China Politics DA-UTNIF 2016-Paperless

Notes
-This file is composed of two different versions of the Xi bad disad, and is designed to maximize
flexibility of scenarios, internal link chains, and link arguments. In an effort to avoid repetition,
link cards that arent specific to PLA reform were left in the anticorruption disad, and you
should pull them from there. Impact scenarios/terminals for both disads can be swapped out as
needed. The same is true much of the impact defense.
-There are a tremendous number of impacts and scenariosyes we get it, we talked about it an
the reasoning for including a large amount of what we have (not all, we actually have even more
if you want more).
-If for the purposes of the camp tournament, lab leaders would like to restrict students to just
those scenarios, I can work out which ones I think are crucial and quickly release a list. We
ultimately decided that for the purpose of the season students would benefit most from having
access to a vast wealth of cards.
Anticorruption DA
1NC-Anticorruption
Anticorruption campaign steady now but next few months are keyXi
wants to stack the politburo and go after a mega-tiger but needs
polcapimpact is CCP collapse
PEI 5/6/16-professor of government at Claremont McKenna College [Minxin, Minxin Pei -- Two ways to break Beijing's
political stalemate, Nikkei Asian Review, 5/6/2016, http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Policy-Politics/Minxin-Pei-Twoways-to-break-Beijing-s-political-stalemate?page=1, DKP]
Behind this apparent disconnect between Xi's power and the difficulties he has encountered in
executing his reform plan lies a political stalemate which, if prolonged, could produce even
worse economic uncertainties and consequences. One manifestation of this stalemate -- bureaucratic paralysis -is well-known. Xi's anti-corruption drive has frightened and alienated many Chinese
officials. Denied what they consider legitimate rewards for toiling for the party, resentful bureaucrats have
been on a work stoppage in the hope that deteriorating economic performance will force Xi
to call off the anti-corruption campaign and return to business as usual. Costs of over-centralization
Unfortunately, these embittered officials may have either underestimated Xi's resolve or failed to
appreciate his political dilemma. Unlike his predecessors, Xi harbors a visceral revulsion toward
corruption inside the CCP and believes that only a self-disciplined one-party regime can survive in a
modern society. At the same time, fighting corruption has earned Xi a huge amount of political
capital and given him a potent weapon against his rivals. Giving it up equals unilateral disarmament. Finally,
having staked so much of his credibility on purging the rot from the party, Xi risks losing it
altogether if he allows the anti-corruption campaign to fizzle out. As he said in his January 2016 speech to the
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, the party's powerful anti-corruption arm, "If corruption is revived and returns, it will
not only worsen our political environment, but also damage the morale of our party and the people. As someone has said, if
corruption bounces back, our people will lose hope." The
challenge for Xi is that the campaign against corruption

is yielding diminishing returns. To be sure, it has been effective in limiting theft by greedy officials, but it
cannot motivate them to do anything positive. For local officials , far removed from the center of power,
their only weapon is passive resistance. There is now a political stalemate between the
system and its strongman. Another stalemate is less well-known and even harder to analyze because it is occurring
in a much higher and more opaque realm of the Chinese party-state. Xi's remarkable success in achieving
political dominance has demolished the delicate balance of power at the top of the
regime. The consequences of the transformation of what may be called a multipolar political order
into a unipolar one in Beijing have been profound. Decision-making authority has been
centralized to an unprecedented degree, inevitably creating resentment among senior leaders
who have seen their influence marginalized. Perhaps the most unsettling development is the loss of
personal security felt by the party's most senior leaders. Previously, they could count on the
balancing among various factions to safeguard their personal security since the post-Tiananmen decision-making
process was consensus-driven. But today, with the dismantling of the entire post-Tiananmen order, the personal security
of most top leaders depends almost solely on their relations with the dominant leader. However
upset they may feel about Xi's political supremacy, his rivals in Beijing have no direct means to undermine his
authority, let alone conspire to unseat him. The party's strict rules on personal interaction and close
surveillance of senior officials make it suicidal for plotters to meet and coordinate. The absence of a clear
alternative who could act as the ringleader further complicates the calculations of Xi's foes. Most importantly,
his rivals themselves belong to different warring factions and are thus hopelessly
divided. The only recourse for Xi's competitors at the top is feigning compliance while
subtly distancing themselves from his policies through silence and inaction. The most recent
evidence is the very public failure of most of China's influential political figures, including Politburo
members and a majority of provincial party chiefs, to embrace the designation of Xi as the new "core" of
the party's leadership. This designation is no mere semantics. In the post-Mao era, when Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin received
In the months ahead, as the crucial 19th

party congress -- scheduled for the fall of 2017 -- approaches, this inchoate force can be
expected to mount a series of actions to frustrate Xi's moves to further consolidate
his power. Specifically, they are likely to vigorously oppose any attempts to stack the deck in
the Politburo and its powerful standing committee or to revise the party's rules on age and term limits. Few
alternatives Such political subterfuge cannot possibly fool Xi. But he has few options. He
could go all out by putting another mega-tiger -- a very senior incumbent or retired official -- in jail
on corruption charges. But this high-risk move could precipitate a complete
breakdown of elite unity and even open political warfare with his enemies. At the same time, it is
inconceivable for him to concede to their unspoken demands of sharing power and restoring collective
leadership. Without an external shock of some kind, this systemic political stalemate is hard to
break. At the moment, both Xi and his rivals have placed their hopes on what happens to the Chinese
economy. Xi's political foes, meanwhile, are eager to see further erosion of his political capital as the
result of continuing economic weakness. They calculate that if Xi's economic report card to the 19th
party congress next year is deemed unsatisfactory, he will be less able to control the leadership
this official designation, it formalized their political supremacy.
succession process and even be forced to seek reconciliation with the bureaucracy. Xi, of course, will not allow such an outcome to
materialize. While
his long-term objective -- sustaining the CCP's rule with reinvigorated economic reform and tight
social control -- may remain unchanged, his immediate priority is to shore up his political
capital. In the current context, this Herculean task requires supporting economic growth with all the
tools at his disposal. For investors and China's trading partners, such a stalemate is bad news.
Not only does it create greater political uncertainty, but also it increases China's overall
economic vulnerabilities. Inaction and passive resistance by Xi's rivals artificially suppress
China's economic dynamism, while doubling down on the obsolete, credit-fueled and investment-driven
growth model amplifies the risks of a destructive debt crisis in the medium term . There are only two ways of breaking
this deadlock. The easy way is to return to the post-Tiananmen system of power-sharing and spoilssharing, which has produced decades of peace among the ruling elites but also spawned pervasive corruption.
The hard way is to mobilize societal forces -- such as private businessmen, professionals and the intelligentsia -- as political
allies to defeat the anti-reform forces inside the party-state. It is impossible to know which strategy Xi will
ultimately adopt. What is clear is that the current stalemate cannot last forever.
The plan is a major win for Xiincreased US engagement is k2 agenda

LI* AND XU** 14-*director of the John L. Thornton China Center and a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy program at
Brookings. He is also a director of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, **Research Assistant & Communications
Coordinator at the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings [Cheng, Lucy, Chinese Enthusiasm and American Cynicism Over
the New Type of Great Power Relations, 12/4/2014, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/12/05-chinesepessimism-american-cynicism-great-power-li-xu, DKP]
As China-watchers were quick to realize, President Obama did not even once mention the New Type of Great Power Relations on
his recent trip to Beijing. It has been widely noted that President Xi Jinping, however, repeatedly
promoted the
framework first at the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) in July, and then at the summit
with Obama in mid-November. After the summit, Chinas official news agency reported that Xi and Obama pledged to
push forward a new type of major-country relations, and that [Obama] is willing to lift the
new type of major-country relationship between China and the U.S. to a higher level. Xinhua implied that
Obama not only accepts, but also actively supports, the New Type concept. In fact, the Obama administration has been cautiously
staying away from it. Why
is China so keen on a New Type of Great Power Relations and on creating

perceptions of endorsement by Obama? And why is the U.S. reluctant to adopt it? What are the
reasons behind such contrasting views Chinese enthusiasm and American cynicism towards this seemingly benign concept?
When Xi Jinping defined the New Type of Great Power Relations in his meeting with Obama at Sunnylands last year, he
described it in three
points: 1) no conflict or confrontation, through emphasizing dialogue and

treating each others strategic intentions objectively; 2) mutual respect , including for each
others core interests and major concerns; and 3) mutually beneficial cooperation , by
abandoning the zero-sum game mentality and advancing areas of mutual interest. Embedded in the
New Type of Great Power Relations is a nations hope for an international environment more conducive to its development. From
the rise and fall of its many dynasties to its forced opening up to the West in the wake of the Opium Wars, China has always seen
itself as a civilization deeply entangled and affected by history. Recognizing the historically recurring clashes between an existing
great power and an emerging power, China looks to the New Type framework to avoid historical determinism and to seek a lessdisruptive rise in an increasingly integrated world. At the same time, China
wants to be viewed as an equal. By using

the term Great Power to primarily, if not solely, refer to China and the United States, China aims to elevate itself
to a level playing field. Obtaining U.S. support of the concept would imply Uncle Sams
recognition of Chinas strength and power. This is what Chinas official media sought to show when it suggested
Obamas support of the concept: parity and respect between the two countries. Furthermore, Chinese leaders believe that the New
By
emphasizing the respect of core interests as an element of the concept, China pushes its
territorial claims to the forefront. This is Chinas attempt at more clearly demarking where the
United States and other neighboring countries need to toe the line. American adoption of the term would imply that the
Type of Great Power Relations enables the two powers to establish a new code of conduct in line with Chinas interests.
United States recognizes Chinas core interests. This mutual respect of each others national interests is at the core of Chinas
aspirations. The Chinese media avidly reporting on Obama and Xis joint endorsement of the concept suggests that there
are
also domestic reasons driving the New Type of Great Power Relations. Although the Chinese concept is
an inherently U.S.-geared proposal, the domestic goals of such a concept should not be
overlooked. From a Chinese perspective, the United States is the only superpower in todays world that has the capacity to
contain Chinas rise. By strengthening Chinas view of itself as a recognized and respected
power, Xi Jinping is able to foster stronger nationalistic pride under CCP leadership
and gain political capital to consolidate his own power at home.
CCP collapse causes extinction

Yee and Storey 13 China Threat: Perceptions Myths edited by Herbert Yee, Ian Storey
Books on Google Play China Threat: Perceptions Myths Front Cover Herbert Yee, Ian Storey
Routledge, Apr 3, 2013 Professor of Politics and International Relations at Hong Kong Baptist
University and Lecturer in Defence Studies at Deakin University, The China Threat:
Perceptions, Myths and Reality, p. 5]
The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a China threat is the fear of
political and economic collapse in the

PRC, resulting in territorial fragmentation, civil war and waves of refugees pouring into neighbouring
countries. Naturally, any or all of these scenarios would have a profoundly negative impact on regional
stability. Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problems, including the increasing political demands of its citizens,
a growing population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid
industrialisation and pollution. These problems are putting a strain on the central governments ability to govern effectively.
Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in millions of Chinese refugees seeking
asylum in neighbouring countries. Such an unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a severe
strain on the limited resources of Chinas neighbours. A
fragmented China could also result in another nightmare
nuclear weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible local provincial

leaders or warlords .12 From this perspective, a disintegrating China would also pose a threat
to its neighbours and the world.
scenario
Uniqueness
Window-19th Congress
Xi wants to consolidate power but now is key
-a2 Xi dominant/factions dont matter
PEI 7/14-professor of government at Claremont McKenna College
[Minxin, Minxin Pei: Political jockeying hinders real

economic reform in China, Nikkei Asian Review, 7/14/2016, http://asia.nikkei.com/magazine/20160714-VIRTUAL-GETSREAL/Viewpoints/Minxin-Pei-Political-jockeying-hinders-real-economic-reform-in-China?page=1, DKP]
Rulers in autocratic regimes are commonly seen as enjoying greater freedom of action in
policymaking than leaders in democracies, because they are not hampered by electoral cycles. For those wedded to this alleged
superiority of dictatorships, it is natural to conclude that autocratic regimes are more capable of
implementing painful economic reforms as a result of their lack of accountability to voters.
However intuitively appealing this proposition is, the reality is different. While it is true that autocrats do not have to
worry about winning elections, they have much less freedom of action than is often assumed. Indeed , they
are just as constrained by the influence of interest groups and the dictates of their political
calendar. Nowhere is the tyranny of the political calendar in an autocratic regime more
apparent than in China. With record-high financial leverage, massive overcapacity in
manufacturing, a colossal real estate bubble and countless zombie companies sucking the blood out
of its economy, China's only viable option is to embrace short-term pain to avoid long-term
stagnation. In other words, Beijing would be far better off if it killed off the zombie companies, recognized the huge amount of
bad loans in banks and recapitalized the banking system. These drastic measures would result in a painful
recession, but the long-term reward would be a more balanced and healthier economy. If the
conventional wisdom about autocratic superiority were right, we would expect the ruling Communist
Party under its general secretary, Chinese President Xi Jinping -- arguably the strongest leader since Mao Zedong -- to adopt
them. Alas, judging by Beijing's recent economic policy, it is evident that Chinese leaders have
little appetite for such intense short-term pain. Instead, they have kept open the credit spigot to
support zombie companies and further inflate the real estate bubble, while taking baby steps to
reduce overcapacity. There are several explanations for their reluctance. For one, Beijing is fearful that
aggressive deleveraging could trigger a chain reaction of debt defaults, a financial panic, and the
collapse of growth. Such fears should not be dismissed lightly. Another possible explanation is that Chinese
leaders think they have ample resources to deal with the country's mountain of debt. For instance, several Chinese economists argue
that the value of China's assets, such as state-owned enterprises, land and mineral resources, is greater than its total debt, suggesting
that the government has no need to worry about more borrowing. A third justification for inaction is that China is unlikely to suffer a
catastrophic financial crisis, because it has a high savings rate: The government controls the banks, and most Chinese debt is
denominated in its own currency. AN INCONVENIENT FACT While such a defense of Beijing's policies may have some merits, its
advocates ignore one inconvenient fact: The Communist Party's political
calendar makes it inconceivable that

top Chinese leaders would risk a recession ahead of another critical leadership succession. The
party's next national congress, its 19th, is scheduled for the fall of 2017. Between now and
then, Chinese leaders will be consumed by political jockeying. The stakes could
not be higher. For Xi, it is his first chance to shape the top leadership. If things go
well, he could place his supporters in the Politburo and , most importantly, on the Politburo Standing
Committee. Under the existing, informal rule of mandatory retirement, five of the seven members of the committee are
slated to step down next year. If Xi can appoint three of his loyalists to the committee, he will
control the party's top decision-making body. There is also speculation about even more
consequential changes at the next party congress, such as the end of the informal rules on term and age limits,
and the practice of appointing a successor-to-be five years ahead of the anticipated succession. If
a successor to Xi is to be anointed, it will occur at the 19th congress. But what does all this political
maneuvering have to do with economic policy? The short answer is everything. T he popular notion that the
Communist Party is a top-down dictatorship , in which the most powerful rulers can
impose their will on those at lower levels of the regime, has no basis in reality. The present
regime is an elitist coalition consisting of numerous factions and interest groups. One
particular group or individual in this regime may be more powerful than any of its or his individual competitors, but
even this dominant group or individual can seldo m completely disregard the unified
opposition of other groups. What complicates the political calculus of today's top Chinese leaders, and particularly of
Xi, is that the party's leadership selection process is constrained by formal and informal procedures in which subnational leaders, in
particular provincial party chiefs and governors, could exert real influence. Between
now and the 19th congress, the

most crucial event in determining the lineup of the next Politburo will be an informal gathering
of the Central Committee and a group of retired senior leaders (former Politburo members) in June next year. DECISIVE ROLE
It was at such a gathering in June 2007 that the party anointed Xi as the successor to Hu Jintao. If this
process is to be repeated, the members of the Central Committee (a body of roughly 200 full voting members,
including nearly all the 62 provincial party chiefs and governors) could play a decisive role, because they can vote
with secret ballots, as was the case in the selection of Xi in 2007.
Window-Economy
Next few months critical to increase current slowdown of Chinese
Econ Transition
Yan 7/15/16: 11:46 AM ET (Sophia Yan is an award-winning business reporter based in
CNN's Hong Kong bureau, covering major financial and economic news across Asia.)
CNNMoney (Hong Kong). First published July 14, 2016: 11:24 PM ET Global Investor
http://money.cnn.com/2016/07/14/news/economy/china-gdp/ - triscuit)
China's technology and consumer driven economic transition. China's
economy grew at its slowest quarterly pace

in seven years, touching down at levels last seen during the dark days of the global financial crisis in early 2009. The world's
second-largest economy grew by 6.7% in the three months to the end of June, compared with the same period a
year earlier, according to China's National Bureau of Statistics. That is a hair better than the 6.6% forecast in a CNN Money survey of
economists, and matches the rate of growth in the first quarter. "I think it is, in fact, slightly positive," said Edmund Goh of
Aberdeen Asset Management. "I think a
lot of people are really expecting slower growth, but the fact that it
is slightly above what the market was pricing in, is a positive sign." Stock markets in China appeared
unruffled and were little changed in Friday trading. Investors were left reeling by last year's turmoil on Chinese markets, and have
been preparing for the worst. But it appears things
aren't quite as bad as expected. Growth in the most

recent quarter was buoyed by more state-backed investment, according to Capital Economics. Retail sales
also picked up, evidence perhaps of the government's attempts to transition the economy away
from manufacturing and exports to services and consumption. Still, the glimmer of good news may not last
for long. For 2016 as a whole, economists surveyed by CNNMoney expect GDP growth to fall to 6.5%, the bottom end of the
government's own target of between 6.5% and 7%. Looking ahead, economic
expansion in 2017 is expected to slow

further to 6.3%. china slow economy "Growth is more likely to pick up over coming months than
slow further, but a lasting turnaround is not on the cards," said Daniel Martin and Mark Williams at Capital Economics.
China's pace of growth makes it one of the world's stronger performers, but it remains a far cry
from the heady days of 10% growth or more, which is why China has many experts and investors
on edge. After breakneck expansion for decades, China's economy is slowing, partly because of
Beijing's efforts to transition the economy to a new growth model. The country is also burdened
with high levels of debt after years of aggressive lending. Experts also continue to doubt the accuracy of China's
official figures, and some are worried that things are worse than Beijing is letting on. Capital Economics, for instance, estimates that
China's economy expanded at just 4.5% in the second quarter. There
are also concerns that President Xi Jinping's

four-year campaign against corruption has taken a serious toll on GDP growth , said Kevin Lai of Daiwa
Capital Markets ahead of the data release. There's no question that the pain is being felt widely. China
announced in late February that it was planning to shed 1.8 million coal and steel jobs in an
effort to reduce excess capacity. The cuts represent about 20% and 11% of China's coal and steel
jobs, respectively, according to IHS Insight. One major concern is how the government will
implement these changes, said IHS China economist Brian Jackson. "If local officials pursue closures too quickly, it could
spark major labor protests," he said.China is coming off a turbulent 2015 for markets and the yuan, which undermined investor
confidence in Chinese authorities' ability to manage the economic slowdown smoothly.
A wrong turn in the economic transition leads to economic stagnation

of China
Mulligan 6/21/16 (Mark Mulligan- Media manager/adviser, reporter, writer, editor and speech-writer with
more than 30 years' experience across Australia, Europe and Latin America. Fluent Spanish speaker and writer, with
some knowledge of Italian and Portuguese. Currently based in Sydney, Australia, but prepared to live virtually
anywhere. Motivated, quick, affable and not afraid of working long hours, weekends and public holidays. Financial
reporting and editing specialist. Insider's knowledge of global trade, financial markets, government policy
development and the Spanish-speaking world. Proven media adviser, crisis/issues manager and advocate. Senior
Markets and Economy Writer. July 2014 Present (2 years 1 month) Writing daily on global markets and the
Australian economy for all Fairfax on-line and print platforms, with regular appearances in video.) The Sydney
Morning Herald. http://www.smh.com.au/business/markets/a-wrong-turn-could-lead-to-economic-stagnation20160620-gpnvie.html - triscuit)
China is at a crossroads where a wrong turn could lead to economic stagnation , says the chief China
economist for Citigroup. Li-Gang Liu says without much-needed debt restructuring and privatisation of the
state-owned enterprises that dominate the country's stock exchanges, China would simply
"muddle through", relying on growth to pay down corporate debt until the economy stalled . The
alternative involved stake sales to employees and domestic retail and foreign institutional investors to clean up companies' balance
sheets while opening up the country's capital markets, he says. "Going forward, if
the government does not tackle the

medium-term challenges facing the Chinese economy. . . . we will see economic stagnation in
China," he said during a visit to Sydney on Tuesday. A recovery in the property sector has taken some
pressure off the Chinese economy. Economic slowdown. His comments come as world markets adjust to the
economic slowdown in China, and take their cue instead from Britain's upcoming vote on EU membership. However,
memories are still fresh of two bouts of market turmoil, in August 2015 and January this year, triggered by
sharp movements in the Chinese yuan and heavy capital outflows . The Chinese yuan has since stabilised
against a trade-weighted basket of currencies, thanks in part to appreciation of the euro and Japanese yen. However, slowing
growth, overcapacity and high debt levels still have China-watchers nervous . The Reserve Bank
of Australia, in the minutes of its June board meeting, noted on Tuesday that China's "industrial production
remained relatively subdued and growth in private-sector fixed asset investment had declined
further". It also acknowledged that this had been offset by "elevated levels" of government
spending. China's debt-to-GDP ratio of 250 per cent mainly stems from the build-up of liabilities in the local government and
corporate sectors during the massive infrastructure pushes of the past 20 years. Another round of privatisation is necessary.
Although not as onerous as in several advanced economies, China's
debt burden has rattled some potential

foreign investors, and led to a series of warnings about possible financial stress that could
trigger another global crisis. Mr Liu says much will depend on the government's strategy over the next few years. "If the
government is willing to engage in another round of privatisations, by selling down current state ownership from 80 or 90 per cent
to, say, 40 per cent, they could use the money to honour bank debt, debt issued through bonds and other obligations," he said.
"However, if China still thinks they can muddle through, thinking growth in the future will pick up and those debts will be honoured
eventually through economic growth, then we may see potential stagnation in China." Mr Liu said
a recent pick-up in
residential and commercial property buying and investment, spurred by lower prices and
monetary and regulatory easing, had helped reduce oversupply in the sector, alleviating
problems in at least one of the country's biggest areas of overcapacity. This improvement, in
turn, had helped absorb excess steel, which had buoyed prices. Crucially for Australia, the price of iron ore,
too, received a boost from the resurgence of real estate activity, although a clampdown by Chinese authorities on speculative activity
in commodity futures markets forced a correction. Rallies not sustainable. In any case, neither of these "mini-rallies" were
sustainable, warned Mr Liu, and Beijing was committed to cutting steel-making capacity. "The
government is going to
reduce China's steel-making capacity by 100 to 150 million tonnes in three to five years," he said.
There were also plans to reduce coal output by cutting average working days a year in the sector
from 330 to 276, he said. "This is a gradual approach," Mr Liu said. "This year they are going to target
two sectors; there are a further four overcapacity sectors which will probably be targeted in the
following year."
Economic transition key to financial success

Wien 5/5/16 (Byron Wien- Vice Chairman in the Multi-Asset Investment group where he acts as a
senior adviser to both the Firm and its clients in analyzing economic, social and political trends to assess
the direction of financial markets and thus help guide investment and strategic decisions. Prior to joining
Blackstone, Mr. Wien was Chief Investment Strategist for Pequot Capital and before that served for 21
years as Chief (later Senior) U.S. Investment Strategist at Morgan Stanley. In 1995, Mr. Wien co-authored
a book with George Soros on the legendary investors life and philosophy, Soros on Soros - Staying Ahead
of the Curve. In 1998 he was named by First Call the most widely read analyst on Wall Street and in 2000
was ranked the No. 1 strategist by SmartMoney.com based on his market calls during that year. Mr.Wien
was named to the 2004 Smart Money Power 30 list of Wall Streets most influential investors, thinkers,
enforcers, policy makers, players and market movers. He appeared in the Thinker category. In 2006,
Mr. Wien was named by New York Magazine as one of the sixteen most influential people in Wall Street.
The New York Society of Security Analysts (NYSSA) presented Mr. Wien with a lifetime achievement
award in 2008. Mr. Wien received an AB with honors from Harvard College and an MBA with distinction
from Harvard Business School. He is on the Investment Advisory Committee of The Open Society
Foundation, a member of the Investment Committees of Lincoln Center and The Pritzker Foundation. He
is a trustee of the New York Historical Society and Chairman of the Investment Committee of the JPB
Foundation.) Real Clear Markets
http://www.realclearmarkets.com/articles/2016/05/05/growth_in_china_is_slowing_but_so_what_10
2155.html - triscuit
By this time there is not a business person in the western world who doesn't know that the Chinese economy is not moving ahead at
the torrid pace of five years ago.
China has grown to become the second largest economy in the world
and the law of large numbers is in its way. In the first quarter, it reported 4.5% real GDP growth,
the lowest since 2010. In order to reach the annualized rate of 6.7%, growth in the next two
quarters would need to be 7.4%, which seems hard to achieve. I have been projecting (guessing) overall
Chinese real growth of 4.5% and arguing with clients and analysts about whether I am too low or too high. The real question is, how
much does this matter? If you are an agricultural or industrial commodity exporter like Brazil or Australia, the Chinese growth rate
means a lot. If you are a Hong Kong businessman/ entrepreneur looking for deals, there is plenty to keep you busy. I have just
returned from a trip to Singapore, Hong Kong, Beijing, Shanghai and Tokyo, meeting with sovereign wealth funds, other clients,
policy officials and business people. While
everyone is aware of the slowdown in China, very few expect a

hard landing caused by a real estate bubble, a banking collapse related to non-performing loans
or other factors. There is a general recognition that Xi Jinping is centralizing his leadership and
taking control of the media and the military, but he is also accomplishing a necessary goal. Official
corruption had reached a level where it was causing the general population to lose confidence in the central government. The
average person had enjoyed more economic opportunity in the last fifty years, but they were angered by local and national officials
accumulating considerable assets and flaunting their wealth (or their children doing so). In addition, growth was accompanied by an
excessively restrictive regulatory environment in the view of most observers. China is not, however, without serious problems. It has
too much capacity in many basic industries and some of it is obsolete. It has a large number of non-performing loans on the books of
its banks and many of these will never be paid back. Because the banking system is integrated into the People's Bank of China, the
assumption is that there won't be a banking meltdown, but that may not be right. While
to the outside world China

does not seem to be under financial stress, Chinese debt has escalated more than 50% since the
recession of 2008-9 and its foreign exchange reserves have been drawn down sharply by 20% to
maintain the value of the renminbi. Real estate is key to financial stability in China. The
combination of monetary accommodation and relaxed rules relating to owning more than one
residence have propped up the market and prices are rising in many of the 100 largest cities , but
observers are worried that this won't last. Consequently, one of China's major problems is capital flight. Wealthy Chinese have been
trying to move assets out of the country for several years. I think it is fair to ask, "If there are so many investment opportunities in
The
extreme volatility of the Chinese stock market made domestic investors apprehensive about
investing in financial assets at home. Apartment prices in the top tier markets like Beijing and Shanghai are clearly
China, why are many people trying to get their money out?" The answer is that China is filled with uncertainties as well.
expensive and have been rising yet higher. In second tier cities there are still good values, but future economic opportunity is less
clear there. Young people want to live in Beijing or Shanghai just as they want to live in New York or San Francisco in the United
States or London and Paris in Europe and the real estate values reflect the popularity of these places. Talk about unintended
consequences: the hope behind the high-speed rail system was that young people could live and work in smaller cities near their
families and travel by train to Beijing and Shanghai on weekends. What happened was that the millennials chose to live in the big
cities and travel to visit their families on weekends. Still, in a country with continued growth and 1.3 billion people, many other cities
will emerge as attractive places to live over time. The major cities are so built up and dense that the logistics of living in those places
is making them less desirable. The
Chinese practice of buying multiple apartments to store personal

wealth points out one of the true tragedies of the country's financial planning. Perhaps because the
stock market was viewed as the quintessential manifestation of the capitalist experience, the Chinese leadership never took it
seriously enough or saw its opportunities. It should have demanded more transparency through regulation and required more
responsible accounting. Their
dilatory attitude resulted in extreme volatility in the "A" share market,

especially after the financial crisis of 2008. Because of this, there was a period when the stock
market was closed down and investors lost access to their assets. While only about 10%-20% of the Chinese
population participated in the market before the closure and few institutions were involved, this action dealt a serious blow to
confidence. Before
the closure, the government participated in the market aggressively to boost

prices. This intervention hurt confidence as well, and it will take a long time to repair the
damage. This is sad because the Chinese are natural entrepreneurs and investors and if the
financial markets were properly regulated, equities could have become an important and
constructive part of the business culture. Had that happened, the problems with capital flight could have been
severely reduced.
Growth of consumer sector crucial to creation of ten million jobs

Xi realized this situation had to change. He began a vigorous anti-corruption campaign to re-establish the
legitimacy of the Communist Party and its leadership and to restore the confidence of the
general population. I attended a small dinner with Dr. Henry Kissinger a few weeks ago and asked him about the anticorruption program. (Kissinger is a hero of mine because he is still well-connected and relevant at 93.) He told me Xi's goal was
to eliminate the corruption that resulted in wealth creation, not the corruption that facilitated
the ease of doing business. If you want to get building materials delivered to your site during the day, rather than at night
in accordance with the rules, you can still make a payment to someone to do that, but major gifts allowing many officials to build
As a result,
gambling travel to Macau is down and luxury goods sales in Hong Kong have declined . But
business in China goes on. The consumer sector continues to grow in importance in the overall
economy. The government is still engaged in fiscal spending and monetary accommodation but the economic planning officials
fortunes were stopped. Even the distribution of gift cards to ordinary employees to establish good will is over.
recognize that the future depends on consumers becoming an increasingly larger portion of GDP. The Chinese consumer is currently
a smaller part of its economy than the consumer in any major industrialized nation, and rebalancing has a long way to go. As for
government expenditures on infrastructure, there is also much to be done. Most visitors to China are aware of the dazzling roads and
buildings in Beijing and Shanghai, but China has more than 100 cities with a population of one million or more. Many of these are in
the western and northern parts of the country and need infrastructure improvements of all types. This
should provide
many jobs for some time to come, increasing the overall wealth of the more remote parts of the
country. If growth in China were closer to 5% than 7%, is that so bad? China will still be able to
create ten million or more jobs annually. The United States, Japan or Europe would be thrilled to grow at that rate.
Why should we all be wringing our hands because growth has slowed to the mid-single-digit level? As Jon Gray, who runs
Blackstone's Real Estate division told me, "Our malls in China had annual sales increases of 18% a few years ago; then that went
down to 12% and now it's 8% - but 8% is still pretty good."
Economic growth key to social reforms and innovation

We also know that the social safety net needs a lot of work. China has weak retirement support
for its aging population and has no universal healthcare. As a result, consumers save as much as
50% of their income so they have the resources to deal with unexpected circumstances. This
affects growth, and few involved in China expect these conditions to change in the near term. In
several of my meetings, Chinese innovation was a subject of debate. Given that Chinese immigrants often do
extremely well in American high schools and universities, why are we not seeing more
technology breakthroughs coming out of the country? One reason is that the Chinese higher
education system is teaching-oriented and research plays a smaller role than it does in American
universities. A second reason is that there is little government money for research. Finally, the
venture capital market is just getting going in China, so while the talent is there, the money isn't.
This is changing and we will see more new products coming out of China in the coming years.
Drones and animation are on the planning boards. The Chinese are also working to advance
healthcare and education practices. While China has relaxed its "one child" policy, this change
may be slow in having an impact. Raising a child is expensive in China and apartments are small. 2015 was the year of
the sheep - a bad time to have a child. 2016 is the year of the monkey - a much better time for giving birth. The authorities expect a
surge. The change in the one child policy may get more traction in non-urban areas. Over
time, larger families will
surely contribute to growth.
End of 2016 key to economic stability

Macquarie Research 4/26/16 (Macquarie Research- top 10 global research platform
with 250 analysts and 20 offices around the world. Macquarie University has been participating
in cotutelle degree programs since 1999. These became a formal component of our research
strategy in 2007. The aim is to establish deep, continuing relationships with international
research universities through the joint research candidate supervision. By the end of 2014, we
will have had over 210 cotutelle and joint PhD candidates with more than 110 universities from
over 30 countries, led by China, Germany and France.)
http://www.macquarie.com/us/corporate/expertise/china-economic-transition-showspromise-in-2016 - triscuit
Chinas economic growth will be higher than expected in 2016 as the country makes its
transition from a manufacturing-based economy. While the overall pace of growth will be slower
than in recent years, Macquarie Research shows emerging sectors such as technology and
tourism will begin to fill the gap left after the manufacturing boom. Erwin Sanft, Macquarie
Securities Head of China Strategy, says Chinas government will also be focused on stabilising
growth ahead of the mid-term retirement of half of the Politburo in 2017. Theres now a desire
to ensure growth is stable. Stability of growth this year is at least as important as structural
reform, Sanft says. Weve been in a multiyear slowdown but at least for the first half of this
year well see growth figures in China that are better than expected." Were expecting growth
this year of 6.7 per cent for China. Sanft says the level of investment through the economy will
be key to delivering this. Manufacturing is on the downturn but he says two areas
infrastructure and housing investment show more promise. Theres now a desire to ensure
growth is stable. Stability of growth this year is at least as important as structural reform. Credit
toward new infrastructure amounted to $US2tn in 2015 but Macquarie says that figure will have
to grow by 15 per cent in 2016 to act as a growth buffer. Sanft says real estate is the other area
where there has been a positive surprise after China lowered transaction taxes and the down
payment required from first time property buyers in February 2016. Weve seen a strong
recovery in the property market in Chinas major cities, so we anticipate an uptick in the
investment cycle for real estate, Sanft says. As Chinas economy becomes more consumption
and services-focused, new structural trends are coming in to play. A wave of consolidation is
expected across the economy after the boom years in manufacturing and property construction
saw the emergence of too many businesses in these sectors. Companies that are globally
competitive are also likely to emerge. Technology is encouraging businesses to become more
innovative and many are now turning their sights to expanding overseas, however the level of
state ownership remains an obstacle to this goal in some industries. Sanft says the transition in
China has seen the emergence of so-called new economies in the technology and servicesdriven sectors, which are experiencing healthy growth and represent the future for the countrys
economy. Even though China will be growing at a slower pace, sectors like the internet,
healthcare, tourism, non-bank financial services, these are all interesting areas and theres a lot
of growth in these parts of the economy, Sanft says.
Econ growth is needed to make China financially stable

Kent 6/16/16 (Cristopher Kent- Assistant Governor (Economic) of the Reserve Bank of
Australia, at the Economic Society of Australia (QLD) Business Lunch, Brisbane) The Economic
Transition In China http://www.bis.org/review/r160616f.pdf - triscuit
Introduction I would like to thank the Queensland branch of the Economic Society of Australia for hosting this event. It is a pleasure
the economic transition in China. This topic is important for the

Australian economy, where economic activity is rebalancing toward non-mining sectors following the end of the
to be back here to discuss
commodity price boom. Indeed, this process is well advanced. The latest data suggest that non-mining activity is growing a little
Much of the original impetus for the commodity price boom came
from the rapid rise in Chinas demand for raw materials. Eventually, the global supply of
faster than GDP.
commodities increased, including supply from the resource-rich states of Queensland and Western Australia. In turn, rising supply
led to an inevitable decline in commodity prices. Although prices are still well above where they were before the boom,
the
extent of the decline over the past few years has been larger than most people expected. In part, that
reflects an easing in Chinas demand for commodities over the past year or
two. This has occurred against the backdrop of a moderation in Chinese economic growth more broadly. The slowing
in growth had been widely anticipated within China and by outside observers. It is a natural consequence of
China moving beyond the rapid phase of growth associated with industrialisation. There is,
however, considerable uncertainty and debate around the extent to which imbalances that have become increasingly evident will
affect the sustainability of Chinas growth over the coming decade. Key
concerns are the economys reliance on

investment as a source of demand and on debt as a source of funding for that
investment. Our central forecast, which is similar to those of many observers, is that the Chinese economy will experience a
further gradual moderation in growth over the next few years. 1 The Chinese authorities intend to keep
overall growth close to its current level for the remainder of the decade. However, there
appear to be increasing tensions between the goals of shoring-up short-term growth and
pursuing institutional reforms that would help to sustain growth over the longer term
and assist with the rebalancing of demand from investment to consumption. The Chinese
authorities have an expansive agenda of reforms necessary for this transition and progress has been made on a number of fronts.
major reforms to the financial system needed to improve the

allocation of capital and social reforms that would bolster consumption
demand remain incomplete. The reform process will take time as it does in most countries. 1 Note that our
Even so,
forecasts are similar to those of both the International Monetary Fund and Consensus. See, IMF (2016), World Economic Outlook,
April 2016. 2 BIS central bankers speeches China will continue to provide Australia with significant economic opportunities over the
longer term, including in sectors such as agriculture, education, tourism and a wide range of business services. Along the way
we should be alert to the risk of adverse developments that could lead

to a sharp economic slowdown in China. I thought it would be useful to share our thoughts about
some of these downside risks. I should stress at the outset that the Chinese authorities are attentive to
these risks and have the scope to respond if the economy turns out to be
much weaker than expected. How the authorities will respond if those risks come to pass is beyond the scope of
my presentation today. But Ill ask you to keep in mind that the authorities will respond so as to
help promote strong and stable growth in China.
though,
Economic slowdown has add short and long term negative effects
Moderating growth in China Despite the stimulus following the global financial crisis, annual growth peaked in 2007. As an aside, it
is worth remembering that while Chinas growth is slower than it was 10 years ago, its contribution to global output growth is greater
now because the Chinese economy is so much larger than it was. In terms of output, the moderation in growth has been reflected in
a slowdown in the industrial sector, while growth in the services sector has been more resilient. At the same time, on the expenditure
The moderation
in the growth of overall activity reflects a combination of longer-term and shorter-term factors.
side of the ledger, investment growth has declined while consumption growth has been relatively persistent.
One prominent long-term factor has been the reversal of Chinas demographic dividend. The
working-age population has reached its peak and is in decline . The second persistent factor is the
decline in the growth of productivity. Both labour and total factor productivity experienced periods of rapid growth in
the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s following market-oriented reforms and increased openness to trade and investment (Graph 5).
Urbanisation also underpinned high rates of productivity growth as people moved from
relatively unproductive jobs in agriculture to more productive jobs in cities. However, since th e
late 2000s productivity growth has declined, as the positive effect of earlier reforms faded. 2 The
relaxation of the one-child policy is unlikely to have a substantive effect on population ageing, at
least not in the short-to-medium term (Lim J and A Cowling (2016), Chinas Demographic Outlook, RBA Bulletin,
June, pp 3542.) Some weakness in productivity growth may relate to a cyclical slowing in the
industrial sector, whereby producers (particularly SOEs) have held on to labour even though
production has declined.\
Econ Instability is affecting housing demand

As in many other economies, housing demand has been an important driver of Chinas growth. Earlier
development of private housing markets led to a sharp rise in residential investment (as a share of GDP) from the early 2000s. But
the pace of growth in housing investment has declined and has made a relatively modest contribution to Chinese growth of late. 4
The combined direct and indirect share of GDP growth accounted for by housing investment is estimated to have been as high as 30
per cent or so in recent years. See, Ma G, I Roberts and G Kelly (2016), A Rebalancing Chinese Economy: Challenges and
International Implications, Paper presented at the RBA Conference Structural Change in China: Implications for Australia and the
World, Sydney, 1718 March. 6 BIS central bankers speeches One
long-term factor affecting housing demand is

the slowdown in the growth of the working age population, which means that China is also
passing its peak in household formation. A shorter-term influence is the substantial rise in the
stock of unsold housing in a range of smaller cities, as developers built in anticipation of
urbanisation that did not materialise as rapidly as expected. It will take time for these inventories to be
reduced and for market signals to direct investment to locations with the best prospects for urbanisation. Further
urbanisation, and demand for larger and higher-quality housing as Chinese incomes grow, will
continue to underpin residential housing demand for some time. But as markets become
saturated, housing is likely to become a less powerful engine of Chinese growth. The slowdown
in residential property investment over the past few years has affected heavy industries that
produce construction materials, including steel. The weakness in demand of late, combined with earlier
strength of investment, has led to a rise in excess capacity in a range of manufacturing and mining
industries, and widespread deflation in industrial prices. Growth of profits in the industrial sector is now the
weakest it has been since the nonperforming loan crisis of the late 1990s (Graph 7). Excess capacity in the industrial sector has
been associated with the phenomenon of socalled zombie firms enterprises that are making losses but still attracting financial
resources. 6 In many cases, these are local government SOEs with substantial social welfare obligations, which leads to
understandable resistance to closure. The
supply-side reform initiative announced by central

government authorities late last year has set goals for the closure of excess capacity in coal and
steel over the next few years.
Economic Transition key to labor intensive services sector

5 The working-age population for urban centres has not yet peaked (given ongoing
urbanisation), although its growth rate is gradually declining. Also, earlier rapid growth in
housing demand was partly a response to unmet demand for private housing that had built up
under the old state-dominated housing system. This source of growth was always going to wane,
as the backlog has been progressively satisfied. 6 The term has been used publicly by the
Premier, Li Keqiang, to describe such firms. For example, see: Keqiang L (2016), Report on the
Work of the Government available at
<http://english.gov.cn/premier/news/2016/03/17/content_281475309417987.htm>, delivered
at the Fourth Session of the 12th National Peoples Congress of the Peoples Republic of China, 5
March. BIS central bankers speeches 7 Evidence of poor returns in manufacturing is mirrored
in declining returns to investment for the Chinese economy overall. Rough estimates suggest
that the return on capital in China has fallen relative to the average cost of finance, largely
reflecting a rapid increase in the capital-output ratio since the late 2000s (Graph 8).7 Graph 8
Prospects for rebalancing In contrast to the weakness in profits, the share of income going to
labour now appears to be rising, reversing the decline seen over the past decade. 8 Accordingly,
it is reasonable to expect that, over time, the composition of demand will tilt towards
consumption and away from investment. Indeed, there are tentative signs that this rebalancing
may have started in the past few years. However, Chinese consumption growth is already very
strong and, historically, it has been rare for economies to experience stable and strong
consumption growth during such a rebalancing. In China, as in many economies, investment
tends to create sizeable demand for industrial goods, while consumption demand is increasingly
focused on services. Thus, a shift in the composition of demand from investment to
consumption is likely to be accompanied by resources moving from the capital-intensive
industrial sector towards the more labour-intensive services sector. Achieving that in a smooth
manner will be a significant challenge. In particular, the move of workers from industry to the
services sector is unlikely to be seamless and could pose risks for employment and household
income. Any decline in the growth rate of household incomes is likely to pose a risk to
consumption. This is because Chinese households are likely to maintain their high rates of
saving. 9 In part, that desire reflects the significant gaps in public pension and health insurance
systems and incomplete access of many migrant workers to social security. This shift in factor
income shares towards labour is a sign that price signals in the Chinese economy are
increasingly reflecting the investment-heavy pattern of expenditure mentioned earlier.
Chinese economy downfall results in global economic hardship

Phillips 7/2/16 (Matt Philips writes about finance, markets and economics. He worked at
The Wall Street Journal for seven years, most recently covering the aftermath of the Great
Recession and the relentless descent of U.S. interest rates. Other descents he covered at the
Journal include the January 2009 splashdown of U.S. Airways Flight 1549 into the Hudson
River and Hillary Clintons bid for the Democratic presidential nomination in 2008. Matt caught
the markets bug as lead writer for the Journals MarketBeat blog, which he helped turn into one
of the most heavily trafficked web properties at the Journal. He spends much of his time trying
to force bankers, traders and economists to speak comprehensible English). Quartz

http://qz.com/722123/britain-doesnt-matter-to-the-global-economy-china-does/- triscuit
With all due respect, Britain doesnt really matter that much. To be sure its upsetting to see the UK political establishmentboth
when were
talking about the future direction of the global economy, Britain has been playing a diminishing
role for decades. According to the IMF, the UK accounted for roughly 2.4% of global GDP in 2015, down from about 4% in the
early 1980s. This means that the slowdown in the UK will barely nudge the worlds large economies at all.
For example, Goldman Sachs economists now estimate that the spillover effects on the US economy from the
Brexit vote will be a scant 0.1%. No, if youre looking for something to worry about, spin the globe and plant your pudgy
finger on the Peoples Republic of China, which continues to grapple with an economic slowdown that has
significant implications for almost every country on earth. Data released July 1 on the countrys all-important
major partiesbeing torn asunder amid a significant turn inward for one of the worlds great democracies. But
manufacturing sector show a deepening contraction there, with the June number falling to 48.6 from 49.2 in May. (Anything below
50 indicates contraction.) If
theres any good news, the slowdown in Chinas manufacturing activity

seems to be offset to a certain degree by an uptick in services. This is a positive sign, as China
must make an economic transition away from export-driven manufacturing if it wants to
produce more sustainable growth. (There simply arent enough customers outside China for all the factories that have
been built in the Peoples Republic to keep busy.) Chinese policymakers are trying to carry out this difficult transition in the
incremental, tightly controlled, less-than-transparent way weve come to expect from the authoritarian regime. That approach
stands in stark contrast to the abrupt, public, and democratic turn the United Kingdom took in the recent EU referendum. But while
they are much quieter, the changes in China remain vastly more important to the global economy as a whole.
Xi Pushing Anticorruption
Xi doubling down on anti-corruption campaignthreatens increasing
instabilityspecifically going after CYL
PHILLIPS 5/3-Beijing Correspondent for the Guardian [Tom, China's Xi Jinping denies House of Cards power struggle but
attacks 'conspirators', 5/3/2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/04/china-xi-jinping-house-of-cards-attacksconspirators, DKP]
Xi Jinping has rejected claims that a House of Cards power struggle is raging at the
pinnacle of Chinese politics, but claimed conspirators were attempting to undermine the
Communist party from within. In a speech published in Beijings official newspaper this week, the Chinese
president warned that the presence of cabals and cliques inside the party risked
compromising the political security of the party and the country. There are
careerists and conspirators existing in our party and undermining the partys governance, Xi said, according to the
Peoples Daily transcript of his comments. We should not bury our heads in the sand and spare these members but must
make a resolute response to eliminate the problem and deter further violations. The speech comes
at a time of growing speculation over possible factional struggles within the 88 million-member Communist
party that Xi has led since late 2012. As evidence of those rifts, experts point to recent moves by Xi to rein in the
influential C ommunist Y outh L eague, which is the power base of former president Hu Jintao and current
prime minister Li Keqiang. This week it emerged that the Youth Leagues budget had been slashed
by more than 50% following a damning investigation into its activities by Xis anti-corruption
agents. Experts also see Xis decision last month to take on the title of commander-in-chief of
Chinas joint battle command centre as a potential indicator of trouble at the top. Since coming to power Xi
has amassed an unusual plethora of official titles including general secretary of the Communist party, president of
the Peoples Republic of China, chairman of the central military commission, leader of the national security commission and head of
the leading group for overall reform. One academic has dubbed him the chairman of everything. Roderick MacFarquhar, a
Harvard University expert in elite Communist party politics, said :
Xi Jinpings donning of uniform and giving him his

title is a warning to his colleagues that he has the army behind him. Whether he actually
has or not, one doesnt know. But that is his bulwark, as it was Maos. However, MacFarquhar said the new
title could be a sign of weakness rather than strength , noting that not even Mao Zedong had
accumulated such a glut of titles. Chairman Mao never needed titles. Everyone knew who was
in charge, he said. Xi has made a high-profile anti-corruption campaign one of his
administrations key missions, disciplining hundreds of thousands of officials, including top party and military figures.
But experts say the war on corruption has generated discontent among officials, caused
political paralysis [failure] and fuelled suspicions Xi is using the campaign as a pretext to
purge his political enemies. Advertisement In his recent speech, Xi denied those charges and vowed to
step up the anti-corruption drive , according to Xinhua, Chinas official news and propaganda agency. We
must make it clear that our partys fight against corruption is not a snobbish affair that discriminates between
new military
different people, and it is not a House of Cards power struggle, Xi said. Andrew Wedeman, a political scientist who is writing a book
called Swatting Flies and Hunting Tigers: Xi Jinpings War on Corruption, said continuing to pursue the campaign carried severe
risks for Chinas leader. There is a certain point where the elite would want to wind this down because at the end of the day as
perhaps suggested by the revelations in the Panama Papers there is enough guilt to go around among the leadership that if you
really push this thing too far then an awful lot of people would be in trouble. Given
the extent of corruption, you can

only push this thing so far without doing serious damage to the integrity and the unity of the
party, Wedeman added.
Xi is stepping up anti-corruption now, but hes fighting an uphill

battle against the rest of the CCP.
Hewitt 5/4 (Duncan, Shanghai correspondent for Newsweek/IBT Media and former BBC correspondent in Beijing and
Shanghai, Cliques And Conspirators Threaten Security Of Chinas Communist Party, President Xi Jinping Warns, International
Business Times, May 4th, 2016. http://www.ibtimes.com/cliques-conspirators-threaten-security-chinas-communist-party-presidentxi-jinping-2363773)//king koopa
The anti-corruption campaign, which has also led to the punishment of hundreds of thousands of lower level officials, is generally seen
to have been popular with many ordinary Chinese citizens. But it is believed to have aroused dissatisfaction among some of the
party's 88 million members, who have balked at the strict discipline imposed by Xi . In a series of
tightened requirements, he has called on party officials to live frugal lifestyles and stop attending private clubs, including golf clubs, not to have
extramarital affairs, and to restrict their families business dealings. China's leaders have acknowledged that some officials have responded to the
crackdown by simply working less hard. In
recent months the discipline campaign appears to have become

increasingly political, with new rules preventing party members from criticizing party policy in
public and increased emphasis on Marxism and atheism. And amid a widening campaign against "western values" in China, a number of
party members have recently been punished for the previously rarely heard charge of making
groundless comments about the Communist Party. Xi said in his speech that banning such comments doesnt mean
members cant criticize the party," but added that "comments on important political issues, liberalism or singing out of tune with the central
government are not allowed." He also said
the party would "kick out" two-faced members who promised to

fight corruption but never reported problems. And he vowed that the anti-corruption
campaign would not wind down. And in a recent move, which some analysts have linked to political infighting, the
Communist Youth League power base of Xi's predecessor as president, Hu Jintao, and current Premier
Li Keqiang recently had its budget slashed in half after an investigation by anti-corruption teams
revealed embezzlement and other irregularities.
UQ-Hague=Aggro Xi
Hague decision makes SCS war uniquely likelywindow is now
WRIGHT 7/21-fellow and director of the Project on International Order and Strategy at the Brookings Institution in
Washington, PhD @ Georgetown [Thomas, Nikkei Asian Review, Thomas Wright: South China Sea ruling gives the US a strategic
boost, 7/21/2016, http://asia.nikkei.com/magazine/20160721-CORPORATE-ASIA-NOWHERE-TO-HIDE/PoliticsEconomy/Thomas-Wright-South-China-Sea-ruling-gives-the-US-a-strategic-boost, DKP]
The surprising international tribunal ruling against Beijing's claims in the South China Sea was a vindication of
long-standing U.S. policy on the disputed waters and went well beyond Washington's expectations. In firmly rejecting
China's "nine-dash" line, the tribunal at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague provided support for the U.S.
argument that all maritime disputes in Asia must be resolved multilaterally and peacefully. The ruling also provides legal
justification for freedom of navigation operations, whereby U.S. ships sail close to China's
artificial islands. The scale of Beijing's legal defeat will undoubtedly lead to much
anxiety and anger in China, and raises fears about what happens next. The Chinese
government could respond by dramatically escalat ing its activities in the South China Sea,
leading to a dangerous standoff with American forces. With war raging in the Middle East,
the European Union on the brink of a breakup, a persistent danger from Russia and a spreading global
terrorist threat , the last thing the U.S. needs right now is a real security crisis in the South
China Sea. It was no surprise, therefore, to see senior U.S. policymakers welcome the result but also stress that they would
give China space to resist the temptation for an aggressive response. There was no spiking of the ball, as Americans describe over-
Washington will no doubt respond strongly

to any new provocations by China, but it will be keen to avoid any perception that its own actions are provocative. In
the long run, however, the ruling will benefit the U.S. and its allies. With its uncompromising but
clear logic, the decision provides an overarching rationale for U.S. strategy toward East
Asia that revolves around upholding the rule of law . This rationale ensures that the U.S.
stands for more than preserving its influence in the region. It is a guarantor of a rulesbased order. The rule of law also appeals to other non-Asian nations, particularly in Europe.
the-top celebrations when a football team scores a touchdown.
China's neighbors can now impress on the EU the importance of standing shoulder to shoulder on international law wherever it is
challenged, be that in Eastern Europe or the South China Sea. INTERNATIONAL ORDE7R Of course, China
will argue that

the U.S. can be hypocritical on this matter. The U.S. has rejected the rulings of international courts
before and it has not ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, a 1982 treaty that sets out the
rights and responsibilities that states enjoy on the oceans. But this rejoinder matters little . Law regarding
territorial disputes and the acquisition of territory is at the heart of the international
order. The July 12 ruling will have an enormous impact on how the rest of the world
perceives problems in the South China Sea. Never again can those problems be dismissed as
disputes over a bunch of uninhabited rocks -- they are now matters of principle.
Paradoxically, the ruling will also increase pressure on the U.S. to finally ratify UNCLOS. Republicans in the Senate have denied
successive administrations the supermajority needed for ratification, but there may be a renewed push in light of the tribunal's
the ruling creates a dilemma f or China. Hard-liners in Beijing

seem to be arguing for decisive action to demonstrate that the court is ineffective and
cannot enforce its rulings. There is speculation regarding the imposition of an air defense
identification zone , whereby China would require aircraft overflying the South China Sea to
identify themselves to Chinese authorities in advance, along with naval blockades or something
worse. But such measures would only serve to increase the incentive for others to push back.
decision. Most importantly,
The key driver of the U.S. rebalance to Asia is the challenge China poses to the regional order. It
is rarely described in this way. U.S. officials argue that the country is simply increasing its investment in one of the world's most
dynamic and important regions, and that it is not about counterbalancing China. But in truth, there
was limited appetite

in East Asia for greater U.S. engagement when China was playing nice, as it largely was prior to the
financial crisis. The demand for greater U.S. engagement was generated by Chinese
assertiveness in 2009 and 2010, and China's strategy has sustained it ever since. If China
escalates, the U.S. will become increasingly engaged in the South China Sea and will
deploy stronger countermeasures. Chinese assertiveness will only serve to
intensify the rebalance to Asia. Moreover, China's neighbors will have more reason to work
closely with each other on South China Sea issues, as well as Asian security more generally. On the other
hand, if China backs off in the South China Sea, then all to the good. In that event, the tribunal's
ruling will have restored stability to the troubled waters.
Despite Hague rulings, China will stay involved in the South China
Sea but lack of credibility restrains Xi- political capital will motivate
him to be aggressive
Nikkei 7-20-16 (Nikkei Asian Review: Xi turns to mind games after arbitration setback
http://asia.nikkei.com/Features/South-China-Sea-arbitration/Xi-turns-to-mind-games-afterarbitration-setback?page=2) JTE
BEIJING/ULAANBAATAR/WASHINGTON -- The atmosphere was less than cordial when Chinese President Xi Jinping and
European Council President Donald Tusk met at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing on the evening of June 12 .
Earlier
that day, an international tribunal in The Hague had denied China's territorial claims over much
of the South China Sea. Wearing his usual dark blue suit and red necktie and speaking in
his typical detached tone, Xi made China's position clear: "Islands in the South China Sea have
belonged to China since ancient times." China, he added, "would not be affected by the ruling or
accept any action or claim based on it." Sitting opposite the Chinese president, Tusk expressed displeasure of his own,
pressing an index finger into his temple as Xi, occasionally raising his voice, continued rebuffing the humiliating arbitration
decision. State-run China Central Television reported Xi's remarks as a headline story during that day's 7 p.m. news program but
omitted Tusk's statement that the EU trusts the tribunal's findings. Following Xi's lead ,
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang

Yi, who also attended the meeting, stood before TV cameras and stressed that the ruling was unacceptable. The
Philippines, which brought the case to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, and neighboring countries praised the
"historic" ruling and have called on China to respect international law. At the Asia-Europe Meeting summit, the first major
international conference following the tribunal's decision, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe called for the ruling to be used as a
basis for resolving tensions in the South China Sea. Japan has its own territorial dispute with China in the East China Sea .
Beijing
has continued to turn a deaf ear to these urgings. In pursuing its national interests, China
employs the concept of "three wars" -- public relations, psychological and legal . The public relations
war involves disseminating information to sway international public opinion in China's favor , while the
psychological war is aimed at checking other countries using military and other threats. The legal war is designed to win support for
China from the international community through court decisions and other legal means. The tribunal's decision is a serious defeat
on this last front. Since spring, when China began anticipating an unfavorable ruling ,
Beijing has been going on the

offensive on the public relations and psychological fronts. It has little to show for these efforts,
however.
Xi Strong but losing grip

Organized resistance to Xis reforms tanks his political capital
Leigh-Moses 1/8 (Russell Leigh-Moses, as been an academic teaching Chinese politics for more than 20 years,
for most of that time in China. He has been a columnist for China Real Time Since 2010, Three Political Questions
Looming Over Chinas Leadership in 2016 The Wall Street Journal, Jan 8, 2016 5:25 am,
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2016/01/08/three-political-questions-looming-over-chinas-leadership-in2016/, GK)
The boldness and breadth of Xis
reforms have led some in the party ranks to wonder privately aboutand even
openly questionwhether his handling of Chinas challenges has always been correct. For example, there
are some who contend that the anticorruption campaign has placed too much power in the
hands of discipline inspectors and unnecessarily disrupted the status quo (in Chinese). Some of that
scrutiny concerns Xis efforts to reinsert the Party more fully into economic and social life, a
move that risks stoking discontent in a populace that has grown used to a certain level of leeway
in recent decades. There are also those within the political apparatus who see Xis recent
restructuring of Chinas military as courageous but more aimed at quelling dissent from the
armed forces than rejuvenating strategy and doctrine. Even Xi himself has noted in a recently released
collection of internal speeches (in Chinese) that not everything he has been doing has been met with
universal acclaim within the Communist party. Murmurs of discord have reached a level in recent months where a
number of officials have been punished for improper discussion of Party policies. Thus far, the angst, anxiety and antagonism
within the government to Xis reforms remain unorganized. Thats because no one has proposed an alternative strategy for dealing
with the nations many challenges that would unify the disaffected to act against Beijing. Social
activists have little

political support from above; annoyed cadres are afraid that any move to form a coalition could
plunge the country into civil unrest. Xi and his allies have been as determined as theyve been
daring in following their own reform pathand their success in getting their way politically has
been remarkable thus far. The most pressing question for this new year is whether what has
worked thus far will continue to do soor whether the disaffected in China start believing that
their leadership may have begun to run out of answers.
Links
Link-Generic
Backing US down a major win for Xi
Sutter 15 Sutter, Robert, Elliot School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Grading Xi Jinpings America
Policy, The Asian Forum, 15 October 2015, http://www.theasanforum.org/grading-xi-jinpings-america-policy-c.
Xi Jinpings New Priorities and Impact on America Unfortunately, Xis record shows repeated choices that place other foreign and
domestic priorities above his avowed but increasingly hollow claims to seek a positive relationship with the United States. These
actions make it increasingly clear that in
Xis view, positive US ties will come on condition of America

avoiding opposition to new priorities in Chinese foreign relations under him.5 By putting the United
States on notice that it is the United States that has to give way to Chinas practices at odds
with US interests, the Xi government has prompted Obama and his government to be much more vocal in issuing often strident
complaints. Xi has ignored them, leaving it to underlings to rebuff them. The frustration within and outside the US government
grows in the face of Xis actions; there has been a toughening of behavior in some areas. A significant debate has emerged inside and
outside the government with those favoring a tougher policy toward China in the ascendance.6 Xi Jinping began the process of
changing Chinese policies with major implications for the United States as he prepared to take control of the Communist Party of
Chinese
policies and practices became much more assertive. Xi received enormous publicity from Chinese
propaganda and media outlets; his image as a decisive leader prepared to act strongly in the face of
American and other criticism was welcomed by Chinese public opinion and
elite opinion . Chinese reassurance and restraint in dealing with the United States and others were played down; officials
China (CCP) and state power in late 2012. The caution and low profile of the previous leaders were viewed with disfavor.
in China said they had conveyed Chinese weakness to Asian rivals and the United States. The string of Chinese actions and initiatives
shook many out of their complacency:7 The government orchestrated the largest mass demonstration against a foreign target ever
seen in Chinese history (against Japan over disputed islands in September 2012). It followed with intense political, economic, and
security pressure on Japan unseen since World War II. China used coercive and intimidating means to extend control of disputed
territory at neighbors expense. Chinese officials dismissed and rebuffed US and other complaints that their actions upset regional
stability. Despite increasing US complaints, the new Chinese government continued manipulative economic practices, cyber theft,
and reluctance to contribute regional and global common goods. China used its large foreign exchange reserves and trading capacity
to develop international banks and to support often grandiose Chinese plans for Asian and global investments, loans, and trade
areas that excluded the United States and countered American initiatives and support for existing international economic
institutions. Xi Jinping tightened political control domestically in ways grossly offensive to American representatives seeking
political liberalization and better human rights conditions in China. The Chinese advances were supported by ever expanding
Chinese capabilities backed by the impressive and growing economic and military power of China. The Chinese military capabilities
were arrayed against and focused on the American forces in the Asia-Pacific region. Official
Chinese media
highlighted Xis leadership; he was depicted in glowing accounts directing multifaceted Chinese
initiatives abroad with confidence and authority in pursuit of his broad vision of a unified, powerful, and internationally respected
Chinawhat Xi and the Chinese publicists called the China Dream. Complaints by neighbors, the United States, and other powers
concerned with the negative impacts of Xis actions were rebuked or scorned. Power-Shift in Asia and Future US-China Relations
Xis assertive ascendance supported the recently common view among Chinese and international
commentators that China had grown in power and confidence to the extent that a tipping point had arrived
in the Asian order with the United States in decline and China in greater control. The choices for America were often depicted in
stark terms. The United States was called on by some to gird itself to prepare to resist in a contest for supremacy with China.
Others saw the need for America to give way, accepting Chinas leading power and
influence in Asia as America pulled away .
U.S.-China cooperation increases Xis political capital

Rudd 15 [Honorable Kevin, senior fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International
Affairs, Former Prime Minister of Australia, U.S.-China 21, Harvard Kennedy School,
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Summary%20Report%20US-China%2021.pdf RD;
AD 7/25/16]
A common strategic framework for U.S.-China relations would offer many advantages. First, in Washington, it
would help provide strategic direction to Government agencies competing for policy attention and space, as well as those multiple agencies 9 The only
exception which could be made would be the height of U.S.-Soviet military cooperation during the Second World War, which occurred in an entirely
different strategic context to the post-1972 world order. engaged in aspects of the China relationship but not on a daily basis, thereby helping to provide
policy coherence in engaging on an interagency basis, as well as with Chinese interlocutors; Second, in Beijing it would go beyond that because of the
for both
powers, a coherent strategic framework would also inject additional positive ingredients: a common determination to manage significant
differences effectively in order to avoid unnecessary confrontation; a common commitment to collaborate in difficult
policy areas with a view to resolving them; and a common sense of purpose to build political
capital and strategic trust over time. For these reasons, the report argues that the ideational
content of a common strategic framework for the relationship should be : realist about those areas of the
relationship which are not possible to resolve within the foreseeable future; constructive about those areas that could be
resolved with high-level political effort at the bilateral, regional and global levels; and guided by a
common purpose to build strategic trust, step by step, over time , not based on declaratory statements, but
more hierarchical nature of the political and bureaucratic decision-making process, providing direction to the system at large; and Third,
instead on common action in resolving common problems.
Cooperation is framed as a win win for China and enhances Xis

credibility
Tsai 15
Sabrina, research associate at the Project 2049 Institute. What China
Wants You to Think About US-China Relations A look at recent
Chinese propaganda on the bilateral relationship. September 25,
2015 http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/what-china-wants-you-tothink-about-us-china-relations/ TH
Chinese media propaganda is part of a larger political warfare apparatus that recognizes the power of media
The U.S.-China bilateral

relationship is no stranger to Chinas media warfare tactics. The efforts of Chinese news outlets
to shape Xis upcoming visit through special reporting and media content have focused on U.S.China people-to-people ties to highlight themes endorsing the unique qualities embodied in
what the media portrays as a special collaborative relationship between two major powers. In line
warfare in applying pressure to its perceived opponents to achieve its core objectives.
with these efforts, Xinhua conducted exclusive interviews with well-known American former officials and experts
such as Henry Kissinger and many others to highlight the importance of bilateral cooperation going forward.
Unsurprisingly, Chinese media is also framing the relationship through a narrative of win-win cooperation in a
The main message is that cooperation is key and all

differences are, in effect, not as significant and should be overlooked as long as there are signs of
goodwill. For example, China is lauding bilateral cyber security cooperation amidst ongoing
negotiations despite its linkage to state-sponsored attacks against American targets such as the Office of
variety of areas where the two countries are at odds.
Personnel Management (OPM), which encompassed the theft of millions of federal workers private information.
While China has responded by touting its line of mutual cyber victimhood, framing the cyber
security problem as a shared national security issue on which the two countries can cooperate,
the ironic reality is that it has active units that are viciously attacking American businesses,
government agencies, NGOs, and democracy and human rights defenders through cyber
warfare. More excessive versions of Chinese media commentaries calling for cooperation
between the United States and China have outlined a common destiny imperative for the two
(a line previously used at other international forums). The basis of this so-called shared future between
the two nations is placed on grounds of a shared destiny as global powers that have no other
option than to seek mutually-beneficial cooperation out of goodwill and strategic interest to
avoid the Thucydides trap. These broad-sweeping policy concepts fail to detail exactly what a shared
State Councilor Yang Jiechis characterization of the

bilateral relationship as making important contribution to world peace and common
development and Foreign Minister Wang Yis statement referring to China as a contributor,
not a free-rider are interestingly reminiscent of past U.S. policy urging China in becoming a
responsible stakeholder in the international community especially in regards to the global
commons of maritime, air, cyber and space. Chinese media reports of Xis state visit to the
United States are double-thronged in purpose: to strengthen Chinas own identity among
domestic audiences as a credible global power; and, to shape the perceptions of bilateral
relationship between the United States and China. At the invitation of U.S. President Obama, Xis
opportunity to interact with the worlds premier economic and military power constitutes a
milestone for the Chinese leader in the international community. The message is clear from the U.S.
destiny would entail and how it would work. But
administration: not only is the White House welcoming Xi at the highest level of reception, Chinas government and
rule are considered credible, despite the governments strong-armed crackdown on rights lawyers, faith groups and
democracy promoters, as well as its aggressive agenda in the South China Sea. Chinese media emphasis on
Xi sends a signal to the domestic audience in China that not only is

Xi Dada a strong, beloved leader at home, his governments policies and one-party communist
rule are credible and respected abroad as well.
Americas warm welcome toward
Sino-US coop boosts polcap

Montlake 15 (Simon Montlake, Simon Montlake is the deputy world editor at the Monitor in Boston. He's a former
Monitor correspondent in Jakarta, Bangkok, and Beijing, where he covered political upheavals, civil wars, economic crises, natural
disasters, and the Beijing Olympics. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2015/0913/The-US-and-China-Will-it-becollision-or-cooperation,)
Chinas brand of authoritarian capitalism is bound to fail in the future, despite its current economic travails. It would be imprudent
in the extreme to assume a China collapse, he writes. This would amount to a triumph of hope over cold, hard analysis. Boiled
down, Rudds argument is that the US
and China need to set aside political issues on which their positions
are too far apart, such as the status of Taiwan. Instead, they should build mutual trust via joint initiatives
on common problems where there is overlap while taking a constructive approach to bilateral and multilateral issues, such as
Sino-American cooperation can in time

yield the political capital needed for strategic breakthroughs. Curbing the effects of
climate change Mr. Obama and Xi drew up a joint plan of action at a summit in Beijing last November is an example
of common purpose. Rudd says his report is aimed primarily at policy elites in the US and China ,
reform of the UN and of Pan-Asian forums. Rudd argues that
and that any bluntness is intentional. Its causing some level of discomfort in both capitals, I assume.... Im not in the business of
dancing around the edges, he says. For US readers, Rudd deftly unspools Chinese realist thinking on the tenets of American
foreign policy, namely that the US has a dual strategy of undermining China from within, while also containing China from
without. Exhibit A: Obamas first-term pivot to Asia and US arms sales to countries such as India and Vietnam. From Chinas
perspective, such steps are evidence of preemptive containment. Similarly, Rudd recognizes the concerns of US strategists who fret
Xi is far more decisive

and destiny-driven than his predecessors. In May 2014, Xi outlined a regional security concept in which the US
that China seeks to create a sphere of influence in Asia that would exclude the US. Rudd notes that
wasnt welcome Critics say Rudds engagement strategy finding common ground and solving non-core problems wont defuse
the deeper divisions. Sino-American tensions arent simply about a lack of goodwill or diplomatic mechanisms, says Ashley Tellis, a
senior associate at Carnegie and coauthor of a report published in April that advocates a hawkish US stance on China. These are
fundamental clashes of interest. Theres nothing in Kevins report that tells me how to circumnavigate these clashes.Rudd argues
that Xi may be open to a grand strategic bargain with the US on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Other analysts have
proposed that a parallel formula be found for Taiwan, whereby the US stops selling weapons in return for a Chinese pledge not to
force reunification.
Link-BIT
Support for the BIT key to help Xi shore up his power base for reform
Paulson 4/29/15 http://cn.nytimes.com/china/20150429/c29paulson/en-us/ Henry Paulson, former US Treasury
secretary
Xi Jinping is facing enormous challenges at home, and he has made it clear that he wants to
have a good relationship with the United States. The recent U.S.-China climate change
agreement not only shows how serious China is about dealing with carbon emissions, it also
signals that China is willing to work with the United States on solving global problems. Among
other things, I believe President Xi will be looking for progress on a bilateral investment treaty,
which will both help open Chinese markets further to U.S. businesses and force Chinas
economy to reform . Just as Chinas entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001 helped
Premier Zhu Rongji push economic reforms , a bilateral investment treaty would help Xi
fight vested interests who are opposed to his reform agenda.
BIT Directly boosts Chinese reform pace

Levine 12/9/14 HENRY LEVINE Senior Advisor Albright Stonebridge Group
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2014/12/19-china-reemergence-comparing-usjapan-perspectives/transcript.pdf
Finally let me just say then that as we look ahead on e item that is absolutely critical and I
consider it in some ways a subset of the third plenum almost, and that is the U.S. China s
Reemergence as a Great Power: Comparing American and Japanese Perspectives 12 Economy
and Politics December 19, 2014 Center for East Asia Policy Studies, Brookings China bilateral
investment treaty. I think it is clearly a part of President Xi's thinking as a tool to drive
reform within China, a nd I think that conclusion in a timely way of a high quality bit will not
only have enormous positive commercial and economic impacts, but it will also have very
positive effects on broader U.S. - China relations as it reinforces the notion that China is ind eed
committed to opening. So far the negotiators feel they're making progress. I think we should all
just hope that that continues and the deal can be wrapped up in a timely way
Chinese factions want BIT as a cover for reforms

South China Morning Post 9/16/15 http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policiespolitics/article/1858654/us-and-china-exchange-new-investment-treaty-offers
Last month, the American Chamber of Commerce in China said turmoil in Chinas stock markets
should encourage Beijing to open the economy more quickly to foreign services companies,
including banks, and that it hoped to see progress during Xis visit. Foreign business leaders
have said Chinese regulations intended to bolster national security have called into question
Chinas commitments to market reforms and could further restrict foreign access to sensitive
sectors. Nonetheless, some experts say factions in China would like to use the external
pressure of the BIT to hasten reforms.
Factions in China want Bilateral Investment Treaty

Hughes and Brunnstrom 15
(Krista, and David. U.S., China exchange new investment treaty offers ahead of Xi visit
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-investment-idUSKCN0RF2KN20150915 TH)
The United States and China have exchanged revised offers for a proposed investment treaty, a
spokeswoman for the U.S. Trade Representative said, in the lead-up to Chinese President Xi
Jinping's visit to the White House next week. China, which has more restrictions on foreign
investment than the United States, is in talks with Washington to reduce the scope of so-called
negative lists of sectors closed to the other side's investors. The USTR spokeswoman said revised negative list
offers were exchanged at talks in Washington last week. Business groups are hoping for news on the bilateral
investment treaty (BIT) during Xi's visit to the United States, which is expected to start on the
West Coast next Monday and include talks with President Barack Obama later in the week. "The
United States continues to review Chinas revised negative list and assess next steps in the negotiations," the USTR spokeswoman
said in an emailed statement late on Monday. "In order to conclude the BIT negotiations successfully, the two sides will need to
reach agreement on a high standard treaty text and a Chinese negative list that is limited, narrow, and represents a substantial
liberalization of the Chinese investment market." China on its part complains that the United States has singled out Chinese
investors for national security reviews. The sides exchanged initial lists in June. On Tuesday, a group of 94 CEO's of some of
America's biggest firms signed a letter to Xi and Obama calling for the rapid conclusion of "a meaningful and high-standard"
bilateral investment treaty, saying they hoped "significant" progress could be made during Xi's visit. "A high-standard BIT with
clear provisions providing equal treatment to each countrys investors and a short list of exceptions is one of the key items that
could make an immediate and tangible impact for both of our economies, they said. The CEOs included Tim Cook of Apple, Warren
Buffett of Berkshire Hathaway, Rex Tillerson of ExxonMobil, Jeffrey Immelt of General Electric, Muhtar Kent of Coca Cola, Mark
Fields of Ford, Doug McMillon of Walmart and Mark Zuckerberg of Facebook. U.S. investors hope that a treaty will give them
Last month, the

American Chamber of Commerce in China said turmoil in China's stock markets should
encourage Beijing to open the economy more quickly to foreign services companies, including
banks, and that it hoped to see progress during Xi's visit. Foreign business leaders have said
Chinese regulations intended to bolster national security have called into question China's
commitments to market reforms and could further restrict foreign access to sensitive sectors.
Nonetheless, some experts say factions in China would like to use the external pressure of the
BIT to hasten reforms.
increased access to China's many state-dominated industries, from financial services to telecommunications.
Link-Climate Engagement
Jinping gains massive clout from climate agreement with the us
confront inevitable emissions reduction AND appear powerful
West 11/13/14 James West is senior digital editor for Mother Jones, and before that, the senior producer for its
reporting project Climate Desk. He wrote Beijing Blur (Penguin 2008). James has a masters of journalism from NYU, and has
produced a variety of award-winning shows in his native Australia, including the national affairs program Hack.
http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2014/11/china-obama-climate-deal-pollution-crisis-politics
China has to act on air pollution. If it doesn't, the country risks political instability . Top
Republicans have slammed the US-China deal as ineffective and one-sided. "China won't have to reduce anything," complained Sen.
Jim Inhofe (Okla.) in a statement, adding that China's promises were "hollow and not believable." But the assumption that China
won't try to live up to its end of the bargain misses the powerful domestic and global incentives for China to take action. The first,
and most pressing, is visible in China's appalling air quality. President Xi
Jinping needs to act now, says Jerome A.

environmentnot only the climateis the
Cohen, a leading Chinese law expert at New York University. Why? Because " the
most serious domestic challenge he confronts." And Xi has the power to follow through on this "ambitious and
necessary commitment," says Cohen, who notes that the Chinese president will likely be in charge for eight more years and has "no
overt opposition to his impressive power." Over the past few decades, China has witnessed the fastest and deepest wealth creation in
history, hauling millions out of poverty in the space a generation. That growth has been heavily reliant on coal, which makes up
roughly 70 percent of the country's total energy consumption. China is the world's top coal consumer and producer. All that has
come with big cost: toxic air. According to one Lancet study, pollution generated mostly by cars and the country's 3,000 coal-fired
power plants killed 1.2 million Chinese people in 2010. That's why, Cohen says, this new announcement is such a big win for Chinese
people themselvesit's a clear demonstration that the country's leaders are confronting China's largest crisis. "This is very
encouraging progress on a crucial issue of human rights: the right to a nonthreatening environment," he says. China's
air has
become a major political threat to the Communist Party . As we reported in our yearlong investigation
into China's fracking plans, the country has a daily average of 270 "mass incidents"unofficial gatherings of 100 or more
demonstratorssparked in part by pollution and environmental degradation. The message is clear. As The New Yorker's Evan Osnos
put it, if the government doesn't figure out a way to respond, "then it's a political crisis, not just an environment crisis."
That's what my colleague Jaeah Lee and I found when we toured China last year: It's impossible to escape the scourge of coal. To
understand why China wants to act now, you need to understand just how desperate the crisis has become: The Atlantic's James
Fallows made this point Wednesday, writing that "when children are developing lung cancer, when people in the
capital city are on average dying five years too early because of air pollution, when water and agricultural soil and food supplies are
increasingly poisoned,
a system just won't last."
You can watch Fallows explain just how closely tied China's
environmental crisis is to the fortunes of the Communist Party: President Xi Jinping
wants to be a powerful global

player . Another motivation for Chinese action has to do with global politics, says Orville Schell, who directs the Center on USChina Relations at the Asia Society in New York. "Xi Jinping is a very tough, muscular, nationalist leader whose
toolbox is taken from earlier Mao periods," Schell said in a phone interview. According to Schell, Xi's preference for assertive
leadership on the world stage means that China is "going to accept much less hectoring and bullying" from the rest of the world,
perceived or otherwise. "They are going to be much more defiant." This
dealin which China is appearing on the

world stage as an equal partner with the United States fits into that narrative, explains NYU's
Cohen. The "climate issue is needed to boost sagging and increasingly tense Sino-American
relations," he said. "Xi is pursuing a two-faced policy toward the US: progress on issues of critical importance to him and his
party/state, and relentless hostility toward the continuing soft power influence of the US over the Chinese people and China's
neighbors. Xi
is facing severe internal challenges. He sees that the US can help him on some and undermine
is actually serious
about climate change. It's not the case that everything is about the machinery of global politicsor even simply about
him on others, so, following one of Chairman Mao's famous maxims, he is 'walking on two legs.'" China
China's domestic worries over air quality. China's recent actions suggest that its policymakers are actually attempting to confront
global warming. Beijing has committed to gradually shut down coal plants inside the city by 2017. Obama and Xi agreed last year to
curb the use of hydrofluorocarbonspowerful greenhouse gases that are used in refrigerants. In September, China announced it was
moving forward with plans for a massive, nationwide cap-and-trade program intended to help combat climate change. The program
will launch in 2016, but there are already a series of pilot carbon markets across the country.
China is transforming attitudes on climate change because of

pollution only boosts pol cap
Ewing 12/10/15 This article was written by Jackson Ewing, adjunct research fellow in international relations at
Nanyang Technological University, for The Conversation. http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/12/10/why-china-and-theus-have-found-common-purpose-on-climate-change
China's Pollution Crisis In China, conventional pollution has moved environmental issues up the
list of development priorities and made them part of the countrys core national strategic
calculations. The scale and scope of protests against air pollution and environmental decline
which by some measurements lead to 1.6 million deaths per year are on the rise, and Chinese
leadership is responding through rhetoric and practice. President Xi called poor air quality
Beijings most prominent challenge in 2014, while a top climate adviser deemed an acute
pollution episode in the capital unbearable. [READ: Primer: The UN Climate Summit in Paris]
In response, the metrics for measuring local bureaucratic success and promotions through party
ranks emphasize environmental performance more than ever before. Punitive measures against
polluters are gaining strength, and efforts to transform energy systems are accelerating through
rapid expansions in solar, wind and nuclear sectors. Such measures have the corollary effect of
reducing greenhouse gas emissions, which has changed the ways that Chinese leadership views
international pressure to act on climate change. Outside pressures to reduce Chinas carbon
emissions used to be viewed as anathema to the countrys development needs, and a distraction
from its core business of wealth generation and societal development. They are now seen as
opportunities for gaining partnerships, technical support and finance to help China transition
toward a cleaner energy future. This includes expanding Chinas manufacturing and export of
clean-energy technologies, which have strong economic growth potential. Xis China thus looks
to the international climate arena for help addressing its domestic energy transition and
pollution reduction goals. That the measures taken will also reduce climate risks is an added
bonus.
Factions support Climate Change policy. Paris Proves

Dequan 4-25-16
By Ling, Researcher of Center for World Affairs Studies Xinhua News Agency Signing landmark
Paris Agreement to combat climate changeEditor: Tong Xinxin CCTV 04-25-2016 15:46 BJT
http://english.cctv.com/2016/04/25/ARTIfuKH268UXKWEUqd7duZF160425.shtml TH
China has promoted the Paris Agreement. Last December, President Xi Jinping attended the Paris
conference and delivered a speech on Chinas proposals, which had won widespread support.
Beijing has communicated with various factions to resolve diplomatic concerns . Chinese Vice Premier
Zhang Gaoli, special envoy of Chinese President Xi Jinping, participated in the signing ceremony on behalf of China on April 22.
Zhang said, China
is a responsible developing country, and the Chinese people honor their

commitments. We will live up to the innovative, coordinative, green, open and sharing
developing concepts to earnestly implement the Paris Agreement. China will continue working
hard to fight against climate change. He promised, China will finalize domestic legal procedures to ratify the Paris
Agreement on climate change before the G20 Hangzhou summit in September this year. China will work with other countries, and
China has pledged to

peak its carbon emissions by 2030. In its 13th Five- Year Plan, it intends to cut its carbon
emissions per unit of GDP by 18 percent in the coming five years , and carry out double control over the
has appealed to G20 members to promote universal approval and implementation of the agreement.
volume and intensity of energy consumption, build zero carbon emission trial project, launch a national emission trade market, and
substantially increase forest carbon sink. Meanwhile, China has established a strict accountability system for environmental
protection. Beijing
will also deepen South-South cooperation on climate change.
Climate agreement overcomes domestic opposition to Xis climate

change agenda
Nakamura and Mufson 11/12/14
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/china-us-agree-to-limit-greenhousegases/2014/11/11/9c768504-69e6-11e4-9fb4-a622dae742a2_story.html David Nakamura
covers the White House. He has previously covered sports, education and city government and
reported from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Japan. Follow @davidnakamura Steven Mufson covers
energy and other financial matters. Since joining The Post, he has covered the White House,
China, economic policy and diplomacy. Follow @StevenMufson. Follow @StevenMufson
The joint climate announcement could undercut U.S. critics who have said that limiting
greenhouse gases is pointless while China refuses to join such efforts. And it could quiet those in
China who have argued that carbon emissions should be measured on a per capita basis or by
improvements in energy intensity.
It is imperative that these two countries the worlds largest emitters of greenhouse gases
show real leadership. This is an important start, said Phil Sharp, president of Resources for the
Future. Agreements like this are more important than they might appear at first glance,
because in both countries there are political factions that justify inaction by pointing at the
failures of the other country.
Chinese efforts inevitable US approval boosts their legitimacy

Carlson and Wang 11/14/14 https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/domestic-politics-uschina-climate-change-announcement Ann Carson is the Shirley Shapiro Professor of Environmental Law, and the inaugural Faculty
Director of the Emmett Institute on Climate Change and the Environment at the UCLA School of Law. Alex Wang is a faculty
member at the UCLA School of Law, where he specializes in environmental law and Chinese law and legal institutions.
While President Obama faces significant domestic opposition to his commitment, conventional
wisdom has it that China can simply, by fiat, transform its economic and energy policy to
achieve its climate goals. Yet, China has long faced tremendous resistance to reform from a
sprawling, fragmented polity. What reason is there to believe that the 2030 carbon emissions
peak will be any more achievable than past environmental goals? The most plausible reason is
that Chinese leaders have in recent years gradually increased the priority of environmental
goals, and more importantly have come to see environmental protection as a vehicle for
transforming Chinas approach to economic growth. Ensuring that Chinas economic engine
does not falter, in turn, is central to the legitimacy of the Party-state. Thus, political will to
transform Chinas economy has produced a certain amount of political will for a shift to a lowercarbon economy. Chinas choking levels of air pollution have bolstered this dynamic. Chinas
stated strategy these days is to move away from heavy industry, exports, and coal, towards an
economy built on services and higher-value-added industries powered by a more diverse energy
mix. But this economic transformation has faced significant opposition from entrenched
domestic interests, such as the central state-owned enterprises in power, coal, steel, oil, and the
like. As a result, economic transformation has been uncertain, energy security risks have
increased, and Chinas skies have continued to fill with pollution. The U.S.-China
announcement should be viewed in this context . It is a signal of intent from the highest
reaches of the state that economic transformation remains a central priority. And the
unprecedented nature of the joint announcement also suggests Chinese leaders believe that the
domestic effort could use all the help it can get. In the end, the U.S.-China announcement has
the potential to shift the debate within each country about the trajectory of their climate
policies as much as it shifts the debate within the international community. For its effect on
domestic policy alone, we think the announcement really may be a game changer.
Independently, climate change is a cover for fast reform

Horn-Phathanothai and Bapna 9/24/15 Leo and and Manish
http://www.wri.org/blog/2015/09/chinas-xi-heads-washington-look-progress-climate-change
Leo Horn-Phathanothai Director for International Cooperation
amid
uncertainty around China's economy and acrimony on cybersecurity, at least one issue holds promise for positive
collaboration: climate change. Last years landmark climate agreement between the two countries, including Chinas
President Xi Jinping's visit to the United States comes at a moment of high tension in Sino-U.S. relations. But
pledge to peak emissions and ramp up non-fossil energy, and the bold steps taken domestically to curb emissions indicate Chinas
seriousness. Realizing President Xis commitment on climate depends on perseverance with broader economic, financial and
institutional reforms. Look specifically at how China deals with its current economic slowdown, its crisis-level air and water
pollution and its overseas investments. Tackling Economic Slowdown Could Put China on Low-Carbon Path If
Beijing responds to the current hard landing by accelerating economic and financial reforms, China will easily meet or even exceed
its climate objectives. Chinas leadership clearly recognizes that a new model of growth is needed , one driven by
consumption, services, and advanced manufacturing. And it has made some important progress in rebalancing its economy in that
direction, as reflected in recent declines and possible peaking in Chinas coal use, declines in heavy industrial output and the
rising share of services in Chinas GDP. While the economic slowdown has contributed to declines in consumption of energy, China
has also taken numerous steps to limit energy consumption in energy-intensive industries and expand non-fossil energy. Chinas
perseverance in carrying out these plans will be important for the shift to low-carbon energy. A clear sign of the governments intent
to rebalance its economy is the way green finance has climbed the agenda .
Green financial reform addresses two

pressing policy priorities: the need to rebalance the economy and unleash new sources of economic dynamism as the
economy slows, and the need to restore an environment that has degraded to the point of crisis. As such, green financial reform is as
much about saving the environment as it is about salvaging the economy. On the other hand the government
will struggle to bend the emissions curve if it defaults to measures that prop up the current inefficient and over-leveraged system
that channels cheap credit towards highly polluting sectors such as construction, manufacturing and infrastructure that are
already plagued by overcapacity. Ultimately, progress needs to be seen in deep reform that moves the Chinese economy away from
high-carbon drivers of growth, by tackling distortions in the economic system at their root, through true-cost pricing of energy and
water, financial reform and a substantial shrinking of the state-owned sector. Sophisticated, Inclusive Approach to Pollution vs
Business As Usual Will China embrace more sophisticated whole-of-society approaches to pollution control in the face of
widespread public concern, or will it default to familiar but less-effective top-down enforcement? Recent institutional reforms and
advances in information and communication technology (including the rise of social media) create exciting opportunities to tackle
pollution through a broad, participatory approach that engages citizens and businesses, and ensures progress is sustained over time.
Amendments to the Environmental Protection Law (EPL) could make it among the strongest environmental laws around and pave
the way for improved environmental governance. And judicial improvements offer the possibility of a stronger role for the courts in
handling local environmental grievances. At the same time the public disclosure of data on air quality and pollution sources in
dozens of Chinese cities enables greater transparency and accountability, driving heightened civic awareness and engagement on
environmental issues beyond air pollution. In Zhejiang Province, for example, reports on pollution sources are published daily, so
residents can monitor pollution from 563 state-owned enterprises in real time. But this is an isolated case, and it remains to be seen
whether Zhejiangs enlightened approach will catch on elsewhere. For sustained progress, Chinas environmental policy needs to
evolve beyond brute application of the principle that the polluter pays to foster greater responsibility and participation by citizens
and the private sector. Chinas Overseas Investments Need to Match Its Domestic Climate Stance Because heat-trapping emissions
dont stop at borders, Chinas commendable climate efforts at home should be matched in its investments abroad. This year, China
sent almost as much capital overseas as it attracted in foreign direct investment. Chinas overseas investments are expected to
continue increasing as overcapacity at home and $3.3 trillion in reserves in search of better returns drive an outbound push in
foreign direct investment. At the same time, the government aims to make China a hub of international finance by establishing the
BRICS bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). These developments point to the high stakes of China greening
its international financial flows. Initial signs including the release of consultation document on environmental and social
safeguards by the AIIB suggest China
may play by the rules and could even set a higher bar for the rest
of the world. Deliberations are at early stage and all is yet to play for: this will be an important area for further engagement with
the US and others. And it remains to be seen if this progressive stance will be generalized across all Chinas vast OFDI flows, and if
Chinese banks will go beyond a do-no-harm approach to shifting their portfolios from brown to green. Chinas hosting of the G20
next year, and its decision to put green finance on the agenda, may offer some encouraging signals in that regard. Keep Watching
China China has come a long way since its initial international pledge on climate change before the 2009 Copenhagen climate
conference. Its November 2014 joint announcement with the United States has increased worldwide momentum toward a climate
agreement in Paris. What President Xi says in Washington on these three key indicators could further build confidence on Chinas
climate commitments and the possibilities for global action. Because of the sheer size of its economy and its environmental
challenges, any shift in Beijing creates ripples around the world. If we want to know which way China will move,
we need to pay attention not only to what President Xi says on Friday or in Paris, but at how the economy, environmental policy and
overseas investments are moving.
Environmentalism drums up political support for Xi

BROWN 16-Director of the Lau China Institute and Professor of Chinese Studies at Kings College, Associate Fellow of
Chatham House, London, previously Head of the Asia Programme at Chatham House, London and a member of the British
Diplomatic Service, PhD in Modern Chinese Language and Politics @ Leeds University [Kerry, Foreign Policy Making Under Xi
Jinping: The Case of the South China Sea, The Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 4, No. 2, February 2016,
http://www.jpolrisk.com/foreign-policy-making-under-xi-jinping-the-case-of-the-south-china-sea/, DKP]
The second theme that can be picked out from Xis statement is that of environmentalism. As
scholar Bill Hayton pointed out in his study of the South China Sea arguments, environmentalism has always figured
as the soft side of how to manage the multi-country dispute. This contributed to the idea of a Peace Park, put
forward by some officials and academics from countries involved in the 1990s, describing a vast marine biology zone in the maritime
Xi himself has sat

within a government that has used environmental concern as a means of arousing popular
domestic support, but also for garnering plaudits from the international community witness the
territory that would not be owned by any one country but placed under multi-sovereign stewardship.[15]
major accords Xi signed with the US during the Asia Pacific Economic Meeting (APEC) in November 2014, and then during his state
visit to the United States in September 2015. Giving
an environmentalist angle to Chinas interests in the

South China Seas at least lessens the harsh tone of its hard power interests by dressing them up in
softer language. It is not surprising therefore that this concern seeps through to the statements of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its spokesperson, Hong Lei, for instance, in a statement on the 27th April 2015 stated that, Chinas
construction on islands and reefs of Nansha is mainly for civilian purposes, which will be conducive to
safeguarding the safety of navigation, [and] protecting the ecological environment (emphasis added).[16] A similar
statement was made in the same year when Cui Tiankai, the Chinese ambassador to the United States, stated that the main purpose
of the installations being built in the disputed territories was to provide services to ships of China, neighboring countries and other
countries that sail across the South China Sea. Such services will include shelter for ships, navigation aid, search and rescue, marine
meteorological observation, fishery service and many others. Emphasis
will also be put on marine environment
protection.[17]
The AFF is a win for Xi

CHEUNG 15-former executive director of the U.S.-China Energy Cooperation Program, a consortium of U.S. and Chinese
companies that supports bilateral commercial cooperation on climate change [Ray, Climate Change Cooperation Is Historic
Opportunity for Xi, Obama, Caixin Online, 9/17/2015, http://english.caixin.com/2015-09-17/100851253.html, DKP]
As U.S. President Barack Obama and President Xi Jinping meet in Washington from September 22 to 28, the two leaders have a
unique opportunity to make history by solidifying U.S.-China cooperation in combating global
climate change. By working together to reduce carbon pollution, the presidents can lead the world's largest polluters to unleash a new era of
sustainable economic growth, while creating a framework for long-term bilateral strategic cooperation. No doubt, Obama and Xi will be engaged in
intense discussions on the complicated U.S.-China relationship. Issues range from accusations of cyber spying to growing military assertiveness in the
Asian-Pacific region. However, both
will be keen to highlight the progress made since November's bilateral

climate agreement. Xi committed China to cap its carbon pollution by 2030 and increase its use of zero-emission energy sources to 20
percent by 2030. Obama agreed to cut America's carbon pollution by 26 percent to 28 percent below 2005 levels by 2025. The two leaders are expected
to promote new low-carbon commercial projects and technical exchanges at the summit. This
joint effort to reduce the threat of a warming

be momentous. First, it can rejuvenate U.S.-China commercial ties, which have become increasingly acrimonious with
accusations of unfair trade practices and intellectual property theft. For China, cuts in carbon pollution will increase the
country's economic efficiency a fundamental element in Beijing's economic reforms as the Chinese
climate can
consumes three times more energy per output of GDP than the United States. The
Chinese effort will create new business

opportunities for U.S. clean technologies, as China is the world's largest renewable energy investor, investing US$ 89.5 billion in 2014 alone,
according to Bloomberg. While the Obama administration sanctioned Chinese solar panel manufacturers for alleged dumping that caused American job
losses, a study by the Pew Charitable Trust found that American companies in the solar, wind and renewable smart technologies had a trade surplus in
China of over US$ 1.6 billion. Demand for clean technologies will only increase as China needs to spend as much as US$ 6.6 trillion to meet its carbon
pollution reduction commitments. Leading U.S. exporters are already jumping at this opportunity. Boeing, whose airplanes account for more than half
of all commercial jetliners in China, celebrated in March its collaboration with Hainan Airlines and Sinopec in their joint execution of China's first
biofuel-powered commercial flight. Just as important, U.S. and Chinese companies can work together to make new clean technologies affordable by
leveraging American technical innovation with Chinese manufacturing capacity. For example, American and Chinese firms together can reduce the
costs of technologies that capture carbon pollution from coal-fired power plants. The outcome could help the coal industry in both countries meet their
emission reduction targets. Such collaboration across a wide range of clean technologies could ignite a global green industrial revolution. Chinese
companies can also serve as investors for the projects. The proposed Texas Clean Energy Project features a consortium of U.S. and Chinese companies
backed by both governments that seeks to deploy the latest carbon-capture technology in a new 400 megawatt power plant with a total investment of
US$ 2.5 billion. Climate change cooperation will also reduce the risk of a confrontation. A decrease in China's demand for fossil fuels will alleviate
Beijing's energy security concerns. This year, China surpassed the United States as the world's largest oil importer over half of which came from the
Middle East, where the United States continues to be entangled. As important, climate
change commercial cooperation can serve

as the underpinnings of a win-win U.S.-China relationship that creates strategic trust. Through systematic efforts,
Washington and Beijing will be incentivized and equipped to manage their trials and tribulations when strategic interests compete. To
institutionalize this collaboration, the United States and China must expand and deepen their
exchanges between the climate change communities of both countries, such as the sharing of best practice among local
governments. Washington and Beijing must strengthen bilateral political and financial support for joint clean energy commercial projects, such as
economic incentives and fast-track approval, and the establishment of a portfolio of carbon reduction demonstration projects that can be commercially
replicated and scaled globally. This
effort no doubt will require political courage from both sides as each
have their naysayers. Hopefully, Xi and Obama already know this because what is at stake is not just stability and peace between the two
superpowers, but also for the world.
Climate cooperation historically boosts polcap

Montlake 15 (Simon Montlake, Simon Montlake is the deputy world editor at the Monitor in Boston. He's a former
Monitor correspondent in Jakarta, Bangkok, and Beijing, where he covered political upheavals, civil wars, economic crises, natural
disasters, and the Beijing Olympics. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2015/0913/The-US-and-China-Will-it-becollision-or-cooperation,)
Chinas brand of authoritarian capitalism is bound to fail in the future, despite its current economic travails. It would be imprudent
in the extreme to assume a China collapse, he writes. This would amount to a triumph of hope over cold, hard analysis. Boiled
down, Rudds argument is that the US
and China need to set aside political issues on which their positions
are too far apart, such as the status of Taiwan. Instead, they should build mutual trust via joint initiatives
on common problems where there is overlap while taking a constructive approach to bilateral and multilateral issues, such as
Sino-American cooperation can in time

yield the political capital needed for strategic breakthroughs. Curbing the effects of
climate change Mr. Obama and Xi drew up a joint plan of action at a summit in Beijing last November is an example
of common purpose. Rudd says his report is aimed primarily at policy elites in the US and China ,
reform of the UN and of Pan-Asian forums. Rudd argues that
and that any bluntness is intentional. Its causing some level of discomfort in both capitals, I assume.... Im not in the business of
dancing around the edges, he says. For US readers, Rudd deftly unspools Chinese realist thinking on the tenets of American
foreign policy, namely that the US has a dual strategy of undermining China from within, while also containing China from
without. Exhibit A: Obamas first-term pivot to Asia and US arms sales to countries such as India and Vietnam. From Chinas
perspective, such steps are evidence of preemptive containment. Similarly, Rudd recognizes the concerns of US strategists who fret
that China seeks to create a sphere of influence in Asia that would exclude the US. Rudd notes that
Xi is far more decisive
and destiny-driven than his predecessors. In May 2014, Xi outlined a regional security concept in which the US
wasnt welcome Critics say Rudds engagement strategy finding common ground and solving non-core problems wont defuse
the deeper divisions. Sino-American tensions arent simply about a lack of goodwill or diplomatic mechanisms, says Ashley Tellis, a
senior associate at Carnegie and coauthor of a report published in April that advocates a hawkish US stance on China. These are
fundamental clashes of interest. Theres nothing in Kevins report that tells me how to circumnavigate these clashes.Rudd argues
that Xi may be open to a grand strategic bargain with the US on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Other analysts have
proposed that a parallel formula be found for Taiwan, whereby the US stops selling weapons in return for a Chinese pledge not to
force reunification.
Public supports climate change cooperation

Howard, 2015 [Emma, a journalist who writes on social affairs and the environment. She has
won a British Journalism Award for her work on Keep it in the Ground, the Guardian's climate
change campaign, and a Legal Reporting Award for her reports on the impact of cuts to legal aid.
Emma is a trustee at the youth activism charity UpRising, 11-5-15,
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/nov/05/climate-change-concerns-chinesecitizens-plummets]
Nevertheless more
than two-thirds of Chinese people support a global deal on reducing greenhouse

gas emissions, the research states. China ranked as the country where citizens were least concerned about the issue
among 40 nations participating in the study. On average, 54% of the 45,000 people who participated globally expressed serious
concern. Bruce Stokes, the co-author of the report, said there was frankly, no explanation for the drop, but suggested as a possible
reason that there must not be as much public discussion about climate change in China as there are in other parts of the world. In
2010, China overtook the US to become both the biggest producer and biggest consumer of energy in the world. Its
government has been applauded by some for its commitment to reduce its greenhouse gas
emissions per unit of gross domestic product by 60-65% from 2005 levels and to see its
emissions peak by 2030. Despite their lack of concern about climate change, when asked which
domestic issues they found most problematic, Chinese participants consistently named air
pollution near the top. Air pollution is thought to cause thousands of deaths every day in the
country, with coal accounting for two-thirds of Chinas energy consumption. Despite the
apparent absence of anxiety in China, 71% of people interviewed there gave their support to their
government curbing greenhouse gas emissions as part of an international agreement due to be
renegotiated at a crunch UN conference in Paris in December where leaders from more than 190
countries will meet. The study revealed marked support for an agreement in almost all of the countries surveyed Pakistan
was the sole exception even in those countries where there was little anxiety about the issue . The public are crying out
for action, said Stokes. Any public policy issue where you get that many people saying this is a
concern to us it seems to me it is a wake-up call to governments. This is an issue that negotiators
and governments have got to address, he said.
Link-Cyber
!!Cybersecurity agreements give Xi a win weak China shoots for
security over confrontation
Hewitt 9/22/15 http://www.ibtimes.com/enigma-xi-jinping-ahead-us-visit-chinas-tough-leader-beset-economicsocial-challenges-2107893 Duncan Hewitt is Shanghai correspondent for Newsweek/IBT Media. He was previously a BBC
correspondent in Beijng and Shanghai, and also worked for the BBC World Service in London, focusing on East and Southeast Asia.
He studied Chinese at Edinburgh University, and first lived in China in the late 1980s. His book Getting Rich First Life in a
Changing China (Vintage UK, 2008) looks at the social changes unleashed by Chinas economic reforms.
Victor Shih, a specialist in China's political economy and international relations at the University of California, San Diego, agrees
that, in
challenging times, 'Stability trumps all', as the Chinese saying goes -- I think this is more true today than
ever before. Some observers have argued that a weaker Chinese leader, faced with a slowing economy, might be
more prone to provoking confrontation, raising the potential for clashes between Chinas fast-modernizing military, and
regional rivals with whom relations have been tense, including U.S. allies such as the Philippines, Taiwan or Japan. The latter has
just angered Beijing by passing laws allowing its military to engage in overseas actions as well as simply self-defense, for the first
However, Lam says that a more chastened Xi may need a foreign policy
success with the U.S. more than before -- making the chances of an accord on cybersecurity ,
foreign investment in China, or even some form of agreement over the future of the South China Sea, a little more likely on
this trip. Xi is still strong -- no other faction in China can threaten him at the moment, Lam says, but we have seen
some dents in his armor, and not everyone is happy. A serious military confrontation with the U.S. over the
time since World War II.
South China Sea is the last thing Xi needs at present, Lam adds. A skirmish would cause panic in China," he says. "It would hit the
economy, the stock market might collapse -- and they cant afford that. Over the past two years, Lam says, the world has seen a
more assertive China flexing its muscles -- without planning to go too far in provoking others.
!!!Attribution improvement and a cyber deal directly accelerates

