boethius gives an account

of homonymity and synonymity that is different from that given by
Aristotle in the beginning of the Categories. Boethius' account has no
counterpart in any extant Greek commentary. I believe that for some
reason Boethius met a theory of homonymous and synonymous things
while working on Isag. I and that it was not until he got beyond the
introduction of the CC and met the theory spelled out in the Greek
comments on the beginning of the Categories that he became familiar
with Aristotle's view.
Whereas Aristotle asserts that, for example, man and ox (i.e., two
species) are synonymous things because they have a common name

(animal) and the same definition in accordance with that name,
Boethius holds the view in Isag. I that man and animal (i.e., a species
and its genus) are synonymous things since they are both called animal
and can be given the definition of animal.14 And whereas Aristotle

exemplifies homonymous things, i.e., things that have only a name in
common but different definitions, with a living man and a picture that
are both called Qiov, Boethius exemplifies with a marble statue

representing a man and a living man that can both be called man.15
Boethius sticks to his interpretations later on in Isag. 1, but there he
uses a statue of Venus and the goddess herself as examples of things
homonymous.16 Moreover, in the introductory part of his CC, before he
comes to Aristotle's text itself, Boethius repeats his previous examples
of synonymous things17 (man and animal, although in one manuscript
the scribe has tried to improve Boethius' account by substituting asinus
for animal), but in the case of homonymous things he now gives both
his own and Aristotle's view, saying that a living man and a painting
representing a man can both be called either animal or man. Having
14 Ed. Brandt, pp. 17,24-18,12.
15 Ed. Brandt, p. 18,12-19.
16 Ed. Brandt, pp. 32,12-33,20.
17 PL 64, 163D-164A.

proceeded in his commentary to Aristotle's definition of homonymous
things, i.e., having produced the first lemma of the Categories, he gives
only the Aristotelian example of a painting of a man and of a living
man that are both called animal.18 When he comes to Aristotle's
definition of synonymous things, he presents a theory that has no coun-
terpart among the extant Greek comments and the purpose of which
seems to have been to integrate his own previous view with the Aristotelian one that he could not avoid facing at this point. He claims (and
this is one of the rare occasions on which he puts forth an original idea
in the CC) that either genera are synonymous with species, as animal
with man (Boethius' own view) or species are synonymous with

species of the same genus, as man, horse, and ox (Aristotle's view).19
But apparently Boethius grew weary of producing his old examples, for
in Isag. 2 he gives nothing but Aristotle's doctrine.20
My second example showing that Boethius had not produced a

before starting to write CC relates to the beginning of chapter 4 of the
Categories (1 b 25-27), where Aristotle provides for the first time a list
of the ten categories. Boethius' translation of Kicofat from this point

on21 is situs. But he had given a list of the categories twice before, first
in the beginning of Isag. 1, and secondly in his comment on Cat. 1 a
20-b 6.22 Both times he translated KE'oOat with iacere. In the case of
Isag. 1, Boethius may have picked up the list of the categories from a
Greek source, since such a list is given in the prooemium of

Ammonius' commentary on the Isagoge23; the list in the CC (in the
comment on Cat. 1 a 20-b 6) is taken from Porphyry's comment on the
same lemma.24 (The switch in terminology from iacere to situs at 1 b
25-27 in CC fits with the hypothesis that CC is written before Isag. 2,

since in the latter work Boethius consistently translates cKE_'Ot with
situs.25) Thus, it seems that Boethius had not produced the translation a
before starting to comment on the Categories, or he would not have
18 PL 64, 165A. (This is of course a necessary minor adaptation to the Latin language,
since in Greek a painting of anything, not necessarily a man, can be called Foiov).
19 PL 64, 167B-C.
20 Cf. Isag. 2, ed. Brandt, pp. 222,23-223,19. This fits with my hypothesis that Isag. 2
was written after CC.
21 PL 64, 220C and in the lemma 11 b 10.
22
23
24
25
Isag. 1, ed. Brandt, p. 14,15; CC, PL 64, 169C-D.

CAG IV:3, pp. 19,13-20,14.
CAG IV:1, p. 71,19-26.
Ed. Brandt, pp. 143, 23; 222, 13; 317, 12.
376 Monika Asztalos
used the term iacere in the beginnin
As for my third and last example

before he comes to Aristotle's text,
ing Cat. 2 a 4-5. He translates Porph
Singulum autem eorum, quae dicta

nulla affirmatione dicitur. Horum
affirmatio fit.27 But further on in
gives the following translation in
quae dicta sunt, ipsa quidem secund
tur. Horum autem ad se inuicem
latter is also the wording in the com
and in a. Consequently, a was n
embarked on the commentary on t

introductory part of CC would hav
B. Conclusions
In sum, Boethius may have come quite unprepared to his first text
by Aristotle, unprepared, that is, in the sense of not starting to comment
on the Categories armed with a good translation beforehand or with

more than a superficial knowledge of the text. As a matter of fact,
whenever Boethius refers to a passage in Aristotle's Categories beyond
the lemma or chapter he is actually working on, a corresponding refer
ence can be found in both Porphyry's and Simplicius' commentaries.30
26 It is tempting to sidetrack for a moment into speculating on why Boethius changed
his terminology at 1 b 25-27. One reason might be that in translating Aristotle's exam
ples of IKeo0at, namely a&va'etat and K~60ireat (in Boethius' translation iacere an
sedere), he found that situs would be a more suitable term than iacere for KEteo0at, the
genus of iacere and sedere. If this is the reason, one may wonder whether the translatio
x should be ascribed to Boethius, since he would have become aware of Aristotle's exam
ples and consequently of the unsuitability of the term iacere already while producing that
translation. But I have decided to suspend for the time being any judgment on th
authenticity of x.
27
28
29
30
PL
PL
PL
PL
64,
64,
64,
64,
162B; CAG IV: 1, pp. 56,36-57,2.

180B.
180D.
184B ( = comment on 2 a 11-19): Partes autem substantiae incompositae e
simplices sunt species et materia, ex quibus ipsa substantia conficitur, quas post per tran
situm nominat dicens substantiae partes et ipsas esse substantias. The reference is to 3 a
29-32. Porphyry has a similar reference, CAG IV:1, p. 88,21-22, as does Simpliciu
CAG VIII, p. 78, 31-32. PL 64, 196C (=comment on 3 b 24-32): Manifestum est, u

What is quite evident is that Boethius modified his conception of his
work as he went along. This is apparent in Isag. I where he sets out to
write a dialogue with some literary ambitions but, as Samuel Brandt
has pointed out, gradually abandons the dialogue form in book II and
drops it altogether toward the end of the book only to have it reappear,
perfunctorily, in the last lines.31
It is easy to form the impression that Boethius plunged into his first
work on Greek philosophy-Isag. 1-equally "unprepared" as in the

case of the Categories. Boethius is there using Victorinus' translation
but often checks it against a Greek copy of Porphyry's text, and it is
with what seems to be an increasing irritation that he makes note of
shortcomings in his Roman predecessor's version.32 It seems to me that
if Boethius had compared Victorinus' Latin translation with the Greek
before starting to write Isag. 1, he would have decided to produce a

translation of his own. Isag. I appears to be his one and only experiment in basing a commentary on someone else's translation.
Therefore, one may assume that Boethius started out with the inten-
tion of using already existing translations of Greek philosophical

works - whenever such translations were available - and providing
them with explanations taken from Greek commentaries, but that he
discovered after his first effort that he ought to provide new translations
of the rest of the texts, since at least the one he had used by Victorinus
turned out to be quite inadequate.
ipse est posterius monstraturus, haec non esse quantitates sed ad aliquid: magnum enim
ad paruum dicitur. Sed cum ad ea loca uenerimus, propositi ordinem loci diligentius
exsequemur. The reference is to 5 b 11 ff. Porphyry has it on p. 97, 3-5, Simplicius on
p. 106, 13-14. PL 64, 228C (= comment on 7 b 15): Ergo simul ea sunt quae se inuicem
uel interimunt uel inferunt, et de his quidem ipse posterius tractat. The reference is to the
Postpraedicamenta. Porphyrius has a similar reference on p. 118, 20 f; Simplicius on

p. 190,2.
31 Brandt's edition (see note 2 above), p. IX.
32 Even if Boethius notices discrepancies between Victorinus and Porphyry already in
the beginning of his dialogue (ed. Brandt, pp. 33,1; 34,12; 35,5 ff; 36,23), it is not until
later that he actually accuses Victorinus of being in error (64,8), obscure (94,11), or of not
having understood Porphyry properly (95,14-15).
378 Monika Asztalos