Chinese anti-corruption
Goldsmith 6/21/16 http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2016/07/ahead-19th-party-congress-xis-struggle-continues/ Jack
Goldsmith is the Henry L. Shattuck Professor at Harvard Law School, co-founder of Lawfare, a Senior Fellow at the Hoover
Institution at Stanford University, and co-chair of its Working Group on National Security, Technology, and Law. He teaches and
writes about national security law, presidential power, cybersecurity, international law, internet law, foreign relations law, and
conflict of laws. Before coming to Harvard, Professor Goldsmith served as Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel from
2003-2004, and Special Counsel to the Department of Defense from 2002-2003.
U.S. Attribution of Chinas Cyber-Theft Aids Xis Centralization and AntiCorruption Efforts Since I have been a skeptic of the US-China agreement last fall on state-sponsored commercial cyber
theft to benefit local firms (most recently here), I should acknowledge the new report by Fireye that concludes that Chinas
cyberoperations against U.S. firms have dropped significantly since 2014. (Ellen Nakashimna has a relatively non-skeptical take on
the report; David Sangers coverage is more balanced and informative) The reports addresses two questions: (1) what is the nature of
the drop-off of state-sponsored commercial theft for commercial gain?; (2) why did it drop off? Both questions have interesting
answers. The Drop in Commercial Theft. Fireye looked at the activities of 72 suspected China-based groups and found an overall
decline in China-based intrusion activity against private and public sector organizations since mid-2014. It has a chart that shows
active network compromises per month dropping from the 60-70 range in 2014 to less than 10 since the Fall of 2015. But then
Fireye has a different graphic on suspected China-based activity against corporate victims from late 2015-2016. During this period,
it reports, China-based groups compromised the networks of U.S. (and other) semi-conductor firms, at least two high-tech U.S.
corporations, a U.S. healthcare organization, a U.S. software company, a media company (nationality unspecified), and a U.S.
aerospace company. The report concludes that the threat from China is less voluminous but more focused, calculated, and still
successful in compromising corporate networks. The Reasons for the Drop. The report shows that most of the drop-off in Chinabased cybertheft occurred before the Obama-Xi agreement last Fall. It attributes the drop-off primarily
to Xis sweeping
changes impacting its use of network operations, especially his efforts to centralize and emphasize
military and government elements engaged in cyber activity, and his anti-corruption campaign
cracking down on the illegitimate use of state resources. It also gives supporting roles to increasing U.S.
exposure of Chinas state-sponsored commercial cyber-theft, dating back to a May 2013 Pentagon report (and
similar private reports at the time), and including the U.S. indictments of five PLA officers in May 2014 and enhanced threats of U.S.
sanctions during the same period. Putting all of this together, it appears that reforms of Chinas cybertheft practices are grounded
primarily in Xis efforts to centralize cyberoperations and stamp out corruption, and that U.S. exposure efforts aided Xi in these
efforts. In other words, the changes are less about the U.S. imposing or threatening hefty costs on a unitary China (the costs and
threatened costs have not in fact been hefty), and more about the U.S. making transparent corrupt state-sponsored activities to
Chinas government, and thus aiding Chinas government (as embodied in Xis regime) in furthering its interests. This plausible
mechanism of influence is consistent with what I took to be the most interesting elements of John Carlins remarks at Harvard last
December, when he explained (around 38:40) that one reason why the indictments of the PLA officers might change Chinas cybertheft behavior is that China is a big complicated country and that in China (as in the U.S., he implied) disclosure of intelligence
activity caused a lot of internal changes, discussion, and debate and it may not be that everyone in the government over there knew
exactly what everyone was doing or had thought about the consequences of what they were doing before it was named and exposed.
U.S. exposure of China-based cyber-theft serves Xis

interests in clamping down on criminal and unauthorized use of [Chinas] state
resources. This is less a story of coercion than it is of cooperation between the U nited States
government and Xi to serve Xis military centralization and anti-corruption efforts.* What we
The report thus helps us better understand how
dont know is how much state-sponsored commercial theft Xi is willing to tolerate (or able to eliminate), or how the governmentrelated China-groups will morph along Chinas very fuzzy public-private sector line to avoid detection from both Chinas government
and the U.S. government, or to operate in a way outside Chinas government that Xi does not care about. Recall that last falls U.S.China cyber deal, China agreed only not to conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property with the
intent of bringing commercial advantage. * This mechanism is thus quite different from the three possible ones I explored last Fall to
explain the U.S.-China cyber deal: (1) the deal involved little of substance and China would continue its practices, (2) China blinked
in the face of threatened sanctions, or (3) the U.S. made secret concessions. The mechanism is interesting for international relations
theory because it shows the value in not viewing the State as unitary, and because it shows how information
generated by a
rival nation (the United States) can serve a national interest (in China, defined as Xis interests ) and
effectuate cooperation even between rivals States.
Open anti-cyber approach improves Xis position relative to Jiang

Zemin faction
Lee 7/9/16 http://chinascope.org/main/content/view/7976/163/ Nathan Lee is a critic, curator, and PhD student in
Modern Culture and Media. A former film critic for the New York Times and Village Voice, he is a contributing editor of Film
Comment and member of the National Society of Film Critics and the International Federation of Film Critics (FIPRESCI). Lee
received his MA in Curatorial Studies at the Center for Curatorial Studies at Bard College, and has curated projects for the Hessel
Museum of Art (Annandale-on-Hudson, NY), Visual AIDS (NYC), and SALT (Istanbul). Lee was the Curatorial and Program
Associate at CCS Bard from 2011-2013, where he taught courses on Bergson, Deleuze, Laruelle, and the ontology of the moving
image.
Besides, Xi seems to prefer an open approach instead of dirty tricks. For example, he promised
the U.S. and has since made good progress on his promise to stop the cyber intrusions which,
when Jiangs faction was in power, had exploded into constant, massive attacks on the Western
government and on businesses. Xi has distanced Beijing from Pyongyang and has been
advocating the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. We can compare the Jiang Factions
interactions with North Korea with Xis to observe the sharp policy changes.
Cyber agreements successfully distract Chinese populace and improve

Xis image
Lam 10/2/15 http://www.jamestown.org/regions/chinaasiapacific/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news
%5D=44452&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=664&cHash=90fdb51a7bf6ecb0e80c847ae05ef54a#.V5wEODU0A2w Dr. Willy Wo-Lap
Lam is a Senior Fellow at The Jamestown Foundation. He is an Adjunct Professor at the Center for China Studies, the History
Department and the Program of Masters in Global Political Economy at the Chinese University of Hong Kong.
Despite a lack of concrete achievements in his summit with his U.S. counterpart Barack Obama, Chinese President Xi Jinping has
accomplished a more important goal for his domestic audience burnishing his image as a
statesman. At a time when ordinary Chinese are bracing for a possible slide in the countrys GDP growth rateand questioning
the Xi teams economic management skillsthe Fifth-Generation leader seems ready to divert the attention of the
disenchanted public toward the foreign policy arena . And while American media has cast doubt on the
results of the Obama-Xi summit, Communist Party mouthpieces as well as government-affiliated experts in China have given an
effusive appraisal of Xis first official trip to the United States. The build-up of Xis image as a charismatic, globetrotting statesman
began even before he left Beijing. A special cartoon strip run by Xinhua exulted in the trip, using a popular diminutive bestowed by
Chinese netizens: Xi Dada is mighty and powerful, it said. [You are] the pride and hope of Chinese people. Go, Xi Dada! (South
China Morning Post, September 26; Xinhua, September 22). After the September 25 summit, Xinhua and CCTV reported that the
Chinese and U.S. presidents had attained a trove of important results. A Xinhua commentary declared that Xis U.S. tour ushers
in new era of win-win cooperation. Quoting Chinese foreign ministry officials, Xinhua said both leaders agreed to continue the
endeavor to build a new model of major-country relationship between China and the United States. Statements issued by the U.S.
government, however, made no reference to the phrase of a new major-country relationship. In another Xinhua article entitled
Asia-Pacific not China-U.S. wrestling ring, commentators Sun Ruijun and Wang Haiqing argued that Xi and Obamas latest
agreement to deepen dialogue on Asia-Pacific affairs is encouraging. The deputy president of the Beijing-based Foreign Policy
Institute, Wang Fan, sounded optimistic on the broader issue of hegemonic transitiona reference to the competition between the
worlds sole superpower and the fast-rising semi-superpower. He pointed out that in light of Xis statement that China will not
challenge the existing international order, the xinjie (, psychological knot) between China and the U.S. has been dissolved.
Wang added that both sides had reached a relatively high level of commonality regarding mutual interests and responsibility on
the world stage (CNTV.cn, September 26; Xinhua, September 26; Shanghaidaily.com, September 26; Ming Pao [Hong Kong],
September 26). Upon closer examination, however, both China and the U.S. have hardly achieved a meeting of the minds on
flashpoints such as cyber-espionage and tension in the South China Sea. Xinhua
quoted President Xi as saying both

countries had reached important consensus on the joint fight against cybercrimes . Xi indicated at
his joint press conference with Obama that both administrations have agreed to step up investigation assistance and information
sharing on cybercrime cases. Yet, according to the Joint Statement issued by the two heads of state, the so-called consensus is
limited to cyber-espionage against corporations. The document stated both states agree that neither countrys government will
conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business
information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors. There was no reference,
however, to the much more serious issue of hacking perpetrated by governmental or military agencies (Xinhua, September 25;
Whitehouse.gov, September 25). In his press conference with Xi, Obama indirectly expressed misgivings as to whether the Chinese
government would be willing or able to stop cyber-enabled theft of American commercial and technological secrets. President
Obama said: The question now is, are words followed by actions adding that the U.S. government was ready to slap sanctions on
Chinese individuals and companies that perpetrated such internet-related crimes. While Xi announced during the September 3
military parade in Beijing that the Chinese Military would demobilize 300,000 soldiers, there are reports that its cyberwarfare
division would witness growth in both resources and numerical strength (Hong Kong Economic Journal, September 11; The
Diplomat, April 3).
Cybersecurity agreement boosts Xis Image

Lewis 1/13/16 James Andrew Lewis is the director and senior fellow of the Technology and Public Policy Program at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies. http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/17653/expanding-internationalnorms-after-the-u-s-china-cybertheft-agreement
But that started to change last
fall, when the first explicit norm on espionage emerged from the
September summit between U.S. President Barack Obama and his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping. The two
reached an agreement on cybertheft, pledging that neither countrys government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled
theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing
competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors. The United Kingdom and Germany quickly reached similar
agreements with China. The U.S.-China deal was also endorsed by the G-20, which added language on respecting online privacy, in a
rebuke to American as well as Chinese spying. Why Xi agreed to this cybersecurity norm is unclear, but its impact was significant.
Since 2010, the U.S. has repeatedly told China that persistent economic espionage by Chinese entities would be cause for disrupting
bilateral relations, but the Chinese simply denied all accusations against them and countered with their own about American spying.
This changed at the summit, in part because of the massive hack last year of the Office of Personnel Management, which Washington
pinned on China. The security clearance records of over 17 million federal employees were exposed in the data breach, one of a series
of six related hacks that acquired massive amounts of crucial intelligence data on the United States. The Chinese knew U.S. officials
were furious and considering a punitive response. China
did not want U.S. sanctions to undermine Xis trip ,
which included meetings with many American business and technology leaders and was in good measure
a long-distance
photo-op meant for Chinese domestic consumption.
!!Anti-hacking agreements boost Xi and directly facilitate the anticorruption campaign

Marks 12/9/15 http://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2015/12/china-us-cyber-attack-hacks-000332 Senior
Reporter at Bloomberg BNA
CSISs James Lewis, whos among the most optimistic analysts regarding the agreement, describes it as the beginning of the story
on how the Chinese and we work together to manages this problem, rather than the end. Though hes optimistic the agreement will
be fruitful, Lewis speculated the U.S. will ultimately sanction some Chinese targets and that there will be many more tense meetings
before Chinese hacking falls to a level U.S. officials decide they can tolerate. He noted that the
U.S. aided its cause by

couching the agreement in anti-corruption language, which has been a signature campaign
during Xis three years atop the Chinese Communist Party. Xi has also pushed to modernize the PLA,
which would dovetail with shifting away from commercial espionage operations, Lewis said. Its unclear how much Chinese
commercial hacking is directly managed by the PLA, so even if top leadership fully intends to reduce it, the shift may be slow, he
said. I can imagine an internal argument that the IP theft isnt actually all that useful, that its not the way to encourage innovation
domestically, said Adam Segal, a China scholar and director of the Digital and Cyberspace Policy Program at the Council on Foreign
Relations. I can also imagine foreign policy factions that say we have to swing back to a more cooperative relationship with the U.S.
and Europe and cybersecurity is an unnecessary irritant. Another possibility is that Chinas
own vulnerabilityby many

measures, they are the largest victim of cyber crime, Segal said may push its leaders to conclude that its more
important to cooperate with other nations on combating cyber crime than to alienate those nations by
hacking their companies. The U.S. could press this outcome by being more responsive to Chinese
requests for assistance investigating cyber crimes, Segal said, noting that Chinese officials frequently complain the
FBI is unresponsive to such requests.
U.S. exposure of and cooperation over Chinese cyber attacks helps Xi

push anti-corruption and military centralization measures.
Goldsmith 6/21 (Jack, Henry L. Shattuck Professor at Harvard Law and Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at
Stanford, U.S. Attribution of Chinas Cyber-Theft Aids Xis Centralization and Anti-Corruption Efforts, Lawfare, June 21, 2016.
https://www.lawfareblog.com/us-attribution-chinas-cyber-theft-aids-xis-centralization-and-anti-corruption-efforts)//king koopa
The Reasons for the Drop. The
report shows that most of the drop-off in China-based cybertheft occurred before the Obama-Xi agreement last
Fall. It attributes the drop-off primarily to Xis sweeping changes impacting its use of network
operations, especially his efforts to centralize and emphasize military and government elements engaged
in cyber activity, and his anti-corruption campaign cracking down on the
illegitimate use of state resources. It also gives supporting roles to increasing U.S.
exposure of Chinas state-sponsored commercial cyber-theft, dating back to a May 2013
Pentagon report (and similar private reports at the time), and including the U.S. indictments of five PLA officers in
May 2014 and enhanced threats of U.S. sanctions during the same period. Putting all of this together, it appears that reforms of Chinas
cybertheft practices are grounded primarily in Xis efforts to centralize cyberoperations and
stamp out corruption, and that U.S. exposure efforts aided Xi in these efforts. In other words, the
changes are less about the U.S. imposing or threatening hefty costs on a unitary China (the costs and threatened costs have not in fact been
hefty), and more about the U.S. making transparent corrupt state-sponsored activities to Chinas
government, and thus aiding Chinas government (as embodied in Xis regime) in furthering its
interests. This plausible mechanism of influence is consistent with what I took to be the most interesting elements of John Carlins remarks at
Harvard last December, when he explained (around 38:40) that one reason why the indictments of the PLA officers might change Chinas cyber-theft
behavior is that China is a big complicated country and that in China (as in the U.S., he implied) disclosure of intelligence activity caused a lot of
internal changes, discussion, and debate and it may not be that everyone in the government over there knew exactly what everyone was doing or had
U.S.
exposure of China-based cyber-theft serves Xis interests in clamping down on criminal and
unauthorized use of [Chinas] state resources. This is less a story of coercion than it is
of cooperation between the United States government and Xi to serve Xis military
centralization and anti-corruption efforts.* What we dont know is how much state-sponsored commercial theft Xi is willing to
thought about the consequences of what they were doing before it was named and exposed. The report thus helps us better understand how
tolerate (or able to eliminate), or how the government-related China-groups will morph along Chinas very fuzzy public-private sector line to avoid
detection from both Chinas government and the U.S. government, or to operate in a way outside Chinas government that Xi does not care about.
Recall that last falls U.S.-China cyber deal, China agreed only not to conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property with
the intent of bringing commercial advantage.
Plan is a wingets spun as nationalist expansion into cyberspace

Media and Netizens When pressure is put on Party elite leaders, who then restructure the tone and parameters of statements on issues like the South
China Sea, it comes in a highly complex way from the public. The ways in which this happens are ill understood. Part of this is because, through lack of
detailed investigations or real in-depth understanding of how the Communist Party surveys and makes use of the opinions of the people, it is hard to
assess what real role the views of the public play. Basically, for all the claims made about Chinese being satisfied or dissatisfied through vehicles like the
Pew Research Institutes annual register, no one really knows what the publics views are. There are no national elections, and no ways to empirically
for
Xi Jinping, appealing to nationalist sentiment and the trope of the Party being the defender of the vision of
a strong, rich China has become an increasingly powerful potential driver of
policy. Nationalism as it appeared in the writings of prominent bloggers like Wang Xiaodong and others in an infamous collection named
test the public mood on issues like government performance and satisfaction with Party policy on specific issues. The one thing that is clear is that
Unhappy China from 2009 asserts that China has been too compliant and weak with its claims over its border issues, and that the government needs
to do more to protect those claims. They focus in particular on the Japanese due to their refusal to deal with their historic crimes, and the United States,
because of its perceived strategy of containment and the ways in which it inhibits or curtails Chinas strategic space, a space these bloggers feel is
legitimately theirs.[25] There
is plenty of evidence that this nationalistic sentiment figures at least in

Chinese cyberspace. But it is less clear how much impact it really has on Party and
government thinking, and in which ways it is evidence of manipulation, or of being manipulated.
In an era of falling GDP growth, with many tough domestic decisions, Chinese leaders are
indeed searching for a new pillar of legitimacy. Since 1978, the core source has been economic
growth. But now, the message is more complicated. And inspiring people through nationalist
messages to line up and support the Party State as it asserts the countrys rights in what is viewed as its own backyard
against those who are seen as its enemies or detractors is good populist politics. The only issue is one of control
is the Party truly still in charge of the message? And if so, what sorts of tactical compromise does it have to make to ensure that it is indeed regarded as
a worthy custodian of nationalist public interests over the disputed islands? The sail through of a U.S. destroyer in October 2015 referred to above once
more offers interesting insights. Just as the loud declarations of military intent and anger by PLA officials before this event did not result in any real
response, so too there is no sign of discontent in the sphere of public opinion. On the whole, the appeal to issues like the South China Sea, even if it does
have widespread soft support from the public, is nowhere near as central to their interests as issues like the quality of their living environment, the
rising living costs and the pressure this puts on their budgets. These are topics that have a direct impact on their daily lives that they can see. The
attention that the Party gives these issues in its internal major announcements evidences their importance. The 2013 Plenum (the Communist Party
Central Committee annual high level policy meeting), for instance, was solely on economic reform, with no real space left for territorial issues and their
management. In 2014, the Plenum was on legal reform, and in 2015 on the preparation for the 13th Five Year Programme. Seen against these policy
announcements, the South China Sea is indeed not a core interest, but a peripheral issue. And for all the noise of some figures in Chinese cyberspace
and media, in the end there is no clear evidence that this plays much of a role in formulating policy.
Link-Economy
Chinese economic policies are necessarily tied to Xi
Blackwill 16 [Robert. D, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy, with Kurt
M. Campbell, Co-Founder and former CEO of the Center for a New American Security, serves as
Chairman of its Board of Directors, B.A. from the University of California, San Diego, certificate
in music and political philosophy from the University of Erevan in Soviet Armenia, Doctorate in
International Relations from Brasenose College at Oxford University where he was a
Distinguished Marshall Scholar, February, Xi Jinping on the Global Stage, Council on Foreign
Relations, https://books.google.com/books?id=pN6nCwAAQBAJ&pg=PR7&lpg=PR7&dq=
%22This+Council+Special+Report+by+Robert+D.+Blackwill+and+Kurt+M.+Campbell,
+two+experienced+practitioners%22&source=bl&ots=1-iIGE_ISi&sig=8FZd7onrp0Dj1YHLiV23xiWn0w&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiLuPHJp4_OAhUT7mMKHdP7A1oQ6A
EIHjAA#v=onepage&q=%22This%20Council%20Special%20Report%20by%20Robert%20D.
%20Blackwill%20and%20Kurt%20M.%20Campbell%2C%20two%20experienced
%20practitioners%22&f=false RD; AD 7/25/16]
Xi is exposed precisely because he sits at the center of all decisionmaking and is visible to the
public. He must address countless domestic challenges for which he is now explicitly accountable,
and a major misstep on any of them could be costly to his political popularity and position.
Without question, the largest problem looming over Xis tenure is Chinas economic slowdown
and its related manifestations, including unemployment and stock market volatility. As noted, Chinas economy, which had
expanded at an annual rate of 10 percent for three decades, is entering a new era of slow growth that has forced the
government to reduce its growth target to a record-low 6.5 percent. Xis challenge is to smoothly reorient
the economy toward consumption and away from exports and investment even as growth continues to fall.
Even with the nationalism from the South China Sea ruling, slow
growth is tanking Xis PCan economic boost is essential to his
credibility.
Hankyoreh 7/24 (The Hankyoreh, South Korean daily newspaper established 1988, China on the Defensive? The
Hankyoreh, July 24, 2016. http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_editorial/753620.html)//king koopa
The state has been investing heavily into the economy to keep growth
rates stable. In 2011, private sector investment was around 40 percent. For the first half of 2016,
it was a mere 2.8 percent. To make up the gap, the Chinese state has poured money into
infrastructure development. Such a pump-priming strategy is sensible, but China will also likely increase its military
expenditures after the decision on THAAD and the ruling at The Hague . Large outlays on guns and butter are not
sustainable in the long run. None of this is good news for Chinese President Xi Jinping. China has long
Still, this number is deceptive.
been hoping to secure as much of the South China Sea as possible through its nine-dash-line policy, which has included the
transformation of rocks into islands and the aggressive challenge to the territorial claims of other countries in the region. The
Philippines brought suit against China under the terms of the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas. The
Hague Tribunal
ruled against Chinas expansive definition of its sovereign control of sea and declared that the
modified rocks do not qualify as islands. The Hague ruling has produced an enormous and stateencouraged nationalist backlash within China. But this short-term boost for Xi cant
obscure the growing unease in political circles . In March, an anonymous letter by loyal
Communist Party members urged the premier to step down. Many in the Party are unhappy
with Xis anti-corruption campaign. And reformers have watched as the state has shut down
their media outlets, including most recently the monthly magazine Yanhuang Chunqiu. In the short term, Xi can
rely on nationalist outrage at the Hague ruling. He can portray China as the victim of a containment strategy
orchestrated by the United States with the help of South Korea through means such as THAAD .
But ultimately the Chinese leader needs to deliver on the economic side. And this means
turning his Silk Road rhetoric into reality. Through its various Silk Road initiatives, Beijing has linked the prosperity of its own
citizens with the economic advancement of neighboring countries. This vision is a step up from the previous aid-and-trade approach.
The Silk Road Belt, with its investments into high-speed transport and cultural exchanges, offers a kind of Marshall Plan scenario for
countries that have yet to plug into the global economy, such as the states of Central Asia. The new high-speed routes will also
shorten the shipping time for goods between China and Europe from 36 to 26 days. But the Silk Road initiatives also have a
profound significance for South Korea. Compared to 10 years ago, according to a Bank of Korea report, Chinese economic growth
now has three times greater impact on the South Korean economy than either U.S. or Japanese growth. In part, this is because trade
between China and South Korea has increased dramatically. China is now South Koreas largest trade partner, while South Korea is
Chinas second largest partner. The THAAD decision has thus far not had an impact on trade. But the South China Sea dispute has
put a damper on Chinas Maritime Silk Road. Agreements with Philippines are on hold. Trade with Southeast Asia has declined, and
Japan has replaced China as the leading source of infrastructure development funds in the ASEAN countries. Both China and Xi
Jinping now face a critical decision. Xi must decide if his efforts to secure great power status for China in the security realm is
worth sacrificing the regional economic growth that will ultimately provide the foundation for sustainable prosperity for China itself.
This will mean tacking more in the direction of the Deng Xiaoping wing of the Party, which is more pragmatic and economyoriented. It will mean negotiating a face-saving compromise with the countries around the South China Sea, particularly the
Philippines and Vietnam. And it will mean continuing to hold back from retaliating against South Korea for the THAAD decision .
If
Xi cant stabilize the Chinese economy and ensure high growth, he will face increased dissent
within the Party.
With growth rates declining, diplomatic victories have become

essential to boosting Xis PC.
Blackwill and Campbell 16 (Robert D., Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council
on Foreign Relations, and Kurt M., Assistant Secretary of State for Asian and Pacific Affairs at the National Committee on U.S.China Relations, Xi Jinping on the Global Stage: Chinese Foreign Policy Under a Powerful but Exposed Leader, Council on
Foreign Relations International Institutions and Global Governance Program, Council Special Report No. 74, February
2016.)//king koopa
Economic growth and nationalism have for decades been the two founts of legitimacy for the
Communist Party, and as the former wanes, Xi will likely rely increasingly on the latter. Since 1989,
the party has deliberately and carefully laid the foundation for such a strategy through patriotic education, censorship, government-backed protests
against Japan, and relentless news and popular media that have reinforced a nationalist victimization narrative. As a powerful but exposed leader,
will tap into this potent nationalist vein through foreign policy, burnishing his nationalist
credentials and securing his domestic position from elite and popular criticism, all while
pursuing various Chinese national interests. For example, an emphasis on territorial disputes and
historical grievances could partially divert attention from the countrys economic woes and
Xi
arrest a potential decline in his public approval; in contrast, a visible setback or controversial
concession on such issues could undermine his standing with Chinese citizens and party elites.
On economic matters, concerns over growth and employment may lead China to become increasingly recalcitrant and self-interested.
Link-MES
MES is a huge boon for Xi
Szabo 5/31
(KENNETH, IN DEFENSE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: CHINA IS NOT A MARKET
ECONOMY Modern Diplomacy, 5/31/2016, http://moderndiplomacy.eu/index.php?
option=com_k2&view=item&id=1464:in-defense-of-the-european-parliament-china-is-not-amarket-economy&Itemid=490 TH)
the MES China covets
would be the ultimate status symbol for the leadership as it would bestow recognition upon the
country that it is playing according to market-rules and that by extension the Partys third way, Socialism with
Chinese Characteristics philosophy has paid off. On the practical side, the MES enhances the access of Chinese
exports to third countries, including the European Union, and would make it far harder for
regulators to slap China with anti-dumping tariffs and other retaliatory trade measures. With the European bloc
The first issue that needs explaining is what this rather technical brouhaha is all about. Essentially,
beset by grave uncertainties in the steel and aluminum sector, which have suffered after world prices were driven down by unfair
Chinese overproduction, concerns about relaxing protective levies have spiked. Indeed, according to the European Commission,
China produces 325 million metric tons of excess steel a year, or twice Europes entire production. This production spree has put at
risks tens of thousands of jobs across the continent, most poignantly the 15,000 British jobs that Tata Steel will axe if it cannot sell
its UK assets this year. Trade and worker unions alike have been turning the screws on the Brussels bureaucrats and have threatened
with massive strikes if their industry isnt protected from Chinas avalanche of underpriced steel. In this tense context, its obvious
why the European Parliament caved in. But putting aside the pressures coming from the street, the EPs justification was
nevertheless sound: China
is very far off from respecting the minimum standards for a market
economy, as they are set out under European law. Concluding otherwise would be not just a
probable death sentence for large swathes of Europes industrial production, but also in blatant
contradiction of European regulations. The EUs five criteria are concerned with a) the nature and frequency of
governmental intervention in the decision-making process of companies, b) the lack of government distortions in the operation of
enterprises linked to privatization; c) the use of non-discriminatory, transparent company laws; d) an effective, transparent legal
system protecting property rights; e) and a genuine financial sector which operates independently from the state. According to a
2009 paper, China had fulfilled only one criteria the one linked to privatizations - with a lot more ground to cover for the
remaining four. Indeed,
as recently as April, the European Commission expressed its deep concerns

with Chinas overbearing state in handling the affairs of state owned companies (SOEs), when it
investigated a proposed joint venture between China General Nuclear Power Corporation and
EDF. After regulators concluded that Chinese SOEs involved in the energy sector have no
independent decision making powers whatsoever, the EC took the unprecedented step of
analyzing the market impact of the deal by looking at the entire corpus of SOEs involved. This
decision is perhaps the most obvious example of Chinas total disregard for market rules as it
sets in stone the fact that 45 of the Fortune 500 companies, are under the direct control of the
Chinese Communist Party with a combined worth of $4.5 trillion. The ECs reasoning nullifies
therefore any semblance of corporate independence in the Middle Kingdom and provides fodder
to those arguing that the Chinese state is directly responsible for the overcapacity issues in the
steel industry for example. It is widely expected that the Commissions reasoning will be rehashed in the upcoming review
of yet another Chinese deal involving one of the SOEs from the energy sector the proposed tie up between Syngenta and
ChemChina, Beijings largest outbound investment to date, clocking in at $43 billion. The deal is already strained by delays and
subdued market expectations, insofar that any further hand wringing stemming from regulatory concerns could easily derail
ChemChinas hopes of becoming the worlds largest agro giant. Rebuffing critics, the European Parliament took the only course of
action that was available to it and sent a strong message that China is simply not prepared to join the ranks of other market
economies. At this point, even if the political will to award China MES exists in certain European quarters, the Parliaments
resounding no has undoubtedly made them reconsider.
Losing the MES battle with the US is challenging Xis credibility with
the politburo
Manning and **Przystup 7-21
(BY ROBERT, senior fellow of the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council. He served as a senior
counselor to the U.S. undersecretary of state for global affairs from 2001 to 2004, as a member of the U.S. Department of State
Policy Planning Staff from 2004 to 2008 and on the National Intelligence Council Strategic Futures Group from 2008 to 2012
**JAMES, Senior Fellow at the National Defense University, Institute for National Security Studies. His views are his own and do
not represent any agency of the U.S. government. JULY 21, 2016 - 7:16 PM How to Explain Xi Jinpings Mounting Foreign-Policy
Failures Foreign Policy http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/21/how-to-explain-xi-jinpings-mounting-foreign-policy-failures/ TH)
Beyond Asia, the
losing streak continued in Europe, where the European Union, despite Chinese pressure, rejected
Beijings bid to be granted market economy status in the World Trade Organization . Instead,
Chinas oversupply of steel and other products triggered an anti-dumping tariff from the EU and United States. In addition, heavy
handed Chinese nationalist economic policies penalizing European and U.S. businesses in favor of Chinas national champions,
particularly in the IT sector, have disillusioned the U.S. business community, long the foundation of support for the U.S.-China
relationship. Absent the ballast of support from U.S. business, the already volatile U.S.-China relationship would become still more
Perhaps the
Politburo Standing Committee should reread the anonymous open letter by a party member that
urged Xi to resign in March. The letter found Xi to be lacking the abilities to lead the party and country into the future,
citing his counterproductive foreign policy as abandoning caution for dangerous adventurism. It defies the imagination
that Xi Jinpings foreign policy has had the unintended consequence of promoting U.S. interests
problematic, shaping the policy environment for a new U.S. president, who will have to make difficult choices.
and strengthening Obamas rebalance success that the State Department or the Pentagon couldnt match on their best day. How
to explain all this? After the 2008-2009 U.S. financial crisis, Chinese analysts mistakenly concluded that the United States was in
terminal decline, and that Chinas moment had come to undo a century of humiliation by asserting its influence rather than biding
its time as it developed its economy. Thus, Chinese strategy is based on flawed assumptions: that China, with geography on its side,
is getting bigger and militarily stronger, and that a declining United States will gradually leave the region. Asian nations will have no
choice but to pay deference to Chinas interests. The
intriguing question is: With all of Xis bad bets going

sour, will his Politburo comrades treat him like most companies would treat a demonstrably
failed CEO?
Link-Space
Cooperation on space massively boosts PLA and consolidates
leadersip power
Cheng 14 Dean Cheng Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center Asian Studies Center The Davis Institute for National
Security and Foreign Policy at The Heritage Foundation http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/2014/04/prospects-for-uschina--space-cooperation
The PLA and Chinas Space Program The close links between the Chinese military and space are not restricted
to the Chinese military and space industrial complexes. The PLA has consistently played a key role in the Chinese space effort, and
Chinas space program is closely identified with the military. Indeed, the Chinese space program dates its creation to October 8,
1956, with the establishment of the Fifth Academy of the Ministry of Defense by Dr. Qian Xuesen. Since then, the Chinese military
has played an essential role in the management of various Chinese space programs. This is reflected today in the continuing role of
the General Armaments Department (GAD) in Chinese space affairs. The GAD is one of the four General Departments of the PLA
(along with the General Staff Department, General Political Department, and General Armaments Department) that form the core of
the Central Military Commission (CMC). It is the CMC that actually manages the military. The Ministry of Defense, by contrast, has
little authority, compared with the two uniformed vice chairmen of the CMC. All of Chinas space launch facilities, mission control
facilities, and tracking, telemetry, and control (TT&C) facilities, including its fleet of space tracking ships, are all subsumed within
the GAD. Indeed, the facilities are typically referred to by their base number in Chinese literature: Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center is
Base 25, while the Xichang Satellite Launch Center is Base 27. Not surprisingly, the various facilities and ships are all staffed by units
of the GAD. The personnel are trained at the Academy of Command Equipment and Technology, which is a subsidiary organization
of the GAD.[2] In addition, Chinas manned space program is managed through the GAD. The website of the China Manned Space
Engineering Office (CMSEO) lists the chief commander of the program as Zhang Youxia. General Zhang Youxia was appointed
director of the GAD in October 2012.[3] Another deputy chief commander (apparently the senior deputy) of the program is Major
General Niu Hongguang, one of the deputy directors of the PLA General Armaments Department. Other deputy chief commanders
are drawn from the military and space industrial complex, reflecting the integrated nature of this key industrial sector. Indeed, it is
useful to recall that the U.S. prohibitions currently limiting the ability of the PRC to launch any satellites containing American parts,
under the International Trafficking in Arms Regulations (ITAR), were put in place due to the transfer of aerospace-related
information to Chinese companies in the 1990s. As the Cox Commission report noted, information that was given to China regarding
items such as the fairing on the Long March-2E space launch vehicle led to improvements for Chinese ballistic missile programs. In
particular, it led to changes in both rocket design and Chinese operations that improved the reliability of all Chinese rocket launches.
[4] Meanwhile, Chinas satellite programs are often linked to military , as well as civilian, users. Like the United
States, for example, Chinas satellite navigation system (Beidou) is linked to the militaryspecifically, the General Staff Department
Satellite Navigation Station.[5] There is even a website celebrating this organizations achievements.[6] Military officers from key
GSD departments apparently were part of the design effort for the Chinese weather satellite system. Military participation in space
efforts is hardly unique to the PRC, but should serve as a reminder that any interaction with the Chinese space program will almost
certainly mean a PLA role and presence. More to the point, there is no obvious civilian counterpart to the PLA in terms of Chinas
space efforts. The most regularly mentioned equivalent to NASA is the Chinese National Space Administration (CNSA). But the head
of CNSA is typically described in Chinese writings and press coverage first as a vice minister of the Ministry of Industry and
Information Technology (MIIT), then as a deputy director of the State Administration of Science, Technology, and Industry for
National Defense (SASTIND), before being mentioned as the head of the CNSA. This suggests that the position of the CNSA is a
third-tier bureaucracy, standing below the key super-ministry for advanced technologies, and the managing authority for Chinas
military industries (SASTIND). By contrast, the PLA is a key part of the Chinese power structure .
One of the key positions for the top Chinese leader (Xi Jinping, Hu Jintao, Jiang Zemin) is the chairmanship of the Central Military
Commission. That role, along with being General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), is what vests Xi, Hu, and Jiang
with their powerhead of the Party and head of the military. In short, bureaucratically the CNSA is dwarfed by the Chinese military
The Importance
of Space to the Chinese Leadership As early as 1958, months after Sputnik was placed into orbit, Chinese
leaders saw the development of space capabilities as reflecting on Chinas place in the
international order. In May 1958, Chairman Mao Zedong advocated the creation of a Chinese space program, declaring at the
(which may explain the CNSAs absence from the top echelon of Chinese manned space management).
Second Plenum of the Eighth Party Congress, We should also manufacture satellites.[7] This high-level support has varied at
times, but space has generally been seen as contributing to comprehensive national power b y
facilitating national economic development, strengthening military modernization, and supporting the legitimacy of the CCP. It is
therefore not surprising that senior Chinese leaders have made sure that they are present for key events such as the inauguration of
satellite communications in the 1970s, or the launch of Chinas first manned spacecraft, the Shenzhou-V. For China, its
space
program is emblematic of its steady advancement since 1949, especially since most of it has been accomplished
through its own efforts. When the Sino-Soviet split occurred in 1960, Chinese access to foreign technology was abruptly ended. As a
result, China had to rely on its own efforts, in what became known as the two bomb, one satellite program. This effort saw the
Chinese focus their national energies to develop an atomic bomb, a hydrogen bomb, and a satellite. This reflected the long-standing
dual-use nature of Chinas space effortsif China was to have a full-fledged nuclear deterrent, it would have to develop a delivery
system, which in turn could also serve as a space launch vehicle. Two bombs, one satellite went beyond a programmatic objective,
however. The term also referred to the idea of homegrown development of advanced capabilities. Because of the SinoSoviet split, as
well as the ongoing Cold War with the United States and broader isolationist policies pursued by Beijing, Chinese development of
these capabilities would have to wholly rely on their own resources. The phrase two
bombs, one satellite, therefore,

came to also be associated with the idea of indigenous development and self-reliance. These characteristics
remain hallmarks of todays Chinese space program. For the same reason, Chinese firsts (e.g., the first satellite and first manned
in keeping with
of Humiliation , Beijing will want any cooperative venture to
be, at a minimum, on a co-equal basis. For the PRC to be treated as anything other than a full member in any program
mission) tend to be of longer duration and incorporate more extensive tasks than other nations firsts. Moreover,
the Chinese memory of the Century
or effort would smack of the unequal treaties that marked Chinas interactions with the rest of the world between 1839 and 1949.
For the same reason, China has generally been reluctant to join any organization or regime in which it was not party to negotiating.
For the CCP, whose political legitimacy rests, in part, on the idea that it has restored Chinese pride
and greatness, this is likely to be a significant part of any calculation. At the same time, space is
now a sector that enjoys significant political support within the Chinese political
system . Based on their writings, the PLA is clearly intent upon developing the ability to establish space dominance, in order to
fight and win local wars under informationized conditions.[8] The two SOEs are seen as key parts of the larger military-industrial
complex, providing the opportunities to expose a large workforce to such areas as systems engineering and systems integration. It is
no accident that Chinas commercial airliner development effort tapped the top leadership of Chinas aerospace corporations for
managerial and design talent.[9] From a bureaucratic perspective, this
is a powerful lobby , intent on preserving

its interests. Chinas space efforts should therefore be seen as political , as much as military or economic,
statements, directed at both domestic and foreign audiences. Insofar as the PRC has scored major
achievements in space, these reflect positively on both Chinas growing power and respect
(internationally) and the CCPs legitimacy (internally). Efforts at inducing Chinese
cooperation in space , then, are likely to be viewed in terms of whether they promote one or both
objectives. As China has progressed to the point of being the worlds second-largest economy (in gross domestic product terms),
it becomes less clear as to why China would necessarily want to cooperate with other countries on anything other than its own terms.
CCP Uses the space program to give Xi legitimacy

Cody 15
MAY 15, 2015 IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS China: A Global Power, In Space Exploring the
Use of the Chinese Space Program as a Tool to Establish China as a Major Power
http://www.reallycoolblog.com/china-a-global-power-in-space/ TH
As the Peoples Republic of China continues to develop its economic, military, and technological capabilities, and as China begins to
assert itself more aggressively on the world stage, the Chinese leadership has sought to portray the country as being among the
worlds major powers.
It appears evident that achieving great power status is a fundamental goal for
Chinas fourth generation leadership, as doing so represents to the Chinese people the
overcoming of Chinas historical period of national humiliation, bolsters the Chinese
Communist Partys political legitimacy, and benefits China in its push for regional hegemony in the Asia-Pacific.
Chinas quest for global status, a major characteristic of the foreign policy and domestic rhetoric
of the current Xi Jinping administration, can be seen reflected by the use of the rapidly
developing Chinese space program as a tool to promote and enhance Chinas standing at home
and influence abroad. With a growing budget, growing ambitions, increasingly advanced
capabilities, and through the formation of significant organizational linkages with the Chinese
government, it is clear that Chinas space program enjoys support from the main political organs
of the Chinese state the PLA, the CCP, and the Civil Service and is becoming a prominent
feature of Chinas rise. Underlying this support is the belief that maintaining an active space program is a symbol of great
power status and brings with it the economic, technological, cultural, and geopolitical benefits which great powers enjoy. This paper
analyzes the domestic and international significance of Chinas space program along with the implications of its current capabilities
and future plans. By exploring the connections between the effects of Chinas space program and the Chinese leaderships broader
strategic and rhetorical goals, the use of the program as an effective tool for establishing China as a global power is explained.
Understanding these connections, as well as the overall significance of Chinas space program, is
vital for a nuanced understanding of Chinas rise as a major international actor and reveals the
vision which Chinese leaders have for the countrys status as a global power in the coming
decades.
US cooperation in space directly benefits the PLA

Messier 12/4/15 http://www.parabolicarc.com/2015/12/04/report-wearily-eyes-rise-chinese-space-program/ Douglas
holds a masters degree in Science, Technology and Public Policy from The George Washington University, where he studied at the
Space Policy Institute. He is a graduate of the International Space University and holds a B.A. in Journalism from Rider University.
Douglas Messier is a communications expert with more than a decade of experience with entrepreneurial startups. A skilled analyst
with superb written communication skills, he has broad knowledge of the aerospace, Internet, education, and environmental fields.
He is an expert in translating scientific and technical concepts for lay audiences and in helping individuals and organizations craft
their messages in print and online.
Key Organizations Involved in Chinas Space and Counterspace Programs Chinas space program involves a wide network of entities
spanning its political, military, defense industry, and commercial sectors. Unlike the United States, China does not have distinctly
separate military and civilian space programs. CCP leaders provide policy guidance and authorize allocations of resources for the
program, and various organizations within the Peoples Liberation Army ( PLA)
execute space policy and oversee the

space research, development, and acquisition process. Chinas military also exercises control
over the majority of Chinas space assets and space operations. Although China conducts civilian space activities, such
as scientific research and exploration, and Chinese civilian agencies provide input into space policy and space research,
development, and acquisition requirements, China does not have an official civilian space program. Tate Nurkin, managing director
of research and thought leadership at IHS Janes Aerospace, Defense and Security, explained to the Commission: Chinas space
program does not have structures in place that make meaningful divisions between military and civil programs, and those
technologies acquired and systems developed for ostensibly civil purposes can be appliedand most frequently arefor military
purposes. This dynamic indicates that Chinas space program is also a critical element in the countrys ongoing military
modernization program. Under this nebulous framework, even
Chinas ostensibly civilian projects, such as human

support the development of PLA space, counterspace, and conventional
capabilities. Moreover, although any countrys satellites are capable of contributing to its military operations, the PLA
during wartime would probably take direct command over all Chinese satellites . Conclusions China has
spaceflight, directly
become one of the top space powers in the world after decades of high prioritization and steady investment from Chinas leaders,
indigenous research and development, and a significant effort to buy or otherwise appropriate technologies from foreign sources,
especially the United States. Although Chinas space capabilities still generally lag behind those of the United States and Russia, its
space program is expanding and accelerating rapidly as many other nations programs proceed with dwindling resources and limited
goals. Chinas
aspirations in space are driven by its judgment that space power enables the
countrys military modernization , drives its economic and technological advancements, allows it to challenge
U.S. information superiority during a conflict, and provides the Chinese Communist Party with significant domestic legitimacy and
international prestige. Chinas space program involves a wide network of entities spanning its political, military, defense industry,
and commercial sectors. Unlike the United States, China does not have distinctly separate military and civilian space programs.
Under this nebulous framework, even ostensibly civilian projects, such as Chinas human spaceflight missions, directly support the
development of Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) space, counterspace, and conventional capabilities. Moreover, Chinese civilian and
commercial satellites likely contribute to the PLAs command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (C4ISR) efforts whenever it is technically and logistically feasible for them to be so utilized, and they would probably
Given the PLAs central role in all of Chinas

space activities, U.S. cooperation with China on space issues could mean
supporting the PLAs space and counterspace capabilities.
be directly subordinate to the PLA during a crisis or conflict.
PLA loves space coop because its a scam to steal our space secrets
Fisher 2/18/15 Testimony of Richard D. Fisher Jr . -- Senior Fellow, Asian Military Affairs, International Assessment
and Strategy Center, before the U.S. -China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China Space and Counter
-Space Issues , February 18, 201 http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Fisher_Testimony_2.18.15.pdf
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaderships intertwined pursuit of global military power and
dominant space power has three main motivations: 1) to help sustain the power posit ion
of the CCP ; 2) to aid the CCP s pursuit of economic -political dominance in key regions to
best assure resource/commercial access; and , 3) to eventually displace the United States from its position of
global leadership. Space power will also be used to support new Chinese -led or promoted anti -U.S./anti -democratic coalitions as it
will be used to crush democratic threats to its rule, beginning with the democracy on Taiwan. As with the former Soviet Union,
in the CCPs fears for

its power position. This requires a CCP -led rejuvenation of China, entailing mobilization
for greater power , ever more control over its own people, and then increasing co ntrol over others. Another result is
Chinas pursuit of r egional and then global military power is not roote d in an existential threat, but
Chinas choice to be hostile to Western rules or concepts that may cons train Chinas power. This justifies an essential Chinese
rejection of American or Western conceptions of transp arency and re straint, or verifiable weapons control in space which might
constrain its power. This mirrors the CCP /PLA s repeated refusal of U.S. requests to consider real nuclear weapons transparency
and control , transparency over its nuclear and missile exports, and --from many of its neighbors and Washington -- fair settlement
of territorial disputes which threaten war . T he lat ter, especially in the South China Sea , is instructive. As it has gained military
power in the South China Sea , China has sought to chang e the strategic environment and dictate new rules to increase its security at
the expense of others. Once it gains commanding strength and positio n in space, will China do the same? For the United States ,
cooperation with China in space may yield some benefits, but it likely will have little impact on the direction and severity
of terrestrial conflicts which will dominate relations with China. One can see the value of meeting with Chinese space officials ,
especially higher CCP and PLA leaders, to advance concerns over their actions in space and to promote transparency. But at this
juncture , before China has achieved levels of space dominance, it is crucial to link any real cooperation with China to its behavior
in space and elsewhere which threatens U.S. security. Furthermore, a llowing China increasing access to U.S. space technology,
irst it could encourage China to

advance an illusion of coopera tion with the U.S. and the Wes t while differences on Earth
space corporations , or government institutions at this time presents two risks . F
become sharper. This could become useful for Beijing to deflect criticism on other issues, or even to obtain leverage over U.S.
China will exploit an y new access for

espionage gains to strengthen its own space and military sectors.
options and actions . Second, as has been proven repeatedly,
Benefits of the space program boost government popularity within

China
Cody 15
MAY 15, 2015 IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS China: A Global Power, In Space Exploring the
Use of the Chinese Space Program as a Tool to Establish China as a Major Power
http://www.reallycoolblog.com/china-a-global-power-in-space/ TH
The domestic significance of Chinas space program is multifold, as it brings both tangible
benefits to the Chinese state and people and also reinforces and reflects the Chinese leaderships
political and rhetorical message. Chinas space program begets economic growth and development, supports Chinas
focus on education, science, and technology, and is a source of considerable national pride and unity. The economic and
development benefits brought about by Chinas space program fit squarely into the
governments campaigns for economic development and prosperity .[xliii] The space program itself employs
hundreds of thousands of employees, and the highly-technical and complex nature of the program means that many of the jobs are
necessarily high-skill and high-paying. As a result of the linkages between the space programs main state corporations and the
broader Chinese economy, the economic growth brought about through production of spacecraft and associated technology
reverberates through Chinas industrial sector.
The expansion of Chinas fleet of communications and

navigation satellites have provided for the Chinese people greater access to cell phone, internet,
radio, and television communications, which in turn help stimulate the broader Chinese
economy. Imaging satellites help provide disaster warning and support disaster relief, saving
China considerable amounts of money of relief efforts. Furthermore, these imaging satellites
help enable the exploitation of maritime fishing grounds, maritime resources, fertile farming
land, and ground-based natural resources, further benefitting the expansion of the Chinese economy.[xliv] These
satellites additionally enable easier mapping needed to plan Chinas continued urbanization and infrastructure growth. Scientific
experiments in space involving technology applicable back on Earth, such as the breeding of crops in space and space medicine,
similarly affect the daily lives of Chinese citizens in a positive fashion, as do the spin-off technologies developed from the lessons
learned through the use of outer space. The development of Chinas commercial launch industry provides domestic companies the
ability to cheaply and easily loft their products into Earth orbit, and state income is produced through Chinas selling of commercial
launches to various domestic and foreign companies. Future plans for the mining of Helium-3 on the moon or valuable resources on
near-Earth asteroids could potentially bring in enormous amounts of revenue and keep Chinas resource-hungry economy sustained
indefinitely.[xlv] The
Chinese space program also reflects and supports the governments emphasis
on education and science. Through the training of qualified space scientists and engineers, the fostering of space science
interests in the youth, and the development of space-based education programs, the Chinese space program has gone to great
lengths to increase the level of technical and scientific education among the Chinese population. These efforts seem to be successful,
as demonstrated by widespread interest in space, science, and technology among the student population. As a result of this interest,
higher levels of Chinas college students are entering into college science and engineering departments. The broadcasting of
television through satellites has supported Chinas program of satellite education TV, which the government claims has enabled
The growth of a
generation of highly educated individuals interested in science, technology, and entering highskill technical fields will enable Chinas continued growth as a sophisticated, 21st-century
economy in the coming decades. Furthermore, the ability for Chinese academies and
universities to launch scientific payloads aboard Chinas launch vehicles greatly expands their
educational and research capabilities. Of course, as previously mentioned, the technological and
educational progress made through the researching and development of space technology has
helped China develop a more sophisticated, advanced, and knowledgeable academia.[xlvii] Key
among the domestic impacts of Chinas space program, however, is its application as a source of
national pride and unity. As discussed earlier, the Chinese government has routinely used the
space program to highlight Chinas achievements, accomplishments, and progress. An active
space program, in the eyes of the Chinese population, is a sign of national and international
prestige; accordingly, its continued success resonates with the Chinese people as an indicator of China overcoming its historical
more than 30 million people to receive college or technical secondary school education since the 1980s.[xlvi]
period of national humiliation. The development of Chinas military capabilities in outer space reflects the governments emphasis
on comprehensive national strength, and indicates to the Chinese people Chinas emerging military might. Furthermore, the
development themes recurring in the Chinese leaderships narratives about the space program suggest that China is on a path of
growth, progress, and technological innovation, all of which appeal to the national pride of Chinas citizenry. Indeed, the ability for
Chinas space program to excite and unite Chinas population is demonstrated in its continued use by the Chinese media and
government for propaganda purposes. Space
missions are routinely addressed by the Chinese media and

government as advancing and enhancing Chinas power and prestige, rousing national ethos,
and inspiring people of all of Chinas ethnic groups for the socialist cause with Chinese
characteristics.[xlviii] These messages clearly resonate with the Chinese people , who, as earlier
stated, demonstrate high interest in Chinas space missions and who regularly turn out in massive numbers for the parades and
celebrations held for Chinas recently returned astronauts.[xlix] These
beneficial domestic impacts are crucial for

Chinas leadership, for they help support and legitimize continued CCP rule.[l] The Chinese
Communist Party has premised its continued rule on its ability to produce economic results, to advance Chinas development as a
technological and economic power, to overcome Chinas past humiliations, and to enhance Chinas standing in the international
community. As
the Chinese space program supports all of these goals in various ways, the Chinese
government has come to see the space program as a reinforcing agent in Chinas domestic
politics. It is no wonder, then, that the Chinese leadership is so quick to enthusiastically support
the continued development of the program and reinforce the linkages between the programs
benefits and its political platform.
Source of national pride

Mansharamani 3-31
(Vikram is a Lecturer at Yale University in the Program on Ethics, Politics, & Economics. He is the author of BOOMBUSTOLOGY:
Spotting Financial Bubbles Before They Burst (Wiley, 2011). China Is Winning the 21st Century Space Race MARCH 31, 2016,
http://fortune.com/2016/03/31/china-space-race-moon/ TH)
China is moving ahead of the U.S. At a cost of more than $150 billion, the International Space Station (ISS) is the most expensive
object ever built. This price tag is more than double the combined costs of Chinas Three Gorges Dam, Bostons Big Dig, and the
Chunnel. But as noted by CNN, funding
for the ISS may run out in the early 2020s. That happens to be
around the same time that the Chinese are expected to complete their own space station,
potentially leaving the Asian power with the sole operating lab in the heavens. And given that
Congress banned NASA from working bilaterally with anyone from the Chinese space program,
its unclear if American astronauts will be welcome. The Chinese space station is merely one part
of the Middle Kingdoms extraterrestrial ambitions. Tinkering in the heavens has emerged as an
important plank of its geopolitical strategy. And if recent history is any guide, the Chinese are
serious about their plans in space. To begin, their program has already accomplished a great deal over the past few
years. In 2013, China became the third nationafter the United States and the Soviet Unionto soft-land a spacecraft on the moon.
In 2014, the country also sent a probe around the moon and back, the first such mission since the 1970s. But China has even grander
plans. These include a 2018 mission to send the first probe in history to land on the dark side of the moon, whose extraordinary
geology is largely unexplored. Other plans aim to bring back lunar samples as well as to land humans on the surface of the moon.
The country has Martian ambitions as well. What are the Chinese doing? Why the increased focus on space and specifically the
moon? I see several reasons. First,
China views space as a potentially game-changing source of energy

security. Specifically, the moon has abundant supplies of helium-3, a light and non-radioactive fusion fuel that is virtually nonexistent here on Earth. Because it lacks an atmosphere and has been bombarded by solar winds containing helium-3 for billions of
years, the moon has massive volumes of the isotope. Some
estimates suggest there are at least 1.1 million

metric tons of helium-3 on the lunar surface, enough to power human energy needs for up to
10,000 years. With one of the fastest-growing appetites for energy on the planet, the Chinese are highly aware that
securing access to this other-wordly fuel would be a hugestrategic advantage. Interestingly, Silicon
Valley is also vying for the moons helium-3, spurred in part by the $30 million Google Lunar XPRIZE. China is also pushing
into the heavens to encourage technological developments. Just as Americas response to
Sputnik fueled basic research and applied science, so might China channel its out-of-this-world
ambitions into useful developments here on Earth. In fact, the chief scientist of Chinas lunar exploration
program cited the spillover benefits expected in information technology and materials science as a key motivator of the program.
The Chinese are also keenly aware of the military significance of space. A 2015 US congressional report
explained how for Chinas military, the use of space power can facilitate long-range strikes, guide munitions with precision, improve
connectivity, and lead to greater jointness across its armed forces. The document described a Chinese leadership that thinks that
space warfare is inevitable and that China must dominate it. Its worth noting Chinas recent testing of anti-satellite weapons.
Finally, there is no question that Chinese success in space will be a source of pride and support
rising nationalism. It will give China bragging rights and have a unifying influence on the
country. In fact, Lieutenant General Zhang Yulin discussed his space ambitions in terms of the
great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. As we focus on Chinas terrestrial power plays, from its trillion dollar Silk
Road to its construction of artificial islands in the South China Sea, we must also watch the emerging geopolitics (exopolitics?) of
outer space. Dismissing distant developments overhead may prove as detrimental, if not more so, than ignoring those in front of our
noses.
Link-Taiwan
Taiwan dispute resolution solidifies the CCP and increases Xis power
Blackwill 16 [Robert. D, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy, with Kurt M. Campbell, Co-Founder
and former CEO of the Center for a New American Security, serves as Chairman of its Board of Directors, B.A. from the University of
California, San Diego, certificate in music and political philosophy from the University of Erevan in Soviet Armenia, Doctorate in
International Relations from Brasenose College at Oxford University where he was a Distinguished Marshall Scholar, February, Xi
Jinping on the Global Stage, Council on Foreign Relations, https://books.google.com/books?
id=pN6nCwAAQBAJ&pg=PR7&lpg=PR7&dq=%22This+Council+Special+Report+by+Robert+D.+Blackwill+and+Kurt+M.
+Campbell,+two+experienced+practitioners%22&source=bl&ots=1-iIGE_ISi&sig=8FZd7onrp0Dj1YHLiV23xiWn0w&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiLuPHJp4_OAhUT7mMKHdP7A1oQ6AEIHjAA#v=onepage&q=%22This
%20Council%20Special%20Report%20by%20Robert%20D.%20Blackwill%20and%20Kurt%20M.%20Campbell%2C%20two
%20experienced%20practitioners%22&f=false RD; AD 7/25/16]
Xi will need to take clear steps to strengthen his position against rival elites, fortify his public
image, and shield the party from the economic downturn. To that end, he will probably intensify his personality cult, crack down even
harder on dissent, and grow bolder in using the anticorruption campaign against elites who oppose him. Above all, he will almost certainly
choose to intensify and stimulate Chinese nationalism in response to slower growth. Ever since Deng
dispatched communist ideology in favor of pragmatic capitalist reforms, the partys legitimacy
has been built on two pillars: economic growth and nationalist ideology. Because the former is
fading, the latter may be the primary tool to support the edifice of the party and Xis strongman image. The
foundations for a turn to nationalism have been laid for decades. After Tiananmen Square, the party inculcated nationalist sentiment through relentless
propaganda, a barrage of chauvinistic television shows and movies, and a patriotic education campaign in the countrys schools.31 According to the
governments nationalist narrative, which downplays the partys failures and communist ideology, China is a country whose century of humiliation
began with the Opium Wars and ended with the partys assumption of power in 1949. The partys primary mission has not been to bring about a
communist utopia but to extricate China from the predations of Western and Japanese imperialists and to put it on a path to becoming the worlds
largest economy. Chinas
territorial disputes with its neighbors and Taiwans ambiguous status are
seen as wounds from this humiliating past that only the party can heal.
Win v. US: first line

Wins over America help Jinping
Sutter 10/15/15 http://www.theasanforum.org/grading-xi-jinpings-america-policy-c/
Robert Sutter, Elliot School of International Affairs, George Washington University
President Xi Jinping
has dealt with the United States for almost three years as relations have declined. His bold and
assertive actions in areas sensitive to US interests departed sharply from past restraint and put an aroused
America on guard. It is hard to give these results a passing grade. As they did in Washington on September 24-25, the two
leaders continue to meet and achieve agreements in limited areas of mutual interest, but rising American debate over China policy is
fed by Xis repeated affronts and seemingly cavalier treatment of US concerns. Americans seek means to get Xi Jinpings China to
stop taking actions seen as offensive in the East and South China Seas, in cyber economic espionage, in state-backed intervention in
currency and Chinese domestic markets that disadvantage US companies; in using Chinas large foreign exchange reserves and other
means to support self-serving Chinese-backed development institutions at odds with those backed by America; in continued rapid
development of military forces aimed at Americans; and in stronger repression of Chinese peoples political freedom and related
human rights. Xi
Jinping continues to see advantage in undermining American interests in these

areas. This plays well with domestic audiences in China.
Showdown win restores Jinping cred

Hewitt 9/22/15 http://www.ibtimes.com/enigma-xi-jinping-ahead-us-visit-chinas-toughleader-beset-economic-social-challenges-2107893 Duncan Hewitt is Shanghai correspondent
for Newsweek/IBT Media. He was previously a BBC correspondent in Beijng and Shanghai, and
also worked for the BBC World Service in London, focusing on East and Southeast Asia. He
studied Chinese at Edinburgh University, and first lived in China in the late 1980s. His book
Getting Rich First Life in a Changing China (Vintage UK, 2008) looks at the social changes
unleashed by Chinas economic reforms.
Some observers have argued that a weaker Chinese leader, faced with a slowing economy, might be more prone to provoking
confrontation, raising the potential for clashes between Chinas fast-modernizing military, and regional rivals with whom relations
have been tense, including U.S. allies such as the Philippines, Taiwan or Japan. The latter has just angered Beijing by passing laws
allowing its military to engage in overseas actions as well as simply self-defense, for the first time since World War II. However, Lam
says that a
more chastened Xi may need a foreign policy success with the U.S. more than
before -- making the chances of an accord on cybersecurity, foreign investment in China, or even some form of agreement over the
future of the South China Sea, a little more likely on this trip. Xi is still strong -- no other faction in China can threaten him at
the moment, Lam says, but we have seen some dents in his armor , and not everyone is happy . A
serious military confrontation with the U.S. over the South China Sea is the last thing Xi needs at present, Lam adds. A skirmish
would cause panic in China," he says. "It would hit the economy, the stock market might collapse -- and they cant afford that. Over
the past two years, Lam says, the
world has seen a more assertive China flexing its muscles -- without
planning to go too far in provoking others. However, with Beijing warning the U.S. to keep away from the islands it is
building on in the South China Sea this year, and also sending its navy on joint exercises with Russia as far as the Mediterranean,
some Chinese analysts have nonetheless warned that Beijing
is taking a risky approach in abandoning the
low-key foreign policy approach it has practiced since the era of Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s. And Lam too acknowledges
the existence of what he calls a dangerous element: compared to the eras of [his predecessors] Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin. Under
Xi the generals now have a bigger say on national security and foreign policy issues -- and like military leaders in many countries
they tend to be more hawkish. China parades its ballistic missiles in a parade Military vehicles carrying DF-21D ballistic missiles
roll toward Tiananmen Square during a military parade to mark the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII in Beijing on Sept. 3, 2015.
Photo: Reuters/Damir Sagolj One Chinese academic, who asked not to be named, also expresses concern that Xi has concentrated
power in the hands of himself and a few advisers in a number of leading groups, covering issues ranging from economics to
security, which operate in parallel to the government. He fears there may be less and less debate in the leadership: I do hope others
can say no to him, can veto decisions, but I dont know." And a worry that Xis concentration of power could spill over into the
realms of the personality cult -- one of his books is said to have sold more than five and a half million copies worldwide, and there
are institutes, and even a new app, for the study of his speeches and writings -- has also alarmed some who initially saw him as a
modernizer.
Win vs. US: Extensions

!!Backing down the US is a win for Jinping
Sutter 10/15/15 http://www.theasanforum.org/grading-xi-jinpings-america-policy-c/ Robert Sutter, Elliot School of
International Affairs, George Washington University
Xi Jinpings New Priorities and Impact on America Unfortunately, Xis record shows repeated choices that place other foreign and
domestic priorities above his avowed but increasingly hollow claims to seek a positive relationship with the United States. These
actions make it increasingly clear that in
Xis view, positive US ties will come on condition of America
avoiding opposition to new priorities in Chinese foreign relations under him.5 By putting the United States on notice
that it is the United States that has to give way to Chinas practices at odds with US interests, the Xi government
has prompted Obama and his government to be much more vocal in issuing often strident complaints. Xi has ignored them, leaving
it to underlings to rebuff them. The frustration within and outside the US government grows in the face of Xis actions; there has
been a toughening of behavior in some areas. A significant debate has emerged inside and outside the government with those
favoring a tougher policy toward China in the ascendance.6 Xi Jinping began the process of changing Chinese policies with major
implications for the United States as he prepared to take control of the Communist Party of China (CCP) and state power in late
2012. The caution and low profile of the previous leaders were viewed with disfavor. Chinese policies and practices became much
more assertive. Xi received enormous publicity from Chinese propaganda and media outlets; his
image as a decisive
leader prepared to act strongly in the face of American and other criticism was welcomed by
Chinese public opinion and elite opinion . Chinese reassurance and restraint in dealing with the United States
and others were played down; officials in China said they had conveyed Chinese weakness to Asian rivals and the United States. The
string of Chinese actions and initiatives shook many out of their complacency:7 The government orchestrated the largest mass
demonstration against a foreign target ever seen in Chinese history (against Japan over disputed islands in September 2012). It
followed with intense political, economic, and security pressure on Japan unseen since World War II. China used coercive and
intimidating means to extend control of disputed territory at neighbors expense. Chinese officials dismissed and rebuffed US and
other complaints that their actions upset regional stability. Despite increasing US complaints, the new Chinese government
continued manipulative economic practices, cyber theft, and reluctance to contribute regional and global common goods. China used
its large foreign exchange reserves and trading capacity to develop international banks and to support often grandiose Chinese plans
for Asian and global investments, loans, and trade areas that excluded the United States and countered American initiatives and
support for existing international economic institutions. Xi Jinping tightened political control domestically in ways grossly offensive
to American representatives seeking political liberalization and better human rights conditions in China. The Chinese advances were
supported by ever expanding Chinese capabilities backed by the impressive and growing economic and military power of China. The
Official
Chinese media highlighted Xis leadership; he was depicted in glowing accounts directing multifaceted
Chinese military capabilities were arrayed against and focused on the American forces in the Asia-Pacific region.
Chinese initiatives abroad with confidence and authority in pursuit of his broad vision of a unified, powerful, and internationally
respected Chinawhat Xi and the Chinese publicists called the China Dream. Complaints by neighbors, the United States, and
other powers concerned with the negative impacts of Xis actions were rebuked or scorned. Power-Shift in Asia and Future US-China
Relations Xis
assertive ascendance supported the recently common view among Chinese and international
commentators that China had grown in power and confidence to the extent that a tipping point had arrived in the
Asian order with the United States in decline and China in greater control. The choices for America were often depicted in stark
Others
saw the need for America to give way, accepting Chinas leading power and influence in Asia as
America pulled away .9g down the
terms. The United States was called on by some to gird itself to prepare to resist in a contest for supremacy with China.
Standing up to America key to Jinping cred

Browne 9/29/15 http://www.wsj.com/articles/what-xi-jinping-offered-in-the-u-s-aslight-shift-in-tone-1443503759 http://www.wsj.com/articles/what-xi-jinping-offered-in-the-us-a-slight-shift-in-tone-1443503759
Winning the hearts of ordinary Americans, and the trust of politicians, was always going to be a
next-to-impossible endeavor for the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao. His immense
popularity rests with the Chinese masses whose hearts swell with pride when he flaunts
Chinas new military hardware and uses it to stand up to America and its allies in Asia.
Not backing down crucial for maintaining Jinping legitimacy

Corr and Michaelides 15 rofessor Benjamin Liebman of Columbia Law School and Isaac
Kardon of Cornell University Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 3, No. 5, May 2015. Nine Scholars
Offer Views on South China Sea Dispute Dr. Anders Corr is Publisher of the Journal of Political
Risk, and Principal at Corr Analytics Inc. He holds a Ph.D. from Harvard University, and a joint
B.A./M.A. from Yale University. He spent five years as a civilian in military intelligence,
including with Asia, Europe, nuclear proliferation, and Afghanistan as foci. Matthew
Michaelides is Editor of the Journal of Political Risk. JPR Status: Report. This report was
updated with additional information on 5/11/2015 and 5/12/2015.
http://www.jpolrisk.com/nine-scholars-offer-views-on-south-china-sea-dispute/
Mr. Kardon argued that the nine-dash line is unjustifiable under international law. However, he made the caveat that it is reasonable
to predict that a global power, especially China, would violate international law. The South China Sea conflict, according to Mr.
China also
seeks, through its aggressive actions in the South China Sea, to demonstrate to domestic audiences that the
State, and Xi Jinping more specifically, are not only effective but also glorious in battle . The
Kardon, is an element of geopolitical efforts that seek to control the most important strategic and economic space.
nine-dash line, according to Mr. Kardon, seeks to impart legal and political legitimacy to the Chinese claim. It also seeks to promote
visual closure of space that paves the way for making it the recognized territory of China. Capacity building of the navy and fishing
fleets gives the Chinese jurisdiction teeth, including through domestic law and economic use. All these Chinese strategies are meant
to erode over time the claims by other countries that are based on international law. Benjamin Purser, a PhD candidate at the
University of Colorado who also works for the RAND Corporation, argued forcefully for the need to modify the current 1982 UN law
governing maritime disputes, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Purser argued that the language of the treaty
should explicitly exclude not just uninhabitable islands, as it does at present, but also physically small islands, that is, those with an
area smaller than a limit to be determined by negotiations or the court. This would remove the incentive to engage in
environmentally destructive and fiscally costly island building campaigns as are being seen in 2015. Mr. Purser presented empirical
support for his argument with a multivariate logit regression, which found that maritime disputes between 1946 and 2014 (n=3381
dispute-years) were positively correlated with islands, hydrocarbons, autocratic states, and high GDP growth of claimant countries.
Maritime dispute contestation was negatively correlated with fisheries, democratic states, and anocratic states. Professor Liebman,
as one of two discussants along with Professor Denoon, made the observation that China will find it difficult domestically to back
down from its claim in the South China Sea. China could, as other countries have done, use international law as a way to climb back
down from its precarious claims in the South China Sea. Chinas domestic population could understand scaling back the claim if
China were to frame it domestically as a position taken in accordance with international law. However, using international law as a
domestic cover for withdrawing claims has usually been done by democracies, according to Professor Liebman. China
and the
Communist Party of China, on the other hand, have staked their legitimacy on the growing power,
strength and glory of China , and so retreat based on international law will not be accepted by domestic
constituencies. While China has sought to shape and influence international law in international fora, it ultimately sees international
law as a tool of the West, and therefore illegitimate. The position of the United States not to join UNCLOS undermines US
arguments and credibility. This does not legitimize Chinas actions, according to Professor Liebman, it simply explains the problem.
Beating the US makes Xi look like a badass

Blackwill and Campbell February 16 https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2756484/CFRBlackwill-Campbell-Xi-Jinping.pdf 41 Robert Blackwill is Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on
Foreign Relations (CFR). His current work focuses on U.S. foreign policy writ large as well as on China, Russia, the Middle East,
South Asia, and geoeconomics. Blackwill served as counselor to CFR in 2005. Most recently, he was senior fellow at the RAND
Corporation in Santa Monica, California, from 2008 to 2010, after serving from 2004 to 2008 as president of BGR International. As
deputy assistant to the president and deputy national security advisor for strategic planning under President George W. Bush,
Blackwill was responsible for government-wide policy planning to help develop and coordinate the mid- and long-term direction of
U.S. foreign policy. He also served as presidential envoy to Iraq and was the administrations coordinator for U.S. policies regarding
Afghanistan and Iran. Blackwill went to the National Security Council (NSC) after serving as the U.S. ambassador to India from 2001
to 2003. He is the recipient of the 2007 Bridge-Builder Award for his role in transforming U.S.-India relations, and the 2016 Padma
Bhushan award from the government of India for distinguished service of a high order. Kurt M. Campbell is chairman and chief
executive officer of the Asia Group, LLC. He also serves as chairman of the Center for a New Amer - ican Security, is a nonresident
fellow at Harvard Kennedy Schools Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, and is on the board of directors for Standard
Chartered PLC in London. From 2009 to 2013, he served as the assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, where
he is widely credited as being an architect of the pivot to Asia. For his work, Secretary Hillary Clinton awarded him the Secre - tary
of States Distinguished Service Award, the nations highest dip - lomatic honor. Campbell served as an honorary officer of the Order
of Australia and as an honorary companion of the New Zealand Order of Merit for his work in support of U.S. relations with
Australia and New Zealand, respectively. He also received top national honors from Korea and Taiwan.
Globally, Xi will maintain a proactive and assertive Chinese foreign policy that involves
institution-building and occasional provocation in order to demon - strate at home that
China is taken seriously abroad. Xi will remain firm in the face of external pressure on the
South and East China Seas, human rights, conditions in Tibet and Xinjiang, and diplomatic
visits by the Dalai Lama. As China assumes the rotating presidency of the Group of Twenty
(G20), Xi will continue to challenge the U.S. global financial and security order using
institutional methods
!!!Backing down US ups Xi cred only military faceoff prevents

escalation
Nevertheless, U.S.
policymakers will likely face a growing challenge in Xi, particularly because he can
coordinate a variety of different instru - ments of statecraft in service of enduring Chinese strategic objectives
and to bolster his nationalist credentials. By contrast, U.S. policymak - ers are burdened by a slower, more
divided, and more public interagency process. Xi will exploit the relative opacity and speed of his system to keep U.S. officials off
balance with new initiatives or provocations. These Chinese
advantages are serious, but they are not

necessarily deci - sive, especially if the United States remains resolved, strengthens its alli - ances,
and forges a bipartisan domestic consensus on Asia policy. To deal with Xis more assertive foreign and defense policies, the United
States should devise a grand strategy for Asia at least as coher - ent and coordinated as the one that has been formulated in Beijing,
which appears designed to maximize Chinas power while challeng - ing the long-standing role of the United States in the region. 49
What we have in mind is not containment, which in any case is a U.S.-Soviet concept that has no relevant application in East Asia
today. Instead, the United States should use a variety of instruments of statecraft to incen - tivize China to commit to a rules-based
order but impose costs that are in excess of the gains Beijing would reap if it fails to do so. This Ameri - can grand strategy should
account for the fact that the decades-long endeavor to integrate China into the global order has not significantly tempered Chinas
strategic objective to become the most powerful and influential country in Asia. This being the case, the United States needs a longterm approach that demonstrates U.S. internal strength, exter - nal resolve, and steadiness of policy. What we propose seeks to avoid
a U.S.-China confrontation and maintain U.S. primacy in Asia. This will require a much more robust effort by Washington, together
with its allies and friends in the region, to shape Chinese foreign policywhich may well become even more forceful as Chinas
slowing economy calls into question political sta - bility and induces the party to lean ever more on the pillar of popular nationalism
to maintain legitimacy. Informed by Xis unique stature and Chinas changed economic prospects, prescriptive suggestions for a U.S.
strategy follow. First, even as the Middle East and Europe once again call for atten - tion, the
United States should

its pivot or 30 Xi Jinping on the Global Stage rebalance to Asia by strengthening its
diplomatic, economic, and military ties across the region. Beijing recognizes that one of its great advantages in
nevertheless continue
this strategic competition is how much time and atten - tion Washington spends on challenges elsewhere. As China steps up its
military challenge and its use of geoeconomic tools, the price of U.S. absence or hesitance in Asia has never been higher. A successful
U.S. grand strategy should take as a given that economics and politics are profoundly intertwined in Asia and that Congress should
pass the TPP if it is not to lose further strategic ground to China, as well as lift con - straints on U.S. exports of oil and gas to its Asian
allies. Second, the United States should substantially strengthen its power projection into Asia . It
should maintain commitments to deploy at least 60 percent of the U.S. Navy and Air Force to the region despite con - tinuing crises
in the Middle East and enduring challenges in Europe. The
United States needs more frequent and formidable

naval activities, more robust air force deployments, and more capable expeditionary for mations, as well as greater partner capacity, to reinforce its preeminent role in preserving peace
and stability in Asia. This will allow it not only to conduct freedom of navigation transits, but also to seek to deter Chi - nese
provocations, respond to regional crises, and reassure allies. The October 2015 dispatch of a U.S. Navy warship to within twelve
nautical miles of Chinas artificial islands in the South China Sea sent a power - ful signal that the United States is determined to
oppose Chinas asser - tions of sovereignty over international waters and to protect freedom of navigation. Such U.S. operations,
including challenges to Beijings unilaterally declared ADIZ, should be conducted as often as necessary to reinforce Asias rulesbased order and need not always be announced publicly before they are undertaken. For these types of operations to be effective,
they will need to be consistent, which in turn requires a long- term military strategy that
prioritizes the Asia-Pacific and commits to the region a level of military assets that reflects its foremost
importance to U.S. national interests. Third, even as Chinas behavior in Asia becomes increasingly provocative, the United States
should refrain from seeking to imple - ment a China-first approach to the region. Such a G-2 bilateral focus, including the signing of
a fourth communique for U.S.-China rela - tions, would suggest a great power condominium that puts China at the center of U.S.
strategy in Asia. This would potentially raise the specter of a spheres of influence approach that would be contrary to 31 Implications
for the United States the open and rules-based U.S. order and raise destabilizing concerns among U.S. allies and partners. Instead of
pursuing a bilateral diplo - matic grand bargain, Beijings
behavior is best influenced by a broad and

coordinated American multilateral strategy that embraces and deepens diplomatic ties with
states throughout the entire region, including China. In short, the United States should embed its China policy within a
larger Asia-wide framework, intensifying every one of Washingtons other bilateral relationships in the region. Deepening and
diversifying contacts throughout Asia will allow the United States greater influence in the regions affairs and greater capacity to
shape Chinas external choices. Fourth, the United States should take the following steps in concert with its Asian allies and
partners: Japan . The United States should continue to work with Japan to enhance the operational capabilities of the Japan
Self-Defense Forces. In addition, the United States should upgrade its ballistic missile defense (BMD) cooperation with Japan,
support Japans cooperation with other Asian allies and partners, and regularly and resoundingly signal that the United States will
come to Japans defense if Japan is attacked. South Korea . The cornerstone of Americas relationship with South Korea is their
shared commitment to defending the latter from North Korean aggression. In that regard, the United States should promote stability
on the Korean peninsula by maintaining enough military forces there to deter aggressive North Korean action, reaffirm its nuclear
guarantees to South Korea, and enhance South Koreas BMD capabilities. Because China is acting consistently as the sole benefac tor of South Koreas enemy to the north, it is crucial for the United States to uphold its status as the guarantor of stability on the
Korean Peninsula, thus facilitating a shared vision of U.S.-South Korean national interests. The United States, South Korea, and
Japan will together need to continue pushing China to use its leverage to restrain North Koreas nuclear ambitions, in part by
reminding Beijing that North Koreas provocative behavior is a driving force behind defense modernization, exercises, and military
deployments for the United States and its allies. Although it is unlikely that this allied diplomacy will produce any fundamental
change in Chinas protective stance toward North Korea, Washington should keep trying.
Link Magnitude-Domestic Agenda outweighs

Even if they are right Xi will make nationalist pushes for things like
cyberattacks and South China Sea disputes internal, domestic issues
massively outweigh in importance
Media and Netizens When
pressure is put on Party elite leaders, who then restructure the tone and
parameters of statements on issues like the South China Sea, it comes in a highly complex way
from the public. The ways in which this happens are ill understood. Part of this is because, through lack of
detailed investigations or real in-depth understanding of how the Communist Party surveys and makes use of the opinions of the
people, it
is hard to assess what real role the views of the public play. Basically, for all the claims
made about Chinese being satisfied or dissatisfied through vehicles like the Pew Research Institutes annual
register, no one really knows what the publics views are. There are no national elections, and no
ways to empirically test the public mood on issues like government performance and satisfaction with
Party policy on specific issues. The one thing that is clear is that for Xi Jinping, appealing to nationalist
sentiment and the trope of the Party being the defender of the vision of a strong, rich China has become an
increasingly powerful potential driver of policy. Nationalism as it appeared in the writings of prominent bloggers
like Wang Xiaodong and others in an infamous collection named Unhappy China from 2009 asserts that China has been too
compliant and weak with its claims over its border issues, and that the government needs to do more to protect those claims. They
focus in particular on the Japanese due to their refusal to deal with their historic crimes, and the United States, because of its
perceived strategy of containment and the ways in which it inhibits or curtails Chinas strategic space, a space these bloggers feel is
legitimately theirs.[25] There
is plenty of evidence that this nationalistic sentiment figures at least in

Chinese cyberspace. But it is less clear how much impact it really has on Party and government
thinking, and in which ways it is evidence of manipulation, or of being manipulated. In an era of
falling GDP growth, with many tough domestic decisions, Chinese leaders are indeed searching
for a new pillar of legitimacy. Since 1978, the core source has been economic growth. But now, the
message is more complicated. And inspiring people through nationalist messages to line up and
support the Party State as it asserts the countrys rights in what is viewed as its own backyard against those
who are seen as its enemies or detractors is good populist politics. The only issue is one of control is the Party
truly still in charge of the message? And if so, what sorts of tactical compromise does it have to make to ensure that it is indeed
regarded as a worthy custodian of nationalist public interests over the disputed islands? The sail through of a U.S. destroyer in
October 2015 referred to above once more offers interesting insights. Just as the loud declarations of military intent and anger by
PLA officials before this event did not result in any real response, so too there is no sign of discontent in the sphere of public opinion.
On the whole, the
appeal to issues like the S outh C hina S ea, even if it does have
widespread soft support from the public, is nowhere near as central to their
interests as issues like the quality of their living environment, the rising living costs
and the pressure this puts on their budgets. These are topics that have a direct impact on
their daily lives that they can see. The attention that the Party gives these issues in its internal major
announcements evidences their importance. The 2013 Plenum (the Communist Party Central Committee
annual high level policy meeting), for instance, was solely on economic reform, with no real space left for territorial
issues and their management. In 2014, the Plenum was on legal reform, and in 2015 on the preparation
for the 13th Five Year Programme. Seen against these policy announcements, the South China
Sea is indeed not a core interest, but a peripheral issue. And for all the noise of some figures in
Chinese cyberspace and media, in the end there is no clear evidence that this plays much of a
role in formulating policy.
A2-Link Non-Unique
Political capital build-up is gradual their link non-unique
arguments are our offense
AD 7/25/16]
This report seeks to add greatest value by attempting to chart a different course for the future. It
recommends a common strategic narrative to guide the U.S.-China relationship , centered on the concept
of constructive realismcommon purpose, or . This framework has three parts: It is realistic about
recognizing areas of fundamental disagreement, while agreeing on common protocols to manage these disagreements without imperiling the entire
relationship; It
is constructive about those areas of difficulty in the bilateral, regional and global
relationship that the U.S. and China can engage on, therefore producing tangible results over
time, and gradually building political capital, diplomatic ballast and incremental strategic trust
which over the longer-term can be drawn upon to deal with the more intractable disagreements
described above; and Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School 5 Building on both these realist and constructive
pillars, this report also advocates for an overriding common strategic purpose for the relationship: to sustain, strengthen and, where necessary, reform
the existing regional and global rules-based order, against those forces seeking to erode the order altogether, to the detriment of the U.S., China and the
broader international community.
Link is unique past policies were only rhetoric

As Obama has stressed, in
light of all Xis initiatives and promises, The question now is, Are words
followed by actions? Xis reassuring message to U.S. technology companies means little when
so many of them are banned or under investigation in China. He may yet renege on promises to
refrain from hacking critical infrastructure or stealing foreign technology indeed, by some reports
China has already broken its recent cyber agreement with the United Statesand the details of
his climate cap-and-trade program remain vague.44 Xis promise not to militarize South China
Sea islands appears empty given his decision to Xis September 2015 State Visit to the United
States 23 construct airstrips and docksand place artilleryon those islands. Similarly, Xis
praise for womens rights and his remarks welcoming NGOs stand at odds with his detention of
feminist activists and his promulgation of a law that will close many NGOs operating in China. 45
Observers will be watching not only whether Xi honors his summit commitments, but also what the United States does in the aftermath of the summit
there is little
reason to believe that Xis words will fundamentally improve the tone or substance of the
with respect to freedom of navigation and other issues that have been in contention between the two countries. In any case,
bilateral relationship. The primary purpose of Xis trip was to enhance his prestige and modestly
reassure the United States at a time of souring business and U.S. domestic opinion, all the while refusing to compromise on significant
Chinese national interests. Although it remains unclear whether he has achieved this goal, at least one conclusion seems firm enough: Xis visit, and
especially his meeting in Seattle with technology CEOs, is strong evidence of his ability to react nimbly and effectively to U.S. initiatives and
demonstrates his gift for public relations. In this regard, it showcases the nature of the challenge that U.S. policymakers face in dealing with him in the
future.
PolCap
-Key-Generic
Polcap needed for structural reforms
Heath 15 (Heath, Timothy R., Senior International Defense Research Analyst with the RAND Corporation, 19 March 2015,
http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/China_Brief_Vol_15_Issue_6_4_01.pdf.)
As Chinas economy moves toward a structure more like that of the United States and other developed nations, trade relations are
growing less complementary and more competitive. Chinese economists assess that future growth will depend heavily on the degree
of the Asia- Pacific regions integration with Chinas economy, as well as issues related to global economic governance and
international trade rules (see, for example, the report by the State Council Development Research Center ) ( China Economic News ,
September 5, 2014). While the pursuit of sustained economic growth provides the principal driver, political and security concerns
remain an important factor. Beginning around 2012, China
stepped up criticism of the U.S. alliance
system in Asia while it increased efforts to establish and refine alternative security organizations, mechanisms and
structures to complement Chinas domination of the regions economy. Reflecting the urgency of these structural reforms,
Chinese officials now regard policy toward Asia as the priority direction ( The Diplomat ,
December 22, 2014). At the international level, China finds an entire network of norms, principles, alliances and frameworks that
offer, at best, an ambivalent reception to Chinas arrival as a great power. Chinese
officials have accordingly

stepped up efforts to shape global principles and norms to delegitimize the ability of the
United States to initiate military attacks without UN sanction. In initiating a debate on the meaning of the
United Nations Charter, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi argued that military attacks initiated without United Nations approval
should be regarded as illegal and illegitimate. He described President Xis proposal on building a new type of international
relations as an important innovation and development of the UN Charter ( Xinhua , February 23). The Quest for Political and
Moral Authority Because
China regards protection of its growing array of economic, political and security
interests as inseparably linked to reform of the international order, one of the most pressing
tasks confronting its leaders is the accumulation of the political capital needed to push
through the systemic and structural reforms that Beijing desires.
!!Jinping political capital through foreign policy wins k2 reform pace

Chong-Ping Lin 14 http://www.chinastudiescentre.com.au/politics/xi-jinpings-boldpolicies-and-political-capital-written-by-chong-pin-lin-and-translated-by-sam-hall/ Chong-Pin
Lin is the former Deputy Defense Minister of Taiwan and once held the Sun Yat-Sen Chair in the
School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University
Xi Jinpings bold policies and political capital Why has Xi Jinping boldly launched 60
items of reforms and relentlessly campaigned against corruption ? The answer may lie in
his abundant political capital that surpasses all of his predecessors in the six-decade
history of the Peoples Republic of China. With Xi Jinping having only taken office for one year,
already 60 highly ambitious reform packages were announced at the Third Plenum of the
Chinese Communist Partys 18th Party Congress in November 2013. Both the number of new
policies introduced and the audacity of these moves are unprecedented in the first years of all
previous CCP leaders after inauguration. It makes one dizzy just to think about what he has
launched: Xis Eight Rules which restricted the lavish lifestyle of Party officials, the Mass Line
Education Campaign which promoted an exemplary and clean image of the Party members,
Party Democratic Life Meetings which re-introduced self-criticism of the Party members,
various anti-corruption measures, suppression of dissidents, strengthening control of
online opinions, declaring the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ),
sending the Liaoning aircraft carrier to patrol the South China Sea , testing the DF-41 ICBMs,
and finally the 60 reform packages themselves. The Spear and the Shield of Xis Reforms Some
say that Xi Jinping turns left on politics and right on economy. That misses the point. The real
catch is this: Xi wields both the spear and the shield of reforms to elevate the quality of
governance so that the Party wont lose its grip on power, as well as the privileges enjoyed by the
leaders and their offspring. The shield comprises conservative and patriotic measures such as
arresting dissidents, announcing the ADIZ, and sending the Liaoning carrier southward as
previously mentioned. Toughness abroad and stability at home under Xi would deprive
the vast elements of vested interests threatened by his moves excuses to attack Xi the bold
reformer . He has stuffed their mouths speechless. Then he can thrust forward with his
spear the ambitious reforms and the risky fight against corruption . The spear and the
shield complement each other. It wont work if one is missing. One of Xis structural
reforms is to establish the National Security Commission to strengthen the coordination
previously insufficient among the organizations of the Party and the government on foreign
policy. In the recent decades, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Peoples Liberation Army
(PLA), Taiwan Affairs Office, and other governmental departments often worked at cross
purposes. A notable exception occurred when Zeng Qinghong played a key role in policy making.
During Hu Jintaos first term from 2002 to 2007, Zeng served as the Vice Chairman of the PRC
and occupied the highest post in the Secretariat of the Party Central Committee. Zeng was a
well-connected princeling in the military and the Party, thanks to the close ties of his parents to
key leaders in the past. An insider in Beijing, he had helped Jiang Zemin, drafted from Shanghai
to the capital to head the Party and the government after the Tiananmen tragedy in 1989, to
consolidate power in the 1990s. These political assets of Zengs endowed him with prowess in
policy integration. Zeng, despite his reputation as Jiangs hatchet man, was supportive of Jiangs
successor Hu Jintao who in turn fully tapped Zengs talents in policy formulation and problemshooting which Jiang had ignored. After Zeng retired in 2008, the linchpin of Beijings adroit
neighbourhood policy was gone. Beginning in 2009, Chinas frictions with neighbours, with
whom Beijing had taken pains to cultivate good relations since 2003, mounted. Obviously
damaging Chinas long-term national interest, the country became encircled by openly and
potentially hostile neighbours supported by the U.S. Chinas recent controversial declaration of
East China Sea ADIZ in late November 2013 was a case in point. Apparently resulted from illcoordination between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the PLA, Beijing failed to advise South
Korea, Australia, and the U.S. beforehand in order to isolate Japan. China ended up losing face
for inability to restrict foreign flights through the zone, and suffered from further image
deterioration in the region. (Beijing only gave America half an hour notice). Xi Jinping must
have been aware that fiasco like this and many before should no longer happen. In fact, he had
started reforming the system by announcing the establishment of the National Security
Commission 11 days before the ADIZ declaration. However, the new mechanism barely had time
to start functioning. Anti-corruption Campaign to Uphold the Rule and Privileges In a speech at
the commemoration of the 90th anniversary of the founding of the Party in July 2011, Hu Jintao
noted that resolute punishment and effective prevention of corruption determines whether the
people are for or against us, and whether our Party will live, die, survive or perish. He
mentioned again in the political report for the CCP 18th National Congress in November 2012
that, poor resolution of this problem (anti-corruption) will fatally injure the Party, and even
cause the Party and the country to collapse. Since Xi Jinping took over, 180,000 officials have
fallen from power by mid-January 2014. Not acting now would see popular grievances rising,
social unrest spreading, the rule of the Party endangered, and the priveleges of the leaders and
their offspring lost. The ultimate motivation of anti-corruption may not be lofty ideal but rather
collective practical self-interest. This is why Xi Jinpings current bold charge forward has gained
the support of the Partys leadership, even as he restricted the activities of former Central
Military Commission Vice-President Xu Caihou, and launched investigation on top-level
officials such as the former Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang. The most
critical factor, however, for his heightened push toward reforms is his possession of the
most abundant political capital among all Chinese Communist Party leaders in history.
Jinping capital key to pushing forward past elite opposition

Mauldin 7/1/15 http://www.mauldineconomics.com/outsidethebox/xis-anti-corruptioncampaign-is-key-to-chinas-prospects ohn Mauldin is the Chairman of Mauldin Economics
which publishes a growing number of investing resources, including both free and paid
publications aimed at helping investors do better in today's challenging economy. For more
information on these publications go to www.mauldineconomics.com. In addition, John is the
host of the Strategic Investment Conferencean annual event for accredited investors that
draws a faculty of some of the most respected investment and economic luminaries in the world.
He is a frequent speaker at conferences around the world and consults with a number of private
firms. He is also a sought-after contributor to numerous financial publications, as well as a
regular guest on TV and radio.
In the following chapter from our recently published e-book on China, A Great Leap Forward?,
George explains that moving forward on more substantive and politically sensitive economic
reforms depends on Xi Jinpings ability to consolidate power and break through the
disruptive vested interests that threaten the Chinese Communist Partys legitimacy and
stand in the way of true economic rebalancing.
While Beijing has made some progress on its stated reform agenda since the Partys Third
Plenum in November 2013, it remains to be seen whether President Xi and his allies have not
only the stomach for more difficult reforms and deleveraging but also the political capital
needed to move forward without a revolt within the Party.
Systemic reform depends on Jinping accumulation of polcap

Baohui 3/12/15 https://www.globalasia.org/forum/inflating-chinas-domesticvulnerability/ Zhang Baohui is Director of the Center for Asian Pacific Studies at Lingnan
University, Hong Kong.
Shambaugh also uses the tightening of political control under Xi as an indicator of rising regime
vulnerability. Again, the claimed causality may be problematic. The reality is that Xi has been
attempting to reign in political elements from both left and right. This partly explains the
greater efforts to control the expression of ideas on the Internet. The tendency of stronger
political control also reflects Xis style of centralized leadership. He is clearly moving away from
the collective leadership model in the Jiang and Hu eras. The transition toward a more
centralized system primarily reflects Xis personal preferences, not necessarily rising regime
vulnerability.
Lastly, Shambaugh points to the lack of concrete progress with Xis ambitious economic reform
agenda as a sign of the looming crisis. He suggests that powerful interest groups are stopping
Xis agenda, revealing his political weakness. However, the truth is that it is too early to tell the
outcomes of these reforms, many of which have not even reached the implementation stage.
Evidence so far indicates that he has been able to pressure the powerful state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) to change their policies and practices. For example, Xi has successfully forced the heads
of large SOEs to drastically lower their salaries and other compensation. Moreover, Xi has
thrown many of these SOE executives into prison on corruption charges. The roving Central
Inspection Teams dispatched by Xi and his right-hand man, Wang Qishan, instill great fear
among these people.
While Shambaugh inflates the regime vulnerability, he is right in suggesting the importance of
deeper reforms for China to avert political instabilities. As he rightly claims, many of Chinas
problems, such as rampant corruption, are rooted in the institutions of the one-party system.
Xis challenge is whether he can successfully implement deeper reforms to correct the defects of
current institutions. His administration has recently proposed Four Comprehensives that
reflect an ambitious agenda for deeper reforms. These include basing governance on the rule of
law. Whether these reforms will succeed in the long haul remains to be seen. Only time will tell
if Xi can marshal sufficient political capital to implement systemic reforms in governance
and the economy.
Anti Corruption Slow now

!!Crackdown slowed because of decreased Jinping polcap
Hewitt 9/22/15 http://www.ibtimes.com/enigma-xi-jinping-ahead-us-visit-chinas-toughleader-beset-economic-social-challenges-2107893 Duncan Hewitt is Shanghai correspondent
for Newsweek/IBT Media. He was previously a BBC correspondent in Beijng and Shanghai, and
also worked for the BBC World Service in London, focusing on East and Southeast Asia. He
studied Chinese at Edinburgh University, and first lived in China in the late 1980s. His book
Getting Rich First Life in a Changing China (Vintage UK, 2008) looks at the social changes
unleashed by Chinas economic reforms.
Indeed, Lam believes that Xis anti-corruption honeymoon could soon be over : Most
Chinese people gave Xi a lot of credit for the campaign at first, he notes. But I think the
authorities have more or less finished taking down the major tigers now -- and people have
become a bit more cynical as they realize that most of these big tigers are also Xis political
enemies. The upheavals over the stock market -- and the governments initial policy of letting it
boom, and talking it up in official media, followed by attempts to stop the plunge, which couldnt
prevent it falling 40 percent in a month -- have also left Xi significantly less popular
among ordinary Chinese, Lam suggests. Even some of those who have done well from Chinas
economic reforms express concern. Theres been too much government intervention [in the
market], it didnt work, says the Beijing-based businessman, adding anxiously: And now Im
worried theyll do more unnecessary things. Lam suggests that while Xi will be seeking to
emphasize that China remains very much open to business during his meetings with members of
the business community in the U.S., the likely upshot of the recent economic challenges is a
slower approach to the economic reforms that he has long promised to make -- reforms that
many investors believe China urgently needs. I think they will learn their lesson about the stock
market, Lam says. But when Chinas leaders face problems, they tend to act cautiously, so I
think reforms like lifting restrictions on the transfer of capital out of China may be delayed."
tianjin The explosion in Tianjin and the government's bungled response did not go down well
home or abroad. Pictured: Smoke rises as damaged vehicles are seen burning near the site of the
explosions, Aug. 15, 2015. Photo: Reuters Victor Shih, a specialist in China's political economy
and international relations at the University of California, San Diego, agrees that, in challenging
times, 'Stability trumps all', as the Chinese saying goes -- I think this is more true today than
ever before.
Xi will go slow now

Armstrong 8/30/15 http://globalriskinsights.com/2015/08/forecasting-chinas-anticorruption-campaign/ Ian Armstrong is a Supervisor and Researcher at Wikistrat, the worlds
first crowdsourced geopolitical consultancy. He previously assisted in research at Temple
University, the University of Pennsylvania, Scottish Parliament, and Hudson Institute's Center
for Political-Military Analysis, where he has focused on non-proliferation, WMD capability
analysis, and international energy. His research has been presented at conferences at Tufts
University and University of Edinburgh, and his analysis has been featured in Business Insider,
International Policy Digest, and Second Line of Defense.
Forecast for the next 12 months
Given the emerging economic problems facing Chinas economy, President Xi will continue to
hold steady on the low-level flies, while also mounting a greater effort at publicly taking down
high-level tigers. The publicity that naturally comes with high-level scandals will further
consolidate the power of the Xi Administration, and help maintain confidence in the
governments ability to amend the recent economic downturn.
At the same time, Xi will largely avoid the kinds of policies and legal reforms he has
previously mentioned and continue to ignore the institutionalization of corruption in the
Chinese government. A quiet hold on these reforms will allow Beijing to postpone their innate
financial burden and instead direct those funds towards other more immediate stimulus
measures.
Anti-corruption will gradually level off now

Voice of America 6/19/15 http://learningenglish.voanews.com/content/china-anticorruption-campaign/2826506.html
Where will the anti-corruption campaign go next? Because President Xi Jinping has successfully
targeted such a powerful official, some believe he may seek to punish even former heads of the
government, including Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin. But other experts say there are already signs
that the government may sharply reduce the strength of the campaign. Kerry Brown is an
author and the head of the China Studies Center at the University of Sydney, in Australia. He
says the anti-corruption campaign is likely to continue. He believes it will target people like top
aides to former Chinese leaders, but he doubts that former top officials will be tried. I dont
think that we will see an intensification, but I do think we will see a continuation and a very
gradual lowering of the pressure .
Reforms currently stalled by pushback

Magnus 11/12/15 http://www.georgemagnus.com/four-points-about-how-chinaseconomic-transition-will-shape-and-shake-the-world-economy/ George Magnus is an
independent economist and commentator, after having had a long career in the financial
services industry. He is currently an Associate at the China Centre, Oxford University, works as
an external senior adviser to UBS and to other financial institutions, and sits on the advisory
board of the Montreal-based Bank Credit Analyst. From 1995-2012, Mr Magnus was the Chief
Economist, and then Senior Economic Adviser at UBS Investment Bank. During this time, he
served for a few years as the Chair of the Investment Committee of the Trustee Board of UBS
(UK) pension and life assurance fund. Before joining UBS, Mr Magnus had been the Chief
Economist at S.G. Warburg (1987-1995), Chief International Economist at Chase Securities

(1985-1987) and Head of Economics for Europe, the Middle East and Africa at Bank of America
(1977-1985). Mr Magnus received an MSc. Econ from the School of Oriental and African Studies,
did postgraduate research at the University of Illinois, and taught economics at the University of
Westminster and at Illinois. Over many years, Mr Magnus has been researching and writing
about the global economy, receiving plaudits in particular for having predicted a Minsky
Moment in 2007 as the financial crisis was starting to erupt. He is a regular contributor to the
Financial Times, Prospect Magazine and other written media, and appears regularly on BBC TV
and radio, Bloomberg TV and other outlets. His opinion pieces, and other written work and
activities can be found on this website.
At the same time, the government is attempting to pursue a programme of broad economic
reforms. The most advanced are financial liberalisation, capital account opening, and local
government financing, but even these are partially successful, of limited scope , or in the case
of the first two, facing pushback and resistance in the wake of the stock and exchange
market shenanigans earlier this year. Other important areas of reform, including those involving
SOEs, land ownership and rights, hukou, the balance between state and private sectors, and
entry barriers to service industries are only making incremental or peripheral progress ,
or have stalled as the government priorities stability and growth. Many parts of the reform
agenda are also not compatible with sustained high economic growth and rebalancing, as
currently pursued.
Reform stalled DEEP reform not coming now

Hurst 10/5/15 http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/10/political-inertia-stallschinas-economic-reforms.html William Hurst is an associate professor of political science at
Northwestern University. He is the author of The Chinese Worker After Socialism and a coeditor of Laid-Off Workers in a Workers State: Unemployment With Chinese Characteristics.
Even if the leadership were committed to radical reform, powerful elites stand in the way.
State enterprise managers, central and local government officials, tycoons, bankers and
hundreds of thousands of bureaucrats all are winners in the partial-reform equilibrium
in which Chinas state-owned enterprise sector is trapped. All of them would lose if genuine
reform were pushed through.
President Xi Jinping and his leadership team have been pretty fearless in pursuing an anticorruption campaign during their first three years in office that has brought down former
generals, Cabinet ministers and a Politburo member once responsible for the countrys internal
security and law enforcement apparatus. But they need to muster much more courage to take on
the powerful interests who have benefited from Chinas transformation to date. For all the
reformist rhetoric, it seems that for now, Chinas stagnant state-owned enterprises, slower
growth and sharp inequities are here to stay.
Reform pace slow now

Callick 11/16/15 http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/opinion/rowan-callick/chinareforms-in-slow-lane-as-xi-jinping-roadmap-is-foggy/newsstory/2e165971ec141c6fc01f3d960e2741ce Asia Pacific Editor Melbourne
China reforms in slow lane as Xi Jinping road
Fast/Slow Distinction
!!Slow reform pace now is sustainable but FAST derails
Armstrong 8/30/15 http://globalriskinsights.com/2015/08/forecasting-chinas-anticorruption-campaign/ Ian Armstrong is a Supervisor and Researcher at Wikistrat, the worlds
first crowdsourced geopolitical consultancy. He previously assisted in research at Temple
University, the University of Pennsylvania, Scottish Parliament, and Hudson Institute's Center
for Political-Military Analysis, where he has focused on non-proliferation, WMD capability
analysis, and international energy. His research has been presented at conferences at Tufts
University and University of Edinburgh, and his analysis has been featured in Business Insider,
International Policy Digest, and Second Line of Defense.
Anti-Corruption as Anti-Growth Since Chinas anti-corruption campaign was launched,

some have asserted that the effort has in fact hurt China, contributing to its slowing economy,
due to significant drops in luxury industries, such as five-star hotels. Indeed, the declines in said
industries, as well as the negative correlation between the campaign and Chinas slowed growth,
suggest that corruption mildly enhanced Chinas short-term economic gains. This revelation in
turn acts as evidence in favor of halting the initiative for the duration of the prevailing economic
slowdown. However, it is Xis suggested institutional reforms that will impose a more
significant burden on Chinas already slowing economy. Reforms of any kind are costly, and
a reformation of Chinas established and complicated legal system and governance structure
would certainly entail serious economic growing pains as the Chinese government finances the
transition. In an already unstable economic environment, Beijing might seriously consider
holding off on these costly reforms.
map is foggy The great aircraft carrier that is China is slowly changing direction, as its leaders
have been urging for more than a decade. But its happening even slower than expected and the
new road map remains vague in part, because few officials now feel sufficiently confident to
propose comprehensive reform strategies. President Xi Jinping has seized the central role in
economic reform and many other initiatives, but so resoundingly that little space is left in the
room even for professional or technocratic experts. The rhetoric remains strong, but the detail
stays thin.
Pacing is keyquick deregulation causes collapse

Gallagher 8/2/13 (Kevin, Associate Professor of International Relations at Boston University, and a Senior Researcher at
the Global Development and Environment Institute, Tufts University, Should China Deregulate Finance,
http://triplecrisis.com/should-china-deregulate-finance/)
If China de-regulated cross-border financial regulations before reforming its interest rate
policy , there could be enormous capital flight out of China . China needs to reform its
interest rate, exchange rate and financial regulatory regimes first. Low interest rates in China, juxtaposed
with higher rates available abroad, would provide an attractive rate of return for many wealthy Chinese. Capital flight would
also jeopardize Chinas exchange rate reform, which has made great strides over the past two
years. Exchange rate reform has made the yuan appreciate significantlywith estimates of yuan appreciation now at 35-50%.
Capital flight could cause a major depreciation of the currency that could hurt consumers
by further weakening their purchasing power , and stall reform. China will also need to
continue financial regulatory reform. Chinas big banks are still indirectly responsible for large
amounts of non-performing loans and are increasingly intertwined with a shadow banking
system that is not properly regulated. These banks need serious reform or they will not be able to compete with
international financial firms upon liberalization. The global record is clear: When Latin America prematurely
opened its doors to foreign finance in the 1990s domestic banks got wiped out. Next, the new
dominant players in the market foreign banks didnt lend to domestic firms with innovative
new ideas. That undermined growth and economic transformation. The result has been anemic
investment rates, de-industrialization and very little inclusive growth. The IMFs own (and other)
research shows that capital flows are susceptible to massive surges and sudden stops. These
trends have only intensified since the global financial crisis . For a while, there was a surge in
capital flows to emerging markets due to low interest rates in the industrialized world, which
made things look good. But now that the U.S. Federal Reserve hinted its bond buying programs
would slow, capital is fleeing from emerging market countries . But even before that trend change occurred,
things were more bubbly than rosy. During the 2009-2013 period, when capital flowed in, exchange rates appreciated. That hurt
export prospects and caused asset bubbles. Now that exchange rates are depreciating, all those loans from the credit bubble are more
expensive because they are denominated in U.S. dollars. Chinas ambitions aside, the fundamental economic lesson is clear:
Regulating capital flows is essential for the exchange rate to fluctuate relative to economic fundamentals rather than the irrational
whims of speculative finance. Indeed, there is now a consensus among economists and international financial institutions that
capital account liberalization is not associated with economic growth in emerging markets, and that it causes banking crises
(especially in nations with fixed exchange rates). Such evidence has even prompted the International Monetary Fund the very
institution that once saw rapid capital account liberalization as a number one priority to change its tune. The IMF now officially
recommends the cautious sequencing of capital account liberalization. China should remember with pride that it was not as severely
effected by the financial crises of the 1980s and 1990s in Latin America and East Asia. These were crises where capital account
liberalization played a big role. Large countries such as Indonesia were set back by as much as a decade. Why did China not
experiences the same disaster? Because it prudently regulated cross-border capital flows. If
China does not now proceed

with great caution, few countries will weather a financial crisis when it hits China. All around the
globe, we are reliant on China for trade, investment and financ e. Simply put, China is too big too fail.
Slow reforms key to avoid derailing

Tian 12/18/15 http://www.educationpost.com.hk/resources/mba/151217-mba-insightssoe-reforms-why-it-is-better-to-go-slow video producer and business writer.
SOE reforms: Why it is better to go slow Reforming SOEs in China is a gradual process
requiring thinking through before actual implementation. Any attempt to speed up
implementation can have devastating consequences. On September 14, Chinas State Council
released a guideline document on deepening reforms of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The
plan called for, among other things, diversification of ownership and improvement of corporate
systemsprinciples already laid out during the Communist partys Third Plenum back in 2013.
There are few quantifiable reform targets or timetables; instead, the document stresses upon the
importance of not rushing through or forcing any immature reforms. While the plan
underwhelmed many observers who expected a more radical privatization agenda, it is a
reflection of the ideology of Chinese President Xi Jinping, anonymous government advisers and
officials told The Wall Street Journal. As Party Secretary of Shanghai, Xi witnessed the
successful transformation of SAIC Motor, a state-run carmaker in the city, and came to the view
that SOEs should remain the cornerstone to the Chinese economy, officials told the newspaper.
The conservative approach to reforms also derives from concerns that a rapid and thorough
privatization could result in economic and social woes for China, according to experts. Tighter
Control When well-known TV journalist Chai Jing released her documentary Under the Dome in
March, she received as much criticism as praise from the public. The documentary, which
highlighted the devastating impact of air pollution in China, called for an end to state
monopolies in the energy sector as a solution to combat the problem. The logic is that if private
developers were allowed to conduct exploration, Chinas oil and gas production would surge,
replacing coal as Chinas cleaner source of energy. But naysayers are quick to point out: Look at
what happened when the coal industry was privatized in the 1980s. What they are referring to
is tens of thousands of substandard coal pits that brought astronomical wealth to their
irresponsible private owners at the cost of the environment and human lives. In 2013, Beijing
ordered a full-scale shutdown of such mines and SOEs were asked to take overa classic
example of how privatization could go awry. [Privatization] would improve corporate
governance only if private shareholders were better able to hold management to account than
Chinas current system, says Leslie Young, Professor of Economics at Cheung Kong Graduate
School of Business, adding that Chinas weak legal framework does not have sufficient strength
to support better corporate regulation. He adds that Chinas immature business institutions
would allow the wealthy and well-connected to also loot state assets in a Big Bang
privatization scenario, as we have witnessed in Russia and other eastern European countries
in the 1990s.
Speeding reforms of SOEs = mass unemployment

Tian 12/18/15 http://www.educationpost.com.hk/resources/mba/151217-mba-insightssoe-reforms-why-it-is-better-to-go-slow video producer and business writer.
So the conundrum is to promote just enough privatization that can motivate managers and
encourage market-driven decision-makingbut not enough to threaten the dominant role of the
Party. Stability Concerns The other worry that comes with large-scale privatization is mass
unemployment a not so distant memory that still haunts millions of working class families.
During the 1990s, the reformist former Premier Zhu Rongji embarked on a broad privatization
movement of SOEs; numerous factories and their affiliated institutions, such as schools and
hospitals, were shut down or sold to private owners, causing the loss of tens of millions of jobs
nationwide. While the process is believed to have laid the foundation for a more robust private
sector to emerge later, the social and political risks it brought along with it continue to spook
policy makers today. According to Xinhua News Agency, China still has roughly 150,000 SOEs,
which employs more than 30 million people across the country. The reform guideline does
mention that a batch of SOEs could be merged, and a batch could be eliminated, especially in
areas with severe over-capacities; but analysts believe that the scale of such elimination will be
very limited, as the slowing Chinese economy is already exerting pressure on the labor market
and worker unrest is on the rise. Its unlikely for SASAC (State-owned Assets Supervision and
Administration Commission) to eliminate an SOE; its more likely to happen to lower-level
subsidiary companies, analysts from Sinolink Securities wrote in a report. Given the reasons
above, Chinas SOE reform is meant to be a gradual process ; and before Beijing has enough
faith that further privatization will serve its national goals, its better to play it safe , says
Babones.
-Low
Xi cred low now-SCS battle
IPCS 7/21 conducts independent research on security issues in the region (Institute for Peace
and Conflict Studies, South China Sea: Chinas Double Speak And Verdict At The Hague
Analysis, 7/21/16, http://www.eurasiareview.com/21072016-south-china-sea-chinas-doublespeak-and-verdict-at-the-hague-analysis/) JoS
The PCA
concluded that China had never exercised exclusive authority over the waters and that several
SCS were too small for China to claim control of economic activities in the waters around them.
As a result, it found China outside the law in as much as activities in Philippine waters are
concerned. The tribunal cited Chinas construction of artificial islands on the Mischief Reef and the Spratly archipelago as illegal
in addition to the military facilities thereon which were all in Philippine waters. The episode has besmirched the
image of Xi Jinping, his politburo and indeed the credibility of the Communist Party of China
(CPC). To lose their legal case for sovereignty over waters that they have heavily invested in
must come as a rude shock to their global aspirations. A complaisant response may set into motion the
unravelling of the CPCs internal hold on the state as defence of maritime claims is central to the
CPCs narrative. Any challenge to this account is seen in Beijing as a challenge to the Partys
rule. But the die has been cast; it remains to be seen how more regions and neighbours respond to Chinas unlawful claims
disputed rocks and reefs in the
wherever it is perceived to exist. An indication of the regional response was Vietnams immediate endorsement of the tribunals
decision. Thus far China has responded sardonically with a typical Cold War propagandist style avowal. We do not claim an inch of
land that does not belong to us, but we wont give up any patch that is ours. The activities of the Chinese people in the South China
Sea date back to over 2,000 years ago said the front-page in the Peoples Daily, which ridiculed the tribunal as a lackey of some
outside forces that would be remembered as a laughingstock in human history. Such dippy doublespeak has no place in
contemporary geopolitics. For China to do nothing about the matter will be difficult in the extreme. It
does not take a

political pundit to note that some form of immediate coercive military manoeuvre in the SCS is
in the offing. Also, it would hardly be realistic to expect China to scurry away to dismantle the
military infrastructure it has so far set up; more likely it is their revisionist policies that would be
reviewed.
Xi lost credibility through SCS ruling. Seeking ways to claim SCS are
the next step
Pei 7/13 professor of government at Claremont McKenna College (Minxin, What Beijing
Could Do Next After the South China Sea Ruling, 7/13/16,
http://fortune.com/2016/07/13/south-china-sea-manila/) JoS
Few should be surprised by the unanimous ruling this week against China by a tribunal of the Permanent
Court of Arbitration (PCA), a Hague-based international judicial entity constituted under the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS). Even Beijing was expecting this outcome. When the Philippines brought the case against China in early 2013 ,
Beijing refused to take part in the proceedings on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction
over the dispute in the South China Sea. Immediately, after the release of the tribunals ruling, the Chinese Foreign
Ministry issued a detailed rebuttal of the ruling, an indication that Chinese leaders had anticipated an unfavorable verdict.
Although the PCAs ruling cannot be enforced, the magnitude of defeat suffered by China cannot
be overstated. For the first time, an international legal entity has effectively rejected Chinese
claims of sovereignty over the South China Sea and soundly criticized its activities such as land
reclamations. While the legal and practical implications of the ruling are still being digested, the most urgent question now is
what options Beijing has in the wake of this legal setback. Given the belligerent response from China, including
a recent military exercise in the South China Sea, it is clear that Beijing will not abide by the
ruling and cease and desist. In determining how to blunt the impact of the ruling and avoid
further loss of its credibility, China will weigh a combination of factors in crafting a response.
The most critical ones are the domestic political considerations of its top leadership and the possible
response by the United States. The first option, seen as the most attractive and least costly, is to buy off Manila. The Philippines case
against China was brought by the administration of President Benigno Aquino, who has just left office. His successor, Rodrigo
Duterte, may be induced, with promises of aid, trade and investment deals, to soften Manilas position. Ideally, Beijing would like
President Duterte to declare that the PCAs ruling has no legal effect on its policy in the South China Sea and that Manila will work
with Beijing on a bilateral basis to resolve its dispute. A change of the Philippines position will not void the legality of the ruling, but
it can significantly soften the diplomatic blow to Chinas image and prestige. If successful, this move will snatch a diplomatic victory
from the jaws of defeat for China President Xi Jinping and strengthen his hands on the eve of the Communist Partys 19th Congress
in the fall of 2017, a crucial event at which many new leaders will be selected. However, there are practical difficulties for Beijing in
executing this option. Chinas
uncompromising stance on the South China Sea has fueled anti-China

sentiments in the Philippines. As a populist, President Duterte can ill-afford to be seen as selling out
the Philippines national interest and dignity for short-term economic gains. In addition, the
United States, which has backed the Philippines through its dispute with China, will unlikely sit
by and let Beijing woo away Manila. The second option for Beijing is to further escalate the
dispute in the South China Sea. Such a move, though high risk, may also produce great long-term benefits. Chinese
leaders want to show that, in spite of the PCAs ruling and Americas efforts to counter Chinese moves in the South China
Sea, Beijing can do what it wants regardless of legality or diplomatic consequences. Among possible
escalatory steps, the least provocative would be increasing military exercises and aggressive patrols by Chinese coast guard and
fishery enforcement vessels in the disputed area. A more dangerous move is the (very public) introduction of weapons into the
artificial islands already built in the South China Sea. Beijing can also declare an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the South
China Sea, as it did in the East China Sea at the height of its dispute with Tokyo over the sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
in late 2013. The most provocative and riskiest escalatory step would be building an artificial island at Scarborough Shoal, which the
Philippines also claims. Unfortunately,
Beijing will encounter strong push back by the U.S. if it opts for
escalation. In particular, the declaration of an ADIZ will provoke a strong American reaction because the U.S. has already
indicated repeatedly that such a move would constitute an escalation that would be
unacceptable. As for building a Chinese artificial island at Scarborough Shoal, President Barack Obama has already warned
President Xi against this step. Given the uncertainty and risks involved in these two options, Beijing will most likely favor the third
Displaying defiance
and fueling nationalism may help Chinese leaders domestically, but following through on their own bluff and
option for now. It will loudly denounce the PCA ruling but do little else, waiting for the dust to settle.
precipitating a direct confrontation with the United States in the South China Sea right before a critical party congress may be too
reckless a step to take.
Xi has no PC now; anti-graft efforts have caused him to lose power.

Khrushcheva 7/21 professor of international affairs and associate dean for academic
affairs at The New School and a senior fellow at the World Policy Institute (Nina L., The
strongmans power trap, 7/21/16, http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/opinion/21506-thestrongman-s-power-trap.html) JoS
Putin, Erdogan and even Chinese President Xi Jinping all have similar, justifiable fears about their political survival. All three
came to office in systems that place real constraints on the exercise of power even if the system
is otherwise undemocratic or an infant democracy ready to be strangled in its cradle. In Erdogans case, Turkey had the rule of
law and institutional checks and balances on executive power; and in Putin and Xis case, there were unwritten rules
sanctified by decades of precedent. These rules established in Russia by Nikita Khrushchev after Joseph
Stalins death in 1953 and in China by Deng Xiaoping following Mao Zedongs death in 1976 were
designed to take the murderousness out of top-level governance by guaranteeing that a leader
would not threaten the life and safety of either his predecessors or his colleagues. In this system,
a government official may be removed from power or placed under house arrest, but there is no
risk of imprisonment or physical harm against him or his family. Putin came to power in 1999 in part
because he understood, and more importantly appeared to accept, this tradition. Boris Yeltsin did not choose Putin as his successor
because of his remarkable administrative gifts, but because Putin assured him that, if he were put in charge, Yeltsin and his family
would be protected from any legal or political retribution. In Yeltsins case, Putin kept his end of the bargain. But otherwise, Putin
has shown little restraint in going after his rivals. For example, the oligarch Boris Berezovsky was driven into exile, where he was
continuously hounded and harassed, until he was found dead in his home in 2013, allegedly having taken his own life. Mikhail
Khodorkovsky, the billionaire owner of Yukos Oil and a possible rival for political power to Putin, was stripped of his company,
imprisoned and later exiled. Lower-profile rivals and enemies have suffered harsher treatment. Exiled Russian intelligence officer
Alexander Litvinenko, to take one highly publicised example, died from radiation sickness in 2006 in the United Kingdom, after
being poisoned with polonium. In that case, an official UK inquiry concluded that Putin might have been aware of the murder plan;
in others, Putins personal involvement is unknown. But the overall message is clear: Putin answers to no rules, and there are no
limits to the reach or ruthlessness of his retribution, no matter how powerful in Russia a person may once have been. In China, Xi, a
professed admirer of Putins methods, has adopted the Russians playbook as he has consolidated power. Since
Dengs final
years in power, in the late 1980s, a form of collective leadership within the Communist Party has
ruled China, with the same unwritten conventions protecting the most powerful from
retribution. Under Xi, however, collective leadership has given way to one-man rule, and the
unwritten rules of behaviour have been junked. Like Putin, Xi uses anti-corruption measures to
dispatch rivals and concentrate power in his own hands, and he has been even more ruthless than Putin in
doing so. Hundreds of senior generals in the Peoples Liberation Army have been purged and
imprisoned on corruption charges. Moreover, Xi has violated the Party norm of not pursuing
members of the Politburo Standing Committee, beyond removing them from office. Consider the
example of Zhou Yongkang, Chinas long-time internal security chief, who has been imprisoned on charges of bribery, corrupting
state power (for allegedly having too many mistresses) and leaking state secrets. Members of his family have also been imprisoned.
Zhous fall came not long after the trial and imprisonment of Bo Xilai, a candidate for Standing
Committee membership who may have been planning a coup against Xi. Both mens imprisonment
precipitated the downfall of a vast network of senior leaders, including provincial governors and the head of the China National
By violating Party norms and unwritten agreements among the ruling elite , Putin
it is becoming increasingly clear, understand that they can never relinquish power
voluntarily without fearing for their future safety. Little wonder, then, that after 17 years of rule, Putin will run
again for president virtually unopposed in March 2018. Xi, however, has a problem. In 2017, he will
complete his first five-year term, and precedent permits him only one more five-year term.
Because five of the seven members of the Standing Committee are to be replaced in 2017, this
would be the moment for his opponents to challenge him by nominating a successor. The mere
existence of a potential replacement could be a political death sentence for Xi, given widespread
anger against him within the Chinese government.
Petroleum Company.
and Xi,
Xi cred is low nowanti-corruption and open cabinet seats are

fueling tensions
Arpi 5/6 (Claude, historian and author of The Fate of Tibet: When Big Insects Eat Small Insects along with several articles
on Tibet, China, and India, New Aggressiveness, The Statesman, May 6, 2016,
http://www.thestatesman.com/mobi/news/opinion/new-aggressiveness/140582.html)//king koopa
Another reading is that Xi
has to accumulate hats simply because he may not be fully in control the CMC and
other organs of the party. It is true that the PLA reforms are extremely ambitious and changing an ingrained corrupt system is
not easy, in China or elsewhere. To add to the Chinese Presidents woes, the Panama Papers named his brother-in-law,
who is said to have established some offshore firms. Though these companies went dormant before Xi came into power,
the damage was done. For the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ), which investigated the Panama-based law firm
Mossack Fonseca, Xis name is indirectly linked. Already in June 2012, The New York Times and Bloomberg had exposed Xis family: As Xi climbed
the Communist Party ranks, his extended family expanded their business interests to include minerals, real estate and mobile-phone equipment, wrote
Bloomberg. Probably more worrisome for Xi, the
Middle Kingdom is sailing through rough weather and in the

months to come, we may witness fireworks in the party. The Nikkei in Japan reported a verbal jab between President
Xi Jinping and Yu Zhengsheng, the Chairman of the Chinese Peoples Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) during the recently-concluded Two
Sessions at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. During
the 19th Congress to be held in November next year, five of the seven
members of the Politburo Standing Committee, are expected to retire. The Nikkei quoted an old China hand:
Signs of discord within the Politburo Standing Committee have now emerged. The
rift may come to the surface over the
committee seats.
Xis PC is low now- South Korea

Perlez 7/8/16 (Jane Perlez is the chief diplomatic correspondent in the Beijing bureau of
The New York Times. She covers China and its foreign policy, particularly relations between the
United States and China, and their impact on the Asian region.)
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/09/world/asia/south-korea-us-thaad-china.html?
partner=rss&emc=rss&_r=0
BEIJING However isolated North Korea may be, it has long had one major ally: China. But for two years, Chinas leader,
President Xi Jinping, seemed to be favoring Pyongyangs neighbor and nemesis to the south. He spent much political
capital wooing South Koreas president, Park Geun-hye, in hopes of drawing the country away from
its longtime ally, the United States. He made an elaborate state visit to Seoul while shunning North Korea and its young
leader, Kim Jong-un, whom he has yet to meet. Ms. Park returned the favor last year, coming to Beijing for a major military parade
at Tiananmen Square, the only leader of an American ally to attend. But on Friday, it
became clear that Mr. Xis efforts

had fallen short. In announcing plans to deploy an advanced American missile defense system in South Korean, Ms.
Parks government showed that it was embracing its alliance with Washington more than ever, and that it
would rely less on China to keep North Korea and its nuclear arsenal at bay . In Beijing, the
decision was seen as a major setback, one that went beyond its interests on the Korean
Peninsula to the larger strategic question of an arms race in Northeast Asia that could impel
China and Russia to develop more sophisticated weapons. Analysts said the deployment of the socalled Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense system, or Thaad, would reinforce the already high level of mistrust
in United States-China relations as the Obama administration nears its end, adding to the raw nerves over disputes
in the South China Sea and differences over American business access to the Chinese market.In March, South Korea and the
United States began formal talks on the Thaad deployment. China tried to persuade Ms. Park to accommodate Beijings interests by
asking for technical adjustments to the system, under which its radar would penetrate less deeply into China, according to Wu
Xinbo, the director of the Center for American Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai. But those adjustments were not made, he
said.
Xi is politically unstable
Raby, 16 [Geoff, Australian ambassador to China from 2007 to 2011 and is now chief
executive of Beijing-based Geoff Raby & Associates, 6-13-16,
http://www.afr.com/opinion/columnists/why-the-south-china-sea-ruling-has-just-madethings-tougher-for-xi-jinping-20160713-gq4lha] - triscuit
It is also a dangerous moment politically for Xi. Having used the anti-corruption campaign to
set himself up as China's new autocratic ruler, he has made many enemies among the elites.
Now any sign of weakness in the face of what will be seen widely in China as national
humiliation will provide a legitimate opening to attack him.
Xi spent political Cap on SCS and in need of more

Hooper 7/19/16 (Mira Rapp-Hooper is a senior fellow in the Asia-Pacific Security Program
at the Center for a New American Tuesday, July 19, 2016)
Security.http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/authors/1943/mira-rapp-hooper - triscuit
On July 12, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague issued a resounding ruling that was three years in the making. In early
2013, the Philippines brought a case to the tribunal against China, contesting many of Beijings maritime claims in the South China
Sea. The Philippines asked the tribunal to reject Chinas claims based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS), which both Beijing and Manila have signed. What did the ruling not do? First, the
decision did not affect, in

any way, Chinas sovereignty claimsthat is, its claims to territory in this waterway, which do
not fall under the purview of UNCLOS. The tribunal has rejected Chinas claims to vast swaths of
water in the South China Sea and the ability to extract resources from it, but it has not weighed
in on Chinas claims to land featuresthe rocks and reefs that dot these waters . The claimants
themselves must settle disputes over who owns each of these, yet there is no treaty like UNCLOS that will guide the way on these
settlements. Because the ruling does not affect sovereignty claims, the tribunal did not order China to decamp from the bases it has
built on its artificial islandsnor does it expect China to. But it does expect that Beijing will cease claiming waters or airspace
around features that are not so entitled. Second, the ruling did not make Chinas nine-dash line illegal. Instead, it declared that it
could not use that line as a historical justification for claims to natural resources. But if China were to bring the line into compliance
with UNCLOSby stating that the line was a claim to territories and the 12 nautical miles of territorial seas around themthat
would be perfectly legal under the Law of the Sea, and a positive step for China and the region. If that happens, though, it will
probably take place incrementally over a long period of time. So whats next for Beijing? President
Xi Jinping has
invested billions of dollars and even more political capital in Chinas recent assertive push into
its maritime periphery. His biggest concern will be saving face and maintaining legitimacy with
the Chinese people and the Chinese Communist Party . He has already declared that China will
not comply with the ruling, and the Chinese air force has announced it has begun regular patrols
over the contested waters. But there is a big difference between denouncing the ruling verbally
and actively contesting it. If Xi chooses the latter course, China may attempt to reassert its
control in the South China Sea by declaring an air defense identification zone, which it has said
it may do if it feels threatened. China could also contest the tribunals ruling by beginning land-reclamation activities at
Scarborough Shoal near the Philippines; putting military forces or equipment on its Spratly outposts; or taking any number of less
escalatory but still worrisome measures. Beijing seems relatively unlikely to do so before the G-20 meetings that it will host in
September. Its best option would probably be a return to bilateral negotiations with the Philippines, in hopes of securing a resourcesharing agreement that would allow it to claim it was still getting something from South China Sea waters far from its shores.
Xi gets credit
Xi is the ultimate flypaper get ALL the credit and blame
3 Introduction He has iron in his soul. Lee Kuan Yew, former prime minister of Singapore,
on Chinese President Xi Jinping Xi Jinping is the most powerful Chinese leader since Deng
Xiaoping, and with his sweeping actions and ambitious directives he has funda - mentally
altered the process by which Chinas domestic and foreign policy is formulated and
implemented. Xis popular anticorruption campaign has cowed senior party and military
officials and allowed him to amass dominating power in a short span of time. With this
transcend - ing authority, Xi has ended Chinas carefully evolved collective and consensual
leadership structure, marginalized the bureaucracy, and put himself at the center of
decision-making on all consequential matters. This report discusses Xis transformation of
Chinas domestic poli - tics, his background and beliefs, the challenges he faces from Chinas
slowing economy, and the implications of his foreign policy for the United States. One
downside to Xis breathtaking success in consolidating power is that it has left him with near
total responsibility for his governments policy missteps on matters ranging from the stock
market slowdown to labor market unrest. His visibility on these issues and his dominance of the
decision-making process have made him a powerful but poten - tially exposed leader. With
Xis image and political position vulnerable to Chinas economic downturn, his countrys
external behavior may increasingly be guided by his own domestic political imperatives.
Xi is the center of China he gets full credit and blame

Xi is exposed precisely because he sits at the center of all decision- making and is visible to the
public. He must address countless domestic challenges for which he is now explicitly
accountable, and a major mis - step on any of them could be costly to his political popularity and
posi - tion.
Scenarios
Stability
! UQ+IL-Anticorruption campaign steady now but Xi needs more
political capital to speed up the processk2 entire agendaimpact is
stability, territory disputes, Taiwan war
LAURENCE 5/16-studying an M.A. in International Relations at the Central European University [Anthony, Xi Jinpings
anti-graft drive is closely linked to economic reform, Hong Kong Free Press, 5/16/2016,
https://www.hongkongfp.com/2016/05/16/xis-anti-graft-drive-closely-linked-to-economic-reform/, DKP]
Hu Jintaos former top aide, Ling Jihua, is now facing trial in Tianjin on charges of corruption, bribe-taking and other treasonous activity. The trial
came just a day after Xi formulated his economic reform package in a 20,000-character speech taking up two entire pages in the South China Morning
Post. While the two stories appear to be unrelated ,
the connection between the anti-corruption campaign

and Xis economic reform policy becomes glaringly obvious if you set aside the days
daily headlines. Before examining how Xis anti-corruption campaign is designed to force through his
economic reform, lets revisit Ling for a brief moment and look at his connections within the CCP and how this relates to Xis broader
economic plans. Ling was, by many accounts, a close cadre to the disgraced Jiang Jiamen, former head of the power SOE overseer the State-owned
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission. It has even been reported that Zhou Yongkang, former Politburo Standing Committee member,
helped launder money to Jiang to send along to Ling to provide as hush money to the families of the two women killed by Lings son in a car accident.
Although this connection is questionable, the occurrence is possible. It should also be noted that Zhou
is serving a life sentence and

Jiang just began serving a 16-year sentence. It is likely Ling will be jailed for more than a decade
as well, as these show trials are merely precursors to the individuals eventual jailing. Mapping
out the interpersonal connections of tigers targeted by the anti-corruption
campaign demonstrates the perilous risks associated with modern Chinese
politics. Lings associates are no exception. In total, five tigers associated with Ling have
been arrested. While these figures wont grab international headlines in the way the former aide to Hu Jintao
has, the familial, provincial and national depth of these relationships signals the continuation of
the guilt by association aspect this anti-corruption campaign has taken on. A few empirical
studies have backed this claim up as well suggesting rivals to Xis clique have
disproportionally been targeted by the campaign. Still, drawing lines between fallen corrupt
figures in Chinas state capitalist system is easy to do. Xi has provided observers with literally
thousands of figures to draw lines between, exposing a network of corruption reaching across a wide range
of individuals within the CCP. Nonetheless, merely suggesting Xi is consolidating his power and cracking down
on rival cliques does not tell the whole story of the anti-corruption campaign. Increased power may be in
part an end in and of itself, but power accumulation could be a means to a different end as well. This is, in part, a
facet of the anti-corruption campaign which Western academics refuse to point out, mainly because theyre in favour of neo-liberal reforms in China.
Xi suggested
neo-liberal reform is not what is at stake. This also appears not to be the case when examining
the already accomplished neo-liberal reforms Xi has achieved, including de-regulation of deposit interest rates,
Complimenting an authoritarian on a political crackdown for the purpose of policy implementation is bad form. That being said,
linkages between stock exchanges and a less manipulated Remnimbi. These are all free-market capitalist agenda items business leaders and blue-
It has been quite an accomplishment for Xi to have spent

nearly all of his political capital on centralizing decision-making power into his
hands through the working small groups in foreign affairs, security and economic policy.
Furthermore, an empowered Xi results in a more aggressive China internationally , as has
been seen in the strong-arming of British diplomats, the territorial disputes in the
S outh C hina S ea, the lack of willingness to uphold the political deal in regard to Hong Kong
and Xis unwavering resolve to recover the lost territory of Taiwan , which he has
referred to as a national tragedy. All this evidence bodes ill for the stability of East
Asia , as weak states in dire economic straits tend to lash out internationally in order to gin up
blooded capitalists have been very happy with.
nationalism as can be seen with Vladimir Putins Russia. The anti-c orruption campaign has allowed Xi to act in
these empowered ways and it will only continue to do so in the future. In anti-corruption trials within
authoritarian regimes, there is always more than meets the eye. This is especially the case in the notoriously opaque PRC. While
China remains a proverbial black box to a certain degree, reading between the lines shows what Xis ultimate goals
are. He has purposefully tied himself to the success of the anti-corruption campaign and , perhaps
more importantly, the success of the economy through the formulation of the Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensive and
Far-Reaching Reforms, which outlines the various reform goals set out at the 18th Party Congress. All of this is not even to mention
the transformation of the largely state capitalist macro-economic planning institution, the National
Development and Reform Commission. Its former head, Liu Tienan, was also jailed on charges of corruption. Liu,
like many other tigers associated with SOEs and state capitalist macro-economic institutions rounded up by the
campaign, had an explicit interest in continuing the state capitalist status quo opposed to liberal
economic reforms. This is not to say these officials werent actually corrupt, but rather there are political undertones in
transforming the economy that make these targeted cases immensely convenient for Xis reform
agenda. Whether or not Xi will be able to pull this plan off is still up for debate. What is not
however is the extraordinary impact Xi has had on the politics and economy of China both of
which are inextricably tied to his success.
East Asia is a powder keg- Instability guarantees nuclear war

Tan 15 (January, Andrew Tan, Associate Professor PhD (Sydney), M Phil (Cambridge), B Soc
Science (Hons) (NUS), BA (NUS) School of Social Sciences, Security and Conflict in East Asia,
Google Books, pgs. 3-4)
The high tensions in East Asia, the highest since the end of the Second World War have led to fears of open
conflict involving the states in the region as well as extra-regional powers, in particular the USA.
By early 2013 tensions between North Korea on the one hand, and South Korea, the USA and Japan, on the other, had deteriorated
to their worst level since the end of the Korean War in 1953, sparking fears of an accidental war due to North Koreas brinkmanship
and political miscalculation (ICG 2013a). Tensions
between the People's Republic of China and Japan were

also at their highest since the end of the Second World War due to their dispute over the
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands (Hughes 2013). More seriously. China, the USA and North Korea possess nuclear
weapons, and Japan has always been regarded as a threshold nuclear power, as it possesses
plutonium stocks generated through its power industry, ballistic missile capability and the technology
to rapidly transform itself into a significant nuclear weapons power should it choose to do so
(Rublee 2010: 62-63). South Korea could also be forced to develop its own nuclear weapons if the threat
from a hostile, aggressive and unpredictable North Korea continues to grow as it develops its nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons capabilities, and uses them to coerce South Korea (AVu* York Times
2013). The impact of any regional conflict in East Asia will be significant and global. Any conflict
in this region would involve not only states in the region and US allies from further afield, but also quickly
escalate into a nuclear conflict, given the superiority that the USA enjoys in terms of
conventional warfare capabilities over North Korea, and to a diminishing degree China, thus forcing
them to resort to non-conventional means, such as nuclear weapons, in any major conflict. Indeed, the US
strategy of Air-Sea Battle, which involves attacking Chinas surveillance, intelligence and command systems, are likely to be
interpreted by China as attempts to disarm its nuclear strike capability and could thus lead to a
quick and unwanted escalation into a nuclear conflict (Schreer 2013). Moreover, today the centre of the
global economy no longer resides in Europe or North America but in Asia, in particular, East
Asia. Indeed, three of the key actors in the region, namely the USA, China and Japan, are also the
three largest economies in the world, with South Korea ranked 15th in global terms, according to the World Bank.
Any conflict in East Asia will therefore have a profound, global economic impact. Furthermore, the fact
that any conflict could escalate into a major war, including nuclear war, means that conflict in East Asia
will have global implications as well as uncertain consequences for the international system.
-Ext-Lashout
Domestic problems make lashout likely-empirics
WHITE 13-law student @ Columbia, MA in Politics and International Affairs @ NYU [Thomas, Chinas Rally Round the Flag
Effect, Huffington Post, 4/12/2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/thomas-white/chinas-rally-round-the-fl_b_4384409.html,
DKP]
China announced recently that a set of islands known as the Diaoyu (in Chinese) or the Senkaku (in Japanese) lie
within its air defense borders. The move by China has largely been viewed as a test of U.S. and
Japanese dominance in the region. Its also a sign that China is ready and willing to flex its military
muscle. The U.S., Japan, and South Korea have largely ignored Chinas threats to take action against
unidentified aircrafts, causing an international relations standoff that could shake up the regional power dynamic in East Asia. But,
so far, all it has seemed to do is embarrass China and anger the international community. Why did China do it? What do they hope
to gain from such an international relations nightmare? Perhaps unexpectedly, the move likely has more to do with
domestic issues than international relations. Its called the rally round the flag effect. Countries
blow smoke internationally in order to stir up nationalist (extreme patriotism) sentiments or
reposition anger away from the government and towards a foreign adversary. The U.S. is rife with
examples. From the Iran hostage crisis to Operation Desert Storm, presidents in particular see a huge increase in
support when theres a foreign enemy to attack. Frequently, countries craft these narratives and in
order to find enemies from without to hide problems within. Countries use the media to reposition the
political narrative towards an external enemy, like Snowball the demonized, long-ago-exiled pig in Orwells Animal Farm, on
whom all the farms problems were blamed. Which brings us back to China. It could be any number of domestic ails that pushed
China to manufacture an international power struggle: the embarrassing saga of Bo Xilai, the record pollution levels, the persistent
allegations of government extravagance, or GDP growth that (while the envy of the West) is seen as disappointing. Its likely that
whatever the problem(s) that Xi Jinping and the Communist Party see as threatening to their power
influenced the governments decision to stoke the embers of the long-disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku
island battle. The situation in China is following a common trajectory. First, a country announces a plan or criticizes another
country. Then, other countries engage in various methods of support, condemnation, or endorsement with intense and
inflammatory rhetoric. Third, diplomats are unleashed to placate the aggressor, everyone calms down, and fourth, each
country involved seeks to save face and spin the story. This most recent move to drum up nationalist support is
potentially threatening to international stability. At worst, Chinas newly decreed military
imposition could start a war; at best, it will lead to a diplomatic headache for all involved. Still, there are benefits to
manufacturing the rally round the flag effect. Its become the norm in international politics today. From a
utilitarian perspective, better a war of words and military maneuvers than a real war. In most instances, after a period of heightened
rhetoric, countries relax and come to a place of negotiation. Some iteration of this manufactured international crisis or another
seems to happen nearly monthly. The problem is that countries are rarely, if ever, punished for their actions. China, for instance,
may be asked to loosen its hold over its new air defense zone, but is unlikely to be worse off than before it manufactured the crisis
with Japan. Thus, there is incentive to engage in this type of international maneuvering. Regardless of whether the rally
round the flag effect is a healthy way for countries to air their grievances or a dangerous game that could
easily devolve into war, these manufactured crises are here to stay. And this directs crucial
attention away from domestic issues and towards a black-and-white narrative that pits us against them.
Its little more than a distraction from whats really important. In this case, amidst poverty, pollution, and profiteering, a few
unpopulated islands in the East China Sea should be all but irrelevant both for China and for the rest of the world. We have more
pressing and more important problems to face that will help people instead of separate people.
-SCS Goes Global

SCS war goes globalhigh risk of miscalc and Chinas willing to act
more recklessly after The Hagues ruling.
Hunt and Hume 7/13 (Katie, BA in modern Chinese studies and senior digital producer for CNN International,
and Tim, MA in journalism from Columbia, Has South China Sea ruling set scene for next global conflict? CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/13/asia/south-china-sea-global-conflict-risks/)//king koopa
Hong Kong (CNN)Could an old map bring Asia to the brink of war? An
international tribunal ruled Tuesday that China's

nine-dash line -- drawn on a map dating from the 1940s that claims large stretches of the South China Sea -- has
no legal basis. It was an eviscerating verdict for Beijing, which has long claimed it has unique, historical rights to the disputed waters which are
rich in resources and a busy thoroughfare for international shipping. "It will certainly intensify conflict and even
confrontation," said Cui Tankui, China's ambassador to the United States , in a speech in Washington.
Analysts say the ruling, which went overwhelmingly in favor of the Philippines, narrows China's wiggle room for negotiation in the dispute . "It will
further escalate nationalist sentiment in a big nation like China," said Wang Jiangyu, law professor with the
National University of Singapore. "In fact, it has immediately forced many of China's moderates to become
hawks." Risk of miscalculation Ashley Townshend, research fellow at the U.S. Studies Centre at the University of Sydney, said that if the ruling had
been a less emphatic victory for the U.S.-allied Philippines, then it may have proved a "bit of a firebreak" for regional tensions, opening up space for
negotiation over the issue. Instead, the
international tribunal delivered a resounding verdict against Beijing,

and in response, China might be less concerned with managing its reputation in the eyes of the
world, and less troubled about being seen as an international lawbreaker. Anton Alifandi, principal Asia
analyst for IHS, said the big worry was that there would be an interstate war involving the major
powers -- the U.S., China and the countries of southeast Asia. But, he said, the stakes were so high that it was highly
unlikely in the medium term that China would deliberately escalate tensions to a point where the U.S. would retaliate -- as to do so would lead to a
defeat for China, and a loss of legitimacy. However, he said, "there
is always a risk of miscalculation, that is the danger." "If

one side plays brinkmanship and thinks the other side will back down and you miscalculate,
things can get out of hand quite quickly." 'First act' Townshend said that it was in no-one's interest that the region -- which has
$5 trillion worth of trade pass through its waters annually -- become the setting of a next global conflict between China and United States. " But it
would be a mistake to argue that the risks are low. The risks are high ," he said. He said that China would be
"acutely aware of the risks of unintended escalation," but it would now be under domestic pressure to register its defiance of the verdict and
demonstrate that it had no intention of changing its position. Shen Dingli, professor and associate dean at the Institute of International Studies at
Fudan University in Shanghai, said China's behavior in the South China Sea, where it's turned sandbars into islands equipped with military airstrips,
was unlikely to change.
-a2 compartmentalized
SCS policy tied to DOMESTIC political battles+MFA statements about
Chinese peaceful nature are just a faade
The Location of Foreign Policy in Contemporary China Who
makes foreign policy in China, and where? As China

becomes an increasingly global player, this question becomes more important. Defining who the
key players are in formulating, articulating and then implementing foreign policy in any country is a major issue.
Answering this question is, after all, a great part of the work of diplomatic missions placed in foreign countries. Looking at a
hot, topical and fast developing issue for China like its maritime territorial demands over the
South and East China Seas does at least give some immediate insight into which parties in China are speaking,
what they are saying, and any differences between them. As this paper will argue later, the South China Sea issue is not ,
in Chinese eyes, a straightforwardly foreign one, but rather it occupies an important space in
domestic politics. Even so, as an issue that evidently matters deeply to Chinese leaders, and presumably
to Chinese people generally (this is what Chinese officials and diplomats claim), and which involves both regional and global
partners, the
question of the South China Sea is where one can look for what could be claimed to be
the real face of Chinese foreign policy. It occupies an area beyond the comforting rhetoric that usually surrounds
more distant issues with indirect and remote impact on ones territory. It is something which impacts China immediately and
intimately, and therefore shows the countrys real priorities. One
assumption would be that the most

authoritative place to look for the articulation of Chinese views on this issue would be the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA), which would be the usual guardian and spokesperson for this area of policy. The MFA
through various means, ranging from spokespeople to published declarations, has produced much language on many
occasions in the last decade about the maritime disputes, particularly since their intensification in 2009. The
question is, however, just how significant and indicative these statements are. Do they represent
the views of the real power holders, and if so, in what ways? Do they reflect Party views on this issue, and what kind of
relationship is there between Party and government iterations? Statements made by Chinese officials from the
foreign affairs apparatus do have a high degree of uniformity, indicating some level of design and careful
formulation. They contain generic language stressing Chinas peace-loving nature , its observance of
international norms in terms of negotiation, and its commitment to peace and harmony. They are the ideal side of the
Chinese government as they face the world, with a language deployed by seasoned, and increasingly urbane,
foreign ministry workers. As Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying stated in June 2015, Chinas attitude
on the South China Sea issue is responsible and its policy consistent, clear and unchanged.[ 1] A
typical example of what this consistent, clear and unchanged policy is was given by Huas colleague, spokesperson Hong Lei in April
2015: We maintain that the relevant disputes should be resolved through negotiation and consultation by countries directly
concerned, and stay committed to safeguarding regional peace and stability and pushing for mutually beneficial and win-win
cooperation along with countries concerned. The situation of this region is generally stable, and relevant cooperation has been
moved forward with positive results. It is hoped that relevant countries would fully respect the efforts by regional countries to
safeguard regional peace and stability, and do more things that contribute to regional peace and stability.[2] Statements
by
the MFA throughout 2014 and 2015 responded in a rigorously consistent way to questions around the
building of permanent structures on some of the contested island features, the move by the Philippines
to take the issue to an international court of arbitration, and American statements of concern. China was neither
accepting nor participating in the arbitral proceeding unilaterally initiated by the
Philippines,[3] this was not an issue between China and the US,[4] and that it was lawful,
reasonable, justified and beyond reproach for China to carry out construction on some stationed islands
and reefs of the Nansha Islands.[5] Such
utterances are located in a context where China stresses its love

of peace, its commitment to consensus and its desire to work with all parties for a negotiated outcome.[6] For all the
rhetorical reasonableness, however, there is high awareness that these are a faade ,
concealing an agenda, as well as domestic decision-making structures and processes that are far
more complex. The MFA in this domestic environment is a servant or messenger, with low status as a
ministry. It has more powers to speak than to do . The clue to this is its role within the Party.
The most senior foreign policy official, on paper at least, Foreign Minister Wang Yi, sits on the 200-strong
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, and on the State Council as a Minister, beside his 27 other ministerial
colleagues. But the Central Committee is only the outer vestibule of true power in the Chinese political
universe. Above him are the State Councillor and his predecessor as Foreign Minister, Yang Jiechi. But he too ranks outside
the 25 most powerful individuals in the country, those who sit on the full Politburo. And Wang is a long way
from the true vortex of power the Standing Committee, with its seven members. Policy areas in China are
subject to vested interest just as much as material and economic resources are. In many ways, they
are the veins along which power flows. Control the policy and you can have some control over
the outcomes. So it is not surprising that there is evidence of fierce competition amongst those
vying for influence over such a key area as Chinas relations to its region and to the wider world.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing, with only 3,000 officials (fewer than those populating the UK or the Australian foreign
ministries) is merely the tip of an iceberg. As scholars Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox elegantly illustrated in a paper
from 2010, around the MFA are many different stakeholders, centres of influence and decision makers (these will be outlined in
more detail below).[7] If the MFA is the messenger, however, where do its messages come from?
SCS UQ
Xi unlikely to be aggressive in SCS now but is committed to
maintaining power basethere are limits
NAKAZAWA 7/22-senior staff writer @ Nikkei [Katsuji, For Xi, South China Sea rebuke may be blessing in disguise,
7/22/2016, http://asia.nikkei.com/Features/China-up-close/For-Xi-South-China-Sea-rebuke-may-be-blessing-in-disguise, DKP]
Although the U.S. and Japan do not have claims in the South China Sea, they are wrapped up in
the row. Effectively, it is China on one side, with the U.S., Japan and some other Asian
countries -- especially the Philippines and Vietnam -- on the other. Washington and Tokyo have denounced
China's "militarization" of the sea as a threat to "freedom of navigation." In October 2015, the U.S. kicked
off operations to ensure that freedom in the South China Sea. Beijing lambasted Tokyo for
leading discussions on the South China Sea at the Group of Seven Summit, held in central Japan's Mie Prefecture in May. Yet,
despite its shows of defiance, China has quietly made some conciliatory gestures toward the
international community, including Japan and the U.S. While strongly rejecting the tribunal, Xi also assured the China-EU
summit on July 12 that China would pursue a peaceful settlement of the South China Sea issue. The same day, China
agreed to arrange a meeting between Premier Li Keqiang and Abe during the Asia-Europe Meeting, held in
Ulaanbaatar last Friday and Saturday. The Xi administration also accepted a visit by newly appointed Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Shinsuke
Sugiyama, which started this past Monday. Li
glad-handed Japanese reporters covering his meeting with Abe last

all likelihood, the leaders exchanged some harsh words over the South China Sea and other matters. But
if so, both governments have swept the disagreement under the rug to pave the way for highlevel talks in the months to come. A ministerial-level economic meeting, dubbed the Japan-China High-Level Economic
Dialogue, is to be held in Japan sometime by the end of this year. A summit of leaders from Japan, China and South
Korea is also in the cards, as are Sino-Japan talks on the sidelines of the Group of 20 summit in China's Hangzhou in September. Still, there
are limits. Li did not smile when he shook hands with Abe before their meeting in the Mongolian capital. The
scene was reminiscent of an awkward handshake between Abe and Xi at the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation summit in Beijing back in November 2014. That meeting was the first between top
Japanese and Chinese leaders in nearly three years, yet Xi remained grim-faced. Like Xi, Li
had to be careful not to look happy with Abe in front of the cameras, lest he trigger a backlash at
home. Aside from the diplomatic dancing with Japan, China scored one success at the ASEM summit: preventing the chair's statement from
Friday. In
directly referring to the South China Sea dispute. The statement was issued four days after the tribunal rejected China's claims. Still, it did call for the
As
for the U.S., the Chinese military invited Adm. John Richardson, the chief of naval operations, to Beijing this week.
Richardson also visited the Chinese North Sea Fleet, China's submarine academy and its aircraft
carrier, the Liaoning. Adm. Wu Shengli, the commander of the Chinese navy, told Richardson on Monday that his force
fears no military provocation, and that China will continue its construction work on South China
Sea islands and reefs as planned. But Wu also emphasized that China will control front-line
troops' activities , avoid strategic misjudgments and protect maritime peace and stability.
Wu's remarks and Richardson's tour sent a message that China wants to avoid a clash with the
U.S. All of this was likely arranged at the behest of Xi, who concurrently serves as chairman of the Central Military Commission. Political ripples
One question is, what happens if the South China Sea tide continues to flow against Beijing?
Eventually, China will have to pin the blame on someone. It remains to be seen who will be left holding
settlement of maritime disputes in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, putting a degree of pressure on China.
the bag. The tribunal ruling came ahead of the Communist Party's annual conclave in Beidaihe, a seaside resort in Hebei Province. China's current
leaders and elders gather there every summer to discuss crucial issues in an informal setting. Traditionally,
the Communist Party

tries to appear firmly united. So the South China Sea dispute is unlikely to inflame an open
power struggle. Nevertheless , the elder leaders' view of foreign and security problems
is certain to affect high-level personnel changes set to be

made at the party's next National Congress in autumn 2017.
-- with the maritime issue at the top of the list --
Economy
Anticorruption crushes business confidencehas sweeping economic
effects
PEI 6/9/16-professor of government at Claremont McKenna College and a non-resident senior fellow of the German Marshall
Fund of the United States [Minxin, Minxin Pei -- Losing the hearts and minds of the money men, Nikkei Asian Review, 6/9/2016,
http://asia.nikkei.com/Viewpoints/Viewpoints/Minxin-Pei-Losing-the-hearts-and-minds-of-the-money-men, DKP]
The last straw for private entrepreneurs, it seems, is their realization that, despite all
the material wealth they have amassed, they enjoy no legal protection under an autocratic
regime. Most entrepreneurs are apolitical by choice. They deliberately shy away from political activities and,
No protection
under normal circumstances, are not overly troubled by the CCP's human rights violations that victimize mostly ordinary citizens
and dissidents. Until
recently, the CCP has handled its delicate relationship with private entrepreneurs
with considerable sensitivity. Aware of the indispensable role of this group in economic development, the party has been
averse to policies that could scare China's economic elites. All this has changed in the last three years. The
dragonet of President Xi's anti-corruption campaign has ensnared many tycoons. While
some of China's wealthiest businessmen might have colluded with corrupt officials, what has petrified private
entrepreneurs is the lack of legal protection of their rights when the police come knocking
on the door. Some of them simply disappear without a trace. A large number have sought
refuge in Hong Kong and western countries. In an act that must have completely shaken Chinese
business elites' confidence in their own personal security, Chinese police detained Guo Guangchang, a
low-key billionaire , in December last year, without providing any explanation. After his release, Guo was
apparently not allowed to say anything in public about the reasons for his mysterious detention. Not all of China's tycoons have been
alienated or subjected to such rough treatment. Some well-known businessmen continue to be showered with government favors.
Not surprisingly, they have reciprocated by trying to use their wealth and influence to burnish the image of the party and defend its
The dominant sentiment among Chinese private

entrepreneurs these days is fear and uncertainty. While it does not take long to destroy the
implicit compact the party has nurtured with private entrepreneurs over the last few decades, it
requires a fundamental shift in policy to restore their confidence in the current government's
commitment to reform, competence, and respect for basic legal principles. At the minimum, the party needs to
demonstrate convincingly that it remains committed to market reforms. It can do so by reversing the
statist policies it has adopted since last year. On the political front , the challenge will be tougher. The
party must show a decisive break with Maoism and end the political exploitation of the
rhetoric and symbols associated with China's darkest recent past. Above all, the party must respect the legal rights
and personal dignity of Chinese private entrepreneurs. In early December last year, Xu Ming , a
44-year-old one-time billionaire and virtual cash machine of the family of former Politburo member Bo Xilai, died of a "heart
attack" in prison. When the news broke, Feng Lun, a real estate developer who keeps an influential blog,
reflected on Xu's tragedy. Upset by the veil of official secrecy surrounding Xu's untimely death,
Feng also railed against Bo's treatment of Xu. During Bo's trial, Xu was produced as an official witness testifying
policies. But by and large, they are a small minority.
against Bo. Although his family had taken millions of dollars from Xu, Bo dismissed Xu contemptuously as a form of lowlife unfit to
associate with him. " Even
a Chinese official on trial," wrote Feng, "considers private

enterprise worse than a chamber pot." Feng also revealed that an unnamed Chinese tycoon
once told him, "in the eyes of officials, we are nothing but cockroaches. They decide
whether we live or die." If Chinese private entrepreneurs are treated like chamber pots and
cockroaches, they are not going to remain friends of the party for very long.
That collapses the global economy

Horowitz 16 --- Evan Horowitz writes the Quick Study column for the Globe, both online
and in print (Evan Horowitz, 1-07-16, " Will the stock crash in China take down the US
economy?" The Boston Globe, 7-25-2016,
https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2016/01/07/will-stock-crash-china-take-downeconomy/mmMmUEED8a6BH5EsCzi3wJ/story.html)//RCB
China fell
so far that trading was actually shut down. And the effects have spread quickly; US and European
stocks opened lower Thursday, and with the price of oil and other commodities continuing to slide, theres concern about a
full-on global crisis. The basic problem is that the Chinese economy isnt what it used to be. Gone are the double-digit
growth rates of the last few decades, and with them the hope that China could smoothly
transition from a developing country to a mature global economy , with a smaller role for the state
and a larger one for consumers. Whether the United States and the rest of the world can weather a
Chinese slowdown without falling back into recession is unclear , but the risk seems to be climbing.
Chinas stock market is crashing, and its pulling down markets all around the world. Twice this week, stock prices in
Whats happening in China? For decades now, economic growth in China has been fiery, often reaching rates above 10 percent. But
those heady days of consistent, high-octane growth seem to be over. View Story US stocks plunge The market rebounded after a
nearly 300-point plunge but then began to drop again Thursday. Twenty-nine minutes of chaos China suspends stock circuitbreaker In 2015, Chinas growth rate hovered around 7 percent, and recent figures from the all-important manufacturing sector
suggest that things arent about to return to the highs. In fact, things may be even worse than the official numbers suggest; a recent
independent analysis found that the true unemployment rate in China may be nearly three times the official rate. To help bolster the
economy, the Chinese government has been letting the value of its currency fall. Thats good for exporters, because it means their
goods will suddenly be less expensive in overseas shops. But its a troubling sign for investors, because China was supposed to be
moving past the export-first phase of its development and becoming real consumer market, where companies from around the world
could sell their goods to a growing Chinese middle class. Why has this affected global stock prices? Its important not to exaggerate
the connection between market fluctuations and the real economy. Theres a lot of unpredictability in market movements, and its
often impossible to tease out the deeper forces. But the slowdown in China could be feeding broader troubles. Start with the effects
inside of China. The most basic reason stock prices fall is because investors start to think or fear that companies are going to
perform worse than previously anticipated. So if the Chinese economy is really slowing, that would mean tighter profits for Chinese
companies, and smaller returns for stockholders. As to why a floundering China should prompt sell-offs all around the world, the
answer is a little more involved. Some
countries have such deep ties with China that they cant
avoid being dragged down by a Chinese recession. Regional trading partners, like Japan,
Korea, and Australia, will have the most trouble. But some farther-flung countries, like
Brazil, have built huge industries focused on selling commodities and raw materials to
China, industries which now seem endangered. For the United States, however, its not clear that a Chinese
slowdown will be all that traumatic. True, there are US companies that will have to rethink plans to market to a no-longer-thriving
Chinese middle class. But if troubles in China bring lower-cost imports and ever-cheaper gasoline, that could help offset the damage.
Then again, there are economists who worry
that a recession in China could trigger a global
recession. For instance, if the already-strong dollar is forced up even further, that could widen the trade gap in a way that
dampens US job creation and keeps wages from growing. Why did the Chinese stock market shut down? Just this week, China
implemented a new system of circuit breakers, which are designed to prevent panic selling and block downward momentum from
getting out of control. Its not an unusual practice. Similar triggers exist here in the United States. But the Chinese version was set to
kick in much faster, forcing a pause in trading when stocks fall 5 percent and shutting down the market entirely when they drop by 7
percent. It was a bad sign that the 7 percent shutdown got tripped on the first day, and worse that it happened again 29 minutes into
the fourth day. Following that debacle, the Chinese government has decided to suspend the circuit breakers. Chinese stock market CSI 300 Index Dec 7 Jan 7 3,200 3,300 3,400 3,500 3,600 3,700 3,800 3,900 4,000 Jan 73,294 Source: Google finance. Closing
prices. What should I watch for in the days ahead? The first thing to look for is any gap between US markets and their Chinese
counterparts. If Chinese stocks continue down, but US and European shares stabilize, that could be a sign that contagion is likely to
be limited. And moving forward, listen closely to the Federal Reserve. At its last meeting, in December, the Fed raised interest rates
for the first time in nearly a decade because the board of governors thought the economy might start growing too fast. If the situation
in China continues to deteriorate, the Fed might be forced to put off any future hikes, or even reverse course. The next Federal
Reserve meeting is scheduled for the end of January, providing a first official occasion to assess whether the slowdown in China,
combined with the recent rate hike, is shifting the US economy into reverse.
-Econ Terminals
Extinction
Haass 13 [Richard N., President of the Council on Foreign Relations,
previously served as Director of Policy Planning for the US State Department,
The World Without America, Project Syndicate, http://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/repairing-the-roots-of-american-power-by-richardn--haass RD; AD 4/2/16]
The most critical threat facing the United States now and for the
foreseeable future is not a rising China, a reckless North Korea, a nuclear Iran, modern
terrorism, or climate change. Although all of these constitute potential or actual threats, the biggest
challenges facing the US are its burgeoning debt, crumbling infrastructure, second-rate primary and
Let me posit a radical idea:
secondary schools, outdated immigration system,
and slow economic growth
in short,
the domestic
foundations of American power. Readers in other countries may be tempted to react to this judgment with a
dose of schadenfreude, finding more than a little satisfaction in Americas difficulties. Such a response should not be surprising. The
US and those representing it have been guilty of hubris (the US may often be the indispensable nation, but it would be better if
others pointed this out), and examples of inconsistency between Americas practices and its principles understandably provoke
charges of hypocrisy. When America does not adhere to the principles that it preaches to others, it breeds resentment. But, like most
temptations, the urge to gloat at Americas imperfections and struggles ought to be resisted. People around the globe should be
Americas failure to deal with its internal challenges would

come at a steep price. Indeed, the rest of the worlds stake in American success is nearly as large as that of the US
itself. Part of the reason is economic. The US economy still accounts for about one-quarter of global output. If US growth
accelerates, Americas capacity to consume other countries goods and
services will increase, thereby boosting growth around the world. At a time when
Europe is drifting and Asia is slowing, only the US (or, more broadly, North
America) has the potential to drive global economic recovery. The US remains a unique
careful what they wish for.
source of innovation. Most of the worlds citizens communicate with mobile devices based on technology developed in Silicon Valley;
likewise, the Internet was made in America. More recently, new technologies developed in the US greatly increase the ability to
extract oil and natural gas from underground formations. This technology is now making its way around the globe, allowing other
societies to increase their energy production and decrease both their reliance on costly imports and their carbon emissions. The US
is also an invaluable source of ideas. Its world-class universities educate a significant percentage of future world leaders. More
the US has long been a leading example of what market economies

and democratic politics can accomplish. People and governments around the
world are far more likely to become more open if the American model is
perceived to be succeeding. Finally, the world faces many serious challenges, ranging
fundamentally,
from the need to halt the spread of w eapons of m ass d estruction, fight climate
change, and maintain a functioning world economic order that promotes trade
and investment to regulating practices in cyberspace, improving global health, and
preventing armed conflicts . These problems will not simply go away or sort
themselves out. While Adam Smiths invisible hand may ensure the success of free markets, it is
powerless in the world of geopolitics. Order requires the visible hand of
leadership to formulate and realize global responses to global challenges.
Dont get me wrong: None of this is meant to suggest that the US can deal effectively with the worlds problems on its own.
Unilateralism rarely works. It is not just that the US lacks the means; the very nature of contemporary global problems suggests that
multilateralism is much easier to

advocate than to design and implement. Right now there is only one candidate for this
only collective responses stand a good chance of succeeding. But
role: the US. No other country has the necessary combination of capability
and outlook. This brings me back to the argument that the US must put its house in order
economically, physically, socially, and politically if it is to have the resources needed to
promote order in the world. Everyone should hope that it does: The alternative to a world led by the
US is not a world led by China, Europe, Russia, Japan, India, or any other
country, but rather a world that is not led at all. Such a world would almost certainly be
characterized by chronic crisis and conflict . That would be bad not just for Americans, but for
the vast majority of the planet s inhabitants.
Rally around the flag, miscalc, nuclear war

Royal 10 Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense
(Jedediah, 2010, Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic
Crises, in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed.
Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215)
Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external
conflict . Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and
defence behaviour of interdependent stales. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable
contributions follow. First, on the systemic level. Pollins (20081 advances Modclski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding
that rhythms
in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power
and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous
shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 19SJ)
that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fcaron.
1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive
environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999).
Separately. Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among
major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions
remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level. Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a
significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states arc likely to gain
pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if
the expectations of future

trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood
for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources . Crises
could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4
Third, others
have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a
national level. Mom berg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and
external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write. The linkage,
between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing.
Economic conflict lends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour . Moreover, the
presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts
self-reinforce each other (Hlomhen? & Hess. 2(102. p. X9> Economic decline has also been linked with an
increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blombcrg. Hess. & Wee ra pan a, 2004). which has the capacity to spill
across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a
sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from
economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military
conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DcRoucn (1995), and Blombcrg. Hess, and Thacker (2006)
find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force arc at least indirecti) correlated. Gelpi (1997). Miller (1999). and Kisangani
and Pickering (2009) suggest that Ihe tendency towards diversionary tactics arc greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that
democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided
evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked lo an
increase in the use of force.
-Ext: Lashout
Slowing economic growth directly correlates to aggressive foreign
policy and lashout
FRIEDBERG and SHOENFELD 15 [Aaron Friedberg, a professor of politics at Princeton University, is the author
"A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia." Gabriel Schoenfeld, a senior fellow at the Hudson
Institute, specializes in intelligence and national security. http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0914-schoenfeld-friedbergchina-danger-20150914-story.html, DKP]
The Chinese Communist Party's power has long rested on four pillars: economic growth, nationalism, repression and communist
ideology. The last of these withered away almost entirely as China liberalized its economy, with slogans such as "Long live the
invincible Marxism-Leninism theory" replaced by "To get rich is glorious." Now the first pillar is unstable too. All eyes are on
the gyrating Chinese stock market. Its precipitous decline and the surprise devaluation of the renminbi have
been roiling world markets and stoking fears of currency wars and beggar-thy-neighbor trade policies. Given
that only about 1% of our gross domestic product comes from trade with China, the U.S. economy is hardly at risk. Yet this summer's
upheaval may accelerate developments that threaten the peace of Asia and pose a strategic
challenge to the West. China's economy has been slowing for a while. In this century's first decade, 10%-plus
returns were the norm; lately the growth rate has hovered around 7% if official figures are to be trusted, which they are not. The
Chinese people have begun to feel the effects, and so has the government, with its reputation for sound
economic stewardship declining in parallel with the downward-sloping GDP growth charts. Xi Jinping
came to power in 2012 determined to burnish the leadership's credentials in this all-critical area. His efforts have taken two forms.
The first has been an anti-corruption campaign that plays to popular sentiments but has doubled as a vehicle for a purge of political
opponents. Three years into the campaign, China's president has a large number of very bitter and well-placed enemies, whose
family fortunes and lives are on the line. At the same time, Xi has been searching for ways to reinvigorate
China's economy. One measure he embraced was to talk up the stock market, which he promised the Chinese people would
create both personal and national wealth. Almost right up to the initial tremors heralding this summer's crash, state-run news
outlets were urging the population to buy stocks. As the Chinese market soared, this may have seemed to Xi's colleagues in the
Politburo as a stroke of genius; millions of people were getting rich on paper, and the Communist Party was getting the credit for it.
It now must appear to them and to an entire class of unhappy investors as a monumental act of maladministration. Having
lost ideological purity and economl65ezic stewardship as claims to power, the party is left, at least
for the time being, with repression and nationalism. Accordingly, Xi has cracked down on dissent with
renewed vigor, sweeping up democracy advocates, environmentalists, lawyers, champions of minority group rights and
anyone else who gets out of line. Simultaneously, he's intensified a campaign to bolster internal
support by riling China's neighbors, particularly the hated Japanese. In the last three years, China has
unilaterally declared an air-defense-identification zone over islands also claimed by Japan,
deployed oil rigs off the coast of Vietnam and built an assortment of fortified artificial islands at
strategic locations around the South China Sea. These actions have created alarm in capitals
across Asia, provoked military buildups and even encouraged regional cooperation in an effort
to contain the increasingly menacing tiger. China's bellicosity may ultimately prove selfdefeating as a national security strategy. Indeed, Chinese conduct appears inexplicable without reference to its domestic sources.
The costs of antagonism are evidently offset by the internal benefits for Xi and the party's grip
on power. Some observers perceive a silver lining in China's difficulties, believing that a country preoccupied with
internal problems will be less aggressive and require fewer diplomatic, economic and military resources to hold it in check. That is
wishful thinking rooted in a radical misreading of China's domestic political dynamics. Prospects
for conflict around China's periphery and beyond are likely to rise commensurately with the
scope of the Communist Party's internal crisis. It is not an accident that this month China dared to
send its navy into U.S. territorial waters next to Alaska, something it had never before attempted. Even with the
much-vaunted but underresourced "pivot" to Asia, the United States was ill-prepared to meet the challenge of preserving peace in
the Pacific. Now the danger we face is growing steadily. The anxieties plaguing China's leaders, in place for
decades, are fueling the belligerence of a rising power; the stock market fiasco, coming on the
heels of an economic slowdown, has turned a scratch into gangrene.
-Ext-Hurts Econ
Anticorruption campaign compounds economic instability
Armstrong 15 [Ian, Journalist at Global Risks Insights, 8-30-15,
http://globalriskinsights.com/2015/08/forecasting-chinas-anti-corruptioncampaign/]
the Transparency
International 2014 Corruption Perceptions Index concluded that China actually became more
corrupt in 2014 than in 2013. This puzzling development can be attributed to the fact that Xi has
focused on instilling fear and purging the existing corruption rather than addressing its
institutional causes via more legal and structural reform . Since Chinas anti-corruption
campaign was launched, some have asserted that the effort has in fact hurt China, contributing
to its slowing economy, due to significant drops in luxury industries, such as five-star hotels .
Yet, while it initially appears that China has begun to make serious gains in reducing the corruption within,
Indeed, the declines in said industries, as well as the negative correlation between the campaign and Chinas slowed growth, suggest
that corruption mildly enhanced Chinas short-term economic gains. This revelation in turn acts as evidence in favor of halting the
initiative for the duration of the prevailing economic slowdown. However, it is Xis
suggested institutional reforms

that will impose a more significant burden on Chinas already slowing economy. Reforms of any
kind are costly, and a reformation of Chinas established and complicated legal system and
governance structure would certainly entail serious economic growing pains as the Chinese
government finances the transition. In an already unstable economic environment, Beijing
might seriously consider holding off on these costly reforms.
Econ Slowdown=Hawkish FP
Economic downturn causes Xi to become more hawkish
The slowdown may, however, lead China to become marginally more protectionist and mercantile,
especially if such efforts are thought to boost employment and thereby enhance social stability.
Never totally committed to markets or free trade, China could close some laborintensive
industries, further devalue its currency, be uncooperative on intellectual property theft, and step
up its harassment of foreign businesses. For the most part, however, its protectionist impulses will be restrained by its
obligations to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its need for foreign capital and markets. In his deals with foreign commodity suppliers,
including Russia, Xi will insist on more advantageous terms and be less inclined to grant debt forgiveness to Ecuador and Venezuela, which currently
repay Chinese loans with oil. Although Xi could attempt to use Chinas economic woes to justify further reforms and commit to market mechanisms, the
To cope
with the stock market slide, for example, Xi rolled out a slew of initiatives that reversed capital
market liberalization and financial reforms. China will continue to limit its responsibilities in
global governance, preferring instead shallow commitments.48 This will be particularly the case
in global institutions where China does not play a rule-making role. The leadership, long hesitant to take action
on such matters, may now feel less equipped to do so. As Chinas economy slows, Xi will not be willing to agree to
binding or inflexible environmental initiatives to combat climate change , especially if they would further
record so far suggests that he is willing to sacrifice that agenda in an attempt to regain shortterm growth and maintain employment.
weaken the countrys fragile economy. Global economic management Diplomacy After the Downturn: Xis Future Foreign Policy 27 in organizations
Xis
resistance to Western culture and values may intensify. Xi has arrested countless dissidents,
civil society leaders, and activists; sharply curtailed the ability of NGOs to operate; intensified
controls over the media and the Internet; and inveighed against Western cultural contamination
while extolling Confucianism. Because Chinas economy is now slowing, Xis fear of political instability may push him to
adopt even sterner measures, and new violations of human rights and the emerging challenges
that Western NGOs and businesses face will likely cause renewed friction in Chinas
relationships with the West.
such as the G20 may also become problematic, China being possibly less inclined to act responsibly on economic matters. Finally,
Cliques
Xi uses anticorruption to target rival cliques and consolidate power
specifically the Communist Youth League
Hewitt 16 (Duncan Hewitt, Cliques And Conspirators Threaten Security Of Chinas Communist Party, President
Xi Jinping Warns, 05/04/16 AT 5:14 AM, http://www.ibtimes.com/cliques-conspirators-threaten-security-chinascommunist-party-president-xi-jinping-2363773, GK)
SHANGHAI Chinas President Xi
Jinping has warned of cliques and conspirators within the ruling

Communist Party, saying they threatened the security of the party and nation . He said such people
would not be spared from punishment as the party seeks to eliminate such problems. He also warned party members against
embracing liberalism and opposing central government policy in what analysts said was further evidence of his desire to reassert
orthodox Marxist values and combat western influences. The remarks came in a speech focusing on deepening Xis ongoing anticorruption campaign within the ruling party. And while
Xi insisted that the campaign was not a political

power struggle, observers said the comments seemed to suggest a growing anxiety in the
leadership over the political loyalty of some officials, some of whom are believed to have grown
disillusioned with the corruption crackdown and Xis tightening of discipline within the party.
There are careerists and conspirators in our party who undermine its governance, Xi said in
the speech, which was made in January at a meeting of Chinas top anti-graft body, but, for reasons not made clear, was only
reported by Chinese media this week. While he said some such people were motivated by a desire for greater power or higher status,
he also hinted at political dissent within the party, saying that "some officials have been forming
cabals and cliques to covertly defy the CPC [Communist Party of China] Central Committee's decisions
and policies," which risked "compromising the political security of the Party and the country. " Xi
reiterated earlier comments, first made during a state visit to the U.S. last year, that the anti-corruption crackdown which was
launched soon after he took power in late 2012, and has brought down more than 100 senior officials in government, the party and
military was "not a 'House of Cards' power struggle" in which targets were chosen because of political rivalries, or well-connected
officials would be spared from justice. We must make it clear that our Party's fight against corruption is not a snobbish affair that
discriminates between different people, he said. The
official Global Times Wednesday quoted a researcher at

Guangzhous Jinan University as saying the problem of officials trying to achieve political
ambitions by forming close ties with high officials in cliques was very serious, and ... will greatly
affect public confidence in the ruling party. Officials have said that the highest-profile victim of
China's graft crackdown, former security chief Zhou Yongkang, who was jailed for life last year
on corruption charges, had formed a series of cliques. And the official Xinhua News Agency said Wednesday that
Zhou was just one of a number of senior corrupt officials [who] have been found to have forged close relationships with groups of
officials at local government level and with business tycoons in different factions with shared interests, such as the 'oil clique,'
'secretary clique' or 'Shanxi clique.'" The
anti-corruption campaign, which has also led to the punishment of hundreds of

is believed
to have aroused dissatisfaction among some of the party's 88 million members, who have balked
at the strict discipline imposed by Xi. In a series of tightened requirements, he has called on party officials to live
thousands of lower level officials, is generally seen to have been popular with many ordinary Chinese citizens. But it
frugal lifestyles and stop attending private clubs, including golf clubs, not to have extramarital affairs, and to restrict their families
business dealings. China's
leaders have acknowledged that some officials have responded to the

crackdown by simply working less hard. In recent months the discipline campaign appears to have become
increasingly political, with new rules preventing party members from criticizing party policy in public and increased emphasis on
Marxism and atheism. And amid a widening campaign against "western values" in China, a number of party members have recently
been punished for the previously rarely heard charge of making groundless comments about the Communist Party. Xi said in his
speech that banning such comments doesnt mean members cant criticize the party," but added that "comments on important
political issues, liberalism or singing out of tune with the central government are not allowed." He also said the party would "kick
out" two-faced members who promised to fight corruption but never reported problems. And he vowed
that the anticorruption campaign would not wind down. And in a recent move, which some analysts have
linked to political infighting, the Communist Youth League power base of Xi's predecessor as
president, Hu Jintao, and current Premier Li Keqiang recently had its budget slashed in half after an
investigation by anti-corruption teams revealed embezzlement and other irregularities.
Specifically going after CYL over next few monthscauses instability

in the CCP
Lam 5/11 (Willy Lam, The Eclipse of the Communist Youth League and the Rise of the Zhejiang Clique,
Publication: China Brief Volume: 16 Issue: 8May 11, 2016 04:46 PM,
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45422&#.V5ZkiDsrKHs,
7/27/16, GK)
Emblem of the Communist Youth League. The league previously served as a path for aspiring cadres--and a powerbase for Former
president Hu Jintao. Power struggle is not a dinner party. Internecine
bickering and back-stabbing among rival

factions and personalities are intensifying as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) prepares for
its 19th Congress next year. Apart from constructing a Maoist-style personality cult around himself, Chinese
President Xi Jinping is pulling out all the stops to remove a major threat to his consolidation of
powerthe Communist Youth League (CYL) Faction (tuanpai; ), which is still one of the CCPs
biggest cliques in the Chinese Communist Party. Cadres affiliated with the CYL Faction, which is led by former President Hu
Jintao, form the biggest bloc within the 25-member Politburo that was endorsed at the 18th Party Congress in 2012. Hu, a
former First Secretary of the CYL, is generally considered a timid, bureaucratic politician. But he served in the Politburo
Standing Committee (PBSC) for 20 years until his retirement in 2012, during which he had ample opportunity to boost
the clout of his clique and advance the careers of his fellow travelers . CYL alumnae were particularly strong
in the regions, leading to the saying that Hu was following the tactic of the regions surrounding the center () in
countering the authoritarian tendencies of his boss, former president Jiang Zemin , who headed the
Shanghai Faction (VOA Chinese, January 12; Oriental Daily [Hong Kong], July 4, 2015). President Xis tough tactics for
elbowing aside the CYL Faction were summed up by his widely-circulated internal assessment of
the League, that it was paralyzed from the neck down. [destroye] At a mid-2015 national
conference of cadres working in mass organizations such as the CYL, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions and the AllChina Womens Association, Xi warned that the CYL ran the risk of being marginalized by young
people and being marginalized by the party-state [apparatus] (VOA Chinese, April 29; Ming Pao [Hong
Kong], October 25, 2015). The CYL was also lambasted for being too bureaucratic, procedurally minded, aristocratic and
entertainment-oriented (). Since late last year,
the Central Commission on

Disciplinary Inspection (CCDI) has stationed a work team in the CYL to look at problems of
corruption and infractions of party discipline (South China Morning Post, February 9; New Beijing Post, July 7,
2015). In a recent article on the website of the CCDIwhich has been interpreted as a full-scale confession of guilt the CYL Party
Committee admitted that League members suffered from weak party leadership, aberrations in
party construction, and failure to run [CYL units] strictly. The League leadership vowed to uphold
the Four-fold Consciousness, () meaning political consciousness, consciousness about the whole
situation, consciousness about following the core [of the leadership] and consciousness about
remaining in unison [with the top party leadership]. The Four-fold Consciousness is understood as a slogan about
professing absolute loyalty to President Xi, the putative core of the leadership (see China Brief, March 7 ). Top CYL cadres
also made a self-criticism regarding their criteria for grooming up-and-coming officials, which, they said, were marred by
elitism, ignoring the grassroots, lack of representation, and narrow coverage [of disparate sectors in
society (Straits Times [Singapore], April 29; CCDI.gov.cn, April 25). Xi has largely abolished the role of the CYL
which was particularly evident during the Hu Jintao era as a method for nurturing future party and government
leaders. Early this year, Xi gave orders that the personnel establishment of CYL units both at central and
regional levels should be cut. The CYLs budget for 2016306.27 million yuanrepresents a cut of some 50
percent compared to that of last year (Xinmin.cn, May 2; CCYL.org, April 15). Moreover, the China Youth University of Political
Studies (CYUPS)which is responsible for training cadres within the CYL systemis expected to curtail its student enrollment from
September this year. Some CYUPS faculty members have expressed fears that the institution, which is sometimes referred as the
CYLs equivalent of the Central Party School, will be severely downgraded (Radio Free Asia, April 23; Radio French International
Chinese Service, April 22). Leverage Against Rival Factions In their battle against the CYL, Xi and his allies such as Head of the
CCDI Wang Qishan, have benefited from graft-related
crimes committed by prominent League member

Ling Jihua, who used to be the right-hand-man of former president Hu. Investigations into Lings alleged misdemeanors, which
began in late 2012, have exposed similar economic crimes of a number of top CYL Faction affiliates
who reportedly included Vice-President Li Yuanchao. The wives of Ling Jinhua and Li Yuanchao were said to be
close business partners. Lings demise has also smothered the voice of former president Hu, who has lost substantial influence due
to the perception that he failed to rein in the excesses of Ling and other CYL officials (Radio Free Asia, August 25, 2015; BBC
Chinese, December 23, 2014). The Ling affairand Xis heavy criticism of the CYLhas cast a shadow over the political fortunes of
PBSC member and Premier Li Keqiang as well as ordinary Politburo members such as Li Yuanchao; Vice-Premiers Liu Yandong and
Wang Yang; Director of the CCP Department Liu Qibao; and Guangdong Party Secretary Hu Chunhua (unrelated to former
president Hu). Premier
Li has been sidelined by Xi and no longer has authority over economic
policy. While he might retain his PBSC membership at the 19 Party Congress, it is possible that he would move over to head the
National Peoples Congress. It is likely that Li Yuanchao, Liu Yandong and Liu Qibao will be given post-retirement jobs at the NPC or
the Chinese Peoples Political Consultative Conference. In theory, Wang Yang, the only CYL Faction member with solid reformist
inclinations, should be promoted to the PBSC. But it
is not certain whether Xi wants two CYL Faction

members in this inner most sanctum of power especially when there is a possibility that the membership of the
PBSC may be reduced from the current seven to five (Apple Daily [Hong Kong], November 29, 2015; United Daily News [Taiwan],
August 29, 2015). Of perhaps more significance is the political fortune of Hu Chunhua. Hu and Chongqing Party Secretary Sun
Zhengcai, both born in 1963, were put into the Politburo by the out-going PBSC led by former president Hu Jintao and former
premier Wen Jiabao. They are the only two Sixth-Generation cadres (those born in the 1960s) in the current Politburo. Similar to the
older Hu, Hu Chunhua served as First Secretary of the CYL; like Hu, a former party secretary of Tibet, the younger Hu built up his
career in the autonomous region. It is well understood, however, that Xi has a low assessment of Hus ability. And the possibility of
Hu Chunhua making the PBSC next year is deemed very slim (Radio French International, Chinese Service, November 29, 2015;
Radio Free Asia, August 17, 2015). Stacking the Deck After doing all he can to eclipse the CYL Faction, President Xi is investing a lot
of resources on putting together his own Xi Jinping Faction, of which the Zhejiang Clique is a major component. Similar to what
Jiang Zemin did in grooming the Shanghai Faction, Xi has bent over backwards to elevate officials who had served under him when
he was Party Secretary of Zhejiang Province from 2002 to 2007 (See China Brief, February 7, 2014). Other components of the Xi
Jinping Faction include the Gang of Princelings; the Shaanxi Cliqueofficials who served in Xis home province, including Director
of the General Office Li Zhanshu and Director of the Organization Department Zhao Leji; and Xis cronies including schoolmates
Chen Xi, who is Executive Vice-Director of the Organization Department and chief economic advisor Liu He, who heads the General
Office of the Central Leading Group on Finance and Economics (South China Morning Post, March 2; World Affairs Journal
[Washington], May 1, 2014). It is evident that Xi
wants his Zhejiang Clique to be as powerful as the Shanghai

Faction under former president Jiang, one of his major political foes.
A2-Anticorruption effective
Corruption isnt going away its just changing
Blank, Burkill, and Hong, 15 [Nick, Frank, and Nicholas, Nicholas Blank is the former head of Krolls Guangzhou,
Shanghai and Seoul offices. He specialises in handling complex due diligence, fraud and intellectual property investigations, Frank
Hong is a partner in Dorseys Corporate group and Office Head in Beijing. His practice focuses on advising international companies
on their direct investments into China as well as advising emerging Chinese multinational corporations on their outbound
investments and other aspects of doing business abroad, especially the United States, Nick Burkill is Co-head of Advocacy in the
London office of Dorsey and Whitney and the co-chair of the firms Anti-Corruption Practice Group. He is ranked as one of the top
commercial and fraud litigators in the UK and identified by the Chambers UK directory as an expert on the UKs Bribery Act, 6-1-15,
http://antifraudnetwork.com/2015/07/has-chinas-anti-corruption-drive-had-any-real-impact-on-commercial-bribery/]
Without doubt, Chinas
anti-corruption campaign is significantly impacting state officials and the

senior leadership of state-owned corporations. The arrest of ex-security chief Zhou Yongkang and the one-day trial
of former China National Petrolefum chief Jiang Jiemin who admitted guilt are just two high-profile recent cases. The net has
also stretched beyond Chinas border, with Xu Jinhui, head of the anti-graft bureau, giving the
US government a priority list of corrupt officials allegedly hiding in the United States . The
biggest change seen by one security manager at a foreign manufacturer in light of the campaign and in line with these cases,
is a dramatic change in the way multinational corporate employees interact with employees at
state-owned enterprise. No one wants to interact or meet with them anymore everyone is
afraid that they could become ensnared in the net of the crackdown . But what has been the
impact on business-to-business relationships? Are kickbacks still being paid between
businesses? From vendors to suppliers? Is the scrutiny being faced by officials also being felt
within the private sector? In a series of private conversations held by Dorsey & Whitney China
and Blackpeak with the security managers of multinational companies, we identified the real
effects of Xi Jinpings campaign on businesses operating in China. Commercial corruption
hasnt gone away. Its simply evolving Our interviews with security managers who are regularly assigned by
multinational companies to investigate allegations received by their staff of kickback payments revealed that little has really
changed. The
security managers we spoke to consistently held the view that commercial corruption
was still occurring at levels consistent with their experience during previous administrations
but, as one investigator in the pharmaceutical industry put it, the methodology has changed. In
the past, employees would skim expense accounts in order to get cash for bribery payments. The
hope was that delivering big sales contracts would increase their chances of bonuses and
promotions. These days they are still skimming, but they are keeping the cash for themselves.
Other sources noted that this change in methodology was making investigation work more
difficult. Previously, compliance officers could build cases by following interactions between employees and bribe givers, usually
involving lavish dinners and expensive gifts. Following these clues would often lead to information about more substantial kickback
payments. With
corruption becoming more closely scrutinised, corrupt employees are becoming

more careful. They are certainly continuing to give or receive money, but they are not meeting
with their counterparts and are not offering entertainment and gifts. The days when it was easy to
overinflate promotional events to skim money are long gone because the ongoing anti-corruption campaign and concerns over
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) compliance have placed tremendous scrutiny on the traditional avenues for squeezing money,
such as promotional events and travel agencies. This trend for corruption being driven under the table is also borne out by the fact
that companies are seeing fewer blatant conflicts of interest relationships.
China Econ k2 Global

China econ collapse triggers global collapse
Chang 16 --- author of The Coming Collapse of China and Nuclear Showdown: North Korea
Takes On the World (Gordon Change, 1-10-16, " How China Could Crash the Global Economy"
The Daily Beast, 7-25-2016, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/01/11/how-chinacould-crash-the-global-economy.html)//RCB
China
has a major adjustment problem, George Soros told a conference in Sri Lanka on Thursday. I would say it
amounts to a crisis. When I look at the financial markets, there is a serious challenge which reminds me of the crisis we had
in 2008. Soros is wrong on one important count. The next global downturn, which looks like it is now beginning in
China, will be worse than the one last decade. Last week, China shook. TwiceMonday and Thursdaya
just-installed circuit breaker mechanism, designed to limit volatility, caused Chinese stocks to
crash. All of the market gains last year were wiped away in just four trading sessions. By Thursday, the widely followed
Shanghai Composite Index lost 11.7 percent, while the Shenzhen Composite was off 15.2 percent.
That meant the destruction of about $1.1 trillion in wealth. Friday, Chinese stocks managed a relief rally, as Claudio Piron of Bank
of America Merrill Lynch termed it in comments made to CNBC. Shanghai shares climbed 2 percent while Shenzhen rose 1.1
percent. Nobody expects stocks to continue their upward path, however. I think the impact should be short-lived, a couple of days
maybe, Piron predicted. And why is that? As Peter Boockvar of The Lindsey Group, an economic advisory firm, said to CNN,
Chinas stock market is going to go where its going to go. And Chinas market wants to go down. The only reason for the rally
Friday is that Chinas National Team of state and state-controlled entities bought up shares in a bid to restore confidence. Money is
gushing out of the country, in fact, a sure sign the
Chinese people are losing confidence. That is why

relatively unimportant news could trigger such widespread selling. The New York Timess Paul Krugman on
Friday wrote that the data out of China does not appear to be big enough to trigger a worldwide crisis, but he worries about the
transmission of panic to global markets. He should. On Monday, what
was predictable reporting about the

Chinese manufacturing sector led to a 300-point initial drop in the Dow after causing losses in
Asia and Europe. On Thursday, a long-forecasted decrease in the value of the renminbi, the
Chinese currency, was the main factor in an almost 400-point tumble at the close of trading in
New York. The markets still do not understand China. The financial community has accepted too much of the Chinese
governments line on its economy, and traders have not discounted the severity of the downturn that will almost certainly take place
there. So
just imagine what happens to global markets when distressing news out of China gets
really dramatic. If China were to fall apart at any other time, the contagion that Krugman worries about could be limited. At
the moment, however, the world economy is vulnerable, with growth a concern almost everywhere but
Africa. Moreover, the post-war international system looks fragile, with Russia redrawing borders in Europe by force, with China
grabbing the waters of the South China Sea, with North Korea detonating nuclear weapons it is not supposed to have, and with
another round of violence in the Middle East. The
investment community has vastly underestimated Chinas

contribution to the global economy and significantly underestimated its fundamental problems. A little ignorance can
go a long way in bringing on historys next great downturn. Heres how we came to this distressing pass. Chinas technocratic leaders
recklessly created a stock market boom in the latter half of 2014 by talking up the prospects for shares. They succeeded in raising
prices until the middle of June of last year, when the market started to collapse. Beijing, beginning in early July, triggered a rebound
with a determined effort that included the buying of stocks by the National Team, the intimidation of market participants with
threats and detentions, and the criminalization of various forms of selling. Chinese technocrats saved prices, but in the process they
ultimately froze the markets. Activity fell dramatically. For instance, as a result of Beijings tactics, the volume in Chinas stock-index
futures market, once the worlds largest, plummeted 99 percent in the June-to-September period. Stock trading volume fell by
around 70 percent. In November, it looked like Chinas technocrats were trying to return the markets to normal operation by
loosening restrictions. For instance, they announced the resumption of initial public offerings. Investors, however, perceived the
rollback of controls as an opportunity to sell off shares. What triggered Mondays sell-off was the release of the Caixin/Markit
Purchasing Managers Index, which showed that Chinas manufacturing sector contracted for the 10th-straight month in December.
The continued weakness in this private survey, in stark contrast with robust official numbers for industrial output, is a hint that the
overall economy is expanding only in the low single digits. There is now wide disagreement over the performance of the economy.
The official National Bureau of Statistics reported that growth in the third calendar quarter of last year was 6.9 percent, and
Citigroups chief economist has said China is generally growing around 4 percent. People in Beijing were privately talking 2.2
percent in the middle of last year, when the economy was doing better than it is now. Whatever the real numberand no one truly
knows what it isits clear it is falling. More
important, its also evident Beijing no longer has the ability to

reverse the downward trajectory. There have been six reductions in benchmark interest rates since November 2014 and
five reductions of the bank reserve-requirement ratio since last February, but this monetary stimulus has had no noticeable effect,
largely because there is a lack of demand for money. Central government technocrats have doggedly created cashM2, the broad
gauge of money supply, was up a 17-month high of 13.7 percent in Novemberbut there is, after a prolonged period of overbuilding,
little need for it. Fiscal spending, a good measure of the governments overall stimulus efforts, accelerated as 2015 wore on. It was up
25.9 percent in August, 26.9 percent in September, 36.1 percent in October, and 25.9 percent in November. Nonetheless, growth has
continued to erode as spending skyrocketed. All this additional cash is not avoiding what looks like economic failure. Imports, a
good indication of both manufacturing and consumption trends, fell 8.7 percent in November in dollar terms, a record 13 straight
months of decline. Exports that month were off 6.8 percent, the fifth-straight month in negative territory. Chinas links with the
world economy, therefore, are in decline. Another disturbing sign comes from price data. Chinas nominal GDP growth of 6.2
percent in the third calendar quarter of last year was less than the officially reported real growth of 6.9 percent. China, therefore, has
entered a deflationary period. Deflation, in turn, suggests a 1930s-style depression. The country is already staggering under
excessive debt, perhaps as much as 350 percent of gross domestic product. Debt of that magnitude becomes almost impossible to
service in an era of continually declining prices. The best-case scenario for China is decades of recession or recession-like stagnation.
And that is why money is fleeing the country at the moment. Bloomberg reports that there was $461 billion of net capital outflow in
the third quarter of last year. In the fourth quarter, there was a $367 billion outflow. The decline from the third to fourth quarter was
attributable not to an improvement in sentiment but the imposition of informal, off-the-books capital controls. These impediments
to movement of capital never work in the long term because people always find a way around them, and that is surely what
happened last quarter. Why do we suspect this? During that quarter the declines in the countrys foreign exchange reserves steadily
increased. In December, the reserves fell by a record $107.9 billion. Whats the best economic indicator? Thats the flow of capital.
The Chinese are taking money out of their country as fast as they can, telling us China does not have much of a future.
China entrenched in global economy domestic econ failure L2

global collapse
Horowitz 16 --- Evan Horowitz writes the Quick Study column for the Globe, both online
and in print (Evan Horowitz, 1-07-16, " Will the stock crash in China take down the US
economy?" The Boston Globe, 7-25-2016,
https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2016/01/07/will-stock-crash-china-take-downeconomy/mmMmUEED8a6BH5EsCzi3wJ/story.html)//RCB
China fell
so far that trading was actually shut down. And the effects have spread quickly; US and European
stocks opened lower Thursday, and with the price of oil and other commodities continuing to slide, theres concern about a
full-on global crisis. The basic problem is that the Chinese economy isnt what it used to be. Gone are the double-digit
growth rates of the last few decades, and with them the hope that China could smoothly
transition from a developing country to a mature global economy , with a smaller role for the state
and a larger one for consumers. Whether the United States and the rest of the world can weather a
Chinese slowdown without falling back into recession is unclear , but the risk seems to be climbing.
Chinas stock market is crashing, and its pulling down markets all around the world. Twice this week, stock prices in
Whats happening in China? For decades now, economic growth in China has been fiery, often reaching rates above 10 percent. But
those heady days of consistent, high-octane growth seem to be over. View Story US stocks plunge The market rebounded after a
nearly 300-point plunge but then began to drop again Thursday. Twenty-nine minutes of chaos China suspends stock circuitbreaker In 2015, Chinas growth rate hovered around 7 percent, and recent figures from the all-important manufacturing sector
suggest that things arent about to return to the highs. In fact, things may be even worse than the official numbers suggest; a recent
independent analysis found that the true unemployment rate in China may be nearly three times the official rate. To help bolster the
economy, the Chinese government has been letting the value of its currency fall. Thats good for exporters, because it means their
goods will suddenly be less expensive in overseas shops. But its a troubling sign for investors, because China was supposed to be
moving past the export-first phase of its development and becoming real consumer market, where companies from around the world
could sell their goods to a growing Chinese middle class. Why has this affected global stock prices? Its important not to exaggerate
the connection between market fluctuations and the real economy. Theres a lot of unpredictability in market movements, and its
often impossible to tease out the deeper forces. But the slowdown in China could be feeding broader troubles. Start with the effects
inside of China. The most basic reason stock prices fall is because investors start to think or fear that companies are going to
perform worse than previously anticipated. So if the Chinese economy is really slowing, that would mean tighter profits for Chinese
companies, and smaller returns for stockholders. As to why a floundering China should prompt sell-offs all around the world, the
answer is a little more involved. Some
countries have such deep ties with China that they cant
avoid being dragged down by a Chinese recession. Regional trading partners, like Japan,
Korea, and Australia, will have the most trouble. But some farther-flung countries, like
Brazil, have built huge industries focused on selling commodities and raw materials to
China, industries which now seem endangered. For the United States, however, its not clear that a Chinese
slowdown will be all that traumatic. True, there are US companies that will have to rethink plans to market to a no-longer-thriving
Chinese middle class. But if troubles in China bring lower-cost imports and ever-cheaper gasoline, that could help offset the damage.
Then again, there are economists who worry
that a recession in China could trigger a global
recession. For instance, if the already-strong dollar is forced up even further, that could widen the trade gap in a way that
dampens US job creation and keeps wages from growing. Why did the Chinese stock market shut down? Just this week, China
implemented a new system of circuit breakers, which are designed to prevent panic selling and block downward momentum from
getting out of control. Its not an unusual practice. Similar triggers exist here in the United States. But the Chinese version was set to
kick in much faster, forcing a pause in trading when stocks fall 5 percent and shutting down the market entirely when they drop by 7
percent. It was a bad sign that the 7 percent shutdown got tripped on the first day, and worse that it happened again 29 minutes into
the fourth day. Following that debacle, the Chinese government has decided to suspend the circuit breakers. Chinese stock market CSI 300 Index Dec 7 Jan 7 3,200 3,300 3,400 3,500 3,600 3,700 3,800 3,900 4,000 Jan 73,294 Source: Google finance. Closing
prices. What should I watch for in the days ahead? The first thing to look for is any gap between US markets and their Chinese
counterparts. If Chinese stocks continue down, but US and European shares stabilize, that could be a sign that contagion is likely to
be limited. And moving forward, listen closely to the Federal Reserve. At its last meeting, in December, the Fed raised interest rates
for the first time in nearly a decade because the board of governors thought the economy might start growing too fast. If the situation
in China continues to deteriorate, the Fed might be forced to put off any future hikes, or even reverse course. The next Federal
Reserve meeting is scheduled for the end of January, providing a first official occasion to assess whether the slowdown in China,
combined with the recent rate hike, is shifting the US economy into reverse.
China K2 Global Economy

Rapoza 16 --- Kenneth Rapoza is a contributor for Forbes and analyzes emerging market
spaces (Kenneth Rapoza, 4-14-16, " Just How Big Is China's Impact On The World Economy?"
Forbes Online, 7-25-2016, http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2016/04/14/just-how-bigis-chinas-impact-on-the-world-economy/#2ddb2341cc1b)//RCB
How big of a deal is China? Just ask Tata Steel , Vale , Rio Tinto . The list is long of steel makers and iron ore exporters that have
been crushed by Chinese oversupply. About 15,000 British jobs are at risk if India-owned Tata Steel cannot find a buyer for its U.K.
plants, including the heavily loss-making Port Talbot works in South Wales, the WSJ reported on March 31. The company said it
wanted out of the U.K. after roughly 10 years of losing money there thanks to the influx of cheap China steel. Over the last year, Vale,
Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton , all iron ore suppliers to China steel companies, have watched their share values erode more than their
local index averages. In an election year like this one in the U.S., the story is especially on Donald Trumps campaign that the
Chinese have destroyed American manufacturing. While China becomes a bad guy every four years, its impact
on global
markets is more obvious now than ever. China may be hated more than it is liked, but the U.S. economy
remains tightly linked to theirs. Hedge funds, led by famous short seller George Soros, are betting on
big corrections in Chinese assets, and are shorting its currency, the renmimbi. Investors are less interested today in
countries dependent on Chinese demand. This has hurt Brazils physical economy as much as its ongoing political crisis.
Recommended by Forbes Photos: Where China Invests In America Trump's War On The American Supply Chain Northwestern
MutualVoice: How Startups Are Helping Families With Senior Care The Impact Of China's New Urbanization Plan Could Be Huge
Getting China Wrong When
China Sneezes The economic damage is widespread. Muted growth

in Chinese demand for commodities such as copper has hit Latin America. Declines in
car imports have affected Germany. Declines in computer and audio equipment demand
has hurt Japan as Chinas home grown equipment market replaces it. Korea is an even more interesting example, says
Andrew McCaffery, global head of alternative investing at Aberdeen Asset Management, one of the U.K.s biggest investment firms.
The slowdown in China has hit world trade in general, as patients
who breathed in the Chinese sneeze pass

the germs onto other countries, which then pass it further down the line. Koreas export market looks much less
promising because of weakening sales to China, he says. Like other China dependent exporters, Korea will be forced to rely on its
own demand. But the likelihood of success varies widely from country to country. Korean household debt is already so high it will be
hard for consumers to pick up the slack. Japans government is practically handing money out to consumers to get them to shop.
Whether it can do so is unclear. Thats not all Chinas fault. Decades of deflation-depressed consumption have Japanese rightfully
thinking: why buy today, when I can buy for less tomorrow? In Brazil, high interest rates caused by inflation have left families
struggling to keep up on their loan payments. Defaults are rising. And although they are not yet at crisis levels, Brazilians are no
longer feeling rich. A political crisis and a weak China has hurt the economy and the locals are less likely to spend diminishing
incomes on retail therapy, says McCaffery, unless theyre happy to seek debt counseling afterwards. China Growth No Longer
Impresses Oddly enough, even though China is growing over 6%, consensus is that it is not enough for the country to reform its
economic system and keep full employment. Employment is an important part of the policy picture in China. Its still a poor country.
And a poor country with a few hundred million struggling to survive can lead to the sort of political unrest the Communist Party
fears. China bashing is popular, but
Chinas importance to the U.S. economy and the worlds

cannot be understated. Chinese economic policy became an important driver to growth in 2009 when the U.S. and
Europe were crashing. Without the trillions it spent on stimulating the economy, many countries would have found no buyer for
their goods, including the U.S. Now China is no longer willing to stimulate consumption and much of its physical economy is left to
its own devices. Some welcome this more capitalist approach, on the one hand. But on the other, fear it means a greater slowdown is
coming. Some say Chinas real GDP is closer to 2%. China releases first quarter GDP on Friday. Nomura Securities estimates the
economy grew at a 6.2% pace year over year. Chinas influence is growing, perhaps more than even Washington lets on. Its currency
will become part of the International Monetary Funds Special Drawing Rights in October, making it the only emerging market
currency in the basket. That gives big emerging market nations like Brazil and Russia another currency to hold in its central bank
reserves other than the dollar and euro, the two currencies currently preferred.
China biggest player in world econ