II. The Double Commentaries
A. Boethius Had No Intention Before CC to

Write Twofold Commentaries
Producing a translation of his own for a commentary was not the

only innovation in Boethius' methods at this stage. As I shall show, it
was in all likelihood while composing the CC that he conceived the

idea of providing, whenever necessary, two commentaries on a given
Greek work.
To be sure, since Boethius provided Porphyry's Isagoge with two

commentaries, one might argue that he formed his plan already while
writing Isag. 1, that is to say, before he began composing CC, but in
Brandt's opinion (with which I agree) there is nothing in Isag. 1 that
indicates beyond a shadow of a doubt that Boethius wrote this short
dialogue with the intention of returning to the subject later on. In the
introduction33 to his edition of Boethius' commentaries on the Isagoge
Brandt retracts his earlier opinion34 that the following passage in the
beginning of Isag. 1 indicates that at that early stage Boethius had

already conceived the idea of writing a second commentary on the
same work: quam quidem artem (i.e. rationalem) quidam partem phi-
losophiae, quidam non partem, sed ferramentum et quodammodo

supellectilem iudicarunt. Qua autem id utrique inpulsi ratione crediderint, alio erit in opere commemorandum.35 In fact, Brandt notes,
Boethius does treat the question at length in Isag. 2.36 But, still according to Brandt, a reference in Ammonius' commentary on the Isagoge37
similar to the one in Boethius' Isag. I indicates that Boethius merely
translated his reference from a Greek source and, consequently, at a
time when he had probably no idea in which context he would return to
the subject. As it turned out, it was to be in Isag. 2. Brandt also

adduces38 the following passage at the end of Isag. I as an indication
that Boethius, when he finished this commentary on Porphyry's work,
33 P. XII f.
34 "Entstehungszeit ..." (see above, note 2), pp. 150 f.

35 Ed. Brandt, p. 10,2-5.
36 Ed. Brandt, pp. 140,12-143,7.

37 CAG IV:3, p. 23,24. As Brandt indicated, Ammonius returns to the question in his
commentary on the Analytica Priora, ed. Wallies, CAG IV:4, pp. 8,15-11,21.
38 In the Prolegomena to his edition, p. XIII.

considered the case closed: Sed iam tibi, mi Fabi, omnia quaecumque
ad Introductionem Porphyrii pertinent, plenius uberiusque tractata
sunt.39
B. Announcement in CC of a Future Discussion of Three Questions

and Its Relevance to the Intent to Write Double Commentaries
What about the commentary on the Categories? Let me begin by

quoting a passage from it that refers to a forthcoming treatment and
where no corresponding reference can be found in any extant Greek
commentary:
Haec quidem est tempori introductionis et simplicis expositionis
apta sententia, quam nos Porphyrium nunc sequentes, quod uideba-
tur expeditior esse planiorque, digessimus. Est uero in mente de

tribus olim quaestionibus disputare, quarum una est quid Praedicamentorum uelit intentio. Ibique, numeratis diuersorum sententiis, docebimus, cui nostrum quoque accedat arbitrium; quod nemo
huic inpresentiarum sententiae pugnare miretur, cum uideat quanto
illa sit altior, cuius non nimium ingredientium mentes capaces esse
potuissent, ad quos mediocriter imbuendos ista conscripsimus.

Afficiendi ergo et quodammodo disponendi mediocri expositione
sunt in ipsis quasi disciplinae huius foribus, quos iam ad hanc

scientiam paramus admittere. Hanc igitur causam mutatae senten-
tiae utriusque operis lector agnoscat, quod illic ad scientiam

Pythagoricam perfectamque doctrinam, hic ad simplices introducendorum motus expositionis sit accommodata sententia.40
1. Question One: the Scope

The scope of the Categories, the intentio in Boethius' Latin, was a
subject of great controversy among all ancient commentators. It was
considered variously as words that signify, as things signified by words,
as concepts, or as a combination of all of the above: words signifying
things by means of concepts. Simplicius is the one who reports the dis39 Ed. Brandt, p. 131,20-22.
40 Cf. PL 64, 160A-B. My edition here is based on a collation of all extant

manuscripts.
380 Monika Asztalos
cussion and the different views in

Boethius decides to follow in the
words of first imposition42 signifyi
words but insofar as they signify.43

quoted above, is the view of Porphy
because it represents his own view
for the beginners for whom he is wr
tinues, he will give his own view wh
In his second commentary on Aris
2), Boethius describes the scope of t
things insofar as they signify thing
more, he indicates that this is how
described "in a commentary on it (i
libri) commentario. The question

referring to. Not CC, because ther
described without any mention of
possibility that the definition of the

int. 2 as well as the reference there
were taken from a Greek comment
was seen above, Boethius had no qua
that he found in Greek commentar
Boethius had come across the defini
cepts in a Greek commentary on
decided not to use it in his own CC.

that he is referring in De int. 2 to
Categories given in a (now lost) wor
this indicates that Boethius actually
the Categories. Furthermore, it conf
41 CAG VIII, pp. 9,5-13,21. Cf. Ph. Ho
Simplicius--la question du 'skopos' du trait

cius. Sa vie, son oeuvre, sa survie, ed. I. Had
42 According to Porphyry, Kata peusin, C
imposition are names given to things, whe
such as noun, verb, etc., given to other names
43 PL 64, 159A-161A. See also below, pp.

44 See CAG IV:1, pp. 57,16-59,33.
45 Anicii Manlii Severini Boetii Commentarii
rec. C. Meiser, Leipzig, I, 1877, II, 1880. Vo

Boethius discusses the scope of the Categor
pp. 7,25-27 and 8,1-7.

gave there as his own is the one involving concepts. According to Simplicius' commentary, this was the prevailing view among the commentators and one held by, among others, Porphyry's disciple Iamblichus.46
2. The Other Two Questions: What Were They?
Which were the other two questions that Boethius intended to discuss in the future? The formula Est uero in mente de tribus olim
quaestionibus disputare, quarum una est, quid Praedicamentorum uelit

intentio is vague and intriguing enough to have aroused speculations
both among medieval scholiasts47 and modem scholars. Among questions suggested by the latter are, for example, the authorship of the
Categories and its title.48 This is a natural enough guess, since Boethius
ends his comment on the authenticity in the CC with the expression Se
de his alias and introduces his explanation of the title with the words
Restat inscriptio, quae uaria fuit (thereby showing at least that this wa
a debated question if not that he intended to return to it).49
In his account of the authenticity of the Categories, Boethius seem

to rely partly on the same information as Simplicius,50 namely that th
46 CAG VIII, pp. 11,30-13,21.
47 Six manuscripts of the CC have a gloss either in the margin or inserted in differen
places in the passage dealing with the scope, explaining that the three questions concern
the scope, utility, and order of the Categories. The content of the gloss can be explained
by the fact that the utility of studying the Categories and the order that work occupies
the philosophical curriculum are the topics treated after the scope in Boethius' introduc-
tory chapter of the CC. Five of these same manuscripts also have a gloss explaining that
the discussion will take place in alio commentario quem composui de eisdem categorii
ad doctiores. Both glosses have found their way into the printed editions of the CC.
48 De Rijk suggests (see note 2 above), pp. 132-138, that the two additional question
concern the title and the utility of the work. He reaches this conclusion from interpretin
olim in the phrase Est uero in mente de tribus olim quaestionibus disputare as a referenc
not to the future but to the past and assumes that Boethius refers to "the three famous o
questions" (p. 134). These, according to De Rijk, are the "well-known Porphyrian trio
intentio, inscriptio, and utilitas. Sten Ebbesen, however, suggests that the two questions
may concern the authorship of the Categories and Aristotle's list of the categories.
agree with his second alternative and will give support for it below. See S. Ebbesen,
"Boethius as an Aristotelian Scholar" in: Aristoteles, Werk und Wirkung, Paul Morau
gewidmet. Bd II. Ed. J. Wiesner, Berlin/New York, 1987, pp. 286-311. Ebbese
discusses the future questions on p. 304.
49 PL 64, 162A.
50 CAG VIII, p. 18,7-21.
382 Monika Asztalos
style of the work betrays its aut

Aristotle's philosophical producti
there is another book on the sam
Aristotle. Neither Boethius nor Sim

troversy on the authenticity of the
respective accounts that justifies lab
does not treat this subject at all.)
alias does not refer to the whole pr

but to a piece of information given
commentary) that some philosopher
that Aristotle was the inventor

Pythagorean Archytas had alread
Boethius reports Themistius as defe
ity by explaining that this alleged for
some peripatetic philosopher who w

donym of Archytas in order to sec
alias in the expression Sed de his
forthcoming treatment in a second

to one already given in his Arithmet
ten categories.51
As for the title of the work, Boet
names suggested and the grounds o

a rather thorough account that has c
plicius.53 Boethius makes it clear w

why. He does not indicate at all that
is difficult to see what he could have
I find it hard to believe that th

Boethius shelved for a future dis
authorship and the title. To begin w

assume that the two questions shou
(notice how any discussion of the

but should be the object of consid
commentaries and furthermore, sin

tify his readers on purpose, that he
51 See Henry Chadwick, Boethius. The Co

Philosophy. Oxford, 1981, pp. 77-78.
52 CAG IV:2, pp. 56,14-57,15.
53 CAG VIII, pp. 15,26-18,6.