Butt 16--- Rachel Butt covers private equity for Business Insider. (Rachel Butt, 5-19-16,
"China's giant population is reshaping the global economy" Business Insider Online, 7-25-2016,
http://www.businessinsider.com/chinas-population-reshapes-global-economy-hsbc-20165)//RCB
The world's second-largest economy is making its weight felt around the world . And the new
power of the Chinese consumer is showing up in various forms. "It could be a trip to Sydney's Taronga Zoo, a compelling new
Korean drama, an upmarket store in London, a multi-million-dollar footballer, an online payment app, a robot, or an electric car,"
HSBC's Julia Wang and James Pomeroy wrote in a recent report. They continued: " The
common thread is that all
roads, wherever they are in the world, eventually lead to China in some way or another." Yes, investors may be
jittery as China is slowing down amid myriad challenges and gloomy predictions of its short-lived rebound. But its economy
is contributing more to global growth, and the more optimistic Chinese consumers are flashing their wallets in a
way that shakes up the world economy. China added the equivalent of Turkey's entire economy to
global GDP in 2015, and the country is responsible for about 12% of total world GDP,
according to the HSBC report, out on Thursday. Here's Wang and Pomeroy connecting the dots: It's a sunny midweek day in Sydney
and Taronga Zoo, scenically positioned on the city's spectacular harbour, would be quiet but for the large numbers of visitors from
mainland China. This highlights the rapid increase in Chinese tourists (and students) in Australia and the growth in the number of
flights between the two countries. This, in turn, is helping Australia rebalance its own economy away from commodity sales to, yes,
China. Look further down the supply chain and we find that in April Airbus and Boeing split an $10 billion order for 35 wide-body
aircraft from China Eastern Airlines as the company adds new long-haul routes. Its biggest impact is in the realm of investment:
China is responsible for 30% of total global investment demand. As the economy transitions from a manufacturing powerhouse to a
consumption-driven economy, Chinese investment has poured in retail, property, and financial services instead of the familiar
commodities. Screen Shot 2016 05 19 at 2.46.17 PM Chinese imports by market and product.HSBC More consumers are getting
wealthier, and HSBC estimates that more than two-thirds of the population will be part of the urban middle-income class those
earning $12 to $50 per day by 2025. That means pretty big changes in the population's income and tastes. The most visceral sign
may be the rise of the Chinese Super League, a soccer league that has recently spent exorbitant amounts to lure the best players from
all around Europe, Wang and Pomeroy note. Chinese investors are investing in soccer teams worldwide as well, and now own 13% of
Manchester City (England), 20% of Atletico Madrid (Spain), and 60% of Slavia Prague (Czech Republic), according to HSBC. And it
doesn't just end there. The report notes that the share of Chinese viewers in global takings for movies has recently jumped to over
10% for most films, compared to only 2% in 2007. batman v superman wb Warner Bros This trend is even more important for
movies made in the US: Chinese box-office takings of American films grew about 49% year-over-year in 2015. Wanda Group, for
example, is riding on this boom with its purchase of Legendary Entertainment, the studio behind Christopher Nolan's "Dark Knight"
trilogy. China accounted for 12% of global takings for the recently released "Batman v Superman" film, according to HSBC. Wang
and Pomeroy suggest that we can expect more Chinese tourists to spend their newfound wealth abroad, in "exotic destinations" like
South Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. The sheer size of the Chinese population can have a pretty big impact on local
economies. Chile, for example, benefits from China's burgeoning middle class. Exports to China now account for 25% of total
Chilean exports, compared to less than 5% in 2000. These exports are shifting from copper to wine, thanks to greater demand from
dinner-party hosts, restaurants, and bars. As another example, Chinese demand may boost South Korea's GDP by anything between
0.2 and 1.8 percentage points depending on the pace of growth in China, according to HSBC. At the same time, the researchers
highlight how the
booming Chinese market could continue to bring headaches like

disinflationary pressure to the rest of the world and problems with how politicians
handle trade deals. The bottom line is that while China may be slowing, its influence on
the global economy is set to keep expanding.
Even businesses not directly tied to China get hurt by downturn

Gillespie 15 (Patrick, reporter at CNNMoney graduated from the University of Delaware and
received a Masters from the CUNY Graduate School of Journalism,
http://money.cnn.com/2015/08/26/investing/china-economy-global-ripple-effect/, China
contagion: How it ripples across the world-by Sophia Ghauri)
Beijing has a big problem. And that's a big problem for the rest of us too. The
world's second largest economy is

slowing down, many fear, much faster than the Chinese government is admitting. What's worrisome is the breadth of countries,
companies and people that are affected by a China slowdown. Economic growth is drying up in Latin America.
European companies are bracing for a sales dive. Smaller Asian economies are watching their
currencies plummet. Even U.S. companies that have little exposure to China are getting hit. And
people are losing jobs. Countries that are dependent on China China is the biggest market for goods produced by some
nations. Consider Chile, which has had a strong economy in recent years. Almost 25% of Chile's
exports go to China. Trade makes up 10% of Chile's economy-- twice that of the United States, according to
the World Bank. So countries like Chile that (1) rely heavily on trade for economic growth and (2)
trade a lot with China -- namely Brazil, Indonesia, Japan -- have direct exposure to China's
economic decline. With the Chinese buying fewer goods or commodities, it's dragging down those countries'
economies and commodity prices. Chile's economy is projected to grow only 1.8% this year,
according to BofA Merrill Lynch. Between 2010 to 2013, it grew over 4% annually. The point is that Chile's
economy is a microcosm of what's happening in many countries across the globe. Less trade
with China translates into weaker economic growth. Global companies can't hide from China's
slowdown Just about everyone with any connection to China is getting hit. Car companies like Ford (F),
BMW (BAMXF) and Volkswagen (VLKAF) are seeing sales in China fall. Luxury brands such as Prada (PRDSF) and Coach (COH)
have seen profits from China decline.
Australian steel company Bluescope Steel warned this week that it

would close one of its plants because of worries about Chinese demand combined with low
prices. The closure would lead to about 5,000 job losses. Even U.S. tech giants Apple (AAPL, Tech30) and
Microsoft (MSFT, Tech30) are affected. Apple's sales in China are way up from a year ago, but its revenues from
China dipped between the company's second and third quarter this year. Microsoft too has experienced a China-related sales
slowdown too. The strong U.S. dollar isn't helping these companies sell their stuff abroad either. Overall the U.S. economy is less
exposed to China compared to the countries. Only 2% of S&P 500 revenues are directly linked to China, according to Goldman
So
while direct sales to China are a small piece of the pie, sales to other countries are huge and they
are already impacted by the ripple effect from China's economy.
Sachs. But that understates the problem. Keep in mind: 44% of revenues for S&P 500 companies come from outside the U.S.
-South America
China economy hurts South America and the farming industry
Gillespie 15 (Patrick, reporter at CNNMoney graduated from the University of Delaware
and received a Masters from the CUNY Graduate School of Journalism,
http://money.cnn.com/2015/08/26/investing/china-economy-global-ripple-effect/, China
contagion: How it ripples across the world-by Sophia Ghauri)
The China domino effect and John Deere It gets worse. Even companies that don't have much direct exposure to China are affected.
For example, look at a stalwart American company from the heartland: Farming equipment manufacturer John Deere (DE). Most of
Deere's sales are in North America, but 40% of its sales come from overseas. How does the
domino effect work from
China to John Deere:

1. China
imports lots of agricultural commodities. China's slowdown has caused commodity

prices to plummet.
2. South
America is a major exporter of commodities that require farming equipment -soybeans, sugar and coffee. Countries like Brazil send lots of their commodities to China.
3. With lower commodity prices, farmers don't really have much money to spend on Deere
equipment. "Farmers will make less money and will have less [cash] to spend on farm
machinery," says Brett Wong, senior research analyst at Piper Jaffray.
-Latin America
China economy declining will be deviating to Latin American
economies
Johnston 15 (Matthew, bachelors degree in Interdisciplinary Studies at St. Stephens
University in the Canadian maritime province of New Brunswick, MA in economics at the New
School for Social Research in New York City,
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/100515/how-chinas-slowdown-affects-yourlatin-american-investments.asp,How Chinas Slowdown Affects Your Latin American
Investments-by Sophia Ghauri)
Part of Chinas
ascendance as a leader in global trade has led to a significant increase in economic dealings with
Latin America. In 2000, bilateral trade between China and Latin America was a mere $12 billion; in 2013, that amount had grown to $289
billion making China the third largest (next to the U.S. and the EU) destination for Latin American exports. As a primary trading
partner with many Latin American countries, an economic slowdown in China means that the
economies of Latin America will face some harsh headwinds, and so will your Latin American investments. A
After joining the World Trade Organization in 2001, China has quickly assumed a lead role in trade within the global economy.
Slowing Chinese Economy Since the early 1980s Chinas economy grew at an average rate of 10% percent a year for about 30 years.
Between 2011 and 2014 that growth slowed to about 8% a year and the official targeted growth rate for this year was set at 7%.
However, a number of indicators suggesting weaker than expected growth have some economists predicting growth rates as low as
4% by years end. Despite Chinese retail sales growing 10.8% in August, beating the forecasted 10.5%, a number of major indicators
suggest that Chinas economy is indeed slowing. One of the most influential engines of economic growth, fixed-asset investments,
slowed to its weakest pace in 15 years at 10.9% for the first eight months of this year. Factor output also disappointed, rising only
6.1% in August, 0.3 percentage points below market expectations. Real estate investment slowed to 3.5% in the first eight months of
this year, the slowest pace since 2009. (For related reading, see: China's Factory Output Worst in Years.) As
China has been

slowing down for a number of years, its trade with Latin America has also shrunk. While bilateral
trade between the two regions reached its zenith in 2013 at $274 billion, 2014 saw that number decline slightly to $269 billion. With
even slower than expected growth occurring in China this year, that number is likely to decline even further. Chinas Primary Latin
American Trading Partners Chinas
development depended on the availability to acquire vast amounts

of natural resources of which a number of Latin American countries had plentiful supplies.
Chinas Latin American imports were primarily supplied by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru and
Venezuela. According to the CIA World Factbook, in 2014, China was Argentinas second largest (next to Brazil) export
destination, comprising 6.9% of total exports, Brazils largest at 18% of exports, Chiles largest at 20.9% of exports, Perus largest at
18.3% of exports, and Venezuelas third largest at 12.9% of exports. The number one exports of these Latin American countries to
China in 2014 were as follows: Argentinaoil seed ($3 billion); Braziloil seed ($16.6 billion); Chilecopper ($9.2 billion); Peru
While these
industries will definitely take a hit from slowing Chinese demand, the importance of these
industries will no doubt have negative impacts on the entire economies of these Latin American
countries. The Effect on Latin American Economies and Your Investments One immediate implication is that the
weak demand for commodities that has caused their prices to slump puts downward pressure on
the currencies of Latin American economies making imports more expensive . This could have
severe inflationary pressures, a reality that is already devastating Venezuela whose inflation rate
has been estimated to be nearly 700% a year and is currently the highest in the world. While doing
ores, slag and ash ($4.8 billion); and Venezuelamineral fuels, oils, distillation products, etc. ($10.9 billion).
better than Venezuela, Argentinas inflation rate of 14.5% is nothing to envy, and a number of other Latin American countries
including Brazil, Chile and Peru, have recently seen consumer prices rising at their fastest rates in a number of years. The
inflationary pressures will have negative impacts on consumer purchasing power compounding the weak demand already coming
from a slower growing China. Chinas importance to these economies cannot be overstated, and the World Bank has estimated that a
1 percentage point decrease in Chinas growth is correlated with a 0.6 percentage point decrease in the GDP of the Latin American
and Caribbean region. Weak economic growth presents significant challenges for companies as revenues decline. A
number of
Latin American stock market indices have been on a downward trend for a number of years
Brazils IBOV, Chiles IGPA and Perus IGBVLand will likely continue with growth in China
much weaker than expected. An index that measures the performance of equity markets in the emerging markets of Latin
America as a whole, the EEML, has also been steadily declining for a number of years. Two exceptions from the countries discussed
are Argentina and Venezuela. Argentinas stock exchange index, the MERVAL, climbed steadily from around the middle of 2013
until reaching a peak in September 2014 when it went into decline. But for the first half of 2015 it has rebounded, up 45% for the
year as of May, fuelled by optimism over presidential elections coming later in the year. But with growth slowing in China, the most
recent trend since the middle of July has the MERVAL heading south. Venezuela, on the other hand, has seen a surprising stock
market rally as the IBVC jumped nearly 170% in two months beginning around the middle of May. This is far from good news,
however, and has more to do with investors distrust in the value of the bolivar as inflation has been astronomical. Investors are
parking their money in other paper assets that they believe will better hold their value than the currency. This speaks not to the
strength of Venezuelas economy but to its weakness. The Bottom Line As
a major export destination of many Latin

American countries, Chinas slowing growth will put downward pressure on Latin American
economic growth. If you have Latin American investments you have likely already noticed declines over the last number of
years. If Chinas slowdown is even worse than expected then it is likely that the downward trend in
Latin American stocks will continue until new sources of demand can be found to stimulate growth.
-Africa
If China has a big economic decline this will hurt significantly African
countries economies
Alfred 15 (Charlotte, World Reporter, The Huffington Post,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/china-economic-problemsafrica_us_55e76780e4b0c818f61a81ef, Why Chinas Economic Woes Are Causing Alarm in
Africa, Will the crisis be a wake-up call for African governments to speed up reform? -by Sophia
Ghauri)
Recent economic turmoil in China the worlds second-largest economy has rocked markets
from the U.S. to Asia and Europe, and Africa has not been spared the upheaval . Chinas plunging stock
markets and surprise currency devaluation last month have increased fears that the countrys rapid economic growth may be slowing
down for good. Many
African nations are now concerned that Chinese demand for its oil and other
resources could dry up. Chinese resource extraction in Africa, while controversial, has helped
fuel economic growth, job creation and investment in African infrastructure. China is the
continents largest bilateral trading partner in 2013, Beijings trade with Africa was double that of the U.S. The
Chinese crisis comes at a bad time for many of Africas largest economies, already contending with the collapse of oil prices over the
past year. Now, experts warn that economic growth may be slowing in Africas biggest economies,
South Africa and Nigeria. Amadou Sy, director of the Africa Growth Initiative at the Brookings Institution, explained to The
WorldPost why Chinas economic woes are causing problems in Africa, and how African nations should respond. What impact has
Chinas market turmoil and yuan devaluation already had on African economies? They have had two
impacts. First, they

have unnerved global financial markets and led to higher short-term volatility in currency, bond
and stock markets as well as commodity markets. Second, and more importantly, they have led market
participants to reassess the likelihood and severity of a slowdown of the Chinese economy. These
impacts have had ripple effects on African economies, and in particular on countries that are
most dependent on exports to China, mainly commodity-producing countries such as South
Africa (gold and wine), Angola (oil) and Zambia (copper). Have they had any positive side effects? In theory, the yuan devaluation
could help African countries like Ethiopia and Kenya that import Chinese goods such as heavy machinery. It could also help African
retailers and consumers, as Chinese imports become cheaper. But the scale of the yuan devaluation was really not that large when
compared to recent movements in other currencies. In fact, African currencies have been depreciating against the U.S. dollar for a
while. For instance, the South African rand has dropped about 12 percent against the U.S. dollar this year. To me, the major positive
side effect is that questions about a Chinese slowdown should push African governments to realize that they need to speed up the
implementation of the continents agenda of economic transformation, and make their economies more resilient to external shocks.
It is like an alarm bell ringing and telling us that the window of opportunity to reform our economies is shrinking. You wrote that
Chinas currency devaluation is not the real problem, as the much more troubling question for Africa is whether Chinas economic
growth is slowing down more permanently. If this is the case, how big an impact would it have on economic growth in Africa? A
sharper than expected slowdown of Chinas economic growth is one of the big external risks to Africas growth forecast .
Other
risks include a further decline in oil prices and a sudden deterioration in global liquidity. Earlier
this year, the World Bank put 2015 growth for sub-Saharan Africa (SAA) at about 4 percent. If
Chinas growth falls below the 6-7 percent range, then one should expect SAA growth to go
below 4 percent. The effect of the slowdown will come through fewer exports from Africa to China, but also indirectly through
lower commodities prices, which in turn would affect African commodity exporters. It is like an alarm bell ringing and telling us that
the window of opportunity to reform our economies is shrinking. We are working on a model to isolate the impact of external shocks
to Africas growth, but International Monetary Fund economists Paulo Drummond and Estelle Liu, focusing on the impact of
changes in Chinas investment growth on sub-Saharan African exports, find that a 1 percentage point decline in Chinas investment
growth is associated with an average 0.6 percentage point decline in sub-Saharan Africas export growth. Which African countries
are most vulnerable to economic slowdown in China? Countries
that export the most to China

predominantly resource-rich economies such as Zambia will bear the brunt of such a shock.
Countries that receive a lot of direct investment from China such as Nigeria, South Africa,
Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, could also experience reduced investment flows . But ultimately, a moresevere-than-expected Chinese slowdown would be a shock to the global economy, and if the European Union is affected, that would
have a negative slowdown on Africa, as the EU is SSAs largest trading partner (China is the regions largest bilateral partner).
A2-Brexit Hurt Economy

Brexit benefits Chinese economy
Schuman 6/27 (Michael Schuman writes about Asia and global economic issues as a correspondent for TIME in Beijing,
China. In his 16 years as a journalist in Asia, he has reported from a dozen countries, including China, India, Japan and Indonesia.
Schuman is the author of The Miracle: The Epic Story of Asia's Quest for Wealth. Before joining TIME in 2002, he was a
correspondent for the Wall Street Journal and a staff writer for Forbes. Originally from New Jersey, he has a B.A. in Asian history
and political science from the University of Pennsylvania and a master of international affairs from Columbia.
http://www.smh.com.au/business/the-economy/china-could-be-the-biggest-winner-from-brexit-20160627-gpsm5v.html )
The United Kingdom's vote to exit the European Union is creating a lot of losers: London's finance industry.
British Prime Minister David Cameron. The pound. The grand cause of European integration. But out of all of the market turmoil
and uncertainty will emerge at least one big winner: China. In the short term, of course, China's struggling economy may
take a hit from the chaos in the EU, its second-largest trading partner. A smaller, less-stable European market and more cashstrapped consumers aren't good news for Chinese exporters . Over the longer term, though, Brexit is almost certainly
in China's economic and political interests. Even a fully united Europe - burdened as it is by debt woes, high costs,
overbearing bureaucracy and, in some cases, dubious competitiveness - has had a tough time competing and contending with China.
Now fractured, the EU can't help but pose less of a counterweight to China's rise on the world
stage. Remember why the European Union was formed in the first place. Proponents like to stress the
EU's mission to promote peace and democracy. More practically , a key goal of unification was to enhance the
region's clout in the global economy. The varied nations of Europe understood that they'd be much stronger if they
forged a common market with shared institutions and even a regional currency, the euro, than if they tried to compete as
independent units. Europe hoped to evolve from a collection of rich but contentious states into a giant economic bloc on par with the
US and more recently, China. In reality, Europe has struggled to fulfil that ideal and has suffered for it. Persistent nationalism has
repeatedly limited its ability to forge a common front on both trade and geopolitical issues. Nowhere has this failure been more
obvious than in Europe's relations with China. As a whole, the EU should in theory wield significant power in
pressing Beijing to open its markets and play fair on trade. Instead, European nations have routinely
squandered that advantage by competing with each other for Chinese investment and favours. Shortly after
the UK's Cameron fawned over visiting Chinese President Xi Jinping last year, German Chancellor Angela Merkel showed
up in Beijing, seeking her own business deals. The opportunities for China to divide and conquer
- both to strike better bargains and to undercut complaints about its own market-distorting behaviour - will only increase now
that Europe's second-largest economy has gone its own way. European businesses would certainly have been better served if the EU
could have cobbled together a common policy towards China. While Chinese companies have gone on a major
shopping spree in Europe - even buying stakes in beloved football clubs - Merkel, on a recent visit to Beijing, was left
griping that foreign firms deserved to "enjoy the same rights and privileges as domestic companies" in China. If she and Cameron
and Europe's other leaders had locked arms and fought for those rights together, they'd have had a much greater chance of success.
Now instead, a truncated common market in Europe will undercut the global competitiveness of its companies. European firms
- from big banks to tech start-ups - would be much better positioned to take on rising Chinese champions if they were able to
capitalise on a full-fledged Europe-wide market. Politically, too, Brexit can only widen China's scope for action. As
China challenges the West's cherished institutions and ideals, from navigation rights to human rights, the
importance of defending those rules and values is rising steadily. A united EU could have
presented a serious check to Beijing's growing assertiveness. We've already seen the alternative: when the
US expressed concerns last year about China's plans to set up a rival to the World Bank, the Europeans stumbled over themselves to
sign up, undermining any hope of extracting concessions from China's leaders. By choosing "Leave", British voters demonstrated an
unfortunate short-sightedness about how the world is changing and how hard it will be for any country with global ambitions to go it
alone. With Brexit, both the UK and Europe are losing a lot more than a partnership. They're losing their best chance to stay relevant
in a greatly altered world order.
Its a major win for China

Dollar 7/27 (David Dollar is a senior fellow with the Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development programs. He is
based within the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings. Dollar is a leading expert on China's economy and U.S.-China
economic relations. From 2009 to 2013, Dollar was the U.S. Treasury Department's economic and financial emissary to China.
Previously, he worked at the World Bank for more than 20 years, serving as country director for China and Mongolia from 2004 to
2009. http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2016/06/27-brexit-aftermath-chinas-rise-dollar )
Finally, from a larger geostrategic perspective, it would seem that China
is the big winner from Brexit. Europe is

less influential player on the world stage and will be absorbed with internal issues of
negotiating the British exit, controlling immigration, and keeping the periphery inside the eurozone. The United States is
likely to be a
also likely to
be distracted by these European challenges. This gives China more scope to pursue its
reclamation activities in the South China Sea and to play divide and conquer with European states on various
issues. For example, China would like to be recognized as a market economy, which is both symbolic and a
practical matter for adjudicating anti-dumping cases. It is also negotiating investment treaties with both the United States and the
EU, though so far Chinas offers have not been very attractive in the sense that they exempt many important sectors from open
investment. A U.K. no longer in the European Union will presumably be anxious to strengthen its ties
with China so it may well be willing to make compromises on market-economy status and investment deals
that a unified Europe would not have made. Brexit itself may not be that important but it may prove to be a good
signal of the decline of Europe and the rise of China.
Anticorruption = Global Pandemic Module

Anti-corruption will tank healthcare reform
Huang 4/25/15 Yanzhong Huang is Senior Fellow for Global Health at the Council on
Foreign Relations. This post appears courtesy of CFR.org and Forbes Asia.
http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/the-anti-corruption-drive-and-risk-of-policy-paralysis-inchina/
Like it or not, President Xi Jinpings anti-corruption campaign is extremely popular among
Chinese people. According to an online survey, combating corruption trails income
distribution as the top two concerns of the Chinese public. There are already reports suggesting
that the campaign has helped reduce the transaction cost for ordinary people to get things done
in China. But from the perspective of the more than eleven million government officials in
China, this also means reduced opportunities to access grey income (i.e., bribes), which
accounts for 12 percent of Chinas GDP. Consequently, civil servant jobs are increasingly losing
their attractiveness in China. According to a recruitment website, more than ten thousand civil
servants had quit their jobs in the three weeks following the Spring Festival in Feburary. The
exodus of civil servants poses particular challenges for the operation of the judicial system.
Already burdened by heavy caseloads, high risks, and government interference, judges are
leaving in droves. As aura of appeal for civil service fades, China faces growing pains in policy
making and implementation. But this is only part of the story. The campaign has also changed
the rules of the game in Chinas officialdom. Corruption in China is so rampant that it involves
almost every government official. According to a conservative estimate made by a law professor
of Renmin University, China has at least two million corrupt officials not being investigated, but
just investigating and convicting them would take forty to fifty years. Instead of setting limited
objectives, the new leadership under President Xi has indicated that it will not set any endpoint
for the campaign or give pardon or amnesty to corrupt officials. It also vows to pursue each
corruption case to the very bottom ( yi cha dao di). Those who are found guilty would lose big,
including their political life. This in effect creates a zero-sum, one-shot game where winner takes
all, and losers (i.e., Bo Xilai) have little chance of replaying the power game and becoming
tomorrows winners. This has significantly raised the stakes in the game, making players on each
side feel insecure. This is evidenced by the rapid increase in the number of officials who have
committed suicide since November 2012, when President Xi came to power. In March 2015,
President Xi reshuffled the Central Security Bureau that is in charge of his personal safety. The
changing rules of the game, coupled with the sustained political hierarchy in China and rapid
centralization of the power of President Xi, make it more likely to reproduce the bandwagoning
politics found in the Mao era, when policy actors rushed to jump on the bandwagon of the
perceived winner (i.e., Mao) in order to demonstrate their early and enthusiastic support of his
favorite policy. While the successful amassing of power should increase the credibility of
President Xis promises and punishments in the policy process, there is no guarantee that he is
the ultimate winner in the anti-corruption campaign. Chinas anti-corruption czar Wang Qishan
allegedly said recently that the fight against corruption was a stalemate, with each side pitted
against each other. Equally important, as a result of more than three decades of post-Mao
reform and social change, the political hierarchy has been sufficiently decentralized so that
central authority is limited by subnational authorities. This is especially the case if the central
leadership fails to spell out its priorities clearly and consistently. These developments have
profound implications for the public policy process in China. As fighting corruption becomes
a top priority in China, other important agenda items such as tackling the
environmental crisis and deepening healthcare reform might end up on the back
burner . Lower-level government officials, being wary about their personal security in the
campaign, would officially bandwagon with Xi, or at least pay lip service to his preferred policy
agenda. But in reality, they would balk at making any moves that would be interpreted by
their colleagues as ambitious attempts to seek personal advantages or threaten the latters
vested interests. As a result, not taking phone calls and not writing instructions on documents
becomes the new normal in the policy process. In May 2014, Premier Li Keqiang at a State
Council executive meeting assailed this phenomenon of holding an office and enjoying all the
privileges without doing a stroke of work. The problem of government inaction and policy
gridlock is particularly serious at the grassroots level. According to the party secretary of
Shanxi Province, in 2014 there was a 60 percent increase in the amount of petitions and offense
reports targeting officials at the township level, but the filed charges actually dropped over the
same period; during 2013-2014, 20 percent of the townships failed to investigate any corruption
cases. In order to address this policy paralysis, the central leadership should seriously
consider limiting the objectives of the anti-corruption campaign and incorporating it into the
track of rule of law.
Key to global pandemics

Barbadoro 13 http://digitalcollections.sit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=2569&context=isp_collection Barbadorojohn, "The Impact of the Chinese Rural
Healthcare System on Infectious Disease: A Study of the History And Reform of Chinese
Healthcare, And the Global Implications of Infectious Disease Control in China" (2013).
Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection. Paper 1544.
http://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp_collection/1544
Health care in China has always been a significant issue in the Chinese political system. The
strong traditions in China and the changing political climate of the last hundred years has
shaped the modern Chinese healthcare systems. The focus on traditional Chinese medicine, and
the introduction of western medicine, combined with a significant inequality between urban and
rural residents and the fastest growing economy in history have combined to present several
challenges to health policy makers in China. As the world is moving towards more and more
globalization, and China has recently encouraged and pushed for the opening of its borders to
trade and travel, Chinese healthcare is becoming a global issue . The ramifications of
inefficiencies and lack of comprehensive coverage spread far beyond China's borders. As the
events of the first decade of the 21*: century have shown, this issue cannot be neglected. The
emergence of pandemic influenzas and coronaviruses such as H7N9 and SARS show that the
policy of providing health care to residents in rural China affect policy and economy on a
global scale. Travel advisories, screening passengers and panic can have a drastic effect on the
economy of every nation in the v/orld and affect the lives of people that have no direct
connection to the disease. Models suggest that a pandemic level influenza that reaches a global
level would cause around 166 Billion USD in economic costs unrelated to direct treatment.'Even in the latest H7N9 scare that infected slightly over 130 has cost the government of China
near $6 billion USD.2 It is clear that the health of China and the monitoring of severe infectious
diseases is a global issue, and in order to save costs globally, the focus must shift on proactive
and preventive care for the risk of epidemic infections. Disease detection and control are global
responsibilities and the elimination of these diseases is a global public good. The key to
evading global infection of these epidemics, or 'pandemic level' diseases , is as Larry
Brilliant coined, "Early detection, early response."3 This philosophy is key to fighting the issues
presented by epidemics. With early detection and response, governments can issue directed and
appropriate responses such as transportation advisories, culling of animals in markets, and
treatment and isolation procedures. These however, are reactionary methods that cause
significant damages in terms of monetary cost and global trade. In China, early detection can be
difficult. With a large mistrust of the health care system, primarily stemming from the high costs
of treatment, and significant percentages of the populace avoiding treatment, infection rates of
epidemics skyrocket. In this way, the healthcare system is inextricably linked to the spread of
infectious diseases. The most effective, and least expensive way to combat epidemics is stopping
the spread at the source. The source for many of these diseases is in rural areas that practice
animal husbandry , the use of livestock in domestic environments. Because of this epicenter
for disease, rural healthcare is of vital importance to prevent that massive sickness, loss of
life and expense that a pandemic level influenza can cause. When rural peoples become
sick, a significant percentage choose not seek medical attention for a variety of reasons,
primarily due to the mistrust in the medical system, and the cost of medical treatment, even if
the patient has healthcare. Because this individual does not seek medical help, the disease is not
detected early, and no response is taken. The lack of isolation that would occur in properly
equipped facilities leads to more spread in markets and populated areas. From this point, the
costs to control the disease sky rocket. Large measures must be taken to prevent v/idespread
infection. South eastern China appears to be the epicenter of most of these severe
influenzas. In the last 15 years, H5N1 in 1997, SARS in 2003, H1N1 in 2009 and H7N9
currently have all begun in this region of the v/orld. Why is this one region an epicenter for
these highly infectious diseases? In this paper, I will explore the evolution of Chinese healthcare,
and the events that shaped the system today. This healthcare system has several flaws that have
affected the ability of the government to monitor, treat and respond to novel emerging
epidemics. This emergence of pandemic level diseases is largely believed to be a result of societal
practices, namely animal husbandry and the selling of a variety of animals in large scale
markets. This insight implies policy changes and health care initiatives to help stem the tide of
increasing emergence of disease in the globalized world. This issue is no longer a problem that
individual nations must deal with on their own. The cooperation of nations is paramount to
protecting the v/orld health and global populations. The trend towards globalization has raised
the threat of pandemics. With increased global travel comes increased possible infection sites
and 'mixing events' where large, susceptible, groups of people come together in a close
environments for the spread of disease. This is often why airports are the first on alert for travel
advisories; they are the hubs that allow not only people, but viruses and bacteria to escape to the
rest of the world. I v/ill explore the arguments for global cooperation towards preventing
epidemic infections. Preventing pandemics is truly a global public good.
Extinction
Keating, , 2009 (Foreign Policy Web Editor Joshua, The End of the World, 11-13,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/11/13/the_end_of_the_world?page=full
How it could happen: Throughout
history, plagues have brought civilizations to their knees. The Black

Death killed more off more than half of Europe's population in the Middle Ages . In 1918, a flu pandemic
killed an estimated 50 million people, nearly 3 percent of the world's population, a far greater impact than the just-concluded World War I .
Because of globalization, diseases today spread even faster - witness the rapid worldwide spread of H1N1
currently unfolding. A global outbreak of a disease such as ebola virus -- which has had a 90 percent
fatality rate during its flare-ups in rural Africa -- or a mutated drug-resistant form of the flu
virus on a global scale could have a devastating , even civilization-ending impact .How likely is it?
Treatment of deadly diseases has improved since 1918, but so have the diseases. Modern industrial farming
techniques have been blamed for the outbreak of diseases, such as swine flu, and as the worlds population grows and humans
move into previously unoccupied areas, the risk of exposure to previously unknown pathogens
increases. More than 40 new viruses have emerged since the 1970s, including ebola and HIV. Biological weapons experimentation has added a
new and just as
Chinese health care k2 global pandemic

!!Chinese health care system key to stopping global pandemics
Barbadoro 13 http://digitalcollections.sit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=2569&context=isp_collection Barbadorojohn, "The Impact of the Chinese Rural
Healthcare System on Infectious Disease: A Study of the History And Reform of Chinese
Healthcare, And the Global Implications of Infectious Disease Control in China" (2013).
Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection. Paper 1544.
http://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp_collection/1544
China's healthcare system has gone through significant changes in the 20th and 21st centuries.
These changes have mirrored not only the political focus of the time, but also the social issues
facing China. The NRCMCS for rural residents is a cheap annual fee that covers a percentage of
medical costs. There are two urban equivalents, the BMIUE and BMIUR for urban employees
through their job, and residency respectively. Despite the focus on cheaper healthcare for rural
residents, the problems of income inequality and mistrust in the medical system are major
problems that affect the health of this large and rapidly growing nation. A result of the
inefficiencies in Chinese healthcare has resulted in the emergence of several epidemics in South
Eastern China. Avian flu of the mid-20,h century, Bird flu in the 1990s, SARS in 2002, and
currently H7N9 have all emerged in this region of the world. With the advent of globalization,
the spread of infectious disease is now a global problem, one that must promote change in
Chinese healthcare , and healthcare systems around the world to help prevent the spread of
epidemics.
Chinese health care key to stopping future pandemic incubator

Kaufmann 8 J Infect Dis. (2008) 197 (Supplement 1): S7-S13. doi: 10.1086/524990 AIDS
Public Policy Project, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge,
and Heller School for Social Policy and Management, Brandeis University, Waltham,
Massachusetts
The severe acute respiratory syndrome crisis exposed serious deficiencies in China's public
health system and willingness to report outbreaks of threats to public health. Consequently,
China may be one of the weak links in global preparedness for avian influenza. China's
rural health care system has been weakened by 20 years of privatization and fiscal
decentralization. China plays a huge role in the global poultry industry, with a poultry
population of 14 billion birds, 70%80% of which are reared in backyard conditions. Although
surveillance has been strengthened, obstacles to the timely reporting of disease outbreaks still
exist. The weakened health care system prevents many sick people from seeking care at a health
care facility, where reporting would originate. Inadequate compensation to farmers for culled
birds leads to nonreporting, and local officials may be complicit if they suspect that reporting
might lead to economic losses for their communities. At the local level, China's crisismanagement ability and multisectoral coordination are weak. The poor quality of infection
control in many rural facilities is a serious and well-documented problem. However, traditions
of community political mobilization suggest that the potential for providing rural citizens with
public health information is possible when mandated from the central government. Addressing
these issues now and working on capacity issues, authority structures, accountability, and local
reporting and control structures will benefit the control of a potential avian influenza outbreak,
as well as inevitable outbreaks of other emerging infectious diseases in China's Pearl River Delta
or in other densely populated locations of animal husbandry in China.
China k2 pandemics
China key to global pandemic risk
Lyn 5/14/5 http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20050914/local/is-southernchina-the-perfect-incubator-for-bird-flu-pandemic.78262. Reuters staff
Is Southern China the perfect incubator for bird flu pandemic? The little boy jumped on a
crate of clucking chickens as his father called out to him to transfer more birds from a large
enclosure into the crate. In this dank, poultry wholesale market in Guangzhou in southern
China, a woman in the next stall selling ducks chomped on an apple while five bare-chested men
sat down to lunch. All around the humans are cages of live chickens, ducks, geese, rabbits, goats,
pigeons and pheasants - the perfect setting for the H5N1 bird flu virus to mix with other viruses
or mutate into what experts predict would be the next pandemic strain. Once the hybrid is easily
transmissible among people - which experts say will ultimately happen as the virus changes they predict more than 25 million hospital admissions and up to seven million deaths globally
within a short period. At least two of the three pandemics in the last century originated in
southern China. And it seems more than a coincidence that the H5N1 made its first known jump
to humans in 1997 in Hong Kong, which lies in southern China. So why is this region such a
hotbed for new deadly bugs? "A large proportion of the global population is in this region, and
beyond that there is a diversity of animals that are thought to be important in the generation of
these pandemic viruses," Malik Peiris, a microbiologist at the University of Hong Kong who has
worked extensively on the H5N1 virus and SARS, said in an interview. "These include
waterfowl, particularly ducks which are reared in large numbers in this region, pigs and the
fact that poultry, pigs and humans are present in very large numbers and in very close
proximity to each other in this region. Not just China but southeast Asia," said Dr Peiris. Spread
across Guangdong province in southern China are tiny farms, where villagers raise small
numbers of pigs in open sheds. Outside, chickens and ducks are free to roam. "In places where
you have pigs, birds and humans living close to each other, they create the ecology for the
emergence of new strains. In southern China, you can easily see them keeping chickens, water
birds very close to pigs and humans. This environment makes gene reassortment more
likely," said Paul Chan, a microbiologist at the Chinese University. Gene reassortment is the
closest things viruses have to sex. They can swap genes with other viruses, often allowing
them to acquire vastly new abilities overnight. It is a faster way to change than simple mutation
- which could also lead to a new H5N1 strain deadlier to people. The H5N1 strain has haunted
the world since it made its debut in humans in 1997. It is now endemic in parts of Asia, where it
has killed more than 60 people since late 2003. The crisis deepened this year when wild
migratory birds began dying from it in central China and experts have since warned that species
which survive could carry the virus all over Europe and Africa within the next two migrating
seasons. So far, the virus has been detected in regions north of China in Kazakhstan, Russia and
Mongolia. It has also been found in China's southwestern regions of Xinjiang and Tibet, which
hangs just over Nepal and the rest of the Indian subcontinent. But such worries cannot be
farther from the minds of farmers and poultry vendors in southern China, where such
husbandry practices have been handed down for generations. "Sick? I have never been sick!"
snapped the woman at the market as she carried on eating her apple. But health experts
continue to be alarmed and governments around the world have hammered out contingencies in
the event of a pandemic, which is certain to put a stop to all air travel, trade and other aspects of
ordinary life. Dr Chan said the threat of a pandemic has become infinitely larger with the
involvement of migratory birds. "With land birds you can catch and kill them, but with
migratory birds you can't. What we fear is that migratory birds will spread the virus to
poultry (in other parts of the world). Poultry is closest to humans, that's the tipping point ,"
he said. Factbox The H5N1 avian flu virus has killed 63 people in Asia since late 2003. It is one
of 15 known subtypes of bird disease caused by type A strains of the influenza virus. Type-A
avian influenzas were first identified in Italy more than 100 years ago. Here are some facts about
H5N1 avian flu. There are dozens of different known flu strains, named for two particular
proteins that each virus carries. H5N1 refers to an avian flu strain that emerged in Hong Kong in
1997, killing or forcing the destruction of 1.5 million chickens, ducks and geese, infecting 18
people and killing six. The World Health Organisation says the quick slaughter of all potentially
infected birds may have averted a pandemic. H5N1 avian influenza re-emerged in Korea in
2003. It has now been found in birds in Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea,
Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Philippines, Russia, Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam. H5N1 is
considered the biggest direct disease threat to humanity because it mutates rapidly and
also can acquire genes from other viruses, making it a potential human pathogen. Experts
predict that if it acquires the ability to infect people easily and to spread from person to person
efficiently, it would make more than 25 million people seriously ill and would kill as many as
seven million. These numbers could go even higher, according to other models, which show
the virus would make 50 per cent of people where it is circulating ill, and five per cent could die.
All influenza viruses change quickly, which is why the standard flu vaccine must be changed
every year. But H5N1 is particularly good at changing. The fear is it would acquire a key gene
from a flu virus that already easily infects humans and become a highly contagious and deadly
strain. Birds that survive infection with H5N1 excrete virus for at least 10 days, orally and in
faeces, making it highly likely to spread. Migratory birds, usually wild ducks, are the natural
"reservoir" of avian influenza viruses and usually do not become sick when infected. Domestic
poultry, including chickens and turkeys, die quickly when infected.
China key H strains

Chinese bird influenza coming back h7n9
Baragona 3/11/15 http://www.voanews.com/content/influenza-virus-china-pandemicpotential/2676432.html staff, voice of America
Flu Virus in China Has Pandemic Potential , Scientists Say A dangerous influenza virus
spreading in China's live poultry markets has the potential to become a worldwide
pandemic, researchers say. They are calling for these markets to be permanently closed to
protect global public health. H7N9 flu has infected roughly 650 people, mostly in China. Almost
all of those patients had contact with poultry. Nearly 40 percent of them have died, an unusually
high rate for influenza. Those who died generally had other medical problems. While the virus
does not spread easily from person to person, experts say the more opportunity the virus has to
evolve, the greater the chances it will get better at infecting people. In a study in Nature,
researchers found H7N9 influenza virus in chickens at markets in several southern Chinese
cities that had been unaffected in the first wave of the outbreak in 2013. They also found the
virus had evolved since then into at least three subtypes, including exchanging some genetic
material with H9N2 virus, a strain that spreads fairly easily from person to person. Yi Guan,
director of the University of Hong Kong Center of Influenza Research, noted that it took just two
years for H7N9 to infect nearly 650 people. By contrast, it took more than 10 years for H5N1
known commonly as bird flu to infect about 800 people. If you compare these numbers, you
will know this virus is even more dangerous than H5N1, Guan said. Experts are concerned that
this virus could spark a pandemic because people have not been exposed to it before and
therefore have not had the opportunity to build up immunity. Scientists are looking for evidence
that H7N9 has been circulating undetected, said Greg Poland, director of vaccine research at the
Mayo Clinic. Theyre not finding it. So, it is a novel virus for humans, he said.
H1n1 pig diseases spreading

Kimball, 15 PHD, Tufts University Professor in immunology, as well as Harvard
[John W., 6/8/15, Kimballs Biology Pages, The "Flu",
http://users.rcn.com/jkimball.ma.ultranet/BiologyPages/I/Influenza.html, accessed 9/15/15]
A new H1N1 flu began infecting humans in North America in April 2009 and has now spread
throughout much of the world. Sequencing its genome revealed a novel virus now called
A(H1N1)pdm09 that contained genes previously found in four different strains of swine flu:
an HA gene (H1) derived from the swine flu of 1930 (and closely-related to the H1 of the great
1918 "Spanish" flu pandemic) along with an NP and NS gene from that virus; an NA gene (N1)
from a virus that had been circulating in the pigs of Europe and Asia since 1979 along with the M
gene from that virus; a PA and PB2 gene that entered pigs from birds around 1998; a PB1 gene
that passed from birds to humans around 1968 and from us to pigs around 1998. Why this
remarkable assortment of genes has enabled he virus to jump so successfully from pigs to
humans remains to be determined. The amino acid sequence around the critical epitopes of its
H1 molecules closely resemble those found in the resurrected 1918 flu virus. This would explain
why antibodies from elderly survivors of the 1918 pandemic neutralize the new swine flu virus.
Antibodies (raised in mice) to the new swine flu virus neutralize the resurrected 1918 flu virus.
The recent pandemic caused serious illness and death mostly in young adults and least in
children and the elderly. As for the elderly, this contrast to the usual pattern arose because
people over 65, even if not old enough to have been exposed to the 1918 virus, had been exposed
to H1 viruses that until 1957 had only drifted from the original 1918 virus, and thus they had
developed partial immunity. The antibodies in young adults were specific for seasonal flu strains
circulating since 1957. These were unable to protect them against the 2009 virus but may have
formed damaging immune complexes with them. Youngsters had no anti-flu antibodies and did
not form such immune complexes. "Bird Flu" Many influenza A viruses are found in birds, both
domestic and wild. Most of these cause little or no illness in these hosts. However, some of their
genes can enter viruses able to infect domestic animals, as was the case for the PA and PB2
genes of the swine flu of 2009 (above). On several occasions, bird flu viruses have also infected
humans, often with alarmingly-high fatality rates. In 2003, human cases of an H7N7 bird flu
virus infection occurred in the Netherlands, and in the same year an H5N1 bird virus caused
human cases in large areas of Asia. Most of the human cases seemed to have been acquired from
contact with infected birds rather than from human-to-human transmission. And now in 2013, a
new bird flu virus, H7N9, has appeared in humans in China. By the end of the summer of 2013,
it had caused 135 observed cases (no one knows yet whether there may also be infected people
who are not sick enough to show up at hospitals). 45 of the observed cases were fatal. The
victims appear to have been infected through contact with infected poultry with little or no
evidence of human-to-human transmission. As a glance at the tables above will show, humans
have had long experience with infections and vaccines by both H1 and H3 flu viruses. But the
human population has absolutely no immunity against any H7 viruses. If this virus
develops the capability to spread efficiently from human to human, it could lead to another
worldwide pandemic.
Flu Key
Pandemic flu is dangerous and unpredictable unpredecented
evolution in the squo.
Taubenberger and Morens 10 (2010, Jeffrey, MD, PhD, Chief of the Viral
Pathogenesis and Evolution Section, Laboratory of Infectious Diseases, National Institute of
Allergy and Infectious Diseases, NIH, with Ann Reid, he was the first to sequence the genome of
the 1918 pandemic of Spanish flu, and David, MD, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases, NIH, Influenza: The Once and Future Pandemic, Public Health Rep. 2010;
125(Suppl 3): 1626)
The next pandemic

No one predicted the
H1N1
pandemic with current knowledge we doubt that
anyone will be able to accurately predict any future pandemic either including when or
where it will occur, what subtype it will be, and what morbidity/mortality impact it will have
While concern over
H5N1
is clearly warranted
many other
possibilities
must also be anticipated and planned for
emergence of the 2009
swine-origin
virus;
the emergence of an
pandemic
, if for no other reason than its current high case fatality rate,
for future pandemic emergence
The majority of the world's population

has no protective immunity to the
influenza that circulated between 1957 and 1968 Isolates of H2N2
are still maintained
in countless laboratory freezers while
H3N2
remain susceptible to importation
of avian H2
this suggests obvious potential origins of future pandemics
H9N2
already capable of causing human disease are another potential
source
(those younger than age 41)
viruses
H2 subtype-bearing
circulating human-adapted
viruses from that era
viruses presumably
by reassortment;
. Current
viruses, some with the ability to bind to human receptors, and
of a future pandemic.
Since 1977, H1N1 and H3N2 viruses have co-circulated to produce seasonal epidemics that
cause an average of 36,000 deaths annually in the U.S.
recent data have made it clear
that evolution
occurs not just by gradual antigenic drift but also intra-clade
reassortment
which creates,
novel
constellations of viral gene segments
globally
72 Moreover,
of circulating human influenza viruses
by
resulting in the importation of new HAs of the same subtype to which there is a lesser degree of population immunity, and
at the same time,
.7375 It is unclear whether the 2009 pandemic H1N1 virus will replace the seasonal H1N1 and H3N2 lineages, or co-circulate with them. It is also unclear whether
continued co-circulation and accelerated evolution of different post-pandemic viruses, coupled with the growing use of influenza vaccines against them, will increase or decrease future pandemic risk or influence the HA or NA subtype of the next pandemic virus. The
co-circulation of post-pandemic H1 and H3

unprecedented
viruses
for three consecutive decades seems
to be
over the past 125 to 160 years. If only H1, H2, or H3 viruses have pandemic potential, the question arises whether such co-circulation limits, in the future, the next pandemic to only H2 viruses. At present there are no data to
answer such a question; however, over the past several decades the dogma regarding pandemics has been so radically overturned that it is now important to rethink and restudy all aspects of this issue.
The past decade has demonstrated how difficult it is to contain HPAI outbreaks given highintensity poultry production and movement
between countries H5N1 are likely to
remain enzootic
in many countries indefinitely This poses numerous agricultural and
economic problems While it might provide an opportunity for H5N1 viruses to acquire efficient
human-to-human transmission
it might, on the other hand, provide a better
opportunity for viruses to adapt to poultry and wild birds, the chief spill-over hosts The use of
antiviral drugs in agricultural settings has made many H5N1 viruses resistant to
adamantanes, while there has also been evidence for H5N1 resistance to neuraminidase
inhibitors The evolution of H5N1 into antigenically distinct clades
greatly
complicates the situation and makes it more difficult to predict
,
the
in domestic bird populations
of poultry
. The
viruses
(if such a change is in fact possible),
.76
, probably driven in part by the use of poultry vaccines,
where H5N1 evolution is going, what to expect next, and how to plan for it.6
Understanding and predicting pandemic emergence is a difficult challenge that we are far from
being able to meet
Planning efforts must consider a range of possibilities that cannot yet be prioritized
and must also address unpredictable ranges of pandemic morbidity and mortality
impacts
there is a need for strong basic public health
approaches to pandemic control.
in 2010. As our understanding of influenza viruses has increased dramatically in recent decades, we have moved ever further from certainty about the determinants of, and possibilities for, pandemic emergence.
in terms of their likelihood,
. Until such time as universal influenza vaccines77 or better drug treatments become available,78
at burnout
Killing millions is still pretty bad
No ev before Nov. 2008 proved that burnout isnt universal in
mammals.
Keim 08 (11/5, Brandon, Wired, citing research by Marcus Gilbert, PhD in Zoology,
Assistant Professor at the University of Copenhagen, Professor of Palaeogenomics at the
University of Copenhagen's Natural History Museum of Denmark, member of the Centre for
Geogenetics at Copenhagen University, Paula Campos, Assistant Professor, University of
Copenhagen, Centre for GeoGenetics, Sergios Kolokotronis, PhD, Assistant Professor of
Biological Science, Fordham University, et al., Disease Can Cause Extinction of Mammals,
http://www.wired.com/2008/11/yes-disease-can/)
DISEASE CAN DRIVE a mammal species to extinction : this doesnt seem surprising, but until today it
hadnt been proven. And now that it has, members of our own mammalian species might
understandably feel uneasy.
The extinction in question took place a century ago on Christmas Island, an uninhabited Indian Ocean atoll to which a merchant ship inadvertently
carried flea-ridden black rats. Within a decade, both of the islands native rat species were extinct.
Scientists have argued whether the native rats were outcompeted by the newcomers, or fell victim to
diseases carried by the fleas. According to DNA analysis of remaining native rat specimens, infection was
widespread within the population after contact, and nonexistent before suggesting that disease
caused the die-off.
Resolving this argument has implications for another debate, over the hypothesis that disease
can be so lethal and contagious as to drive a mammal species extinct . This had been
observed in snails and amphibians, but not in mammals.
The authors of the study, published today in Public Library of Science ONE, hope conservationists will take heed:
accidentally-intrduced pathogens could wipe out endangered species. But to me, the findings also
have human implications . Some would say that the rats were vulnerable because they lived
on an island; but the Earth is an island, too .
Burnout is wrong
Kerscher 14 (2014, Karl-Heinz, PhD, Professor, Space Education, Wissenschaftliche
Studie, 2014, 92 Seiten)
The death toll for a pandemic is equal to the virulence , the deadliness of the pathogen or pathogens,
multiplied by the number of people eventually infected. It has been hypothesized that there is an
upper limit to the virulence of naturally evolved pathogens. This is because a pathogen that quickly
kills its hosts might not have enough time to spread to new ones, while one that kills its hosts
more slowly or not at all will allow carriers more time to spread the infection , and thus likely out-compete a
more lethal species or strain. This simple model predicts that if virulence and transmission are not
linked in any way, pathogens will evolve towards low virulence and rapid transmission . However, this
assumption is not always valid and in more complex models, where the level of virulence and the
rate of transmission are related, high levels of virulence can evolve. The level of virulence that is
possible is instead limited by the existence of complex populations of hosts , with different susceptibilities to
infection, or by some hosts being geographically isolated. The size of the host population and competition between different strains
of pathogens can also alter virulence. There
are numerous historical examples of pandemics that have had

a devastating effect on a large number of people, which makes the possibility of global
pandemic a realistic threat to human civilization.
xt no burnout
No burnout empirical evidence and genetics.
Wolfe 11 (2011, Nathan, PhD in Immunology and Infectious Disease from Harvard, Chief
Executive Officer of Global Viral Forecasting and the Lorry I. Lokey Visiting Professor in Human
Biology at Stanford University, Director of Global Viral, receipient of the NIH Director's Pioneer
Award, The Viral Storm, p. 29-31)
The majority of microbes that cause infection in humans are relatively harmless but some have a
striking capacity to make us sick
,
. This can sometimes be expressed in the form of, say, a common cold (caused by a rhinovirus or adenovirus) but can also manifest itself in life-threating illnesses such as
smallpox.
Deadly microbes are a consistent challenge to evolutionary biologists because of their

paradoxical habit of eviscerating habitats upon which they depend for their own survival.
Yet the process of evolution occurs largely at the level of the individual or
even the gene. Evolution does not proceed with forethought
virally induced extinction events have undoubtedly occurred throughout the history of
interactions with microbes, no matter the ultimate cost for virus or host
Its analogous to a
bird destroying the forest in which it and its descendants live.
, and theres nothing to stop a virus from spreading in such a way that leads to a dead end. Such
More central from the perspective of a virus is the impact of disease on transmission
. As we learned in the
introduction, on average, each germ must infect at least one new victim for every old one who either dies or recovers and purges himself of the microbe in order to avoid extinction. This is the rule of the basic reproductive number, or R0. If the average number of
Since microbes generally cant walk or fly from one host to the
next they often strategically alter their host to help in their spread
Microbes often make us cough or sneeze
suffer from
diarrhea
or cause open sores
new victims per old victims drops to less than one, then the spread of the microbe is doomed.
. From the perspective of a bug, a symptom can be an all-important means of
enlisting our help in moving itself around.
, which can permit them to spread through our exhaled breath,
, which can spread microbes through local water supplies,
to appear on our skin, which can spread through skin-to-skin contact. In these cases its obvious why a microbe would trigger
these generally unpleasant symptoms. Unpleasant symptoms are one thing, but killer microbes are quite another.
Keeping its host alive and pumping out new microbes would seem to be an ideal plan for a bug
And some bugs do certainly employ such a strategy
HPV infects around 50
percent of sexually active adults at some point
while
a few strains of HPV cause cervical cancer, most do not. Those strains that do kill their hosts
infect them for many year
.
. Human papillomavirus, or
during their lifetimes. It currently infects around 10 percent of people on the planet, a staggering 650 million people. And
s before showing any symptoms at all. Even if the current vaccines that protect against the cancer-causing HPV variants were deployed universally, harmless HPV strains would continue to
circulate at huge levels with an impact no greater than occasional if unsightly warts. These viruses can spread effectively without killing. Yet other bugs kill with startling efficiency.
Bacillus anthracis
causes anthrax infection, which kills
quickly and effectively
anthrax reactivates and spreads rapidly
throughout the animal, often killing it in short order. But this dead host is by no means a
dead end
anthrax simply goes back into spore form
, a bacterial pathogen of grazing animals like sheep and cattle that occasionally infects humans,
. Following ingestion of anthrax spores during grazing,
. After using the energetic resources of its dying host to replicate in massive numbers,
. Wind, a common feature of the
grassy plains of the grazing hosts, then spreads the spores throughout the environment, where they can wait for new prospective victims to arrive. In the case of anthrax, creating hardy spores frees the bug from any negative consequences of its destruction.
Such situations are not limited to spore-forming bacteria cholera bacterium

and the smallpox virus
both kill in only days or weeks. But before the deaths
take place, the deadly symptoms spread trillions of microbes to potential new victims Human
deaths
represent a mere consequence
. The
diarrhea,
, which gives us
, which causes severe viral disease,
, while unfortunate to us,
of the conditions the bugs need to get to their next hosts.
From the perspective of a bug the impact on its host is only measured in its ability to survive and
reproduce altering our physical bodies is just the beginning. Some microbes also influence our
behavior,
One of the most striking examples comes from
Toxoplasma
gondii
This parasite has found a
. And
effectively making us zombies acting in their benefit.
. While toxo, as parasitologists refer to it, can infect a range of mammals from humans to rodents, its life cycle cannot be completed until it lands in a cat.
a feline parasite,
frighteningly effective way to get home when it ends up in the wrong mammal
the
parasite spreads to the nervous system of infected, unsuspecting rodents and hijacks their
brains .
. Careful studies have documented how
Sometime after infection, having spent much of their life steering clear of cats, mice begin to see them as positively enticing. This fatal attraction leads to a dead mouse, but also a toxo cyst that has the potential to complete its life cycle in the
newly infected, not to mention, satiated, cat.
Truly deadly diseases must strike a balance between the likelihood of causing death in its victim
once the victim is infected and their efficacy in terms of allowing the victim to spread the disease
to others
they can kill and spread quickly ,
infecting dozens of new victims in the course of a day , as in the case of smallpox and
cholera.
. You cant generally have your cake and eat it, tooproducing many microbes in a host increases the chance that theyll spread but also harms the host. Consequently, microbes sometimes use very different methods to cause devastation.
They can keep the carrier alive for a long time, which carries the potential to infect multiple victims over many months or years, as in the case of the HPV virus. Or
More ev burnout isnt always true

McCallum 12 (2012, Hamish, PhD, DIC, Professor, Griffith School of Environment,
Griffith University, expertise in ecology of infectious diseases, conservation biology, and
quantitative ecology,Disease and the dynamics of extinction, Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 19 October
2012 vol. 367 no. 1604 2828-2839)
Abstract
Invading infectious diseases can, in theory, lead to the extinction of host populations ,
particularly if reservoir species are present or if disease transmission is frequencydependent . The number of historic or prehistoric extinctions that can unequivocally be attributed to
infectious disease is relatively small, but gathering firm evidence in retrospect is extremely
difficult. Amphibian chytridiomycosis and Tasmanian devil facial tumour disease (DFTD) are two very different
infectious diseases that are currently threatening to cause extinctions in Australia. These provide an unusual
opportunity to investigate the processes of disease-induced extinction and possible management strategies. Both diseases are apparently recent in origin. Tasmanian DFTD is
entirely host-specific but potentially able to cause extinction because transmission depends weakly , if at all, on host
density. Amphibian chytridiomycosis has a broad host range but is highly pathogenic only to some populations
of some species. At present, both diseases can only be managed by attempting to isolate individuals or populations from disease. Management options to accelerate the process of evolution of host resistance or
movement of diseases and hosts, habitat destruction and

fragmentation and climate change are likely to increase emerging disease threats to biodiversity
tolerance are being investigated in both cases. Anthropogenic changes including
and it is critical to further develop strategies to manage these threats.

1. Introduction
The role of infectious disease in the history of human society is well known. In contrast, until the pioneering
work of Anderson and May [14] in the late 1970s, the perception among most ecologists was that welladapted parasites do not harm their hosts . The role of infectious disease as a driver of host
population dynamics was therefore underappreciated, and infectious diseases or parasites were
rarely considered as significant extinction threatening processes .
simple models show that parasites and infectious diseases may , in some circumstances, be capable of
being significant contributors to extinction [5]. From first principles, a population declines when there are more deaths than there are births and extinction
occurs when there continue to be more deaths than births even as the population declines towards zero. It is therefore necessary to first distinguish between
situations in which infectious disease may reduce population size to such an extent that other
factors may lead to extinction and cases in which infectious disease contributes to there being an
excess of deaths over births even in a vanishingly small population.
In theory, however,
The most fundamental concept in epidemiology is the basic reproductive number, R0, which is the number of secondary infections per primary infection when disease is introduced into a naive population [6,7].
For many (but not all) pathogens or parasites, R0 is an increasing or saturating function of population size or density [8], leading to the existence of a threshold host population size below which the pathogen
cannot persist.
The simplest host pathogen models are those in which there is a single host and a single pathogen, no spatial structure, and transmission occurs as a binary collision process between infected and susceptible hosts.
In this situation, R0 is directly proportional to host population size, which means that at a sufficiently small population size R0 will decrease to below one and the pathogen will no longer be able to persist in the
a pathogen maybe able to

reduce a population to a sufficiently low level that other factors may lead to the
ultimate extinction of the host.
host population. A host-specific pathogen should therefore itself become extinct before it is capable of driving its sole host to extinction [9]. However, such
Sexually transmitted diseases are particularly likely to have severe effects on their host population and potentially to be able to cause host extinction. Not only are they often transmitted in a frequency-dependent
rather than in a density-dependent fashion [10,11], meaning that R0 depends weakly, if at all, on host density, but also in many cases they affect fecundity rather than mortality. Whereas very high mortality
reduces R0 because infected animals are rapidly removed from the population, a reproductively suppressed host may remain in the population for an extended period, continuing to spread infection. The number
of sexually transmitted diseases in non-human animals is much larger than is commonly supposed [12] and they may be important drivers of extinction.
Finally, in many populations where disease is an important threatening process, it is one of several multiple stressors. For example, many local populations of the koala Phascolarctos cinereus are affected by
chlamydia (Chlamydia pecorum and Chlamydia pneumoniae [13]), which is primarily sexually transmitted, causing both reproductive suppression through cystitis and increased mortality through
keratoconjunctivitis-related blindness [1315]. However, while prevalence in a population of clinical signs of chlamydia does appear to be associated with lower koala recruitment, it may be a relatively weak
predictor of overall population change (figure 1), suggesting that other factors may be more important in driving population dynamics. It seems that chlamydia is particularly important in combination with
multiple stressors such as habitat loss and distress caused by overbrowsing [17].
2. Role of disease in historical and prehistoric extinctions
Verifying that infectious disease has been responsible for a historical or prehistoric extinction is
difficult. The extinct host is, of course, no longer available for any experimental work and it is rare for good-quality data to have been collected as the species involved was in terminal decline. Further, the
mere presence of a pathogen or parasite in a declining host population is not evidence that the parasite was a significant contributor to decline.
In some cases, the role of infectious disease in extinction is nevertheless fairly clear . There is
very good evidence that avian malaria and birdpox were responsible for the extinction of a
substantial proportion of the Hawaiian avifauna in the late nineteenth century [18,19]. While there is no direct evidence that any of the 25 [18] species of
Hawaiian land birds that have become extinct since the documented arrival of Culex quinquefasciatus in 1826 [19] were even susceptible to malaria and there is limited anecdotal information suggesting they were
affected by birdpox [19], the observation that several remaining species only persist either on islands where there are no mosquitoes or at altitudes above those at which mosquitoes can breed and that these same
species are highly susceptible to avian malaria and birdpox [18,19] is certainly very strong circumstantial evidence. An important contributor to the potential of avian malaria and birdpox to cause extinctions of
highly susceptible species is the existence of a range of birds in Hawaii, both native and non-native, that are able to tolerate infections with these pathogens and therefore act as reservoirs [20,21].
A second example of extinction of an island species in which disease is strongly implicated is less
commonly known. The formerly abundant endemic rats Rattus macleari and Rattus nativitas disappeared from
Christmas Island in the Indian Ocean (1029 S 10538 E) around the turn of the twentieth century. Their
disappearance was apparently abrupt, and shortly before the final collapse sick individuals were
seen crawling along footpaths [22]. At that time, trypanosomiasis transmitted by fleas from introduced black rats R. rattus was suggested as the causative agent. Recently, Wyatt
et al. [22] managed to isolate trypanosome DNA from both R. rattus and R. macleari specimens collected during the period of decline, whereas no trypanosome DNA was present in R. nativitas specimens collected
before the arrival of black rats. While this is good circumstantial evidence, direct evidence that trypanosomes caused the mortality is limited, except that the one specimen described at the time of collection as
As with the Hawaiian birds, the role of a reservoir species

able to tolerate infection, in this case the introduced black rat, is critical.
suffering trypanosome infection did in fact test positive for trypanosome DNA.
Tons of counterexamples burnout is bullshit.

McCallum 12 (2012, Hamish, PhD, DIC, Professor, Griffith School of Environment,
Griffith University, expertise in ecology of infectious diseases, conservation biology, and
quantitative ecology,Disease and the dynamics of extinction, Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 19 October
2012 vol. 367 no. 1604 2828-2839)
In most cases, there will be multiple

stressors contributing to decline , such as habitat destruction and fragmentation or overexploitation. Chytridiomycosis is
unusual in that it has led to declines in frog species in otherwise pristine environments . Although there have been
It is relatively unusual for infectious disease to be the sole cause of endangerment for a species [34].
suggestions that climate change has been responsible for increasing the impact of the disease in central and South America [118], this hypothesis has not stood up to detailed
Tasmanian DFTD is threatening a species that, until the appearance of disease, appeared to be
secure and increasing in numbers. However, extremely low genetic diversity, possibly as a result of a previous selective sweep [47,73], has
analysis [119].
predisposed the species to be susceptible to an allograft.
Loss of genetic diversity and pathogen pollution are increasing, with concomitant increase
in risk of novel disease threats . The effects of anthropogenic climate change on infectious
diseases are complex [120], but climate change is likely to lead to disease emergence in at least
some cases [121], including through host range shifts and changes in migration patterns [122]. While
approaches to address these threats are being developed, the range of tools currently available is limited. There is an urgent need both to address the factors likely to cause
disease emergence in wildlife populations and to develop new approaches to manage the
disease threats to biodiversity that will inevitably
arise in the future.
Recent empirical analysis disproves burnout.

MacPhee and Greenwood 13 (2013, Ross, PhD, former chairman of the Department
of Mammalogy at the American Museum of Natural History, where he has been a Curator since
1988, and Alex, PhD, Head of Department at the Leibniz Institute for Zoo and Wildlife
Research, Department of Wildlife Diseases, Germany, Virology and Evolutionary Biology,
Infectious Disease, Endangerment, and Extinction, International Journal of Evolutionary
Biology Volume 2013 (2013), Article ID 571939, 9 pages)
Abstract
Infectious disease, especially virulent infectious disease, is commonly regarded as a cause of fluctuation
or decline in biological populations. However, it is not generally considered as a primary factor in
causing the actual endangerment or extinction of species. We review here the known historical examples in which disease has,
or has been assumed to have had, a major deleterious impact on animal species, including extinction, and highlight some recent
cases in which disease is the chief suspect in causing the outright endangerment of particular species. We conclude that the
role of disease in historical extinctions at the population or species level may have been
underestimated . Recent methodological breakthroughs may lead to a better
understanding of the past and present roles of infectious disease in influencing population
fitness and other parameters.
Surveillance key
Surveillance key to bioterror and global pandemic responses.
Kman and Bachmann 12 (2012, Nicholas, MD, Associate Professor of Emergency
Medicine, Ohio Task Force 1-FEMA Urban Search and Rescue, Department of Emergency
Medicine, The Ohio State University Medical Center, and Daniel, MD, Emergency Medicine, The
Ohio State University Medical Center, Biosurveillance: A Review and Update, Advances in
Preventive Medicine, Volume 2012 (2012), Article ID 301408, 9 pages,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2012/301408)
Surveillance is recognized as the single most important public health instrument for
identifying public health events of global concern, particularly infectious diseases that are
emerging [3]. Not only is the use of surveillance helpful for bioterror attacks , but also the
information generated by surveillance systems is also useful in the recognition and response to emerging
infectious diseases . These epidemics are not related to traditional bioterror agents but their
public health significance can be equally alarming . The recent H1N1 Influenza outbreak is a prime example of this.
The four functions of basic surveillance include (1) detecting cases of disease in specific populations and reporting the
information, (2) analyzing and confirming reported case information to detect outbreaks, (3) providing timely and appropriate
responses at the local/regional level to allow appropriate national level prevention and control of disease outbreaks, and (4) providing epidemiologic
intelligence information to assist in long-term management of public health and health-care policies and programs [3].
Surveillance in health care refers to the continual systematic collection, analysis, interpretation,
and dissemination of data [4]. Early methods of public health surveillance have been passive and
voluntary. This process occurred when patients were diagnosed with a reportable communicable disease and local health departments were notified by clinicians, hospitals, or laboratories. Time would
pass as information meandered through local and state health departments. Although many of the key components of surveillance occur at the local level, it takes many working
parts for this to occur in a timely fashion .
Passive surveillance is an important component to global biosurveillance. It has the advantages of being inexpensive, easy to implement, and free of technologic barriers. However, it likely is not rapid and accurate
enough to be used alone to respond to a bioterrorist attack. Passive surveillance is used best with other methods to quickly identify the treat and institute public health protection measures such as immunization,
prophylaxis, and quarantine.
Active surveillance is the method of tracking emerging infectious disease threats. Active surveillance involves outreach to actively collect disease information from specific groups, such as sentinel medical
providers or hospitals. Typically, active surveillance is undertaken to look for a specific disease. Active surveillance is more labor intensive and requires more public health resources than passive surveillance [5].
Systems for bioterrorism surveillance for public health require 3 key features : timeliness, high
sensitivity and specificity, and routine analysis of data [1]. Timeliness of diagnosis is vital
as the effectiveness of most treatments hinges on early detection . To this end, the electronic collection
and reporting of surveillance data has improved detection as compared with manual methods [1].
High sensitivity is necessary as , without this, systems may fail to detect cases of
bioterrorism-related illness which could result in delays in detection. On the opposite end, systems with
inadequate specificity may have frequent false alarms, which will result in costly public health responses. Using the example of a food-borne illness
outbreak, a system with low sensitivity may miss the sentinel cases and not identify the trend until the outbreak is already widespread. This compromises the ability of the surveillance system to adequately mount
an effective public health response to the outbreak. Using the same example, a system with low specificity may identify cases which are not truly related to an outbreak resulting in an unnecessary public health
response with diversion of resources from other true outbreaks. Sensitivity and specificity are typically inversely related such that optimization of one characteristic is at some expense to the other. Striking the
optimal balance between these two characteristics for any given surveillance system is difficult [1].
Advanced surveillance key to disease containment.

Choffnes 08 (2008, Eileen, PhD, Scholar and the Director of the Institute of Medicines
Forum on Microbial Threats, former Senior Scientist and science policy advisor to the Assistant
Administrator for the EPAs Office of Prevention, Pesticides and Toxic Substances as well as the
Department of Energys chemical and biological non-proliferation program, Improving
infectious disease surveillance, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, http://thebulletin.org/improvinginfectious-disease-surveillance-0)
The advance of human civilization has brought people, plants, animals, and microbes together
in otherwise improbable combinations and locations. Today, international travel and
commerce (most notably the explosive growth of commercial air transportation during the past 50 years) drives the
rapid, global distribution of microbial pathogens, and the organisms that harbor them.
These include humans, whose migrations have been implicated in the spread of diseases including SARS, drug-resistant malaria, and chikungunya (a vectorborne viral disease) in Europe. Indeed, it is possible to travel between most places in the world in less time than
the incubation period for many infectious diseases. Travel has not only become increasingly
rapid, but also more pervasive in once-remote areas that serve as both sources and sinks for emerging infectious diseases.
Newly emerging and re-emerging diseases highlight the need for a systems approach to
domestic and global disease surveillance and detection . Since 2003, highly pathogenic avian
influenza has spread across 60 countries, killing millions of birds and 238 of 378 infected
people. Yet, disease surveillance and detection still rely heavily on the astute individual : the clinician,
veterinarian, grower, livestock manager, or agricultural extension agent who notices something "unusual" and brings it to the attention of officials. While most developed
countries have some type of national surveillance system and the ability to detect and diagnose human, animal, and plant diseases, many developing countries have insufficient
resources or infrastructure to support such activities. In these places, disease detection relies first on the local level and is entirely dependent upon the early recognition of both
The catch is that there is a dearth of these "astute" individuals in many areas of the
known and novel infectious diseases.

world that are incubators for emerging infectious diseases.
Technological advances in disease surveillance and detection --such as regional syndromic surveillance,
bioinformatics, and rapid diagnostic methods--have contributed to infectious disease control and prevention .
Containing the spread of disease , in a profoundly interconnected world, however, requires
active vigilance for signs of an outbreak, rapid characterization of its geographic range,
definition of the causative disease agent(s), as well as strategies and resources for an appropriate and efficient
response. These challenges--often viewed in terms of human public health--are shared by the plant and animal health communities.
Key to contain emerging disesases and bioterrorism

Castillo-Salgado 10 (2010, Carlos, MD, DrPh, JD, Professor at Johns Hopkins
Bloomberg School of Public Health, Trends and Directions of Global Public Health
Surveillance, Epidemiol Rev, doi: 10.1093/epirev/mxq008)
there were important debates on the future direction of global surveillance ,

particularly in light of the 3 key global factors : 1) the constant emergence of new diseases and
pathogens and the reemergence of conditions that were under public health control; 2) the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in New York City and the
During the revision of the IHR,
threats of bioterrorism in other cities around the globe; and 3) the unprecedented expansion of the Internet and
information technology .
during the last decades, 20 well-known diseasesincluding
tuberculosis, malaria, and cholerahave reemerged and spread globally, often in more virulent
and drug-resistant forms . In addition, it has been reported that at least 30 previously unknown disease agents have
been identified, including HIV, Ebola hemorrhagic fever, hepatitis C, Lyme disease, Nipah virus, West Nile virus, s evere a cute
r espiratory s yndrome, avian flu virus, and influenza A (H1N1) virus, for which no adequate treatments are available.
According to different scientists, agencies, and organizations (3344),
Jones et al. (45) published an extensive and enlightening analysis of the emergence and trends of 335 new infectious
diseases, called emerging infectious disease events. They reported that most of these were zoonoses (60.3%),
that the majority (71.8%) originated in wildlife, and that they were increasing significantly over time. They also indicated that the peak incidence of these emerging
infectious disease events occurred in the 1980s concomitant with the HIV pandemic. The results of this study suggested that the origins of emerging infectious disease events are significantly correlated with
socioeconomic, environmental, and ecologic factors, providing a basis for identifying regions where new emerging infectious disease events are most likely to originate.
As more than 60% of the new emerging diseases causing devastating outbreaks have their source in interactions between animals and humans, an innovative way to identify a predictive landscape of emerging
Mapping hot spots for emerging

diseases has proved to be a useful insight of the distribution of the factors that affect the
emergence of zoonotic diseases. In 2009, the US Agency for International Development (46, 47) launched its multi-million dollar Emerging Pandemic Threats program as a
communicable diseases is to use data related to human and animal interactions and environmental and spatial sociodemographic data.
major global initiative to preempt or combat, at their source, newly emerging diseases of animal origin that might threaten human health. This program includes 5 interconnected projects. The 5 projects are
described as follows: 1) PREDICT (a 5-year agreement of leading global experts in wildlife surveillance to monitor for and increase the local capacity in mapping geographic hot spots to identify the emergence of
new communicable diseases in high-risk wildlife); 2) RESPOND (a 5-year agreement of private and academic institutions with the objective of training in outbreak investigation and response linking animal and
human disease detection and control); 3) IDENTIFY (an agreement with the World Health Organization, Food and Agriculture Organization, and the World Organization for Animal Health supporting the
development of laboratory networks and strengthening diagnostic capacities for new emerging zoonotic diseases); 4) PREVENT (a 5-year agreement with an education agency and private sector to develop better
communication strategies and behavior change responses to modify high-risk practices that affect the potential of new disease threats from wildlife); and 5) PREPARE (a 5-year agreement awarded to a
humanitarian, nonprofit organization to provide technical cooperation and support for national, regional, and local pandemic preparation to help countries in improving their capacity to respond to pandemic
events).
This new overreaching program illustrates the relevant role that is placed on monitoring and surveillance of wildlife at the global scale. More communication and coordination among veterinary and human
epidemiologists are needed for the success of these new global surveillance initiatives.
The current, observed trends of communicable diseases and chronic illness, natural disasters,
violence, and bioterrorism present an unprecedented challenge for global health , particularly as they are occurring
at the time of one of the most difficult economic global crises in recent history. As a consequence of globalization, the world today is more
interconnected by means of transportation and faster communication , and this has resulted in
new patterns of travel and migration. Borders have become open, not only for the circulation of
newly emerging and reemerging infectious disease pathogens but also for copying healthy and unhealthy communities behaviors and
individuals lifestyles. Global health surveillance is an important mechanism for detecting changes
in the epidemiologic patterns of both emerging and reemerging diseases and allows for the
detection of outbreaks , hot spots of diseases, or any public health risks , including
those introduced by bioterrorism .
Surveillance is key to effective public health response

surveillance refers to the systematic and ongoing collection, analysis,

dissemination, and sharing of relevant information related to public health events of international importance to assist in deploying
In the context of global health,
specific public health and security responses.
Surveillance is also recognized as the single most important public health instrument for
identifying public health events of global concern, particularly infectious diseases that are emerging.
Global health surveillance is essential to estimate the burden distribution and trends over time
of health events causing serious public health risks and problems. Surveillance is especially
important for the prompt identification of outbreaks and their source , which is crucial in the
effective public health response needed in all affected countries. The new global surveillance also
supports greater global health security assessments and control practices .
Expert consensus
With the transition from the 20th century into the 21st century, international travel, trade, and
commerce as core dimensions of globalization have become key forces in reshaping public health at the national and
international levels. Globalization and global health are terms being used persistently during the new millennium, as illustrated by an enormous cadre of new publications, such
as the World Health Organization's Global Burden of Disease (1, 2), the Institute of Medicine's reports on global health (3, 4), and the explosion of multiple new global health
entities, such as global health initiatives and funds (57), global health commissions (8, 9), global health alliances such as the Global Health Council (10), creation of new global
health departments in more academic institutions, launching of new global health journals (1113), anthologies in global health (1416), and even the creation of global health
television (17).
There is consensus among the public health community that one of the most relevant
essential functions in global health is global health surveillance . In the last few years, global
epidemiologic surveillance has been the subject of a major revision and overhaul . Global
surveillance has been reshaped by important changes in the new International Health
Regulations (18, 19) and the rapid development of new global public health networks for disease surveillance and bioterrorism (20, 21). These networks
provide for the first time at the global scale real-time information about potential outbreaks and epidemics of newly
emerging and reemerging infectious diseases. In addition, critical information for selected diseases and public health risks
is now systematically collected and uploaded to the Internet for documenting the escalating environmental pressures,
monitoring current human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) and influenza pandemics, identifying
hot spots for natural and human-made disasters, and recognizing potential bioterrorist threats around the world. Most of
this information is now available for the consultation of the professional community but also has
been made accessible to the general public through public and private websites.
Surveillance key to prevent global pandemics need to improve

accuracy but political will exists this ev is TOO qualified.
Morse et al. 13 (2013, Stephen, PhD, Professor at the Mailman School of Public Health,
Columbia University, Jonna A K Mazet, PhD, Professor at the One Health Institute, School of
Veterinary Medicine, UC-Davis, Mark Woolhouse, PhD, Professor at the Centre for Immunity,
Infection and Evolution, University of Edinburgh, Colin R Parrish, PhD, Professor at the
College of Veterinary Medicine, Cornell University, Dennis Carroll, PhD, US Agency for
International Development, William B Karesh, DVm, IUCN Species Survival Commission
Wildlife Health Specialist Group, EcoHealth Alliance, Carlos Zambrana-Torrelio, MSc,
EcoHealth Alliance, W Ian Lipkin, MD, PhD, Professor at the Center for Infection and
Immunity, Columbia, and Peter Daszak, PHD, EcoHealth Alliance, Prediction and prevention
of the next pandemic zoonosis, Lancet. 2012 Dec 1; 380(9857): 19561965)
Global strategy for surveillance and prevention
For emerging infections, strengthening of public health surveillance worldwide to provide early
warning has been the primary recommendation of expert groups for the past two
decades.4,5,10,77,78 Although greatly improved, public health surveillance capabilities remain
restricted and fragmented , and have uneven global coverage .20,64,79 ProMED and the ProMED-mail e-mail
LISTSERV and website were developed in the 1990s to improve early-warning capacity.77 This notion has expanded substantially, with a series of new initiatives such as WHOs Global Outbreak Alert and
Response Network;80 a tripartite One Health initiative involving WHO, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN, and the World Organisation for Animal Health; HealthMap.org (and similarly Canadas
a system that does high-capacity searching and filtering of internet feeds to

identify novel pathogen outbreaks as rapidly as possible;81 and, in the USA, the Centers for Disease Control and Preventions Global Disease
Detection programme, the Department of Defenses Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response System, and other initiatives. These initiatives have been
assisted by regional coordination and the formation of, for example, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, and subregional networks such as the Mekong
Global Public Health Intelligence Network),
Basin Disease Surveillance Network.82,83 The adoption of the revised International Health Regulations, which have a target of establishment of minimum core capacities, or specific plans, by mid-2012, by the
194 member states of WHO was a noteworthy advance.84 The revised Regulations incorporate a broad definition of outbreaks of public health concern, which include outbreaks in non-human animals, and
provides an incentive for low-income countries to build capacity for pandemic surveillance and prevention. Although implementation will probably be delayed because many countries have so far been unable to
achieve minimum core capacity goals, the adoption of the Regulations should greatly improve standards for surveillance, reporting, and response.82
Efforts to reduce or prevent pandemic zoonoses before they emerge in people have also begun ,
and might form the template for a new, globally coordinated pandemic prevention strategy . For
influenza, these efforts have been focused on animal surveillance as a strategy to identify periods when the risk of spillover to people is high.64 Wider surveillance in wildlife to include targeted pathogen discovery
has been called for.3,5,7,64 However, few coordinated efforts have been implemented to pre-empt zoonotic disease emergence with wildlife surveillance. The Emerging Pandemic Threats programme is a
noteworthy project initiated in 2009 by the US Agency for International Development. The programme is a suite of capacity-building investments designed to rapidly identify (and eventually predict) the
emergence of new public health threats and increase country-level capacities to mitigate the potential effects of these threats.85 It draws heavily from efforts to address the H5N1 threat, and emphasises a strategic
approach that builds on the understanding that the health and well being of people, animals, and the environment are inextricably linked; promotes a One Health approach that spans the animal health, public
health, environ mental, and conservation communities;86 targets promotion of policies and capacities to identify and minimise the risk of emergence of new disease; and uses a risk-based approach to target
investments where the likelihood of disease emergence is greatest.
The Emerging Pandemic Threats programme, through its PREDICT component, has developed an approach in which predictive modelling is used to identify the regions, wildlife hosts, and human beinganimal
interfaces most likely to propagate the next emerging zoonosis. The approach brings together experts from specialties, including wildlife ecology, epidemiology, genetics, virology, informatics, and veterinary
medicine, all focused on building of a global early warning system for emerging diseases that move between wildlife and people. The programmes first goal is to obtain timely and reliable data for zoonotic threats,
through internet surveillance of reports of unusual events in hotspot countries, analyses of the capacity of pathogens to emerge and then spread under different social systems in hotspots, and in-depth sample
collection from the wildlife hosts most likely to harbour zoonoses. Samples are analysed to identify known zoonotic pathogens and new, closely related viruses, and then those deemed most likely to infect and
cause illness in people are more fully characterised.
PREDICT is active in 20 developing countries in emerging infectious disease hotspots and focuses on surveillance at human beinganimal interfaces where cross-species trans mission is most likely. Infection in
the natural or reservoir hosts is often asymptomatic,20 and thus testing of seemingly healthy animals is essential, but might be resource intensive, and unproductive if done randomly. To avoid this issue,
PREDICT uses a combination of risk modelling to target locations, interfaces, and host taxa, and computerised data collection and analysis and active wildlife field sampling at high-risk sites to collect and identify
viruses that might transfer from wildlife and cause disease. The programme partners with national and local governments, in-country scientists, and other local specialists who are active in outbreak reporting,
microbial characterisation, and pathogen discovery, in collaboration with other US Agency for International Development Emerging Pandemic Threats projects as appropriate. These partnerships are intended to
ensure the longevity of the programme by building capacity in the most in-need regions. The programmes scale gives some indication of how feasible this type of approach is for identification of the many
thousands of novel pathogens that are probably in wildlife globally. In the first two years of the programme, around 100000 samples from 20000 animals (mainly bats, rodents, and non-human primates) in 20
countries have yielded 150 novel viruses from families known to harbour zoonoses. These data will be used to further refine global hotspot mapping and modelling strategies and test hypotheses about zoonotic
transmission. They will also be shared as open source information, after the appropriate country clear ances, through an interactive application at HealthMap.org. In selected high-risk regions, the associations
between viral diversity, biological diversity, patterns of human contact with wildlife and livestock, and changes in land use are being explored to decipher the rules that govern disease emergence.
The ultimate goal of the Emerging Pandemic Threats programme is to develop a strategy to prevent future pandemics at
the source before they infect human beingsan ambitious goal that requires more than building of health-care capacity or surveillance and diagnostic
programmes. The challenge to true pandemic prevention (and pre-emption) is how to address the
underlying drivers that are essentially ecological (eg, juxtaposition of livestock production and wildlife populations) or occur on large
spatial scales because of economic activity (eg, change in land use related to development of tropical forests).1 In the case of both Nipah virus14 and H5N1,87,88
economic development resulted in changes to animal production that led to the opening of a new niche for a pathogen. Could the seemingly opposing forces of
economic development and public health have been reconciled before rather than after these
outbreaks occurred? Expansion of so-called health impact assessments is a possible approach.12 Incentives for industries with roles in activities that propagate pandemics could be linked
to development initiatives. For example, concessions in development of logging or mining could include better food supply chains as an alternative to bushmeat hunting, better clinics for migrant workers than are
available, and more intensive surveillance of livestock at these crucial interfaces. Similarly, efforts to curtail the wildlife trade for food and pets in hotspot and other countries could include creation of incentives
for consumers that lead to certification of industries promoting healthy practices.
Conclusion
The basis on which to build a global pandemic prevention strategy has changed substantially
over the past few decades. A newly revised global reporting system of outbreaks and new
molecular methods for pathogen identification and discovery are available, and advances in
communications technologyeg, access to mobile phones and the Internet, even in
remote areas have enabled improved reporting . The early identification of a new human
coronavirus respiratory disease from Saudi Arabia89 and a novel haemorrhagic fever virus in central Africa90 are examples of the great
improvement in surveillance capabilities.
Understanding of the process of emergence and spread has moved from anecdotal through
analytical to potentially predictive. Researchers are positioned to move from a paucity of
data to a wealth of information on potential pathogens in nature. The challenge is to develop the basic research agenda to
allow potential pathogens to be distinguished from harmless microbes by use of molecular sequence data only (the most commonly collected information), or information that can be deduced from these dataeg,
structures of key proteins.
Political will for countries to act together to strengthen global networks against pandemic emergence also seems to have become
positive. This new approach to pandemic prevention is shown by the handling of the discovery , in
1997, of a highly pathogenic influenza A (H5N1) of avian origin that infects people (precursor of the now widespread H5N1 avian influenza).91 Since then, and despite the viruss continued inability to
transmit effectively between people, the public health community has recognised that a lethal virus circulating only in wildlife and domestic animals creates extraordinary opportunities to mitigate future risk.64
The response to H5N1 has implicated not only clinical, diagnostic, and therapeutic advances, but also better understanding of avian ecology, the economics of poultry production in low-income countries, and the
ecology of the virus across the viruss broad host range. For perhaps the first time, the response to a zoonotic pandemic has included development agencies improving individual countries abilities to identify new
zoonoses early and mitigate quickly any new health threats arising within their borders.
The challenge is to establish whether and how researchers can intervene before a pathogen
reaches the human population and develop appropriate triggers for action. Zoonotic diseases, by
definition, should be a key mission of human-health agencies, agricultural authorities and producers,
and natural resource managers, all working cooperatively. Substantial investments in each
of these challenges are essential because the ecological and social changes worldwide that allow the emergence of infectious
diseases are increasing at an unprecedented rate . Integration of efforts and coord ination of budgetary resources for prevention and
control is clearly a challenge that governments, both local and national, need to confront, and building of capacity to sustain these efforts might be the greatest challenge of all.
Pandemic kills econ

Asian Pandemic kills global economy
Begley 1/21/13 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-reutersmagazine-davos-flu-economyidUSBRE90K0F820130121 retuers staff
Flu-conomics: The next pandemic could trigger global recession A high body count is
not the only meaningful number attached to a pandemic. The potential cost of a global outbreak
of the flu or some other highly contagious disease, however ghoulish to calculate, is essential for
government officials and business leaders to know. Only by putting a price tag on such an
occurrence can they hope to establish what containing it is worth. The financial damage by itself
can be devastating. The expense of major epidemics is evident every time a health agency totes
up the cost of treating infected people the outlays for drugs, doctors' visits, and
hospitalizations. But that spending is only the most obvious economic impact of an outbreak.
Consider the effect on international airlines. During the 2003 SARS (severe acute respiratory
syndrome), which began in southern China and lasted about seven months, business and leisure
travelers drastically cut back on flying. Asia-Pacific carriers saw revenue plunge $6 billion and
North American airlines lost another $1 billion. The tourism industry also took a beating. The
net revenue of Park Place Entertainment, owner of Caesar's Palace in Las Vegas and other
gambling and hotel complexes, plunged more than 50 percent in the second quarter of 2003
compared with the year before, mainly because Asian high rollers hunkered down rather than
risk infection while traveling. Fear even hurt businesses dependent on sales calls. AIG, which
pulled almost 30 percent of its revenue from Asia back then, was hobbled when the epidemic
kept its agents from visiting potential customers. That's just the easily measured stuff; the
indirect costs pushed the total SARS bill much higher. "The biggest driver of the economics of
pandemics is not mortality or morbidity but risk aversion , as people change their behavior to
reduce their chance of exposure," says Dr. Dennis Carroll, director of the U.S. Agency for
International Development's programs on new and emerging disease threats. "People don't go to
their jobs, and they don't go to shopping malls. There can be a huge decrease in consumer
demand, and if (a pandemic) continues long enough, it can affect manufacturing" as producers
cut output to align supply with lower demand. If schools are closed, healthy workers may have to
stay home with their children. People afraid of becoming infected are less likely to go out to
stores, restaurants or movies. Most of China was essentially on lockdown in the first half of
2003 as the government did everything in its considerable power to minimize human-to-human
contact and, hence, the spread of SARS. Beijing was shut down tighter than at any time since
martial law was declared during the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests. Discos, bars, shopping
malls, indoor sports facilities, and movie theaters were closed, and 80 percent of the capital's
five-star hotel rooms were vacant. By May 2003, Singapore Airlines had cut capacity 71 percent
and put its 6,600-member flight staff on unpaid leave. Tourism to Singapore fell 70 percent, and
the country's gross domestic product took a $400 million hit that year. From Asia, where the
disease was largely confined, the ripples spread in all directions. Toronto recorded 361 SARS
cases and 33 deaths, and the World Health Organization issued an advisory against traveling
there surely a factor in the $5 billion loss Canada's GDP suffered in 2003. It's not surprising
that a pandemic hurts businesses dependent on employees or customers moving from point a to
point b (as AIG and the airlines learned), but SARS also set back transport companies such as
FedEx (closed airports; fewer people doing business), telecom equipment-makers such as Nortel
(vendors and customers staying home) and cable-TV-box maker Scientific-Atlanta (multiple
parts made in Asia). It even cut deeply into profits for Estee Lauder, which under normal
circumstances sells a lot of cosmetics in Hong Kong, Singapore and China, and in duty-free
airport shops. In our interconnected world, a farmer running a fever in Southern China can
reduce the income of a baggage handler in Frankfurt, and hence all the businesses that worker
patronizes. "Within hours or days, an event that starts on one side of the world can
establish itself on the other, " says Carroll. Lufthansa saw demand for flights to and from
the Far East tumble 85 percent that year, and grounded a dozen planes. With planes grounded,
oil demand fell by 300,000 barrels a day in Asia, dinging the revenues of oil companies from
Kuwait to Venezuela. A COST BEYOND MEASURE? The World Bank estimated China's SARSrelated losses at $14.8 billion, and although the United States and Europe were largely spared its
ravages, the pandemic reduced the global GDP by $33 billion. And here's a scary thought: As
health crises go, SARS wasn't that bad: It killed just 916 people and lasted well under a year. The
Department of Health & Human Services estimates that the ho-hum seasonal flu is responsible
for 111 million lost workdays each year in the United States. That's $7 billion in sick days and
lost productivity. A global pandemic that lasted a year could trigger a "major global recession,"
warned a 2008 report from the World Bank. If a pandemic were on the scale of the Hong Kong
flu of 1968-69 in its transmissibility and severity, a yearlong outbreak could cause world GDP to
fall 0.7 percent. If we get hit with something like the 1957 Asian flu, say goodbye to 2 percent of
GDP. Something as bad as the 1918-19 Spanish flu would cut the world's economic output by 4.8
percent and cost more than $3 trillion. "Generally speaking," the report added, "developing
countries would be hardest hit, because higher population densities and poverty accentuate the
economic impacts." The majority of the economic losses would come not from sickness or death
but from what the World Bank calls "efforts to avoid infection: reducing air travel avoiding
travel to infected destinations, and reducing consumption of services such as restaurant dining,
tourism, mass transport, and nonessential retail shopping." The really bad news is that we may
not be hearing all the bad news. Economists who study pandemics worry they may be
underestimating the financial toll because they haven't been considering all the ramifications.
"Research to understand the indirect costs of an epidemic has been growing, focusing on how to
accurately incorporate productivity losses and effects on economic activity," says Bruce Lee of
the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, where he is an associate professor, director of the
Public Health Computational and Operations Research Group, and an expert in the economics
of infectious diseases
Extinction
Extinction
Quammen 12 (9/29, David, award-winning science writer, long-time columnist for
Outside magazine for fifteen years, with work in National Geographic, Harper's, Rolling Stone,
the New York Times Book Review and other periodicals, Could the next big animal-to-human
disease wipe us out?, The Guardian, pg. 29, Lexis)
Infectious disease is all around us
. It's one of the basic processes that ecologists study, along with predation and competition. Predators are big beasts that eat their prey from outside. Pathogens (disease-
under ordinary conditions it's

natural
But conditions aren't always ordinary
Aberrations occur
zoonosis
It's a word
destined for heavy use in the 21st century Ebola and
Marburg are zoonoses. So is bubonic plague So was the
Spanish influenza
causing agents, such as viruses) are small beasts that eat their prey from within. Although infectious disease can seem grisly and dreadful,
do to wildebeests and zebras.
every bit as
as what lions
. Just as predators have their accustomed prey, so do pathogens. And just as a lion might occasionally depart from its normal
behaviour - to kill a cow instead of a wildebeest, or a human instead of a zebra - so a pathogen can shift to a new target.
infectious presence, sometimes causing illness or death, the result is a
. When a pathogen leaps from an animal into a person, and succeeds in establishing itself as an
. It's a mildly technical term, zoonosis, unfamiliar to most people, but it helps clarify the biological complexities behind the ominous headlines about swine flu, bird flu,
Sars, emerging diseases in general, and the threat of a global pandemic.
of the future,
so-called
of 1918-1919, which had its source in a wild aquatic
bird and emerged to kill as many as 50 million people. All of the human influenzas are zoonoses. As are monkeypox, bovine tuberculosis, Lyme disease, West Nile fever, rabies and a strange new affliction called Nipah encephalitis, which has killed pigs and pig
farmers in Malaysia. Each of these zoonoses reflects the action of
a pathogen can "spillover crossing into people from other animals

that
",
. Aids is a
disease of zoonotic origin caused by a virus that, having reached humans through a few accidental events in western and central Africa, now passes human-to-human. This form of interspecies leap is not rare; about 60% of all human infectious diseases currently
known either cross routinely or have recently crossed between other animals and us. Some of those - notably rabies - are familiar, widespread and still horrendously lethal, killing humans by the thousands despite centuries of efforts at coping with their effects.
Others are new and inexplicably sporadic, claiming a few victims or a few hundred, and then disappearing for years.
within
what's called
a reservoir host
Zoonotic pathogens can hide
. The least conspicuous strategy is
to lurk
: a living organism that carries the pathogen while suffering little or no illness. When a disease seems to disappear between outbreaks, it's often still lingering nearby, within some reservoir
host. A rodent? A bird? A butterfly? A bat? To reside undetected is probably easiest wherever biological diversity is high and the ecosystem is relatively undisturbed. The converse is also true: ecological disturbance causes diseases to emerge. Shake a tree and things
fall out. Michelle Barnes is an energetic, late 40s-ish woman, an avid rock climber and cyclist. Her auburn hair, she told me cheerily, came from a bottle. It approximates the original colour, but the original is gone. In 2008, her hair started falling out; the rest went
grey "pretty much overnight". This was among the lesser effects of a mystery illness that had nearly killed her during January that year, just after she'd returned from Uganda. Her story paralleled the one Jaap Taal had told me about Astrid, with several key
differences - the main one being that Michelle Barnes was still alive. Michelle and her husband, Rick Taylor, had wanted to see mountain gorillas, too. Their guide had taken them through Maramagambo Forest and into Python Cave. They, too, had to clamber across
those slippery boulders. As a rock climber, Barnes said, she tends to be very conscious of where she places her hands. No, she didn't touch any guano. No, she was not bumped by a bat. By late afternoon they were back, watching the sunset. It was Christmas evening
2007. They arrived home on New Year's Day. On 4 January, Barnes woke up feeling as if someone had driven a needle into her skull. She was achy all over, feverish. "And then, as the day went on, I started developing a rash across my stomach." The rash spread.
"Over the next 48 hours, I just went down really fast." By the time Barnes turned up at a hospital in suburban Denver, she was dehydrated; her white blood count was imperceptible; her kidneys and liver had begun shutting down. An infectious disease specialist, Dr
Norman K Fujita, arranged for her to be tested for a range of infections that might be contracted in Africa. All came back negative, including the test for Marburg. Gradually her body regained strength and her organs began to recover. After 12 days, she left hospital,
still weak and anaemic, still undiagnosed. In March she saw Fujita on a follow-up visit and he had her serum tested again for Marburg. Again, negative. Three more months passed, and Barnes, now grey-haired, lacking her old energy, suffering abdominal pain,
unable to focus, got an email from a journalist she and Taylor had met on the Uganda trip, who had just seen a news article. In the Netherlands, a woman had died of Marburg after a Ugandan holiday during which she had visited a cave full of bats. Barnes spent the
next 24 hours Googling every article on the case she could find. Early the following Monday morning, she was back at Dr Fujita's door. He agreed to test her a third time for Marburg. This time a lab technician crosschecked the third sample, and then the first sample.
The new results went to Fujita, who called Barnes: "You're now an honorary infectious disease doctor. You've self-diagnosed, and the Marburg test came back positive." The Marburg virus had reappeared in Uganda in 2007. It was a small outbreak, affecting four
miners, one of whom died, working at a site called Kitaka Cave. But Joosten's death, and Barnes's diagnosis, implied a change in the potential scope of the situation. That local Ugandans were dying of Marburg was a severe concern - sufficient to bring a response
team of scientists in haste. But if tourists, too, were involved, tripping in and out of some python-infested Marburg repository, unprotected, and then boarding their return flights to other continents, the place was not just a peril for Ugandan miners and their
families. It was also an international threat. The first team of scientists had collected about 800 bats from Kitaka Cave for dissecting and sampling, and marked and released more than 1,000, using beaded collars coded with a number. That team, including scientist
Brian Amman, had found live Marburg virus in five bats. Entering Python Cave after Joosten's death, another team of scientists, again including Amman, came across one of the beaded collars they had placed on captured bats three months earlier and 30 miles away.
"It confirmed my suspicions that these bats are moving," Amman said - and moving not only through the forest but from one roosting site to another. Travel of individual bats between far-flung roosts implied circumstances whereby Marburg virus might ultimately
be transmitted all across Africa, from one bat encampment to another. It voided the comforting assumption that this virus is strictly localised. And it highlighted the complementary question: why don't outbreaks of Marburg virus disease happen more often?
Marburg is only one instance to which that question applies. Why not more Ebola? Why not more Sars? In the case of
Sars
, the scenario
could have been very much worse
. Apart from the 2003
outbreak and the aftershock cases in early 2004, it hasn't recurred. . . so far. Eight thousand cases are relatively few for such an explosive infection; 774 people died, not 7 million. Several factors contributed to limiting the scope and impact of the outbreak, of which
humanity's good luck was only one. Another was the speed and excellence of the laboratory diagnostics - finding the virus and identifying it. Still another was the brisk efficiency with which cases were isolated, contacts were traced and quarantine measures were
If the virus had arrived in a different

city
it might have burned through a much larger segment of humanity
instituted, first in southern China, then in Hong Kong, Singapore, Hanoi and Toronto.
first-rate medical institutions -
sort of big
- more loosely governed, full of poor people, lacking

. One further factor, possibly the most crucial, was
inherent in the way Sars affects the human body: symptoms tend to appear in a person before, rather than after, that person becomes highly infectious. That allowed many Sars cases to be recognised, hospitalised and placed in isolation before they hit their peak of
1918 influenza
occurred
before globalisation
When the Next Big One comes it will
conform to the
1918 influenza high infectivity preceding notable symptoms
it
move through
airports like an angel of death
not every virus goes airborne
If
HIV could you and I might already be dead If rabies could would be the most horrific
pathogen on the planet The influenzas are well adapted for airborne transmission
a new
strain can circle the world within days
Human-to-human transmission is
the crux That
is what separates a
localised
disease
from a global
pandemic
infectivity. With influenza and many other diseases, the order is reversed. That probably helped account for the scale of worldwide misery and death during the
in the era
-1919
. And that infamous global pandemic
. Everything nowadays moves around the planet faster, including viruses.
same perverse pattern as the
cities and
. The Next Big One is a subject that disease scientists around the world often address. The most recent big one is Aids, of which the
eventual total bigness cannot even be predicted - about 30 million deaths, 34 million living people infected, and with no end in sight. Fortunately,
-1
likely
. That will help
the
from one host to another.
virus
, it
, which is why
. The Sars virus travels this route, too, or anyway by the respiratory droplets of sneezes and coughs - hanging in the air of a hotel corridor, moving through the
cabin of an aeroplane - and that capacity, combined with its case fatality rate of almost 10%, is what made it so scary in 2003 to the people who understood it best.
capacity
bizarre, awful,
, intermittent and mysterious
(such as Ebola)
. Have you noticed the persistent, low-level buzz about avian influenza, the strain known as H5N1, among disease experts over the past 15 years? That's because avian flu worries them deeply, though it hasn't caused many human
fatalities. Swine flu comes and goes periodically in the human population (as it came and went during 2009), sometimes causing a bad pandemic and sometimes (as in 2009) not so bad as expected; but avian flu resides in a different category of menacing possibility.
It worries the flu scientists because they know that H5N1 influenza is extremely virulent in people, with a high lethality. As yet, there have been a relatively low number of cases, and it is poorly transmissible, so far, from human to human. It'll kill you if you catch it,
very likely, but you're unlikely to catch it except by butchering an infected chicken. But if H5N1 mutates or reassembles itself in just the right way, if it adapts for human-to-human transmission, it could become the biggest and fastest killer disease since 1918. It got to
Egypt in 2006 and has been especially problematic for that country. As of August 2011, there were 151 confirmed cases, of which 52 were fatal. That represents more than a quarter of all the world's known human cases of bird flu since H5N1 emerged in 1997. But
here's a critical fact: those unfortunate Egyptian patients all seem to have acquired the virus directly from birds. This indicates that the virus hasn't yet found an efficient way to pass from one person to another. Two aspects of the situation are dangerous, according
to biologist Robert Webster. The first is that Egypt, given its recent political upheavals, may be unable to staunch an outbreak of transmissible avian flu, if one occurs. His second concern is shared by influenza researchers and public health officials around the globe:
with all that mutating, with all that contact between people and their infected birds, the virus could hit upon a genetic configuration making it highly transmissible among people. "
the world
," Webster told me, "
there is the possibility of disaster
As long as H5N1 is out there in
. . . There is the theoretical possibility that it can acquire the ability to transmit human-to-human." He paused. "And then God
No other primate has ever weighed upon the planet to anything like the
degree we do
We are an outbreak And here's the thing
about outbreaks they end
help us." We're unique in the history of mammals.
. In ecological terms, we are almost paradoxical: large-bodied and long-lived but grotesquely abundant.
:
. In some cases they end after many years, in others they end rather soon. In some cases they end gradually, in others they end with a crash. In certain cases, they end and recur and end again.
Populations of tent caterpillars, for example, seem to rise steeply and fall sharply on a cycle of anywhere from five to 11 years. The crash endings are dramatic, and for a long while they seemed mysterious. What could account for such sudden and recurrent collapses?
One possible factor is infectious disease, and viruses in particular.
Pandemics risk extinctionno burnout

Sandberg 08 (9/9, Anders, Ph.D. in computational neuroscience from Stockholm
University, James Martin Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford
University, How can we reduce the risk of human extinction? http://thebulletin.org/how-canwe-reduce-risk-human-extinction)
The risks from anthropogenic hazards appear at present larger than those from natural ones. Although great progress has been made
in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world, humanity is still threatened by the possibility of a global thermonuclear
war and a resulting nuclear winter. We
may face even greater risks from emerging technologies. Advances

in synthetic biology might make it possible to engineer pathogens capable of extinction -level
pandemics. The knowledge, equipment, and materials needed to engineer pathogens are more
accessible than those needed to build nuclear weapons. And unlike other weapons, pathogens
are self-replicating , allowing a small arsenal to become exponentially destructive .
Pathogens have been implicated in the extinctions of many wild species. Although most
pandemics "fade out" by reducing the density of susceptible populations, pathogens with
wide host ranges in multiple species can reach even isolated individuals. The intentional or
unintentional release of engineered pathogens with high transmissibility, latency, and
lethality might be capable of causing human extinction. While such an event seems unlikely today,
the likelihood may increase as biotechnologies continue to improve at a rate rivaling Moore's
Law.
Pandemics are existential threats turns all other impacts.