his commentary by announcing unambiguously that he will discuss
them in a forthcoming work.
There are indeed two such announcements in the CC. In the first
instance, Boethius remarks on the fact that there are neither more nor
less than ten categories: Sunt uero quidam, qui contendunt recte
enumerationem non esse dispositam. Alii namque ut superuacua
quaedam demunt, alii ut curto operi addunt, alii uero permutant. Quos
nimirum non recte sentire alio nobis opere dicendum est.54 Porphyry
cites Athenodorus and Cornutus as critics of Aristotle's division.55
Simplicius has a very long discussion of the problem,56 citing He

minus, Athenodorus, Lucius, Nicostratus, Xenocrates, and Andronicus
on the side of those who considered the highest genera to be less tha
ten, and giving lamblichus' and Porphyry's answer to their objections
(In this case, Porphyry's defense must have been given in the now lo
Pros Gedaleion, since it is absent from his Kata peusin.) Simpliciu
then names the proponents of a greater number than ten, once again
Nicostratus and Lucius,57 and gives the solution of the "more illustriou
among the commentators,"58 probably still Porphyry and lamblichus

The only representatives of the opinion that the established account of
the categories ought to be reorganized are, in Simplicius' account, the

Stoics. No particular defender of Aristotle is mentioned in this case.
The latter part of Simplicius' report, however, has a lamblichean touch
since it points out, among other things, that any criticism of the accoun
of the ten categories is not primarily directed against Aristotle but
against the Pythagoreans and Archytas who made the division before
Aristotle; and in the conclusion of his account of the debate Simplici
points to the "divine lamblichus" as the one who demonstrated th

sufficiency of the ten categories.
The second reference to a future treatment of a question occurs at

the end of the chapter on the category of relation, as a comment on 8
21-24 which runs as follows in Boethius' translation: Fortasse autem
difficile sit de huiusmodi rebus confidenter declarare nisi saepius pertractata sint; dubitare autem de singulis non erit inutile. (The problem
54 PL 64, 180C. Cf. note 48 above.
55 CAG IV:2, p. 86,20-32.
56 CAG VIII, pp. 62,17-68,31.
57 Simplicius observes that some protagonists criticized Aristotle's account from different standpoints (62,33-63,1); Nicostratus and Lucius were apparently among them.
58 P. 66,13.
384 Monika Asztalos
that Aristotle has been discussing i
tive.) Boethius comments on the

diceret, nisi nos ad maiorem acuminis exercitationem considera-
tionemque revocaret. Quod quoniam eius est adhortatio, nos quoque in
aliis de his rebus dubitationes solutionesque ponere minime grauabimur.59 Apparently Boethius is interpreting Aristotle's conclusion to
the chapter on relation as an encouragement to return to the subject
again for a "greater exercise of subtle speculation," and even, perhaps,
as a justification for writing a second commentary on the Categories.
The expression maiorem acuminis exercitationem considerationemque
is echoed in the beginning of De int. I where Boethius announces that
the second commentary on the De interpretatione will explain what a
speculation of a deeper subtlety demands.6
There can be little doubt that the problems (dubitationes) and solu-
tions (solutiones) that Boethius saved for a future work are among
those included by Simplicius in his commentary on 8 b 21-24 where
they are introduced thus: 'AXX& catp6o &v ent'1 otnbv ge.r& Icnv tin;
EwE og tepLivetv uatv r' ;in~txOeoaa; &dropia; (=Boethius' dubitationes) i&'6V Kai Tzi ; XS Et; (= Boethius' solutiones) ac'rCv aritovCdao0at.61 The philosophers cited in the discussions that follow are
Boethus, Ariston, Andronicus, Achaicus, Syrianus, Alexander, and "the
divine Iamblichus."62
C. When the Decision Was Made to Write a
Second Commentary on the Categories

Here the careful reader will object: If Boethius, when he announced
in his treatment of the scope in the very beginning of CC that he would
discuss two other questions in a forthcoming work, had in mind (as I
believe he did) discussions pertaining to matters dealt with further on in
the Categories, how can I claim (as I have done) that Boethius started
commenting on this work with a superficial knowledge of it at most and
even less of the Greek comments thereon?
59 PL 64, 238D.
60 De int. 1, ed. Meiser, p. 32,2-3: quod vero altius acumen considerationis exposcit,
secundae series editionis expediet.
61 CAG VIII, p. 201,17-18.
62 Pp. 201,18-205,35.
My answer is that I believe that Boethius added the passage in

which the reference to a forthcoming treatment of the scope of the
Categories occurs, in the margin of his own copy of CC (beside the

introductory part dealing with the scope of the work) after having com-
pleted the commentary (or at least after having completed the part con-
taining the comments on chapter 7 on relatives). Furthermore, I

believe that the unknown person who produced the archetype (now
lost) of the CC inserted Boethius' marginal annotation in the wrong
place. I will demonstrate this by printing below the whole passage in
the CC where the scope of the Categories is treated. The part of the
text that I consider to be Boethius' marginal addition is printed in italics and has been kept in the place it occupies in all manuscripts.
Quare prius breuiter huius operis aperiunda uidetur intentio, quae
est huiusmodi. Rebus praeiacentibus et in propria principaliter

naturae constitutione manentibus humanum solum genus exstitit,
quod rebus posset nomina imponere. Vnde factum est, ut singil-
5 latim omnia persecutus hominis animus singulis uocabula rebus

aptaret. Et hoc quidem uerbi gratia corpus hominem uocauit,
illud uero lapidem, aliud lignum, aliud uero colorem; et rursus,
quicumque ex se alium genuisset, patris uocabulo nuncupauit;

mensuram quoque magnitudinis proprii forma nominis ter10 minauit, ut diceret bipedale esse aut tripedale; et in aliis eodem
modo. Omnibus ergo nominibus ordinatis, ad ipsorum rursus
uocabulorum proprietates figurasque reuersus est et huiusmodi
uocabuli formam, quae inflecti casibus possit, nomen uocauit,

quae uero temporibus distribui, uerbum. Prima igitur illa fuit
15 nominum positio, per quam uel intellectui subiectas res uel sen-
sibus designarent; secunda consideratio, qua singulas nominum

proprietates figurasque perspicerent, ita ut primum nomen sit
ipsum rei uocabulum, ut, uerbi gratia, cum quaelibet res homo
dicitur; quod autem ipsum uocabulum, id est 'homo', nomen

20 uocatur, non ad significationem nominis ipsius refertur sed ad
figuram, idcirco quod potest casibus inflecti. Ergo prima positio
nominis secundum significationem uocabuli facta est, secunda

uero secundum figuram. Et est prima positio, ut nomina rebus
imponerentur, secunda uero, ut aliis nominibus ipsa nomina

25 designarentur. Nam cum 'homo' uocabulum sit subiectae substantiae, id, quod dicitur 'homo', nomen est nominis, id est ipsius
386 Monika Asztalos
nominis appellatio est. Dicimu
'homo'?", et proprie respondetur:

haec intentio est: de primis rerum
30 significantibus disputare, no
proprietatem figuramque forman
sunt. Namque cum de substantia

ita tractatur, quasi unum eorum c
temporibus permutari, sed qua

35 indiuiduum aliquod aut specie
huius operis intentio de uocibus r

significantes sunt, pertractare.
Haec quidem est tempori intro
tionis apta sententia, quam nos Po
40 uidebatur expeditior esse pla
mente de tribus olim quaestionib

quid Praedicamentorum uelit inte
sorum sententiis, docebimus, cui
trium; quod nemo huic, inprese

45 miretur, cum uideat, quanto
ingredientium mentes capaces esse potuissent, ad quos
mediocriter imbuendos ista conscripsimus. Afficiendi ergo et
quodammodo disponendi mediocri expositione sunt in ipsis quasi
disciplinae huius foribus, quos iam ad hanc scientiam paramus

50 admittere. Hanc igitur causam mutatae sententiae utriusque
operis lector agnoscat, quod illic ad scientiam Pythagoricam
perfectamque doctrinam, hic ad simplices introducendorum
motus expositionis sit accommodata sententia. Sed nunc ad pro-
positum reuertamur, sitque in praesenti Praedicamentorum

55 intentio, quae est superius comprehensa, id est de primis uocibus
prima rerum genera significantibus in eo, quod significantes sunt,
disputare.
Et quoniam res infinitae sunt, infinitas quoque uoces, quae

significent, esse necesse est. Sed infinitorum nulla cognitio
60 est. Infinita namque animo comprehendi nequeunt. Quod autem
ratione mentis circumdari non potest, nullius scientiae fine con-
cluditur. Quare infinitorum scientia nulla est. Sed hic Aristoteles non de infinitis rerum significationibus tractat sed decem
praedicamenta constituens, ad quae ipsa infinita multitudo signi-