Rubin 11 (1/14, Harvey, MD, PhD in Molecular Biology, Professor of Medicine, University
of Pennsylvania, secondary appointments as Professor in the Department of Microbiology, the
Department of Biochemistry and Biophysics in the School of Medicine and as Professor of
Computer and Information Sciences at the University of Pennsylvania School of Engineering
and Applied Sciences, has served on a number of national and international scientific review
panels including the NIH, NSF, NASA Intelligent Systems Program, DARPA, and The Medical
Research Council, South Africa, Future Global Shocks: Pandemics, OECD,
http://www.oecd.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/governance/risk/46889985.pdf)
Classifying pandemics as a Future Global Shock is consistent with considering

infectious diseases as existential threats to human security
The UNDP conceptualizes security as human-centric rather than
state-centric and includes protection from the shocks that affect human safety and welfare, such
as disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental
hazards
certain aspects of public health and
as described in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) of 1994 and
reaffirmed in the 2003 UN Commission on Human Security.
the traditional
. The consequence of such a definition, as Ole Weaver points out (Weaver 2009) is, ... that action according to the normal procedures will not be able to offset this in time, and therefore extraordinary measures are both needed and justified. In
the nature of an existential threat depends in part on the particular threatened sector. In
considering the traditional national security threat, the survival of the sovereignty, territory and
physical condition of the nation is at stake to the environmental community, the sustainability of
an ecosystem is at risk to the economic sector, survival includes
the means of production. To
the medical community
and infectious diseases sectors survival under a
pandemic global shock clearly refers to taking every action to minimize morbidity and mortality
as well as
economic, social and political stability of communities, nations and
transnational organizations
the
global shock to public health in the form of a pandemic is unique among global
shocks
this formulation,
protecting
in general and especially to the public health
to minimize the effect of the pandemic on the
. In this view, analyzing a pandemic future global shock must be informed by its effect on a broad range of key resources and critical infrastructure. Therefore, we argue that
in having profound positive and negative externalities and interdependencies.
Anti Corruption bad: Air Pollution
Anticorruption = Air Pollution Module

Anti-corruption tanks pollution control in China [REPEATS STEM
FROM DISEASE]
Huang 4/25/15 Yanzhong Huang is Senior Fellow for Global Health at the Council on
Foreign Relations. This post appears courtesy of CFR.org and Forbes Asia.
http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/the-anti-corruption-drive-and-risk-of-policy-paralysis-inchina/
Like it or not, President Xi Jinpings anti-corruption campaign is extremely popular among
Chinese people. According to an online survey, combating corruption trails income
distribution as the top two concerns of the Chinese public. There are already reports suggesting
that the campaign has helped reduce the transaction cost for ordinary people to get things done
in China. But from the perspective of the more than eleven million government officials in
China, this also means reduced opportunities to access grey income (i.e., bribes), which
accounts for 12 percent of Chinas GDP. Consequently, civil servant jobs are increasingly losing
their attractiveness in China. According to a recruitment website, more than ten thousand civil
servants had quit their jobs in the three weeks following the Spring Festival in Feburary. The
exodus of civil servants poses particular challenges for the operation of the judicial system.
Already burdened by heavy caseloads, high risks, and government interference, judges are
leaving in droves. As aura of appeal for civil service fades, China faces growing pains in policy
making and implementation. But this is only part of the story. The campaign has also changed
the rules of the game in Chinas officialdom. Corruption in China is so rampant that it involves
almost every government official. According to a conservative estimate made by a law professor
of Renmin University, China has at least two million corrupt officials not being investigated, but
just investigating and convicting them would take forty to fifty years. Instead of setting limited
objectives, the new leadership under President Xi has indicated that it will not set any endpoint
for the campaign or give pardon or amnesty to corrupt officials. It also vows to pursue each
corruption case to the very bottom ( yi cha dao di). Those who are found guilty would lose big,
including their political life. This in effect creates a zero-sum, one-shot game where winner takes
all, and losers (i.e., Bo Xilai) have little chance of replaying the power game and becoming
tomorrows winners. This has significantly raised the stakes in the game, making players on each
side feel insecure. This is evidenced by the rapid increase in the number of officials who have
committed suicide since November 2012, when President Xi came to power. In March 2015,
President Xi reshuffled the Central Security Bureau that is in charge of his personal safety. The
changing rules of the game, coupled with the sustained political hierarchy in China and rapid
centralization of the power of President Xi, make it more likely to reproduce the bandwagoning
politics found in the Mao era, when policy actors rushed to jump on the bandwagon of the
perceived winner (i.e., Mao) in order to demonstrate their early and enthusiastic support of his
favorite policy. While the successful amassing of power should increase the credibility of
President Xis promises and punishments in the policy process, there is no guarantee that he is
the ultimate winner in the anti-corruption campaign. Chinas anti-corruption czar Wang Qishan
allegedly said recently that the fight against corruption was a stalemate, with each side pitted
against each other. Equally important, as a result of more than three decades of post-Mao
reform and social change, the political hierarchy has been sufficiently decentralized so that
central authority is limited by subnational authorities. This is especially the case if the central
leadership fails to spell out its priorities clearly and consistently. These developments have
profound implications for the public policy process in China. As fighting corruption becomes
a top priority in China, other important agenda items such as tackling the
environmental crisis and deepening healthcare reform might end up on the back
burner . Lower-level government officials, being wary about their personal security in the
campaign, would officially bandwagon with Xi, or at least pay lip service to his preferred policy
agenda. But in reality, they would balk at making any moves that would be interpreted by
their colleagues as ambitious attempts to seek personal advantages or threaten the latters
vested interests. As a result, not taking phone calls and not writing instructions on documents
becomes the new normal in the policy process. In May 2014, Premier Li Keqiang at a State
Council executive meeting assailed this phenomenon of holding an office and enjoying all the
privileges without doing a stroke of work. The problem of government inaction and policy
gridlock is particularly serious at the grassroots level. According to the party secretary of
Shanxi Province, in 2014 there was a 60 percent increase in the amount of petitions and offense
reports targeting officials at the township level, but the filed charges actually dropped over the
same period; during 2013-2014, 20 percent of the townships failed to investigate any corruption
cases. In order to address this policy paralysis, the central leadership should seriously
consider limiting the objectives of the anti-corruption campaign and incorporating it into the
track of rule of law.
Kills 1.6 million a year

Associated Press 8/12/15 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/14/airpollution-in-china-is-killing-4000-people-every-day-a-new-study-finds
Air pollution is killing about 4,000 people in China a day, accounting for one in six premature
deaths in the worlds most populous country, a new study finds. Physicists at the University of
California, Berkeley, calculated about 1.6 million people in China die each year from heart, lung
and stroke problems because of incredibly polluted air, especially small particles of haze. Earlier
studies put the annual Chinese air pollution death toll at one to two million but this is the first to
use newly released air monitoring figures. The study, to be published in the journal PLOS One,
blames emissions from the burning of coal, both for electricity and heating homes. It uses real
air measurements and then computer model calculations that estimate heart, lung and stroke
deaths for different types of pollutants. Study lead author Robert Rohde said 38% of the Chinese
population lived in an area with a long-term air quality average the US Environmental
Protection Agency called unhealthy. Its a very big number, Rohde said. Its a little hard
to wrap your mind around the numbers. Some of the worst in China is to the south-west of
Beijing. To put Chinese air pollution in perspective, the most recent American Lung Association
data shows that Madera, California, has the highest annual average for small particles in the
United States. But 99.9% of the eastern half of China has a higher annual average for small
particle haze than Madera, Rohde said. In other words nearly everyone in China experiences air
that is worse for particulates than the worst air in the US, Rohde said. In a 2010 document the
EPA estimated between 63,000 and 88,000 people died in the US from air pollution. Other
estimates ranged from 35,000 to 200,000. Unlike the US air pollution in China is worst in the
winter because of burning of coal to heat homes and weather conditions that keeps dirty air
closer to the ground, Rohde said. Beijing will host the 2022 Winter Olympics. Outside
scientists praised the research . Jason West at the University of North Carolina said he
expected it will be widely influential. Allen Robinson at Carnegie Mellon University said in an
email that parts of the United States, such as Pittsburgh, used to have almost as bad air but have
become much cleaner through tough regulations combined with large collapse of heavy
industry. As China started to clean up its air, limiting coal use, it would also reduce emissions
of carbon dioxide, the chief global warming gas, Rohde said.
Causes nuclear war with Russia

Nankivell 9 Senior Researcher @ Office of the Special Advisor Policy Nathan Nakivell,
Senior Researcher at the Office of the Special Advisor Policy, Canadien Department of National
Defence. China's Pollution and the Threat to Domestic and Regional Stability. Asia-Pacific
Journal. 3/21/2009. http://japanfocus.org/-Nathan-Nankivell/1799
In addition to the concerns already mentioned, pollution, if linked to a specific issue like water shortage, could have important
geopolitical ramifications. Chinas northern plains, home to hundreds of millions, face acute water shortages. Growing demand, a decade
of drought, inefficient delivery methods, and increasing water pollution have reduced per capita water holdings to critical levels.
Although Beijing hopes to relieve some of the pressures via the North-South Water Diversion project, it requires tens of billions of
dollars and its completion is, at best, still several years away and, at worst, impossible. Yet just to the north lies one of the most underpopulated areas in Asia, the Russian Far East. While there is little agreement among scholars about whether resource shortages lead to
greater cooperation or conflict, either scenario encompasses security considerations. Russian politicians already allege possible Chinese
territorial designs on the region. They note Russias falling population in the Far East, currently estimated at some 6 to 7 million, and
argue that the growing Chinese population along the border, more than 80 million, may soon take over. While these concerns smack of
inflated nationalism and scare tactics, there could be some truth to them. The method by which China might annex the territory can only
be speculated upon, but would surely result in full-scale war between two powerful, nuclear-equipped nations.
Xt: kills
Best research proves largest source of global death
Berkeley Earth September 15 JPRI Critique Vol. XXI No. 8 (September 2015) Killer
Air: Analysis of Air Pollution in China by Berkeley Earth erkeley Earth was conceived by Richard
and Elizabeth Muller in early 2010 when they found merit in some of the concerns of global
warming skeptics. They organized a group of scientists to reanalyze the Earths surface
temperature record, and to address the major concerns of global warming skeptics in a
systematic and objective manner. They published their initial findings in 2012. Since then
Berkeley Earth has pursued further scientific investigations on the nature of climate change, a
major education and communications program to strengthen the scientific consensus on global
warming, and work to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the places that will be the worst
emitters over the next 30 years. One key element of this latter program will be to forge a new
coalition between industry and environmental groups for the use of cleanly-produced natural
gas as a bridging fuel to slow global warming over the next few decadeswith a particular focus
on China. http://www.jpri.org/publications/critiques/critique_XXI_8.html
In August 2015 Berkeley Earth released a study showing that air pollution kills an average of
4,000 people every day in China, 17% of all Chinas deaths. For 38% of the population, the
average air they breathe is unhealthy by U.S. standards. With unprecedented detail, the
sources of pollution throughout China are mapped directly from ground-level measurements.
The most harmful pollution is PM2.5, particulate matter 2.5 microns and smaller. This
penetrates deeply into lungs and triggers heart attacks, stroke, lung cancer, and asthma. Beijing
is only a moderate source PM2.5; it receives much of its pollution from distant industrial areas,
particularly Shijiazhuang, 200 miles to the southwest, says Robert Rohde, coauthor of the
paper. Since the sources arent local, reducing pollution for the 2022 Olympics may prove
difficult. The paper has been accepted for publication in the refereed journal PLOS ONE.
Berkeley Earth analyzed hourly measurements of 1500 ground stations covering 4 months. The
fact that sources of PM2.5 match those of sulfur implies that most of the pollution comes from
coal. Worldwide, air pollution kills over three million people per yearmore than AIDS,
malaria, diabetes or tuberculosis. Air pollution is the greatest environmental
disaster in the world today, says Richard Muller, UC Berkeley professor emeritus of
physics and Scientific Director of Berkeley Earth, coauthor of the paper. When I was last in
Beijing, pollution was at the hazardous level; every hour of exposure reduced my life expectancy
by 20 minutes. Its as if every man, women, and child smoked 1.5 cigarettes each hour, he said
Policy can solve

Simple policies can drastically curb air pollution 80%
Greenpeace 12 http://www.greenpeace.org/eastasia/campaigns/air-pollution/
Air pollution is a severe problem one that we ignore at the risk of our health and our economy.
Smog hangs heavy over Beijing, Shanghai and Hong Kong, where children grow up with asthma
and other respiratory illnesses. Of particular concern is PM2.5 (particles with an aerodynamic
diameter less than 2.5 m) air pollution. In Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Xian, PM2.5
concentration levels in all four cities exceed World Heath Organisation (WHO) air quality
guidelines. This means higher health risks to the cardiovascular system, cerebrovascular system
and an increase in the probability of cancer and premature death. And supposing if the four
cities effectively controlled PM2.5 levels and had met WHO air quality guidelines in 2012, the
number of premature deaths would have decreased by at least 81%, while the economic benefits
of reducing these premature deaths in the four cities would amount to 875 million USD.
AT China wont solve

China working to address air pollution now coal boom leveling off
West 1/30/15 http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2015/01/pollution-chinawinter-weather-america-smog James West is senior producer for the Climate Desk and a
contributing producer for Mother Jones. He wrote Beijing Blur (Penguin 2008), and produced
award-winning TV in his native Australia.
There's some hope that China is attempting to stabilize and, eventually, curb its pollution
through new emissions standards that would cut the level of dangerous particles, including
sulfates. There are also signs that China's coal boomthe source of most of the country's air
pollutionis finally slowing down. A new analysis released this week by Greenpeace showed
that for the first time this century, China's coal consumption fell in 2014.
K2 warming
Solving air pollution spills over to warming
Berkeley Earth September 15 JPRI Critique Vol. XXI No. 8 (September 2015) Killer
Air: Analysis of Air Pollution in China by Berkeley Earth erkeley Earth was conceived by Richard
and Elizabeth Muller in early 2010 when they found merit in some of the concerns of global
warming skeptics. They organized a group of scientists to reanalyze the Earths surface
temperature record, and to address the major concerns of global warming skeptics in a
systematic and objective manner. They published their initial findings in 2012. Since then
Berkeley Earth has pursued further scientific investigations on the nature of climate change, a
major education and communications program to strengthen the scientific consensus on global
warming, and work to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the places that will be the worst
emitters over the next 30 years. One key element of this latter program will be to forge a new
coalition between industry and environmental groups for the use of cleanly-produced natural
gas as a bridging fuel to slow global warming over the next few decadeswith a particular focus
on China. http://www.jpri.org/publications/critiques/critique_XXI_8.html
Elizabeth Muller, Executive Director of Berkeley Earth, said Its troubling that air pollution is
killing so many and yet isnt on the radar for major environmental organizations in the U.S. or
Europe. She says that solutions include greater use of scrubbers, increased energy efficiency,
and switching from coal to natural gas, nuclear power, and renewables. Many of the same
solutions that mitigate air pollution will simultaneously reduce Chinas contribution to global
warming. We can save lives today and tomorrow.
Air cleanup will reduce Chinas climate footprint AND encourage

interdependence
Reuters 9/25/15 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-column-sandalowidUSKCN0RP2D420150925
Third, both countries are seeking areas where they can work well together. Despite the
significant tensions in their relationship, the United States and China need each other and know
it. Their economies are deeply intertwined, with enormous trade and capital flows between
them. Areas in which the two countries work productively together can help in managing the
many difficult issues in the bilateral relationship.
Other factors also play a role. Chinas local air pollution crisis grips the nation. Most measures
to reduce emissions of heat-trapping gases also help reduce local air pollutants .
The United States has an impressive record cleaning the air in its cities and U.S. companies are
eager to help China address its air pollution challenges.
Extinction: Warming
Chinese pollution key to global warming
Environmental Defense Fund 15 https://www.edf.org/climate/why-china-centerour-climate-strategy
Rarely a week goes by before Chinas air pollution crisis is in the news again. The unprecedented
soot and smog levels are triggering a cascade of damaging health and economic effects. Theyre
also contributing to an equally sinister, yet under-reported problem: climate change . To
avoid a looming national public health crisis and an imminent danger to the worlds
climate, China must act soon. Chinas enormous carbon footprint 1/2 of the worlds coal
supply is burned by China each year. Over 20%of the worlds climate pollution originates in
China. A giant leap forward Fortunately, China is beginning to get serious about climate action.
The nation of 1.4 billionthe worlds most populous and No. 1 greenhouse gas emittertook a
giant leap forward in September 2015 when it announced plans to roll out a national carbon
market in 2017. The cap-and-trade market will build on a series of successful pilot projects that
EDF helped design, using a proven market-based solution to tackle global warming at a critical
time. Carbon market: Game changer years in the making Projected CO2 emissions under
current policies (chart) EDFs long history with China Over the past two decades, EDF Vice
President Dan Dudek and his team have helped China establish a variety of market-based
incentives to trim emissions, and increase enforcement of environmental laws. These projects
are part of the reason Dudek, an expert on cap-and-trade markets, earned a coveted spot on
Chinas highest international advisory body on the environment, which reports directly to the
Premier every year. Successes weve helped with 21%emissions drop that Shenzhens carbon
market will likely lead to by end of 2015.* 28,000environmental officers that will complete
training by the end of 2015. 1 milliontons of greenhouse gases verifiably reduced via low-carbon
farming. An urgent opportunity The nation is still rapidly transitioning from rural to urban. In
15 years, about 250 million more people will likely move to cities, and use twice as much energy
than in the countryside. The government has asked for our input on new environmental policies
and programs in their next five-year plan. Were ready to help with many projects, including: If
we seize this moment, we can help shape the outcome. By welcoming the expertise of
EDF, China is proving that its ready to tackle climate change.
Extinction
Brandenberg 99 PhD, Physicist (Dr. John, Physicist, Dead Mars, Dying Earth, p. 232233)
The world goes on its merry way and fossil fuel use continues to power it. Rather than making
painful or politically difficult choices such as inventing in fusion or enacting a rigorous plan of
conserving, the industrial world chooses to muddle through the temperature climb. Lets
imagine that America and Europe are too worried about economic dislocation to change course.
The ozone hole expands , driven by a monstrous synergy with global warming that puts more
catalytic ice crystals into the stratosphere, but this affects the far north and south and not the
major nations heartlands. The seas rise , the tropics roast but the media networks no longer
cover it. The Amazon rainforest becomes the Amazon desert. Oxygen levels fall , but profits
rise for those who can provide it in bottles. An equatorial high pressure zone forms, forcing
drought in central Africa and Brazil, the Nile dries up and the monsoons fall. Then inevitably, at
some unlucky point in time, a major unexpected event occursa major volcanic eruption, a
sudden and dramatic shift in ocean circulation or a large asteroid impact (those who think
freakish accidents do not occur have paid little attention to life on Mars), or a nuclear war that
starts between Pakistan and India and escalates to involve China and Russia Suddenly, the
gradual climb in global temperatures goes on a mad excursion as the oceans warm and release
large amounts of dissolved carbon dioxide from their lower depths into the atmosphere.
Oxygen levels go down as oxygen replaces lost oceanic carbon dioxide. Asthma cases double
and then double again. Now a third of the world fears breathing. As the oceans dump carbon
dioxide, the greenhouse effect increases, which further warms the oceans, causing them to dump
even more carbon. Because of the heat, plants die and burn in enormous fires which release
more carbon dioxide, and the oceans evaporate , adding more water vapor to the greenhouse.
Soon, we are in what is termed a runaway greenhouse effect, as happened to Venus eons ago.
The last two surviving scientists inevitably argue, one telling the other, See, I told you the
missing sink was in the ocean! Earth, as we know it, dies . After this Venusian excursion in
temperatures, the oxygen disappears into the soil, the oceans evaporate and are lost and the
dead Earth loses its ozone layer completely. Earth is too far from the Sun for it to be a second
Venus for long. Its atmosphere is slowly lost as is its waterbecause of the ultraviolet
bombardment breaking up all the molecules apart from carbon dioxide. As the atmosphere
becomes thin, the Earth becomes colder. For a short while temperatures are nearly normal, but
the ultraviolet sears any life that tries to make a comeback. The carbon dioxide thins out to form
a thin veneer with a few wispy clouds and dust devils. Earth becomes the second Mars red,
desolate, with perhaps a few hardy microbes surviving.
Extinction: Hydro Cycle

air pollution collapses the hyrdrological cycle
US Mission to the EU 1 "Aerosol Pollution Could Threaten Earth's Water
Supply,"
http://www.useu.be/Categories/Evironment/Dec1001AerosolPollutionWater.html
A new study issued by researchers at Scripps Institution of Oceanography at the

University of California, San Diego, argues that particles of human-produced
pollution may be playing a significant role in weakening Earth's water cycle,

much more than previously realized. The study was funded in part by NASA and
used new satellite data from NASA's Terra satellite revealing the global nature of the
particles. Tiny aerosols primarily made up of black carbon, the authors argue,
can lead to a weaker hydrological cycle, which connects directly to water

availability and quality, a major environmental issue of the 21st century.
The paper, based on results obtained during the international Indian Ocean
Experiment (INDOEX), is published in the Dec. 7 issue of the journal Science.
"Initially we were seeing aerosols as mainly a cooling agent, offsetting global
warming. In this article we are saying that perhaps an even bigger impact of
aerosols is on the water budget of the planet," said Scripps Professor V.
Ramanathan, who along with Professor Paul Crutzen, a co-author of the new study,
led the INDOEX science team as co-chief scientists. "Through INDOEX we found that
aerosols are cutting down sunlight going into the ocean. The energy for the
hydrological cycle comes from sunlight. As sunlight heats the ocean, water
escapes into the atmosphere and falls out as rain. So as aerosols cut down
sunlight by large amounts, they may be spinning down the hydrological
cycle of the planet." The fourth co-author of the paper, Daniel Rosenfeld, also
notes that these aerosol particulates may be suppressing rain over polluted
regions. Within clouds, aerosols can limit the size of cloud droplets, stifling the
development of the larger droplets required for efficient raindrops.
extinction
Jackson et al 01 Robert, Panel Chair, Department of Biology and Nicholas
School of the Environment, Duke University, "Water in a Changing World,"
http://www.esa.org/science/Issues/TextIssues/issue9.php
Life on earth depends on the continuous flow of materials through the air, water,
soil, and food webs of the biosphere. The movement of water through the hydrological
cycle comprises the largest of these flows, delivering an estimated 110,000 cubic kilometers
(km3) of water to the land each year as snow and rainfall. Solar energy drives the hydrological
cycle, vaporizing water from the surface of oceans, lakes, and rivers as well as from soils and
plants (evapotranspiration). Water vapor rises into the atmosphere where it cools, condenses,
and eventually rains down anew. This renewable freshwater supply sustains life on the
land, in estuaries, and in the freshwater ecosystems of the earth. Renewable fresh water
provides many services essential to human health and well being, including water for
drinking, industrial production, and irrigation, and the production of fish, waterfowl,
and shellfish. Fresh water also provides many benefits while it remains in its channels
(nonextractive or instream benefits), including flood control, transportation, recreation,
waste processing, hydroelectric power, and habitat for aquatic plants and animals. Some
benefits, such as irrigation and hydroelectric power, can be achieved only by damming,
diverting, or creating other major changes to natural water flows. Such changes often diminish
or preclude other instream benefits of fresh water, such as providing habitat for aquatic life or
maintaining suitable water quality for human use.
Sino-Russian Impact ext

Chinese and Russia conflict over resources escalates to nuclear
conflict.
Sharavin 1 Alexander, Director of the Institute of Military and Political Analysis, 10-3-1,
What The Papers Say (Russia), Wednesday, l/n Director @ Institute of Military and Political
Analysis
China's economy is among the fastest-growing economies in the world. It remains socialistic in many aspects, i.e. extensive and highly
expensive, demanding more and more natural resources. China's natural resources are rather limited, whereas the depths of Siberia
and the Russian Far East are almost inexhaustible. Chinese propaganda has constantly been showing us skyscrapers infree trade
zones in southeastern China. It should not be forgotten,however, that some 250 to 300 million people live there, i.e. at mosta quarter of
China's population. A billion Chinese people are stillliving in misery. For them, even the living standards of a backwater Russian
town remain inaccessibly high. They have absolutely nothing tolose. There is every prerequisite for "the final throw to the
north."The strength of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (CPLA) has beengrowing quicker than the Chinese economy. A decade
ago the CPLA wasequipped with inferior copies of Russian arms from late 1950s to theearly 1960s. However, through its own efforts
Russia has nearlymanaged to liquidate its most significant technological advantage.Thanks to our zeal, from antique MiG-21 fighters of
the earliestmodifications and S-75 air defense missile systems the Chineseantiaircraft defense forces have adopted Su-27 fighters and S300 airdefense missile systems. China's air defense forces have received Torsystems instead of anti-aircraft guns which could have been
usedduring World War II. The shock air force of our "eastern brethren"will in the near future replace antique Tu-16 and Il-28 airplanes
withSu-30 fighters, which are not yet available to the Russian ArmedForces! Russia may face the "wonderful" prospect of
combating the Chinesearmy, which, if full mobilization is called, is comparable in sizewith Russia's entire population, which also
has nuclear weapons (eventactical weapons become strategic if states have common borders) andwould be absolutely insensitive to
losses (even a loss of a fewmillion of the servicemen would be acceptable for China). Such a warwould be more horrible than the
World War II. It would require fromour state maximal tension, universal mobilization and completeaccumulation of the army military
hardware, up to the last tank or aplane, in a single direction (we would have to forget such "trifles"like Talebs and Basaev, but this does
not guarantee success either).Massive nuclear strikes on basic military forces and cities of Chinawould finally be the only way out, what
would exhaust Russia'sarmament completely. We have not got another set of intercontinentalballistic missiles and submarine-based
missiles, whereas the generalforces would be extremely exhausted in the border combats. In the longrun, even if the aggression would
be stopped after the majority of theChinese are killed, our country would be absolutely unprotected against the "Chechen" and
the "Balkan" variants both, and even against the first frost of a possible nuclear winter.
CCP Collapse scenario

Chinese pollution causes CCP collapse causes conflicts throughout
the region.
Nankivell 9 Nathan Nakivell, Senior Researcher at the Office of the Special Advisor Policy,
Canadien Department of National Defence. China's Pollution and the Threat to Domestic and
Regional Stability. Asia-Pacific Journal. 3/21/2009. http://japanfocus.org/-NathanNankivell/1799
As the impact of pollution on human health becomes more obvious

and widespread, it is leading to greater political mobilization and
social unrest from those citizens who suffer the most. The latest
statement from the October 2005 Central Committee meeting in
Shanghai illustrates Beijings increasing concern regarding the
correlation between unrest and pollution issues. There were more
than 74,000 incidents of protest and unrest recorded in China in
2004, up from 58,000 the year before (Asia Times, November 16,
2004). While there are no clear statistics linking this number of
protests, riots, and unrest specifically to pollution issues, the fact that
pollution was one of four social problems linked to disharmony by the
Central Committee implies that there is at least the perception of a
strong correlation. For the CCP and neighboring states, social unrest
must be viewed as a primary security concern for three reasons: it is
creating greater political mobilization, it threatens to forge linkages
with democracy movements, and demonstrations are proving more
difficult to contain. These three factors have the potential to challenge
the CCPs total political control, thus potentially destabilizing a state
with a huge military arsenal and a history of violent, internal conflict
that cannot be downplayed or ignored. Protests are uniting a variety
of actors throughout local communities. Pollution issues are
indiscriminate. The effects, though not equally felt by each person
within a community, impact rich and poor, farmers and businessmen,
families and individuals alike. As local communities respond to
pollution issues through united opposition, it is leaving Beijing with
no easy target upon which to blame unrest, and no simple option for
how to quell whole communities with a common grievance.
Moreover, protests serve as a venue for the politically disaffected who
are unhappy with the current state of governance, and may be open to
considering alternative forms of political rule. Environmental experts
like Elizabeth Economy note that protests afford an opportunity for
the environmental movement to forge linkages with democracy
advocates. She notes in her book, The River Runs Black, that several
environmentalists argue that change is only possible through greater
democratization and notes that the environmental and democracy
movements united in Eastern Europe prior to the end of the Cold
War. It is conceivable that in this way, environmentally-motivated
protests might help to spread democracy and undermine CCP rule. A
further key challenge is trying to contain protests once they begin.
The steady introduction of new media like cell phones, email, and text
messaging are preventing Chinas authorities from silencing and

hiding unrest. Moreover, the ability to send and receive information
ensures that domestic and international observers will be made
aware of unrest, making it far more difficult for local authorities to
employ state-sanctioned force. The security ramifications of greater
social unrest cannot be overlooked. Linkages between environmental
and democracy advocates potentially challenge the Partys monolithic
control of power. In the past, similar challenges by Falun Gong and
the Tiananmen protestors have been met by force and detainment. In
an extreme situation, such as national water shortages, social unrest
could generate widespread, coordinated action and political
mobilization that would serve as a midwife to anti-CCP political
challenges, create divisions within the Party over how to deal with the
environment, or lead to a massive show of force. Any of these
outcomes would mark an erosion or alteration to the CCPs current
power dynamic. And while many would treat political change in
China, especially the implosion of the Party, as a welcome
development, it must be noted that any slippage of the Partys
dominance would most likely be accompanied by a period of
transitional violence. Though most violence would be directed toward
dissident Chinese, a ripple effect would be felt in neighboring states
through immigration, impediments to trade, and an increased
military presence along the Chinese border. All of these situations
would alter security assumptions in the region.
Extinction
Renxing 5 The CCPs Last-ditch Gamble: Biological and Nuclear War. San Renxing Aug 08,
2005. http://english.epochtimes.com/news/5-8-8/30931.html.
Since the Partys life is above all else, it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the use of biological, chemical, and
nuclear weapons in its attempt to extend its life. The CCP, which disregards human life, would not hesitate to kill two hundred
million Americans, along with seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends. These speeches let the public see the
CCP for what it really is. With evil filling its every cell the CCP intends to wage a war against humankind in its desperate attempt to
cling to life. That is the main theme of the speeches. This theme is murderous and utterly evil. In China we have seen beggars who
coerced people to give them money by threatening to stab themselves with knives or pierce their throats with long nails. But we have
never, until now, seen such a gangster who would use biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons to threaten the world , that all
will die together with him. This bloody confession has confirmed the CCPs nature: that of a monstrous murderer who has
killed 80 million Chinese people and who now plans to hold one billion people hostage and gamble with their lives.
Strong Xi=Adventurist
Strong Xi will be even more adventurist and expansionist
The Role of the Party in Foreign Policy Under Xi: Not Just Speaking about the Historic Mission, but Doing Something About it In view of the crucial
political importance of foreign policy and its often intimate links with domestic issues (something the South China Sea issue illustrates well, as will be
shown later), it is not surprising that the ruling Communist Party set the parameters and tone. The question however is how they do this, and in what
ways Chinas system differs, for instance, from a multi-party democratic system like the US or those in the European Union, or, for that matter, even
from non-democratic ones like that of Russia. The leadership at the elite level of Xi Jinping as General Secretary of the Party offers a very good
opportunity to look into this question. This is because of Xis
particular activism and interest in foreign affairs issues

be partly explained by his own political personality and the ways in which it
impacts his style of leadership something we have seen unfold since he was appointed in November 2012. But it also arises
from an historic context, one in which China not only has a greater foreign policy space and
impact, but also shows signs of being deeply conscious of this. The treatment of the South China Seas issue is
symptomatic of this change. Even in the middle of the decade from 2000 to 2010, during the era of Hu Jintao as General
Secretary of the Communist Party, it would have been surprising to hear someone state that the South China
Sea disputes were a high priority for the country. They were part of a constellation of issues left
over from the era of colonisation and Chinas hard march towards modernity , which it labels as The
Century of Humiliation. While Hong Kong and Macau had reverted to Chinese sovereignty in the late 1990s, the key issue for Hus
China was more around managing its new prominence in the world through the popular concept at that time of peaceful rise (
(see below). This activism can
heping jueqi),[8] rather than daring to stake out new territory on which to issue strong views. Tensions with Japan, which flared up on the streets in
2005, were perhaps a precursor of things to come. But tellingly, when China finally did issue something approaching a statement of its core interests
through its then state councillor for foreign affairs, the South and East China Sea did not explicitly figure.[9] Chinas
transition to becoming
the worlds second largest economy in 2010 had a psychological impact bigger than was realised at the
time, when it was noted largely as yet another statistic the country was toppling. It perhaps made the central leadership to
realise that they had a foreign policy attitude that was not suitable to their real importance and status. From
this time onwards, complaints about US containment of their strategic space started to escalate. Xi is
therefore the first leader who speaks within, and to, this context of China as a truly global actor, who is
aware of its international role and wants to state it more forcefully. This desire for greater status for China and for a
global role more commensurate with its economic importance and size has given rise to a Chinese
narrative articulated towards the world, in particular by Xi as the chief spokesperson for the Party State, which is more confident,
more aware of its core economic and political role, and more willing to state (or even, to use a more loaded word, assert) its
interests. This has been more than just rhetorical. Xi Jinping has visited 33 countries in 30 months up to September 2015,
on four continents, including three trips to Russia, three to Indonesia, two to the US, and one to India. Never before has a Chinese
leader been so active on the world state. But it is not only the fact that he has travelled so much, but also what he has said during
these trips that is particularly worthy of note. During this globetrotting he has articulated a vision of China in
which the world is seen in concentric circles around it , according to the relative rank of importance of these countries or
territories to China politically and economically. The US of course ranks in the top tier, and is accorded the moniker by Xi of a
new type of great power relations ()[10] status. Russia is also, on some accounts, accorded great power ranking,
though in a very different way than the US. Below this is the EU (Civilisational partners),[11] and then beyond it places like the Middle East (key for
Chinas energy needs)[12], Africa (increasingly important for investments and new markets), Latin America and Australia (resources). This is the world
according to Xi, as far as it can be divined from his words abroad. In this Xi ranking, Chinas own region occupies a highly distinctive place.
Relations with Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia (interestingly, only one of these,
South Korea, had he visited to as of November 2015), all contesting parties for some parts of the South and East China seas territory, have, because
of their disputed maritime borders, a
unique and intimate impact on Chinas view of itself and its role in the
world. They are foreign countries. Yet their disputes with China concern territories that the Peoples Republic
considers part of its own territory, and which for this reason figure within its domestic policy framework, not in the Chinese international realm. About
these, therefore, it uses the strident language of `non-interference in internal affairs and `non intervention, making it hard sometimes even to discuss
these issues, let alone move towards resolving them. In a far more visceral sense than the US with its constant perceived interference in terms of hard
power and political dominance, or the Europeans with their irritating claims (to the Chinese Party State at least) to universalist values and ideological
influence over a China increasingly keen to assert cultural and intellectual autonomy, Japan and its other regional partners directly erode and invade
Chinas sense of its own sovereignty by denying the historic primacy of its claims and the sense of an ancient Chinese civilisational hegemony encoded
in them. The infamous nine-dash line by which China in recent years has marked the general area it claims therefore marks not only an asserted (albeit
ambiguity, or duality, is part of the reason why an issue like

the South China Sea does not sit easily with any single decision making body within China, nor has
it proved easy about which to make flexible policy. It touches raw emotions, and relates profoundly to the sense of
who the Chinese are and how they see their new role in the world as a reborn and resurrected
nation. Even the Party State deals with these issues at its peril. This does however offer the Xi Jinping style of
leadership capital it can exploit. Xi has differentiated himself at least from his immediate predecessor, Hu
Jintao, by showing a willingness to speak to Chinese desires for status and strength in the new era, and to
appeal directly to the governments mission to right the historic injustices done to it. While Hu did refer to this historic mission of the Party, under
Xi the construction of permanent structures in the South China Sea area equates to real action, showing
the Chinese people that he is willing to do something rather than just speak, to show that China is serious
over its claims and will not give up on them. While never descending to crude nationalistic rhetoric, it is not surprising that Xis general
approach has received a wide band of public support, and has, in some constituencies at least, aroused deep
nationalist fervour, a fervour that the government has shown great ambiguity about controlling.
In an era of falling GDP growth and tough domestic politics, this offers a new source of
legitimacy for the Communist Party, and one from which it is not able to easily walk away. All at
Sea: Xi and the South China Sea The role of the Party in this policy-making environment therefore is to supply a
framework within which others can then negotiate, settle and agitate for specifics the sort of specifics articulated by the
MFA statements above. The Party, therefore, as it speaks through its ultimate elite mouthpiece, Xi, sets out commitments to the
vague) territorial border, but also a deeply emotional one. This
rhetoric of peaceful rise, the observance of consensus, limited commitment to negotiation, but utter commitment to observing Chinas sovereignty,
ensuring it never suffers humiliation again, and guarding its dignity. These abstract principles are the ones on which a body like the MFA can build
specific responses. We can look at this in practice. A report of Xi Jinping speaking at one of the occasional study days of the Politburo
(these have been a regular feature of Chinese political life at least since the time of his predecessor, Hu Jintao) in October 2013, a few months after he
had become president, had
him making the following points: That China wants to resolve its maritime
territorial disputes peacefully and through talks but will not compromise on sovereignty and has to
step up its defensive capabilities. That it adheres to the path of peaceful development, but in no
way will the country abandon its legitimate rights and interests, nor will it give up its core
national interests. That it will use peaceful means and negotiations to settle disputes and strive to safeguard peace and stability. On this,
Xi stated that, China will prepare to cope with complexities, enhance its capacity in safeguarding
maritime rights and interests, and resolutely safeguard its maritime rights and interests. In
addition to these strategic points, he also made clear that China had the ambition of becoming a maritime
power. He categorised this as an important task for China as the oceans and seas have an
increasingly important strategic status concerning global competition in the spheres of politics,
economic development, military, and scientific and technology. He also emphasized the sustainable exploitation
of marine resources, saying that exploitation and protection, as well as pollution control and ecological
remediation, should all be taken into account[13] There are two mainstream policy issues that Xi refers to more sharply in
his discourse than his predecessor Hu did, and these have been reflected in MFA statements that frame the South China Sea issue since. The first is the
general notion that China is a power with important maritime interests, simply because for Xi these are linked to the preservation of Chinas economic
interests and its security. For scholars like Robert Ross, who have argued powerfully for the ways in which China has historically tended to act as a land
based and land focussed power, this is an important change, and builds on intimations made through the 1980s by the then architect of Chinas
modernising navy, Liu Huaqing, that it needed deepwater capacity. This high-level repositioning of Chinas macro-foreign policy of course has a
trickle down effect, which helps to locate Chinese foreign policy thinking across the various interested parties, and helps various interested parties to
locate Chinese foreign policy thinking in order to justify their viewpoints and positions.[14]
Anticorruption Bad
-Stability
Xi will use cred to push anti corruption and consolidate power- that
causes lash out and East Asian instability
Laurence 5-16-16 (Anthony J,, studying an M.A. in International Relations at the Central
European University. Hong Kong Free Press: Xi Jinpings anti-graft drive is closely linked to
economic reform. https://www.hongkongfp.com/2016/05/16/xis-anti-graft-drive-closelylinked-to-economic-reform/) JTE
It has been quite an accomplishment for Xi to have spent nearly all of his political capital on
centralizing decision-making power into his hands through the working small groups in foreign affairs, security and
economic policy. Furthermore, an empowered Xi results in a more aggressive China internationally , as has been
seen in the strong-arming of British diplomats, the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, the lack of
willingness to uphold the political deal in regard to Hong Kong and Xis unwavering resolve to
recover the lost territory of Taiwan, which he has referred to as a national tragedy. All this
evidence bodes ill for the stability of East Asia, as weak states in dire economic straits tend to
lash out internationally in order to gin up nationalism as can be seen with Vladimir Putins Russia. The anticorruption campaign has allowed Xi to act in these empowered ways and it will only continue to
do so in the future. In anti-corruption trials within authoritarian regimes, there is always more than meets the eye. This is especially the case
in the notoriously opaque PRC. While China remains a proverbial black box to a certain degree, reading
between the lines shows what Xis ultimate goals are. He has purposefully tied himself to the
success of the anti-corruption campaign and, perhaps more importantly, the success of the economy through the formulation of
the Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensive and Far-Reaching Reforms, which outlines the various reform goals set out at the 18th Party
Congress. All of this is not even to mention the transformation of the largely state capitalist macro-economic planning institution, the National
Development and Reform Commission. Its former head, Liu Tienan, was also jailed on charges of corruption. Liu, like many other tigers associated
with SOEs and state capitalist macro-economic institutions rounded up by the campaign, had an explicit interest in continuing the state capitalist status
there are political

undertones in transforming the economy that make these targeted cases immensely convenient
for Xis reform agenda. Whether or not Xi will be able to pull this plan off is still up for debate. What is not however is the
extraordinary impact Xi has had on the politics and economy of China both of which are
inextricably tied to his success.
quo opposed to liberal economic reforms. This is not to say these officials werent actually corrupt, but rather
East Asia is a powder keg- Instability guarantees nuclear war

Tan 15 (January, Andrew Tan, Associate Professor PhD (Sydney), M Phil (Cambridge), B Soc
Science (Hons) (NUS), BA (NUS) School of Social Sciences, Security and Conflict in East Asia,
Google Books, pgs. 3-4) //ZB
The high tensions in East Asia, the highest since the end of the Second World War have led to
fears of open conflict involving the states in the region as well as extra-regional powers, in
particular the USA. By early 2013 tensions between North Korea on the one hand, and South
Korea, the USA and Japan, on the other, had deteriorated to their worst level since the end of
the Korean War in 1953, sparking fears of an accidental war due to North Koreas brinkmanship
and political miscalculation (ICG 2013a). Tensions between the People's Republic of China and
Japan were also at their highest since the end of the Second World War due to their dispute over
the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands (Hughes 2013). More seriously. China, the USA and North Korea
possess nuclear weapons, and Japan has always been regarded as a threshold nuclear power, as
it possesses plutonium stocks generated through its power industry, ballistic missile capability
and the technology to rapidly transform itself into a significant nuclear weapons power should it
choose to do so (Rublee 2010: 62-63). South Korea could also be forced to develop its own
nuclear weapons if the threat from a hostile, aggressive and unpredictable North Korea
continues to grow as it develops its nuclear, chemical and biological weapons capabilities, and
uses them to coerce South Korea (AVu* York Times 2013). The impact of any regional conflict
in East Asia will be significant and global. Any conflict in this region would involve not only
states in the region and US allies from further afield, but also quickly escalate into a nuclear
conflict, given the superiority that the USA enjoys in terms of conventional warfare capabilities
over North Korea, and to a diminishing degree China, thus forcing them to resort to nonconventional means, such as nuclear weapons, in any major conflict. Indeed, the US strategy of
Air-Sea Battle, which involves attacking Chinas surveillance, intelligence and command
systems, are likely to be interpreted by China as attempts to disarm its nuclear strike capability
and could thus lead to a quick and unwanted escalation into a nuclear conflict (Schreer 2013).
Moreover, today the centre of the global economy no longer resides in Europe or North America
but in Asia, in particular, East Asia. Indeed, three of the key actors in the region, namely the
USA, China and Japan, are also the three largest economies in the world, with South Korea
ranked 15th in global terms, according to the World Bank. Any conflict in East Asia will
therefore have a profound, global economic impact. Furthermore, the fact that any conflict could
escalate into a major war, including nuclear war, means that conflict in East Asia will have
global implications as well as uncertain consequences for the international system.
-Power Consolidation
Anti-corruption campaign breaks up political stability and balance of
power in China-Xi wants to be Mao
Page 15 (Jeremy Page, China Anticorruption Campaign Targets Party Cliques, March 2, 2015 5:33 p.m. ET,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-anticorruption-campaign-targets-party-cliques-1425335633, 7/27/16, GK)
BEIJINGThe
annual meeting of Chinas legislature, usually a time for shows of political unity, is
taking place this year amid a campaign to rid the Communist Party of the factions that have long
dominated its inner workings. President Xi Jinpings war on graft unprecedented in scopebegan in
recent months to more overtly target what the leadership calls cliques of officials with common
political or economic interests. The biggest targets, retired security chief Zhou Yongkang and Ling Jihua, a long-serving aide to
Mr. Xis predecessor, have been accused in state media of playing factional politics. Mr. Xis boosters argue that he is
finally ridding the party of cliques that are technically banned and have long caused infighting,
graft and scandals. The skeptics view is that Mr. Xi, who took power in 2012, is disrupting the informal
mechanisms through which Chinas diverse interest groups influence policy and prevent
authoritarian excess. Some political analysts and foreign diplomats say Mr. Xi is himself engaging in
factionalism, by filling top posts with his allies. Ultimately, they say, Mr. Xi is trying to stack the deck
for a leadership change in 2017, when five of the seven-man Politburo Standing Committee, the apex decision-making
body, are expected to retire, adhering to unofficial age limits. Mr. Xi and Premier Li Keqiang can serve until 2022. For those retiring
in 2017, its a safe bet not to challenge Xi Jinping. Bo Zhiyue The
corruption fight reached deeper into Chinas

armed forces Monday as the military reported that 14 generals were either placed under
investigation or convicted by authorities in recent months. Those named ranged from a vice political commissar with
the nuclear missile force to the deputy chief of staff of the North Sea Fleet. Though the nature of most offenses wasnt specified,
many were accused of serious violations of discipline, a common catchphrase for corruption. By trying to purge cliques, Mr .
Xi is
reversing the decades-old practice of collective leadership, in which top leaders had equal status
and represented their own networks of patrons and protgs. Its also another step in Mr. Xis
rise as Chinas most powerful leader since the early 1990s. For those retiring in 2017, its a safe bet not to
challenge Xi Jinping, said Bo Zhiyue, an expert on Chinese politics at the Victoria University of Wellington in New Zealand.
Theyre not going to play a balancing role because they want to look after their families beyond 2017. The legislature, the National
Peoples Congress, which opens its annual session Thursday, is expected primarily to display support for Mr. Xi. The congress, which
is controlled by the party and largely powerless, is significant because it approves budget and economic plans, and could provide
details of Mr. Xis program to strengthen the rule of law. The run-up to this years meeting, however, has seen a marked absence of
the policy proposals and public debate the congresss almost 3,000 members previously engaged in to try to make the body more
relevant. If
youre trying to strengthen rule of law but at the same time youre throwing people in
jail left and right, its difficult to credibly commit to people that its OK to participate in politics,
said Rory Truex, a Princeton University political science expert who has written a book on the congresss role. Theres an inherent
tension there, he said. Some delegates in previous years, he said, had proposed requiring officials to declare their assets publicly,
but several activists were recently detained for advocating the idea. Id be curious to see if there are any deputies still speaking up
on those issues. My bet is there arent, Mr. Truex said. Since taking power, Mr. Xi
has tried to centralize authority in

his own hands, Chinese officials and scholars say. A Politburo Standing Committee meeting in January
said the legislature and other state institutions should act consistently with Mr. Xis leadership
in ideology, in politics and in action. Xi Jinping is trying to assume the role of leadership even
over the legislatures affairs, said Mr. Bo, the Victoria University professor. The campaign against factions has
made it doubly risky for senior party figures to take initiatives or strengthen the institutions they
lead. Factions have been present since the partys earliest days and have been blamed for some
of Communist rules worse excesses. The radical Gang of Four was held responsible for the
chaos of the 1966-76 Cultural Revolution. Since the death of revolutionary patriarch Mao Zedong, though, some
party insiders say, factions have helped to maintain a balance of power in an increasingly diverse
society and economy. In Mr. Xis campaign against factions, state media have taken the unusual
step of naming some of the groupings, alongside charts mapping their structure . Those named include
the secretary clique of former aides to senior leaders and the oil clique of officials linked to the energy industry, many of whom
had worked with Mr. Zhou, the retired security official. Then theres the Shanxi clique of figures hailing from Shanxi province, the
home province of Mr. Ling, the aide to former President Hu Jintao. Mr. Lings political career was doomed after he attempted to
cover up the death of his son in a high-speed Ferrari crash in 2012, according to party insiders. Many experts, however, say the
crucial issue isnt whether Mr. Xi amasses power but rather how he does so and what he accomplishes with it. Promoting his own
allies doesnt matter if he follows procedures and consolidates institutional power, said Huang Jing, an expert on Chinese politics at
the National University of Singapore. But if
it just reinforces his personal authority, that would be very

dangerous. Thats what Chairman Mao did.
Anticorruption lets Xi consolidate power

Yuen 14 (Samson Yuen, student at Oxford University and a research assistant at the French Centre for Research
on Contemporary China (CEFC), studies the citys politics and social movements and is co-editing a book on the
Umbrella Movement, articles in China Perspectives, The Diplomat, Twenty-First Century, Mingpao, The Stand News,
Hong Kong Economic Journal, and Hong Kong Economic Journal Monthly, commentator on Chinese politics. Prior
to joining academia, management consultant and traveled, B.A. in Economics from the University of Chicago and an
M.Phil. in Politics (Comparative Government) from Oxford University, Disciplining the Party: Xi Jinping's anticorruption campaign and its limits, CEFC, 2014,
https://www.academia.edu/8338769/Disciplining_the_Party_Xi_Jinpings_anticorruption_campaign_and_its_limits)
The anti-corruption
drive makes reform easier in a variety of ways. It lets Xi promote pro-reformist

allies to replace purged officials, but also cows others into backing (or at least not opposing) more ambitious reforms. A
Reuters report to which Shannon Tiezzi referred suggests that Xi is hop-ing that removing corrupt officials and
those resisting change will allowhim to consolidate his grip on power and implement difficult
economic, judicial and military reforms that he believes are vital to perpetuate one-party rule. It
quoted well-connected sources that revealed Xis plan topromote some 200 reform-minded officials from Zhejiang Province, where
he served as Party secretary from 2002 to 2007, to senior Party positions in the coming years. Indeed, some observers have argued
that the
anti-corruption campaign will allow Xi to accumulate political capital and pre-pare for
the next leadeship reshuffle in the 2017 Party plenum. The far-reaching campaign is not without internal resistance,
however. Accord-ing to the Financial Times , retired leaders Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao have reportedly
urged Xi to rein in the anti-corruption campaign, warning him not to take on too many of the
powerful families or patronage networks at the top of the party hierarchy.
-CCP
Anticorruption agenda causes CCP collapse-5 reasons
SHAMBAUGH 15 (DAVID, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs;
Director, China Policy Program, http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-coming-chinese-crack-up1425659198, The Coming Chinese Crackup: The endgame of communist rule in China has
begun, and Xi Jinpings ruthless measures are only bringing the country closer to a breaking
point-by Sophia Ghauri)
On Thursday, the National Peoples Congress convened in Beijing in what has become a familiar annual ritual. Some 3,000 elected
delegates from all over the countryranging from colorfully clad ethnic minorities to urbane billionaireswill meet for a week to
discuss the state of the nation and to engage in the pretense of political participation. Some see this impressive gathering as a sign of
the strength of the Chinese political systembut it masks serious
weaknesses. Chinese politics has always had a

theatrical veneer, with staged events like the congress intended to project the power and
stability of the Chinese Communist Party, or CCP. Officials and citizens alike know that they are supposed to
conform to these rituals, participating cheerfully and parroting back official slogans. This behavior is known in Chinese as biaotai,
declaring where one stands, but it is little more than an act of symbolic compliance. Despite appearances, Chinas political system
is badly broken, and nobody knows it better than the Communist Party itself. Chinas
strongman leader, Xi Jinping, is

hoping that a crackdown on dissent and corruption will shore up the partys rule. He is determined to
avoid becoming the Mikhail Gorbachev of China, presiding over the partys collapse. But instead of being the antithesis of Mr.
Gorbachev, Mr. Xi may well wind up having the same effect. His
despotism is severely stressing Chinas system

and societyand bringing it closer to a breaking point . Predicting the demise of authoritarian regimes is a risky
business. Few Western experts forecast the collapse of the Soviet Union before it occurred in 1991; the CIA missed it entirely. The
downfall of Eastern Europes communist states two years earlier was similarly scorned as the wishful thinking of anticommunists
until it happened. The post-Soviet color revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan from 2003 to 2005, as well as the 2011
Arab Spring uprisings, all burst forth unanticipated. China-watchers have been on high alert for telltale signs of regime decay and
decline ever since the regimes near-death experience in Tiananmen Square in 1989. Since then, several seasoned Sinologists have
risked their professional reputations by asserting that the collapse of CCP rule was inevitable. Others were more cautiousmyself
included. But times change in China, and so must our analyses. The endgame of Chinese communist rule has now begun, I believe,
and it has progressed further than many think. We dont know what the pathway from now until the end will look like, of course. It
will probably be highly unstable and unsettled. But until the system begins to unravel in some obvious way, those inside of it will
play alongthus contributing to the facade of stability. Communist rule in China is unlikely to end quietly. A single event is unlikely
to trigger a peaceful implosion of the regime. Its demise is likely to be protracted, messy and violent. I wouldnt rule out the
possibility that Mr. Xi will be deposed in a power struggle or coup dtat. With
his aggressive anticorruption

campaigna focus of this weeks National Peoples Congresshe is overplaying a weak hand and
deeply aggravating key party, state, military and commercial constituencies. The Chinese have a
proverb, waiying, neiruanhard on the outside, soft on the inside . Mr. Xi is a genuinely tough ruler. He exudes
conviction and personal confidence. But this hard personality belies a party and political system
that is extremely fragile on the inside. Consider five telling indications of the regimes
vulnerability and the partys systemic weaknesses. First, Chinas economic elites have one foot out
the door, and they are ready to flee en masse if the system really begins to crumble. In 2014,
Shanghais Hurun Research Institute, which studies Chinas wealthy, found that 64% of the high net worth individuals whom it
polled393 millionaires and billionaireswere either emigrating or planning to do so. Rich Chinese are sending their children to
study abroad in record numbers (in itself, an indictment of the quality of the Chinese higher-education system). Just this week, the
Journal reported, federal agents searched several Southern California locations that U.S. authorities allege are linked to
multimillion-dollar birth-tourism businesses that enabled thousands of Chinese women to travel here and return home with infants
born as U.S. citizens. Wealthy Chinese are also buying property abroad at record levels and prices, and they are parking their
financial assets overseas, often in well-shielded tax havens and shell companies. Meanwhile, Beijing is trying to extradite back to
China a large number of alleged financial fugitives living abroad. When a countrys elitesmany of them party membersflee in
Second, since taking

office in 2012, Mr. Xi has greatly intensified the political repression that has blanketed China
since 2009. The targets include the press, social media, film, arts and literature, religious
groups, the Internet, intellectuals, Tibetans and Uighurs, dissidents, lawyers, NGOs, university
such large numbers, it is a telling sign of lack of confidence in the regime and the countrys future.
students and textbooks. The Central Committee sent a draconian order known as Document No. 9 down through the party
hierarchy in 2013, ordering all units to ferret out any seeming endorsement of the Wests universal valuesincluding
constitutional democracy, civil society, a free press and neoliberal economics. A
more secure and confident

government would not institute such a severe crackdown. It is a symptom of the party
leaderships deep anxiety and insecurity. Third, even many regime loyalists are just going
through the motions. It is hard to miss the theater of false pretense that has permeated the
Chinese body politic for the past few years. Last summer, I was one of a handful of foreigners (and the only
American) who attended a conference about the China Dream, Mr. Xis signature concept, at a party-affiliated think tank in
Beijing. We sat through two days of mind-numbing, nonstop presentations by two dozen party scholarsbut their faces were frozen,
their body language was wooden, and their boredom was palpable. They feigned compliance with the party and their leaders latest
mantra. But it was evident that the propaganda had lost its power, and the emperor had no clothes. In December, I was back in
Beijing for a conference at the Central Party School, the partys highest institution of doctrinal instruction, and once again, the
countrys top officials and foreign policy experts recited their stock slogans verbatim. During lunch one day, I went to the campus
bookstorealways an important stop so that I can update myself on what Chinas leading cadres are being taught. Tomes on the
stores shelves ranged from Lenins Selected Works to Condoleezza Rices memoirs, and a table at the entrance was piled high with
copies of a pamphlet by Mr. Xi on his campaign to promote the mass linethat is, the partys connection to the masses. How is
this selling? I asked the clerk. Oh, its not, she replied. We give it away. The size of the stack suggested it was hardly a hot item.
Fourth, the corruption that riddles the party-state and the military also pervades Chinese society
as a whole. Mr. Xis anticorruption campaign is more sustained and severe than any previous
one, but no campaign can eliminate the problem. It is stubbornly rooted in the single-party system, patron-client
networks, an economy utterly lacking in transparency, a state-controlled media and the absence of the rule of law. Moreover, Mr.
Xis campaign is turning out to be at least as much a selective purge as an antigraft campaign. Many of its targets to date have been
political clients and allies of former Chinese leader Jiang Zemin. Now 88, Mr. Jiang is still the godfather figure of Chinese politics.
Going after Mr. Jiangs patronage network while he is still alive is highly risky for Mr. Xi, particularly since Mr. Xi doesnt seem to
have brought along his own coterie of loyal clients to promote into positions of power. Another
problem: Mr. Xi, a child

of Chinas first-generation revolutionary elites, is one of the partys princelings, and his
political ties largely extend to other princelings. This silver-spoon generation is widely reviled in
Chinese society at large. Finally, Chinas economyfor all the Western views of it as an
unstoppable juggernautis stuck in a series of systemic traps from which there is no easy exit. In
November 2013, Mr. Xi presided over the partys Third Plenum, which unveiled a huge package of proposed economic reforms, but
so far, they are sputtering on the launchpad. Yes, consumer spending has been rising, red tape has been reduced, and some fiscal
reforms have been introduced, but overall, Mr. Xis ambitious goals have been stillborn .
The reform package challenges

powerful, deeply entrenched interest groupssuch as state-owned enterprises and local party
cadresand they are plainly blocking its implementation. These five increasingly evident cracks
in the regimes control can be fixed only through political reform. Until and unless China relaxes
its draconian political controls, it will never become an innovative society and a knowledge
economya main goal of the Third Plenum reforms. The political system has become the primary impediment
to Chinas needed social and economic reforms. If Mr. Xi and party leaders dont relax their grip, they may be
summoning precisely the fate they hope to avoid. In the decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the upper
reaches of Chinas leadership have been obsessed with the fall of its fellow communist giant. Hundreds of Chinese postmortem
analyses have dissected the causes of the Soviet disintegration. Mr. Xis real China Dream has been to avoid the Soviet nightmare.
Just a few months into his tenure, he gave a telling internal speech ruing the Soviet Unions demise and bemoaning Mr. Gorbachevs
betrayals, arguing that Moscow had lacked a real man to stand up to its reformist last leader. Mr. Xis wave of repression today is
meant to be the opposite of Mr. Gorbachevs perestroika and glasnost. Instead of opening up, Mr. Xi is doubling down on controls
over dissenters, the economy and even rivals within the party. But reaction and repression arent Mr. Xis only option. His
predecessors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, drew very different lessons from the Soviet collapse. From 2000 to 2008, they instituted
policies intended to open up the system with carefully limited political reforms. They strengthened local party committees and
experimented with voting for multicandidate party secretaries. They recruited more businesspeople and intellectuals into the party.
They expanded party consultation with nonparty groups and made the Politburos proceedings more transparent. They improved
feedback mechanisms within the party, implemented more meritocratic criteria for evaluation and promotion, and created a system
of mandatory midcareer training for all 45 million state and party cadres. They enforced retirement requirements and rotated
officials and military officers between job assignments every couple of years. In effect, for a while Mr. Jiang and Mr. Hu sought to
manage change, not to resist it. But Mr. Xi wants none of this. Since 2009 (when even the heretofore open-minded Mr. Hu changed
course and started to clamp down), an increasingly anxious regime has rolled back every single one of these political reforms (with
the exception of the cadre-training system). These reforms were masterminded by Mr. Jiangs political acolyte and former vice
president, Zeng Qinghong, who retired in 2008 and is now under suspicion in Mr. Xis anticorruption campaignanother symbol of
Mr. Xis hostility to the measures that might ease the ills of a crumbling system. Some experts think that Mr. Xis harsh tactics may
actually presage a more open and reformist direction later in his term. I dont buy it. This leader and regime see politics in zero-sum
terms: Relaxing control, in their view, is a sure step toward the demise of the system and their own downfall. They also take the
conspiratorial view that the U.S. is actively working to subvert Communist Party rule. None of this suggests that sweeping reforms
are just around the corner. We cannot predict when Chinese communism will collapse, but it is hard not to conclude that we are
witnessing its final phase. The
CCP is the worlds second-longest ruling regime (behind only North

Korea), and no party can rule forever. Looking ahead, China-watchers should keep their eyes on the regimes
instruments of control and on those assigned to use those instruments. Large numbers of citizens and party members alike are
already voting with their feet and leaving the country or displaying their insincerity by pretending to comply with party dictates. We
should watch for the day when the regimes propaganda agents and its internal security apparatus start becoming lax in enforcing
the partys writor when they begin to identify with dissidents, like the East German Stasi agent in the film The Lives of Others
who came to sympathize with the targets of his spying. When human empathy starts to win out over ossified authority, the endgame
of Chinese communism will really have begun. Dr. Shambaugh is a professor of international affairs and the director of the China
Policy Program at George Washington University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. His books include
Chinas Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation and, most recently, China Goes Global: The Partial Power.
-Investment
Anti-Corruption is slowing growth and deterring investment
Hewitt 3-22-16 (Duncan, Shanghai correspondent for Newsweek/IBT Media, previously a
BBC correspondent in Beijng and Shanghai, and also worked for the BBC World Service in
London, focusing on East and Southeast Asia. He studied Chinese at Edinburgh University.
International Buisness Times: How Chinas Anti-Corruption Campaign Is Putting Pressure On
A Slowing Economy. http://www.ibtimes.com/how-chinas-anti-corruption-campaign-puttingpressure-slowing-economy-2308834) JTE
But while the massive campaign which has led to the arrest of some 100 officials of ministerial or provincial leadership rank,
known as "tigers," and tens of thousands more known as "flies," at lower levels has been popular with Chinas citizenry, critics
warn the crackdown is
hitting Chinas growth and could undermine current attempts to stimulate the
slowing economy with new infrastructure projects. Xi has been keen to assuage these concerns. At the start of the
annual meeting of Chinas legislature and its advisory body this month, the Chinese president took the unusual step of meeting with
a group of private entrepreneur delegates and reassured them that their contribution to the nations economy was valued and would
be protected. He also called on government officials to maintain links with businesses, saying they should stay in touch with private
enterprises ... and be proactive in helping them to solve their difficulties, while also reiterating that such contacts must be clean
and both sides should avoid bribery. Observers said that Xis
appeal to officials was a rare and tacit

acknowledgment from the top that the anti-corruption campaign, and the austere new discipline
rules for officials that accompany it, have had some negative effects on an economy already
buffeted by the global slowdown. In particular, Chinese media and analysts have warned that the repeated
arrests of local officials accused of corrupt links with entrepreneurs mean that some officials
have taken fright and cut contacts with businesses and businesspeople, leading to the
suspension of investment projects.
-Stalls Agenda
Anti-Corruption stalls rest of agenda- environmental and health care
reform
Huang 5-25-15 (Yanzhong, Senior Fellow for Global Health at the Council on Foreign
Relations. The Diplomat: The Anti-Corruption Drive and Risk of Policy Paralysis in China
http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/the-anti-corruption-drive-and-risk-of-policy-paralysis-inchina/) JTE
These developments
have profound implications for the public policy process in China. As fighting
corruption becomes a top priority in China, other important agenda items such as tackling the
environmental crisis and deepening healthcare reform might end up on the back burner. Lowerlevel government officials, being wary about their personal security in the campaign, would
officially bandwagon with Xi, or at least pay lip service to his preferred policy agenda . But in reality,
they would balk at making any moves that would be interpreted by their colleagues as ambitious attempts to seek personal
advantages or threaten the latters vested interests. As
a result, not taking phone calls and not writing

instructions on documents becomes the new normal in the policy process . In May 2014, Premier Li
Keqiang at a State Council executive meeting assailed this phenomenon of holding an office and enjoying all the privileges without
doing a stroke of work. The
problem of government inaction and policy gridlock is particularly serious

at the grassroots level. According to the party secretary of Shanxi Province, in 2014 there was a 60 percent increase in the
amount of petitions and offense reports targeting officials at the township level, but the filed charges actually dropped over the same
period; during 2013-2014, 20 percent of the townships failed to investigate any corruption cases. In order to address this policy
paralysis, the central leadership should seriously consider limiting the objectives of the anti-corruption campaign and incorporating
it into the track of rule of law.
Anti-corruption campaign slows Chinas political process

Leigh-Moses 1/8 (Russell Leigh-Moses, as been an academic teaching Chinese politics for more than 20 years,
for most of that time in China. He has been a columnist for China Real Time Since 2010, Three Political Questions
Looming Over Chinas Leadership in 2016 The Wall Street Journal, Jan 8, 2016 5:25 am,
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2016/01/08/three-political-questions-looming-over-chinas-leadership-in2016/, GK)But theres also a political risk. Already, the current crusade has compelled many officials to
hunker down and sit on their hands to avoid attracting attention a phenomenon that has
slowed policymaking. Likewise, many developers remain wary of starting new projects that might aid
an ailing economy because theyre still not sure whats permissible in the new environment .
Broadening the anti-graft campaign could handcuff policymaking even further, because cadres
will spend time looking over their shoulders, and entrepreneurs, wondering about political
support, will wait until the dust settles before embarking on new commercial initiatives.
-Military Modernization
Anti Corruption is key to Xis military modernization efforts
Grossman and Chase 4-21-16 (Derick, B.A. in Political Science and Asian Studies,
University of Michigan; M.A. in U.S. National Security Policy, Georgetown University and
Senior Project Associate at Rand Corporation, and Michael, B.A. in political science, Brandeis
University; M.A. in China studies, Johns Hopkins University SAIS; Ph.D. in international
relations, Johns Hopkins University, and a senior political scientist at RAND. RAND: Xi's
Purge of the Military Prepares the Chinese Army for Confrontation
http://www.rand.org/blog/2016/04/xis-purge-of-the-military-prepares-the-chinesearmy.html) JTE
Much has been made of Chinese leader Xi Jinping's flurry of announcements in recent months signaling major structural reforms to
the People's Liberation Army (PLA), scheduled for completion by 2020. While understanding the details of Xi's reforms is critical to
assessing the direction of PLA modernization going forward, it is also necessary to consider the broader implications of the apparent
nature of Xi's relationship with the military. Many observers have stated the obvious: Xi, who serves concurrently as China's
is as
large and in charge in military circles as he is in Chinese politics more generally . This certainly
appears to be true, but the manner in which he holds sway over the PLA is worthy of more attention than it has received. Xi is
relying on an unprecedented anti-corruption campaign, echoing Mao Zedong's dictum that the party
commands the gun, and implementing a sweeping reorganization of the PLA to ensure his personal dominance over
the military and to strengthen its ability to deter or win future wars . When Xi assumed power in November
2012, he vowed to fight both tigers and flies a reference to taking on corrupt leaders at the highest levels as well
as lower-level bureaucrats engaged in corrupt practices throughout the Chinese system, and the PLA would be no
exception. The first shot over the bow came against the tigers. In 2014, Xi arrested a former CMC vice chairman, Xu Caihou, for
President, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC),
participating in a cash for ranks scheme. After expelling Xu from the party, Xi followed up in 2015 with the arrest and purge of
another former CMC vice chairman, Guo Boxiong, on similar charges. The arrests were unprecedented in that Xu and Guo were the
two highest-ranking officers in China's military when they served as CMC Vice chairmen, and their arrests marked the first time the
PLA's highest-level retired officers faced corruption charges. As of early March 2016, Xi's
anti-corruption campaign had
reportedly resulted in the arrest of at least 60 military officers , although the actual numbers could be higher.
The military anti-corruption drive is part of a much broader dragnetall told, throughout China, more than 1,600 individuals are
either under investigation for corruption or have been arrested, purged, or sentenced since Xi came to power. Xi's immediate
predecessors, Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin, were concerned about corruption, but neither had the stature among the top brass to
target the upper echelons of the PLA with such daring. Xi appears to believe that a lack of civilian leadership intervention, especially
under Hu and Jiang, has resulted in a substantial drift of the PLA away from the party oversight Mao famously identified as so
crucial. This, in Xi's view, explains why the PLA became so pervasively corrupt under his predecessors. Xi
therefore instills
fear in his senior military officers by reminding them that his status as the most powerful
Chinese leader in decades allows him to intervene at will to curb the PLA's excesses. Xi drew a direct
line between Mao and the present at a major meeting in November 2014. In commemoration of the 85 th anniversary of the Gutian
Congress at which Mao first affirmed the party's absolute control over the military in 1929, Xi convened 420 of his most senior
officers to meet in the small town of Gutian in southeastern Fujian Province. To our knowledge, this was the first time a PRC leader
reconvened military leadership at Gutian since Mao's famous meeting theresymbolism that was certainly not lost on the top brass.
Besides the obvious deference to Mao, Gutian's message was also very much derived from Mao's conceptualization of the proper
balance between the party and military. Prior reading material, for example, reaffirmed the unassailable and preeminent position
the party has over the military. This set the stage for Xi to implicitly convey to all in attendance that they too could become victims of
the anticorruption campaign is probably the most important source of Xi's power over the PLA. Another is
his anti-corruption campaign, just as General Xu had a few months earlier, if they refused to toe the line. Indeed,
a sweeping reorganization of the military that has the potential to be the most important in the PLA's history. The new system aims
to place the services on a more even footing in the traditionally army-dominated PLA and enable the military to more effectively
harness space, cyberspace and electronic warfare capabilities. It also establishes new theater commands to enhance the PLA's
readiness and strengthen its deterrence and warfighting capabilities. Importantly, despite some speculation to the contrary,
Xi's
assertion of control over the military in the form of the anti-corruption campaign and
organizational reforms is more likely to enhance than it is to impede the PLA's ongoing
modernization efforts. Part of Xi's China Dream is to produce a strong military capable of
deterring, or if necessary taking on powerful potential adversaries, including even the United
States. Xi wants a PLA that demonstrates utmost loyalty to the party, but he also wants a far
more competent and operationally capable PLA by 2020, one that is commensurate with China's
status as a major world power and capable of protecting China's regional and global interests. If
his aspirations are realized, Xi's reformed PLA will soon be capable of posing an even more
potent challenge to China's neighbors, and to U.S. objectives and strategy in the region.
Corruption is the only thing holding back modernization efforts

Banerjee 15 (Brinda, November 26, 2015, a researcher working on security, armed conflict
and military policies. She holds a Bachelors in Journalism (with Honors), a Masters in Peace
and Conflict Studies and is currently pursuing her Ph.D. in state responses to internal conflict.
ValueWalk: China Plans Military Modernization, Downsizes PLA
http://www.valuewalk.com/2015/11/china-plans-military-modernization-downsizes-pla/) JTE
As the supreme commander of the Peoples Liberation Army, President Jinpings interest in strengthening the Chinese military is
not surprising. Sources in Beijing share that President
Jinping is particularly interested in removing all

traces of corruption from the military before revamping it and launching the new structure. The
president hopes to breathe new life into the Chinese military once the reforms are introduced
and in order to be able to do so he is making sure that any and all risks are tackled upfront. In
keeping with this reasoning, President Jinping has introduced severe anti-corruption laws and launched
anti-corruption drives in the last two years. President Jinpings resolve to eradicate corruption was cemented when
the administration ousted two vice-chairmen of the Central Military Commission. Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou were tried and
proven guilty on charges of corruption and they have been removed from office along with their cohorts.
-Economy
Anti-corruption causes Macro and Micro effects on the economy
Sudworth, 2014 [John, Reporter at BBC News Shanghai, 4-3-14,
http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-china-blog-26864134]
According to a report published by Bank of America Merrill Lynch this week ,
the Chinese government's anti-graft

campaign could cost the economy more than $100bn this year alone. Many of the micro effects
of Xi Jingping's anti-corruption drive have already been well documented of course; a slowdown
in the restaurant trade for example, and a big dip in sales of luxury goods. Over the past year or so, in
Shanghai's posh malls and boutique designer shops - once at the centre of the happy merry-go-round of official largesse and gift
giving - you've almost been able to hear the sound of the weeping and gnashing of teeth. But
the BofAML report suggests

that the campaign is also having a significant and troubling macroeconomic effect. Since early
last year, it says, government bank deposits have been soaring, up almost 30% year on year.
Even honest officials, the report suggests, are now so terrified of starting new projects, for fear of
being seen as corrupt, that they're simply keeping public funds in the bank. The total cost to the
economy of the prohibition on government consumption and the chill on administrative
spending is an estimated reduction in growth of at least 0.6% this year. But it could, the report
argues, be as high as 1.5% which, by my rough calculation, gives us the figure of about $135bn of
lost economic activity. The report's authors admit their calculations are a "back-of-the-envelope estimate of fiscal
contraction", but even if they are only half right it is an extraordinary amount of money and it highlights some of the challenges
facing China's anti-corruption crusader-in-chief, President Xi Jinping. Since taking office more than a year ago he has made the
cause his defining goal, warning that official graft and extravagance threaten the very survival of the ruling Communist Party.
-Luxury Goods
Anti-corruption damages luxury goods industry
Hsu, 2016 [Sara, Assistant Professor of Economics at the State University of New York at New
Paltz and Research Director at the Asia Financial Risk Think Tank in Hong Kong, Writer for The
Diplomat, 4-5-16, http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/any-luxe-left-for-china/]
Chinas anti-corruption campaign has dented consumers purchases of luxury goods for more than
three years, and now restrictions on cross-border online purchases of luxury goods may further
adversely impact the industry. What will become of the luxury goods industry in China? According to Bain and Co.,
Chinese consumers spent 2 percent less on luxury goods in 2015. Luxury goods for social gifting, particularly
mens wear, watches, and leather goods, took a hit during the corruption crackdown. Qian and Wen (2015) estimate
that the corruption campaign negatively impacted luxury imports by 13.3 percent. New tax
measures on luxury items purchased online may further dampen the industry. Cross-border ecommerce, which includes luxury goods from abroad, will be taxed at levels of over 2,000 RMB
for single purchases, and at over 20,000 RMB per person per year starting on April 8. Taxes on
luxury goods in particular will be increased to 60 percent. Purchase of luxury goods online in China is often less
expensive than in brick and mortar stores, but this may change as taxes rise.
-Suicide
Anti-corruption causes suicide
Sison, 2016 [Desiree, News Reporter for CHINATOPIX, 6-15-16,
http://www.chinatopix.com/articles/92027/20160615/suicide-cases-among-chinese-civil-servantsaccused-of-graft-are-on-the-rise.htm]
More Chinese government officials suspected of committing graft and corruption are taking
their lives, the Communist Party of China (CPC) said on Tuesday. On Sunday, two civil servants suspected of
embezzling government funds committed suicide. Chinese state-run media reported that Liu Xiaohua, a highranking official in the Guangzhou province, hanged himself in his home on Sunday, days after learning that he was set to be
interrogated by the party for corruption. On the same day, Xiao Bibo, the head of the secret protection bureau of the Yantian district,
committed suicide by jumping to her death from a bridge in the northeastern part of the district. Motives Although police are still
investigating the motives behind the suicides, the communist party has started to look into the rising cases of suicide among
government officials accused of corruption since last year. According to an editorial published recently by the Chinese official paper,
Guangming Daily, under the presidency of Hu Jintao, there was only 68 cases of suicide in a span of
nine years, from 2003 and 2012. However, under the leadership of President Xi Jinping, who
has stepped up China's anti-corruption campaign, suicide cases have risen tremendously among
government officials suspected of graft. In the first two years of Xi's presidency, up to 77
government officials accused of corruption reportedly killed themselves . Anti-corruption campaign
Experts have noted that President Xi's far-reaching anti-corruption campaign has spared no one in government including people in
the military and state-owned companies and industries. Human rights lawyer Yuan Yulai said it was not surprising that the
suspected officials took their lives even before they could be interrogated by the communist party's corruption watchdog. The
interrogation, known as shuanggui, has been described as 'dark' as suspects are held incommunicado for an undetermined duration
of time before they are turned over to the prosecutors to be formally charged. "Being hardline and suppressive of ordinary people,
some officials found themselves, in turn, subject to the same treatment when they faced fellow officials with higher ranking," Yuan
said. A large number of officials suspected of graft had opted for suicide in a bid to protect their
families and kin from being subjected to intense scrutiny by investigators and prosecutors. Under
the law, it is only a court judge and not the CCDI who determines whether a suspect is guilty. Yuan said that if the accused
dies before or during the trial, all judicial proceedings against the suspect are stopped, and the
case, as well as the accompanying investigation, is terminated.
A2-Businesses Adapt
Adaptation doesnt check- too slow
International Business Times: How Chinas Anti-Corruption Campaign Is Putting Pressure On
Yet some still worry that the adaptation to a cleaner economy will be drawn out and painful:
We used to be able to take officials out to dinner to discuss business, but now they wont talk to
you, grumbled one businessman from southern Guangdong province, whose business has
slumped. Another noted that luxury restaurants in some cities in the region have lost a lot of
business. Civil servants are afraid of being photographed in nice restaurants, he said. The
urban planner suggested that without such channels, some Chinese businesspeople, and
officials, simply do not know how to make deals. Until they establish [a] proper process its
going to be a problem, he said. Many people in China dont know how to do normal business,
how to contact officials, where to go ... They used to do it all at the dinner table!
A2-Its Working
Xi wants to maintain power- sacrificial of millions through a failed
anti-corruption movement
Daly 5/11/16 (Robert Daly- director of the Kissinger Institute on China and the United States
at the Wilson Center., The Mixed Rationales and Mixed Results of Xi Jinpings Anticorruption
Campaign- Wilson Center): https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/the-mixed-rationales-andmixed-results-xi-jinpings-anticorruption-campaign#sthash.YEJolvr1.dpuf - triscuit
Since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, the hallmark of his leadership and greatest source of his popularity has been a relentless
anticorruption campaign. Three years in, Xis
crusade is gaining steam. Approximately 750,000 of the

Chinese Communist Partys (CCP) 88 million members have been punished following
investigations by Xis Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), a powerful body that is part
inspector-general and part ideological watchdog. Twice as many party members were prosecuted in 2015 as
in 2013. No Chinese or foreign critic claims that Xi is mistaken about the scale of the problem. Since Deng Xiaopings reforms
sparked explosive growth in the 1990s, national and local officials have had constant opportunities for graft, and they have seized
them. Corruption
pervades government offices, but it is also widespread in hospitals, where

patients make illegal payments to scalpers and medical personnel to secure appointments, book
beds, and receive proper care; in public schools, where parents pay sponsorship fees to secure
their childrens admission; and in most other institutions. For citizens raised on a socialist ethic of fairness,
self-sacrifice, and shared poverty, the corruption of CCP cadres not only hurts them financially, but also erodes their belief in a party
that, since Maos day, has promised to Serve the People. To restore the partys legitimacy, Xi had no choice but to declare war on
corruption and try to return the CCP to its ascetic roots. Xi is not merely out to change party members behavior; in good Maoist
fashion, he wants to change their minds. The guiding slogan of his anticorruption strategy is Wont, Couldnt, Wouldnt (b gn,
bnng, bxing). In the campaigns first phase, cadres wont dare be corrupt, because punishment is certain. In the second phase,
they couldnt be corrupt even if they wanted to, because institutional improvements will preclude it. In the third phase, it wouldnt
cross their minds to be corrupt, because they will have been purified through socialist culture. Despite the heads that have rolled and
the support he has garnered, Xis signature initiative is a delicate balancing act. Conceptual and operational challenges, together
Selling Xis
anticorruption message to an increasingly well-informed public is a challenge, even for a
populist leader who controls the media. Xis program reasserts the partys primacy through
Maoist disciplinary measures and through the slogan, The Party Leads All AffairsParty,
Political, Military, Civil, and AcademicEast, West, South, North, and Center. He is declaring
that only the CCP can save China, even as he warns that the partys endemic corruption is
Chinas greatest threat. That this square circle is causing confusion is evinced by reports of
cadres doubts on the eve of the 2016 meeting of the National Peoples Congress. Most Chinese
with Xis leadership style, could make this campaign to ensure the CCPs survival a threat to its stability instead.
political campaigns are explained to the party and public through carefully crafted rationales based on Marxism-Leninism and Mao
Zedong thought, but Xi has offered no theory to explain how such a saintly party was coopted. The liberal idea that power is
inherently corrupting and that all leaders need checks and balances, a free press, and independent judiciaries to keep them in line
is inadmissible in Beijing. The partys implicit explanation for corruption is that bad people do bad things. Reports on fallen officials
do not stop at describing how much they stole; they detail how many mistresses the thief maintained, how often he solicited
prostitutes no prurient detail is omitted if it will convince readers that the accused was depraved despite his or her party
membership. Salacious personal stories are used to deter questions about systemic causes of corruption and to obscure the
contradictions in Xis program. Chinese
commentators have raised questions from the first about the

sincerity of the anticorruption campaign, suggesting that Xis true goal was to clear out his
predecessors patronage networks and consolidate his own power, rather than to rectify the
party itself. The jury is still out, but evidence to date suggests that Xi is pursuing both goals. Corruption does undermine the
partys legitimacy. Xi needs party members to fall in line (knq), and he needs to win back the
support of the people if he is to rule effectively. But he has taken a hands-off approach to
established elites; he has not yet taken on any of the powerful, rapacious princelings (hng r
di: the offspring of revolutionary party heroes) or second-generation officials (gun r di) who
share Xis own political pedigree. Xi wants a pure party, but he is also using the campaign to
purge officials who do not owe their loyalty to him. In August 2015, party media ran and reran an editorial railing
against the unimaginably fierce resistance that Xis reforms were encountering at local levels. Policies were not being
implemented an extraordinary admission for the CCP. The common Chinese explanation for
bureaucratic paralysis is that local leaders do not want to make mistakes or do anything that will
get them noticed. Better to lay low and wait out the anticorruption campaign . Nearly every cadre has
done something that was not strictly by the book, after all, so any misstep, or even proper execution of a policy that hurts the interest
of a vindictive colleague, could have the CCDI anticorruption cops knocking at the door. Xis
anticorruption campaign
has made enemies in the party and Peoples Liberation Army. Whether or not rumors that Xi
has faced assassination plots are true, there undoubtedly are factions that will attack Xi if he
falters or fails. These latent threats seem to be making Xi more averse to criticism, more wary of aspersions on his competence,
more needful of total obedience, more isolated within his small sphere of advisors, more prone to control information, and even
In
February, it was announced that Xi is The Core of the CCP and, as such, needs unceasing
protection (jinju wih X Jnpng zhge hxn). Against the background of the anticorruption campaign, making Xi the Core
more inclined than before the anticorruption campaign to double down rather than compromise when he meets resistance.
threatens the CCP succession mechanism that helps maintain stability in China. As the Core, Xi has abandoned the collective
leadership model that enabled the transitions from Deng Xiaoping to Jiang Zemin, to Hu Jintao, and then to Xi himself. It is
unlikely that Xis successor will be christened as the Core from day one of his term, as no leader who could sustain such a status will
be permitted to build his own patronage network while Xi is in power. After Xis term ends in 2022, therefore, either he will remain
the untitled power behind the throne, as Deng did, or Xis successor will have to spend his first five years clearing out Xis
entrenched networks, as Xi is now doing to Jiangs and Hus appointees. The
emerging Xi-ist political model is

wasteful at best, and could prove destabilizing. It derives from the daunting challenges that
China faces, from Xis leadership style, and from the anticorruption campaigns failure to
address the systemic causes of the partys rot. The net result is that Chinas system is becoming
more fragile, even if its leader is strong.
Anti-Corruption insignificant, focus on state- owned enterprise

operation instead
Xi Jinping has focused on corruption, but he needs to pay more attention to the operation of
state-owned enterprises. Because these companies are extensions of the government, they are
not held accountable in the same way as western companies. While profits are a goal, the
employment of a maximum number of people is also an objective. This has to change in order to
sustain productivity and growth, but labor efficiencies were given lower priority on the list of
planned reforms. Banks also need to become more profit-oriented. One of the reasons there are
so many non-performing loans on their books is that the managers know that big or small, they
can't fail: the government will bail them out.
Terminal Impacts
China Econ Collapse

China economic collapse causes extinctionmost probable scenario
OTG News 13 [The REAL Chinese Economy Exposed, Off the Grid News, 2013,
http://www.offthegridnews.com/financial/the-real-chinese-economy-exposed/, DKP]
It is time to start prep aring for another major economic catastrophe , and this time it wont start in
America. Itll come from China; in fact, its probably already started. The looming catastrophe is the biggest
real estate bubble in human history, and it was ably documented by CBS correspondent Lesley Stahl for a recent 60 Minutes
broadcast. Stahls report is well done and absolutely frightening . Everybody who cares about his or her economic
future needs to see it, and see it now. The highlights of the report are as follows: The so-called Chinese economic miracle
is a fraud ; it is based on out-of-control real estate development. The Chinese government has been driving its economy by
forcing local and regional governments to build vast numbers of new buildings nobody wants or needs. This fuels industrial
production, but it produces no real wealth and siphons what wealth there is into the bubble economy. Stahls camera crew found
entire ghost cities with nobody living in them. The bubble economy is paid for by Chinas middle class; the only thing they can invest
in is all that real estate. The real estate is worthless; there are no buyers because the average person in China only makes around $2
a day. The Chinese Communist Party makes it illegal for average Chinese to invest outside the country. Party bosses, who have their
money in Swiss bank accounts, dont care about the situation. The bubble has started to burst, and many of the developers no longer
have the money to continue with their projects. Vast numbers of buildings are sitting half finished. Much of Chinas capital is tied up
in loans made to finance worthless real estate. Chinas Bubble Will Hurt America The
bursting of the China bubble will

hurt the United States in two ways. The first is that China might suddenly sell off those U.S. Treasury
bonds it has bought up in an attempt to keep afloat. As of December 2012, China held $1,202.80 billion worth of treasuries
according to the Treasury Departments own figures. That would destroy the value of those bonds; it would
also destroy the U.S. governments power to bail out industries or borrow money. Think the
fiscal crisis is bad now? What happens if Congress cannot raise the debt ceiling? Wed either face
massive cuts in government services or massive tax increases or both. Look at how the fiscal cliff and other
shenanigans on Capitol Hill have affected the markets. Yet they may only be the tip of the iceberg ; our
economy is basically based on trade with China. American retailers sell Chinese goods, American railroads and
trucks are set up to haul Chinese goods, and our largest retailer, Wal-Mart, has a business model based on the availability of cheap
Chinese goods. Keep looking and youll see that technology companies like Apple, which makes the iPods, iPads, and other yuppie
toys, produce their products in China. American
agriculture is dependent on the sale of food to China. Whats left of

is increasingly based on selling the Chinese stuff they cannot make, such as machine tools. If the
Chinese economy suddenly or gradually collapses, the trade could dry up. A Chinese implosion
could cause our economy to fall to Great Depression levels. Instead of a recovery, we could be looking
at a far worse economic downturn. Chinese Collapse Could Further Damage the U.S. and Lead to Worse Things An
obvious victim of economic collapse in China will be the Chinese Communist Party, which has staked its
reputation on economic success. The economic success now looks like a giant con game, and guess who the
Chinese mob will blame? Hint: it wont be the United States of America. Events in Russia in 1991 and the Middle East
last year showed us how quickly totalitarian and authoritarian governments can collapse. The situation is often
here today, gone tomorrow. This can create a power vacuum that can lead to worse
tyranny and war. The collapse of the German economy in the 1920s and 30s led to Hitler and the
Nazis. The collapse of the Russian Empire led to Lenin and the Soviet Union. The situation in China
today is a lot like that in France in 1789, where the monarchy, having bankrupted the country, turned to the
middle class for help. Bungled attempts at financial reform led to the French Revolution and the Reign of Terror in
which the king and queen and many innocent people were sent to the guillotine. The result was
Napoleon and twenty years of war that tore Europe apart. Napoleon, like Hitler, tried to solve his nations economic
our manufacturing
problems by invading other nations and pillaging them. Chinese Chaos Could Lead to Catastrophe It is unclear who or what would
there is
simply nobody outside the party capable of exercising any sort of real leadership. The result will
replace the Chinese Communist Party. The party has effectively crushed or stifled all opposition. As in Russia in 1991,
probably be chaos on a massive scale, particularly if the Chinese military and security forces
dont get paid. Something else to remember and get scared of is that China has nuclear weapons. Unlike North
Korea and Iran, China has nuclear missiles capable of hitting the U.S. right now. What
happens to them if there is no government left in Beijing? Who would be controlling the 3,000
nuclear weapons in China right now? This doesnt even count other weapons of mass destruction
that China might have. When the Soviet Union collapsed, it was discovered that the Russians had a massive secret stockpile of
biological weapons they hadnt told anybody about. Theres
a strong possibility that there are huge stockpiles

of biological weapons or massive biological weapons factories in China today. What happens
to those weapons if the Communist government collapses and Chinese military personnel are going hungry?
One possibility is that those weapons could fall into the hands of terrorists. Another is that they could
fall into the hands of homegrown Chinese extremists, such as diehard Communists, Islamic
insurgents , or Messianic cults.
US-China War
U.S. China war is likely and vaporizes the worlddata
Stanford 16 [Stefan, Co-owner of All News Pipeline, education from Dale Carnegie Public
Speaking, China Prepares Nuclear Strike Against US As America Rides Down The Road To Hell Targets Could Include Biggest Cities On East And West Coast And 'Blast Waves That Could
Vaporize Manhattan' And Well Beyond, 1/22/2016, All News PipeLine,
http://allnewspipeline.com/China_Prepares_Nuclear_Strike_Against_US.php RD; AD
7/29/16]
In a note on a story that he linked to this morning on his website, Steve Quayle warned us: "BEFORE THE US IS DESTROYED BY NUKES, GOD WILL
REVEAL THE SINS OF ITS LEADERS TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE". Quayle further warned us: "IT'S HERE!" With the History News Network
telling us days ago that the prospect of a nuclear war is about to become much more likely, we take a look in this story at a new warning that has come
out that is leading experts to believe that China
may be preparing nuclear strikes against the US as America

rides down the road to hell as shared in the 2nd video below from Alex Jones and Infowars. Back in October of 2013, the
Washington Times ran a story in which they told us that according to China's state-run media,
China's nuclear submarines could launch massive attacks upon American cities as a means of
'counterbalancing US nuclear deterrence in the Pacific Ocean'. While we've made it through the past 2+ years since
that story was written unscathed, a new warning has come out in the National Interest (as also shared by Pravda in the 1st video below) that China
is now preparing nuclear strikes against America. The National Interest story is not an easy read and tells us the tale of 50
million+ dead Americans. The graphic at the top left from a 1963 story offering a hypothetical Department of Defense nuclear attack scenario against
America, looked at now over 50 years later, finds the number of 50 million will likely be far greater if China goes through with this.: When one reads
enough Chinese naval literature, diagrams of multi-axial cruise missile saturation attacks against aircraft carrier groups may begin to seem normal.
However, one particular graphic from the October 2015 issue (p. 32) of the naval journal Naval & Merchant Ships [] stands out as both
unusual and singularly disturbing. It purports to map the impact of a Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)
strike by twenty nuclear-armed rockets against the United States. Targets include the biggest cities on the East and West Coasts, as well as in the
Midwest, as one would expect. Giant radiation plumes cover much of the country and the estimate in the caption holds that the strike
would
yield perhaps 50 million people killed [ 5000 ]. The map below that graphic on the same page illustrates the
optimal aim point for a hit on New York City with a blast wave [] that vaporizes all of Manhattan and well
beyond. Back in September of 2015, All News Pipeline told you about a bizarre video that came out from a Chinese tech giant showing a Chinese
attack upon a US military base. A month and a half later on October 29th, Susan Duclos put out a story on ANP in which she told us about a warning
that had gone out from China: "Prepare for the worst." Back in December of 2015 we published a story in which we shared the warning signs of a fullout nuclear war were growing daily while less than a week ago we told you of new warnings thatRussia was preparing for nuclear war while the US was
investing nearly a billion dollars more in chemical and biological warfare projects. Is an all-out nuclear war in America's future? Why is there so much
preparation and propaganda coming from all sides involved that something may soon go nuclear? With the US and global economies now in freefall, is
all of this what Gerald Celente meant when he said: "When all else fails, they take us to war"? From the Pravda Report.: Lyle Goldstein, Associate
Professor in the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, claims in his article for the National Interest
that China is ready to deliver a nuclear strike on the US territory. One particular graphic of the Chinese ballistic
missile strikes by nuclear-armed rockets against the United States, published in the Naval & Merchant Ships counts for a lot! There are even marked
the best points for a hit in New York, that would make the Chinese nuclear arsenal more effective. The
Chinese Navy is also being

developed on a long-term horizon and is being equipped with nuclear capabilities. This data ,
according to the National Interest, confirms that Beijing works on some of its far-sighted nuclear plans to
become a reality one day. With economic collapse unfolding before our very eyes and possible
nuclear war with China (and Russia/Iran?) on the horizon, in the 2nd video below from Infowars we're given the
myriad number of reasons that America is quickly on the road to hell. As our own leaders , from
Barack Obama to Hillary Clinton to Congress, literally embrace evil, as Steve Quayle warned, their sins are now being
exposed to the American people. Alex Jones tells us that now the elite are finally coming out and telling us we're facing a massive
financial situation and America's best days are over as a means to consolidate their control and further enslave the American people.
China Crash Bad
Lashout Impact
Turns the case extinction
Plate 03 (Tom Plate, East Asia expert, adjunct professor of communications at UCLA, 6-2803, Strait Times)
But imagine
a China disintegrating- on its own, without neo-conservative or Central Intelligence Agency prompting, much less
outright military invasion because the economy (against all predictions) suddenly collapses. That would knock Asia
into chaos. A massive flood of refugees would head for Indonesia and other places with poor
border controls, which dont want them and cant handle them; some in Japan might lick their lips at the prospect of World War II
revisited and look to annex a slice of China. That would send Singapore and Malaysia- once occupied
by Japan- into nervous breakdowns. Meanwhile, India might make a grab for Tibet, and Pakistan for
Kashmir. Then you can say hello to World War III,
Depression Impact
Biggest internal link to global econ
Egan 9/1/15 http://money.cnn.com/2015/09/01/investing/stocks-markets-dow-chinacrisis/ I'm a staff writer @CNNMoney, Hoboken resident, and sports & news junkie.
China is the scariest threat to stocks since 2009. Here's why America's stock market is in
the midst of one of the longest bull markets in history -- despite recent steep losses recently. It's
a bull market that has gone through many panic attacks. The European debt crisis, the
downgrade of America's AAA rating, Greek drama, and the fiscal cliff all inflicted big wounds.
But each time, U.S. stocks emerged victorious despite nursing some bad bruises. In the last two
weeks the U.S. stock market is once again churning. This time, on fears that China's economic
upheaval could knock the world into recession. But will the current market freak out be different
for the bull market? China, after all, is not only the world's second largest economy, but it
touches businesses and countries around the world. And U.S. companies are vulnerable to that,
which is why a severe Chinese slowdown looks like the biggest risk to U.S. stocks since 2009.
"This is a real threat. A hard landing in China is the biggest threat to the global
economic recovery since the financial crisis ," said David Joy, chief market strategist at
Ameriprise Financial. The broader question is: Does China represent the same kind of systemic
risk that the financial crisis did? Or are there reasons to believe China has the ability and
willingness to avoid the worst-case scenario? Chinese ripple effect is spooking investors
Concerns about China have knocked U.S. stocks into their first correction since the 2011
downgrade of America's perfect credit rating. "An economic slowdown in China is as large of a
catalyst in investors' minds as anything we've seen going back to the financial crisis," said Art
Hogan, chief market strategist at Wunderlich Securities. China matters so much because its
explosive growth fueled the rest of the world. A huge appetite for goods and raw materials lifted
economies in Europe, Asia, Latin America, Australia and elsewhere. So China's slowdown has a
huge ripple effect around the globe. Just look at how South Korea on Tuesday revealed a 15%
plunge in August exports because of weaker demand from China. "If China gets a cold, the rest
of Asia gets the flu," said Peter Kenny, chief market strategist at The Clear Pool Group, a
financial technology firm. Fed may not come to the rescue Concerns about China's economy are
amplified by the fact it remains a bit of a black box to investors. Few trust the accuracy of
Beijing's economic stats and many believe actual growth is a lot lower than the government
reports. It's also important to put the China scare in context. Previous market scares occurred
during times when the Fed was either aggressively flooding the financial markets with cash and
buying bonds or promising low rates. But now the Fed has stopped buying bonds and mortgages
and is preparing to raise rates for the first time in nearly a decade. So that safety net may not
be around anymore. Stocks are not cheap At the same time, it's become tougher to find
bargains in the stock market, especially given the energy-driven slowdown in earnings growth.
Many experts believed the U.S. stock market looked close to fully valued, if not downright
expensive before the recent retreat in prices. "Stock prices got way far ahead of reality. They're
having a big valuation adjustment now," said Peter Boockvar, chief market analyst at The
Lindsey Group. As broad as the China scare is, it isn't yet on the same level of the Lehman crisis
of 2008. At that time, the global financial system appeared on the verge of a meltdown. "That
was an existential crisis. There was a real possibility it could have turned into a depression," said
Joy. But given China's pivotal role in driving global growth, this episode is clearly unnerving
investors more than some of the other panic attacks since then. Related: Can the global gloom
sink the U.S. economy? China attempts to stabilize growth Is the market reaction justified or
overdone? It's too early to tell at this point.
Extinction
Burrows and Harris - 2009 (Counselor in the National Intelligence Council, Member
at the National Intelligence Council - Mathew J. Burrows, Global Trends 2025: A
Transformed Worldan unclassified report by the NIC published every four years
that projects trends over a 15-year period, has served in the Central Intelligence
Agency since 1986, holds a Ph.D. in European History from Cambridge University,
and Jennifer Harris, Member of the Long Range Analysis Unit at the National
Intelligence Council, holds an M.Phil. in International Relations from Oxford
University and a J.D. from Yale University, 2009 (Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical
Effects of the Financial Crisis, The Washington Quarterly, Volume 32, Issue 2, April,
Available Online at http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr_Burrows.pdf, Accessed
08-22-2011, p. 35-37)
Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the
future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces.
With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample [end page 35]
opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity.
Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe
that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from
that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic
societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of
multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no
reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the
twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater
conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile
economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying
those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will
remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda.
Terrorisms appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and
youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in
2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place
some of the worlds most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups
in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups
inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training
procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacksand newly emergent
collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized,
particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an
economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced
drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East .
Although Irans acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a
nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security
arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider
pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent
relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would
emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity
conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an
unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those
states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear
rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dualcapable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving
reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of
strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight
times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption
rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. [end page 36] Types of
conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could
reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neomercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to
take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this
could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to
energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability
and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have
important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a
rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as Chinas and Indias
development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these
countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be
military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions,
rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for
multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming
scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water
resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a
more dog-eat-dog world .
Global Spillover
Biggest threat to global economy
Economist 8/29/15 http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21662581-stockmarketturmoil-china-need-not-spell-economic-doom-it-does-raise-questions-far
Investors are now trying to delve beyond iPhone shipments and gauge where Chinas economy
and so the worldsstands. In terms of global impact, a hard landing in China would
now rival an American depression . Countries from Australia to Angola have grown richer
from digging stuff out of the ground and shipping it to China. Industries from carmaking to
luxury goods look to China for new business. It has been the most stable contributor to world
economic growth . Will that continue? Certainly, there are reasons to think it is in trouble.
Exports are stumbling, bad loans rising and the industrial sector at its weakest since the depths
of the global financial crisis. Never entirely credible, the governments claims that the economy
is chugging along at 7% now elicit derision. Even more alarming is the way these stresses appear
to be showing through in its markets. On August 11th the central bank stunned investors by
devaluing the yuan, whose rate it guides through regular interventions. The currency moved
more in a day than it does in most months. The devaluation looks to have been a technical
change to the way the exchange rate is managed. But thanks to poor communication, many saw
it as Chinas first fusillade in a global currency war. Markets around the world have been on
tenterhooks ever since. Capital outflows from China have shot up as investors have soured on
the economy. And then there is the daily carnage in the stockmarket. The government has
thrown at least 1 trillion yuan ($156 billion) at buying shares in order to stabilise them, only to
see prices plunge even more violently. The fear is that all this market turmoil speaks to deeper
fractures in the foundations of the Chinese economy, with the entire edifice at risk of toppling
over. So is this the hour of Chinas crisis? Highly unlikely. Though the economy faces grave
problems, the financial tumult is misleading. Chinas stockmarket has long been derided as a
casino, and for good reason. The bourse is small relative to the economy, with a tradable value of
a third of GDP, compared with more than 100% in developed economies. Stocks and economic
fundamentals have little in common. When share prices nearly tripled in the year to June, they
no more reflected a stunning improvement in Chinas growth prospects than their collapse since
then has foreshadowed a sudden deterioration. Less than a fifth of Chinas household wealth is
invested in shares; their boom did little to boost consumption and their crash will do little to
slow it. Punters borrowed lots of money to buy stocks in good times, to be sure, and some of that
debt will default. But it amounts to just 1% of total banking assets, a potential hit that, although
unpleasant, is hardly systemic. The property market matters far more for Chinas economy than
equities do. Housing and land account for the vast majority of collateral in the financial system
and play a much bigger role in spurring on growth. Yet the barrage of bearish headlines about
share prices has obscured news of a property rebound. House prices have perked up nationwide
for three straight months. Two months after the stockmarket first crashed, this upturn
continues.
China hard landing tanks world economy

Barnato 12/3/15 http://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/03/you-should-fear-a-china-hardlanding.html
It's the market doom-and-gloom scenario : A " hard landing " for the world's secondlargest economy. China's economy has slowed steadily since 2010, when gross domestic product
(GDP) growth last topped 10 percent. China's President Xi Jinping is predicting 6.5 percent GDP
growth next year and the International Monetary Fund is forecasting 6.3 percent. However,
Oxford Economics, an advisory firm, has put the world through a stress test to show what would
happen if Chinese growth slowed to 2.4 percent in 2016 and only recovered to 5 percent after
five years. The scenario might seem extreme, but Societe Generale warned in October that there
was a 30 percent risk of a China hard landing. In the French bank's model, this would see
Chinese GDP fall to 3 percent in 2016. Oxford Economics warns that the risks to Chinese growth
were "substantial" and "would have a profound effect on the global economy."
China crash tanks global economy

Scott 11/19/15 Greater China Economy Editor for Bloomberg News.
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-19/a-hard-landing-in-china-could-shakethe-worldThe crew at Oxford Economics have done just that in a new report that makes stark reading for
anyone with a stake in the global economy. China's economic boom of the past 30 years means it
now accounts for 11 percent of world GDP and around 10 percent of world trade. For resources,
it's an even bigger player, accounting for 11 percent of world oil demand and 40 to 70 percent of
demand for other key commodities, according to the Oxford Economics research. Its financial
system is massive, with its broad money supply now larger than the U.S.'s and amounting to
over 20 percent of the world's. So were China to sneeze, the world may well catch a
cold. First to trade. The volume of goods imported into China have already fallen by around 4
percent in the first three quarters of the year, after rising an average 11 percent per year from
2004-14. That means China has cut around 0.4 percentage point from world goods trade growth
in the nine months to the end of September, after having added an average 1 percentage point a
year in the previous decade. The biggest losers are those with the closest trade links and those
whose economies are most open. For most advanced economies, their reliance on trade with
China is lower, with Germany among the more dependent: Then there's the indirect effects as
the drag on GDP of China's trading partners works through the global economy. For instance,
Japan would not only suffer from weaker exports to China but also to Korea and other Asian
trading partners affected by Chinas slowdown, the Oxford Economics research shows. Another
transmission is via commodity prices, with any further slowdown in Chinese growth leading to
additional price falls, especially as supply has expanded significantly in recent years. That would
be bad news for the likes of Australia and Brazil. And here's another spillover you may not
have thought of: One consequence of the plunge in crude prices is that oil exporting countries
and their sovereign wealth funds now have less money to invest in advanced economy financial
assets. Another leg down would compound that, the Oxford Economics report says. There is a
silver lining: Lower prices, especially for food and energy, would increase purchasing power in
countries which are net commodity importers, including many advanced economies, emerging
Europe, India, and the industrialized Asian countries such as Korea and Taiwan. "A slowing
China redistributes global economic activity through the commodity channel as much as
dampening it," lead economist Adam Slater wrote in the report. Then we come to the financial
channels. One risk is that a further growth slowdown creates financial ripples in China that
spread to the rest of the world. On this score, the closed nature of China's financial markets
should prove a buffer. Ownership of Chinas banks is largely domestic, limiting potential for a
bad loan blowout to become a global problem. There are some economies that would feel a sting:
There is also the blow to corporate profits around the world if China's growth slumps. The stock
of foreign direct investment in China is now around US$1.5 trillion, so if returns on those assets
slow, so do global profits, according to the report. The bottom line: World growth would
"slow sharply," in a China hard-landing scenario, according to Oxford Economics. Close
trading partners and commodity exporting countries would bear the brunt, and advanced
economies would be significantly affected too, with deflationary pressures intensifying.
China crash tanks Western economies

Jacques 9/14/15 http://www.martinjacques.com/articles/articles-geopoliticsglobalisation/its-not-the-chinese-economy-thats-on-life-support/ He is also a non-resident
Fellow at the Transatlantic Academy, Washington DC. He has previously been a Visiting
Professor at Renmin University, the International Centre for Chinese Studies, Aichi University,
Nagoya, and Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto. He was a Senior Visiting Research Fellow at the
Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore. He was until recently a Senior
Visiting Research Fellow at IDEAS, a centre for diplomacy and grand strategy, and a fellow at
the Asia Research Centre, both at the London School of Economics. He was formerly the editor
of the renowned London-based monthly Marxism Today until its closure in 1991 and was cofounder of the think-tank Demos. He has been a columnist for many newspapers, made many
television programmes and is a former deputy editor of The Independent newspaper. He took
his doctorate while at Kings College, Cambridge.
The western preoccupation with headline GDP figures overlooks this deeper structural shift.
Ultimately it is the ability of the Chinese economy to make the transition from a labourintensive, investment-led, export-oriented economy to one based on value-added production
and domestic consumption that will be crucial to its long-term future. This, however, should not
deflect attention from the short-term risks. Chinas chronic debt problem partly corporate
(especially in infrastructural-related industries, such as steel, that have 30-40% excess
capacity); partly property (the result of an explosion in construction, with many buildings
remaining empty); partly financial (the growing inability of borrowers to pay back their debts,
especially in the shadow banking sector) could lead to a massive deleveraging and
consequent economic contraction. One of the great problems facing the Chinese leadership
is that it is facing several serious challenges all at the same time. If it backtracks on restructuring
and rebalancing to provide short-term economic stimulus and shore up the growth rate, this will
only store up much more serious problems for the future. If it mishandles the debt problem
China could conceivably have the hard landing that it has so skilfully avoided over the last few
decades. In short, the new Chinese leadership is confronted with serious overload. Add to this
Chinas enormously ambitious infrastructure project, One Belt One Road, Americas blatant
attempt to contain China and Chinas more assertive foreign policy, especially in east Asia, and
the danger of over-reach becomes apparent. Chinas leadership, unsurprisingly given the
circumstances, has made one serious error: its ill-conceived and mistaken intervention to try to
reverse the sell-off on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, from which it now appears to have largely
backtracked. In the event, however, it was the resulting plunge in western markets that was far
more revealing and significant. Its message was threefold. First, the west is concerned about the
state of Chinas economy. Second, it was a dramatic illustration of just how important China
now is to the global economy, in many ways greater than the US. Even five years ago such an
event would have been unimaginable: China has arrived big time. And third, it reminded
everyone of the underlying fragility of the western economy, the fact that it has never recovered
from the financial crisis, that the latter ushered in a new era of what Larry Summers has called
secular stagnation. The western world continues to depend on a life-support system ,
namely zero interest rates, combined with Chinese growth. What if the latter falters? That is
why western markets have suddenly started panicking. In Beijing there is concern, not panic.
Their challenges seem manageable in comparison.
Global contagion five ways

Zero Hedge 9/16/15 http://davidstockmanscontracorner.com/five-channels-ofcontagion-from-chinas-hard-landing/
The contagion from Chinas economic slowdown is deep and widespread, with profound
implications for both emerging and developed markets. There are five main channels of
contagion for credit: 1. Exports and revenue exposure. Economies for which China is the largest
trading partner will suffer from lower demand: Brazil, Chile, Australia, Peru, Thailand and
Malaysia. Specific sectors in developed markets will also be affected, especially Germany and
Italy. A number of sectors in DM credit with high dependence on Chinese revenue could be
vulnerable, including German carmakers (VW, Daimler, BMW), luxury goods manufacturers
(LVMH), and telecoms companies. 2. Banking system exposure. Among countries which report
to the BIS, South Korea, Australia and the UK have the largest proportion of foreign claims in
China. For the UK and Australia, exposure is concentrated among a few banks, specifically
HSBC, Standard Chartered and ANZ. UK banks are more exposed than Australian banks, as
their loans to China represent up to 30% of their total lending, whereas loans to Asia are
generally less than 5% of Australian bank lending (except for ANZ at 14%). 3. Commodity
dependence. With China consuming nearly half of the worlds industrial metal supply, slower
growth may weigh on supply-demand dynamics and directly lower commodity prices. Countries
that rely on commodity exports, and specifically Chinas consumption of them, are especially
vulnerable. 4. Petrodollar demand for $-denominated fixed income asset investment. Lower
commodity prices also mean oil exporters will have lower revenues and less savings to invest in
$-denominated fixed income assets. The yearly flow of Petrodollars may shrink to around
$280bn/year this year from $700bn in 2014, according to our estimates based on average
annual oil prices and lifting costs. If we assume that 30% of oil proceeds is invested in $ fixed
income, then the decline is roughly equivalent to $100bn/year in lower demand for dollar
assets. This is equivalent to the increase in net supply of Treasuries or $ IG corporates YoY. 5.
Currency depreciation and a high proportion of hard currency debt increase solvency risks for
EM corporates. While EM sovereigns generally do not rely on hard-currency debt much more
than in the past, EM firms have boosted their share of hard-currency debt over the past
decade.The portion of $-denominated bonds from foreign firms is now a quarter of the total US
IG market. Many EM firms have a large proportion of their debt in hard currency. We have
previously highlighted the vulnerability of some EM firms in particular, such as Chinese real
estate developers.
Tanks global economy

Talley 1/21/15 http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2015/01/21/how-chinas-slowdown-coulddrag-down-the-global-economy/ I an Talley writes about international finance from the Wall
Street Journal's Washington, DC bureau. His coverage includes the International Monetary
Fund, the G-20, the U.S. Treasury and topics such as exchange rate policies, the euro crisis,
emerging market capital flows and financial regulations.
How Chinas Slowdown Could Drag Down the Global Economy Chinas economic growth is
slowing to its lowest pace in more than two decades as it reaches the limits of its credit-fueled,
export-led expansion and tries to avoid a hard landing. How might that slowdown affect the
global economy? We already know: Growth in the worlds No. 2 economy is already more than
30% lower than many economists forecast. The International Monetary Fund, for example, has
sliced nearly four percentage points off its five-year outlook since 2010. Chinas cooling has been
a major factor in the IMF also downgrading global growth and the emergency lender warning
the world economy may struggle to pull itself out of its low-growth rut for years to come: That
slowdown has been a key factor in the precipitous decline in oil and other commodities, as well
as global trade. In its latest Global Economic Prospects report, the World Bank warned that a
hard landing is one of the biggest risks to the global economy. The World Bank assigns a low
probability to a sharp and unexpected drop in the Chinas growth rate given the countrys large
foreign currency reserves and other economic shock absorbers. But, it warned, a sharper
decline in growth could trigger a disorderly unwinding of financial vulnerabilities
and would have considerable implications for the global economy . If growth is one
percentage point lower in China than expected, the bank estimates it could shave a half
percentage point off global growth: That would put further downward pressure on commodity
prices. Questions over Chinas growth outlook is one reason some economists expect oil prices to
remain relatively low through at least 2016. Latin America is particularly at risk, given the
regions heavy reliance on commodity exports, and could fuel a sharp slowdown in several of the
regions major economies. (The China trade links can already be seen in Brazils sluggish
expansion.) Thats why the World Bank and the IMF are urging governments in the region to
move more quickly in overhauling their economies.
Crushes US economy
Scutt 10/7/15 http://www.businessinsider.com.au/chart-the-horror-outcome-of-a-chinahard-landing-on-stocks-2015-10 Global markets and economics reporter, Business Insider
Australia
Societe Generales cross asset strategy teams October research note, an epic 63 page monster
that investigates the impact on global growth and financial markets from a hard landing in
China, has certainly got the markets talking. Given heightened concerns over the outlook for the
worlds second-largest economy something that has contributed to substantial financial
market volatility over the past three months the note is not only timely, its resonating with
investors. One chart in particular has found stardom among the investment community a
prediction of what a hard landing in China would do to the US S&P 500 stock index. Theres
little wonder why is creating such a stir. Resembling a waterfall, or a cliff base jumpers
would leap off, it suggests a theoretical drop in Chinas GDP growth rate from 6.9% in 2015 to
3.0% in 2016 could see the benchmark US index tumble back to its GFC lows some 1,300
points below its current trading level. Thankfully, Soc Gen dont attach a high probability of a
hard economic landing in China occurring, putting the odds at just 10%. Hopefully theyre right.
Otherwise the correction in stocks not only in the US but globally is likely to be substantially
more than that.
Biggest internal to global econ

China growth drop biggest risk to global economy
Gould 1/15/15 https://www.thefinancialist.com/a-hard-landing-in-china-who-feels-itworst/ Jens Erik Gould has reported from over a dozen countries on issues including health,
immigration, politics, the environment, education, crime, economic policy and the oil industry.
Most recently, he is a regular contributor to Time and Time.com from southern California, and
he produces and hosts the video series, "Bravery Tapes," which uses journalism to tell stories of
human courage. Previously, Jens was a staff correspondent for Bloomberg News in Mexico City,
covering the economy, politics and the drug war. He began his career covering Hugo Chavez and
Veneuzela, where he was a regular contributor to The New York Times and National Public
Radio. Jens is the recipient of a Fulbright scholarship and has an undergraduate degree from the
University of Michigan.
Whats the greatest risk to the global economy in 2015? Europes stuttering economy is a big
one. Ever-present geopolitical risk is another. But the possibility of a hard landing in China
looms largest. Long-running concerns still remain: oversupply in the housing market, the heavy
debt burden of credit-fueled growth, and investment as a share of GDP thats more than twice as
high as the developing world average. And new concerns continue to pile up: housing prices
have fallen for six months in a row, near-record capital outflows, and deposit growth is currently
running close to a record low. The backdrop of the triple bubble in housing, credit and
investment remains the same as a year ago, but many other factors are in our view worse,
Credit Suisse analyst Andrew Garthwaite wrote in a recent report. In other words, the chances of
a sudden and significant drop in Chinas growth rate remain significant and might even be
growing
Stops US rate hike

China hard landing stops global rate hike
Halt to Fed hikes The U.S. Federal Reserve is seen starting to hike interest rates when it
meets this month, but a China hard landing would put the tightening cycle on hold ,
said Oxford Economics. The Bank of England would also delay raising rates and the European
Central Bank would hold the rate on its main refinancing operations, which provide the bulk of
liquidity to euro zone banks. "The policy response that greets a major shock to Chinese activity
could be more profound than assumed in our simulations. In China, the authorities might seek
to counterbalance the slowdown more actively through expansionary fiscal measures and
encouraging greater bank lending. More generally, with so many countries bound by constraints
on conventional monetary policy at the zero lower bound, additional unconventional measures
could be countenanced by various central banks across the world," Oxford Economics said.
Russia Spillover
Spills over to Russia
Russia worst-affected in hit to world GDP
The weakness in China would spill over to countries across the globe, with world growth seen
by Oxford Economics slowing to 1.7 percent, compared with its baseline forecast of 3.0 percent.
Global growth would disappoint again in 2017.
"A China hard landing would have a profound effect on the global economy. It would weigh
heavily on emerging markets. And advanced economies would not be immune," Oxford
Economics said in its report.
Emerging markets and commodity-producing nations would bear the brunt, as China is a major
consumer of energy and other commodities. Russia was seen worst affected by Oxford
Economics, with its economy forecast to grow by nearly 5 percent less in 2016-17 in
the event of a China shock.
Spills over globally, North Korea

China crash causes North Korean nuclear lashout, wave of state
failure
Poretz 9/3/15 http://www.fletcherpoliticalrisk.com/home-1/2015/9/2/dont-burst-ourbubble-geopolitical-consequences-of-a-chinese-financial-crisis Analyst Kaiser Associates August
2015 Present (5 months)Washington D.C. Metro Area Kaiser Associates is a boutique strategy
consulting firm. Kaiser Associates is dedicated to helping leading global corporations improve
their performance and unlock new sources of sustainable, profitable growth
Dependent States While the entire global economy will suffer from a large-scale Chinese
financial crisis, the tumult will be felt first and hardest by states most dependent on Chinas
economy. In its rise, China has developed supreme economic importance to several regional and
resource rich states. According to the World Trade Organization, China is the lead trading
partner to Angola, Sudan, Yemen and Cambodia. Beyond their trade with China, these countries
have another essential common factor: they are all Least Developed Countries (LDCs). In fact,
among the states to which China is the principal export or import partner, nearly a third are on
the UNs list of LDCs. This excludes the likes of Democratic Republic of Congo and Equatorial
Guinea, which have highly publicized economic ties to China but unpublished trade statistics.
Aside from being generally poor, LDCs are also often decentralized, highly corrupt and prone to
conflict. And political power, particularly among the resource-rich rentier states, is almost
always held narrowly at the top. To borrow language from Nassim Taleb, these states are fragile.
This point was made particularly clear to me on recent visits to Myanmar and Cambodia - two
countries with tragic histories of political violence and uncertain political futures - where both
the jade market in Mandalay and the booming real estate market in Phnom Penh were all
dominated by Chinese businessmen. Their suitcases full of cash superficially fuel economic
growth but in actuality line the pockets of a cabal of kleptocrats. To consider the geopolitical
consequences of a Chinese financial crisis on these dependent and underdeveloped states,
consider the extreme but analogous case of Latin America during the Great Depression. During
the early 20th century, America was an industrializing nation en route to global pre-eminence
and had unmatched influence in Latin American states. The region was underdeveloped, had
tremendous economic and political inequality and was highly dependent on commodity exports
to the U.S. and Europe. During the Great Depression, it was likely the hardest hit region in the
world. There were precipitous falls in exports and foreign investment and by Depressions end,
fifteen out of twenty Latin American countries had defaulted on their debt. Of course, the
suffering spilled over into politics as well. Numerous states, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile
and Peru experienced military coups. In the case of Brazil, the fall in coffee prices, which was
paramount to the states revenue generation, brought the 1930s military dictatorship of Getulio
Vargas. Vargas reign began the states efforts to diversify into industrial production and
ultimately became the model for import substitution. To say nothing of its economic efficacy,
Brazilian import substitution was an obvious political condemnation of American political and
economic dependency. In the event of a Chinese financial crisis today, dependent LDCs will also
face political and economic ruin. To see how shocking that could be, consider a special
case: North Korea. While North Korea may be the state closest to autarky, the regimes
dependence on China is unquestioned. Dating back to the Chinese military rescue during the
Korean War, North Korea has been existentially reliant on China. Today, China represents 60%
of the countrys trade, providing the majority of its food often in direct aid of the military and 90% of its energy. However, Beijings feelings towards North Korea are reportedly divided,
with the Hermit Kingdom falling out of favor with some after its first nuclear test in 2006. If
belts tightened in China due to massive credit and economic constraints, the squeeze would
certainly be felt in North Korea as well. Unfortunately for its neighbors, the DPRKs
typical means of blowing off political steam is by blowing up rockets . Long-term
however, in a regime tightly controlled by a small group of the elite, it wouldnt take much
dissatisfaction for the regime to fall. A few key defections could bring down the entire enigmatic
house of cards. The geopolitical consequences of such a regime change are worthy of much more
than lip service, but certainly such a transition, generally assumed to reunification with South
Korea, would be profound. The threat to regimes are posed today to the LDCs and the myriad
other states (if only I were bold enough to say Russia), to which China is benefactor. Most of
these are rentier states with iron-fists keeping it all together. When the money dries up, some
may find the resources to weather the storm and keep their elite clients and soldiers happy.
Others may not. These regimes at their core are unstable; a loss of financing or an economic
downturn could easily sway the allegiances of an avaricious political elite, prompting a wave of
systematic policy or regime changes.
Chinese Civil War

China market crash = civil war
Zero Hedge 6/28/15 Zero Hedge is a financial blog that aggregates news and presents
editorial opinions from original and outside sources. It reports on economics, Wall Street, and
the financial sector and is credited with bringing the controversial practice of flash trading to
public attention in 2009 via a series of posts alleging that Goldman Sachs' access to flash order
information allowed it to gain unfair profits.
A Helpless China Tips Its Hand: A Market Crash "Poses Great Danger To Social Stability" While
Greece has understandably been the focal news event over the weekend - after all it has been 5
years in the making - let's not forget that in another massive move, one geared squarely to
prevent a market collapse and to avoid even further panic, the Chinese central bank cut both its
policy rate and the reserve rate in a dramatic push to calm down markets after a 10% crash in
just two trading days. Which, incidentally, shows that after the Fed, the BOE, the SNB, the BOJ
and the ECB, the PBOC is the latest bank to have cornered itself in a world where it must inflate
the bubble at all costs or face the dire consequences. What consequences? Nomura explains: The
policy easing should be viewed as a measure to contain the risk of a hard landing or systemic
crisis rather than one to achieve faster growth. In this case, the stronger-than-expected
monetary easing may help stem the decline in the equity market following a 10.6% drop over the
past two trading days. The positive wealth effect of the equity market on consumption or
aggregate demand is limited in China, but an equity market collapse would hurt millions of midclass households and pose great danger to the economy and social stability. And there you have
it: just like all other central banks, the opportunity cost to markets returning to fair value is
nothing short of social conflict (as admirably displayed with every passing day in the US ) and
even, perhaps, civil war. Which means that unlike before, when the bursting of the bubble
would merely lead to a few high flying 1%-ers literally flying from the top floor having lost
everything, this time the gamble could not have been higher, and when the central banks finally
lose control the outcome will be nothing short of war... just as Paul Tudor Jones, Kyle Bass
and countless others have warned before.
China market collapse = mass civil unrest

Raponza 5/1/15 http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2015/05/01/this-might-bewhat-a-chinese-hard-landing-looks-like/ financial journalist who covers business and investing
in emerging markets.
PMI data today also showed that Chinas labor market is weakening. Chinas job market is
Beijings landing site. The last thing President Xi Jinping wants is a bunch of unemployment
low-income migrant workers. With all the bling that has become of cities like Shanghai, the
masses suddenly losing their spending power while the rich (and getting richer, according to
FORBES latest China billionaire list) flash new iPhones and Michael Kors handbags could very
easily lead to civil unrest.
K2 climate
Chinese Growth key to engagement on GHG reduction
As Chinas economy slows, Xi will not be willing to agree to binding or inflexible environmental
initiatives to combat climate change, especially if they would further weaken the countrys
fragile economy. Global economic managemen
K2 Chinese Protectionism
Chinese slowdown = protectionist lashout
The slowdown may, however, lead China to become marginally more protectionist and
mercantile, especially if such efforts are thought to boost employment and thereby enhance
social stability. Never totally committed to markets or free trade, China could close some laborintensive industries, further devalue its currency, be uncooperative on intellectual property
theft, and step up its harassment of foreign busi - nesses. For the most part, however, its
protectionist impulses will be restrained by its obligations to the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and its need for foreign capital and markets. In his deals with foreign commodity
suppliers, including Russia, Xi will insist on more advanta - geous terms and be less inclined to
grant debt forgiveness to Ecuador and Venezuela, which currently repay Chinese loans with oil.
Although Xi could attempt to use Chinas economic woes to justify further reforms and commit
to market mechanisms, the record so far suggests that he is willing to sacrifice that agenda in an
attempt to regain short- term growth and maintain employment. To cope with the stock market
slide, for example, Xi rolled out a slew of initiatives that reversed capital market liberalization
and financial reforms.
Chinese Democracy
Chinese growth crash kills Chinese democracy
Finally, Xis resistance to Western culture and values may intensify. Xi has arrested countless
dissidents, civil society leaders, and activists; sharply curtailed the ability of NGOs to operate;
intensified controls over the media and the Internet; and inveighed against Western cultural
contamination while extolling Confucianism. Because Chinas econ - omy is now slowing, Xis
fear of political instability may push him to adopt even sterner measures, and new violations of
human rights and the emerging challenges that Western NGOs and businesses face will likely
cause renewed friction in Chinas relationships with the West
At its self-correcting
No self-correction Chinese policymakers over-react
Economist 7/11/15 http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21657395-panickedresponse-tumbling-stocks-casts-doubt-pace-reform-china-embraces
If economic stability is not in peril, the best explanation for the interventions is politics. When
the stockmarket was soaring, the press cheered the bull run as an endorsement of the economic
reforms of the Xi-Li team. Now that it is falling, regulators want to shore up the leaderships
reputation. It is not just the motive that is dodgy; the nature of the intervention is also unwise.
Cutting interest rates as support for the economy when inflation is so low is fair enough. But
regulators capped short-selling; pension funds pledged to buy more stocks; the government
suspended initial public offerings; and brokers created a fund to buy shares, backed by centralbank cash (see article). Just as the Communist Party distrusts market forces, so it
misunderstands them. Botched attempts to save stocks suggest it is losing control, while a
successful rescue would have made buying shares a one-way betinflating the bubble still
further. One of the persistent illusions about Chinas governance is that, whatever its other
shortcomings, eminently capable technocrats are in control. Their haplessness in the face
of the market turmoil points to a more disconcerting reality. China is not the first country to
prop up a falling stockmarket. Governments and central banks in America, Europe and Japan
have form in buying shares after crashes and cutting interest rates to cheer up bloodied
investors. What makes China stand out is that it panicked when a correction of clearly
overvalued shares had been expected. Rather than calming investors, its barrage of measures
screamed of desperation.
No policy solutions China crash will be as real as it gets

Poretz 9/3/15 http://www.fletcherpoliticalrisk.com/home-1/2015/9/2/dont-burst-ourbubble-geopolitical-consequences-of-a-chinese-financial-crisis Analyst Kaiser Associates August
2015 Present (5 months)Washington D.C. Metro Area Kaiser Associates is a boutique strategy
consulting firm. Kaiser Associates is dedicated to helping leading global corporations improve
their performance and unlock new sources of sustainable, profitable growth
If any of Garthwaites bubbles were to burst, it could freeze credit in the financial system,
cause a massive loss in wealth and bring the broader economy to a halt. Not to worry, some
argue, as implicitly guaranteeing much of the existing debt, including the banking sector,
municipalities, shadow-banking system and state owned enterprises, is the Chinese government.
But while Beijing has previously proven capable of plugging holes to steer the ship to safety, in
the midst of a tempest all bets are off. Nonetheless, many insist that the states power to
intervene with trillions of dollars and forcibly dictate market behavior is sufficient to stave off
financial peril. I have two response s. First, assuming the government can keep the financial
system afloat and move in earnest towards liberalizing reforms, virtually identical political risks,
admittedly less dramatic, remain under the anticipated lower-growth regime. Second, the
outstanding debt presents potentially systemic risk and represents liabilities an order of
magnitude greater than the governments mobilizable assets. Thus, there is more than just
Western dogma behind the conviction that, as in the physical world, in the economy, natural
forces always dwarf the designs of men. While the timetable may be delayed, in statist China, all
steps taken by the government to prevent financial ruin other than structural reforms will only
create more moral hazard and moral hazard will only heighten risks of a greater crash. As
former Treasury Secretary and China-ist Hank Paulson wrote in reference to a Chinese credit
crisis, It's not a question of if, but when. Brace yourselves: we may be in for a hard
landing in China and the geopolitical ramifications would be staggering .
AT Growth already tanked

!!Damage from squo efforts priced in if anti-corruption levels off
Barnato 12/4/15 http://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/04/how-chinas-anti-corruption-drive-ishurting-growth.html
Lo said that the economic hit from the crackdown should wane through 2016 and
2017. "I think the negative impact will fade, as there has been (and will continue to be)
policy easing to offset it and people's/investors' confidence should be stabilizing," he told CNBC
via email.
China not collapsing disregard the hype

Magnus 9/1/15 George Magnus is an independent economist and commentator, after
having had a long career in the financial services industry. He is currently an Associate at the
China Centre, Oxford University, works as an external senior adviser to UBS and to other
financial institutions, and sits on the advisory board of the Montreal-based Bank Credit Analyst.
From 1995-2012, Mr Magnus was the Chief Economist, and then Senior Economic Adviser at
UBS Investment Bank. During this time, he served for a few years as the Chair of the Investment
Committee of the Trustee Board of UBS (UK) pension and life assurance fund. Before joining
UBS, Mr Magnus had been the Chief Economist at S.G. Warburg (1987-1995), Chief
International Economist at Chase Securities (1985-1987) and Head of Economics for Europe,
the Middle East and Africa at Bank of America (1977-1985). Mr Magnus received an MSc. Econ
from the School of Oriental and African Studies, did postgraduate research at the University of
Illinois, and taught economics at the University of Westminster and at Illinois. Over many years,
Mr Magnus has been researching and writing about the global economy, receiving plaudits in
particular for having predicted a Minsky Moment in 2007 as the financial crisis was starting to
erupt. He is a regular contributor to the Financial Times, Prospect Magazine and other written
media, and appears regularly on BBC TV and radio, Bloomberg TV and other outlets. His
opinion pieces, and other written work and activities can be found on this website.
http://www.georgemagnus.com/chinas-economy-no-collapse-but-its-serious-and-so-are-thepolitics/
Chinas economy is not collapsing People who have become China experts in the last
few weeks , point to the sharp falls in power consumption and freight traffic two of the three
indicators in the now famed Li Keqiang index but these and other industrial indicators dont
tell us anything about whats going on in the services or tertiary sector , which accounts for
about half of the economy. Even if producers are having a tough time at the moment, consumers
of household goods and services and buyers of real estate havent gone to ground. Retail sales
were still up by over 10% in July, and property sales registered pretty robust year on year
increases of over 13% in the second quarter and 19% in July. The government is going to
continue to support the economy with infrastructure spending, monetary easing, and fiscal and
debt initiatives. In August, even though the Caixin and NBS PMI data were down, some of the
high frequency data could look better in year-on-year terms, largely because of flattering base
effects following from declines this time last year. The official data are likely to continue to show
the economy growing around 6.5-6.8% in annual terms in the next few quarters.
No hard landing now

Fitch Ratings 12/7/15 https://www.fitchratings.com/site/fitch-home/pressrelease?
id=996165 Fitch Group is a global leader in financial information services with operations in
more than 30 countries. Fitch Group is comprised of: Fitch Ratings, a global leader in credit
ratings and research; Fitch Solutions, a leading provider of credit market data, analytical tools
and risk services; BMI Research, an independent provider of country risk and industry analysis
specializing in emerging and frontier markets; and Fitch Learning, a preeminent training and
professional development firm. With dual headquarters in London and New York, Fitch Group
is majority owned by Hearst.
Emerging Asia's real GDP growth should slow to 6.3% in 2016 as regional economic pressures
continue to add to a challenging outlook, says Fitch Ratings. That said, effective policy responses
and sovereign buffers should provide a degree of protection, and the slowdown is better
understood as a normalisation of growth rates and not an uncontrolled collapse . A hard
landing in China is unlikely , and growth in India and in ASEAN should pick up. We forecast
emerging Asia as remaining the fastest-growing emerging markets region in 2016. Fitch's latest
Global Economic Outlook, published yesterday, forecasts global growth to pick up slightly in
2016. Issues linked to lacklustre trade and investment growth remain. But major advanced
economies such as the US, Eurozone, UK and Japan seem to have emerged relatively unscathed
from the slowdown in key emerging markets in 2015. We forecast global growth to accelerate to
2.6% in 2016 and 2.7% in 2017, from 2.3% in 2015. In Asia-Pacific, the outlook remains
challenging with added economic pressures from the continued slowdown in China's growth,
sluggish global trade growth, and an expected rise in US rates and resulting dollar strength. The
expected slowdown in emerging Asia, however, is likely to be driven almost entirely by China.
Fitch forecasts Indian growth to accelerate to 8% in the fiscal year ending March 2017, while
emerging Asia excluding China and India should grow by 5.2% in 2016, up from 5% in 2015. One
potential downside risk to regional growth could come from high private-sector debt, which is
still rising. Four Asian emerging markets have the highest ratios of bank private-sector credit to
GDP of any Fitch-rated emerging markets - China, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam. Upward
pressure on regional interest rates stemming from the US may weigh on domestic demand in
more indebted economies. Fitch maintains its view that the China slowdown is part of a broader
structural adjustment necessary to achieve a more sustainable growth pattern. The data thus far
from 2015 supports this picture, with weak exports and investments being offset by relatively
robust consumption and a solid labour market. Importantly, the scenario of a very sharp
slowdown in Chinese growth following the financial market volatility in the summer has not
played out. This has reinforced the view that China is likely to muddle through during its
structural-adjustment process - and avoid a hard landing.
AT Alt Cause only housing

ONLY housing internal link matters
Davis September 15
http://www.vanguard.com/pdf/ISGGMMCH_092015_Online.pdfVanguard global economics
team Joseph Davis, Ph.D., Global Chief Economist Europe Peter Westaway, Ph.D., Chief
Economist Biola Babawale Georgina Yarwood Asia-Pacific Qian Wang, Ph.D, Senior Economist
Alexis Gray Americas Roger A. Aliaga-Daz, Ph.D., Principal and Senior Economist Andrew J.
Patterson, CFA Vytautas Maciulis, CFA Ravi Tolani Zoe B. Odenwalder Matthew Tufano
A slowdown in Chinas real estate investment is expected, but the likelihood of a housing market
crash that leads to a global recession is low. Chinas slowdown will be most felt by its neighbors
and commodity exporters like Brazil. There is a risk that select emerging-market economies will
continue to struggle in adjusting their growth models given low commodity prices, weaker
productivity, and high debt levels. Our view remains that Chinas slowdown and excess capacity
will generate deflationary impulses worldwide, and investors should expect periodic and sharp
volatility. However, that volatility should not damage global growth too significantly as long as
the United States and Europe continue recovering and China avoids a housing market
crash.
AT Housing crashed already

Housing doomsaying exaggerated soft landing now
Economist 4/18/15 http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21648567-chinesegrowth-losing-altitude-will-it-be-soft-or-hard-landing-coming-down-earth
Problems are real but such disaster warnings rest on a misdiagnosis. The oft-heard idea that
China is sitting on mountains of unsold homes is an exaggeration. Those making this claim
point to the gap between property sales and construction. Sales of residential housing last year
were 20% higher than they were in 2009, but projects under way have more than doubled since
then, according to official data. If true, it would take five years to consume the pipeline of homes
being built, up from three before the global financial crisis.
But many of those projects are in fact little more than holes in the ground. Some have been
halted for a lack of funds, others because developers want to wait to sell into a stronger market.
The evidence for this is actual construction activity, indicated by property completions as well as
cement production (see chart 1). These are a much closer fit with sales. It will take 16 months to
clear Chinas inventory of new homes at the current sales rate, up from ten months when the
market was in better shape, according to E-House, a property consultancy. This points to a
deterioration but hardly a nightmare.
That Chinas property market is not about to collapse under the weight of oversupply is good.
The bad news is that its growth is stalling. The housing sector started to take off early this
century after the government allowed ownership of private property. Mass migration to cities
added to demand; Chinas urbanisation rate has more than doubled to 55% today from 26% in
1990. Both these factors are fading. Many Chinese have already upgraded to snazzier flats than
their original state-issued boxes. And the pace of urbanisation is slowing.
AT Stock Market = NU
Summer market crash over-rated dont believe the doomsaying
Karabell 7/9/15 Zachary Karabell is head of global strategy at Envestnet and author of The
Leading Indicators: A Short History of the Numbers That Rule Our World. He is a contributing
editor at Politico Magazine. http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/07/china-stockmarket-119896#ixzz3vcpBe8ey
ver the past month, as Greece has occupied headlines, China has been rocked by a crashing stock
market. The oscillations appear far from over, with the Shanghai exchange up 6 percent on
Wednesday, having plummeted more than 30 percent in the weeks before, which still leaves the
index up about 80 percent over the past 52 weeks. That amounts to trillions of dollars gained
and then lost in a very short time. Theres been no dearth of commentary about how dire this
situation could be. Forget About Greece, China is the Real Reason to Freak Out, blared one
typical headline. Chinas growth model has had legions of skeptics for years, and the recent
turmoil in its markets has provided a new peg for old concerns that China is headed for the
much-dreaded hard landing of its economic system. Thats not going to happen, at least
not now. All stock markets are questionable proxies for the health of the real economy, and
Chinas equity markets are even worse. Between the Shanghai Exchange laden with state-owned
behemoth companies in old industries like steel and insurance and the Shenzhen Exchange with
its tech emphasis, Chinas markets nonetheless represent just a sliver of Chinas actual
economy. The shares are traded almost entirely by individual (retail) investors, and in person
rather than online (though that is changing). These markets are dominated by citizens of the
Beijing-Shanghai corridor or of the Pearl River nexus of Shenzhen-Guangdong and Hong Kong.
Unlike American or European bourses, Chinese stocks are not woven into the fabric of
retirement accounts or large institutional pensions or municipal budgets. They are speculative
casinos , and everyone in China knows it (or should). And these casinos have not over the
past decades tracked actual economic growth. The Shanghai Composite crashed in 2007-08
and didnt recover until recently; meanwhile, China glided through the global financial crisis
largely unscathed. The index also meandered at various periods in the 2000s even as Chinas
gross domestic product was soaring. To argue now, as many have, that the collapse of this minibubble is directly connected to dire weakening of the Chinese economy is to ignore just how
uncorrelated these equity markets and Chinas overall economy have been. There is a legitimate
debate about whether China is deteriorating economically or simply amid a massive shift in the
mix of its economic activity away from making stuff and building stuff and toward consuming
stuff itself. That debate is heated in China and Hong Kong as well. The movement of stocks may
be a convenient peg for the debate, but that doesnt mean that these moves offer a tell one way
or the other. If they did, then you should have heard voices proclaiming a new China boom early
this year. Concerns about the viability of Chinas growth model have punctuated the past 15
years, ever since China joined the World Trade Organization in December of 2001 and began a
vertiginous growth path of double-digit GDP, flooding the world with low-cost manufactured
goods and building megalopolis from scratch. In the past three years, under the aegis of a
powerful and even more autocratic leader, Xi Jinping, Chinas economic growth as measured by
GDP has slowed considerably, to under 7 percent this year for the first time in decades. The goal
of the current government is to move China away from the growth model that propelled the
country to become the worlds second-largest (or largest depending on the calculations)
economy today. How China grew so fast without major hiccups is astonishing; it would be even
more astonishing if it manages that transition currently underway. Yet, for the moment, while
excessive construction, bad loans, too much real estate investment and still sclerotic state
industries are issues, that transition appears to be happening. Services and consumption are
increasing as a percentage of economic activity even as infrastructure spending and investment
are slowing. And then there are the stock markets. If you are in the middle class (or more likely
what we would call upper-middle class) in Beijing or Shanghai or Shenzhen, and you have some
disposable income that you wish to save and invest for the future, your options are limited.
Chinese citizens cannot invest outside of China. That leaves only a few options for their
disposable income: Keep it in cash; buy luxury goods; go to Macau and gamble; buy real estate;
invest in stocks. Thats about it. Until recently, the preferred options were real estate and Macau.
But the Chinese government has cracked down on both: on real estate by raising the cash down
limits, and on Macau by restricting various junkets out of legitimate concern that Macau had
become an unofficial way to get money out of the mainland. Not all of these restrictions have
worked, of course, but money has consequently poured into stocks. The volatility and the
challenges of closed-capital system are real issues for China, its governors and its people. But
the flip side is that none of these could be issues without the Chinese system succeeding in
generating disposable incomes for hundreds of millions of people who had none 25 years ago.
The readiness of Americans to jump to the conclusion that China is on the verge of collapse and
that its stock market bubble is proof would do well to remember that the Nasdaq index in the
United States peaked in March of 2000 and didnt get back to the same highs until this past
March, 15 later. The Internet bubble and the telecom collapse did lead to a recession in 2001,
which deepened after the attacks of 9/11. But that bubble was not a symbol of all that was wrong
in the American economy, nor did the rise and fall and then slow rise portend chaos in our
system. China may yet face days of reckoning , as might we all. But this recent bubble,
and then burst , and then perhaps bubble again in Chinas stock markets is being misused
and misread as a symbol. It is not.
AFF Answers
UQ
Growth Already Stalled

Chinas economy is structurally declininggrowth will remain flat at
best
NIKKEI 7/28-[Nikkei Asian Review, Editorial: An official's 'L-shaped' growth forecast hints at uncertainty about China's
economic outlook, 7/28/2016, http://asia.nikkei.com/magazine/20160728-GENERATION-CHANGE/Viewpoints/Editorial-Anofficial-s-L-shaped-growth-forecast-hints-at-uncertainty-about-China-s-economic-outlook, DKP]
China's gross domestic product in the April-June period grew by 6.7% from a year earlier. The growth rate
remained flat compared with the January-March period and was the slowest since the first three months of
2009, during the global financial crisis. The current state of China's economic performance
is alarming. The world economy is being shaken by Britain's vote to leave the European Union and other
factors. We would like to urge the Chinese government to take drastic policy measures, primarily by restructuring state-owned
enterprises, in order to maintain China's growth potential for the medium to long term. There has recently been a noteworthy move
in China with respect to how the present state of the nation's economy is assessed. The People's Daily, the Chinese Communist
Party's flagship newspaper, published in May an interview with an anonymous person who was deemed to be an
economic
aide to President Xi Jinping. The official warned that China's economic growth trend would be Lshaped rather than U-shaped, and definitely not V-shaped. Such an L-shaped recovery, he said, is a stage that
will last more than a year or two. He also noted that during the next few years, it would be hard to fundamentally
alter the current difficult situation, in which the economy is saddled with weak demand and
overcapacity. An L-shaped trajectory indicates that the economy will not turn up for a while
after having declined. It is different from the view so far presented by the Chinese government. The official said that using
conventional policy tools to prop up the Chinese economy would only inflate a bubble and
compound economic woes. What really needs to be done is to carry out bold structural reforms,
especially on the supply side, he said. That posture is to be welcomed, if it represents Beijing's willingness to make renewed efforts to
accelerate reforms that have been deferred. LEVERAGE RATIO At a press conference in June, a Chinese government institution
showed economic data that seemed to underscore a sense of alarm among Chinese policymakers. The
168.48 trillion yuan ($25.2 trillion) at the end of 2015. China's total
nation's total debt was
debt-to-GDP ratio -- or the economy's overall
was extremely high at 249%. The institution said that the risks are manageable, given China's high
savings rate. But it will take a long time to dispose of vast sums of debt. The corporate sector, pressed to repay
leverage rate --
debt, will have to restrain capital spending for a certain period of time. That trend in corporate behavior has already shown in recent
statistical figures. Recognition
of how serious the debt problem is must have translated into the view
that the Chinese economy will follow an L-shaped trajectory for some time to come. Industrial
production, which has long been the main engine of China's growth, has slackened amid a supply glut in the market.
Exports have also decreased substantially. A cloud of uncertainty is hanging over the
Chinese economy. For the coming months and years, the Chinese government needs to shore up the economy by taking
measures to boost consumption, such as those aimed at sustaining the current robust new-car market, and by pushing efficient
public-sector investment that serves to increase future growth potential. China has set a growth target of between 6.5% and 7% for
2016. Premier Li Keqiang recently expressed his confidence by saying, "We are optimistic about the current state and future prospect
of the Chinese economy." His remarks showed a clear difference in tone from what the economic aide to President Xi told the
People's Daily. Does this mean that there is disagreement within the Chinese leadership over the direction of economic policy? That
is another cause for concern.
No econ uniqueness-investors already feel alienatedstructural reforms are

stalled
PEI 6/9/16-professor of government at Claremont McKenna College and a non-resident senior fellow of the German Marshall
Fund of the United States [Minxin, Minxin Pei -- Losing the hearts and minds of the money men, Nikkei Asian Review, 6/9/2016,
http://asia.nikkei.com/Viewpoints/Viewpoints/Minxin-Pei-Losing-the-hearts-and-minds-of-the-money-men, DKP]
The Western
media has largely missed arguably the most important recent economic development in
China: the dramatic fall of private investment. According to official statistics, nominal private fixed-asset
investment grew only 5.2% in the first four months this year, half the rate of 2015. Since private fixed-asset
investment accounted for nearly two-thirds of total investment before its recent decline, a sustained
fall in private capital expenditures will further exacerbate China's economic
slowdown. Alarmed by this development, the State Council has prescribed a series of measures to revive private investment.
In the much-noted interview published in the People's Daily on May 9, the unnamed "authority," widely believed to be the chief
economic adviser to President Xi Jinping, flagged the substantial fall in private investment as the top macroeconomic risk. There are
several plausible economic reasons behind the plunge in private investment .
Few sensible private entrepreneurs want to

continue pouring money into the Chinese real estate bubble. Massive overcapacity has destroyed
profitability. Economic slowdown has reduced return on capital. However, there is also a political
story behind the drop of private investment: China's private entrepreneurs have grown
increasingly alienated from their government. This bold assessment may be greeted with much skepticism.
The conventional wisdom is that Chinese entrepreneurs, as a group, are among the greatest beneficiaries
of the post-Tiananmen order. Politically, the ruling Chinese Communist Party has courted this group as a new social base of support.
Economically, nearly all members of this group have struck gold in the last two decades of boom. For a small select number of wellconnected entrepreneurs, they could not have become China's answer to America's "robber barons" without favors from the CCP. Of
Their
entrepreneurship and confidence in China's future are among the most important drivers of
Chinese growth in the last four decades. However, since mid-2015, several developments have
drastically altered their assessment of the current government's policies and
chilled their relationship with the ruling elites. Slow pace of reform As businessmen, Chinese private
course, private entrepreneurs have also served the party's political interests well while making themselves wealthy.
entrepreneurs are most sensitive to the impact of government policies on their economic well-being. On this front, it is a safe bet to
argue that they
have been sorely disappointed -- if not thoroughly disenchanted -- by both the lack of reform and
the revival of statism in economic policy in the past few years. When the landmark document of the CCP's 3rd plenum
in November 2013 was issued, private entrepreneurs had much to cheer despite many inconsistencies and ambiguities contained in
progress in carrying out promised reforms has been

painfully slow. In particular, the discrimination against the private sector remains practically
unchanged as state-owned enterprises continue to enjoy monopolistic protection and abundant
subsidies from the state. The turning point was, in retrospect, Beijing's ill-advised intervention in
the stock market crash last summer. On its own, such intervention might not have directly hurt the interests of Chinese
entrepreneurs, but its signal -- that the government knows best and will use whatever it takes to fight market
forces -- must have shaken private entrepreneurs' confidence in the CCP's commitment to
market-oriented reforms. To make matters worse, pumping trillions of yuan into a deflating stock market
bubble was only the beginning of Beijing's retreat from reform. In short order, the Chinese
government shelved several financial reform plans (among them the approval process of stock market listings)
out of fear of further financial instability. The progress in restructuring the economy has been
disappointing as well. Although the service sector has grown, the government has been slow in shuttering
state-owned zombie companies. By keeping these companies alive through constant infusion of bank credit, Beijing
has allowed manufacturing overcapacity to persist, destroying corporate profitability, the
economic lifeline of private entrepreneurs who typically reinvest profits to expand their
businesses. Such a disappointing record of policy performance , one may argue, must have sowed
deep doubts among private entrepreneurs about the competence of their leaders. As entrepreneurs
operating under the perennial political uncertainty of an autocratic regime, Chinese businessmen are acutely
sensitive to political signals. Here, again, they find more to worry about in recent years. Among the most unsettling
developments, the revival of the political rhetoric and symbols associated with the Maoist era must
have repelled private entrepreneurs the most. For this group, the Maoist era represents China's economic "Middle
the CCP's new reform agenda. Unfortunately,
Ages" when practicing capitalism was punished by imprisonment and worse. Any officially condoned resurrection of Maoist rhetoric
and symbols could only mean a great political leap backward. Earlier this year, Ren Zhiqiang, a celebrity real-estate developer with
more than 38 million followers on social media site Weibo, was
so disgusted by the official media's extravagantly slavish

demonstration of loyalty to the CCP that he wrote an acerbic blog reminding the Chinese government that
the people, not the party, are the real owners of the official media. When the party shut down Ren's Weibo
account as punishment, many leading businessmen came to his defense.
Chinese growth is already stalledno uniqueness for decline

Saran 4-29 [Shyam, senior fellow at the Centre for Policy Research, former foreign secretary
and Prime Ministers Special Envoy for Nuclear Affairs and Climate Change and as chairman of
the National Security Advisory Board current chairman of the Research and Information System
for Developing Countries, Economic roots of Xi Jinpings nationalist politics, Hindustan times,
http://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/economic-roots-of-xi-jinping-s-nationalistpolitics/story-VZI3sSykTB2wpsYTOUZVGO.html RD; AD 7/27/16]
Speaking at the National Peoples Congress in 2007, the then Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao declared, The biggest problem with
Chinas economy is
that growth is unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated and unsustainable. The strategy outlined to deal with this
challenge was to shift the economic growth model from being investment and export driven to consumption and domestic demand driven, with a
parallel shift from manufacturing to services. But then came the global financial and economic crisis later that year and Chinas answer was a truly
massive stimulus package of over $600 billion, according to some estimates. This took the form of abundant and cheap credit to mostly local
government entities and State-owned enterprises (SOEs), which invested in more property, infrastructure and capacity expansion in manufacturing
industries, taking the economy in a direction reverse of what the proposed reforms had intended. Quite predictably, the economy has ended up being
more unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated and unsustainable. This is most dramatically reflected in one single, telling figure: The
credit
overhang in the Chinese economy is now 250% of GDP and slated to rise to 300% by 2020.
International ratings agencies have downgraded Chinese credit risk from stable to negative
recently. While official figures put Chinas current GDP growth rate at over 6.5%, some analysts believe it is closer to 5% or less. In order to prop
up growth, a 4.6 trillion yuan additional credit has been pumped into the economy in the first quarter of this
year, which will further exacerbate the problem of overcapacity and misallocated resources. In order to reduce the
risk from bad loans and non-performing assets with local governments, the Chinese government has allowed them to issue local bonds which can be
used as collateral for bank loans. This merely shifts the financial liability on to banks, which are already over-leveraged. Similarly, SOEs are being
permitted to convert part of their outstanding loans into equity. But banks will merely hold these as non-performing shares instead of as nonperforming loans, and if the SOEs fortunes continue to decline, then the banks will end up in a worse financial situation. It has been argued that one
part of Chinas rebalancing strategy seems to be going well and that is easing pressure on domestic overcapacity through aggressive capital investment
abroad. This is the apparent motivation behind the ambitious One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative, for which a $40 billion fund has been created.
However, recently a former senior Chinese finance official made the following revealing admission on a Chinese website, before it was taken down by
internet censors: In previous years, China made large investments in the energy sector. Looking at it now, these investments were useful in ensuring
energy supplies though financial losses were large. If we do not go this route, external demand will shrink, which will put tremendous pressure on
domestic production and exacerbate the overcapacity problem. So despite the difficulties we need to stick to this overseas economic strategy. What is
clear from this overall picture is that China is not rebalancing its economy; in fact, it is
repeatedly kicking the can down the

road for fear of a hard landing. The longer this continues the greater the future risks to the
Chinese economy and to the global economy, considering Chinas status as the worlds second
largest economy, its biggest trading nation and now a major capital exporter. These uncertain economic
dynamics are playing into the ongoing political uncertainty within the Chinese Communist party leadership. When Xi Jinping became the top party,
State and military leader in 2012, he was presented as a pre-eminent leader in the mould of Deng Xiaoping, if not Mao, in a category above the other six
members of the Communist Party Politburo Standing Committee, which is the highest forum of collective leadership. There was speculation that his
elevated status was a consensus decision of the Party, designed to give him the authority to push through the urgent and overdue reforms, to finally
enable the transition identified in 2007. The 60-point ambitious reform package announced at the third plenum of the 18th Party Central Committee in
November 2013, seemed to confirm this. It was also assumed that these economic reforms would be accompanied by political reforms in the direction
of greater individual freedoms, rule of law and enhanced role of the private sector. Even the
anti-corruption campaign unleashed

by Xi Jinping against both tigers and flies appeared to be an integral part of the same reform
package. Two years later economic reforms have mostly stalled. Maintaining Party ascendancy
has repeatedly trumped the logic of reform. We find Xi Jinping aspiring to an even more elevated, indeed, unassailable
leadership position than at the beginning of his term. He is being described as the core of the party leadership and dissent within both the party and
outside, is being vigorously and ruthlessly suppressed. The media is being brought back under strict party control. The anti-corruption campaign has
morphed from being a genuine attempt to root out venality within the party to an instrument being wielded in factional struggles. There continues to be
activism on the external front particularly in the South China Sea. There
is a link between the slowing and increasingly

vulnerable economy and the revived political authoritarianism and nationalist pretensions of Xi.
He may be justifying his exercise of untrammelled power as necessary to maintain party supremacy in the face of political and social tensions which a
stalled economy is likely to unleash. But this is being challenged within the party and the army. There is real risk of political blowback. The impact of
these developments on the global economy and international security could be profound and enduring.
CCP Collapse Inev

CCP in decline-structural factors
Southerland 6/24/16 (San Southerland, executive editor of Radio Free Asia, is a former Asia correspondent for
the Monitor and former Beijing bureau chief for The Washington Post, http://www.csmonitor.com/Books/BookReviews/2016/0624/China-s-Future-predicts-the-protracted-decline-of-China-s-Communist-Party)
the most likely long-term outcome for Chinas ruling

Communist Party will be one of protracted decline. This marks an evolution from Shambaughs earlier views,
which suggested that the Party was adapting to multiple challenges, thus ensuring its survival.
Shambaugh also concludes that while Chinas President Xi Jinping exudes self confidence, hes in
reality too insecure to pursue needed economic and political reforms . During his
first four years in office, Xi has amassed greater personal power than any Chinese leader since
In Chinas Future, Shambaugh predicts that
Deng Xiaoping, Shambaugh says. And Xi has centralized the institutional power of the Party, the state, and the military in his own
hands, says Shambaugh, a political science professor at George Washington University in Washington, D.C. who has written many
books on China.According to Shambaugh, no
country anywhere has developed a truly modern economy

without also democratizing. But President Xi has emphatically rejected this linkage. After many years of
rapid economic development, says the author, China has now reached a critical juncture in its economic,
social, political, environmental, technological and intellectual development .In Shambaughs view,
Chinas economic reforms have bogged down. For example, Chinas much anticipated moves to make state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) more competitive and less monopolistic are stalled. The SOEs, he says, are the epitome of deeply vested
And the links between the SOEs and the

state banks that make loans to them is a form of protectionism that will be difficult to break.
China, he says, is burdened with excess manufacturing capacity and heavy central, local, corporate, and bank
interests, with no small degree of corruption deeply embedded within them.
debts acquired as the state tried to maintain the countrys high growth rate. On the social front, the size of the countrys population
aged 60 and above is increasing dramatically. But many families have only one child, resulting in a declining labor supply to support
economic production and care for the elderly
CCP collapse inevitablesocial unrest, wealth gaps, credibility

Johnston 16 (Matthew, bachelors degree in Interdisciplinary Studies at St. Stephens
University in the Canadian maritime province of New Brunswick, MA in economics at the New
School for Social Research in New York City, 2/2/2016,
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/020216/will-china-suffer-fate-similar-sovietunion.asp, Will China Suffer a Fate Similar to That of the Soviet Union? -by Sophia Ghauri)
Despite liberal market reforms, China remained a primarily Communist country with a
centralized command structure, and the rapidly rising middle class would begin to press for
more economic and political reform as early as 1989 in the Tiananmen Square protests . Fearing the
situation would get out of hand, the CCP forcibly suppressed the protests with tanks and heavily armed troops that opened fire and
crushed anyone in the way. Since
these protests the CCP has assumed greater control over the economy
by shifting greater wealth and ownership from private companies to state-owned ones . Even though
the middle class continued to grow for another 15 years following the protests, since 2005 the middle class has been shrinking and
income inequality is on the rise. Indeed, the gap between Chinas rich and poor has recently become one of the worlds highest, as its
Gini coefficient has grown from 0.3 in 1980 to 0.61 as of 2010. While the Soviet Union may have lacked a middle class, its citizens
were arguably less poor than Chinas and far less numerous, with about a billion Chinese people considered poor out of a total
population of 1.3 billion. Such
inequality, especially in a nation that seemingly originated based on

egalitarian ideals, has led to increasing social unrest. But it is not just issues of inequality that have motivated
this growing unrestenvironmental issues have also become a substantial concern. Indeed, protests and riots in China have
increased from 8,700 incidents in 1993 to more than 180,000 in 2010. Realizing the revolutionary potential of the middle class and
the need to try and satisfy their demands, Chinas newest President, Xi Jinping, promised reforms that will go beyond those of Deng.
Economically, he claimed to give the market a greater role in determining economic outcomes while politically, he claimed to give
more clout to the constitution. Subsequent
to Xis reform proposals, a newspaper in Guandong

province attempted to publish an editorial piece arguing in favor of constitutional government,
but was ultimately censored. An ensuing protest demanding greater freedom of the press broke
out, which resulted in numerous arrests, an episode which The Economist claims, ushered in
a crackdown on civil society of greater duration and intensity than any since the dark days that
followed the Tiananmen protests. The Fragile Legitimacy of the CCP In the midst of increasing social
unrest, Chinas economic growth model appears to be reaching its limits . Chinas rapid growth was
fuelled by an investment and export-oriented model. But with demand for its exports slowing and industrial overcapacity limiting
the returns to investment, the country grew at its slowest rate in 25 years in 2015. Believing that much of the legitimacy of the Soviet
leadership depended upon the performance of the economy, the CCP is frantically doing whatever it can to maintain a good front,
regardless of whether real economic performance is actually improving. (See also: Can the Economic Data From China Be Trusted?)
With economic growth on the wane, the Chinese government facilitated a stock market boom in the first half of 2015 by cutting
traders' fees and having state-owned media publish articles encouraging stock market investing. But the plan would backfire, as late
June saw the beginning of a nearly $4 trillion stock market rout triggering a panicked Chinese government to intervene. (See also:
Chinese Stock Market Ban Hurts Production). The
interventions may have stalled the stock rout, but they

also hurt the credibility of the CCP and Mr. Xis proposal to give markets a greater role in
determining economic outcomes. While the need for such reform is recognized, the
governments actions reveal fears associated with giving up too much control over the economy
too quickly. In fact, it is precisely Gorbachevs radical reforms that were quickly followed by the Soviet Unions collapse that the
CCP is trying to avoid. Ironically, however, it may just be Xis resistance to actually implementing more liberal reforms that serves to
undue his partys hold on power. What he and the CCP are failing to recognize is that their legitimacy rests not so much on strong
economic growth as it does on the happiness of Chinese citizens. So long as economic performance fails to translate into greater
happiness, the legitimacy of any government will be in question. The Bottom Line There are obvious similarities between the former
Soviet Union and contemporary China, but it may be the
CCPs failure to see the subtle difference that will lead
to their eventual demise. Like the Soviet Union, China is realizing the limits of its economic growth model. Yet, while
slowing, Chinas economy is far from the crisis mode that preceded the Soviet Unions collapse. The CCPs fear of declining
growth and reluctance to follow in Gorbachevs footsteps are keeping them from loosening their
hold on the economy and implementing much-needed reforms. Meanwhile, social dissent
continues to grow, and it is far from obvious that the CCP will be able to suppress the various
forces tearing at its hold on power.
China Collapse Inev

No impact uniquenessChina already on brink of collapse
WEISS 5/11-PhD in Cultural Anthropology @ Columbia, Fulbright Scholar [Martin, China on the Verge of Volcanic Financial
Eruption, The International Chronicles, 5/11/2016,
http://www.theinternationalchronicles.com/china_on_the_verge_of_volcanic_financial_eruption, DKP]
China today is a volcano ready to erupt. The longer the eruption is delayed, the greater its
impact will be on the global economy. And of all the countries in the world, its the United States, Chinas largest
trading partner, that could feel some of the greatest economic shock waves . The likely scenario : A
recession in China triggers political and labor unrest, followed by an even deeper economic
decline. Beijing responds with a combination of economic stimulus and brutal crackdowns. But its too
little, too late. Chinas ascendant middle classes and entrenched elites tolerated the central governments
tough-fisted controls and corruption only as long as they could continue to reap the material benefits of a
growing economy. As those benefits disappear, tolerance turns to turmoil. The IMF Highlights Chinas
Income Inequality Until around 1990, the IMF reports, Asian economies grew strongly and evenly. Hundreds of millions of people
from all strata of society participated in the economic "miracles" of China and the Asian Tigers. Middle classes grew by leaps and
bounds. Poverty plunged. But in the early 1990s, Asia reached a monumental fork in the road. Its growth trajectory made a sharp
turn. And it has not changed course ever since. Yes, the growth continued. But it was far more imbalanced, tilted
heavily toward the rich. And yes, Asia gave global GDP a huge boost. But it did so with ever greater
vulnerability to political instability. The Gini Index, a widely accepted measure of bad income distribution, rose
in Indonesia, Hong Kong, India and even in supposedly mature economies like New Zealand, Australia, Japan, Taiwan
and Singapore. But the worst and most dramatic changes took place in China, where income
inequality rose far more than in any other country in Asia. While Indias Gini index rose by about 7 points and
Indonesias by 10, Chinas rose by nearly 20. And even this measure greatly understates the huge regional discrepancies in China
between the impoverished countryside and the industrial megalopolises; between the small coastal provinces (see blue in map) and
the giant Western regions (brown). No matter how you slice the numbers, China has clearly suffered the most radical
shift from equality to inequality among all large countries and across all regions of the world. Since 1990, inequality in
China has surged over ten times faster than it has in the advanced OECD countries, in the worlds Newly
Industrialized Countries (NICs), and in Asias Low Income Countries (LICs). Meanwhile, even regions like Sub-Saharan Africa and
Latin America have made improvements during this period. These numbers dont lie, and I have seen it with my own eyes: When
Elisabeth and I walk down Wangfujing Avenue in Beijing or stroll in the Pudong district of Shanghai, for instance, we see scenes that
bring the stats to life in dazzling color. We see Chinas super-rich lining up for diamond-set coats at Cartier. We see them inspecting
Phantom Coupes at the Rolls-Royce dealership. And at almost the same time, were beset by the wretched ultra-poor, peddling
counterfeit Rolexes, refilled mineral water bottles, or Maos Little Red Book. Everywhere, the most-widely revered gods in urban
China today are the god of wealth and the god of power. In the long march toward conspicuous consumption, even Confucian
traditions respect for elders, parents and those of lower social status have largely fallen by the wayside. Of course virtually no
one inside or outside China advocates for a return of the forced (and oft contrived) equality of the Maoist era. But this rapid
shift to the opposite extreme has shocking consequences Protests, Revolts and Chaos in the Making
Revolts. The 1989 Tiananmen Square uprising may have been the most widely known to the outside world. But it was not
the last nor the most widespread. In terms of the number of provinces impacted, the protests by the Falun Gong
religious movement a decade later was broader. Ten years after that, the riots in Urumchi, the capital of the minority
Uyghur region of Northwest China, were still larger. And the more recent Pro-Democracy protests were the biggest of all.
Year-by-year, province-by-province, protests in China are growing progressively more
impactful. Labor protests. Even if you accept the governments official count, the number of major labor protest incidents
in China has been surging. Workers are demanding higher wages, better benefits or simply an end to outrageously abusive
working conditions. Crackdowns. Under President Xi Jinping, the Chinese government is cracking down on
popular dissent with growing impunity, audacity and ferocity. And the U.S. Congress has taken notice. In its
latest annual report, the Congressional-Executive Commission on China pulls no punches, declaring that: Human rights and
rule of law conditions in China have deteriorated sharply, especially since Xi Jinping came to power in November
2012. The Chinese government has broadly silenced dissent, suppressed human rights advocates,
and taken control over civil society. They have targeted journalists, human rights lawyers, ethnic minorities, religious
groups, non-governmental organizations, intellectuals, democracy advocates, petitioners and peaceful protesters. Without an
independent judiciary, citizens across China have little legal recourse, most notably to redress appropriations of their land or homes
by local officials for development projects. Even those making modest calls for reform have faced harassment, detention and arrest.
The government has dramatically stepped up its rhetoric against foreign ideals, values, and influence. Specifically, the Communist
Partys Document No. 30 purges Western-inspired liberal ideas from universities and prohibits teaching and research on a number
of topics, including judicial independence, media freedom, human rights and objective analysis of the Communist Partys history. In
official pronouncements, the Chinese government says its committed to yifa zhiguo (the rule of law). But anyone who thinks that
means "rule of law for the people" is bound to be disappointed. What it really means is precisely the opposite. According to the
Congressional Commission, Beijing is "further entrenching a system in which they utilize statutes to strengthen and maintain its
leading role and power over the country." Internal Sponsorship Community Party documents expressly state their intent to use the
law to strengthen their control over legislatures, local governments, and the courts. Many of Chinas religious and political prisoners
are subject to harsh and lengthy prison sentences, often thrown into extralegal black jails and education centers. Reports of
torture in detention are routine not to mention other human rights abuses, including denial of
medical treatment and the use of forced hospitalization in psychiatric facilities. Prominent public interest lawyer Pu Zhiqiang
recently faced charges of picking quarrels and provoking trouble and inciting ethnic hatred. His so-called "crime": Social media
posts that mocked several government officials and that criticized Chinas ethnic policy. Liu Xia, wife of imprisoned Nobel Peace
Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo, was isolated under extralegal detention at her home in Beijing municipality despite her poor health. All
told, the Congressional Commission has information on approximately 1,300 cases of political and religious prisoners detained or
imprisoned, though the actual number is certain to be much higher. Lawyers who accept politically sensitive cases face disbarment,
physical violence, and the closure of their law firms. In July 2015, for example, Chinese authorities took into custody more than 250
individuals in an unprecedented nationwide sweep. A rash of new, police-state laws. Suddenly and without
warning, the Chinese government has issued a series of far-reaching new laws with the
cumulative effect of gutting relations with the West. Just in the last 18 months, for example, theyve issued
or drafted The Peoples Republic of China National Security Law, which identifies cyberspace,
outer space, the oceans, and the Arctic as parts of Chinas national security interests. The law
stressed the need not only to maintain territorial integrity but also to guard against negative cultural influences and dominate
the ideological sphere." The PRC Overseas NGO Management Law, which impacts more than 7,000 foreign nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating in China. All will have to find a domestic sponsor (if they can). All will have to register
with the police and be subject to random raids or inspections (if they dare). The PRC Counterterrorism Law, which grants
authorities the legal power to cut Internet access in order to safeguard national security and social public order, while also
stipulating that user data from Internet companies must be stored in China. These and other laws add up to an even broader, more
severe crackdown on critics, protesters and ethnic minorities. They are poison for U.S. companies that do business in China. And
ultimately, they could sink U.S. trade with China. The big dilemma, according to the Congressional Commission on China: Americas
business and trade interests in China depend on the Chinese governments willingness to comply with international law, enforce its
own laws, allow the free flow of news and information, and fulfill its obligations under the World Trade Organization (WTO). But
with these laws and crackdowns, China is moving swiftly in precisely the opposite direction. And heres where the Commission fears
the ongoing changes in China could impact the United States directly: Impact #1. It could hurt the safety of our
personal information in cyberspace. Impact #2. It could threaten the safety of our food and drug supplies.
Impact #3. It threatens the protection of our intellectual property. Impact #4. It will destabilize the entire Pacific
region. Impact #5. It will reduce trade. Impact #6. It could sabotage U.S. business interests. Needless to say, all this
could dig a hole in the portfolios of mutual funds, hedge funds or any individual investor with a big stake in China. And all
these impacts are based exclusively on currently observed trends before the
vicious cycle of recession and political turmoil begins in earnest, before the volcanic forces in
China erupt.
Polcap
Xi All Powerful
Xis power is already massively high
One downside to Xis breathtaking success in consolidating power is that it has left him with
near total responsibility for his governments policy missteps on matters ranging from the stock
market slowdown to labor market unrest. His visibility on these issues and his dominance of the decision-making
process have made him a powerful but potentially exposed leader. With Xis image and political
position vulnerable to Chinas economic downturn, his countrys external behavior may
increasingly be guided by his own domestic political imperatives. For the last three years , with
Chinas economy still producing robust growth numbers, such concerns have not fundamentally influenced Xis
foreign policy. Xi has been able to be continuously proactive, and he has used his power to take
Chinas foreign policy in a new direction. He has boldly departed from Dengs injunction to keep
a low profile 4 Xi Jinping on the Global Stage and has reclaimed islands, created international institutions,
pressured neighbors, and deployed military assets to disputed regions. Xis foreign policy has been assertive,
confident, and, importantly, a diversified mix of both hard and soft elements. Even as China has taken firm steps on territorial issues, it has used
geoeconomic instruments to offer generous loans and investments, and even created new
organizations such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). 1 By combining inducements with
intimidation, Xi has demonstrated the benefits of cooperating with China as well as the economic and military costs of opposing it, especially on issues
important to Beijing.2
Xis power is high and not contingent on foreign policy

Xis arrest of senior officials is risky, and is sustained in no small part by public opinion
supportive of the anticorruption campaign and of Xi more broadly. Unlike recent Chinese leaders, Xi
appears to have an intuitive grasp of public sentiment and has sustained a nascent cult of
personality around his image as a brash and assertive strongman, reportedly telling Russian President Vladimir
Putin in 2013, We are similar in character.12 This image is buttressed by a relentless propaganda campaign
waged through traditional and social media that portrays Xi as an incorruptible and selfsacrificial mix of everyman and superman.13 That effort has been successful in making public
opinion a pillar of Xis power, with a Harvard study finding that Xi had a higher approval rating
domestically than any other world leader in 2014.14
Alt Causes to PolCap

Alt causes overwhelm Xis credibility
Johnson 15 [William, writer for Reuters, Why Chinas President Xi Jinping isnt Mao 2.0,
Reuters, http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/04/20/why-chinas-president-xi-jinpingisnt-mao-2-0/ RD; AD 7/27/16]
The massive changes underway in China from rapid urbanization, to the closing of coal-fired power plants, to the insuring of deposit accounts are
happening not because of some top-down, heavy-handed approach by Xi, but because of circumstance. Not only is Xi not as authoritarian as many
Westerners have depicted him, but he faces
a series of challenges that will continue to undermine the power

he does hold. Three issues prevent Xi from being an authoritarian leader. First, he is constrained by structural flaws in
the economy. In order to keep China labor-competitive, he must contend with issues like a
rapidly aging workforce, disenfranchised migrant workers and horrific pollution. To keep
migrants happy, Xi has reformed the household registration program, which had limited their
access to services outside their hometowns. He has softened the countrys one child policy to reinvigorate
the workforce, and taken major steps to cut pollution, especially in Beijing. But continued problems
demand prompt action to sustain Chinas its economy. Secondly, Xis political perch is not as powerful as it
seems. Since taking the Party helm in 2012, Xi has amassed an impressive array of titles, becoming the only Chinese leader
other than Hua Guofeng to simultaneously lead the Communist Party, the State Council and the Central Military Commission. He has
consolidated his power in the Politburo Standing Committee, with Premier Li Keqiang the lone remaining member from the populist
faction, with the remaining six, including Xi, all members of the elitist faction. Xi would appear to be in a position to do
whatever he pleases. Yet he cant. Three of the elitist members in the Politburo Standing Committee
answer to former president and influential Party member Jiang Zemin, 88. Even though Jiang and Xi are
members of the same faction, their interests dont always align much like the Tea Party and
mainstream Republicans. In matters like the investigation of Jiangs close allies, Jiang holds more sway than Xi. Only
after Jiang gave his okay could the administration depose and arrest then-security chief Zhou Yongkang on corruption charges. Moreover, the
new membership of the Standing Committee may have nothing to do with factions. The five new members
may have been selected because they meet the age requirements. The strict seniority and retirement
rules would have prevented these new members from ever reaching the top, had they been passed over this time around.
The balance in the Standing Committee will shift in Xis second term, as the remaining Politburo
members are mostly from the populist faction. Internal division will challenge Xis influence. In
addition to dealing with high-level party intrigues, Xi also struggles to keep cadre at the local and provincial levels
motivated and functioning, despite having to give up many of the perks to which they had long been accustomed
because of Xis efforts to root out corruption within the Party. Ive seen firsthand what a difficult task that will be. I recently
visited a friend who is a mid-level provincial party official, based in Dalian. She picked me up in a domestic First Automotive Works sedan, instead of
the black, late model Audi that had been the sign of a high-level cadre. After many apologies for not being able to treat me in grand style, we had dinner
in a local night market. I picked up the check a first! The main topic of conversation was her search for a job with a private, preferably foreign,
company. She said without the perks, she wasnt sure she would be able to provide for her family in a Party job. This sentiment is rampant within the
Party, and Xi
risks losing productivity and control at the provincial level and below if the Party is
unable to compete with the private sector for recruits. Corruption pervades the business sector as well. Xi has had to
battle provincial governments that resent his efforts to establish top-down control over state-owned enterprises (SOEs), in order to control costs,
eliminate over-capacity and earmark a greater share of their revenues to the Central Committee. SOEs are difficult to supervise. Because they can be
owned by municipal, provincial or special district party committees as well as the Central Committee they are prone to inefficiencies and
corruption. Ghost employment is rampant, and provincial companies may duplicate the efforts of national companies cannibalizing market share.
When one considers the systemic flaws in Chinas social and economic structure, its clear that
Xi is being driven as much as he is driving. If Xi is to maintain both Party rule and social
stability, he must respond to all of these problems. His predecessor largely kicked these cans down the road. Xi does not
have that option.
A2-Hague-PC High
SCS ruling doesnt hurt Xiuses it to stir public fervor and
nationalism
NAKAZAWA 7/22-senior staff writer @ Nikkei [Katsuji, For Xi, South China Sea rebuke may be blessing in disguise,
7/22/2016, http://asia.nikkei.com/Features/China-up-close/For-Xi-South-China-Sea-rebuke-may-be-blessing-in-disguise, DKP]
TOKYO -- After a stinging rebuke in international arbitration, the Chinese government is performing a delicate balancing act over
the South China Sea dispute. Publicly, President Xi Jinping's administration continues
to play hardball, vowing to

defy the July 12 tribunal ruling against its claims to much of the sea. The tough talk appears to be an effort to
shore up popular support at home. Behind the scenes, however, the Chinese leadership is sending
nuanced messages to avoid international isolation. Some even suggest Xi stands to benefit
from the arbitration setback , at least in the short term. The international tribunal, set up under the auspices of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, admonished China in a case brought by the Philippines. Beijing claims a large area of
the South China Sea, which it marks on maps with a U-shaped "nine-dash line." In recent years, China has been reclaiming land on
reefs inside the line, creating artificial islands. But the tribunal ruled that there is no legal basis for the nine-dash line. It also said
there is no land mass in the disputed Spratly Islands, known as Nansha in China, that qualifies for a 200 nautical mile (370km)
exclusive economic zone. This was based on the technical definition of an island as a natural land formation, surrounded by water,
that remains above water at high tide. Islands also come with territorial waters that stretch out 12 nautical miles. The tribunal's
ruling was much harsher on China than many expected. Yet Xi is anything but discouraged, according to a seasoned
Chinese watcher of the nation's domestic politics and its foreign policy. "To be sure, it is a complete defeat for China," this person
it is a heaven-sent lifeline for Xi , who has been in a difficult position at home,

politically." At first glance, this might seem implausible. However, there is smoldering discontent within
the Chinese Communist Party over Xi's highhanded governing style, and his once sky-high popularity
has shown signs of falling as the economy slows down. The ruling has given the administration
an opportunity to trumpet its hard-line stance over an international dispute through domestic media outlets -and given citizens a cause to rally around. At least for now, the verdict has diverted public attention
from domestic woes. On July 12, immediately before the tribunal handed down the ruling, Xi attended a China-European
said. "But
Union summit in Beijing and declared that his government would not accept any arguments against its territorial claims. Normally,
a top Chinese leader would refrain from hastily remarking on a sensitive issue. When a U.S. military plane mistakenly bombed the
Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia in 1999, then-President Jiang Zemin trod carefully. Hu Jintao, the vice president at the time, was the
This time,
had no choice but to move quickly himself to cushion the political fallout. He
anticipated that an unfavorable ruling would be unavoidable, so Xi sought to pre-empt it. Yang
Jiechi, the state councilor supervising China's foreign policy, and Wang Yi, the foreign minister, followed Xi's example,
calling the ruling "a political farce staged under a legal pretext" and "wastepaper."
point man initially. Jiang made his first public comments on the bombing only after gauging domestic public opinion.
though, Xi
Disad is Bad Scholarship

Chinese leadership prioritizes policy over its own intereststhe
disads totalizing assertion that factional politics drives every CCP
decision leads to inaccurate predictions.
Batke 6/23 (Jessica, M.A. in East Asian Studies from Stanford and research analyst in the U.S. Department of States
Bureau of Intelligence and Research focused on leadership and governance in modern China, Gossip, guanxi, and guesswork: time
to demystify the Chinese leadership, Mercator Institute for China Studies, June 23, 2016. http://blog.merics.org/en/blogpost/2016/06/23/gossip-guanxi-and-guesswork-time-to-demystify-the-chinese-leadership.html)//king koopa
Recent research suggests that several of the categories we previously used to assign Chinese
officials to a particular faction, such as birthplace, are not especially relevant . The one category that has
a significant effect on later hiring and promotion is whether or not two individuals have previously worked together. Yet, even this
seems quite similar to how hiring and promotion functions outside of China. Are we prepared to say that previous personal
connections or, especially, shared work experience are not major factors in promotions in Western democracies? Or are we ready to
start assigning Western leaders to particular factions because of their work histories? There
are certainly cases when

Chinas guanxi culture has unique effects on hiring and promotion. But we should be cautious of
discussing all personnel issues within that special, China-only frameworkdoing so elides
possible useful points of comparison with other governments. Mao ran a poor country, Xi administers a
wealthy nation A question Im constantly asking myself is whether contemporary China shares more similarities with the China of
1950 or with a European country of today. The rapid social, economic, technological, and, yes, political change over the last 65 years
at least raises the question of whether it is relevant to think about the current Chinese leadership wholly in terms of past Chinese
leaders. General Secretary Xi Jinping, for example, has a lot more to manage and, in some ways, fewer options than his
predecessors. In
stark contrast with Mao, who was running a poor, war-torn country with little to
lose, Xi must administer an increasingly wealthy nation with an increasingly expectant
population, and do so within the framework of the CCP as a governing rather than a revolutionary party. Likewise, in the
years before World War I, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson apparently worked four hours a day, slept nine hours a night, [and]
played golf regularly. Clearly, the demands of running the United States 100 years ago are nothing like they are today. China has
undergone a similar national transformation in an even shorter timeframe. We should therefore think through which of the goals,
Public policy
trumps personal goals The fact that the CCP has so far survived this sometimes-wrenching transformation does, however,
tell us something about internal leadership priorities and struggles. Looking at all the different ways a state can
fail, it is no small feat that China is still in one piece, let alone in an increasingly powerful
international position. This suggests that, despite all the waste, corruption, and personal enrichment
that have come along with CCP rule, the leadership since reform and opening has ultimately
prioritised public policy over personal goals. This doesnt mean that Chinese leaders are perfectly clean or altruistic.
methods, and functions of contemporary Chinese leaders are directly comparable to those of previous generations.
Nor does it mean that public policy in China translates into Western governance ideals such as a free press or robust protections
for human rights. But it does mean that Chinese
leaders have managed (sometimes by the slimmest of margins) to rise

above political fighting to keep a grip on one of the worlds largest and most complex states. What
does this mean for how we analyse Chinese leadership politics? Because we have limited access to Chinese leaders, we often use
Our default assumption

is that a leader supports a particular stance for factional or institutional reasons. But this view
can overlook the role that individual agency plays in policy decisions, including perhaps forming
looser networks of policy coalitions depending on the issue at hand something more akin to what we
might see in other types of governments. A better starting point may be to ask what possible
public policy (in the Chinese context) goals a leadership decision might have, and then to
look for evidence why this may or may not be the case. Leaders personal views, political intrigue,
factional or institutional frameworks to help us speculate about a particular leaders motivations.
and bureaucratic infighting can all be incorporated into this frameworkand sometimes they may end up being the entire story
but by prioritizing personal politics over policy as a starting point for our analysis, we may be
missing a larger story.
Links
Cyber
Hacking control spends Xi pol cap with the military

Maurer 16 http://carnegieendowment.org/files/JIR1603_CYB_Global_norms.pdfTim Maurer co-leads the Cyber Policy
Initiative at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he focuses on cyberspace and international affairs
The lack of a visible reduction in this activity led to renewed calls for sanctions, including by the
chairman of the US Senate Committee on Armed Services, Senator John McCain, in November.
Amid the tense atmosphere of a US presidential election year, this raises the possibility that
the US could again attempt to impose sanctions during 2016. Given Chinas desire to avoid
becoming a constant subject of domestic political debate in the US, and the negative signals
regarding its economy, it is unlikely that China would risk sanctions by completely failing to
stand by the agreement. It may not be a lack of will that led to this apparent delay in
implementing the agreement. Firstly, China is not a monolithic hacking machine. Turning words
into action will be a test of Xis control over the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA). There are
likely to be hackers within the PLA for whom the activity constitutes a profitable side business
that they would be unwilling to relinquish. Similarly, there is the risk that deniable or rogue
operations would continue despite an order from the PLA leadership to halt certain activities. If,
during 2016, corruption investigations were launched targeting senior PLA commanders
believed to be involved in cybersecurity, this would be one indicator that Xi was attempting to
bring these units under control, given the extent to which previous anti-corruption campaigns
have been used to strengthen Chinese presidents domestic political position.
Reducing hacking costs pol cap requires stopping fly-by-night

operators
Mattis 12/7/15 http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=44865&no_cache=1#.V5wnGTU0A2w
Peter Mattis is an American computer programmer, entrepreneur, and business executive. He is the Vice President of Engineering
for Cockroach Labs, a company he co-founded in 2014
PLA Divestiture 2.0: Cutting Back on For-Profit Freelancing , Using Stricter Control
In 1998, Jiang Zemin ordered the PLA to divest itself of much of the commercial empire it had
created since the beginning of the Reform Era. Beginning in the 1980s, the Chinese leadership
led by Deng Xiaoping placed military modernization at the bottom of their list of policy
priorities, converting much of the defense industrial base to civilian use. The PLA was
encouraged to engage the market, and budget stagnation meant that the PLA budget was not
fully funded. The profits of these commercial endeavors also went into commanders pockets,
leading to some wide-ranging corruption scandals in the mid- and late-1990s. The divestiture
order did not remove the PLA entirely from the commercial world, but it limited PLA
commercial activities to support activities directly relevant to PLA maintenance in garrison,
such as spousal support and on-base services. [1]
The most important step the PLA may have taken was to rein in its soldiers who had been
freelancing for companies and local party officials with commercial stakes. This divestiture
would represent a major reduction in financial opportunities, and it would take time to
implement. The PLA signals intelligence apparatus is a far-flung operation with elements sitting
inside 3PLA bureaus and military region technical reconnaissance bureaus across the country.
[2] Local military commands also have been one of the major sources of the PLAs corruption
problem, and, if endowed with useful capabilities, cyber militias could an addition source of
problems for the PLA in controlling freelancing, as they provide an easy avenue for civilian
technical talent to interface with local commanders. One sign that this is occurring would
be occasional flare-ups against reform , such as the PLA Daily article suggesting some of
Xis reforms under consideration undermined social cohesion and could affect stability (South
China Morning Post, November 19).
Under this scenario, the PLA are intended to rein in soldiers and contractors from conducting
operations that are not tied directly to specific needs for military intelligence, defense industry,
or national-level policymakers. Limiting computer network operations requirements to those
tied to specific information requirements could cut back PLA hacking substantially. In this
scenario, outside observers probably would see a drop over time in the militarys activity as
policy and operational guidance is conceived and promulgated, including an inevitable period
where uncertainty by low-level actors about the precise boundaries of the new limits frequently
pushes decisions about operations back up the chain of command. Economic espionage
originating with the PLA would be reduced, but not eliminated, though some Western
commercial sectors with military applications could become the target of even more focused
attacks
Stopping hacking costs Xi Pol cap

Creemers 6/8/14 http://chinaoutlook.com/de-escalating-tensions-over-cyberattacks/Rogier Creemers is a postdoctoral research fellow at Oxford Universitys Centre for Socio-Legal Studies. With a background in Chinese Studies, International
Relations and Law, his main research interests are the law and policy of Chinas information society, as well as media governance. See more at: http://chinaoutlook.com/author/rogier-creemers/#sthash.5jJ2H6QL.dpuf
Second, there are great imbalances in the hacking issue. On the economic front, there is much
more corporate information in the US that might be of interest to China than vice versa. China
has yet to produce its first domestic airliner, computer operating system or successful export
car. The technological challenges China faces in these areas are widely appreciated and regularly
discussed. Nor is it simply technological superiority. Equally important are the operational and
logistical know-how that supports the sales and exploitation of these products. Global car or
aircraft manufacturers, for instance, needs very complex supply chains, spare parts channels
and maintenance networks, in order to ensure sales of their primary products. This is expertise
that Chinese companies often lack, particularly at the international level. Therefore, the alleged
wholesale capturing of corporate data outlined in, amongst others, the Mandiant report, might
not only be lucrative in terms of primary technology or even corporate negotiating positions vis-vis Chinese counterparts, but also because they might provide useful insights into corporate
governance of globally successful firms. The US, on the other hand, has little to gain from
hacking into Chinese companies, except in the relatively small areas of military and national
security matters. As a result, the bargain that must be struck is one in which the Chinese side
would agree to cease a lucrative activity, without a directly comparable commitment from the
US side. This suggests that the US might need to concede on objectives elsewhere. Again, this
will make negotiations more complex and open them up to domestic accusations of weakness. A
third, and related point, is the matter of financial outlay. Military hardware tends to be
expensive, which was an important driver of both the 1930s fleet treaties and the nuclear arms
treaties, where all parties recognized that continuing the arms race would become unaffordable.
In comparison, building cyber-capability is much less expensive, for military purposes as well as
for the acquisition of intelligence. The PLA units allegedly involved in cyber-espionage operate
from a few buildings in Shanghai, using basic electronic equipment. They do not need to station
officials abroad nor procure expensive hardware. Their hacking campaigns have comparatively
small budget implications and there is therefore little political incentive within the system to
curtail them. In fact, the vast amount of information that can be procured using these methods
suggests that hacking is very cost-effective. These characteristics of hacking per se are
compounded by specific perceptions and concerns, both on the Chinese and US sides. While
Chinese IT firms have tried to become more competitive with their American counterparts over
the past few years, more recently they have also become more infused with security concerns.
Once the Snowden files had revealed some of the NSAs surveillance capacities, China rapidly
became concerned about the dominance of American hardware and software over its domestic
market. These concerns were exacerbated when Microsoft announced it would end security
support for Windows XP, an operating system that still powers the majority of Chinese
government computers. Efforts are currently underway to provide indigenous solutions, and a
first Chinese mobile operating system was launched a few months ago. Domestically, another
question is how much political capital the Xi Jinping leadership is able and willing to spend
on ending an activity that is not only seen as profitable for domestic development, but also as
part and parcel of contemporary politics . More broadly, China has generally been
intransigent in matters of international and global governance, and cyber-governance is no
exception. Its five principles for cyberspace are based on classical notions of national
sovereignty, which sidesteps complicated questions about how borders are to be drawn online.
More recently, it did not respond to US overtures on mutual transparency on
military cyber-capability. Citing the Snowden releases, the clearly superior US cybercapability, and its control over many internet control resources, (network hegemony), China
has repeatedly accused the US of not recognizing the enormous asymmetry between the two
countries. These recriminations are not completely groundless. Post-9/11, the US has vastly
expanded its global data collection capacities, with the aim of preventing further terror strikes.
It has also used these capabilities to more effectively monitor the activities of state leaders
worldwide. But whereas Angela Merkels hacked conversations could conceivably fall under the
heading of national security, hacking foreign corporations such as Petrobras and Huawei has
greatly weakened the central point that the US would like to underpin a cyber agreement with
China: the separation between national security and commercial concerns. Washington lawyers
may well find a juristic justification for these acts, but that will not suffice to alleviate concerns
on the counterparts side. In other words, if China and the US wish to de-escalate tensions over
hacking, it will require both countries to recognize that activities each regards as part of core
national interests simultaneously impair international trust. This will not be easy.
China is moving to cyber sovereignty, plan keeps that from happening

and kills Xis power play
Andal 16
(By Stephenie, undertaking a PhD in the Department of Government &
International Relations at the University of Sydney.The Diplomat China
Power Xi Jinpings Global Cyber Vision January 20, 2016
http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/xi-jinpings-global-cyber-vision-for-thefuture/ TH)
Yet while control measures such as the Great Firewall (Beijings central censorship apparatus) remain a great source of concern for cyber scholars, the
Chinas
move towards cybersovereignty, which I argue, we should see as nothing less than an innovative and
bold push to re-shape the global contours of cyberspace in Chinas favour . We might do well to subvert our
overwhelming focus on the domestic aspects of Chinese cyber policy dangerously ignore the broader, international implications inherent in
scholarly bias of China as playing second fiddle to other global power players (most prominently the United States) especially in areas of innovation,
cyber policies, and digital communications, and explore the possibility of a China that, emboldened by perceived American hypocrisy post-Snowden, is
playing a strategic long game with highly forward-thinking digital policies. This
presents to us a much more complex and

challenging picture of a China intent on leading the pack in a post-utopian cyber age, with
thinking that may be as innovative as it is dangerous. First, we should recognize Chinas
increasingly bold cyber policies such as its lobbying for cybersovereignty as a reflection of a China that is
wielding its still-mighty (albeit sputtering) economic power to carve out new regional and
political alliances across a variety of platforms. And in doing so, it is altering the geopolitical landscape across the Greater
China region and globally. The Shanghai Cooperative Organization (SCO), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and One Belt, One Road all
of these reflect an emboldened Beijing increasingly impatient with being on the receiving end of
what it perceives to be unfair, American-based policies, with Xi calling attention to such
injustice in the United States-led Internet hegemony that unfairly guarantees the security of
one or some countries while leaving the rest insecure. Importantly, while cybersovereignty articulates the right for
sovereign nations to manage their own cyberspace without foreign interference, Beijing is not forging this path alone; rather, it has been actively
seeking to bolster the credibility of this policy through alliances with other like-minded regimes, solidified by the creation of regionally based
communication policies. Therefore, while much has been made of the fact that the conference featured prominent attendees from Silicon Valley
heavyweights like LinkedIn, far more telling was the presence of delegates from the SCO, who represent countries whose support of cybersovereignty
has not gone unnoticed. The conference also took place in the wake of the BRICS Media Summit held recently in Beijing, which brought media
representatives from BRICS economies together to discuss plans for a BRICS common information space that would end the hegemony of Western
domination of the global media, especially on global issues such as [] cyber security. Second,
over the past year Beijing has

made a strong commitment to making digital communication technologies, cyberspace, and
policies such as cybersovereignty central to Beijings power apparatus. This recognition of the vital importance
of digital communication technologies and the Internet to broader issues on the International stage in the cyber age we live in, are reflective of Beijings
historic and canny understanding of the centrality that communications play to the power of the Chinese Communist Party, with a CCTV editor in
Beijing (speaking under conditions of anonymity) remarking to me recently that a central tenet of Beijings power is the calculating use of media as the
throat of the Chinese Communist Party.
This embedded approach to communication in the current and

future power of China does indeed appear to be ahead of many other nations in this regard, who
tend to treat digital technologies as exogenous PR tools for diplomatic staff engaging in digital
diplomacy. Finally, Beijing is increasingly making digital information technologies key
components of its vision for the future, and is actively pursuing innovation in this area in order
to ensure continued economic supremacy. While its future success in this arena must be questioned how can China
successfully enforce a tightly controlled domestic cyberspace while also capitalizing on economic opportunity there is no doubt that there is
unparalleled economic opportunity for domestic and foreign technology firms willing to obey the Chinese law, and Google in particular has faced
recent rumours that it may be positioning themselves to re-enter the Chinese market. Yet China is increasingly moving to in-house technology, and the
global success of Chinese technology giants like Tencent, Alibaba, and Baidu, should cause us to question the tired view that China is merely
copycatting Western technology. Rather, China is increasingly at the forefront of cutting-edge technologies and cyber innovations, and its sheer size
and economic clout allows it to experiment in a plethora of innovative ways that often remain unexamined. Beijing is actively mapping the cyber terrain
through its forward-thinking and early adoption of Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6), it is pioneering information economy pilot zones (zones of
innovation situated around the country that specialize in the realm of big data amongst others), and is increasingly moving to avoid reliance on foreign
Internet infrastructure (and presumably surveillance), as demonstrated by the recent announcement of a new encrypted smartphone for Beijings police
force, created in collaboration with Alibaba. Chinas
drive for cybersovereignty should be seen as a calculated

power play by Beijing to seize on the moment of transition that the global Internet is in at
present, a time when growing geographical and political cleavages in the global cyber terrain are
becoming increasingly apparent. The inclusion of the term multilateral (in reference to Internet governance) in an outcome
document approved recently at the UN General Assembly, reflects Chinas growing power on the global cyber stage and its sway over future approaches
to how to govern and shape the global Internet. Cannily recognizing that such structural trends are already in existence, China is doing openly what
many nations are, and have been doing quietly for years, as made uncomfortably clear by the Snowden revelations. And as expressed to me by a number
of scholars in China recently, although Beijings tactics in shaping the global cyber contours are met with either dismissal or disdain in much
scholarship, in fact, the
forward-thinking nature of the Chinese model is increasingly regarded as very

superb and many countries admire it. As uncomfortable as such statements may make us feel,
they should force us to examine Beijings approach from another perspective, in recognition of
Chinas productive and proactive efforts and not just its defensive techniques to shape its
and our cyber commons.
Case turns the DA US freakout on China over cyber will bolster xi

and directly encourage aggression
Pickrell 9/29/15 Bilingual (Chinese) editor, translator, and writer for the Changjiang Daily
Press Group. I graduated from Central China Normal University in May 2016 with a PhD degree
in International Politics and Diplomacy. http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/a-dangerous-gameresponding-to-chinese-cyber-activities/
Third, in mainland China, American sanctions will likely go a long way towards bolstering
support for Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Chinese nationalism is
based on feelings of humiliation, fear, and pride. China is proud of its long history, for much of
which China was the dominant power in Asia, and is very aware of its fall from glory in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century. China is primarily motivated by the Century of
Humiliation national narrative, a tale of victimization at the hands of imperial powers that
simultaneously promotes a fear and a distrust of the international system, the liberal world
order, and the United States, which is seen as the last of the imperialist powers. This story
encourages the widely held belief that China should take steps to correct past mistakes and
reclaim its position atop of the Asian hierarchy. The government often uses external enemies to
bolster support for the party. Chinese government officials have convinced the people that China
has never done anything to harm another state and that all actions that negatively affect China
are nothing more than attempts to once again humiliate China; this increases domestic support
for party leadership and presents the party as the savior and protector of the Chinese nation. As
a result of domestic censorship, patriotic education initiatives, and state control over the media,
the Chinese people view the world and the actions of other states through this lens. China always
plays the victim, and it will be no different this time around. If the United States imposes
sanctions against China, it will be presented domestically as an attempt by the United States to
humiliate China and prevent it from rising to great power status. Rather than make political
reform in China, which has long been an American aspiration, more likely, it will actually
strengthen party leadership and make reform, already unlikely, an impossible dream.
Punishment Diplomacy Four, punishment diplomacy, a dangerous yet popular
expression that is already quite prominent in China and appears every time the United States
sells weapons to Taiwan, meets with the Dalai Lama, flies spy planes through what is perceived
as Chinese air space, and sails naval vessels through Chinese waters, is likely to become even
more popular, which will increase domestic support for assertive and aggressive Chinese actions
abroad. Since Xi Jinping stepped up in 2013, China has become increasingly assertive; however,
public opinion in China, which encourages peace and restraint in most state-to-state
interactions, excluding those with Chinas long-time enemy Japan, has actually helped to keep
Chinese assertiveness in check. Since the decentralization of Chinese foreign policy, public
opinion, especially online, has had a greater effect on Chinese foreign policies. If Chinese
citizens feel that the United States is threatening China, which is, considering Chinas culture
and history, exactly how Chinese citizens will feel, public opinion will shift, and the public will
start to encourage government officials to take a tougher stance against the United States.
Without public support for restraint, the world may see the emergence of a China that is
significantly more assertive than anything seen previously.
Warming
Pushing climate coop costs Xi pol cap
Stratfor 9/30/15 https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/climate-change-common-ground-between-china-and-us
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/climate-change-common-ground-between-china-and-us
China is in the middle

of a structural economic shift, forcing Beijing to simultaneously tackle a multitude of issues. Xi is attempting to
liberalize the country's financial system, liberalize its economic system, reform the state-owned enterprises,
conduct an anti-corruption campaign and implement a more active foreign policy , all while dealing
Though there is little doubt that Xi is sincere about trying to control China's emissions, the fact is that
with a slowing domestic and international economy. We have long said that Xi's anti-corruption purge is linked to the centralization
he still has a finite amount of political capital and

bandwidth and must use it wisely . Xi's economic and financial reforms are by far Xi's most
important. A market-based carbon trading platform does not contradict that agenda, but as the
Chinese economy continues to slow down perhaps even more in Chinese core industrial zones the local
governments that enforce policies will hesitate to do so, fearing it will worsen the already poor economic
of Beijing's political structure under Xi's control, but
situation. Although we may see isolated success, China is unlikely to hit its targeted emission reduction goals because of these
limitations.
Massive pol cap costs