65 ficantium uocum referri debeat, terminauit. Vt, uerbi gratia, cum
dico homo, lignum, lapis, equus, animal, plumbum, stagnum,

argentum, aurum, haec et alia huiusmodi, quae nimirum infinita
sunt, omnia ad unum substantiae uocabulum reducuntur; haec
namque, et si qua sunt alia, quae certe sunt infinita uocabula,

70 unum substantiae nomen includit. Rursus, cum dico bipedale,
tripedale, sex, quattuor, decem, linea, superficies, soliditas
et quaecumque alia ex eodem genere infinita sunt, uno quantitatis
nomine continentur, ut haec omnia, quae sub quantitate ponuntur.
Rursus, cum dico album uel scientia uel bonum uel malum et alia
75 huiusmodi, quamquam in hoc quoque genere infinita sunt, unum
tamen nomen concludens omnia qualitatis occurrit; et de aliis

quoque similiter. Rerum ergo diuersarum indeterminatam
infinitamque multitudinem decem praedicamentorum paucissima
numerositate conclusit, ut quae infinita sub scientiam cadere non
80 poterant, decem propriis generibus definita, scientia et comprehensione claudantur. Ergo decem praedicamenta, quae dicimus, infinitarum in uocibus significationum genera sunt. Sed
quoniam omnis uocum significatio de rebus est, uocum significantium, in eo, quod significantes sunt, genera rerum genera
85 necessario significabunt. Vt igitur concludenda sit intentio,

dicendum est in hoc libro de primis uocibus prima rerum genera
significantibus in eo, quod significantes sunt, dispositum esse
tractatum.63
The most obvious indication that the italicized passage is dislocated

occurs in its last sentence where Boethius summarizes the scope given
"above" (superius) as "to discuss the primary words (i.e., words of first
imposition) that signify the primary genera of things, insofar as they
signify." But that is not how the scope was defined "above", where it
was given thus: "to discuss the primary names given to things, that is to
say, the words signifying things, not insofar as they are formed accord-
ing to some property and figure but insofar as they signify" (lines
29-32); and, a little further: "Thus, the scope of this work is to treat
words signifying things, insofar as they signify" (35-37). These two
definitions say nothing about the genera of things mentioned in the ital-
icized passage. But if the latter passage is moved to where I believe

63 PL 64, 159A-161A. My edition is based on a collation of all manuscripts.
388 Monika Asztalos
that Boethius had intended it to be

definition of the scope in Boethius' a
given in lines 87-88 which is obviou

as given "above". The definition giv
Porphyry's that Boethius declares in
By moving the italicized passage

scope gains a great deal in clarity
explains that the categories are word
words signifying things, not words
noun and verb). In lines 58-88 he arg

nifying things is as infinite as are t
infinite number of things cannot
categories are not the infinite mult

genera of words signifying the ten
would have been unpedagogical had
55-57 in the italicized passage) be
before he had explained why the cat

genera of things. Maybe the fact tha
addition end in a fairly similar way
something to do with the fact that th
place. Furthermore, given the conten
end of the account of the scope that o
Thus, I believe that Boethius conce
treatment of certain Greek materia
the course of composing the CC, ma
Greek discussions concerning the
(see above, p. 383). Having completed

in its beginning an announcement o
Categories once more in order to dis
D. Division into Two Commentaries
According to Level of Depth

First of all, Boethius picked up the notion of preparing his readers
(cf. the afficiendi ergo et quodammodo disponendi in the addition on
the scope of the Categories, p. 386 above) during his encounter with
Aristotle's 8tO0'CEotg at 6 a 32 in the Categories. Boethius translates the

term with two Latin words, affectio and dispositio,64 and comments on
6 a 32: Dispositio autem uel affectio est ad aliquam rem accommodatio et applicatio, ut si quis grammaticam legens, qui nondum perdidicit,
habet ad eam aliquam dispositionem, id est ea affectus est et habet aliquid accommodatum et quasi propinquum.65 Thus, as Boethius understood it, the process of learning requires students to approach a subject
twice, first by acquiring a superficial knowledge of a textbook, then by
considering the deeper aspects of its contents. Accordingly, the pur-
pose of CC was to provide readers with superficial knowledge. The

deeper aspects were reserved for a second, more advanced commentary.
Secondly, the following passages from the CC may throw some light
on how the Greek comments on the Categories led Boethius to believe
that this treatise was intended to prepare students for more advanced
philosophical works. The first passage is a comment on Aristotle's

remark in 10 a 25-26 that there might appear some other mode of quality (than the four he has just treated), but that those just mentioned are
the ones most spoken of. Boethius explains: Non sunt tamen putandae
solum esse qualitates quas supra posuit. Ipse enim testatur esse
quoque alias qualitates, quas modo omnes enumerare neglexit; sed cur
neglexerit, multae sunt causae. Prima, quod elementi uicem hic obtinet
liber nec perfectam scientiam tradit sed tantummodo aditus atque pons
quidam in altiora philosophiae introitum pandit. Quocirca, si hoc ita

est, tantum dicere oportuit, quantum ingredientibus satis esset, ne
eorum animos nondum ad sicentiam firmos multiplici doctrinae subtili-
tate confunderet. Quae uero hic desunt, in libris qui MEt& Tx cpuotcuc
inscribuntur apposuit. Perfectis namque opus illud, non ingredien-
tibus, praeparatur.66 Here Boethius ascribes to Aristotle the conception
of the Categories as an elementary introduction to the "perfect

knowledge" (perfectam scientiam) and higher philosophy (altiora philosphiae) of the Metaphysics which was intended for the "perfect," not
for beginners. In this, he is following Porphyry,67 as is Simplicius.68
Moreover, in a comment on 11 b 1-16, which is almost directly

64 In CC, PL 64, 241B, Boethius comments on this terminology: Dispositionem uero
indiscrete idem quod affectionem uoco.
65 PL 64, 216B-C.
66 PL 64, 252B-C.
67 CAG IV:2, p. 134,25-29.
68 CAG VIII, p. 264,1-4.
390 Monika Asztalos
translated from Porphyry,69 Boethi
the categories of facere and pati pl

such as De generatione et corruptio
Physics, and all categories in a deep
tiliusque) in his Metaphysics.70 Wh
had in all likelihood read in the Kat
that there are doctrines about the
quando, habitus, situs), that are not
enough has been said about these ca
that it was written for beginners.71
Lastly, in the beginning of his

informs his readers that Aristotle took the division of motion into
species further in his Physics than in the present work. The reason for
this is, in Boethius' opinion: Igitur, quoniam hic liber ad introductionem quodam modo factus est, noluit nimis diuisionis attenuare
rationem, ne ingredientium animos subtiliori diuisione confunderet.72
Porphyry's extant commentary on the Categories ends before this

point, but Simplicius has a similar remark.73
Thus, if we consider the last mentioned three passages from the CC,
we may infer that Boethius, upon bringing his commentary to a conclu-
sion, was left with an impression - gained from the Greek comments
more than from Aristotle himself- that the Categories had been writ-
ten as an introduction to the more "perfect" philosophical works,
notably the works on natural philosophy and metaphysics, and that,

consequently, many of the things treated in the Categories received a
fuller investigation in those more advanced treatises. It seems to me
that one cannot exclude the possibility that Boethius came to realize,
during his penetration of the Greek comments on the Categories, that
since there was a certain amount of overlapping between the doctrines
of this work and those, for example, of the Metaphysics, it would be
well to prepare his readers for the metaphysical aspects of the

categories, but that from a pedagogical standpoint it would be advise-
69 CAG IV:2, p. 141,11-17.

70 PL 64, 261D-262A.
71 Porphyry's comments on 11 b 1-16 are present in Simplicius' commentary, CAG
VIII, p. 295,4-16.
72 PL 64, 289C.
73 CAG VIII, p. 427,19-28.

able to save the questions with metaphysical implications for a second,
more advanced commentary on the Categories.
I will now illustrate how I believe that Boethius conceived and car-
ried out this division into two series of commentaries on the logical
works: one that was to deal exclusively with the "word-andproposition-aspects" of the Aristotelian texts and another that was to
take into account the metaphysical implications of these logical items.
The first time that Boethius made a reference in CC to a forthcoming
treatment was while discussing the number of the categories (since I
consider the reference to a forthcoming discussion of the scope to have
been added afterwards in the present CC). Now, in the Greek commentaries there is a topic of metaphysical importance in connection
with this discussion that Boethius avoids bringing up. The topic is the
view presented by Aristotle in Metaphysics 998 b 22 that being is not a
genus common to the categories. This doctrine is brought into the discussion of the number of categories by Simplicius in his commentary
on the Categories.74 But Boethius avoids every mention in the CC of
the doctrine that being is not a genus common to the categories and,
consequently, that it is not synonymously but homonymously predicated of the ten categories. This in and of itself is rather remarkable,
since he had explained it already in Isag. 1 75 in a comment on

Porphyry's remark76 to the effect that if someone were to call all
categories beings ('vza), he would speak homonymously, since being
is not their genus, whereas if being were a genus common to all
categories, it would be said of them synonymously. In Isag. 2 Boethius
naturally comes back to the theory77 and explains at greater length why
being cannot be a genus common to all categories.78 His silence on the
matter in CC is significant, since there he usually recycles topics

treated in Isag. I that are relevant to the Categories. Likewise, in his
elementary commentary on the De interpretatione (De int. 1) he avoids
any reference to the way in which being can be said of the categories,
but in De int. 2, in a comment on 16 b 23, he does refer to the view that
being is said homonymously of the categories.79 Thus, in the introduc74 CAG VIII, pp. 61,19-62,17.
Ed. Brandt, pp. 74,13-75,6.
CAG IV, p. 6,8-10.
75
76
77
78
79
Ed. Brandt, p. 144,1-6.
Ed. Brandt, pp. 220,11-225,9.

De int. 2, ed. Meiser, pp. 3-7.
392 Monika Asztalos
tory CC and De int. 1 Boethius avoid
matter of the Metaphysics, can

although we know that he was aw
treated it already in Isag. 1, a work
Let us go back to Boethius' referen

ment of three questions (see p. 379
sider the different views on the sco
he himself holds. He asks his reade
stand is different from the view h
realize how much deeper the forme
for the beginners for whom he ha
Now, he says, he has followed th
because it seemed easier, less comp

an introductory and simple kind of
Thus, it is clear that Boethius was
tions: at an introductory stage an e
one that is philosophically better,
Boethius' choice in this case can b

"There are several explanations of
phyry, Aspasius, and Herminus. W
phyry, the best of these commen
explanation seems simpler, we have
ity."80 In the corresponding par
Porphyry's exposition at length; in
Herminus' view and gives a brief r

The latter, he claims, is simpler bu
Porphyry's view is truer.81
It is noteworthy that in both ca
present a simple view in an introdu
found or complex one for advanc
inconsistent with the "truer" one. I
to be sure, but perfectly compatibl
80 De int. 1, ed. Meiser, p. 132,3-8: huius s
et Porphyrio, Aspasio quoque et Hermino pro
sitorum Porphyrius dixerit, alias dicemus. qu

esse videtur, eam nunc pro brevitate subiec
Meiser, pp. 274-294.

81 For his summaries and criticisms of Al
may of course have relied on Porphyry's (no

therefore not double-tongued but gives his readers as much wisdom as
he judges them able to digest at a certain stage in their education.
Lastly, a few words should be said about the level of difficulty of
Boethius' two commentaries on the Isagoge. S. Brandt observed that

the doctrines of Isag. 2 hardly represent a more difficult level than
those in Isag. 1.82 Does this fact gainsay the observation made above
relative to the pedagogical concerns behind Boethius' twofold commentaries? Not at all. For, as was mentioned above, Boethius had not
written Isag. I with any intention to return to the subject in a more
advanced commentary. When he did return to Porphyry's Isagoge, it
was not only with the purpose of providing a deeper, more complex,
and philosophically truer exposition of Porphyry's five predicables, but
also of providing a complete Latin version of the text, translating it
word for word (uerbum uerbo expressum comparatumque) and with no
concern for literary qualities, only for the truth.83 Since he had written
Isag. I at such an early stage in his career, he took the opportunity in
Isag. 2 to revise his comments and add a substantial amount of doctrines that he became familiar with while appropriating Greek comments for his own work on the Categories.
E. Two Editions
At this point, a rather curious remark in Isag. 2 deserves mention; it

follows a quick review of some doctrines previously explained in the
CC: Sed si cui haec pressiora quam expositionis modus postulat uidebuntur, eum hoc scire conuenit nos, ut in prima editione dictum est,
hanc expositionem nostro reseruasse iudicio, ut ad intelligentiam simplicem huius libri editio prima sufficiat, ad interiorem uero speculationem confirmatis paene iam scientia nec in singulis uocabulis rerum
haerentibus haec posterior collocatur.84 Brandt has pointed out85 that
there is no such remark in the dialogue on the Isagoge, and he suggests
that either Boethius' memory failed him or he wanted to give the

impression by this passage in Isag. 2 that he had formed the plan of
writing a second commentary already while composing Isag. 1.
82 Prolegomena (see note 2), p. XXI.
83 Isag. 2, ed. Brandt, p. 135,1-13.
84 Isag. 2, ed. Brandt, p. 154,2-8.
85 In the prolegomena to his edition, p. XIII.
394 Monika Asztalos
It is not at all unlikely that Boethiu

on logic comprising, at least, Isag. 1
time, a second edition with comme
and De interpretatione (provided, o
second commentary on the Categ
may refer in the passage quoted abo

commentaries included in his first
1; nostro ... reseruasse iudicio ma
statement in the CC that he will giv

Categories) in a forthcoming work:
quoque accedat arbitrium. The passa
following announcement in the beg
nos libri huius enodationem dupli

quantum simplices quidem intell
obscuraque complectitur, tantum h
simus: quod vero altius acumen c
series editionis expediet.86 That Boe

series of different works also seems
in the De syllogismo hypothetic
secundae editionis expositione IEpi '

III. The Greek Sources
I have already spoken extensively about Boethius' sources. Now,

however, I should like to treat the question of, not so much what they
were, but in what form they became known to him.
A. Porphyry and Post-lamblichean Comments

Most of CC has its origin in Porphyry's Kata peusin (hereafter K.p.),
and, conversely, most of K.p. has been used in CC. In his 1923 article
"Bobce et Porphyre," J. Bidez reached the conclusion that the K.p. was
86 Ed. Meiser, pp. 31,6-32,33. If Boethius had these passages in the CC and De int. 1
in mind, the words huius libri in the quote from Isag. 2 must be taken with intelligentiam
simplicem, not with editio prima. L. M. De Rijk suggested that the passage in Isag. 2
might be a reference to the one quoted from De int. 1, but decided, on second thought, to
consider it instead a gloss added by an early editor of Boethius' work. See De Rijk (note
2), pp. 129-132.
87 PL 64, 841C.

the unique source, or almost unique source, of CC. Bidez pointed out
that Boethius did not give a literal translation of the K.p. but abandoned
the dialogue form, inserted lemmata from the Categories, changed the
content occasionally to suit the Latin language and Roman culture, and
paraphrased, amplified, summarized, or simplified his source as he saw
fit.88
Since Bidez' article, scholars have become aware of the fact that by
no means all of the Greek material in CC can be traced back to K.p.,
but that some of it has correspondences in, for example, Simplicius'
commentary. By his own admission Simplicius adhered to lamblichus
more closely and attentively than to other commentators whose works
were available to him and often even copied lamblichus' comments

verbatim.89 According to Simplicius, in many cases "the divine lamblichus" followed Porphyry's Pros Gedaleion closely in his own commentary, even with respect to the actual wording, while determining
and distinguishing some things more carefully than his predecessor.90
At the present stage of my work on a critical edition of CC, my

hypothesis is that in this commentary, which was intended to be a simple, elementary exposition of the Categories, Boethius relied for the
most part on the introductory K.p., but that he also consulted at least
one other Greek commentary written by someone who, like Simplicius,
followed lamblichus closely. For his second commentary on the

Categories, if it was ever written, Boethius probably relied more on
this follower of lamblichus.
First of all, the way in which Simplicius characterizes Porphyry's
two commentaries comes very close to Boethius' description of his

own CC and his future work on the Categories. Simplicius places K.p.
among the commentaries written with the purpose of uncovering briefly
(ouvt6w;og "&RomaiayEnrtv) only the notions put forward by Aristotle

himself.91 This can be compared with Boethius' promise in the beginning of his CC to avoid deeper questions and to begin by uncovering
briefly (breuiter aperiunda) the scope of the Categories.92 On the other
hand, Simplicius says that in Pros Gedaleion Porphyry gave a perfect
exegesis of the Categories and presented solutions to all objections

88
89
90
91
92
Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire, 2, pp. 189-201.

CAG VIII, p. 3,2-4.
CAG VIII, p. 2,5-15.
CAG VIII, p. 1,10-13.
PL 64, 159A.
396 Monika Asztalos
raised by his predecessors.93 This re

his forthcoming treatment of the C
tam doctrinam; there he will give a
held by others as well as of his o
formats (brevity vs. full discussions
there is no evidence that he had

Gedaleion (see below).
As for my claim that Boethius fo
one commentary that follows lamb
that lamblichus was not an immatu
the majority of the cases in wh
lamblichus' commentary on the Tim
Given this, one might venture the
commentary on the Categories, wh
Pros Gedaleion very closely and oft
cessor by name mostly when disagr
Whenever Boethius in his CC ex
sophical view to Porphyry, he allud

ion without mentioning by name th
cius' commentary we can gather th
among others, lamblichus. I will di
question.
We have already seen how Boethius declares that he gives

Porphyry's view of the scope of the Categories not because he adheres
to it himself but because it is simple and thus suitable for his introductory kind of commentary. We have also inferred that his own view in
this matter is that proposed by, for example, lamblichus.
Secondly, in a comment on 8 a 6-12, where Aristotle argues that the
perceptible is prior to perception, Boethius quotes a passage from the
Pros Gedaleion95 where Porphyry claims in opposition to Aristotle that
all relatives are simultaneous in nature, even perception and knowledge
on the one hand and the perceptible and the knowable on the other.96
93 CAG VIII, p. 2,5-8.
94 J. Dillon, "Iamblichus on Chalcis (c. 240-325 A.D.)," Aufstieg und Niedergang der
romischen Welt. Teil 2. Prinzipat. Bd. 36:2, Berlin/New York, pp. 862-909 (p. 868).
95 That this is the source can be inferred from the fact that the quote does not translate
any passage in the K.p.; its contents, however, correspond to K.p., CAG IV:2,
p. 120,27-35. Cf. S. Ebbesen (note 48 above), p. 303.
96 PL 64, 233B-D.