Stratfor 9/30/15 https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/climate-change-common-ground-between-china-and-us
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/climate-change-common-ground-between-china-and-us
Xi's plans to standardize the seven pilot emissions trading systems and to expand them into a national one is probably overly
aggressive; there is no one-size-fits-all solution for a country as diverse as China. The sheer scope of a national emissions trading
system is staggering. China's industrial sector which includes chemicals, refining, iron and steel, and similar industries is by far
the biggest source of emissions. However, China has consistently failed to force the sector to comply with national policy, especially
when it comes to overseeing the plans of individual firms. This difficulty can largely be traced back to Mao Zedong's policy of
regional self-sufficiency , which resulted in the proliferation of small-scale industrial factories

and plants across China. These firms would produce a wide array of products such as low-quality steel for the local
construction industry, but most industrial sectors ended up dispersed and extremely fragmented. For at least 15 years, Beijing has
been attempting to consolidate those sectors, but doing so has been difficult because local politicians oppose many of the attempts
for fear they could disrupt the local economy, hurt local tax revenue and contribute to regional unemployment.
China's
fragmented industrial sector is going to be a significant hurdle to implementing and enforcing any emissions
trading system. Several of the pilot zones were in regions that are more economically liberal and have been the primary places for
enacting more aggressive new programs such as special economic zones and or other laissez faire-stylized platforms. As a result,
emissions trading systems in places like Guangdong, Shanghai and certainly Shenzhen are going to have far more political support
to make their implementation easier. Other places, such as Beijing and Tianjin, also have strong local support because of the high
levels of pollution and smog already tainting the cities' air quality. Expanding
this type of system into areas without

be much more difficult. Other heavily industrialized
provinces such as Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, and Liaoning will confront challenges. Even farther inland and
in the north, the economy is less developed, and these areas will have a harder time adjusting than will the relatively
similarly strong local political support, however, will
more progressive southern, coastal or Yangtze River-based economies. Hebei is the heart of China's steelmaking industry and seven
of China's 10 smoggiest cities are located in the province. While Hebei's provincial government has been supportive of curtailing
pollution, it will be difficult to monitor the programs to ensure compliance because of the sheer number of firms located there.
Historically, under pressure from the government to close down, many companies have either expanded capacity to meet minimum
capacity regulations, have invested in more environmentally friendly platforms to meet emissions standards or have fit under their
carbon (or other environmentally linked) caps, which has been only nominally effective. Further complicating the situation, these
companies are now being saddled with low commodity and steel prices because of China's declining economy, making it difficult to
raise the cash needed to finance expansion or new equipment purchases. These companies have not responded to market forces but
have instead used loan restructuring and other measures to avoid running out of business often with the backing of local officials.
So, while
Beijing plans on using economic forces to shutter inefficient production and to establish
cleaner production practices, companies will inevitably find creative ways to work around the
regulations. Beijing must try to balance its final cap allotment and trade mechanism with China's overall economic needs. The
amount of carbon emissions allowed must be set where the price of carbon is high enough to make it economically attractive to
invest in technologies that reduce emissions. If the price is too low, the system will not work. As we have seen in the case of the EU
cap-and-trade system, an initially high cap level can result in the market price of carbon flat-lining when industrial production
deteriorates in poor economic conditions something witnessed in the wake of the financial crisis in Europe. As industrial
production falls, there are more cap allotments to go around, since reduced production typically means reduced emissions. The
European Union's carbon price fell from a peak of 30 euros per ton of CO2 equivalent in late 2008 to the 5 to 10 euro range that it
has hovered between since late 2011. This can render a cap-and-trade system ineffective. It is estimated that the cost of carbon must
exceed 40 euros before industries begin to see a large push toward renewable sources of energy and to investment into cleaner
industrial systems. There are already signs China will fall into the same trap as Europe. Beijing is expected to set the initial market
price for carbon at around 39 yuan (roughly $6.10) per ton of CO2 equivalent, which is compared to the current price of about $9 in
Europe. This is just the initial price, but once carbon allotments are set and are freely traded the price could fall much lower. For
example, right now the carbon prices in Guangdong, Hubei and Shanghai China's three largest pilot markets by emissions size
are $3.76, and $2.01, respectively. These are not only far below Europe's level, they are not even close to the level needed to
economically-incentivize investment into cleaner emissions protocols. As China's economy undergoes a structural shift away from
being dominated by the industrial and low-end manufacturing sectors, high-emitting production should in theory decline, putting
China as a whole at greater risk for a drop in carbon prices. China has the additional constraint that many of the products or services
derived from emissions heavy industries such as electricity are heavily regulated. This means that the cap-and-trade system will
cause even more economic distortions if Beijing does not also liberalize linked products, allowing producers to pass the costs onto
the consumers. As we have seen in Europe, organizing a system to remove carbon allowances from the market to drive up the price
of carbon is a difficult proposition. The Europeans are hoping to establish a market stability reserve, which would add or subtract
carbon to the market beginning in 2021. Even then, in Europe's case, it is only expected to raise carbon prices to 30 euros by 2030.
The United States, for its part, failed to get a nationwide cap-and-trade proposal though Congress.
Air pollution popularity DOESNT spill into climate reduction the

AFF is unpopular even if SOME mitigation measures are popular
Browne 12/8/15 http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-about-face-in-climate-talks-1449557586 Senior Correspondent
and Columnist, The Wall Street Journal. Andrew Browne is a Senior Correspondent and Columnist for The Wall Street Journal.
And domestic politics will now decisively influence whether China meets its carbon-reduction
goals, and then accelerates the downward momentum. A big question, though, is whether
Beijing will prioritize the fight against air pollution, which isnt quite the same battle as curbing
emissions of carbon dioxide. Air pollution generates regime-threatening public anger and some
of Chinas steps to mitigate it, such as investing in technology to improve energy efficiency, do
curb carbon emissions as well to the extent that they cut the use of coal. But other measures
target key air pollutants like sulfur and nitrogen, but not carbon dioxide, which is blamed for
contributing to climate change but whose damaging effects are not as immediately obvious.
Valerie J. Karplus, the director of the China Energy and Climate Project at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, writes that air-pollution-control efforts while essential, will only take
China part of the way toward its stated carbon-reduction goals. Deeper cuts will require a
wholesale move away from cheap coal, which accounts for about two-thirds of Chinas energy
mix, in favor of more expensive clean energy. This is politically difficult since in the short
term it will almost certainly crimp growth.
MES Solves CCP

Granting MES boosts CCP
Yu 7/28 (Yu Jie - China Foresight Project Manager and Dahrendorf Senior Research Associate
at LSE IDEAS https://www.boell.de/en/2016/07/28/chinas-brexit-dilemma )
In Beijings view, granting
China the Market Economy status is not only a matter of political recognition by the EU.
certainly be a relief to China in dealing with its long-standing issue of
excessive industrial capacity. In the long run, China would have to pay a hefty price, both
economically and politically, for not addressing its industrial overcapacity in time. Laying-off a
large number of workers in non-performing industries will surely be a source of social discontent, which in turn,
could destabilize the ruling elites of the Chinese Communist Party.
More importantly, it would
Anticorruption Good
Defense Consumers Adapt

Adaptation checks economic collapse- middle class growth
International Buisness Times: How Chinas Anti-Corruption Campaign Is Putting Pressure On
Brands are also adapting. We are now targeting the middle class, said Pierre-Henri Faye, AsiaPacific director of French cognac manufacturer Grand Marnier Liqueurs, acknowledging that
expensive alcohol brands have had to refocus their strategy. Mazarines Yaussaud said a growing
middle class and the reduction in spending on gifts or bribes for officials means people are
spending more on products for their own use.Now Chinese clients think more about themselves
and their own needs, rather than just about giving presents to others, he said. And while he
accepts that luxury consumers these days are more selective, and less likely to throw their
money around indiscriminately, hes convinced the domestic market can still adapt and
survive.There are millions of people looking for more sophistication and quality. So we still
think the market will increase a lot over [the next] five to 10 years.
-Long Term Growth

Anti-Corruption stimulates consumers and creates long term growth
Armstrong 8-30-15 (Ian, assisted in research at Temple University, the University of
Pennsylvania, Scottish Parliament, and Hudson Institute's Center for Political-Military Analysis,
where he has focused on non-proliferation and international energy. His research has been
presented at conferences at Tufts University and University of Edinburgh. Ian's analysis has
been featured at prominent outlets such as Business Insider, Foreign Policy Association, CBS
News, and RealClearEnergy. Global Risk Insights: Forecasting Chinas Anti-Corruption
Campaign. http://globalriskinsights.com/2015/08/forecasting-chinas-anti-corruptioncampaign/) JTE
Though corruption might have contributed to short-term economic gains, a historical overview of developing economies
demonstrates that corruption
ultimately stimulates socioeconomic inequality, distorts true economic

indicators, undermines economic institutions, reduces efficiency, and increases the risk of a
full-blown crisis quite similar to the prevailing economic realities in China today. The continued prosecution
and removal of corrupt officials has actually lowered the cost of living for the average Chinese
citizen, freeing up money for increased consumption by average citizens that would otherwise be
sacrificed as extra fees, or bribes. Though legal and structural reforms are costly and require potentially painful
transitioning periods, the inherent inequality that comes with corruption makes it in fact harmful for
long-term growth and largely incompatible with the kind of consumer-led economic growth
China is seeking to achieve. Under Xis proposed investigation into the legal aspects of corruption, China may
endure short-term pains, but would ultimately emerge a more dynamic economic force.
Anti-corruption is popular and the campaign is respected around the

world
Wei, 2016 [Song, Deputy Director of the Center for Anti-Corruption Studies, University of
Science and Technology, Beijing, writes for China Daily, 7-1-16,
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2016-07/01/content_25927314.htm
Over the past more than three years, China's
anti-corruption cause has made remarkable progress toward

building a clean government, and its anti-corruption campaign has won the support of the
people. In last year's National Bureau of Statistics survey on the Party's working style and the building of a clean government,
91.5 percent of the respondents across 22 provinces and regions expressed satisfaction with the
anti-corruption campaign, which was 16.5 percentage points higher than that in 2012. And 90.6
percent of them said the anti-corruption campaign had effectively curbed corruption. The great
progress made in the anti-corruption campaign has increased the public's trust in the Party and
created a favorable environment for achieving the long-term goals of the Party and the country.
Moreover, the crackdown on corruption has improved China's international image. And some foreign
media outlets have even said that Xi's warning against corruption indicates the country's leadership will take stricter measures to
punish corrupt officials. These
developments show China's achievements in the fight against

corruption have been recognized by people both at home and abroad.
A2-China Econ Collapse

Chinese growth is sustainable
AD 7/25/16]
Sorry, but on balance, the
Chinese economic model is probably sustainable. On the sustainability of Chinese economic growth
should assume a Chinese growth rate in the medium
to medium-high range (i.e. in excess of 6 percent) as probable for the period under review. This
takes into account both official and unofficial statistics on the recent slowing of the rate. It also
takes into account lower levels of global demand for Chinese exports, high levels of domestic
debt, the beginning of a demographically driven shrinking in the labor force, continued high
levels of domestic savings, at best modest levels of household consumption, an expanding
private sector still constrained by state-owned monoliths, and a growing environmental crisis.
But it also takes into account the vast battery of Chinese policy 8 Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
| Harvard Kennedy School 9 responses to each of these and does not assume that these are by definition destined to fail. Furthermore, if
Chinas growth rate begins to falter, China has sufficient fiscal and monetary policy capacity to intervene to
ensure the growth rate remains above 6 percent, which is broadly the number policy makers
deem to be necessary to maintain social stability. It is equally unconvincing to argue that Chinas transformation from an
as the continuing basis of Chinese national power, on balance we
old economic growth model (based on a combination of high levels of state infrastructure investment and low-wage, labor-intensive manufacturing for
export), to a new model (based on household consumption, the services sector and a strongly innovative private sector) is also somehow doomed to
failure. This
is a sophisticated policy blueprint developed over many years and is necessary to

secure Chinas future growth trajectory through different drivers of demand to those that have
powered Chinese growth rates in the past. There is also a high level of political backing to drive implementation. The process
and progress of implementation has so far been reasonable. Moreover, to assume that Chinas seasoned policy elites will
somehow prove to be less capable in meeting Chinas next set of economic policy challenges than
they have been with previous sets of major policy challenges over the last 35 years is just plain
wrong. China does face a bewildering array of policy challenges and it is possible that any one of these could significantly de-rail the Governments
economic program. But it is equally true that Chinese policy elites are more sophisticated now than at any time
since the current period of reform began back in 1978, and are capable of rapid and flexible policy responses when
necessary. For these reasons, and others concerning the structure of Chinese politics, the report explicitly rejects the China
collapse thesis recently advanced by David Shambaugh. It would also be imprudent in the extreme for
Americas China policy to be based on an implicit (and sometimes explicit) policy assumption
that China will either economically stagnate or politically implode because of underlying
contradictions in its overall political economy. This would amount to a triumph of hope over
cold, hard analysis.
Economic Collapse GoodSCS War

Chinese economic collapse prevents conflict over the SCS and
Senkaku Islands
Pei 15 [Minxin, professor of government at Claremont McKenna College, Will Chinas
Economic Collapse Save the South China Sea?, The National Interest,
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/will-chinas-economic-collapse-save-the-south-china-sea13713 RD; AD 7/29/16]
Not too long ago, the Chinese economy appeared to defy both gravity and doomsayers. Despite years of unbalanced growth, Beijing has managed to rely
on investment to power its economy and keep growth high. The countrys binge on credit since 2009, which has brought the debt-to-GDP ratio close to
300 percent, a perilous level for an upper-middle income country, has not triggered a financial crisis. Its real estate bubble, perhaps the largest the
world has ever seen in terms of completed but unoccupied residential housing, is leaking air but has yet to crash totally. It was this appearance of
economic invincibility that has emboldened the Chinese government to embark on an ambitious
but highly-risky new foreign policy in the last few years. Many Chinese elites saw the United
States and the rest of the West as in inexorable decline and Chinas rise unstoppable. Hubris has led to
the adoption of economic and security policies that would certainly make the late Deng Xiaoping turn in his grave. Instead of maintaining a low profile,
Beijing has greatly extended its economic commitments abroad and begun openly challenging
the U.S.-led security order in East Asia. On the economic front, China has committed over $100 billion to capitalize the Asian
Infrastructure Bank (AIIB), the New Development Bank, and the New Silk Road Fund, a set of financial institutions and vehicles designed to extend
Chinese influence abroad and actively compete against existing international financial institutions such as the Asian Development Bank and the World
Bank. In the developing world, China has also bet heavily on exploiting natural resources and large infrastructure projects. In Latin America, China has
loaned out nearly $120 billion since 2005. In Africa, Chinese investments and development loans are estimated to have exceeded $100 billion. Faced
with a rival backed by nearly $4 trillion in foreign currency reserves, all the West could do was to worry privately but complain publicly about Chinas
inadequate environmental and human rights practices in its investment activities abroad. The
boldest step China has taken in the

context of its apparent economic strength is, without any doubt, its approach toward territorial
and maritime disputes in East Asia. While previous leaders deliberately shelved the intractable and potentially dangerous disputes
over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the South China Sea, the current Chinese leadership has taken a far more
confrontational approach in the belief that, with its growing economic strength and military
power, China no longer needs to be deferential to the interests and sensitivities of the United
States and its allies in the region. As a result, in the last two years, China has escalated tensions by
establishing a controversial Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands and built several large artificial islands in the contested waters of the South China Sea. Now that
Chinas economic engine is finally stalling and its weaknesses are inescapably visible, the obvious question is
whether China can continue to sustain its assertive foreign policy. Based on past Chinese behavior and existing hard constraints, it seems that, if
there is anything positive coming out of Chinas economic unraveling, it will be a less assertive foreign policy. Despite the
enormous foreign policy risks taken by President Xi Jinping, cautious pragmatism has been the modus operandi of Chinese leaders in the post-Mao era.
Xis three predecessors, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao, were all keenly aware of the disparity of power between China and
the West, particularly the United States. As such they made substantial foreign policy concessions when Chinas
economic weakness dictated a cooperative foreign policy. For example, Deng did not allow the issue of
American arms sales to Taiwan to block the development of U.S.-China commercial relations. Jiang exercised
enormous restraint over the Taiwan issue in the late 1990s so that the United States could support Chinas entry into the WTO.
Jinping Polcap good-Reforms

Only Jinping pol cap enables Chinese economic transition
Ma 3/12/16 http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/12/can-china-avoid-the-middle-income-trap-five-year-plan-economy-twosessions/ Damien Ma is a fellow at the Paulson Institute and the co-author of In Line Behind a Billion People.
Third, with a rapidly aging population a premature demographic transition due in large part to Chinas strict population controls
of the past 30 years Beijing
must do all it can to harness the countrys human capital to power its
economy forward. Chinese universities are expected to graduate more than seven million college
students in 2016 alone, a pool of human capital that has little interest in making widgets on assembly lines or pursuing a
lifetime of bureaucratic service, the latter a career path once envied for its stability . But while Chinese policymakers
have trumpeted entrepreneurship and risk-taking as an alternative for recent graduates, it is not
clear whether many will actually pursue that path a 2013 survey of Chinese engineering students showed that
while many of them expressed interest in starting a business, only 3 percent planned to follow through. L everaging human
capital for entrepreneurship and private enterprise extends beyond college graduates and
encompasses another enormous demographic: the approximately 260 million rural-to-urban
migrants who have poured into Chinas cities over the past several decades in search of work.
Official policy has previously denied most of these migrants formal urban status, making their existence in most cities tenuous . But
Beijing now intends to allow 45 percent of the migrant population, most of whom are still
officially registered as rural residents, to become permanent urban citizens by 2020 , up from about
38 percent in 2015. This could lead to another large pool of as-yet untapped human potential that
could expand the breadth of entrepreneurship and local innovation, especially in third- and
fourth-tier cities where it is easier to acquire urban residency than in restrictive first-tier metropolises like Shanghai. Its not
that hard to envision; in the 1980s, some of the most innovative market experiments were initiated in rural China, not the coastal
cities. If Beijing
hopes to show the world how a developing economy of its size can avoid the
middle-income trap, it must curtail top-down control and harness bottom-up dynamism.
Significant political capital will have to be expended to push through many of the reforms. Its
still too early to tell if the 13th Five-Year Plan will bring about the necessary changes. But if so,
then Xi will have left for his successor, by 2022, a country on its way toward membership in the
club of advanced economies.
Slow Growth Good

Economic slowdown key to reforms
In short, the limited prospects for stronger consumption growth and the declining returns to
investment suggest that the bulk of the rebalancing over coming years is likely to be
accomplished through slower investment growth. Other things being equal, this would entail a
further easing in growth of activity overall. Competing objectives and rising risks The Chinese
authorities acknowledge the challenges posed by the various objectives they have set themselves.
A key objective is to double 2010 income levels by 2020. This would require annual average
growth of 6.5 per cent over the next few years. 10 By itself, this might prove challenging in the
face of unfavourable developments affecting the longer-run determinants of growth. In
particular, the prospects for a rapid turnaround in productivity growth would appear to be
rather limited given the gradual pace of economic reforms in recent years. But the government
has ambitious reform plans, including: increasing the transparency of local government
finances staged reform of the household registration (hukou) system increasing the coverage
and sustainability of pension schemes and developing a national health insurance safety net
and reforming SOEs, in part through consolidation, to create efficiencies. Some early, but
gradual, progress has been evident in these areas. At the same time, the authorities would like to
encourage the rebalancing of demand growth away from investment and to slow the
accumulation of debt, at least within the heavily indebted corporate sector. However, over recent
years meeting short-term growth targets appears to have taken precedence over plans to place
growth and financing on a more sustainable footing.
Slowdown helps combat increasing debt

10 This goal was first stated at the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China
(CPC) and reiterated at the National Peoples Congress in March 2016. See Jintao, H, Report of
Hu Jintao to the 18th CPC National Congress (2012) available at
<http://www.china.org.cn/china/18th_cpc_congress/2012 11/16/content_27137540.htm>
and Keqiang, L, Report on the Work of the Government (2016) available at
<http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/NPC2016_WorkReport_English.pdf>. 11
A recent article in the Peoples Daily, the most authoritative official media source, has
highlighted that the government faces a dilemma in managing the economy; the article itself can
be seen as an attempt by the authorities to manage expectations. See, Peoples Daily (2016), An
Authoritative Person Discusses the Current Chinese Economy, 9 May, p 1. Available at
<http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2016 05/09/nw.D110000renmrb_20160509_601.htm>. Over the past year, meeting the governments short-term growth goals required
policymakers to pursue more stimulatory macroeconomic policies. This has been achieved
through cuts to benchmark interest rates, an easing in fiscal policy and a relaxation of housing
market restrictions all while accommodating a faster pace of debt accumulation. 12 Overall,
these measures have tended to stimulate investment in housing and public infrastructure
more so than consumption or private investment. Indeed, there has been a return to growth in
housing prices, a pick-up in housing sales and a recovery in residential investment. 13 The trend
rise in the ratio of debt to GDP since the global financial crisis has continued. Although
estimates vary somewhat, this has led Chinas total (public and private) debt to rise to around
250 per cent of GDP (Graph 9).14 This is still below that of several advanced economies, but it
stands out among emerging market economies given Chinas relatively modest stage of
economic development. The high level and rapid growth of debt in China increases its
vulnerability to adverse shocks. Reflecting the investment-driven nature of the expansion since
2008, the rise in debt has been concentrated in the corporate sector and local governments offbalance sheet vehicles that have been responsible for funding substantial infrastructure
investment. There is a risk that defaults on these debts could impose significant losses on
financial institutions and could lead to a general loss of confidence and a tendency for liquidity
to recede in a range of funding markets. To date, efforts by policymakers to address risks
associated with the build-up in debt have focused on restructuring local government debt. Highinterest off-balance sheet funding has been swapped with the issuance of low-interest local
government bonds; that is good for local governments but comes at the cost of putting more
pressure on banks and other lenders by reducing their interest income. With regard to
addressing financial risks in the corporate sector, so far, the central government appears to have
taken a relatively hands-off
Financial Growth risks economic hardship

12 The rate of growth of financing has picked up noticeably (to around 17 per cent in year-ended
terms, once the swapping of local government off-balance sheet borrowing for local government
bonds has been taken into account). 13 For a few of the largest cities, conditions have
strengthened so much that the local authorities have been tightening up measures designed to
restrict demand, most notably in Shenzhen and Shanghai. approach, leaving it to banks and
local governments to address issues as they arise. The authorities also appear more willing
tolerate some defaults in the bond market, which has grown rapidly as a source of funding in the
past couple of years. This will help improve the allocation of credit overtime, but this funding
channel remains vulnerable to the possibility of a sharp reassessment of risks by lenders. So far,
there are no outward signs of distress in the banking system, despite falling profit growth and
rising non-performing loans (Graph 10). But the structure of the financial system continues to
evolve rapidly, raising concerns about the robustness of the funding position of some of the
faster-growing segments of the industry, particularly smaller banks and nonbank financial
intermediaries. One concern is that some smaller lenders have large exposures to regions and
industries currently experiencing economic hardship. Likewise, institutions involved in complex
shadow banking transactions could experience problems if a shift of sentiment in funding
markets forces these types of activities to be unwound. Graph 10 It is worth noting, however,
that compared with many cases of heavily indebted emerging economies that have faced
financial problems in the past, Chinas debt is largely domestic. A considerable portion of that
has arisen from state-owned or controlled financial institutions lending to state-owned or statecontrolled enterprises, which to some extent allows the problem to be handled within the official
family. 15 Moreover, the debt has largely been funded by the household sector, which has
sustained a very high rate of saving. Although this does not preclude the possibility of
substantial disruption in the financial system, it does provide some leeway for authorities
attempting to ensure that the financial system remains liquid. The extent of that leeway will
potentially depend on the effectiveness of capital controls. But that is a topic for another time. 15
There is a tension between the government maintaining the smooth functioning of financial
markets through implicit guarantees of financial institutions, and the problems of moral hazard
and inefficient resource allocation that can result.
Slow Economic Transition spillover benefits o/w harms

Some companies and countries are already benefitting, despite a weak emerging markets macro
environment Chinas economic transition has dampened sentiment for emerging markets , but its impact
can vary greatly across the diverse group of economies. Furthermore, many growth industries in emerging markets
continue to thrive because of long-term trends like technological innovation and demographics,
and the energy market slump has been less uniformly negative than commonly assumed . Chinas
Growing Pains China is undergoing two massive transitions: from industrial-driven to consumer-driven growth, and from a
controlled to a free-market economy. Importantly, for investors, a
maturing China likely means slower growth

and higher volatility. The acute slowdown in Chinas industrial economy is not yet offset by growth in the services sector, so
the net result has been an overall decline in GDP growth. The Chinese government recently reiterated its goal of doubling real GDP
between 2010 and 2020, which translates to roughly a 6.5% annualized growth rate for the next five years, lower than the recent 7%
target and a recent history of over 8% GDP growth. In addition to the uncertainty surrounding Chinas economic adjustment, the
governments policy response will likely remain difficult to predict, which could lead to volatile markets in 2016 .
The
governments bold intervention in the domestic A-shares market in July, and the yuan
devaluation in August, surprised many investors who had been looking for increased financial
market reforms and liberalization, underscoring the potential for global transmission of Chinas
financial and currency risks. However, we remain optimistic about the long-term secular growth
opportunity in services and consumeroriented companies, most of which are private companies,
not state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Services continue to grow as a share of the economy and now represent close to 50%
of GDP, up from about 40% 10 years ago. We believe the growth of the middle class could be a long-term
secular support for consumer and service companies. Although reform efforts have reduced
luxury spending, many domestic consumer companies are thriving as they cater to Chinas
growing middle class, and many global companies continue to invest to ride this long-term
trend. The Spillover Effect Unsurprisingly, such enormous changes in the worlds second largest economy are being felt in many
other economies and financial markets. In fact, the International Monetary Fund has estimated that each percentage point
of deceleration in Chinas investment growth could reduce global growth by 0.1 percentage
points, which is five times greater than in the early 2000s. However, the impact on other economies is likely to
be uneven. In the emerging markets, countries such as Taiwan, Korea and Malaysia may be
among the most impacted in the short run, given many of these economies have been built on
strong linkages to Chinas industrial growth. Other emerging markets, such as Brazil and much
of Latin America, may feel the impact of Chinas slower growth via reduced demand for many
raw materials, which has weighed heavily on commodity prices for some time . Nor have developed
market economies been immune to the effects of Chinas transition. Germany and Japan have sizable direct economic exposure to
China through capital goods manufacturing. Less directly, European companies, in aggregate, derive roughly 30% of their revenues
not all
spillover effects are negative. In contrast to many of its emerging markets peers, India has benefited from low
oil and commodity prices, as a large net importer, and low prices are rapidly reducing the
stubbornly high inflation that has plagued its economy in recent years. India also has relatively
from emerging markets, underscoring their need to prepare for more challenging end-markets. As mentioned above,
fewer direct trade linkages to China and has the potential to significantly drive domestic
economic growth with further reforms. Among the developed markets, the US could also ultimately
benefit, as lower energy and commodity costs flow through to consumers, who contribute about
70% of GDP. MANY COUNTRIES STAND TO BENEFIT FROM CHINAS TRANSITION Todays
Opportunities and Tomorrows Growth We believe that innovative companies in the emerging markets, and particularly China that
cater to the growing middle class consumer can prosper over time, even in countries that currently face an unfavorable
macroeconomic backdrop. These companies, most of which are not SOEs, may be involved in consumer goods and services, as well
as healthcare and online commerce. In fixed income, we believe some areas of the market may be overly discounting the longterm
growth potential of emerging markets because of the current challenges, particularly in sovereign credit where some valuations may
be overstating the amount of risk underlying these securities. Similarly, emerging markets currencies have experienced a significant
downturn, as evidenced by the JP Morgan Emerging Market Currency Index declining by 25% since the end of 2013, which we think
creates potential opportunities in some cases, and broadly benefits the export competitiveness of many emerging markets countries.
Impact-D
No China Econ Collapse

Economic Crash unlikely
Rapoza 7/20/16 @ 03:52 PM (Kenneth Rapoza, Contributor of business and investment in
emerging markets, written about Brazil pre-Lula and post-Lula and spent the last five years
covering all aspects of the country for Dow Jones, Wall Street Journal and Barron's. Meanwhile,
for an undetermined amount of time) Forbes Investing
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2016/07/20/china-economic-transition-under-wayhard-landing-spared-again/#2271601f4bec triscuit)
The Chinese
hard landing is coming! Only as Jesus said to the disciples, no one knows the exact hour or the day. In other
take a while. So far, despite the August 2015 one-off devaluation of the renmimbi,
and the stock market crash two months prior that was lit up once MSCI MSCI +% said it was not including the AShares in its MSCI Emerging Markets Index, Chinas economy has held up. The International Monetary
Fund even went so far on Wednesday as to say that the worlds No. 2 economy will grow 6.6% next year
over 6.5% this year. Boom, goes the dynamite! We dont believe that China is growing as fast as it is reported, but we dont
words, this may
have a better estimate so we just go with the government, admits Chris Probyn, chief economist for State Street STT +1.64% Global
Advisors in Boston. The
big call on China is essentially that the government has the policy flexibility
to prevent individual problems in a bank, or in an investment firm, from becoming systemic. It
can ring-fence these things and prevent a hard landing. Thats the call on China. There are those who take the
other side off that trade, but I think whats happening in China is rather subtle and positive . In 2009, when the
economy was going into the ringer because of the housing crisis in the U.S., China threw everything it had to prop up the market and
its economy. This time Beijing
is going smaller scale. Rather than having a massive misallocation of

investment capital, they are being more selective than ever. They are transitioning away from
heavy industry, dirty manufacturing and exports and focusing more on consumer and services .
That story is still going on behind the scenes, and has been the only bull narrative China has. The ruling Communist Party
has no electoral legitimacy, so their only claim to the public imagination is their competence.
Losing their competence to run the economy is the Partys biggest fear . The risks of a hard landing
remain low, says Andy Rothman, an investment strategist for Matthews Asia in San Francisco. The services and
consumption part of the economy, for example, remains robust and is now the largest part of the Chinese
economy. This mitigates the weakness of the industrial part of the economy, which is shrinking as a share of GDP. This year will
almost certainly be the fifth consecutive year in which the the services part of Chinas economy will be larger than the industrial side,
says Rothman. The
Chinese consumer is driving an increasingly larger share of economic growth,

he says. In the first half of this year, household consumption contributed to about 73% of
Chinas GDP growth, up from a roughly 60% share in the first half of last year, and a 42% share
for the full year of 2006. Financial pundits like to look at GDP. GDP is stagnant, but still positive. First half GDP grew 6.7%,
the slowest pace in seven years. The pace of growth has continued to decelerate but only gradually, from 7% in the first half of last
year and 7.4% in the first half of 2014. The
latest economic data shows that the Chinese economy is still
steady-as-she-goes. If shes listing, she has yet to run aground.My top concern is anemic investment spending by private
firms, says Rothman. They are relatively profitable but are clearly not yet prepared to expand capacity or invest in more
automation.
No LashoutLobbyists want restraint

Business lobbying groups in China are pro-restraint
Business There may be ways in which other
stakeholders, as outlined by Knox and Jakobson, have a much more

influential role with the Party. Business might be one of them. Business after all plays a big role
in getting elite leaders the sort of support and networks to deliver results like GDP growth, and to
further their careers. Of course, businesses do have some interest in the outcome of the South China Sea issue. But as Hayton
showed, the exploitable resources there are not perhaps as plentiful, nor as lucrative, as might be
thought. State-owned energy companies like Petro China and the Chinese National Overseas Oil Corporation
(CNOOC) have presidents or Chief Executive Officers that sit on the Central Committee of the Communist Party
(though none are currently in the Politburo). For figures within the Standing Committee like the current Vice
Premier Zhang Gaoli, their careers started as Party operatives in the major state companies. State
enterprises, through the generation of profit and wealth, are important for the Party. They account for half of
the central governments revenue, so it is not surprising that the Party jealously guards them. As
American scholar Yasheng Huang stated in his work on the privileges granted to State companies, they occupy the top
position in the political pecking order, are given preferential access to loans and capital and have
their factors of production like land costs, utilities, and even labour, subsidized. [27] They do have
influence over some foreign policy issues, such as the formulation of rules of outward investment, and to some
extent they operate as a disparate lobbying group. But on the South China Sea, the opportunities are too
speculative and unclear for them to figure explicitly. Their greatest interest in this area is to maintain secure
and stable supply routes. They therefore would be more a source of restraint than of agitation,
since it is not in their interest to cause unrest or disruption in this region.
A2-Diversionary War
Internal conflict leads to diversionary peace
Fravel 5 (M. Taylor Fravel - Assistant Professor of Political Science and a member of the
Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Regime Insecurity and
International Cooperation Explaining Chinas Compromises in Territorial Disputes
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/016228805775124534 )
To explain why and when states might compromise in territorial disputes, this article presents a counterintuitive argument about the
effects of domestic conflict on foreign policy. Diversionary war theory asserts that leaders facing domestic strife provoke conflicts
with other states just to improve their position at home.13 By contrast, I argue that internal
conflict often creates

conditions for cooperation, producing a diversionary peace instead of war. Em-battled leaders
are willing to cooperate with other states in exchange for assistance in countering their domestic
sources of insecurity. In territorial disputes, leaders are more likely to compromise when
confronting internal. Chinas willingness to compromise in territorial disputes carries several
implications for international relations theory. First, Chinas cooperative behavior as an
authoritarian state underscores the importance of moving beyond democracy in the study of regime
type and cooperation.14 Second, Chinas compromises question the role of reputation building in
explaining the intractability of territorial disputes between states. China offered many
concessions despite clear incentives that its simultaneous involvement in multiple conflicts created to
signal toughness and resolve, not conciliation.15 Third, Chinas behavior challenges existing arguments about the foreign
policies of revolutionary states.16 In China, radical politics at home failed to produce assertive or belligerent foreign policies in most
of its territorial disputes.17 Fourth, Chinas cooperative response to regime insecurity helps to explain a key puzzle for the
diversionary war hypothesis: why many periods of domestic strife fail to produce crisis escalation and the use of force.18 Violence
is less common than diversionary war theory predicts because, under certain conditions, leaders
can have strong incentives to pursue cooperation instead of war to strengthen their domestic
political security.
Internal threats cause cooperation

Fravel 5 (M. Taylor Fravel - Assistant Professor of Political Science and a member of the
Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Regime Insecurity and
International Cooperation Explaining Chinas Compromises in Territorial Disputes
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/016228805775124534 )
When
leaders face internal threats to their survival, they may use foreign policy in addition to domestic tools such as
repression to enhance their political security. They may cooperate to achieve different types of support: (1) to
gain direct assistance in countering internal threats, such as denying material support to opposition groups; (2)
to marshal resources for domestic priorities, not defense; or (3) to bolster international recognition of
My argument about regime insecurity applies this insight of omnibalancing to international cooperation more broadly.
their regime, leveraging the status quo bias of the international system to delegitimize domestic challengers.22 When leaders face
internal threats, they may also cooperate to enhance their external security and preempt potential attempts by
other states to profit from their domestic woes. These effects of regime insecurity are paradoxical: efforts
to consolidate
political power at home, often through repression, produce efforts to cooperate abroad.
A2-East Asian War

No East Asia war
Global Times 7-13 [S. China Sea issues challenging, not devastating, Global Times,
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/994081.shtml RD; AD 7/27/16]
International order in East Asia still stable The
international order consists of three elements - values, norms

and institutional arrangements. International values work as a criterion to judge whether
international systems are maintaining order. Take the South China Sea. From US perspective, Beijing is
challenging the Washington-established order in the region. However, for China, it is the US that is trying to change the international order by
deploying 60 percent of its naval vessels to the Pacific region. Different definitions of the international order contribute to different views on the
challenges international systems are facing. Norms are needed to instruct
players' behavior and encourage them to

seek peaceful solutions to disputes. Norms have not been established in some certain international fields. For instance, the ChinaUS cyber conflicts are due partly to an absence of norms in cyber security. International order is different from region to region. In East Asia,
China's rise is a concern for many countries. Although frequently perplexed by tensions, East
Asia has witnessed no war since 1991. Europe, on the other hand, has a totally different order
from East Asia. There has been little tension in Europe, but the region has seen occasional wars,
for instance, those in Kosovo and Ukraine. The maintenance of international order means seeking peaceful solutions, instead
of wars, to address international disputes. Given the divergences in values, norms and institutional arrangements, different regions need to establish
different security patterns. It is unrealistic to turn to the same pattern to address different challenges. For instance, it would be tough for the US to
It is not
necessary to be too concerned about the South China Sea issue. Admittedly, certain disputes , for
instance, the South China Sea and North Korean nuclear issues, will fuel tensions in the region. However, East Asia is a
peaceful place as a whole. A direct war between China and the US is very unlikely. The two
nations have the ability to prevent wars and put conflicts under control. If a transparent mechanism can be
establish another NATO in Asia. Even if a multilateral military alliance can be formed in Asia, it will not play the same role as NATO.
built between the two powers, the current tensions will be prevented from escalating into wars. The article is an excerpt of a speech by Yan Xuetong,
director of the Institute of Modern International Relations, Tsinghua University. The speech was published in pit.ifeng.com. Illegal judgment should be
ignored The tribunal's final award is illegal. To begin with, the Philippines has broken its diplomatic promises and cheated on its treaty obligations.
Manila is perfidious as it ignored the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea before unilaterally initiating the arbitration to the
tribunal. In addition, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has no jurisdiction over disputes concerning sovereignty. The initiative by
the Philippines constitutes an abuse of UNCLOS, and thus the award is illegal. In fact, according to other articles of the UNCLOS, the tribunal has no
jurisdiction over the Philippines' case. By only referring to articles favorable to Manila, the judges are unfair and have breached the principle of
neutrality. Soon after the final award was announced, the Chinese side released two statements regarding the award and China's sovereignty and
maritime rights. The statements have reiterated China's stance, refuted the tribunal's claims, and further explained China's legal rights regarding the
South China Sea. As China does not accept or participate in the arbitration, it has put forward its own requests over the South China Sea issue. The
development of the disputes will not be determined by The Hague, but hinges on the implementation of the claims by each side. Foreign Minister Wang
Yi pointed out that "the arbitration and the bad-faith dramatization and political manipulation that ensued have put the South China Sea issue to a
dangerous situation, with growing tension and confrontation. It is detrimental to peace and stability in the region Now the farce is over. It is time
that things come back to normal." China still welcomes negotiations with the Philippines if the latter takes the overall situation into account, considers
the South China Sea issue seriously, and cooperates with China on the waters. However, if Manila insists on the tribunal's award, it will not be greeted
by diplomatic talks. The award is just a piece of paper. The development of South China Sea disputes hinges on the operations by concerning parties on
relevant waters, rather than a useless paper from the tribunal. Conflicts will be highly likely if the Philippines, backed up by the tribunal's award, acts of
its own will on the South China Sea. The article was compiled from China National Radio's interview with Ye Hailin, director at National Institute of
International Strategy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Dispute sign of China's historic rise The award of the South China Sea case was as
expected. But it is still a big challenge for China. The dispute is not a haphazard incident, but an anticipated result of geopolitical vicissitudes. It is an
unavoidable confrontation between the US, an established power, and China, a rising power. China intends to stay out of the Thucydides' Trap by rising
peacefully, but its intention doesn't mean it will be understood by the outside world. China should keep in mind that during the process of peaceful rise,
there will be small clashes as long as there won't be wars between major powers. The award will make little impact on China. Even though the arbitral
tribunal denied China's "nine-dash line" and its historic claim to the South China Sea, no one can enforce the award. The US can't be the enforcer
because it hasn't ratified the UNCLOS. The arbitration is not purely about international law; it is a politically driven issue. Political issues can only be
resolved in political ways, not by laws. China should make a basic judgment over the current circumstance: The
US and China are not

enemies, but competitors. Therefore, cooperation and disputes co-exist in the Sino-US
relationship. Competition is reflected in the geopolitical conflicts between China and the US,
such as the South China Sea and East China Sea disputes. However, none of these individual
disputes are focal points of the rival relationship. The crux of the complicated Sino-US ties is the divergence between two
different ways of development. Neither side will withdraw from the South China Sea dispute: The US won't do it because it would mark the decline of its
global influence, and China won't do it because it is an issue concerning sovereignty and territorial integrity. The third option will be both sides taking
one step back after trading blows for several rounds. China and the US won't go to war despite the escalating tensions in the South China Sea, and the
development of the dispute has different meanings for China and the US. China's rise will start from the dispute, but the US will decline as a result. The
article was compiled from IPP-Review's interview with Zheng Yongnian, director of the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore.
A2 SCS War
No SCS war-interdependence locked in
Jennings 6-6 (Ralph Jennings - As a news reporter I have covered some of everything since 1988, from my alma mater U.C.
Berkeley to the Great Hall of the People in Beijing where I followed Communist officials for the Japanese news agency Kyodo.
Stationed in Taipei since 2006, I track Taiwanese companies and local economic trends that resonate offshore. At Reuters through
2010, I looked intensely at the islands awkward relations with China. More recently, Ive studied high-tech trends in greater China
expanded my overall news coverage to surrounding Asia. http://www.forbes.com/sites/ralphjennings/2016/06/06/why-odds-ofwar-in-the-contested-south-china-sea-are-near-zero/#56875ef135e0 )
If you live in Taiwan, you know how this works: Show up in a caf or a library and find the tables occupied not by people but their
stuff. Books and a water bottle, even a laptop computer, tell you dont sit here, its occupied. Owners of the stuff arent in the toilet.
Theyre in a class or out shopping. Seat seekers usually oblige the hint even though its a slap in the face, or maybe just a forgettable
nip. This metaphor happens to apply to the South China Sea, a tropical Asian body of water contested by seven governments,
including an expansionist China and others backed by Beijings rival world superpower the United States. Taiwan is a claimant as
well. Despite speculation about armed conflict as China bores deep into other countries maritime
territory, the parties have learned during their dispute of more than 40 years to avoid one
anothers stuff yet keep saying in public that its all theirs and please everyone else stay away. China, for example,
disagrees that Malaysia has a territorial right to explore for undersea natural gas around the Spratly Islands,
but it doesnt sabotage the equipment. Vietnam and Taiwan claim islets elsewhere in the Spratlys,
one archipelago in the 3.5 million-square-meter ocean, that are so close you can see from one to the next . But they dont
attack and Taiwan says it has even helped Vietnamese vessels erstwhile maritime intruders per Taiwanese law recover from
storm damage. The two governments still occasionally point fingers for infringing on each others maritime claims to parts of the
ocean thats packed with fish and undersea fuels. Armed conflict would follow only if a claimant took the books and laptop off
someones metaphorical library table and theres little precedent. I only think there would be a war if Vietnam or the Philippines
tried retaking territory already seized by Beijing, says Sean King, senior vice president with consulting firm Park Strategies in New
York. I think a de facto code of conduct is evolving, most easily shaped by Beijing. Fear of conflict has obvious merit. Vietnam fired
on two Chinese ships in 1974 and in 1988 China killed 74 Vietnamese sailors as it sank or demolished three ships. Two years ago
Chinese and Vietnamese boats sparred after Beijing allowed a Chinese state oil company to park a rig off Vietnams coast. Chinas
militarization of some of the seas approximately 500 islets among the various archipelagos raises more concern, prompting weaker
claimants such as the Philippines to seek help from the United States or start buying more weapons. But those upsets are oddball
incidents, nothing near routine. No one wants a war despite the maddening erosion of their claims and
the economic opportunity they represent. First, the countries claiming the South China Sea have been leaving their
stuff there a long time and coast guards from other places know where it is, reducing odds of a mishap. China and the United States
both move in predictable ways and military commanders from each side have probably ordered no shooting except in extreme
cases, says Denny Roy, senior fellow with the East-West Center think tank in Honolulu. The idea is the United States could strike on
behalf of its old colony the Philippines as the two sides have increased defense cooperation since 2014.But the United States,
China and other Asian countries with maritime claims depend on one another too much
economically to get into an armed struggle, says Lin Chong-pin, a retired strategic studies professor in Taiwan.
Interdependence has surged since the Global Financial Crisis seven years ago, he says. China, he adds, since 1982 has advocated
struggle without a reaching a breaking point. The unprecedented magnitude of interdependence of powers
in the world and especially after the great recession 2009 is such that they wouldnt want a war,
Lin says.
A2-Sino-India War
No impactno change to agenda or troop structure
SHAH 4/20-Research Assistant @ Observer Research Foundation [Kriti, Xi strengthens his hold over Chinas military,
4/20/2016, http://www.orfonline.org/research/xi-strengthens-his-hold-over-chinas-military/, DKP]
The main implications of the reform include the reduction in power and influence of the PLA. While the reforms enable the PLA to
concentrate on territorial defence and combat, it also increases the jointness between the PLA navy, air force and rocket force.
Discussing the implications of the reforms for India , General Narasimhan highlighted how the
vastness of western theatre command geographic area would perhaps affect its military
capability. While earlier India was dealing with two military regions, it would only deal with one the western command. In addition, the reduction of troops over a period of time as the geographic area of command
stabilises over time could mean that they will be fewer troops in operation against India. The large area
under the western commander will also make it difficult for the theatre commander to orchestrate his actions. The reforms
and their affect on China and its neighbours will play out in time, as Xi implements them in
steady phases. The question and answer session raised some important queries with regard to whether the PLA had been
weakened due to Xis centralisation of power, who would head Chinas out-of-area missions under the new army structure, whether
the central theatre command would form the nucleus of the army as it looked after Beijing and how the present reforms would look
change the way China behaved with US and its allies, vis--vis matters in the South China Sea. The speaker responded reiterating
that in
China, the survival of the regime was of paramount importance, and therefore the political
department of the PLA would always remain strong. In addition, the headmaster of the outof
area contingency operations would remain with the CMC. General Naramsinhan also stated his
belief that there would be no major change in Chinese interest in the South China Sea. Since
only the command and control structure had changed, with no major change in troop structure,
the US and its allies would therefore view Chinese outofarea operations in the same way. In
addition, any change in how the US and allies would view the PLA reforms, would only be seen as
the reform continue to steadily roll out over a period of time.
PLA Reform DA
1NC-PLA Reform
!Xi pushing PLA reform but needs political capitalmust overcome
powerful factions
PAGE 4/25-reporter in the Wall Street Journal's Beijing bureau, covering domestic politics, international relations and
security, started covering China in 1997 [Jeremy, President Xi Jinpings Most Dangerous Venture Yet: Remaking Chinas Military,
Wall Street Journal, 4/25/2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/president-xi-jinpings-most-dangerous-venture-yet-remaking-chinasmilitary-1461608795, DKP]
BEIJINGChinas
stock market was swooning. Investors were panicking. Yet when Chinese President Xi
Jinping spoke that first Monday in January, he didnt address the global angst about the worlds second-largest economy.
Clad in an olive-green Mao suit, he was talking instead to Chinese troops about another challenge that
consumes his time and political capital : the biggest restructuring of the P eoples L iberation
A rmy since the 1950s, a plan that unnerves America and its Asian allies and could upset the
global balance of power. We must emancipate our minds and change with the times, he told
troops of the 13th Group Army on Jan. 4. They should not, he said, wear new shoes to walk the old road. Four days earlier, Mr. Xi had
started to implement a plan to transform the Soviet-modelled military , long focused on defending
China from invasion, into a smaller, modern force capable of projecting power far from its shores.
The plan , to be implemented by 2020, is one of Mr. Xis most ambitious and politically risky
undertakings yet. If it succeeds, it could lay the ground for China to conduct combat operations as
far afield as the Middle East and Africa. That would mark a milestone in the nations emergence
from a period of isolationism that began under the Ming Dynasty in the 15th century. It could enable China not just
to challenge U.S. military dominance in Asia, but also to intervene militarily
elsewhere to protect its shipping lanes, resource supplies and expatriates , as other world powers have.
While an expeditionary Chinese military could help in humanitarian and counterterror operations, the concern for the U.S. and its allies
is that Beijing might use force in ways that conflict with Western interests. The challenge for
Mr. Xi is that his overhaul strikes at the core of one of Chinas most powerful
interest groups , an institution that swept the Communist Party to power in 1949 and enforced
its rule against Tiananmen Squares pro-democracy protests 40 years later. The presidents plan is much
more complex and disruptive than previous military reforms , which just tinkered within
the existing system, said Yue Gang, a retired PLA colonel and military analyst. If the reforms fail, you
could lose popularity and have to take responsibility and resign, so theres a big political risk,
he said in an unusually stark warning from a Chinese military figure about the high stakes involved. Chinas State Council
Information Office, the governments official mouthpiece, referred inquiries to the defense ministry, which responded in a faxed statement saying The
Wall Street Journals queries contained pure speculation and did not correspond to facts without specifying what points were inaccurate. The
ministry said military and civilian authorities had done intensive studies to ensure the smooth transition from the old system to the new one and also
the security and stability of the troops. The
PLA had begun taking tentative steps abroad even before Mr. Xis plan. It has
sent ships and submarines into the Pacific and Indian Oceans, installed military equipment on
reclaimed land in the South China Sea and challenged U.S. naval forces around Chinas coast.
Internally, though, the PLA has been hobbled by a structure and mind-set rooted in the
revolution and dominated by the Army, which before the overhaul accounted for some 70% of troops and
seven of 11 officers on the Central Military Commission that commands Chinas armed forces.
The plan is a major win for Xiincreased US engagement is k2 agenda

LI* AND XU** 14-*director of the John L. Thornton China Center and a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy program at
Brookings. He is also a director of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, **Research Assistant & Communications
Coordinator at the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings [Cheng, Lucy, Chinese Enthusiasm and American Cynicism Over
the New Type of Great Power Relations, 12/4/2014, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/12/05-chinesepessimism-american-cynicism-great-power-li-xu, DKP]

As China-watchers were quick to realize, President Obama did not even once mention the New Type of Great Power Relations on
his recent trip to Beijing. It has been widely noted that President Xi Jinping, however, repeatedly
promoted the
framework first at the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) in July, and then at the summit
with Obama in mid-November. After the summit, Chinas official news agency reported that Xi and Obama pledged to
push forward a new type of major-country relations, and that [Obama] is willing to lift the
new type of major-country relationship between China and the U.S. to a higher level. Xinhua implied that
Obama not only accepts, but also actively supports, the New Type concept. In fact, the Obama administration has been cautiously
staying away from it. Why
is China so keen on a New Type of Great Power Relations and on creating

perceptions of endorsement by Obama? And why is the U.S. reluctant to adopt it? What are the
reasons behind such contrasting views Chinese enthusiasm and American cynicism towards this seemingly benign concept?
When Xi Jinping defined the New Type of Great Power Relations in his meeting with Obama at Sunnylands last year, he
described it in three
points: 1) no conflict or confrontation, through emphasizing dialogue and

treating each others strategic intentions objectively; 2) mutual respect , including for each
others core interests and major concerns; and 3) mutually beneficial cooperation , by
abandoning the zero-sum game mentality and advancing areas of mutual interest. Embedded in the
New Type of Great Power Relations is a nations hope for an international environment more conducive to its development. From
the rise and fall of its many dynasties to its forced opening up to the West in the wake of the Opium Wars, China has always seen
itself as a civilization deeply entangled and affected by history. Recognizing the historically recurring clashes between an existing
great power and an emerging power, China looks to the New Type framework to avoid historical determinism and to seek a lessdisruptive rise in an increasingly integrated world. At the same time, China
wants to be viewed as an equal. By using

the term Great Power to primarily, if not solely, refer to China and the United States, China aims to elevate itself
to a level playing field. Obtaining U.S. support of the concept would imply Uncle Sams
recognition of Chinas strength and power. This is what Chinas official media sought to show when it suggested
Obamas support of the concept: parity and respect between the two countries. Furthermore, Chinese leaders believe that the New
By
emphasizing the respect of core interests as an element of the concept, China pushes its
territorial claims to the forefront. This is Chinas attempt at more clearly demarking where the
United States and other neighboring countries need to toe the line. American adoption of the term would imply that the
Type of Great Power Relations enables the two powers to establish a new code of conduct in line with Chinas interests.
United States recognizes Chinas core interests. This mutual respect of each others national interests is at the core of Chinas
aspirations. The Chinese media avidly reporting on Obama and Xis joint endorsement of the concept suggests that there
are
also domestic reasons driving the New Type of Great Power Relations. Although the Chinese concept is
an inherently U.S.-geared proposal, the domestic goals of such a concept should not be
overlooked. From a Chinese perspective, the United States is the only superpower in todays world that has the capacity to
contain Chinas rise. By strengthening Chinas view of itself as a recognized and respected
power, Xi Jinping is able to foster stronger nationalistic pride under CCP leadership
and gain political capital to consolidate his own power at home.
That emboldens Xi-causes war with Taiwan

YEE 16 Chinas Revolutionary Military Reform for War to Take Taiwan by Force edia analyst and translator at the American
Consulate General in Hong Kong, a translator/interpreter for Baker & McKenzie, the translation manager of his own translation firm
and chief editor at iSinoLaw China law website, which has joined forces with Thomson Reuters and appeared in Westlaw Chinas
platform since November 2011. https://www.google.com/url?
sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwislZK73uDLAhVBOyYKHTYFAmcQFggdMAA&url=ht
tps%3A%2F%2Ftiananmenstremendousachievements.wordpress.com%2F2016%2F02%2F02%2Fchinas-revolutionary-militaryreform-for-war-to-take-taiwan-by-force%2F&usg=AFQjCNF15rYwwXQhBxTcBqj5A1EjxeTtsQ&sig2=F-c0nIdHkRZy_OqpDxQTcg
Chinas Revolutionary Military Reform for War to Take Taiwan by Force When Mao set
up Chinas old military system with 11 relatively independent local military commands, it was a warlord arrangement to maintain a
balance between various factions in Chinese military and ensure Maos control of the military. Such military organization is entirely
unsuitable to modern war but can ensure absolute control of the military by Chinese leader. Why Chinese leader Xi Jinping
wants to thoroughly reorganize the military since he seems to have gained full control of Chinese military?
Maintaining a military balance has always been a major trick of Chinese leaders art of being the emperor, but what Xi wants is a
military force able to fight a modern war. US media Strategy Page shows its insight in Chinas military reform in its article
Intelligence: The Dragon Is A Lot More Aware And Faster To React. It first points out that Chinas reform is of American style in
which instead following orders from the above blindly, subordinates can talk back, with different opinions and interpretations of
battlefield situations. That
will greatly enhance Chinese troops combat effectiveness. What is much

more important is the centralization of intelligence. The article points out that in the past Chinas huge military
intelligence capability was scattered and compartmentalized. Now the goal is to use computerized analysis and
modern communications systems to quickly (often in real time) collect, analyze and present all (or
most) of that information. For anyone expecting to fight China that is a scary prospect because the
new reforms make the dragon is a lot more aware and faster to react . What war
then is Chinese President Xi Jinping preparing for ? The war with Japan for the Diaoyus (known as
Sinkakus in Japan)? Is it worthwhile to fight a war for some rocks with the United States? The rocks are useless but there are rich
fish and energy resources in the sea around them. Chinese fishermen are fishing there and Chinese oil rigs are drilling there with no
hindrance from Japan as Japan dares not start a war without US support. What about the South China Sea? The US only sends
warships near Chinas islands for freedom of navigation. It hurts Chinas dignity but causes no harm. In fact, it benefits China in
giving China the excuse to militarize its artificial islands in the South China Sea to prevent naval
especially submarine attack at Chinese homeland from the South China Sea. When China has built sufficient
defense there it will be easy for China to drive US warships and warplanes away from the South
China Sea and turn the sea into Chinas inner lake. The real war Xi is preparing is the war to unify
Taiwan with China . Xi cannot be sure that Taiwan will not pursue independence with a proindependence president in power. Nor is he sure that the US will not interfere if China takes Taiwan by
force. Due to strong nationalism among Chinese people, Xi and his party will become entirely unpopular
if they fail to take Taiwan by force if Taiwan pursues independence. Seeing the growing possibility of
Taiwans pro-independence DPPs victory in the presidential election last year, Xi had to begin the very
difficult military reform urgently in spite of strong resistance in the military.
Taiwan conflict goes nuclear most probably scenario.

Colby 13 principal analyst and division lead for global strategic affairs at the Center for Naval Analyses, former policy
adviser to the secretary of defenses representative for the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, expert adviser to the Congressional
Strategic Posture Commission, and staff member on the Presidents Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the U.S.
Regarding WMD, Abraham M. Denmark, vice president for political and security affairs at the National Bureau of Asian Research
(NBR) and Asia-Pacific security adviser at the Center for Naval Analyses, former country director for China affairs in the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, cochairs of the CSIS Working Group on US-China Nuclear Dynamics
(Elbridge A, Nuclear Weapons and U.S.-China Relations,
http://csis.org/files/publication/130307_Colby_USChinaNuclear_Web.pdf)
Taiwan remains the single most plausible and dangerous source of tension and conflict
between the U nited S tates and China
the situation remains combustible
nuclear weapons would most likely become a
major factor, because the fate of the island is intertwined both with the legitimacy of the
Chinese Communist Party and the reliability of U.S. defense commitments
Taiwan.
. Beijing continues to be set on a policy to prevent Taiwans independence, and the United States maintains the capability to come to Taiwans defense. 12
Although tensions across the Taiwan Strait have subsided since both Taipei and Beijing embraced a policy of engagement in 2008,
, complicated by rapidly diverging cross-
strait military capabilities and persistent political disagreements.13 Moreover, for the foreseeable future Taiwan is the contingency in which
in the Asia-Pacific region.
***Start footnote 13***
Taiwan
the main potential flashpoint for the United States in
no other major flashpoint is more likely to bring the U nited S tates into combat
Richard Betts has observed well the dangers stemming from the
East Asia
. He notes that
situation, which he terms
with a major power
. . . . Americans and Chinese see the issues at stake in the dispute over Taiwan in different terms; U.S. policy on the defense of Taiwan is uncertain, and thus so is the understanding in Beijing, Taipei, and
neither great power can fully control developments that

might ignite a crisis. This is a classic recipe for surprise, miscalculation, and
uncontrolled escalation
Washington over how far the United States might go under different circumstances. He goes on to say that
. See Richard K. Betts, American Force: Dangers, Delusions, and Dilemmas in National Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 186.
2NC
Pol Cap Key

Xi pol cap key to military reform
Mulvenon 16 http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm49jm.pdf James Mulvenon is Deputy
Director, Advanced Analysis at DGI's Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis. A specialist on the Chinese military, 3/1/16
First and foremost , it is clear that this
reform is being driven with the personal imprimatur and

political heft of Chairman Xi Jinping himself , though clearly aligned with an organizational desire for reform within
parts of the PLA itself . 12 Xi has dedicated a significant amount of his political capital on issues of
party - military relations. My article in C LM 47 analyzed t he appearance of the so - called CM C Chairman
Responsibility System, which represents an important personalization of Xis leadership over
the PLA . Earlier, CLM 4 6 explored Xis implementation of his leadership consolidation at the Gutian Conference in November
201 4 , where the top 42 0 officers in the PLA were lectured about the absolute control of the PLA by the Chinese Communist Party ,
leavened with unsubtle threats about their individual vulnerability to his expanding and merciless anti - corruption investigations.
Yet the Central Milit ary Commission Opinion on Deepening Reform of National Defense and the Armed Forces issued on 1 January
2016 insists that
a key goal of the reorganization is to consolidate and perfect the basic principles
and system of the party s absolute leadership ove r the military [emphasis added], implying there is
still work to be done in party - army relations and perhaps even reflecting the concern
that the reforms might undermine Beijings grip on the military . 13
Xi needs a win to revive stalled reforms

Erickson 15 http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2015/09/02/sweeping-change-in-chinas-military-xis-pla-restructuring/
Andrew Erickson is a professor at the U.S. Naval War College and a research associate at Harvards Fairbank Center. 9/2/15
Chinese President Xi Jinping
needs some positive achievements, immediately . The year began with his
become mired in problems and widelyperceived blundering on economic issues. This only strengthens incentive to commemorate the sensitive 70th
striking consolidation of leadership at home and abroad but has
anniversary of Chinese victory in World War II with historys most exciting Beijing military parade. Glimpses of new missiles and
other armaments will rightly attract widespread attention so dont miss the show. Long after the soldiers and crowds disperse,
however, China
stands to experience far more lasting impact from a move that may be announced following the
pomp and circumstance: major military reforms. Propelled by Xis vigorous efforts to realize his
dream of a strong country with a strong military, reform plans long underway are finally surfacing . Now
reportedly afoot: a sweeping transformation of Chinas military, with tremendous implications for its strategy and operations. The
parade will provide Xi a good opportunity to announce his ambitious plans on how to transform the PLA into a real modern army
capable of winning wars, a leading Chinese naval analyst told the South China Morning Post.
Public
Chinese public wants a tough military
Cheng 7/24 (Jing Cheng, Why China wont back off the South China Sea whatever the world might say, China
Policy Institute Blog, 24 July 2016 19:00, https://www.hongkongfp.com/2016/07/24/china-wont-back-off-southchina-sea-whatever-world-might-say/, 7/28/16, GK)
A much-anticipated ruling on the South China Sea dispute initiated against China by the Philippines finally came down and
the Hague-based international tribunal that judged it ruled in favour of the

Philippines, rejecting Chinas claims of historical rights to the seas resources. The Philippines
unsurprisingly,
welcomed the ruling, and celebrated it as a devastating legal blow to Chinas claims in the contested waters. Filipinos coined a new
word, Chexit, inspired by the term Brexit, to symbolise that China is out of the South China Sea. The
reaction from China

was furious. Its Ministry of Foreign Affairs immediately declared that the award is null and has
no binding force, and that China neither accepts nor recognises it. Xinhua, the state news agency, said
the tribunal was law-abusing and its award ill-founded. Meanwhile Beijing released a white paper reiterating its
claims to the South China Sea and adhering to the position that the dispute should be settled
through negotiations. Chinese internet users overwhelmingly expressed their patriotic
sentiments and support for the government claim. On Sina Weibo, Chinas hugely popular social sharing site,
state newspaper Peoples Daily said there is no need for others to rule on Chinas territorial and
maritime rights, with an image and slogan stating, China: we cant lose even one single dot.
Within a few hours, this message had attracted more than 1m retweets and hundreds of thousands of
supporters among Weibo users. Its hashtag has totted up more than 3.7 billion shares.
Scenarios
China Power Projection

Reforming coming but Xi must overcome resistancecauses massive
increase in Chinese power projection capability
Interests abroad Under his new plan, Mr. Xi, who heads that commission, is trying to shift power to
naval, air and missile forces, which are vital for his ambitions to enforce territorial
claims in Asia and protect Chinas swelling economic interests elsewhere. He is doing that by forming
new service branches and downgrading the status of the Army. He is wresting power from senior
generals by dismantling command structures including the PLAs seven Military Regions and four General
Departments, through which its officers have for years wielded authority, resisted central oversight
and sometimes lined their pockets. He is taking direct command of combat operations: Official
media named him for the first time as commander-in-chief of a new joint battle command center that he
visited on Wednesday in a rare appearance in camouflage fatigues and combat boots. And he is trimming 300,000 of the
PLAs 2.3 million troops, a move he announced last year, the biggest cut in two decades. That means putting
out of work large numbers of soldiers experienced with weapons, just as the state sector , which
absorbed previous troops cuts, also plans to lay off millions. The cuts add to a pool of at least six million
PLA veterans, thousands of whom have joined well organized protests in recent years, including one last
June outside Central Military Commission offices in Beijing, over what they see as insufficient government
support. The government has ordered state firms to reserve 5% of new jobs for veterans and pledged at a March parliament
meeting to spend 39.8 billion yuan ($6.1 billion) this year on allowances for demobilized troops, a 13% increase over 2015. Premier
Li Keqiang told parliament: We will see that demobilized military personnel are settled into new jobs or have good access to
Chinas restrictive political system makes it hard for

the plans opponents to speak freely. Top military figures have warned officers in speeches
not to express opinions on the subject. Still, there are signs of dissent. The PLA Daily, the
main military newspaper, in November posted online and then removed an article warning that if
restructuring is not done properly, this could affect the stability of the military or
even all of society. Retired Maj. General Wang Hongguang, a former deputy head of one of Chinas military
regions , told reporters at the March parliament meeting that local authorities cant afford to
support all the demobilized soldiers. This is hundreds of billions of yuan, he said, adding
that the defense budget needed to increase by more than 10%. The next day, the government
announced a 7.6 % increase, the lowest in six years. Mr. Xis ultimate goal is to enable the
PLA to conduct complex joint operations combining air, sea and ground forces with
information technologythe kind of operation the U.S. has pioneered. Reagan-era echoes His
plan echoes the Reaga n-era Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, which revamped the U.S. military
to address the inter-services rivalry and insufficient civilian control exposed during the Vietnam War and
1983 Grenada invasion. Despite fierce institutional resistance, it cut American forces and reduced
powers of the heads of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines. It bolstered the authority of
regional commanders to oversee all services in combat. That joint operations approach means
commanders can mobilize whatever air, navy or other forces they need when trouble arises.
Chinese leaders have hankered after similar capabilities since observing the 1991 Gulf War , when
employment and business startup services.
Mr. Xi has
indicated he sees a comparable capability as essential to the China Dream he
outlined after taking power in 2012, when he ordered the military to prepare to fight and win
wars. A defense white paper last year gave the PLA a new strategic task to safeguard the
security of Chinas overseas interests on top of its traditional defensive duties. Beijing ha s since
announced plans to build its first overseas military outpost, in the African nation of
Djibouti, which is home to U.S. and Japanese bases and has served as a supply stop for Chinese naval ships
U.S. leaders coordinated a complex array of forces to devastating effect, say Chinese officers and military historians.
on antipiracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden. The PLA has also established an Overseas Operations Office as part of its overhaul.
China must adapt to a global revolution in warfare as threats to its expanding interests
intensify, said Maj. Gen. Chen Zhou, a top PLA strategist who led the government white-paper team, in a group
interview in March. He cited the Chinese navys evacuation of Chinese citizens last year from Yemen, in the midst of a civil war, as an
example. Restructuring
and finding jobs for 300,000 troops is an unprecedented challenge, he

said. But any revolution has a price to pay. Mr. Xi first must strengthen his control
over the military, which has long been a rival power center to Chinas civilian
leadership. Founded in 1927, the PLA formed the backbone of the Communist uprising that ushered Mao Zedong into power
in 1949. For years afterward, military officers were central in Party leadership. When Deng Xiaoping came to power in 1978, he
started sidelining the military from politics, winning support by letting it build business empires spanning nightclubs,
pharmaceuticals and real estate. By the 1990s, though, Beijing worried about the militarys readiness, especially after a 1996 standoff
with the U.S. over Taiwan. In 1998, then-President Jiang Zemin started crowbarring the PLA out of business, extending budget
increases in return. His successor, Hu
Jintao, struggled to stamp his authority over the PLA. In 2011, U.S.
officials said President Hu seemed unaware of a provocative test flight of Chinas new stealth
fighter hours before meeting Robert Gates, U.S. Defense Secretary at the time. The incident fueled speculation
among military experts that hawkish elements in Chinas armed forces were increasingly driving
Chinese foreign policy. Chinese officials declined to comment. Corruption was also becoming endemic,
especially the buying and selling of ranks, with a generalship costing at least 10 million yuan ($1.5
million) but generating far more through graft, according to Chinese officers.
Threatens US heg
Holmes 15-Distinguished Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, PhD and MA in History @ Georgetown University [Kim, "China
prepping for regional hegemony," Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2015/6/china-preppingfor-regional-hegimony, June 2016
What is China up to? Its been building artificial islands in the South China Sea. Recently, two motorized artillery pieces were
On May 20 the
Chinese navy challenged a U.S. surveillance aircraft flying near one of the islands. It demanded
that the U.S. plane leave its military alert zone, even though it was flying in international
airspace. Stung by Beijings aggressiveness, Defense Secretary Ashton Carter pushed back. Weve been flying over the South
spotted on one of these artificial islands. Experts believe the Chinese may plan to use them as airstrips.
China Sea for years and years and years, he told reporters last week, and well continue to do that fly, navigate, operate.
Beijing has been pressing territorial claims in the East China and South China seas for years.
Experts believe Beijing is bent on territorial expansion so that it can play an even greater role in
world affairs. But Chinese officials dismiss such talk. They describe their actions as defensive, making themselves out as victims
of hegemonic powers and interested only in protecting their sovereignty. An official Chinese white paper on military strategy
released last week should put the matter to rest. It shows quite clearly that China
is developing a grand plan not only

to use military power to defend its expansive territorial claims and influence in East Asia but
also to challenge the U.S. as a rising global power. It puts their provocative actions of building
islands and flagging down U.S. military aircraft in their proper perspective. The first thing to note is that
the military strategy is described as active defense. This is a technical term that really means China envisions the need
for offensive military operations. Its a far more aggressive stance than we are used to, at least in terms of
public statements made by the Chinese government about the purposes of their military strategy. The
new offensive
component of its war plans actually has its own acronym, PMS, for preparation for military
struggle. Chinas military forces will prepare to win informationalized local wars, highlighting
maritime military struggle and maritime PMS. Cutting through the jargon, it means that the purpose of
force is not to deter wars but to win them. It also shows a heavy emphasis on cyberwarfare and a
new focus on moving away from land power toward the offensive intent admittedly quite openly.
Chinas air force will shift from territorial air defense to both defense and offense and build an air-space defense force structure.
Note the word offense. Thus we can expect more challenges of U.S. military aircraft over the international waters that Beijing
unilaterally declares as part of their defense perimeter. Then theres the Chinese navys addition of open seas operations to its
existing focus on offshore waters defense. When combined with the armys new focus on trans-theater mobility, and not merely
on the more modest theater defense, you start to get the picture. China thinks it needs those man-made islands and robust new
The
Chinese government is putting its money where its mouth is. It announced a 10 percent increase
of the military budget for 2015. That would make China the second-largest military spender in
the world. Increases in defense spending have been outpacing GDP growth rates for years, and
although Chinas defense spending is still far below Americas, it is growing while the U.S. is
cutting its defense expenditures. All of this adds up to a bold new role for Chinas armed forces .
Long thought to be content with the mere defense of its mainland territory, China is clearly staking a larger claim for
itself. It is striving to become the dominant military power in East Asia for sure, but also, in the
long run, a rival challenger to American military power.
land and naval capabilities not only to operate in the open seas but to move military forces from one theater to another.
Extinction
Barnett 11, Professor, Warfare Analysis and Research Dept U.S. Naval War College [Thomas, World Politics Review, The
New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads, 3/7/2011,
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads,
DKP]
Americans that we stand at a crossroads in our continuing

evolution as the world's sole full-service superpower. Unfortunately, we are increasingly
seeking change without cost, and shirking from risk because we are tired of the responsibility . We
Events in Libya are a further reminder for
don't know who we are anymore, and our president is a big part of that problem. Instead of leading us, he explains to us. Barack
Obama would have us believe that he is practicing strategic patience. But many experts and ordinary citizens alike have concluded
that he is actually beset by strategic incoherence -- in effect, a man overmatched by the job. It is worth first examining the larger
picture: We
live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet
endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of
mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take
the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined
global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort
of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II. Let me
be more blunt: As
the guardian of globalization, the U.S. military has been the greatest force
for peace the world has ever known. Had America been removed from the global
dynamics that governed the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended .
Indeed, it's entirely conceivable there would now be no identifiable human civilization left ,
once nuclear weapons entered the killing equation. But the world did not keep sliding down
that path of perpetual war. Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in
our now-perpetual great-power peace. We introduced the international liberal trade order
known as globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What resulted was the collapse of
empires, an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the
doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a profound and
persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based conflicts.
PLA Lashout
Only reform stall solves Chinese lashout
Dreyer 16 June Teufel Dreyer is a Senior Fellow in FPRIs Asia Program as well as a member of the Orbis Board of Editors.
She is Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida, and author of Chinas Political System:
Modernization and Tradition (Pearson, 2015, ninth ed.) and Middle Kingdom and Empire of the Rising Sun (Oxford University
Press, forthcoming 2016). http://www.fpri.org/article/2016/03/chinas-military-reorganization-and-americas-window-ofopportunity/ 3/1/16
the reforms
aimed less at demonstrating Chinas sincerity toward peace and disarmament and more toward producing a leaner and
meaner fighting force: he noted that even with its size reduced, the PRC would still have the worlds largest military, be fully
Fewer Cooks, More Cruise Missiles The spokesmans subsequent comments, however, seemed to indicate that
prepared to cope with risks to the nations security, and would result in a better and more efficient military. The cuts, meant to
streamline the PLA, would mainly target troops equipped with outdated armaments, office staff, and personnel of non-combat
operations. China would maintain an appropriate scale of defense expenditure, to be accompanied by many reform initiatives.
These changes , which have been described as tectonic, do not bode well for global security .
Foreshadowed by a vaguely worded statement by Xi at the 3rd Plenum of the partys 18th Central Committee in November 2013
about the need for reform, they were fleshed out in a far-reaching reorganization that was announced on New Years Eve. 2015. The
countrys seven military regions have been replaced by five theater commands---the latter sometimes translated as combat zones-one each for east, west, north, south, and central China. According to Chinese sources,[1] areas of responsibility for the respective
commands are: Eastern Theater Command Taiwan and the contested Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Western Theater Command Central
Asia (exercising vigilance against infiltration by radical and separatist elements) Northern Theater Command Northeast Asia (Japan,
Korea) Southern Theater Command South China Sea and Southeast Asia Central Theater Command Defense of the central
authorities and the great rear for delivering reinforcement and support to the other four theaters The decision was motivated by a
conviction that the previous military region organization was ill-equipped to meet the demands of joint war-fighting. According to
the official state news agency Xinhua, the previous system was characterized by institutional barriers to winning wars such as
unclear functions and ineffective joint command systems. The four general departments had developed autonomous tendencies that
were inappropriate to the demands of future informationized war, a term that has become a mantra in PLA literature over the past
decade.[2] Command and control is henceforth to go directly from the CMC to these five zones. [3] A second major component of the
reorganization involves replacing the PLAs four military departments--the General Command, General Political, General Logistics,
and General Equipment departmentswith fifteen groups, dispersing their functions and placing the successor groups under the
direct control of the partys Central Military Commission (CMC), headed by President Xi Jinping. The impetus for this change was
concern that the four departments had been behaving independently of one another. A Japanese newspaper, the conservative Sankei
Shimbun, advanced yet another reason: to weaken the power of Chief of the General Staff Fang Fengfei. Fang had been appointed to
his position by previous president and head of the CMC Hu Jintao just before Hu left office and hence Xi regarded him as loyal to Hu
rather than himself.[4] At the same time, new services have been inaugurated. The PLA Rocket Force, which will take over from the
Second Artillery Corps, will henceforth have parity with a newly constituted PLA Land Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Rocket Force
is charged with responsibility for the nations increasingly powerful nuclear arsenal, while official sources describe the Strategic
Support Force rather vaguely as a new-type combat force to maintain national security and an important growth point of the PLAs
combat capabilities.[5] Non-Chinese sources believe that it will deal with high-technology warfare in space and cyberwar. The
intelligence community, including the former Second Department of the General Staff Department and the intelligence services of
the National Security Commission, Ministry of Public Security, Liaison Office of the partys Central Committee, and the partys
United Front Work Department, is also scheduled for a major reorganization. One source reports that the General Staffs First
Department will be incorporated into the new Joint Staff Department, while the Third and Fourth Departments will join the new
Strategic Support Force, The intent, similar to plans for the PLA, is to centralize intelligence gathering and analysis and to place
them firmly under the control of Xi Jinping.[6] What Does the Reorganization Mean for the United States? If imitation be the
sincerest form of flattery, Washington should be pleased: the new command and control structure of the PLA replicate those of the
U.S. military in significant ways. Unfortunately, there is little to be gained from having a weaker adversary become more powerful
through emulating ones strengths. Though still acknowledged as the worlds most powerful force, the American military has seen its
edge over China erode over the past decade, with the PRCs impressive advances enabled by a combination of generous budget
increases, hard work, and technology purloined from the U.S. As well as by the stringent U.S. defense budgets that were mandated
by sequestration rules. In March, Air Force Chief of Staff General Mark Welsh told the Defense Subcommittee of the House
Appropriations Committee that Chinas air power will overtake that of the United States by 2030; navy sources have made similar
statements about the PRCs maritime buildup, since U.S. procurement has slowed due to budget cuts. Although the Obama
administrations budget request for fiscal year 2017 includes a request for an additional $2.8 billion in funding for research and
development,[7] there is consensus among analysts that the technological gap between the United States and Chinese militaries may
continue to narrow. Meanwhile, the slowdown in Chinese economic growth has barely affected defense budgets, which have enjoyed
a nearly unbroken string of double digit increases each year since 1979 although the country has no external enemy. The intended
2016 budget increase of 7.6 percent, though one of the lowest since 1989, is still above the projected growth rate of 6.5 to 7 percent
for the economy as a whole--and far above the defense budget increases of any state that could remotely be considered a peer
competitor of the PRC. Generous budgets have enabled the purchase of more capable weapons, including the Dongfeng (DF)-26,
dubbed the Guam killer, since it is the first ballistic missile capable of targeting the U.S. bases on that island with conventional
warheads. The DF-26, on display for the first time at the parade to commemorate victory in World War II, was revealed to have antiship ballistic missile capabilities as well. Also on display for the first time were the DF-5B and DF-31A intercontinental ballistic
missiles. The DF-21D, developed in order to counter U.S. aircraft carriers, is hence known as the carrier killer, while the DF-5B is
believed to be Chinas first nuclear-armed ICBM with multiple independent re-entry vehicles. According to the respected Defense
Week, although officially the DF-5B can carry three nuclear warheads, there are suspicions it can carry as many as five. [8] Also of
concern are stealthy planes, new submarines both nuclear and conventionally powered, hypersonic weapons, and increasing
numbers of drones. There has been a marked increase in arms purchase from Russia, most recently of S-400 missiles, whose 400
kilometer range can reach New Delhi, Calcutta, Hanoi, Seoul, and anywhere on Taiwan as well as support the PRCs controversial Air
But
Will All These Plans Be Fulfilled? Drawing up blueprints for progress toward a force that is leaner,
more capable, efficient, and loyal to him that Xi Jinping wants is one thing; bringing it to
completion is another. One major impediment is apt to be pushback from those whose personal
Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea.[9] China is also acquiring Russias highly regarded Su-35 fighter plane.
interests are affected. The cuts are expected to fall disproportionately on the ground forces which, consonant with Chinas status as a
major continental state, had traditionally comprised the bulk of its military establishment. However, Beijing clearly intends to
enforce its claims to disputed areas in the East China and South China seas against the resistance of other claimants and American
unwillingness to accede to the new regime the PRC seems to be imposing on its freedom of navigation. The
PRCs island
creation activities in disputed areas and placement of military installations on the islands militate toward a
force structure that is more geared to war at sea and in the air than on land. Hence the vested interests of
the ground forces will be affected. Perhaps indicative of the difficulties the leadership faces is the fact that the
commanders of all five of the newly created battle zones are from the ground forces. Military leaders who see their
dominant position being undercut can defend the primacy of land-based power by
pointing to an intermittently simmering border dispute with India as well as the danger of religious extremist infiltration from
Central Asia -- and, perhaps more effectively, by passive resistance. Numerous hints in the official press indicate that
the leadership is worried about exactly this. Xis comments just preceding his announcement of the cuts, that all officers and troops
must keep in mind their responsibility to serve the people whole-heartedly to carry out the noble mission of world peace may be
taken as an admonition to accept the severance orders that will be forthcoming. According to an article in the military newspaper
Jiefang Junbao, although General Scharnhorst, the leading proponent of 19th century Prussian military reform, faced many
obstacles, he nonetheless managed to implement measures that resulted in the modernization of the Prussian military, thus enabling
its stunning later successes.[10] Another opined that, although during the Long March Mao Zedong demoted General SunYi from
division head to regiment leader due to the demands of the job, Sun obeyed unquestioningly and even requested that his pay be
reduced. Hence todays officers should not say irresponsible words or act irresponsibly.[11] Officers and troops must not, according
to the military newspaper, be two-faced people who overtly support military reform but in fact work against it. A U.S.-based
website with good connections in China reported that some members of the recently-disestablished General Staff Departments
intelligence service were allegedly retaliating by launching investigations against some of Xi Jinpings trusted allies.[12] There is
likely a good deal that investigations might find: according to other reports in the military newspaper, three years after Xi Jinpings
anti-corruption campaign began, it is still a problem. Lest readers conclude that these past efforts were futile, a Jiefang Junbao
commentator stated that although rampant corruption has been contained, the deeper issue has not been completely dealt with.
There are also complaints about the poor quality of personnel. Officers repeat Chairman Xis call for more rigorous training but do
not require it: empty words are far too common.[13] There
are constant complaints about the poor quality of
personnel and serious dereliction of duty.[14] An additional problem involves how to absorb the 300,000 troops that
are to be cut into a civilian economy that is less robust than in the past. State owned enterprises, SOEs, have been told to reserve five
percent of their total recruitment for demobilized troops. One problem is that the SOEs themselves are scheduled for restructuring
in order to make them leaner and more efficient, and hiring those without a professional background will not help their bottom line.
[15] Nor are the new weapons necessarily problem-free. One reason for purchases from Russia is Chinas
difficulties in indigenous production. For example, despite charges that their designs were stolen from the United States, the J-20
and J-31 stealth fights cannot fly at supersonic speeds without resorting to afterburners, thereby forfeiting the stealthiness that
enables them to escape radar detection. There are also reliability problems. The air forces best engine, the WS-10, in development
since the 1980s, is underpowered and reportedly lasts only 30 hours before it must be replaced.[16] Russia has also sold S-400
missiles to two PRC adversaries: as many to Vietnam as to China, and twice as many to India. The S-35 agreement was the result of
tortuous negotiations, with Russia wary of the Chinese penchant for buying only a few copies, then reverse engineering and
producing its own. Only after falling oil prices and international sanctions sharply impacted the Russian economy did Putin agree to
the sale of 24 planes---but, conspicuously, without any technology transfer or licensing permissions.[17] The Bottom Line
Foreign analysts believe that in time the militarys mechanical and systems integration difficulties can be worked out, though its
personnel problems may prove more intractable. Many
of the planned changes are not expected to be

completed until 2020. This provides the United States with a window of opportunity . It is
incumbent on the next administration in Washington to make good use of what could be Americas last opportunity to maintain its
military primacy.
Reform k2 military readiness

Reform k2 Chinese military readiness and technological diversity
SHAH 4/20/16-Research Assistant @ Observer Research Foundation [Kriti, Xi strengthens his hold over Chinas military,
Lt. Gen Narasimhan noted at the outset that the aim of the Xi
Jinpings military reforms was to strengthen his

control over the PLA and make the army a more efficient fighting force by breaking down barriers
between rival commands. The reforms optimise the size of the army by reducing the number of noncombat
personnel and institutions and improve the balance between services and branches of the military by
placing them on equal footing. At the forefront of the reforms is the absorption of the four general departments of the PLA by 15 new
departments within the Central Military Commission. The General Staff Department that was the most important department of the
PLA and which also focused on intelligence and operations has now become the Joint Staff Department within the CMC, no longer
exercising operational control of the army and instead operating as simply a staff organisation similar to the US joint chief of staffs
system. In the addition, the other 14 departments and offices of the CMC will include departments for logistics, equipment
development, science and technology and fighting corruption. Another major reform has been the reorganisation of the seven
military regions into five theatre commands. While all military regions will have their own commander, the grades and ranking of
the theatre commanders have been keep intact. Of the five theatre commands, the Northern Command will concentrate on
Mongolia, Russia and Korea; the Central Command on protecting Beijing; the Eastern and Southern Commands will focus on
Chinas maritime security ambitions protecting the east and South China Sea; while the Western Command will look at part of
Mongolia, the Central Asian republics and South Asia. The theatre commands will also have their own army, navy and air force
components to respond to security threats from their strategic directions. The
reforms will also focus on outof

area operations as part of Chinas holistic view of national security. Encompassing both traditional and
non traditional security threats, the Chinese military will be directed to address threats well beyond its
territorial borders. In the past, it has deployed the PLA Navy to the Gulf of Aden and involved itself in one way or the other in
Sudan, Libya, Syria, Myanmar to name a few. This is part of Xis strategy to make China shoulder greater
international responsibility and obligations in areas of piracy, peacekeeping, disaster response
and terrorism. General Narasimhan also discussed the importance of the creation of the PLA Rocket force.
According to him, both conventional and strategic assets would be under this force, which in turn would report to the CMC. In
addition, the
PLA Strategic Support Force (or PLASSF) is expected to be a game changer, as it is the
core Chinas information warfare force and will be a central component of Chinas active defence concept. Its
organisational structure has been designed so as to integrate military systems and services to improve efficiency in information
supply. The
PLASSF includes space operations, electronic and cyber warfare, technical

reconnaissance and missile research and development. Its main aim will be to protect the countrys financial
security and the security of peoples lives in the country. Xis military reforms also include a reduction of over 300,000 troops, which
it will also optimise

the structure of the armed forces by reducing troops that are equipped with either outdated
equipment, or are non combat or administrative personnel.
will be done in phases up to 2017. While this will save approximately $100 million of their annual budget,
Crushes hegUS edge already eroding

ECONOMIST 15- ECONOMIST.COM [Why America's military is losing its edge, ECONOMIST.COM, 6/11/15,
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/06/economist-explains-9, MHS]
AMERICA'S ability to project power on behalf of its own interests and in defence of its allies has
been the bedrock of the rules-based international order since the end of the second world war. Critical to that
effort has been the role of technology in maintaining a military edge over potential adversaries
through the first and second offset strategies. In the 1950s it offset the Soviet Unions numerical advantage in conventional
forces by accelerating its lead in nuclear weapons. From the late-1970s, after the Soviets closed the gap in nuclear capability, America began making
investments in emerging technologies that led to the ability to look deep and shoot deep with precision guided munitions. For the next quarter of a
century American military dominance was assured. Now, that decisive
military edge is being eroded. Why? The same

technologies that made America and the West militarily dominant have proliferated to potential
foes. In particular, precision-guided missiles are widely and cheaply available . Rather than investing in the
next generation of high-tech weapons to stay far ahead of military competitors, the Pentagon has been focused more on the very different demands of
counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. While
America has been distracted, China has been busy

developing asymmetric capabilities specifically designed to counter Americas power in the West
Pacific. For over two decades its been investing double-digit defence budgets in an arsenal of highly-accurate, submarines, sophisticated integrated
air defence systems (IADS) and advanced cyber capabilities. All with the aim of making it too dangerous for American carriers to operate close enough
Americas military
establishment has shown little appetite for axing much-cherished legacy programmes to pay
for the game-changing new stuff, such as stealthy, long-range strike drones able to survive in the most contested airspace. For
to fly their tactical aircraft or cruise missiles. The Chinese call it winning a local war in high-tech conditions. Meanwhile,
example, the Pentagon has committed to buy 2,500 semi-stealthy F-35 fighter jets even though their limited combat radius reduces their usefulness in
many war-fighting scenarios. Meanwhile the navy persists with 11 fabulously expensive but increasingly vulnerable carriers when underwater vehicles
both manned and unmanned may be better equipped to tackle enemies with advanced area denial capabilities. Getting career airmen and sailors to give
up their toys isnt the only cultural challenge. These days the scientific and technological developments that will help sharpen Americas military edge,
such as artificial intelligence for unmanned systems, are as likely to come from the consumer tech companies in Silicon Valley as the traditional defense
industry. Just how these two very different cultures will mesh creatively remains to be seen. America is determined to regain its military edge through a
third offset strategy. But even if the political will and technical brilliance can be summoned up again, dominance will require continuous effort and
innovation because technology proliferates so much faster these days. In part that is thanks to a previous project the Pentagons Defence Advanced
Projects Agency helped into being, the internet.
US-China Power Transition risks war

Lai 6/30/2016 (David Lai, Ph.D. is Research Professor of Asian Security Affairs at the
Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. The views expressed in this article are
those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the United
States Army War College, the United States Army, the Department of Defense, or the United
States Government) The Diplomat - Chinas assertiveness and U.S. hedging is a natural
part of a power transition. Its also dangerous http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/the-us-chinapower-transition-stage-ii/ - triscuit
China is assertive! This has been the talk in Washington for quite some time. The
most-noted Chinese assertive acts

are, of course, the newly proactive and at times tougher-than-before stands toward the United
States. Chinas upgraded and forceful moves in the East and South China Seas have also raised
many eyebrows. Alongside those highly-contested turns are Chinas self-assured pushes for
change in regional and global affairs. Why has China become assertive? In a fundamental sense, Chinas change of
behavior is not a planned act in a long march to overthrow the United States, but a natural outgrowth from its expanding national
power. Its
assertiveness is a manifestation of typical behavior at the second stage of the power

transition ostensibly taking place between China and the United States. At the moment, China is still
somewhat perplexed about its own assertiveness and the consequences. The United States in the meantime is also struggling with
the proper ways to deal with rising China .
The nations in the Asia Pacific, and eventually the world, are
watching attentively the unfolding U.S.-China power transition and will adjust their policies
accordingly. Power transition is set in motion by the rise of a previously underdeveloped big
nation, dissatisfied with the existing international system and its powerful stakeholders . As its
national power grows and expands, this rising big fellow has the impulse to make changes, intentionally or compulsively, to the
rules of the system that purportedly works against its interests. Changes
of this kind challenge the existing

international order. If the challenger and the status-quo powers cannot come to terms with the
changes peacefully, they often settle their differences on battlefields. Thucydides was perhaps the first to
observe that power transition carries the seeds of war. In his account of the Peloponnesian War between Sparta and Athens in the
5th century BC, Thucydides asserted that the growth of Athenian power and the fear generated on the Spartan side had trapped the
two powerful nations into a war for 27 years. While
the power transition theory is still subject to scrutiny, the

world is witnessing Chinas rise, with its unprecedented scale, speed, and complexity. Given Chinas
precarious relations with the existing international order and its present leader, the United States, it begs the question whether a
power transition is in the making and whether U.S.-China relations will fall into the same trap.
Aggro China
Reform causes US-Chinese escalation from devolution risks nuclear
war
Bosco 15 Joseph A. Bosco is a member of the U.S.-China task force at the Center for the National Interest and a non-resident
senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He previously served as China country desk officer in the office
of the secretary of Defense from 2005-2006. http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/the-danger-chinas-military-reforms/ 12/10/2015
Chinas new military reform measures, intended to give more power to lower-level authorities,
are likely to increase the threat of conflict with its neighbors and with the United States in
ways both obvious and more subtle. First, to the extent the reforms succeed in making the Peoples Liberation Army more effective
and capable of real combat as Xi Jinping has advocated, that is bad news for the region, the United States, and its allies. Given the
territorial gains Chinas aggressive posture has already made, any
enhanced military power, real or perceived, can

only whet the PRCs appetite for further advances. Second, the devolution of authority to
local commands portends a rise in incidents like the 2001 EP-3 collision and multiple ship-to-ship confrontations in
the South and East China Seas. Beijing attributed each of those dangerous encounters to the
unauthorized actions of individual captains or pilots or local commanders , not to higher-level military or
Communist Party direction. (This from a government that has controlled the communications and family planning practices of its
1.3 billion citizens.) The
ostensible expansion of lower-level military decision-making has set the

stage for additional air or maritime confrontations and provided Beijing with further plausible
It
will now be easier for Beijing to explain away such occurrences as it does for everything from cyber-attacks,
intellectual property theft, trade violations , even threats of nuclear war from active or retired generals. It has
deniability if its aggressive top-level policies happen to trigger incidents potentially involving material destruction and loss of life.
effectively given itself a get-out-of-jail-free card for any unfortunate future development at sea, in the air, in space, or in cyber-space.
Increases likelihood of miscalc and pre-emption

Yu 16 Miles Maochun Yu is a professor of East Asia and military and naval history at the United States Naval Academy (USNA).
He is the author of numerous scholarly articles on military and intelligence history and newspaper columns
http://www.hoover.org/research/what-do-chinas-cyclical-military-reforms-tell-us, 1/12/2016
The fifth, and the current, round of military
reform announced this month is indeed far-reaching and
revolutionary. It will revamp several crucial structural features of the PLA, including replacing the cumbersome 7 Military
Region Commands with 4 Theater Joint Commands; cutting troop strength by 300,000 from the current 2.3 million to 2 million;
abolition of the four PLA management departmentsthe General Political, General Logistics, General Armaments, and General
Staff, whose functions are being rolled into 15 agencies directly controlled by the Communist Partys Central Military Commission,
the highest military command authority of the land. These cyclical military reforms, however, reflect systemic problems that will
likely prolong the cycle of changes without fundamental progress. First of all, all five reforms have occurred when the supreme
leaders despotic position was threatened or in need of consolidation, resulting in large-scale leadership purges with the PLA and the
promotions of loyal but not necessarily competent generals and admirals in charge; second, all reforms aim at centralizing command
authority at the very top, discouraging initiative-taking, and flexible maneuverability of combat units; third, all reforms are
accompanied by the strengthening of the role of the Political Commissars in the PLA at all levels, whose job it is to indoctrinate and
the danger of a growing PLA . On the

contrary, nothing is more menacing to todays world peace than a modern military in a
communist regime with ballistic, blue water navy, space, cyber, and electromagnetic capabilities,
without internal dissent and with guaranteed troop loyalty to an all-powerful supreme leader who
is also backed by an economy four times larger than Russias and by trillions of dollars of hard currency reserve. For despite the
mind control at the expense of military professionalism. This is not to mitigate
PLAs intrinsic weaknesses, there is a bigger chance for miscalculation and a stronger
willingness to take the risk of war , as history has repeatedly proven.
Ext-aggro China
Reforms prerequisite for Chinese naval capabilities and power
projection
Stratfor 1/11/16 China Takes Bold Steps Toward Military Reform,
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/china-takes-bold-steps-toward-military-reform 1/11/2016
At the tail end of 2015, Beijing
introduced the ambitious first wave of Chinese President Xi Jinping's

comprehensive plan for military reform . The changes which include a more powerful strategic weaponry
command, a new ground force headquarters and an organization called the Strategic Support Force are the culmination of a
decadelong effort to improve the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The
focus is on military capability and

overcoming the deep-rooted political intransigence that has stymied the development of China's
armed forces. Analysis China's ground forces have never had their own headquarters until now. Previously, the People's
Liberation Army's Four General Departments served as the de facto army headquarters, functioning together as the equivalent of a
joint staff, to which the navy, air force and the newly renamed Rocket Force would report. Effectively, this meant that the navy, air
force and strategic missile forces were treated as adjuncts of the army. The establishment of an army headquarters will improve the
This
is a key prerequisite to developing the ability to conduct joint operations necessary to prevail
in modern warfare and crafting a capable military that can operate far from the security of
mainland China.
Four General Departments' ability to serve as a joint staff and also help equalize the standing of the four branches of the PLA.
Southeast Asia and Middle East escalation