Since we know from Simplicius97 that lamblichus did not agree with
Porphyry on this point but with Aristotle, one may assume that
Boethius, who also sides with Aristotle, quotes Porphyry's Pros
Gedaleion via lamblichus (or via some post-lamblichean commentator).
Thirdly, Boethius gives Porphyry's reasons98 for considering the

Postpraedicamenta (the last part of the Categories judged spurious by,
e.g., Andronicus of Rhodes) a well-founded addition. He then gives

another defense of the Postpraedicamenta99; again, we know from
Simplicius that this second argument was proposed by lamblichus who
considered Porphyry's reasons to contain only part of the truth.
On two occasions, Boethius mentions lamblichus by name and in
both cases he is critical of him. The first time'" the criticism had been
delivered by Themistius. The second time101 Boethius introduces two
solutions proposed by lamblichus to an objection raised by some
against Aristotle's assertion (6 b 28) that all relatives are spoken of in

relation to correlatives that reciprocate (Ackrill's translation). The first
solution, Boethius says, is worthless, the second, however, very strong.
A similar discussion, all proponents unnamed, is given by Simplicius102
who presents an evaluation of the proposed solutions that comes close
to the one in CC.
It is thus likely that Boethius used- apart from the K.p.- a commentary on the Categories written by someone who (like Simplicius) as
a rule followed lamblichus and mentioned him mostly when disagree-
ing, just as one may assume that lamblichus mentioned Porphyry

mostly when criticizing him. If so, Boethius inherited the references to
views in the Pros Gedaleion not from lamblichus but from the latter's
follower (and occasional critic). On the other hand, and especially

given the closeness in content between Boethius' CC and Simplicius'
commentary, it is not at all unlikely that Boethius would have found in
his post-lamblichean source, and heeded, a piece of advice similar to

the one given in the introduction to Simplicius' commentary, to wit,
97 CAG VIII, pp. 379,22-380,2.
98 PL 64, 263B-C.
99 PL 64, 263D (Docent autem hoc, inquit, etiam ipse ordo congruus ... )-264B. It is
not clear who is the subject of inquit.
100 PL 64, 162A.
101 PL 64, 224C-225B.

102 CAG VIII, pp. 181,19-182,21.
398 Monika Asztalos
never to neglect the works by Porph

B. Shiel's Thesis
It is with respect to everything that I have argued so far in this pap

that I would like to consider in some detail the thesis concerning th
nature of Boethius' Greek sources that was proposed in an article by
James Shiel published in 1958, reprinted with a postscript in 1984, an
revised in 1990. Since the last, revised version must be considered th
latest view of the author, I will deal with the arguments as presente
there. 104
Shiel's thesis concerning the CC can be summarized as follows:

Boethius had a Greek copy of the Categories that contained marginal
explanations, some quite substantial. Most of these were taken from
the K.p., but only sporadically verbatim; the rest were additions from
later sources, including lamblichus. They all seem to derive from the
school of Proclus.
I will begin by expressing some general doubts concerning the thesis
that Boethius' source was a Greek copy of the Categories provided

with marginal scholia. In CC Aristotle's text is usually introduced by
means of phrases like Ait enim, Atque hoc est quod ait, Nunc expositionis cursum ad sequentia conuertamus. It seems to me, prima facie,
that Shiel's thesis would gain credibility if Boethius regularly introduced his comments, instead of the lemmata, by means of phrases like
the ones mentioned above. I do not consider the few instances where
Boethius introduces by such phrases a named commentator's view as
an argument against me: in those cases,105 Boethius is adducing views
not from the K.p. but from a post-lamblichean source.
Here is a list of the arguments that Shiel gives in his revised article
in support of his thesis relative to the CC. All of them are used to
103 CAG VIII, p. 3,13-15.
104 J. Shiel, "Boethius' commentaries on Aristotle," in: Mediaeval and Renaissance Stu-
dies 4 (1958), pp. 217-244; Boethius. Ed. by M. Fuhrmann and J. Gruber. Darmstadt,
1984, pp. 155-183; Aristotle transformed, the ancient commentators and their influence.
Ed. by R. Sorabji. London, 1990, pp. 349-372. The most detailed and convincing criticism of Shiel's thesis has been delivered by S. Ebbesen in the article cited in note 48.
Ebbesen discusses Shiel's thesis on pp. 289-291.
105 PL 64, 224C-225B, 233B, and 263B-C.

confirm the view that Boethius was not following "an exact or complete or first-hand copy of the Kata peusin."
(1) Boethius omits many of Porphyry's explanations, even some

useful ones. Had these been in his Greek source he would surely
have included some of them.
(2) Boethius' topics are not always in the same order as

Porphyry's, or even as Aristotle's.
(3) Many of Boethius' explanations are simpler than Porphyry's;

some of them add hardly anything to Aristotle's own words.
(4) Even where dependence on Porphyry is apparent, the verbal

similarities are seldom exact. The disparity of word usage rules
out any idea of direct translation of Porphyry.
(5) Many passages or phrases in the CC have no parallels in Porphyry but in other Greek commentators. Even when there is no
extant Greek parallel, the phrasing is such that one senses the presence of a Greek source.
First, I would like to make two general remarks concerning Shiel's
argumentation (i.e., not his thesis): (a) Its purpose seems twofold,
although this is not explicitly stated; namely, on one hand, to refute
Bidez' suggestion that Boethius' commentary was taken "almost completely form the Kata peusin," and, on the other hand, to prove that
Boethius' source was a Greek text of the Categories provided with

marginal annotations. For example, point (5) above provides in my
opinion more of a refutation of Bidez than support of the scholia-thesis.
(b) Shiel's tacit assumption is that whatever source Boethius used, not
only did he translate all that was in it, but he translated it as faithfully
as Aristotle's text. This second point needs to be elaborated further.
Of course, if Shiel did not hold that Boethius translated whatever he
found in his Greek source, he could not very well argue from Boethius'
omission of explanations in the K.p. to his not possessing a complete

copy of that commentary and, accordingly, that Boethius only had a
copy of the Categories with scholia from the K.p.
In the case of Boethius' two commentaries on the De int. Shiel
asserts that "the two editions between them give us all the Greek
material," the simpler points in the first edition and in the second whatever Boethius omitted to translate in the first. Shiel further holds: "If
Boethius in the editio secunda omits to translate any point he tells us
400 Monika Asztalos
so." He substantiates the latter claim

Boethius declares that he will omit a
Stoic logic, since it is unfamiliar to La
would not even be able to recognize
But I am not sure that one can infer from this one instance that
Boethius always tells us if he omits something in his Greek sour
The point he is making here is not merely, or even primarily, that he
omitting something but that he is not going to bother his readers with
presumably incomprehensible point from Stoic logic.
The problem, it seems to me, is that in the case of the Categories
we have only one commentary by Boethius and that, consequently,

are not in a position to judge whether the doctrines in the K.p. omitt
in the CC would have appeared in the second commentary that
Boethius had it in mind to write (and maybe even did write), where
in the case of the De int. the two extant commentaries by Boethius
enable us to see exactly what he did treat, but, since in this case his
Greek sources are lost, we still cannot judge the extent to which he
reproduced the Greek comments available to him.
I will now turn to Shiel's tacit or implicit assumption that Boethius
translated the Greek comments as faithfully as he translated Aristotl
text itself. It seems to me quite clear that Boethius had different leve
of ambition when he translated the "text" and when he translated the
Greek comments. Two examples will be given to show this. When

giving 6dyoq, language, as an example of a discrete quantity, that is to
say, a quantity that consists of parts that do not form a continuum, Aris-
totle specifies: 0yw &axbyv tbv Erix (pOvfvj;q X6yov ytyv6voEvov

(Categories 4 b 34-35). The phrase seems to have been thrown in as
an afterthought in order to make it clear that it is the spoken language
that Aristotle has in mind. But in CC Boethius explains that Aristotle
added the phrase dico vero illam quae fit cum voce orationem in order
to prevent any ambiguity that might arise from the fact that in Greek
X6yoq can refer both to spoken language and to thought. In spite of the
fact, Boethius explains, that there is no risk of ambiguity in the Latin
language which has two words, ratio and oratio, where Greek has only
one, he has translated Aristotle's addition, "so that the translation
would not be accused of lying in any respect." He concludes: "In order

that nothing should be lacking, I have translated even what was not
106 De int. 2, ed. Meiser, p. 201,2-6.

very fitting in Latin."107 There is a kind of reverse parallel to this in
the De int. 1,108 where Boethius has inserted the word ratio, absent
from Aristotle's text, in his translation. He explains this addition by
claiming that Aristotle intended the word X6,yo; to be supplied from the
preceding passage; but there X6,yo; referred to what is named oratio in
Latin, whereas here the 6yo; that is to be understood refers to what
the Romans call ratio. Thus the need for inserting ratio. Boethius
ends: de qua re illis nunc satisfacimus, si qui Graecae orationis periti
nos forte culpabunt, cur quod illic non fuit, nostrae translationi
adiecerimus. I have not come across any corresponding apology for
deviating (or not deviating) from the text of a Greek comment. Thus, it
seems from both examples above that Boethius expected those of his
readers who were familiar with Greek to compare his translation of
Aristotle with the original and frown upon mistranslations, whereas he
felt that he had a freer hand with respect to the Greek comments. For
example, I do not interpret Boethius' omission of Porphyry's explanation of the word Kwzrlyopi'ct109 in the way Shiel does; namely, as an
omission of a useful comment, which omission is an indication of
Boethius having had an incomplete copy of the K.p. I rather believe

that since the word praedicamentum lacks the court-room association
of the Greek word, Boethius did not consider the explanation useful in
a Latin commentary, and since it was not part of Aristotle's text he felt
free to omit it.
I should now like to comment in some detail on the five points I

noted in Shiel's argument (above, p. 399).
(1) This is an argument ex silentio. I will comment on Shiel's examples one by one: (a) I have already shown that Porphyry's explanation
of the meaning of the word Kxrlqyopia' would not be suitable for a

Latin audience. (b) The omission of Porphyry's reference to the views
of Athenodorus, Cornutus, Herminus, and Boethus on the scope of the
Categories11o is to be expected, since Boethius declares that he will
enumerate the different views in a forthcoming work. (c) In omitting
107 PL 64, A-B: "... Quare, ne quid mendax translatio culparetur, idcirco hoc quoque
addidi: Dico uero illam quae fit cum uoce orationem ... Quocirca, ne quid deesset, etiam
hoc quod ad Latinam orationem minus esset conueniens transtuli."
108 Ed. Meiser, pp. 72,23-73,13.
109 CAG IV:2, pp. 56,3-57,14.
110 CAG IV:2, p. 59,3-33.
402 Monika Asztalos
Porphyry's explanation of the w

Boethius is in good company, si
Boethius, again like Simplicius,112
in the K.p.) on the fact that X6yo;

and descriptions.113 (d) It is true th
ment114 on Aristotle's "chiasmic ar

particular accident, universal accid
b 9 - so, incidentally, does Simplici
a compartment with Ammonius wh
ment but, like Boethius,115 describe
a diagram.116 (e) Boethius shares
va(o;117 and Kar& KaOtv6rlt18 with

K.p. 82, 23-28, omitted by Boethius
tary that is avowedly a simple expo
since it does not give an explanatio
has already done, with the help of
against defining differentia as som
quale: does the differentia, the obj
that each of the animals swan, rav
stances? Boethius normally exclu
mentary. In this case he is accompa

ally does include such objections. (g
has been left out by Boethius for g
that belong rather to physics than
cannot cease to move; movement is
substances are susceptible to contraries). (h) Boethius omits

Porphyry's argument119 for an utterance being a discrete quantity (the
long syllable is to the short as 2 to 1; 2 and I are numbers; numbers are
discrete quantities; ergo, etc.). Well, but so does Simplicius. (i)

Boethius omits a question raised in K.p. 132,4-11. So he does, but this
S"' CAG IV:2, p. 64,30.
112 CAG VIII, p. 29,16-24.
113 PL 64, 166A.
114 CAG IV:2, pp. 78,34-79,8.
115 PL 64, 175C.
116Ammonius: In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarius, ed. A. Busse, CAG IV:4,

pp. 25,5-26,20.
117 CAG IV:2, p. 81,7.
118 CAG IV:2, p. 81,16.
119 CAG IV:2, p. 101,33-34.

is exactly at a point in his commentary where he declares that he ought
to limit the prolixity of the discussions and write his commentary so
that it is neither too brief (and therefore obscure) nor too lengthy
(which would bore the readers).120
(2) Shiel holds that Boethius' topics are not always in the same
order as Porphyry's, or even as Aristotle's. But one should realize that
Boethius' aim is to furnish an explanation of Aristotle's text; therefore,
he arranges his comments in an order that follows Aristotle and that
clarifies the meaning of the Categories as much as possible.

Porphyry's K.p., while being a commentary on an introductory level,
reveals a philosophical rather than a pedagogical concern, even if the
latter is also present. I therefore think that the difference in order of the
topics in the CC as compared with the K.p. is the result of a conscious

choice by Boethius based upon his purpose and personality as a commentator, not a sign of his source having been not a continuous commentary but a text with marginal scholia in disorder. As for Shiel's
claim that Boethius deviates from the order of things in Aristotle him-
self, I have found only one instance of this in the CC: 6 a 11-18 is
inserted between 5 b 11-14 and 5 b 14-6 a 11. But in this case
Boethius is very careful (as careful indeed as he is when he con

deviates from Aristotle's text) to announce that he has done so
why.121
(3) Shiel argues that Boethius' explanations are simpler than

Porphyry's. This is, again, an argument ex silentio. Besides, most of
the explanations that are nothing but a rephrasing of Aristotle occur
toward the end of the commentary after Boethius' declaration that,
from this point on, he will have to keep his comments down to a
minimum. Shiel quotes part of this passage as a parallel with lamblichus who "similarly curtails the prolixity of Porphyry's comments."
I assume that what Shiel has in mind here is Simplicius' statement in
the very beginning of his commentary122 that lamblichus determined
and distinguished certain things in Porphyry by means of abbreviating
the objections. But Simplicius is describing lamblichus' habit in general of excluding problems treated by Porphyry. There is nothing in the
Greek commentaries that implies that Boethius at this point is translating a Greek comment in declaring that he will keep his commentary
120 PL 64, 250C.
121 PL 64, 213A.
122 CAG VIII, p. 2,11-13.
404 Monika Asztalos
within reasonable limits. Therefore,
ence concerning the meagerness of ext

the CC: "in these sections the Greek which Boethius followed cannot
have been very voluminous or profound."
(4) I have already commented on Shiel's claim that the disparity of

word usage rules out any idea of direct translation from Porphyry by
pointing out that I cannot see any evidence in the CC that Boethius
intended to furnish as exact a translation of the Greek comments as of
Aristotle himself. What is worth considering - and certainly not only
in a discussion of Shiel's thesis - are those fairly numerous cases in

which Boethius' terminology differs from that of Porphyry while coin-
ciding with that of another Greek commentator. One example will

suffice: Shiel observes, and rightly so, that Boethius could never have
translated axiGEtgl23 as diversitates.124 But what is significant in this
case is, I believe, not primarily that Boethius is not translating (or even
rendering the notion of) aXaGEt; here but that he is translating 8ta(popda;, the word that Ammonius uses in the corresponding place in his
commentary on the Categories125 and a word that Boethius regularly
translates as diversitates. This, in turn, hardly proves that Boethius got
the comment from the margin of a Greek copy of Aristotle's Organon
but that somehow or other Boethius' interpretation of Porphyry is
influenced by later commentators whose views are also reflected in
Ammonius' work.126
(5) As was pointed out above, Shiel's statement reveals something
about Boethius' Greek sources, whether extant or not, but nothing of
their formats. A question that I would, for my own part, find more
fruitful to investigate than the format of Boethius' source is whether
there is any way of determining (and this may be as difficult or impos-
sible to prove as Shiel's thesis) whether (a) Boethius had access to

Porphyry's K.p. and at least one post-lamblichean commentary, in
which case the verbal discrepancies from Porphyry can be explained as
a result of Boethius' eclecticism and we must imagine him inserting
into a Porphyrian comment whatever he found suitable in a later

source; or (b) he used one or several later Greek commentaries that
123 CAG IV:2, p. 60,22.
124 PL 64, 212B.
125 CAG IV:4, p. 15,22.

126 Shiel's claim, p. 355, that all parallel passages in Ammonius turn up in Simplicius as
well, is not true.

incorporated not only the Pros Gedaleion via lamblichus but also the
K.p. in a slightly adulterated form. From my present stand-point, I
believe (a) to be more likely.
Since this paper focuses on Boethius' CC, I have deliberately
refrained from answering Shiel's arguments for the scholia-thesis taken
from Boethius' other commentaries. I hope to have shown that all the
phenomena that Shiel has collected can (and some of them should) be
explained in ways other than as indications of Boethius' dependence on
scholia. I believe, although this is not the place to discuss it, that the
same can be said in the case of Boethius' other commentaries.
(As a matter of fact, since Ammonius' and Simplicius' commentaries exhibit all five points discussed above, one might with equal right
claim that their authors had access to Porphyry's (and others') com-
ments only in the form of marginal scholia. In order to avoid any

misunderstanding, I want to make clear that I do not wish to make such
a claim.)
Gradually Boethius has been disrobed and divested of many titles to
fame in the history of philosophy. It all began with Bidez, a great

admirer of Porphyry, who judged Boethius severely: Boethius took
almost everything in the CC from Porphyry, and Porphyry gained noth-
ing in the process. Shiel showed that Porphyry was by no means the
only Greek commentator who had left his imprint in the CC, but this
did not help much, since he also claimed that Boethius had not read a
complete Greek commentary, not even the short K.p. Finally, the
interpretations of two passages in De int. 2 given by Shiel and
Chadwick respectively, led John Dillon to conclude that Boethius tried
to cover up his lack of familiarity with the primary sources.127 This
127 J. Dillon, review of H. Chadwick's Boethius (see above, note 51) in The Classical
Review, N.S. 33 (1983), pp. 117-118. The following passage was interpreted by Shiel in
a way that led Dillon to believe that Boethius only pretended to have read the Greek philosophers whose views Porphyry refers to: cuius expositionem (sc. libri De int.) nos scili-
cet quam maxime a Porphyrio quamquam etiam a ceteris transferentes Latina oratione
digessimus (De int. 2, ed. Meiser, p. 7,5-9). Shiel takes the ceteris to be "obviously
Alexander, Aspasius, Herminus and the Stoics" (p. 358). But nothing in the quote reveals
that Boethius had pre-Porphyrian philosophers in mind. He may as well be referring to
commentators later than Porphyry. That he is dependent on such is apparent from the fact
that he mentions Syrianus several times. Besides, Boethius merely says that he will
translate from other writers as well as from Porphyry; it would have been entirely
406 Monika Asztalos
made Boethius not only unorigi

dishonest.
I am not trying to do the impossible, namely, present Boethius as an

anachronistic for him (or for somebody like Simplicius for that matter) to say that when-
ever he translates from pre-Porphyrian writers, he quotes them via Porphyry. In the
beginning of the sixth and last book of the De int. 2 Boethius draws a sigh of relief,
announcing that this book will put an end to his long commentary which has cost him a
considerable amount of labor and time, since he has collected the views of very many (sc.
philosophers) and spent almost two years continually sweating over his commentary:
Sextus hic liber longae commentationi terminum ponit, quae quodam magno labore constiterit ac temporis mora. nam et plurimorum sunt in unum coacervatae sententiae et
duorum ferme annorum spatium continuo commentandi sudore consumpsimus (De int. 2,
ed. Meiser, p. 421,2-6). Shiel interprets the end of this pasage in the following way and
quotes it in support of his thesis: "For there are scholia of numerous points heaped up all
together and so I have spent almost two years in a constant sweat of writing comments"
(p. 361). Shiel takes sententia to mean scholion, marginal comment, and refers to Isidore
of Seville's Etymologies, I, XXI, De notis sententiarum. But Isidore is discussing signs

referring to single words, sentences, or verses. Contrary to Shiel's belief, Boethius does
not use the word sententia in the sense of scholion but in the usual classical senses of
"sentence", "meaning" (of discourse) and "judgement", "view" (of speakers or writers).
Cf., e.g., the beginning of the CC: Ibique, numeratis diuersorum sententiis, docebimus
cui nostrum quoque accedat arbitrium ... Hanc igitur causam mutatae sententiae-it
makes more sense to change one's view than to change a scholion. The plurimorum sententiae, the views of very many, is paralleled by the numeratis diuersorum sententiis in
the beginning of the CC and can hardly mean "scholia of numerous points." Boethius'
second statement (that he has spent almost two years commenting on the De interpretatione) should not be connected with the first one by means of an explanatory "and so".
The two statements illustrate that his work has cost him much labor (since he has collected so many views) and time (since it took him almost two years). Shiel interprets sunt
... coaceruatae as "were heaped together", i.e., in the margins of a Greek codex, but I
agree with Chadwick (p. 129) who takes this to refer to what has been done by Boethius
in his commentary. The labor is the collecting of views done by Boethius. For the meta-
phorical sense in which coacervo (lit. "to heap together") is used here, cf., for example,
Cicero, De partitione oratoria, 11,40, where it is used with argumenta. Chadwick inter-
prets nam et plurimorum sunt in unum coacervatae sententiae thus: "because he has
compressed into a single book the contents of very many books" (p. 129). Due to this
interpretation John Dillon thought that Boethius was passing himself off as more wellread than he actually was. But the "very many books" are not there in the Latin. It is evident, at least to me, that plurimorum refers to the very many philosophers (as indeed there
were) who had pronounced their views on the De interpretatione. Thus, Boethius is not
boasting about the labor and time spent collecting views from a large number of books.
Indeed, the idea that Boethius claims to have indulged in a vast amount of reading and
that he tried to cover up the embarrassing fact that he is not relying on primary sources is
a myth the origin of which can be traced to misinterpretations of these two passages in the
De int.2 .

with Aristotle's Categories and De interpretatione. And I am not in a
position to judge whether or not Boethius displays real originality in his
later, more mature works. But I think that it would be unfair to expect
novel interpretations in commentaries like the Isag. 1 and CC, which, if
my assumptions in the first sections of this paper are correct, are not
only the earliest of Boethius' works on Greek philosophy but also the
context in which he first encountered Aristotle. He seems to have
come quite unprepared to both the Isagoge and the Categories,
unarmed with proper translations and unfamiliar with the work he w
commenting on. Boethius is indeed an epitome of the expressio

docendo discimus.
UNIVERSITY OF STOCKHOLM

M. Asztalos Boethius As A Transmitter

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Originaltitel

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

M. Asztalos Boethius As A Transmitter

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Department of the Classics, Harvard University

Boethius as a Transmitter of Greek Logic to the Latin West: The Categories

sophical and theological works mainly for their impact on medieval

Aristotle's De interpretatione. Classicists are often repelled by

torians of philosophy complain about his lack of originality. While

mentary on Aristotle's Categories. Its contents were first presented in a session on

368 Monika Asztalos

Boethius devoted his first effort in

of their internal references, it ha

Boethius began commenting on the

tary on his own, complete translati

Isag. 2 and the commentary onthe C

demonstration of how a comparis

species, proprium, differentia, and

2 S. Brandt, "Entstehungszeit und zeitlich

logus 62 (1903), 141-154 and 234-275. See

to Anicii Manlii Severini Boethii In Isagogen P

Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum 48,

McKinley studied the frequency of certain p

Boethius' translations of the Isagoge and Ca

was influenced by his translations of Porphy

data corroborate Brandt's chronology wher

Boethius as a Transmitter of Greek Logic 369

tione nunc dedisse sufficiat, in Praedicamentorum uero expositione

Boethius wrote Isag. 2 he had already conceived his entire commentary

on the Categories before beginning his second commentary on the

tion occupies a few paragraphs - a brisk treatment in comparison with

the several pages long exposition in Isag. 2. If one accepts Brandt's

around. Secondly, and more importantly, what Boethius says in the

5 Patrologia Latina (= PL) 64, 272C-273A.

370 Monika Asztalos

will demonstrate it in a commentar

Boethius to be referring to is theref

tary on the Categories that we kno

When dealing with the chronol

works, which in many cases are ha

to other works or to other place

translated from Greek (several insta

pp. 376 and 378). Therefore it is rel

Ammonius has no reference to a

combinations. This example may

while working on CC. Whether or not Boethius became acquainted

a comparison of the five predicables with each other. If Boethius met

is lost, but Simplicius, Ammonius' pupil and a contemporary of

must have decided not to use it in that work.

For the purpose, then, of establishing the chronology between CC

Boethius as a Transmitter of Greek Logic 371

draw new conclusions as to Boethius' own methods of approaching

it for granted that Boethius began commenting on Aristotle's

I. The Translations of the Categories Ascribed to

Let me begin by summarizing some conclusions arrived at by

Lorenzo Minio-Paluello in his introduction to the critical edition of the

Latin translations of Aristotle's Categories7: Boethius' translation of

form (representing ca. two thirds of the Greek) as lemmata in CC,

ninth century (the date of the earliest extant manuscript of c)

Minio-Paluello assumes that whoever put together c had a defective

372 Monika Asztalos

copy of x and supplied what was lac

behind c mistakenly inserted into h

mentary, a word that follows imm

me more likely that the redactor of

b. He probably had copies of x and

to x and improved the latter with t