Duke Political Review 16 http://dukepoliticalreview.org/chinas-new-military-strategy-self-defense-orexpansion/ Founded in 2013, Duke Political Review is Dukes premier political publication, aiming to publish a diverse range of
student opinions on political and social issues. DPRs biannually published print publication and constantly updating website
feature local, national, and international political analysis and commentary. 2/18/2016
Though his ambitions are clear, the path he wishes this influence to take remains ambiguous. It is valid to reason that the new
military reform will only be used for protecting Chinas increasing global interests, especially economically. On the other hand, it
remains reasonable to infer that China
hopes to apply its military supremacy to eliminate dissenting

voices around the globe. If this is the case, then Xi has picked one of the best moments in history.
Chinas greatest rival, the United States is gripped in a carnival of democracy. The presidential election weakens the diplomatic
power of the current president and reduces US advantage in negotiations. China
has recently passed an antiterrorism law that grants the military committee the power to launch attacks abroad under
certain circumstances related to terrorism. This is the first law in China that grants the power to wage wars abroad whose main
purpose is not self-defense (both the Korean War and the Vietnam War are interpreted in China as self-defense). Combined with the
military reform, the law seems both worrisome and reassuring. On one hand, the law grants the army domestic legitimacy to wage
wars abroad, and the increasing tensions between China, South East Asia, Taiwan, and Japan foreshadow the likelihood of Chinese
action. Even though it is difficult to interpret the military actions taken against Chinese neighbors as anti-terrorism acts, the law has
opened a precedent for the legitimacy for China to deploy troops abroad. This precedent may be used in the future to pass laws that
grant the military committee the power to send troops abroad in other circumstances besides anti-terrorism. The law also implicitly
infers from the popular cultural notion that China is rarely expansionist and often unwilling to invade other countries. As noted by
Chinese Philosopher Tingyang Zhao, war not aiming at defense is never a part of the Chinese culture, and it is highly unlikely for
contemporary China to launch wars if there exist other diplomatic ways to deal with the conflicts. The absence of religious disputes
in Chinese history excludes the necessity for expansion in the traditional culture, and the ancient prosperity in China is based on
peace with the nomads in the north. In modern society, each time we attempt to launch wars, we reassure our people by calling the
military campaigns self-defense. It is very difficult to predict the exact steps China will take, but
2016 remains a very
important year for Chinas foreign policies. China is also suffering from extreme Islamic radicalism in Xinjiang Province
and Yunnan Province. The anti-terrorism law preempts the possibility for China to be more actively engaged in the affairs of the
Middle East. The development of Chinas foreign relations in 2016 will also be influenced by the result of the 2016 presidential
elections in the USA, since the attitude of the new president may potentially affect Chinas attitude towards the world. If things are
going well diplomatically, we might predict a more active China in international politics in a positive way, and America can expect a
new partner to cooperate against ISIS. But if irrational decisions are made in the international arena, or negotiations
and
compromises fail, the powder keg in South East Asia or in the Middle East might be ignited
immediately .
Taiwan
PLA reform causes Taiwan invasion
Lowther 7-21 [William, staff reporter in Washington, PLA reforms short-term boon for
Taiwan: expert, Taipei Times,
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2016/07/21/2003651479 RD; AD
7/29/16]
Recent reforms within the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) are in the short term good news for Taiwan, a Washington conference was told
on Tuesday. The reforms are to be very disruptive for the Chinese military, as they try to work out the kinks, said Phillip Saunders, director of the
Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs at the US National Defense University. They can say this is how it will work on paper, but how will it
work in practice? he asked a National Bureau of Asian Research conference on The Implications of PLA Reforms for Taiwan. The good news for
if the reforms
eventually do work, the Chinese military will emerge with more robust capabilities. They will
have a more capable joint force and thus a much more threatening one if you are sitting on
Taiwan, he said. He said that, despite the current high priority of maritime issues for Beijing, Taiwan
remained a major spur for military planning, force building and the development of advanced
weapons systems. Saunders said that advanced equipment would continue to go to the PLAs Eastern Theater Command, which holds
primary responsibility for Taiwan. He said that long-range systems some with area-denial and anti-access
capabilities could be a great threat to Taiwan. Asked what advice he would give to Taiwan and how the nation should
Taiwan in the near term is that the PLA will be less likely to undertake a major operation, he said. However, he stressed that,
respond to changes in the PLA, Saunders said that Taiwan should spend more on defense. That would be the single most important thing, he said.
Saunders said Taipei should continue to work on asymmetrical capabilities that could really raise the costs of a successful invasion. To me, thats the
right approach, but in practice, it is challenging, he said. Saunders praised President Tsai Ing-wen () for focusing more on the domestic
development of weapons and on domestic procurement. He said Taiwan could design, build and field many weapons systems that might not be top-ofthe-line, but that could make a big difference in complicating the ways China could execute an invasion. Saunders and center research fellow Joel
Wuthnow recently published a paper on Chinas military reforms. Late last year and early this year, China announced a sweeping set of reforms to the
organizational structure of the PLA. The two men said the PLA
was now working to produce new and better-trained

leaders responsible for developing doctrine, and conducting training and operations relevant to
a Taiwan contingency. The PLA will probably continue a tradition of sending its best and brightest
officers to the theater responsible for Taiwan, they said. The PLAs organizational reforms are clearly
intended to allow China to field a stronger joint force capable of effectively conducting operations
across the range of possible contingencies, including those related to Taiwan, they said. If all goes according to plan, Taipei could
face an adversary that is not only better organized, trained and equipped, but also more
confident in its ability to fight and win wars, they added.
Modernization
Reforms key to conventional modernization
Economist 1/16/16 http://www.economist.com/news/china/21688424-xi-jinpingreforms-chinas-armed-forcesto-his-own-advantage-xis-new-model-army
CHINAS biggest military shake-up in a generation began with a deliberate echo of Mao Zedong. Late in 2014 President Xi Jinping
went to Gutian, a small town in the south where, 85 years before, Mao had first laid down the doctrine that the Peoples Liberation
Army (PLA) is the armed force not of the government or the country but of the Communist Party. Mr Xi stressed the same law to the
assembled brass: the PLA is still the partys army; it must uphold its revolutionary traditions and maintain absolute loyalty to its
political masters. His words were a prelude to sweeping reforms in the PLA that have unfolded in the past month, touching almost
every military institution. The aim of these
changes is twofoldto strengthen Mr Xis grip on the 2.3m-strong armed forces,

the PLA a more effective fighting force, with a
leadership structure capable of breaking down the barriers between rival commands that have long
hampered its modernisation efforts . It has taken a long time since the meeting in Gutian for these reforms to
unfold; but that reflects both their importance and their difficulty. The PLA itself has long admitted that it is lagging
behind. It may have plenty of new weaponsit has just started to build a second aircraft-carrier, for instance but
it is failing to make effective use of them because of outdated systems of command and
control. Before any substantial change in this area , however, Mr Xi felt it necessary to
strengthen the partys control over the PLA, lest it resist his reforms and sink back into a
morass of money-grubbing. The reforms therefore begin with the main instrument of party control, the Central Military
which are embarrassingly corrupt at the highest level, and to make
Commission (CMC), which is chaired by Mr Xi. On January 11th the CMC announced that the PLAs four headquartersthe
organisations responsible for recruiting troops, procuring weapons, providing logistics and ensuring political supervisionhad been
split up, slimmed down and absorbed into the commission. Once these were among the most powerful organisations in the PLA,
operating almost as separate fiefs. Now they have become CMC departments.
causes accidental escalation because of the US response to

modernization
Christensen 15 06/09/15, Thomas J. Christensen, Boswell professor of world politics and director of the China
and the World Program at Princeton University, is a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs,
Managing disputes with China, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2015/06/09/commentary/japan-commentary/managingdisputes-china/#.VjGL67erSj3
he Chinese leadership could use its conventional military power to threaten U.S. partners and to
impose high costs on U.S. forces if they intervened to assist their allies. The ability to conduct such asymmetric warfare against the
The
U.S. has ways to reduce a threat posed by Chinas ability to wage asymmetric warfare. But a future
U.S. can potentially affect how disputes are managed in peacetime and who might prevail politically if a fight were to occur.
U.S. president might be reluctant to use some of the more effective methods the American military has at its disposal such as
destroying or disabling military targets on the Chinese mainland especially early in a conflict when such measures would be most
effective. For
example, attacking Chinas potent ballistic missiles , their launchers and their command-andcontrol systems before the missiles strike U.S. bases and surface ships would be an efficient way to reduce the
threat. Chinese submarines, which can fire torpedoes and cruise missiles or lay sea mines, pose another potential threat. The
U.S., all things being equal, might be tempted to attack submarine ports and naval command-andcontrol systems on Chinese soil. But all things are not equal. No U.S. president has ever launched robust conventional
attacks against the homeland of a nation with nuclear retaliatory capability. Moreover , the conventional mobile ballistic
missiles and submarines China has developed to counter superior U.S. forces overlap dangerously
with the land-based missiles and submarines that China is developing to provide a secure nuclear retaliatory
capability. If the U.S. were to attack missile systems and submarines for the purpose of protecting against conventional attack
early in a conflict, Washington could unintentionally compromise portions of Chinas nuclear arsenal as well. Chinese leaders
could mistakenly view this as an attempt to eliminate Chinas nuclear deterrent, risking
escalation. China adheres publicly to a no-first-use doctrine on nuclear weapons, a position that would seem to
mean that no amount of conventional firepower leveled against it would cause it to resort to a nuclear response. But internal
Chinese military writings suggest that no-first-use is more of a guideline than a rule and doesnt necessarily
apply under conditions in which a technologically superior foe attacks crucial targets with conventional weapons.
Space War
Chinese military restructuring = space war buildup
Raske 2/3/16 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2016/02/03/PLA-reforms-Toward-winning-informationised-localwars.aspx Dr Michael Raska is Assistant Professor in the Military Transformations Program at the S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies, Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. His research interests focus on East Asian security and
defense issues, including theoretical and policy-oriented aspects of military innovation, force modernization trajectories,
information conflicts and cyberwarfare.
The third major military reform measure, announced on 1 February, is the reorganisation of the major Chinese
military commands from the previous seven 'military regions' to five 'major war zones' or theatre operations. These are the
Northern, Eastern, Southern, Western, and Middle or Central theaters, which are comparable to the US concept of Combatant
Commands. Changes
in the PLA's organisation force structure complement its gradual

technological advances. Indeed, the PLA under President Xi Jinping has seen many accomplishments: from the
introduction of next generation of supercomputers, to aviation prototypes such as the J-16, J-20, J-31, new helicopters and UAVs, to
the ongoing construction of a second aircraft carrier, as well as record number of commissioned ships such as Type 054A, 056
frigates and 052C destroyers. In
the next five to ten years, China is expected to transfer many

experimental models from R&D to the production stage, including a number of systems in what the PLA calls
'domains of emerging military rivalry' : outer space, near space, cyber space, and under water. These include next generation
ballistic missiles, nuclear and conventional, long-range precision-strike assets such as hypersonic vehicles, offensive and defensive
cyber capabilities and new classes of submarines, supported by a variety of high-tech directional rocket rising sea mines with
accurate control and guidance capacity. PLA Strategic Support Forces Of all the newly established units, the
PLA Strategic
Support Forces (SSF) represents perhaps the most significant development. While details remain hidden under a veil of
secrecy, semi-authoritative sources and press reports indicate that the SSF will consist of three independent
branches: 'cyber force' with 'hacker troops' responsible for cyber offense and defense; 'space force' tasked with
surveillance and satellites ; and 'electronic force' responsible for denial, deception, disruption of enemy radars and
communications systems. The SSF integrates the previous PLA General Staff Headquarters Third and Fourth Departments,
responsible for technical reconnaissance, electronic warfare, cyber intelligence and cyber warfare, as well as absorbing the Foreign
Affairs Bureau of the former PLA General Political Department, tasked with information operations, propaganda and psychological
warfare. This
corresponds to PLA writings on future conflicts such as Science of Military Strategy that emphasise
a holistic perspective toward space, cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum that must be
defended to achieve information dominance ( zhi xinxi quan). This is the ability to gather, transmit,
manage, analyse and exploit information, and prevent an opponent from doing the same as a key prerequisite for allowing the PLA
the PLA recognises the importance of controlling

space-based information assets as a means of achieving true information
dominance, calling it the 'new strategic high ground .' Consequently, establishing 'zhi tian quan'
( space dominance) is an essential component of achieving 'information
dominance.' Strategic Implications Ultimately, the key question is this: will the reforms in the PLA's organisational force
to seize air and naval superiority. To this end,
structure will be reflected in its operational conduct, particularly in the PLA's capabilities to exploit cyber-kinetic strategic
interactions in its regional power projection, as well as responses in potential crises and security flashpoints in East Asia? On one
hand, China's political and military elites believe that a new wave of the global Revolution in Military Affairs is gathering pace, led
principally by the US, and China must therefore accelerate the pace of its military development. Internally, however, the reforms are
designed primarily to close the PLA's inter-service rivalries, interoperability gaps and the dominance of the ground forces. In other
words, significant capability gaps will continue to exist. In the long-term the coordinated exploitation of space, cyber-space,
electromagnetic spectrum and strategic information operations will likely enable four critical missions for the PLA: Force
enhancement to support combat operations and improve the effectiveness of military forces such as ISR, integrated tactical warning
and attack assessment, command, control and communications, navigation and positioning and environmental monitoring;
Counter-space missions to protect PLA forces while denying space capabilities to the adversary; Information operations to direct
influence on the process and outcome in areas of strategic competition, and; Computer network operations targeting adversaries
data and networks. Consequently, the
PLA's growing military-technological developments may
significantly alter both the strategic thought and operational conduct of major powers in East
Asia, including the US and its allies such as Australia.
= destabilizing ASAT attacks

Zenko, Senior Fellow, CFR, worked for five years at Harvard Universitys Kennedy School of
Government, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service, and State
Departments Office of Policy Planning 14
(Micah, Dangerous Space Incidents, Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 21)
Crisis-Related Interference China, North Korea, and Iran could
conceivably be involved in dangerous space

activitiessuch as a "direct ascent," or vertical launch, ASAT test from a ground-based missile systemduring
a crisis with the United States or one of its allies to gain bargaining leverage, to deter potential hostile acts,
or for defensive reasons in anticipation of imminent conflict. The intent of these activities could be
misinterpreted if they cause unintended harm to U.S. and ally satellites, and could thereby exacerbate or
inadvertently escalate the crisis. China has the most active ASAT development program, having
conducted at least six direct ascent, or vertical launch, ASAT missile tests since 2005. China has not yet intentionally
interfered with U.S. space assets. However, it has conducted ASAT tests without warning and
signaled intent to undertake malicious actions. People's Liberation Army ( PLA) Air Force publications argue that
shooting down U.S. early-warning satellites would be a de-escalatory and stabilizing action
in a naval encounter with the United States. China might be tempted to demonstrate its
ASAT capabilities during a major crisis to deter potential U.S. military involvement,
such as during a confrontation with Taiwan or other neighboring states over unresolved territorial disputes in the East or South
China Seas. The purpose would be to signal its resolve and willingness to escalate militarily and
thus gain "escalation dominance."
Space conflict goes nuclear

Billings 8/10/15
Lee Billings is an editor at Scientific American covering space and physics, Citing Michael
Krepon, an arms-control expert and co-founder of the Stimson Center, and James Clapper,
Director of National Intelligence, The Scientific American, August 10, 2015, War in Space May
Be Closer Than Ever, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/war-in-space-may-be-closerthan-ever/
The worlds most worrisome military flashpoint is arguably not in the Strait of Taiwan, the Korean
Peninsula, Iran, Israel, Kashmir or Ukraine. In fact, it cannot be located on any map of Earth, even though it is very easy to find. To
see it, just look up into a clear sky, to the no-mans-land of Earth
orbit, where a conflict is unfolding that is
an arms race in all but name. The emptiness of outer space might be the last place youd expect militaries to vie over
space isnt so empty anymore. About 1,300 active satellites wreathe
the globe in a crowded nest of orbits, providing worldwide communications, GPS navigation,
weather forecasting and planetary surveillance. For militaries that rely on some of those
satellites for modern warfare, space has become the ultimate high ground , with the
U.S. as the undisputed king of the hill. Now, as China and Russia aggressively seek to challenge U.S.
superiority in space with ambitious military space programs of their own , the power struggle
contested territory, except that outer
risks sparking a conflict that could cripple [ destroy ] the entire planets space-based
infrastructure. And though it might begin in space, such a conflict could easily ignite full-blown war
on Earth. The long-simmering tensions are now approaching a boiling point due to
several events, including recent and ongoing tests of possible a nti- sat ellite weapons by China and Russia, as
well as last months failure of tension-easing talks at the U nited N ations. Testifying before Congress earlier
this year, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper echoed the concerns held by many senior government officials about the
growing threat to U.S. satellites, saying that China
and Russia are both developing capabilities to deny

access in a conflict, such as those that might erupt over Chinas military activities in
the S outh C hina S ea or Russias in Ukraine. China in particular , Clapper said, has demonstrated
the need to interfere with, damage and destroy U.S. satellites , referring to a series of
Chinese anti-satellite missile tests that began in 2007. There are many ways to disable or destroy satellites beyond provocatively
blowing them up with missiles. A spacecraft could simply approach a satellite and spray paint over its optics, or manually snap off its
communications antennas, or destabilize its orbit. Lasers can be used to temporarily disable or permanently damage a satellites
components, particularly its delicate sensors, and radio or microwaves can jam or hijack transmissions to or from ground
controllers. In
response to these possible threats, the Obama administration has budgeted at least $5 billion to be
enhance both the defensive and offensive capabilities of the U.S. military space
program. The U.S. is also attempting to tackle the problem through diplomacy , although
with minimal success ; in late July at the U nited N ations, long-awaited discussions stalled
on a European Union-drafted code of conduct for spacefaring nations due to opposition from Russia,
China and several other countries including Brazil, India, South Africa and Iran. The failure has placed
diplomatic solutions for the growing threat in limbo , likely leading to years of further debate within
spent over the next five years to
the UNs General Assembly. The bottom line is the United States does not want conflict in outer space, says Frank Rose, assistant
secretary of state for arms control, verification and compliance, who has led American diplomatic efforts to prevent a space arms
race. The U.S., he says, is willing to work with Russia and China to keep space secure. But let me make it very clear: we will defend
our space assets if attacked. Offensive space weapons tested The prospect of war in space is not new. Fearing Soviet nuclear
weapons launched from orbit, the U.S. began testing anti-satellite weaponry in the late 1950s. It even tested nuclear bombs in space
before orbital weapons of mass destruction were banned through the United Nations Outer Space Treaty of 1967. After the ban,
space-based surveillance became a crucial component of the Cold War, with satellites serving as one part of elaborate early-warning
systems on alert for the deployment or launch of ground-based nuclear weapons. Throughout most of the Cold War, the U.S.S.R.
developed and tested space mines, self-detonating spacecraft that could seek and destroy U.S. spy satellites by peppering them
with shrapnel. In the 1980s, the militarization of space peaked with the Reagan administrations multibillion-dollar Strategic
Defense Initiative, dubbed Star Wars, to develop orbital countermeasures against Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles. And in
1985, the U.S. Air Force staged a clear demonstration of its formidable capabilities, when an F-15 fighter jet launched a missile that
took out a failing U.S. satellite in low-Earth orbit. Through it all, no full-blown arms race or direct conflicts erupted. According to
Michael Krepon, an arms-control expert and co-founder of the Stimson Center think tank in Washington, D.C., that was because
both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. realized how vulnerable their satellites wereparticularly the ones in geosynchronous orbits of
about 35,000 kilometers or more. Such satellites
effectively hover over one spot on the planet, making

them sitting ducks. But because any hostile action against those satellites could easily
escalate to a full nuclear exchange on Earth , both superpowers backed down. Neither one of us signed a
treaty about this, Krepon says. We just independently came to the conclusion that our security would be worse off if we went after
Today, the situation is much more

complicated. Low- and high-Earth orbits have become hotbeds of scientific and commercial
activity, filled with hundreds upon hundreds of satellites from about 60 different nations. Despite their largely
peaceful purposes, each and every satellite is at risk , in part because not all members of the
growing club of military space powers are willing to play by the same rules and they dont have
to, because the rules remain as yet unwritten. Space junk is the greatest threat. Satellites race through space
those satellites, because if one of us did it, then the other guy would, too.
at very high velocities, so the quickest, dirtiest way to kill one is to simply launch something into space to get in its way. Even the
impact of an object as small and low-tech as a marble can disable or entirely destroy a billion-dollar satellite. And if a nation uses
such a kinetic method to destroy an adversarys satellite, it can easily create even more dangerous debris, potentially cascading into
a chain reaction that transforms Earth orbit into a demolition derby. In 2007 the risks from debris skyrocketed when China
launched a missile that destroyed one of its own weather satellites in low-Earth orbit. That test generated a swarm of long-lived
shrapnel that constitutes nearly one-sixth of all the radar-trackable debris in orbit. The U.S. responded in kind in 2008, repurposing
a ship-launched anti-ballistic missile to shoot down a malfunctioning U.S. military satellite shortly before it tumbled into the
atmosphere. That test produced dangerous junk too, though in smaller amounts, and the debris was shorter-lived because it was
generated at a much lower altitude. More
recently, China has launched what many experts say are additional tests
of ground-based anti-satellite kinetic weapons. None of these subsequent launches have destroyed satellites, but
Krepon and other experts say this is because the Chinese are now merely testing to miss, rather than to hit, with the same hostile
capability as an end result. The latest test occurred on July 23 of last year. Chinese officials insist the tests only purpose is peaceful
missile defense and scientific experimentation. But one
test in May 2013 sent a missile soaring as high as 30,000

kilometers above Earth, approaching the safe haven of strategic geosynchronous
satellites.
China-Russia war
Chinese PLA reform sparks Russia-China military conflict

Kosaka 1/28/16 Nikkei senior staff writer http://asia.nikkei.com/magazine/20160128-SHATTERED-HOPES/PoliticsEconomy/China-s-military-reorganization-could-be-a-force-for-destabilization?page=2
The government of Chinese President Xi Jinping
has embarked on a sweeping restructuring of the country's

armed forces. The aim is to wipe out the last remnants of the old, outmoded military and turn it into a modern and powerful
force that can move nimbly under the control of the Chinese Communist Party. The upgrade, being accomplished via structural
reforms, is the largest in the history of the Chinese military, and will result in much greater efficiency and effectiveness. However,
it
is also certain to destabilize the Asian region. At the Central Military Commission Reform Work
Conference in Beijing on Nov. 24-26 last year, the CCP vowed to implement by 2020 military reforms focusing on three priorities -consolidating seven military regions into five "battle zones"; setting up new units, which integrate army, navy and air force units, in
the military's nerve center as well as each battle zone; and strengthening the forces in charge of missile, space and cyber warfare,
which are growing in importance in today's military conflicts. The People's Liberation Army is not technically a national military
force; rather, it is owned by and under the command of the CCP, the sole ruling party of China. This makes the Chinese military
fundamentally different from its counterparts in democratic countries like Japan and the U.S. While it is the CCP's force,
commanders of the existing seven military regions have traditionally enjoyed considerable discretion in wielding their authority,
which has led to the spread of corruption by allowing them to make money through engaging in "military business" on their own. In
short, China's military has been typical of one in a developing country. The navy and air force have also long been treated as adjuncts
of the army. TIGHTER GRIP To improve this regime, the CCP plans with its recently announced reforms to reorganize and
consolidate the seven military regions into five battle zones. The General Staff Headquarters, one of the military's current core units
(the "four general headquarters and departments"), will be renamed the Joint Staff Department. This will put the department under
the direct control of the Central Military Commission, a step designed to tighten the party's grip on the entire military and change
the "warlordism" situation remaining in China. The military's three other core units will be reorganized as the Political Work
Department, Logistic Support Department, Equipment Development Department and other departments. Other sections will be
reshuffled and a new unit created, tasked with maintaining discipline and dubbed the Discipline Inspection Commission. These
reforms show the government's intention to keep regional military commanders from transforming themselves into military cliques
and abusing their authority. Furthermore, the Xi leadership will introduce the battle zone command system, in which joint
commands overseeing combined army, navy and air force units are established within each battle zone. To the militaries of
developed countries, establishing joint command of the three armed branches is considered essential. In the U.S. military, for
instance, the three branches assume the role of "force provider," which trains and maintains troops in peacetime. The Unified
Combatant Command, which is divided into the Pacific, European, Central and other regional commands, functions as "force user,"
employing a combination of land, naval and air power according to need. This approach enables efficient military operations across
branches, such as air units supporting ground troops or naval vessels, as well as coordinated landing operations by the three
branches. The Russian armed forces have pushed the consolidation of military districts and the establishment of a joint command
system as part of the military overhauls under President Vladimir Putin's regime since 2003. Without the military reforms, Russia
could not have succeeded in its abrupt annexation of Crimea in 2014. Japan's Self-Defense Forces also switched to a joint command
system in 2006. The massive rescue operation after the great earthquake and tsunami that struck the northeastern Tohoku region in
2011 was in effect the SDF's first full-scale operation under the system. The armed forces of most other major countries, including
European nations, Canada and Australia, maintain a joint command system for emergency and overseas operations. JOINT OPS
China's latest military reforms are also aimed at enhancing the army-navy-air force joint
operations capability by adopting a similar system, to ensure equal military footing with the U.S. in the future. Just as the U.S.
Pacific Command, based in Hawaii, directs joint operations by the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps in the western Pacific
and Indian Ocean, the Chinese military's Guangzhou (south) battle zone command is expected to take control of all troops from all
branches in the South China Sea. If Chinese forces invaded Taiwan, the Senkaku Islands, known as the Diaoyu Islands in China, or
nearby islands in southeastern Japan, the Nanjing (east) battle zone command would likely be responsible for the operation.
China and Russia are in a honeymoon phase at present . But Russia is constantly aware
of the risk of an expanding China. With the two countries sharing a long border, Chinese emigrants could
easily spread into the sparsely populated Russian maritime province on the Sea of Japan , which
was Chinese territory in the Qing dynasty (1644-1912), and East Siberia. Therefore, China's reorganization of its
military structure makes not just the U.S., Japan and Southeast Asian countries nervous, but
also Russia about the long-term perspective. The Beijing (north) battle zone, probably created by
combining the former Beijing and Shenyang military regions, will
likely emerge as an area of keen interest for the
Russian military.
Extinction
Cate 7/22/15 https://www.quora.com/How-would-a-war-between-Russia-and-China-playout-Who-would-win Editor, Civitas Media, Mount Airy, NC Professional award-winning
journalist for more than two decades, amateur (and self-educated) history buff and computer
engineer
The whole world would lose. China has about 10 times the population of Russia, and the qualitative value of its
win a conventional war on sheer numbers. China can put
more soldiers into the field than Russia has people. Of course, Russia wouldn't let it come to that. Fighting a defensive
war, or launching a pre-emptive strike if it knew war was inevitable, Russia could inflict horrendous casualties on
the Chinese. However, China could accept almost any level of losses and would eventually grind the Russian
military down. The Russians could respond by retreating deep into Siberia, using an Asian version of their tactics against
Napoleon and Hitler, but the Chinese could simply not pursue them. The result would be a Chinese victory by
default, with massive territorial losses for Russia, including enormous natural resources, oil reserves, and the closest thing Russia
has to a warm-water port, Vladivostok. Russia's 300 years as a Great Power would be at an end, and it would never recover. The
Russians couldn't accept that outcome, so they'd play the nuclear option. The
Sino-Russian War would eventually devolve into a massive nuclear exchange that
armaments are close enough to those of Russia that it would
would kill hundreds of millions of people, with the fallout causing enormous collateral damage in most of Europe, Japan, Korea and
Indochina, and less so in the rest of the world.
Sino-India War
Miltiary reform directed at India, increases Sino-Indian tension
Ranade 15 http://www.rediff.com/news/column/what-chinas-military-plans-mean-for-india-column/20151027.htm
Jayadev Ranade, former Additional Secretary in the Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India, is President of the Centre for China
Analysis and Strategy. 10/27/2015
Described by Chinese officials as the most extensive and far-reaching ever, the military reforms will be carefully studied and
monitored in many world capitals. The
impact of these military reforms, which are intended to boost China's ability to
achieve its regional ambitions, will be felt mainly by countries in China's neighbourhood and those with whom China shares
a land or maritime frontier. There are major implications for India. Though there was a transparently thin attempt to project the
troop reduction as intended to promote peace, the downsizing is actually part of plans to streamline and
strengthen the PLA and fashion it into a hi-tech, lethal, 'informationised' force capable of defending
China's national interests at home and abroad. For China's Communist Party and military leadership, the main focus of the
military reforms and restructuring are the ideological and political indoctrination of the PLA;
upgrading of personnel skills; acquisition, development and familiarisation with advanced hi-tech armaments; intensification of
training under new conditions to 'fight and win local wars under hi-tech informatised and complex electromagnetic conditions'; and
raising the cyber warfare capability of all PLA formations. Since
future conflicts are anticipated to be localised

and mainly along China's peripheries, the PLA's capabilities for rapid trans-regional
transportation over long distances of large numbers of fully armed and equipped formations comprising all services and
reinforced by the second artillery will be further enhanced. The assessment of China's political and military leaders of the
international situation and environment around China has been an important contribution in the formulation of plans for reforming
and restructuring the PLA. Noticeable is the continuity in the tenor of their assessments. Particularly significant for India is the PLA
spokesman's statement to the Wen Wei Po on May 27, 2011, when he said, 'China is currently facing an unsafe world. The West is
recovering while the East is anxious and the North is stable while the South is tense... a dangerous situation on China's borders is
increasing. There is also the possibility that the actions by outsiders will bring about complex changes.' Equally importantly, the
annual conference of the PLA's prestigious Academy of Military Sciences on January 9, 2015 concluded that 'Unprecedented changes
are taking place in the global military situation; military force in international relations is more widely used; and the situation in the
Asia-Pacific has worsened.' These assessments are reflected in the manner in which the new Theatre Joint Commands,
which will replace the Military Regions, are proposed to be constituted. Pertinent for countries which have unsettled or disputed
borders with China is China's assessment that it perceives
a considerably low level of external threat from the

north. Consequently, analysts assess that three Group Armies from the northern areas will be demobilised.
Chinese media reports additionally indicate that the PLA's troop strength in the southern sector -- the southwest
facing India and the southeast responsible for a Taiwan crisis, as well as the South China Sea and Vietnam -- would not
experience major cuts. There are two versions of the plans for restructuring of the PLA. In one, four Theatre Commands are
to replace the existing seven MRs while the other states that there will be five Theatre Commands, which would also mean
demobilisation of fewer troops. Reports reveal that plans for restructuring the PLA envisage orienting the Theatre Joint Commands
as per their primary task and concentrating firepower and troops trained for a specific type of warfare within a single Theatre for
ease of rapid deployment. The Shenyang and Beijing MRs to be merged into the Northeast Theatre Joint Command and the Jinan,
Nanjing and Guangzhou MRs to be absorbed in the Southeast Theatre Joint Command, all have mainly maritime roles. The primary
objective of these two Theatre Joint Commands, which will over time be reinforced by aircraft carriers, will be to enable China to
establish dominance over the East China Sea and South China Sea and stand up to a US-Japan alliance. A glimpse of the India-China
military exercises in Kunming this month. IMAGE: Indian and Chinese soldiers during explosives training, part of the India-China
military exercises in Kunming, China, this month. Photograph: Kind courtesy The Indian Army Significant for India is that both
versions of the restructuring plans state that the Lanzhou and Chengdu MRs, which are oriented for military operations
against India, will be retained as independent Theatre Joint Commands. The two MRs have been strengthened in recent years and
their military activity along the Sino-Indian border has visibly increased. Their conversion now into Theatre Joint Commands while
retaining their operational orientation implies that the two MRs will
be appreciably reinforced and possibly

entrusted with additional responsibilities. While the Northwest Theatre Command consisting of the Lanzhou MR
may also get involved in safeguarding Chinese investments in the northern areas in Pakistan and trying to stop the flow of Islamic
China will continue to apply sustained

pressure and maintain an 'offensive' posture towards India. The reform plans, as announced by
extremist elements into Xinjiang, the indication is clearly that
Xi Jinping, China's president who is chairman of the Central Military Commission, will lead to large scale demobilization. It will
reduce the personnel strength of the PLA ground forces, referred to officially for the past few years as the PLA Army (PLAA), to
360,000 personnel from the present 850,000. The personnel strengths of the PLA Navy (PLAN) and PLA Air Force (PLAAF) will
meanwhile proportionately increase. While emphasising the importance of Integrated Joint Operations, China's military leadership
has earlier stated that the operational roles and budgets of the PLAN and PLAAF will increase further. Retired PLA Major General
Xu Guangyu, a senior consultant at the Chinese Military Disarmament Control Council and an expert on contemporary Chinese
military affairs, was quoted by the government-owned Global Times on September 6, as speculating that the ratio of ground, air and
naval forces would finally be 2:1:1! The increased operational role for the PLAN and PLAAF has implications for India. The
demobilised PLA
personnel will mainly be absorbed into the PAPF and the border guards . The PAPF is to be transformed
personnel strength of the People's Armed Police Force (PAPF) is also set to increase appreciably since
into a National Guard. While with its increased strength the PAPF will be able to more effectively tackle the rising popular discontent
in the country, it will additionally be able to help stiffen the implementation of central policies in the troubled border regions of
Tibet and Xinjiang by strengthening its presence in those areas. Augmentation of the border guards will additionally mean that
trained ex-military personnel can be deployed along the border.
Nuke upgrade
Xi-driven reform = mass nuclear modernization MIRVing and
hypersonic weapons
Yee 14 https://tiananmenstremendousachievements.wordpress.com/tag/df-41/ Author of Tiananmen's Tremendous
Achievements, Chinese/English translator
China
successfully tested its DF-41 ICBM with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) technology
Mil.huanqiu.com says in its report today that according to a report by US Washington Free Beacon (WFB), on December 13
able to hit anwhere in the United States. According to WFB, it was the third test launches of Chinas newest ICBM DF-41 that has a
range of 7,486 miles enough to reach anywhere in the United States. However, WFB says that MIRV technology was not tested in the
two previous tests. The successful test of DF-41 with MIRV technology is a breakthrough in Chinas development of strategic nuclear
weapons. Now, the entire United States is vulnerable to Chinas strategic nuclear weapons difficult to
intercept due to MIRV. According to a report by US Congress, a DF-41 can carry 10 MIRV warheads. Moreover, China has been
updating its DF-5 and DF-31A ICBMs to enable them to carry MIRV warheads. In September 2013, China tested another long-range
ICBM DF-31B that is also capable of carrying MIRV warheads. In its report on the test, SCMP quotes Macau-based military expert
Antony Wong Dong as saying that Xi was taking a more confrontational military stance on the global stage as part of a wider strategy
to consolidate allegiance within the military. SCMP says, Xi is facing a certain resistance in dealing with the massive corruption
problem in the PLA, Wong said. With challenging international political tension, the army would be forced to listen to him, just like
during the eras of his predecessors, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. This blogger believes that tests of advanced weapons have
nothing to do with Xi forcing the military to obey him. It is a part of Chinas arms race with the US that began when Hu Jintao was in
charge. Hu began the arms race with the US due to US return to Asia to encircle China. (See my previous posts on the arms race
and South China Sea disputes). Chinas
busy tests of ICBMs, hypersonic weapons, stealth

aircrafts , etc. are in fact parts of Xis Chinese dream that militarily means making China
militarily strong. As pointed out in my book Tiananmens Tremendous Achievements Expanded 2nd Edition, Xi uses
Chinese Dream to put an end to the fierce power struggle between reformists and the
conservatives headed by Bo Xilai and rallied both reformists and conservatives around him so that he will be able to
carry out his thorough reform smoothly. However, what Xi has been doing makes US military
dominance precarious especially when US has been heightening pressure on Russia that makes Putin mad in intensifying
his efforts in weapon development and strengthening his alliance with China.
Nuclear war between US and China

Chase 13
[July 2013, Michael S. Chase is an Associate Professor in the Warfare Analysis and Research
Department at the U.S. Naval War College, China's Transition to a More Credible Nuclear
Deterrent: Implications and Challenges for the United States, Asia Policy, Number 16]
China's transition to a more secure second-strike capability is likely to contribute to greater strategic stability in the U.S.-China relationship, a goal that
is emphasized in the most recent U.S. Nuclear Posture Review.104 Nonetheless, China's
larger and more sophisticated

nuclear force will also create challenges for U.S. policymakers . One possibility is that this force could give
China greater confidence in using its conventional capabilities to coerce its neighbors . However, even if
leaders in Beijing conclude that a more powerful and survivable nuclear force does not allow them to exert their conventional leverage, China's growing
nuclear capabilities could still become a complicating factor in future arms-control negotiations. Furthermore, aspects
of Chinese
doctrine could undermine crisis stability and heighten the risk of escalation in the event of a
confrontation with another nuclear power. A Bolder Beijing? Some U.S. scholars have argued that a more powerful
nuclear force could embolden China to behave more aggressively if it becomes embroiled in a
regional crisis. Most prominently, this case has been set forth by Thomas Christensen: In the minds of China's top leaders, China may be
acquiring a secure second strike capability for the first time or recovering one it lost after the United States developed new strike capabilities since the
1980s. If true, Chinese
leaders might be more bold in conventional crises with the United States than
they otherwise would be, knowing that China is at least capable of countering any American
threat of nuclear escalation if a strong response is made to China's conventional military
actions.105 [End Page 95] Furthermore, Christensen argues, the relationship between a secure second-strike
capability and conventional military operations is growing in importance as China develops
"new conventional military capabilities designed to assert or protect the PRC's interests in its
maritime periphery in ways that greatly increase the chance of conventional engagement with
U.S. forces, something China was previously largely incapable of doing in an effective manner." This may be especially
important because of disagreements between China and other countries in the region about
what constitutes the legitimate status quo, which in turn increase the volatility of potential
flashpoints such as Taiwan or the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea and the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. Christensen concludes that this could be
problematic if the firebreaks between conventional and nuclear conflict are less than fully
robust, and there are plausible scenarios for nuclear escalation that China could exploit to gain
greater leverage in an otherwise conventional crisis or conflict. 106 Arms-Control Challenges China's growing
nuclear arsenal will make the PRC a more important consideration in discussions about future U.S.-Russia arms-control agreements, perhaps
eventually paving the way for multilateral agreements on nuclear arms control. On the other hand, China's larger and more credible nuclear deterrent
could constitute an obstacle to future arms-control agreements if Beijing is unwilling to participate in such discussions. The integration of China into
the global nuclear reduction process that President Obama outlined in his 2009 speech in Prague will eventually be required to move toward the longterm goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.107 The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review reflects this challenge, stating that "over time" the United States
"will also engage with other nuclear weapon states, including China, on ways to expand the nuclear reduction process in the future."108 Some Russian
observers are also expressing concerns about the modernization of China's nuclear force. Even though their analysis is [End Page 96] at times seriously
flawed, it still raises potential implications for Russian participation in future arms-control negotiations.109 Chinese scholars are well aware of the
possibility that China will face greater pressure as the United States and Russia downsize their nuclear forces. Teng Jianqun of the China Institute of
International Studies, for example, sees Washington's approach as still focused mainly on Russia but notes that "as bilateral disarmament progresses,
the U.S. will certainly pay increasing attention to China's arms control policies."110 But China is clearly far from eager to be drawn into the process,
especially given the asymmetry in the size of its nuclear arsenal compared with those of the United States and Russia. Teng explains: American and
Russian stockpiles make up more than 90 per cent of the world's total nuclear weapons. Though both have nearly halved their nuclear arsenals since
the end of the Cold War, their total number of nuclear weapons is still many times greater than that of states with small nuclear forces. Only when the
two great nuclear powers have reduced their arsenals to an appropriate level will China follow suit.111 It should be noted, however, that Chinese
scholars have not specified what number would constitute an "appropriate level." This suggests that Beijing will remain reluctant to participate in such
negotiations, at least until U.S. and Russian numbers decline to a level that makes it more difficult for China to resist entering into serious multilateral
discussions. Moreover, Beijing may also resist pressure to take part in arms-control discussions until it has achieved its own nuclear force
modernization goals. According to Wang Zhongchun, "as China's participation in multi-lateral nuclear disarmament negotiations will unavoidably lead
to a reduction and weakening of its strategic deterrent force, we should improve the base number of our nuclear [End Page 97] force before
participating in any nuclear disarmament negotiations."112 Wang suggests that "the development of a necessary quantity and quality of nuclear
weapons" will be required to ensure that any concessions made in future negotiations will not leave China in a position where its strategic forces "fail to
fulfill the promise of a retaliatory strike." Second, beyond the implications for arms control, challenges
for escalation
management that arise from Chinese capabilities and doctrine also merit consideration . In particular,
U.S. strategists should pay careful attention to some of China's thinking with respect to
deterrence operations. The potential use of China's missile force to send signals aimed
at influencing an adversary raises the possibility of miscalculation or inadvertent
escalation in a crisis or conflict scenario. Miscalculation during a crisis is a particularly
troubling possibility, the risk of which could be heightened by uncertainty over the message that
one side is trying to convey to the other or by overconfidence in the ability to control escalation.
The most serious concern is that the signaling activities described in Chinese publications could
easily be interpreted not as a demonstration of resolve or as a warning but as
preparation to conduct actual nuclear missile strikes , possibly decreasing crisis
stability or even triggering escalation rather than strengthening deterrence. Indeed, some
Chinese sources contain references that raise troubling questions about miscalculations that
could result from attempts to increase the intensity of deterrence during a crisis or conventional
conflict.113 While such signals are intended to put the enemy under the severe psychological
strain of realizing that China's missile forces have entered the "pre-mobilization state" in hopes
of causing the adversary to "abandon certain activities ," the authors apparently fail to
fully consider the potential for catastrophic miscalculation . Given the risks of
unintended escalation, some of these actions could be destabilizing, especially during
a conflict with a nuclear-armed adversary . Although Chinese authors appear to
demonstrate at least some awareness that actions intended to deter an adversary could instead
escalate tension, discussion of this risk in the relevant publications is highly limited . For instance, Zhao
Xijun notes that deterrence must be carefully calibrated to maximize the chances of achieving the desired results. If the threat level is [End Page 98] too
low, it will fail to influence the enemy; but if it is too high, there is an equally serious risk that deterrence will fail because the enemy may lash out in
desperation.114 Similarly, in another passage, Zhao offers a cautionary note that deterrence
operations could accidentally
trigger escalation if they are poorly timed : Whether the timing for conducting the military deterrence of the missile
forces is correctly chosen will directly affect the progress of deterrence and its outcome. If the appropriate timing is chosen, then deterrence will deter
the enemy, contain the eruption of war, and obtain the objective of peace with the small price of deterrence. If inappropriate timing is chosen, then
deterrence may cause the situation to deteriorate, even leading to the eruption and escalation of war.115 Nonetheless, the
available sources
suggest that Chinese thinking about the risks of specific actions may be rather
underdeveloped, which in turn could make attempts to manage escalation in a
U.S.-China crisis or conflict extremely challenging and potentially very dangerous
for both parties . U.S. policymakers will face difficult choices in responding to these developments. In some cases, restraint will
be required to maintain stability.116 Trying to trump Chinese nuclear modernization through a
large-scale buildup of U.S. missile-defense capabilities would be costly and counterproductive .
Chinese sources indicate that a principal driver of Chinese nuclear calculations is the concern
that a larger and more complex U.S. missile-defense system could undermine the
viability of China's strategic deterrent, thus leaving China vulnerable to nuclear
coercion in a crisis. Consequently, limiting missile defenses intended to protect
the U.S. homeland to a level appropriate for dealing with the much smaller threat
posed by North Korea could help avoid precipitating a larger increase in Chinese
nuclear capabilities .117
Hypersonic missile Module

Xi strategic control = hypersonic missiles
Yee 3/15/15 http://chinadailymail.com/2015/03/15/pla-expert-says-china-will-not-be-a-rival-to-us-for-at-least-50years/ Author of Tiananmen's Tremendous Achievements, a book based on what I witnessed about dissenters' preparations to seize
state power, etc
Hu Jintao had a strategy for wiping out the enemy at sea. Due to that strategy, China will soon acquire the
capabilities to wipe out its enemy at sea by achieving air supremacy with its stealth fighter jets and saturation attack on an enemy
navy with anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles. Hu Jintaos strategy is good, but China will be defeated by the US even if it wipes out
the part of the US navy near its coast, because the US can easily cut Chinas trade lifelines due to its navys dominance of the oceans.
What is the next strategy developed by Xi Jinping for China? It is the strategy to build up Chinas capabilities
to defend Chinas trade lifelines. For that Xi has urged the Chinese air force to acquire integrated space and air
capabilities for both attack and defence. With such capabilities, China will be able to attack US fleets at high sea to
prevent them from cutting Chinas trade lifelines. In Chans book, it is described how an aerospace bomber can kill an
aircraft carrier battle group in minutes. Such an aerospace bomber will be one of the weapons in Xis integrated space
and air capabilities for both attack and defence. When China has developed a fleet of aerospace bombers
armed with hypersonic missiles, the US will no longer be able to cut Chinas trade lifelines. The missile
from the bomber will fly at a hypersonic speed of Mach 23 that no missile defence
so far can intercept.
Hypersonic missiles = US China major war, escalation

Ekmektsioglou 6/28/15 http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-hypersonic-missiles-push-america-chinatowards-war-13205?page=3%29 Eleni G. Ekmektsioglou is pursuing her PhD at American Universitys School of International
Service. Her research focuses on the impact of military innovation on crisis management. She is a non-resident fellow at Pacific
Forum CSIS.
How Hypersonic Missiles Push America and China towards War Having referred to the drivers
of hypersonic weapons development, the question regarding their impact at the operational and strategic level still begs for an
answer. Hypersonic weapons appear to be what both sides are after in terms of seizing the initiative and surgical targeting of key
points that lie at the heart of the adversarys war effort. Surprise at the tactical level as well as preemption in case of an ASAT strike
appear to be feasible missions for hypersonic weapons, which could be aimed at crippling the enemys C4ISR systems. Thus,
hypersonic weapons could be a valuable addition in both A2/AD and counter-A2/AD strategies. In the first option, these systems
long ranges help the United States avoid entering the contested zone. Strikes from outside the theater of operations would pose no
risk for U.S. forces. For the second strategy, counter-intervention missions could be executed successfully with hypersonic weapons
the accuracy and speed of which penetrate BMDs, adding another layer to the Chinese strategy of keeping U.S. forces outside the
theater of operations in accordance with the using the land to control the sea concept Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang
stressed in 2009. Both strategic perspectives would be based on firm ground if the
East Asian context did not lend itself

to what Herman Kahn calls two-sided escalation situations . In such a situation, no state can
sufficiently claim to be capable of achieving escalation dominance where it can credibly negate its
adversarys efforts of escalating further as a response to previous actions. Even though there is a general tendency for military
planners to opt for direct escalatory strategies, in
a U.S.-China conflict scenario, such predetermined and

rigid strategy paths might have deleterious consequences, forcing both parties into a highly
escalatory conflict that could otherwise be avoided. The main drivers behind escalation are two: firstly,
hypersonic weapons are escalation prone due to their low levels of responsiveness once
they are initiated, and limited capabilities for signaling given their high speed. All these make a
surprise attack an eventuality the other side needs to account for pushing both parties to seizing the initiative
early which leaves no room for signaling and diplomacy.
Blue Water Navy+Energy Security

PLA reform establishes a blue water navy and intensifies energy
securitycauses Tibet and Xinjiang invasion, destabilizes India and
Pakistan, and deepen Chinas economic slowdown
Rao 6-29 [Malladi Rama, New Delhi based senior journalist and distinguished commentator
on South Asian and Central Asian, China reorganises PLA with an eye on Tibet, Xinjinag, Asian
Tribune, http://www.asiantribune.com/node/89158 RD; AD 7/29/16]
Chinas perceptions about the world around it have had an important influence on its recent decisions to reform its military. Also, the reforms are
aimed at maintaining the supremacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) whose primary responsibility is to ensure single-party rule in China. So
surprise the provincial military commands have been placed under the control of newly set -up National Defence Mobilization Department which is a
party of President Xi Jinping led Central Military Commission. These are, of course, well known observations and, therefore, would not be saying
anything new. However, there is another angle to the Chinese dream action. Seen from the focus of peripheral diplomacy which President Xi Jinping
unfolded two years ago, the South China Sea is the main focus area, in terms of China establishing its territorial sovereign rights over a energy rich area
and ensuring that the US rebalance to East Asia remains only in name. The other aspect of the South China Sea is the assertion of the greater role being
played by the Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in waters further and further beyond Chinas shores. The
PLAN aims to convert

itself into a blue water navy and it is symbolic of Chinas efforts to protect its sea lines of
communication. Essentially for two reasons: one to protect the countrys energy security which
is coming mainly from the Persian Gulf; two to become a naval power which can reach Africa
where China has a number of commercial and economic interests. Chinas major concerns
internally remain focused on Buddhist Tibet and Muslim majority Xinjiang that borders Pakistan. Therefore,
the next aspect of its military reorganization relates to having the unity of command in the
military to handle internal crises. At the end of the day, there is a lesson here for India as the change in the pecking order
of the Tibet Military Command indicates that China intends to ensure that India does not meddle in Tibet.
With an eye on India, China has also raised the level of the Tibet Military Commands authority
and placed it directly under the command of the Peoples Liberation Army ground forces . The rank
and status of the Western Tibet Military Command has been elevated widening the scope of its missions and combat preparedness. The move would
raise its authority, including the designation of troops, but also expand their function and mission, the deputy director of the Political Work
Department of the Tibet Military Command, Zhao Zhong, was quoted as saying. This would also boost their combat readiness. The Tibet Military
Command, however, will be directly under the PLA Ground Force, headed by General Li Zuocheng, who sits on the CMC. Its political rank will be
elevated to one level higher than its counterpart provincial-level military commands and will come under the leadership of the PLA Army. Global Times
reports this suggested that the command may undertake some kind of military combat mission in the future. Tibet Military Command required
specialist mountain skills and long-range capabilities, which need the deployment of special military resources. The Xinjiang Military Command may
also be elevated. The Tibetan and Xinjiang commands are under the newly created Western Theatre Command, the largest of five newly reorganised
military regions of the PLA. Before the reorganisation, the Xinjiang command was part of the military region responsible for the western sector of the
border with India and the disputed Aksai Chin region, while the Tibet command fell under the military region responsible for the eastern sector of the
border. The crucial point that is often said and reiterated is that the current wave of military reform strengthens the hands of President Xi Jinping over
the PLA and the degree of control he exerts over the armed forces will also allow the President greater command over internal security. This has
implications for Tibet and Xinjiang also. Early in 2016, China announced the restructuring of its four military departments into 15 organs under the
Central Military Commission (CMC), a change that will centralize power under the CMC. The move is part of a push to reassert the absolute authority of
the party commission headed by Xi and modernize the military's organizational structure. Xi is also pressing ahead with the downsizing of the military
by 300,000 members to eliminate many non-combat-related functions. The new structure includes three Commissions - discipline inspection, politics
and law, and science and technology - as well as the general office and five more: administration, auditing, international cooperation, reform and
organizational structure, and strategic planning. There are six new departments: joint staff, political work, logistical support, equipment development,
training, and national defense. Previously, all these functions were under four headquarters in the People's Liberation Army (PLA) - General Staff,
General Political, General Logistics and General Armaments. The reshuffle of the CMC highlights the centralized leadership of the CMC in both
administration and command of the PLA, which will ensure the multiple-department CMC becomes more efficient in supervision and coordination. It
also embodies the military reform outline issued at the end of November 2015, which included adjusting CMC headquarters system and adopting
multiple departments under the CMC. The reshuffle means that the CMC can give direct orders to battle command zones in combat without notifying
the General Staff department and different services. The establishment of Joint Staff Department means that China will focus on joint operations
among all service branches, including the army, air force, navy and the rocket force. The reorganization, which was officially launched on 1 January
2016 will fundamentally redefine the roles, missions and authorities among the services particularly the Peoples Liberation Army, or PLA and the
Central Military Command. Under the new rules, Chinas
seven military regions will be replaced by jointwarfighting commands in charge of war zones or theatres of operation. Should the proposed reforms be
successfully implemented, the PLA will emerge as a much more capable, and lethal fighting
force. At the core of operational reform will be streamlining command and control authority to better
conduct modern, information-intensive joint campaigns especially in the maritime-
aerospace battlespace domains, which are the domains in which PLA strategists believe Chinas most
pressing operational contingencies reside. The vast reorganization carries risk, particularly in light of
Chinas current woes with a plunging stock market and slowing economy. Party officials have made
economic progress the linchpin of its governing legitimacy. The military reforms will leave about
300,000 people out of jobs, and local economies could be affected as military regions are stood
down. The reorganization is slated to be complete by 2020, but it could take longer if the new system is to operate efficiently.
Blue water navy = string of pearls

Koike 13 Yuriko Koike is a former Minister of Defence and National Security Adviser of Japan.
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/03/2013320122153784433.html
President Barack Obama's current security strategy in Afghanistan, Yemen, and elsewhere suggests that the US will seek to mitigate
the latter risk by continuing its covert interventions - particularly its use of unmanned aerial vehicles. Preventing rivals from gaining
overweening influence in the region, however, will require a very different type of response - one that will require the backing of old
allies, such as Japan, and new friends, like India. The reason for this is clear: China's
dependence on Middle East

energy imports means that it is almost certain to seek to fill any regional security vacuum . Indeed,
China appears to have long anticipated the coming changes in the region's security structure, and already seems prepared to take
advantage of them if permitted to do so. Its
"string of pearls" across the Indian Ocean - a series of potential naval

stations connecting China to the Middle East and Africa - would support a Chinese blue-water navy able to
patrol the sea-lanes of the Arabian/Persian Gulf.
Extinction
Sayler 11Kelley, CSIS research assistant, MA Baylor, Nuclear Stability in South Asia, 2011 ,http://csis.org/blog/nuclearstability-south-asia
The convergence of a number of factors in South Asia including strategic anxieties,

destabilizing military doctrines, and conventional force disparities places the region in
growing danger of succumbing to a nuclear arms race. Such was the conclusion of a recent SIPRI report that cited India and
Pakistans parallel expansion of fissile material production capacity and nuclear infrastructure as evidence of the countries progressive descent into nuclear competition. Indian,
Pakistani, and American experts gathered to discuss this development, as well as other topics in South Asian security, at a Monday event hosted by the United States Institute for
Peace. Opening the discussion, Vijay Shankar, former Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Strategic Forces Command, offered an overview of Indias nuclear sizing requirements.
Shankar stated that Indias policy of No First Use allows it to maintain a minimal arsenal the precise size of which is dictated by credibility and survivability concerns - that
. Shankar then noted Indias interest in preserving minimum

deterrence, a policy that is further supported by Indias recognition of a point of diminishing returns in nuclear sizing. It is not at all clear,
however, that India possesses the political will to sustain such a policy in the face of evergrowing strategic cooperation between China and Pakistan . To be sure, Indias nuclear sizing
requirements are, as Shankar conceded, driven by multilateral considerations, which are almost certain in the longterm to reflect Indias discomfort with Chinas string of pearls strategy for expanding PRC
influence into the Indian Ocean and South China Sea . India is also unlikely to be particularly
heartened by the prospect of a joint Chinese-Pakistani naval base operating in its neighborhood
or by reports of a steadily expanding Pakistani arsenal. For its part, Pakistan has similarly committed to maintaining a policy of
minimum deterrence. But the comments of Shankars Pakistani counterpart, Shahzad Chaudhry, former Air Vice
Marshall of the Pakistani Air Force, would seem to belie this intention. Chaudhry noted that Indias robust economic
growth rate has enabled it to aggressively modernize its military forces. As a result, conventional force disparity has widened, prompting
Pakistan to increase its reliance on nuclear weapons as a means of achieving strategic parity. It was this policy, Chaudhry argued, that
prevented the Kargil War from escalating into a nuclear exchange. But given this emphasis on maintaining strategic parity, it would seem that Pakistans nuclear
sizing requirements will be driven more by Indias force posture than by any inherent comfort
with the theory of minimum deterrence . And as India continues to develop its conventional capabilities - and to uphold the Cold Start
provides the country with a cost-effective means of deterrence
doctrine, which many Pakistani experts believe is intended to generate space for a limited war - it seems reasonable to expect that Pakistani nuclear forces will expand in kind.
Indeed, Pakistans development of the nuclear-capable Hatf-9 would seem to indicate an interest in both growing and diversifying the countrys arsenal, thereby moving it away
from a policy of minimum deterrence. Following Shankar and Chaudhrys discussion of the potential for a South Asian nuclear build-up, Jamshed Hashmi, Chairman Emeritus
of Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority, continued with a presentation on the relationship between civilian and military nuclear programs. Hashmi argued that there has
always been a separation between these programs in Pakistan, but that separation in India is insufficient to ensure the absence of material diversion. In addition, Hashmi
Dalton of the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace then highlighted the intimate connection between nuclear energy and nuclear
denounced the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement, saying that it legitimized the use of nuclear power plants for non-peaceful purposes. Toby
weapons/doctrine in South Asia. While Pakistans nuclear energy needs are different from those of Indias, he argued, both states desire the prestige that is associated with
having advanced nuclear technology and, for this reason, will continue to seek to legitimize their respective nuclear programs. Given this condition, as well as the likely
expansion of regional arsenals, nuclear security and transparency measures will be increasingly important to implement in the coming years. In contrast to the South Asian
was pessimistic about the prospects for escalation control in the event of a future
crisis and questioned the assumption that the presence of nuclear weapons had had a
moderating effect on the Kargil War. He instead argued that time pressures and the lack of reliable
dialogue channels will increase the potential for misperception in future crises. Dalton additionally noted the
discussants, Dalton
possibility thatsustained American discussion of Pakistani nuclear security could exacerbate fears of a disarming first strike, thereby driving
BWN Ext-India
Chinese blue water navy makes India reraise
Katyal 14 http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/08/04/why-indias-blue-water-ambitions-matter/ aster of Public Affairs candidate
at Princeton University. 8/14/2014
Almost unnoticed by the rest of the world, India has built one of the largest and most powerful navies in the world. However, there
exist a number of drivers for further expanding its influence at sea. New
Delhi has been growing uneasy about

Beijings perceived String of Pearls strategy in the Indian Ocean. Some see this as encirclement by
Chinas strategic alliances and building of maritime facilities in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar. With
China developing its own blue water navy, India aims to not only secure its own territory but also be able to
project power farther than its shores. While Beijing grows its influence in the Indian Ocean that
India sees as its backyard, New Delhi in turn targets a strong presence in the eastern South China Sea .
Both countries aim to have presence in the strategically located Malacca Straits, where 40 percent of the worlds trade and more than
80 percent of Chinas oil imports pass through.
War with Pakistan, extinction

Zahid 14
[Ahsan Ali Zahid, an MPhil scholar at the School of Politics and International Relations, Quaide-Azam University. Hasan Ehtisham is an MPhil scholar at the Department of Strategic Studies,
Quaid-e-Azam University "An ocean of benefits or conflicts?", Express Tribune, 7-4-2015, <
http://tribune.com.pk/story/914385/an-ocean-of-benefits-or-conflicts/ > //wyo-hdm]
The Indian Ocean can be saved from becoming a zone of conflicts if India stops thinking it owns it. If
the West encourages

New Delhi to build a blue-water navy, it would only be a matter of time before it ends up
becoming a nightmare for the West itself. The Indian Ocean ranks as the fifth largest ocean, covering 20 per cent of
the water on Earth. It consists of 60 islands owned by different states and has four major waterways the Strait of Malacca, the
Strait of Hormuz, Bab-el Mandeb and the Suez Canal. Interestingly, the Indian Ocean had never been nuclearised even during the
Cold War. The
shifting of Indian nuclear weapons capabilities from land to sea, in their deployment
against Pakistan and China, could end up initiating a three-party nuclear competition. India is
modernising its navy at a rapid pace, and allocated it a budget of $4.8 billion in 2011 . China, on the
other hand, is not in a position right now to generate a stir in the contemporary strategic balance in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).
India dragged the IOR into an intense arms race by introducing a nuclear-powered ballistic
missile submarine, INS Arihant, in 2014; it is also in the process of building two more Ship
Submersible Ballistic Nuclear submarines. India now has two platforms, INS Subhadra and INS Suvarna, to launch
Dhanush missiles. The Indian Navy also has the ability to launch BrahMos missile, a joint venture between Russia and India, which
can carry both conventional and nuclear payloads. In short, India
is playing a dangerous game in pursuit of

prestige and international recognition in the IOR where confidence-building measures or
institutionalised conflict-resolution seem to be totally absent. In the backdrop of the traditional
rivalries in this region, the addition of nuclear-capable submarines in the Indian naval fleet is a
serious threat to Pakistan and China. This provocation could force Pakistan and other regional
states to launch drives to acquire similar capability, thus initiating an arms race in South Asia. It
is not surprising that China is willing to sell eight diesel-electric, and not nuclear, submarines to Pakistan. As stated earlier, South
Asia has no institutional mechanism that can be used to deal with confrontational behaviour
that regional states may indulge in the IOR. If India is resolute about taking the route of seabased nuclear strike capability, then it is highly unlikely that any possible escalation could be
controlled. Pakistan needs to work on sea-based deterrence as this can provide it with strategic advantages, which could serve
many implicit opportunities. The most vulnerable part of the Indian defence is its coastal belt, which the
Pakistan Navy can exploit through the element of surprise. During the Cold War, India was not happy about
US presence in the IOR. However, Chinas presence is the main factor that transformed the dynamic of Indian strategic thinking and
today, Indian and US interests are congregating , which has generated a more favourable strategic environment for both countries
against China. Regardless of Russian and Chinese opposition, India has offered a foothold to the US in the Indian Ocean by signing a
new 10-year Defence Framework Agreement with it. The Indian approach, which projects China as a potential threat in the IOR, is
an exaggerated one. China is more focused in the Pacific Ocean and South China Sea, with trade security its only interest in the IOR.
It is still behind India and the US in gaining geographical advantages and maritime power in the
IOR. The imaginary Chinese string of pearls strategy is playing with the minds of Indian strategists. Last year, in November 2014,
after a patrolling Chinese submarine docked in Sri Lanka, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi called a cabinet committee to clear
an $8billion warships project to counter the Chinese Navy. The US, on the other hand, wants to encircle China via agreements with
There are chances

of a naval arms race emerging if we consider historical Indo-Russian naval cooperation and the
current increased exchange of naval collaboration between the US and India. It is up to the global
players, especially the US and Russia, to either promote global peace by denying India the acquisition of deadly war
regional states. Pakistan provides China the best way out to reach the Indian Ocean, near the Persian Gulf.
munitions like Akula-II or, to sell their weaponry and jeapordise global security.
Hypersonic glide
XI military reform pushes hypersonic glide AND uses it aggressively
Ranade 1/21/14 http://www.newindianexpress.com/columns/Aim-of-Chinas-MilitaryReforms/2014/01/21/article2010589.ece
Aim of China's Military Reforms he four inland military regions of Shenyang, Beijing,
Chengdu and Lanzhou are to similarly be merged into two large combat zones. Chengdu and
Lanzhou both exercise operational jurisdiction over the India-China border. Each of the two new
zones will have units of the PLA Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery integral to them. They will
function under a new unified combat command. These reports also disclose that the PLAs
300,000 non-combatant personnel will be eliminated by 2022. Though Chinas ministry of
defence denied the reports, it is pertinent that mention was first made in China Daily and that
its contents are generally in consonance with Xu Qiliangs assertion in Peoples Daily and the
reforms approved at the CCP CCs Third Plenum. Rapid advances have also been made in the
indigenous development of advanced defence technology and hardware in the past three years.
Emphasis was underscored with the appointment of General Zhang Youxia, a known
proponent of indigenous development of modern advanced defence technology, as director of
the PLAs General Armaments Department (GAD) in October 2012. The latest development was
the announcement on January 9 that China had conducted the first flight test of a new
hypersonic glide vehicle, dubbed the WU-14 by the Pentagon, thus becoming one of five
nations to possess this capability. The hypersonic vehicle, capable of travelling at speeds
between Mach 8 and 12, represents a major advance in Chinas secretive strategic nuclear and
conventional military and missile programmes. China had in May 2012 opened a new JF12
shockwave hypersonic wind tunnelthe largest of its kindthat replicates flying conditions
between Mach 5 and 9. Also this month, pictures of the new two-seater J-16 stealth fighter built
by the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation were posted online. Slated to first be inducted by PLAN
and later the PLAAF, the J-16 is loaded with eight tons of air-to-air and anti-ship missiles and
has a combat radius of several hundred miles, enabling it to help Chinese warships battle for
control of regional waters claimed by China. Some reports claim two dozen J-16 are ready for
induction. These military reforms will give the PLA an outward focus, implying that
recovery of territories claimed by Beijing will be a central feature of Chinas
strategic agenda . They will reinforce diplomacy aimed at realising Chinas Dream. Xi
Jinping, meanwhile, continues to further tighten his and the CCPs grip on the PLA. An
important example is the Third Plenum approving the PLA being brought within the ambit of
the partys anti-corruption watchdog, the Central Discipline Inspection Commission.
Extinction
Butt 12/3/15 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-yousaf-butt-/hypersonic-nuclear-arms-race_b_8700510.html Nuclear
physicist, Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense
University
In the meantime, an alternate incarnation has gained traction: the hypersonic boost-glide
vehicle concept. Because the boost-glide trajectory is vastly different from the traditional
parabolic path nuclear-tipped missiles follow, its thought that a conventional HGV strike is not
likely to be confused with a nuclear ICBM attack (see figure below).
Basically, after theyre released from their rocket-booster, these weapons skim near the top of
the atmosphere at speeds greater than 4,000 mph, gliding and maneuvering to their targets with
high precision, instead of following a parabolic path like ballistic missiles. Russia and China are
also in on the game but importantly may not be restricting themselves to conventional
weaponry on their HGVs.
This HGV mission creep from conventional to nuclear should be nipped in the bud. If not, it
may increase the risk of stumbling into a nuclear war the risk of accidental nuclear
war is already high enough without introducing high-speed and stealthy nuclear HGVs into the
mix. Russia, in particular, may be motivated to develop nuclear warheads for its HGVs because
such nukes would not count against the limits negotiated in the New START treaty. Nuclear
HGVs would have essentially no arms-control constraints. Not only that, but the flight profile of
HGVs provides a natural immunity from U.S. ballistic missile defenses which have preoccupied
Russian and Chinese military planners for decades. Because HGVs typically fly at less than 100
kilometer altitude, they are more difficult to detect by the long-range radars used to cue strategic
missile defenses. This low altitude also happens to be well below the region where the midcourse
ballistic missile defense interceptors work: HGVs will simply underfly American strategic
missile defenses that attempt to intercept the warheads in space (>100 kilometer altitude). On
top of that, the HGVs are maneuverable, which makes finding a firing solution for any type of
defense virtually impossible. Though new types of missile defenses like the THAAD-ER are
being investigated to try to address the HGV threat they could, at best, only protect limited
regions of the country in the vicinity of a THAAD battery. And even these new missile defenses
could be defeated by decoys and by maneuverability just like the present midcourse and
terminal systems. Luckily, HGV technology is very complex and the vehicles are still in the
developmental and testing phase, so there is still some time to discuss international norms
governing their use. Strategic restraint here could benefit all the players. The difficulty of
mastering the technology is evident by the various failed tests in the U.S., Russia and China. A
notable U.S. success was the Armys Advanced Hypersonic Weapon: it was successfully tested in
2011, flying from Kauai, Hawaii and hitting its target at the Reagan Test Site on the Marshall
Islands, 3,700 kilometers away. But there have also been several test failures HGV
development is clearly still in its infancy. The Chinese evidently have the best HGV test record
so far: theyve tested their DF-ZF (aka WU-14) HGV prototype six times in the past two years
with only one reported failure. The latest Chinese DF-ZF test was just last week and was yet
another success. The Russian test record has been more spotty, with all tests of their Yu-71 HGV
in the past few years having reportedly failed. Nonetheless, Russian ambitions for the HGV
remain undimmed with Janes Intelligence Review claiming that, Russia appears to be
considering the option of deploying its hypersonic system in a nuclear, as well as conventional,
configuration, by the 2020-2025 timeframe. Given that Russian nuclear HGVs would not count
against the limits agreed to in the New START treaty and presumably in any follow-on treaty
it would make sense for them to plan to field such nuclear weapons. HGVs are fast, difficult to
detect and virtually impossible to defend against. In times of tension, it may be tempting to use
HGVs to preemptively take out an adversarys offensive capability: for instance the U.S. may
decide to target an adversarys ground-based anti-satellite weapon sites. In fact, this is among
the five representative scenarios outlined in a 2009 Defense Science Board report. But because
of the well-known compressed HGV timelines, the adversary may preemptively use their ASATs
a classic case of crisis instability (Use-it-or-lose-it) due to the short timescales involved.
2nc nuke impact Mirv

AND military reform causes Mirving Yee 14
Extinction
Zhao 15
[3/24/15, Tong Zhao is an associate at the CarnegieTsinghua Center for Global Policy., What
if China develops MIRVs?, thebulletin.org/what-if-china-develops-mirvs8133]
No less important, China views MIRV capability as necessary to retaining a credible nuclear
deterrent in the face of perceived new challenges to force survivability, especially missile
defense. Due to its relatively small arsenal and low alert levels (China does not have a launchon-warning policy and is believed to have warheads unmated and stored separately from
missiles in peacetime), the credibility of Chinas nuclear deterrent is often questioned. Some
American analysts have even gone so far as to suggest that Chinas nuclear arsenal would not
survive a nuclear first strike from the United States, or even a conventional first strike.
Uncertain versus assured retaliation. Consequently, Chinese scholars such as Wu Riqiang have
argued that Chinas current nuclear deterrent is based on uncertain retaliation and so the
country should be interested in a future deterrent based on assured retaliation. Well before
China achieves the latter goal, MIRVs can influence the risk-benefit calculations of potential
adversaries by dramatically increasing the retaliatory power of any surviving Chinese missiles,
therefore increasing the credibility of the threat of uncertain retaliation. More importantly,
persistent American investment in missile defense is also motivating China to develop MIRV
capability. MIRV technology has long been a technically feasible option for China. By 1990, China
had acquired the ability to launch multiple satellites into distinct orbits from a single rocket, a
technological feat that in many ways mirrors that of deploying multiple warheads from a single
missile. Despite obtaining this nascent ability, developing and deploying MIRVed missiles did
not appear to be a top priority for the country's rulers . However, with the United States
reinforcing its commitment to missile defense over the last decade, more Chinese
experts are drawing connections between MIRVs and missile defense. MIRVed
missiles are especially useful for dealing with nuclear-tipped interceptors, because MIRVed missiles
force the defender to detonate multiple nuclear interceptors in relative proximity to each other
which may in the end unintentionally destroy the defenders other interceptors as well, an effect
known as nuclear fratricide." But given that todays missile interceptors are not nuclear-armed, but simply use the kinetic energy
from a direct impact to destroy an incoming warhead, MIRVed missiles probably do not provide a better chance of defeating an opponents missile
defenses than the simultaneous release of a large number (or salvo launch) of single-warhead missiles. Still, one
MIRVed missile can

achieve the same result as many single-warhead missilesand offers the bonus of being cheaper
to build, once the technology has been mastered. In theory, the United States could respond to Chinas MIRVed missiles by
deploying interceptors that can hit the Chinese missiles during either the initial boost phase or shortly afterwards, before their warheads are released.
(In the boost phaseearliest stage of a missiles flightthe missiles booster is actively engaged and the missile is gaining velocity. During this period,
neither the warheads nor the bus on which they are mounted have been released from the missile body, making it an especially attractive target
because all the warheads are still grouped together.) But developing interceptors that can knock out incoming missiles in their boost phase is much
more technologically challenging than contemporary systems which target incoming missiles at a later stage of flight. And their deployment requires
the interceptor to knock out an incoming missile so early in its flight that the incoming missile is barely off the groundwhich in turn means that the
interceptor must strike very fast indeed, or be very close to the launchsite to begin with. The latter strategy imposes significant geographical
constraints; if
the United States were to successfully develop boost-phase interceptors, they would
need to be deployed far forward, on land or in waters close to China. Such deployment would
make them vulnerable to Chinas growing capability to neutralize enemy assets deployed close to
Chinas coast. As a result, the Chinese increasingly see MIRVs as a necessary countermeasure
(original link in Chinese) to the prospective further buildup of US missile defense. That said, there are
different opinions among experts in the Chinese technical community about the usefulness of MIRV technology. For example, an engineer from the
Research and Development Center of China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology argued that the penetration capability, survivability, and overall
effectiveness of MIRVed missiles is nowhere near that of a salvo launch of single-warhead missiles with the same number of warheads (original in
Chinese). (It should be noted that the total number of openly available publications on this subject is very small, and we consider that even one strong
and open opposition piece from an insider shows a lack of internal consensus.) Meanwhile, non-Chinese media and government reports strongly
indicate that despite Chinas on-going research and development program in MIRV, there is no evidence of a decision to actually deploy the technology,
should it be created. There is some historical precedent for this approach; there were instances in the past where China developed certain types of
Traditional
wisdom holds that MIRVed ICBMs undermine stability for two reasons. First, MIRVed missiles
greatly increase ones first-strike capability against an adversarys forces, thus potentially
inviting a preemptive strike . Second, a MIRVed missile loaded with a large number of
warheads is a tempting target; if the warheads owners believe that they are threatened by an
enemy first strike, then there is a greater incentive to fire them first before they can
be wiped out on the launchpad. This use it or lose it dilemma is one of the
fundamental problems with MIRVed ICBMs .
strategic military technologies but never deployed them: China's neutron bomb is a prime example. Impact on strategic stability.
1nc impact PAP dual command

Xi uses pol cap to centralize the PAP, stoking unrest
Stratfor 3/22/16 https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/china-presidents-attempt-disarm-challengers
Xi appears to be making the preparations for a similar power struggle one expected to take
place at a particularly sensitive time. Xi is making moves to crack down on the formation of
factions ahead of the 19th Party Congress in 2017. China's consensus-based politics are breaking
down, as are Deng-era norms that cadres defeated in leadership struggles will not be harmed.
The lead-up to the 19th congress, where there will be massive turnover in the senior ranks of the
Communist Party, is expected to be accompanied by unusually desperate political struggle.
While the PAP is nowhere near as strong as the People's Liberation Army, it is still a substantial
armed force and is one that currently answers to both Xi and Premier Li Keqiang. And while Li
may not be a direct political adversary to Xi, lower-level PAP forces are answerable to China's
various regional governments, from which challenges to Xi's rule may emanate. Xi will
centralize as much armed force under his own command as possible, if only to deny its use to
anyone else.
Yet adjustments to the PAP command and control will not be without risks. The reason that the
PAP was put under dual leadership in the first place was to improve the ability of local
governments to manage unrest as it occurred. Around 6 million layoffs are expected over the
next two to three years as China proceeds with cuts to overcapacity in bloated heavy industries
such as coal and steel. Consequently, the likelihood of large protests similar to those in
Heilongjiang will increase. The greatest challenge for Xi will be disarming regional governments
while still preserving their ability to quickly react to developing cases of domestic unrest.
Only PAP decentralization maintains the CCP key to local

knowledge and DISTANCING the CCP from crackdowns
Lee 8/19/8 http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?
tx_ttnews[tt_news]=4999&tx_ttnews[backPid]=168&no_cache=1#.VvxoMUeseM8 John Lee is a visiting fellow at the Centre for
Independent Studies (CIS) and Managing Director of Sydney-based research company L21. Dr. Lee is the author of "Will China
Fail?" (CIS, 2007).
In reality, Chinas provincial and local leaders have long had enormous discretion given the size
and population of the country combined with the relative lack of institutions to guide public
decision making and enforce top-down accountability. As an old Chinese proverb states:
Heaven is high and the emperor is far away . Outside major urban centers where most
instances of unrest occur, central authorities have no choice but to hand over authority to local
official to instruct PAP troops and other law enforcement authorities [10]. Only local officials
are able to respond quickly in order to quell any unrest. According to one expert, Some
localities have degenerated into private fiefdoms run by local party officials [11]. What
frequently occurs is a decentralized and even feudal-like system of enforcing social order.
Moreover, increasingly frequent calls by President Hu Jintao and other Politiburo Standing
Committee leaders to work towards a harmonious society and target social disorder as the top
priority serves to hand more power and leeway to local officials with regard to the use of PAP
troops. Local officials simply justify their deployment of armed police as a decisive response, as
nipping potentially dangerous instances of unrest in the bud. Removing the right for local
officials to immediately deploy PAP troops at their discretion would risk the inflammation of
any one of the tens of thousands of incidents of unrest into a major event. Finally, despite some
attempts at reversing the decentralization of many state functions over the past decade,
Chinas central leaders have little choice but to continue to support local officials
in order to prolong the survival of the CCP as rulers. Beijing relies on local Party officials
to represent its authority and preserve the CCPs interests. Over time, these local officials build
up powerful connections with influential members and organizations within their communities,
and become well entrenched. The now emerging story of Zhang Zhiguo, the local Party boss who
ran Xifeng county in Liaoning Province like his own kingdom for five years with impunity, is
very typical of China according to one of its local lawyers Su Chunyu. Key to Zhangs power
was collusion with heads of the local Public Security Bureau and other law enforcement
authorities. This is typical of the way politics works says Su. Zhang was finally sacked only
because he sparked widespread outrage when it was revealed he sent local authorities 600 miles
to arrest a journalist in Beijing who had written an article criticizing his rule (Washington Post,
June 10). Conclusion There is a happy coincidence of interests on all sides that the PAP should
become the unofficial coercive instrument for the Party. The PLA with help from the
Propaganda Bureau has relentlessly tried to restore the image of Chinas military as the peoples
army since the 1989 Tiananmen protests. Being seen to be cracking down on its own people
would be a backward step. The central leadership is eager to avoid giving the impression that
they are dependent on the PLA to maintain national order and stability. Better to use a distinct
organization such as the PAP and avoid incurring too much political debt owing to the PLA at
the same time. For provincial and local Party members, access to the PAP is needed to maintain
social stability and entrench their own rule in their localities. Arguably, the PAP is frequently
used to legitimately enforce social order. But when the source of disorder is dissatisfaction with
these same officials, self-serving deployment of the armed police is inevitable. Effectively,
preserving the power of local CCP officials incompetent and corrupt or otherwise is
becoming a primary duty of the PAP.
Chinese chaos = extinction

Yee and Storey 13 China Threat: Perceptions Myths edited by Herbert Yee, Ian Storey
Books on Google Play China Threat: Perceptions Myths Front Cover Herbert Yee, Ian Storey
Routledge, Apr 3, 2013 Professor of Politics and International Relations at Hong Kong Baptist
University and Lecturer in Defence Studies at Deakin University, The China Threat:
Perceptions, Myths and Reality, p. 5]
The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a China threat is the fear of political and
economic collapse in the PRC, resulting in territorial fragmentation, civil war and waves of
refugees pouring into neighbouring countries. Naturally, any or all of these scenarios would
have a profoundly negative impact on regional stability. Today the Chinese leadership faces a
raft of internal problems, including the increasing political demands of its citizens, a growing
population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment
caused by rapid industrialisation and pollution. These problems are putting a strain on the
central governments ability to govern effectively. Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war
might result in millions of Chinese refugees seeking asylum in neighbouring countries. Such an
unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a severe strain on
the limited resources of Chinas neighbours. A fragmented China could also result in another
nightmare scenario nuclear weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible local
provincial leaders or warlords .12 From this perspective, a disintegrating China would
also pose a threat to its neighbours and the world.
2nc PAP Impact : Global Econ

Unchecked movements would escalate and lead to global economic
collapse
Lee 13 (Ann, senior fellow at Demos, is the author of "What the U.S. Can Learn From
China.", New York Times, Civil Unrest in China Would be Devastating for the World Economy,
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/05/11/have-the-bric-nations-lost-theirmomentum/civil-unrest-in-china-would-be-devastating-for-the-world-economy)//MP
The complexity and fragility of Chinas political system is something that is often underappreciated by
Western observers. The scandal and rapid downfall of Bo Xilai, a top Chinese government official of Chongqing who was once
widely considered for the Standing Committee, was a rare glimpse of the deep political divisions that exist within the Chinese central
government. Although these power struggles have usually been shielded from the public, the political
battles within the

party are no less fierce than in multiparty systems in democratic societies . And while some China
observers believe that the ousting of Bo Xilai is a watershed moment for the reformists to continue their development goals
unhindered, the reality is that the Maoists
could potentially unite and strike back when everyone least

expects such an event to happen. If they are successful in harnessing the disgruntled farmers
and unemployed factory workers in China to rally behind them, it is remote but not impossible for
the civil unrest to turn into another civil war. In such a scenario, Chinas miraculous growth would
grind to a halt. A halt to Chinas growth would spell. instant and devastating inflation for the rest of
the world All the major economies -- the United States, Japan and Europe -- have been printing money with
abandon because Chinas productivity exported deflation to the world . However, if Chinas cheap
labor force disappears because of civil war, all the cheap goods that they produced and exported
would suddenly be scarce. The manufacturing in China would not be relocated easily anywhere else
in the world for lack of a knowledge base and supply chain network that even comes close to
matching Chinas base. As a result, hyperinflation of the kind that has given the Germans nightmares would come back with
a vengeance. The rest that can follow we already know from history.
[INSERT ECON COLLAPSE IMPACT]
1nc impact: Chinese Cyber war

Chinese military reform increases cyber warfighting
Gertz 1/27/16 http://freebeacon.com/national-security/chinese-military-revamps-cyber-warfare-intelligence-forces/ Bill
Gertz is senior editor of the Washington Free Beacon. Prior to joining the Beacon he was a national security reporter, editor, and
columnist for 27 years at the Washington Times. Bill is the author of six books, four of which were national bestsellers. His most
recent book was The Failure Factory, a look at an out-of-control government bureaucracy that could have been a primer for the Tea
Party. Bill has an international reputation. Vyachaslav Trubnikov, head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, once called him
a tool of the CIA after he wrote an article exposing Russian intelligence operations in the Balkans. A senior CIA official once
threatened to have a cruise missile fired at his desk after he wrote a column critical of the CIAs analysis of China. And Chinas
communist government has criticized him for news reports exposing Chinas weapons and missile sales to rogues states. The staterun Xinhua news agency in 2006 identified Bill as the No. 1 anti-China expert in the world. Bill insists he is very much pro-China
pro-Chinese people and opposed to the communist system. Former Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld once told him: You are
drilling holes in the Pentagon and sucking out information.
A recent Chinese military reorganization is increasing the danger posed by Peoples

Liberation Army cyber warfare and intelligence units that recently were consolidated
into a new Strategic Support Force. The announcement of the military reorganization made on
Dec. 31 by the Chinese government provided few details of what has changed for three military
intelligence units formerly under the now-defunct General Staff Department. However, U.S.
officials and China analysts say the major cyber warfare and intelligence-gathering groups were
elevated into the new Strategic Support Force, a military service-level force equal in standing to
Chinas army, navy, air force and missile services. They include the 3rd Department, or 3PLA,
that is believed to have as many as 100,000 cyber warfare hackers and signals intelligence
troops under its control. The group includes highly-trained personnel who specialize in network
attacks, information technology, code-breaking, and foreign languages. Five members of a 3PLA
hacking group were indicted by the Justice Department for commercial cyber attacks against
American companies in 2014. The 4th Department, Chinas separate military electronic
intelligence and electronic warfare service, is also part of the new support force. Additionally,
the traditional military spy service devoted to human spying known as 2PLA was combined into
the new support force. From a strategic perspective, the PLA will now be able to move forward
with the concept of integrated network electronic warfare and better manage the use of satellites
for [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance], said former military intelligence officer
Larry Wortzel. James Lewis, a cyber specialist with the Center for Strategic and International
Studies, said the new force will enhance the capacity of the PLA. They have a ways to go,
but this is their effort to compete with the U.S. in the information domain, Lewis said. It fits
with their improved [anti-satellite] and cyber attack capabilities. The 3PLA was identified by
the National Security Agency as one of Chinas most aggressive cyber spying agencies. Classified
documents made public last year revealed that the NSA estimates 3PLA hackers conducted more
than 30,000 cyber attacks aimed at gathering defense industrial secrets. More than 500 of the
cyber attacks were gauged to involve significant intrusions of defense networks. Compromises
included the theft of secrets regarding the F-35 and F-22 jets, the B-2 bomber, and space-based
laser systems. The NSA learned details of the operations by conducting its own cyber
penetration in 2009 of a network connected to 3PLA computers. Adm. Mike Rogers,
commander of the U.S. Cyber Command, said large-scale hacking has numbed many Americans
to a threat that is growing. If you look at the trends, if you look at the activity, for example, that
we see within critical infrastructure in the United States, power and other things, you see nation
states, individuals, and actors within those systems, Rogers said last week. To date we have
not seen on any significant scale a desire to take that access and employ it as a way to bring the
system down, he said. But what happens when that changes? Because as military, Ive always
thought about threat as a combination of capability and intent. Im watching capability where I
go, wow. If the intent were to change we have some real challenges here. And intent can change
very quickly. Chinese military expert Yin Zhuo told the state-run Peoples Daily newspaper that
foreign forces continue to conduct cyber attacks on Chinese government, military and civilian
facilities and the new Strategic Support Force will focus on the threat. It is imperative that we
possess a corresponding defense force, he said. The Strategic Support Force will play an
important role in safeguarding our nations financial security and protecting our peoples safety
in daily lives. The overall functions of the Strategic Support Force are targeting detection and
reconnaissance, satellite and space operations, electronic warfare and cyber warfare. All these
are new domains that will determine whether our military can win victories on future
battlefields, Yin said. The force will be integrated within other military groups and will provide
potent battlefield support for joint operation actions of multiple services and arms so as to
achieve the goal of winning local wars under informatized conditions, Yin said. U.S. intelligence
officials disclosed to the Washington Free Beacon last year that China has sharply increased
funding for cyber warfare capabilities. The funding increasean estimated 30 percent more
devoted to cyber warfare and cyber spyingfollows Beijings assessments that its capabilities lag
behind those of the United States. The buildup of cyber warfare capabilities was described by
officials as a long term, strategic buildup of digital warfare capabilities. By contrast with China,
the U.S. Cyber Command currently has around 6,000 people engaged in both cyber defense and
cyber attack preparations. The NSA, which conducts the bulk of cyber intelligence-gathering,
employs a force of at least 40,000 people. Wortzel, the former military intelligence officer, said
the new force combines the electronic warfare and countermeasures capabilities of 4PLA with
the signals intelligence capabilities of 3PLA, along with control of satellites and space-based
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The cyber warfare, collection and defense
responsibilities had been divided between 3PLA and 4PLA. Now they apparently will be
consolidated in the Strategic Support Force, Wortzel said, noting that the civilian Ministry of
State Security will probably keep its separate cyber and intelligence gathering capabilities.
Lewis, the CSIS cyber expert, said the PLA reorganization is probably good news on the cyber
espionage front. It gives Xi the control to tamp down PLA spyinghe seems to want to do this
after calculating that the gain now isnt worth the friction, Lewis said. But its bad news for
warfighting as they are reorganizing with one opponent in mind. In September,
Chinese leader Xi Jinping announced that Chinas military needed a new strategy for
information warfare amid a global military revolution. The 3PLA headquarters is located in
Beijings Haidian district and its branch offices are located in Shanghai, Qingdao, Sanya,
Chengdu, and Guangzhou. The Shanghai office is said to be focused exclusively on targeting the
United States. The five PLA hackers indicted by the Justice Department, who remain wanted by
the FBI, were part of a 3PLA agency called Unit 61398, which has been identified as a major
cyber attack unit behind the theft of large amounts of U.S. government and private sector data,
ranging from secrets related to the F-35 jet to corporate secrets about nuclear power generation.
Peter Mattis, a China analyst with the Jamestown Foundation, said the new military
reorganization is the most significant change since the PLA was reorganized in the 1950s and
likely will integrate the resources of the 2PLA, 3PLA and 4PLA into various regional and
functional military headquarters. Although no specific announcements have thus far been
made about the intelligence apparatus, it seems unreasonable to think the PLAs intelligence
system will go untouched, Mattis stated in an article published in War on the Rocks. Chinas
most senior intelligence officer in the past has been the deputy chief of the General Staff
Department, who played a key role in the ruling Communist Party decision-making on domestic
and foreign affairs. That position will likely now be taken by the chief of the Strategic Support
Force. The general in charge of the Strategic Support reportedly is Lt. Gen. Gao Jin. Chinas
government relies heavily on the use of strategic intelligence, based on the precepts of the
ancient strategist Sun Tzu who said the acme of skill was defeating your enemy without
shooting. The biggest question about the reorganization of intelligence is how the PLA will do
within the intelligence apparatus to increase jointnessone of the stated goals of the reforms,
Mattis stated. Plenty of evidence suggests the Chinese military wants intelligence more
connected to operational decision-making.
That escalates cyber arms racing

Swaine 13 (Micheal D. Swaine, expert in China and East Asian security studies and a Senior Associate in the Asia Program
at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Chinese views on cybersecurity in Foreign relations. Carnegie Endowment
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CLM42MS.pdf page 1-2 September 24, 2013)\\mwang
During the past few years, cybersecurity
has become a major concern among many countries, as a result

of the continued rapid expansion and deepening technological sophistication of the Internet ,
alongside the growing reliance of governments and societies on cyberbased systems for everything from communications and
information storage to military operations and commercial activities.1 In
recent months, this issue has become a

major source of both tension and potential cooperation for the U.S.-China relationship in particular.
Stemming from a Western (and especially U.S.) assessment that a growing number of destructive cyberattacks on commercial
enterprises and government institutions originate not only from Chinese individuals, but also most likely from Chinese government
(and especially military) sources, Washington
has greatly intensified its expression of concern to

Beijing.2 Beijing has repeatedly denied carrying out cyberattacks against any other country, while calling for both
bilateral and multilateral cooperation, free from accusations, to formulate agreed-upon norms for the operation of the
global Internet as well as place its oversight in the hands of a broadly representative international structure. The United States has
resisted the latter proposal. These developments
have elevated the issue of cybersecurity to a top

priority within the overall bilateral relationship . In response to the importance and urgency of the
issue, Washington and Beijing recently agreed to form a Cyber Working Group (CWG) as part of the bilateral Strategic and
Economic Dialogue (S&ED),3 with the first Bilateral Cybersecurity Working Group Dialogue held in Washington D.C. on 8 July.
Thus far, however,
little progress has occurred in reducing suspicion and developing

cooperation in this area . To the contrary, the United States and presumably China are
strengthening their capacity to engage in both defensive and offensive cyber actions against each
other, presenting the prospect of a cyber arms race while potentially intensifying the
already high level of distrust between the two countries .5 To understand the challenges and
opportunities presented to the Sino-U.S. relationship by the cybersecurity issue, it is important to examine in some detail the views,
beliefs, and apparent assumptions of Chinese observers toward the subject. This article addresses Chinese thinking on four basic
aspects of the issue: The Definition of Cybersecurity and the Challenge It Presents The Cybersecurity Threat Posed by the United
States and Other Countries The Origins and Motives behind Foreign Cybersecurity Threats Chinese Preferences for Mitigating
Cybersecurity Threats As they have in several previous editions of CLM, our examination of Chinese views on these topics will
distinguish between three basic types of Chinese sources: authoritative; quasi-authoritative; and non-authoritative.6 For each area,
particular attention is given to: a) the authoritative PRC government viewpoint (if publicly available); b) views toward the United
States in particular; and c) any variations that might exist among Chinese commentators, in both substance and tone. The article
addresses several specific questions: to what extent and in what manner do Chinese definitions of cybersecurity and Chinese views
on the cybersecurity threat differ from those of the United States and other countries? How do Chinese sources respond to U.S. and
Western accusations against China? In all these areas, can one discern any significant differences: among authoritative Chinese
sources, between military and civilian sources (of all types), and among authoritative, quasi-authoritative, and nonauthoritative
sources in general? The article concludes with a summary and some implications for the future
goes nuclear
Gady 5/4/14 Franz-Stefan Gady is an Associate Editor with The Diplomat. His interests include civil-military relations,
revolution in military affairs, and cyber diplomacy. He also is a Senior Fellow with the EastWest Institute where he edits the Policy
Innovation Blog. Franz-Stefan has reported from a wide range of countries and conflict zones including Afghanistan, Iraq, and
Pakistan. His writing and photos have appeared in The International New York Times, BBC News, Foreign Affairs Magazine, Foreign
Policy Magazine, The National Interest, Vice News, The Middle East Eye, The Christian Science Monitor, Profil, Der Standard, and
Die Presse among other publications.
Could Cyber Attacks Lead to Nuclear War? It could, according to a former commander of
U.S. nuclear forces. De-alerting nuclear arsenals could help reduce the likelihood of a
cyberattack causing an accidental nuclear war between the United States and Russia, retired
U.S. Gen. James Cartwright recently stated in an Associated Press interview. Short fuses on U.S.
and Russian strategic forces have particularly increased the risk of accidental nuclear war,
according to Cartwright, while the sophistication of the cyberthreat [to nuclear weapons] has
increased exponentially. One-half of their [U.S. and Russian] strategic arsenals are
continuously maintained on high alert. Hundreds of missiles carrying nearly 1,800 warheads are
ready to fly at a moments notice, a policy report compiled by a study group chaired by the
retired U.S. general summarized. At the brink of conflict, nuclear command and warning
networks around the world may be besieged by electronic intruders whose onslaught degrades
the coherence and rationality of nuclear decision-making, the report further points out.
Turns Case-Cyber
Military reform increases the frequency and strength of Chinese
cyberattacks
Lin 3-7 [Dr. Ying Yu, Adjunct Associate Professor in the International Affairs and Diplomacy
Program at Ming Chuan University, The Implications of Chinas Military Reforms, The
Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/the-implications-of-chinas-military-reforms/ RD;
AD 7/29/16]
Implications for the Region The
establishment of battle zones in place of military regions thus represents a

shift in the operational thinking of the PLA and a departure from the army-dominated force
structure, which is often compared to a dog with a tail too big to wag. What is to come instead is an elite and
highly flexible force with integrated joint operations capability. Now that Xi has greater control over the military, the military diplomacy
function of the PLA could be put to better use. Besides the old-school tactics of verbal attack and saber-rattling, as seen in the 1996
Taiwan Strait Crisis, the expansion of the PLAs presence could well be used as bargaining chips in
international politics. By using the PLA externally as a means for military deterrence, in modern gunboat
diplomacy for instance, or as a gateway for making contributions to the international
community, Xi should feel more at ease in his application of the well-known carrot-and-stick approach.
Another obvious change in the PLAs structure after the reforms is the integration of foreign intelligence
capabilities. Foreign intelligence was formerly the responsibility of the second and third departments of GSD, which handled human intelligence
and electronic and Internet intelligence, respectively. Now the job has been re-assigned to army-led units, the Rocket Force and SSF, in what amounts
to an integration of intelligence resources. Whats noteworthy is that the Liaison Department of the GPD and GAD have their own intelligencegathering units. Along
with the extensive restructuring of GPD and GAD, the intelligence units under
the two general departments could be merged into SSF, which would signify a reshuffle of the
intelligence community. If the CMC is in the future to have intelligence units that directly report to it in a way similar to the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) of the U.S. or Russias GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate), it will symbolize a further integration of Chinas foreign
intelligence capabilities. In the restructuring of the second and third
departments of GSF, it should be noted that the latter used to

control the majority of the components of Chinas cyber force, which is mainly devoted to computer
hacking, while the former specializes in human intelligence and intelligence analysis. If the two
departments are to merge, the attacks launched by the cyber force would become even more
ferocious. For example, the advanced persistent threat technique commonly used by the cyber force
depends heavily upon information about a specific target such as his or her personal data, circle of friends, and reading
habits. Acquiring this information is not what a computer hacker excels at. So the integration of intelligence
resources will only encourage Chinas cyber force to be more aggressive toward target countries
like Taiwan.
Links
Space
Chinas new space force key to overall military reform
Costello 2/8/16 http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news
%5D=45075&no_cache=1#.V5xZ7DU0A2w John Costello is Congressional Innovation Fellow for New American Foundation and a
former Research Analyst at Defense Group Inc. He was a member of the US Navy and a DOD Analyst. He specializes in information
warfare, electronic warfare and non-kinetic counter-space issues.
On December 31, 2015, Xi Jinping introduced the Peoples Liberation Army Rocket Force
(PLARF; ), Strategic Support Force (PLASSF; ), and Army Leadership Organ.
The move came just within the Central Military Commissions deadline to complete the bulk of
reforms by the end of the year. Most media coverage has focused on the Rocket Force, whose
reorganization amounts to a promotion of the PLA Second Artillery Force (PLASAF) to the
status of a service on the same level of the PLA Army, Navy, and Air Force. However, by far the
most interesting and unexpected development was the creation of the SSF.
According to official sources, the Strategic Support Force will form the core of Chinas
information warfare force, which is central to Chinas active defense strategic concept. This is
an evolution, not a departure from, Chinas evolving military strategy. It is a culmination of
years of technological advancement and institutional change. In the context of ongoing reforms,
the creation of the SSF may be one of the most important changes yet. Consolidating and
restructuring Chinas information forces is a key measure to enable a number of other
state goals of reform , including reducing the power of the army, implementing joint
operations, and increasing emphasis on high-tech forces.
More ev
Ultimately, the strategic support force needs to be understood in the broader context of the
reforms responsible for its creation. One on hand, the reforms are practical, intending to usher
Chinas military forces into the modern era and transform them into a force capable of waging
and winning informatized local wars. On the other hand, the reforms are politically motivated,
intending to reassert party leadership to transform the PLA into a more reliable, effective
political instrument.
The Strategic Support Force, if administered correctly, will help solve many of the PLAs
problems that have prevented it from effectively implementing joint operations and information
warfare. The creation of an entire military service dedicated to information warfare reaffirms
Chinas focus on the importance of information in its strategic concepts, but it also reveals the
Central Military Commissions desire to assert more control over these forces as political
instruments. With the CMC solidly at the helm, information warfare will likely be leveraged
more strategically and will be seen in all aspects of PLA operations both in peace and in war.
China is committing itself completely to information warfare, foreign nations should take note
and act accordingly.
SSF shift key to joint operations

in also foresees the SSF playing a greater role in protecting and defending civilian infrastructure
than the PLA has in the past:
[The SSF] will play an important role in Chinas socialist construction. Additionally, China is
facing a lot of hackers on the internet which are engaging in illegal activities, for example,
conducting cyber attacks against government facilities, military facilities, and major civilian
facilities. This requires that we protect them with appropriate defense. The SSF will play an
important role in protecting the countrys financial security and the security of peoples daily
lives (China Military News, January 5).
Yang Yujun, MND spokesman, also suggested that civilian-military integration will form a
portion of the SSFs mission, but stopped short of clarifying whether this meant the force will
have a heavy civilian component or will be involved in defending civilian infrastructure, or both
(CNTV, January 2).
Yin noted that the SSF will embody the PLAs vision of real joint operations. In Yins view,
military operations cannot be divorced from electronic space, a conceptual fusion of the
electromagnetic and cyber domains. The SSF will integrate reconnaissance, early warning,
communications, command, control, navigation, digitalized ocean, digitalized land, etc. and will
provide strong support for joint operations for each military service branch. Indeed, this view
was also echoed by Shao Yongling (), a PLARF Senior Colonel who is currently a
professor at the PLAs Command College in Wuhan. She suggested that the SSF was created to
centralize each branch of the PLAs combat support units, where previously each service had
their own, resulting in overlapping functions and repeat investment. Consolidating these
responsibilities in a central force would allow the military to reduce redundancies, better
integrate, and improve joint operational capabilities (China Military News, January 5).
Shift to joint ops key feature of military reforms

Lin 3/7/16 http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/the-implications-of-chinas-military-reforms/ Dr. Ying Yu Lin is Adjunct
Associate Professor in the International Affairs& Diplomacy Program at Ming Chuan University.
From the perspective of operational effectiveness, the transition from military region to battle
zone is of great significance to the development of joint operations capability. The PLA has been
underscoring the concept of integrated joint operations since the Iraq War of 2003. Many
publications on the subject have since been incorporated in the PLAs internal reference
materials. In executing joint operations, however, the biggest challenge is not technology but the
army-centric military region system and the conservative attitudes of the military leadership.
For example, the army-dominated military region system, if it is to engage in modern combat,
must have the cooperation of the air force, navy, and the rocket force to achieve the desired
effects. And in the execution of anti-access/area denial operations, the PLA has come to realize
that it can not pose any threat to the U.S. military, especially its aircraft carriers, unless it has
the cooperation of other services and ballistic missile forces. That each service goes its own way
without building coordination with other services is already a serious problem, as it greatly
reduces the combat strength of the PLA. So in terms of improving combat strength, the
transition from military region to battle zone is not only to streamline personnel but also to
establish battle zones as the main operations command that serve actual needs on the
battlefield. For a combat mission to be properly executed, the commander of a battle zone is
entrusted with the power and discretion to mobilize troops within his area of responsibility
(AOR), greatly enhancing the overall joint operations capability of the forces involved.
The PLAs performance in this regard can been seen from its execution of missions related to the
East China Sea air defense identification zone (ADIZ), which geopolitically falls within the AOR
of the Nanjing Military Region and the East Sea Fleets naval aviation forces, with a considerable
overlap of responsibilities between the air force and navy. In fact, there was no previous example
of the air force and navy acting under the command and control of the army. What usually
happened was that the three different services acted independently. According to data made
public by Japan, Chinese military planes that have been present in the East China Sea ADIZ to
date are mostly from the naval aviation forces. These planes include Y-8 electronic
reconnaissance aircraft, the H-6 bomber, Su-30 and J-10 fighter jets, and Y-12 transport aircraft
attached to the State Oceanic Administration. Before Japan released photos of two Chinese Su27 fighters flying close to two Japanese surveillance planes over the East China Sea in May 2014,
there were few records of planes dispatched to the area by the PLA Air Force. This might have
something to do with the fact that PLA Navys aviation forces, in accordance with the
assignment of duties across the services, are responsible for the airspace over the maritime areas
which they are assigned to protect. It is true that a considerable number of fighter jets are
deployed in the Nanjing Military Region and that the PLA has been running cross-region
exercises since 2012, including the rare deployment of a full fighter regiment from its inland
base to a coastal base. However, the outcomes of these exercises did not receive conspicuous
media coverage.
In late 2013, the media reported that Xu, the former CMC vice chairman, has delivered remarks
on the development of joint operations capability. He called for a further improvement to the
joint operations command mechanism of the CMC and that of the various theaters around the
country so as to facilitate the relevant training and guarantee the results of structural reforms.
The subsequent political developments around the East China Sea ADIZ provided the
opportunity for the PLA to train its forces and integrate resources in a joint operations
environment. In video footage of Chinese SU-27s made public by Japan, the tail numbers
revealed that the planes were based in Chongqing, Sichuan Province. This represents a further
step toward the development of cross-region operations and joint operations between the air
force and navy.
Meanwhile, the PLA Air Force and PLA Navy have their own independent links to the coastal
radar stations under their control. The PLA began developing joint surveillance systems in 2006
in an attempt to integrate aerial images for use by all relevant units. No details have emerged on
how the program is progressing. But in light of the current mission requirements for the East
China Sea ADIZ, China needs to develop a joint surveillance system. Although the development
of integrated joint operations has been the goal of the PLA in recent years, improving and
integrating infrastructure is only a first step. Whats more important is coordinating other vital
factors such as logistics, personnel and organization, and operational thinking. The army-centric
military region system has made it difficult to put joint operations into practice. Now with the
joint operations command mechanism for the East China Sea ADIZ as the model, the PLA wants
to encourage mission-oriented operational thinking, which could overcome structural barriers
and serve as a starting point for inter-service joint operations. Ultimately, this will eventually
help Beijing achieve its goal of establishing battle zones as the main operational command in
modern warfare.
Impacts
Impact-Taiwan
China-Taiwan crisis is a major political goalleads to nuclear war and
flips the AFF
Glaser 11 [Charles, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and
Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2011-03-01/will-chinas-rise-lead-war]
The prospects for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may nevertheless require
Although it lost
control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, China still
considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification remains a key
political goal for Beijing. China has made clear that it will use force if Taiwan declares
independence, and much of China's conventional military buildup has been dedicated to
increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the United States' ability to intervene. Because
some changes in U.S. foreign policy that Washington will find disagreeable -- particularly regarding Taiwan.
China places such high value on Taiwan and because the United States and China -- whatever they might formally agree to -- have
such different attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, the issue poses special dangers and challenges for the U.S.Chinese relationship, placing it in a different category than Japan or South Korea. A
crisis over Taiwan could fairly
easily escalate to nuclear war, because each step along the way might well seem rational to the actors involved.
Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the United
the U nited S tates would find itself under
pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort of attack, no matter how it originated. Given
the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control Washington
has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the United States found itself following
events rather than leading them. Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing
improvements in China's military capabilities may make Beijing more willing to escalate a
Taiwan crisis. In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to
increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack . Standard deterrence
States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless,
theory holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position.
China's nuclear modernization might remove that check on Chinese action, leading Beijing to behave more boldly in future crises
A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan , meanwhile,

could fuel a conventional and nuclear arms race. Enhancements to U.S. offensive
targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile defenses might be interpreted by China
as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a
general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations.
than it has in past ones.
Esalates to attacks on US citiesboth sides believe they will win
White 15- Hugh, professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University in Canberra. His book The China
Choice: Why We Should Share Power was published in the US last year by Oxford University Press (May 5, 2016, Would America
Risk a Nuclear War with China over Taiwan?, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/would-america-risk-nuclear-war-chinaover-taiwan-12808?page=2)
After a decade of relative harmony, tensions between Beijing and Taipei are rising
again. As Taiwan's leaders and voters face big choices about their future relations with China, America must think carefully
about its commitments to Taiwan. Would America be willing go to war with China to prevent Taiwan being forcibly united with the
mainland? J. Michael Cole, responding in The National Interest to a recent op-ed of mine in Singapore's Straits Times, expresses a
widely held assumption that it would, and should. To many people it seems self-evident that America would honor the commitments
enshrined in the Taiwan Relations Act. But the TRA was passed in 1979, when China's GDP was 1/20th the size of America's, its
place in the global economy was miniscule, its navy and air force were negligible, and its prospects for progress depended completely
on America's goodwill. (Recommended: 5 Chinese Weapons of War India Should Fear) So back then a US-China conflict carried
much bigger economic and military risks for China than for America. That made the TRA's commitments both highly credible and
very unlikely to be tested. Washington could safely assume that Beijing would back off to avoid a conflict in which China had so
much more to lose than America. Things are different today. China's economy is now so big and so central to global trade and capital
flows that the consequences of any disruption would be just as serious for America as for China. Militarily, America
can no
longer expect a swift and certain victory in a war over Taiwan. China's anti-access/area-denial
capabilities would preclude direct US intervention unless those capabilities had first been
degraded by a sustained and wide-ranging strike campaign against Chinese bases and forces .
(Recommended: 4 Chinese Weapons of War Taiwan Should Fear) China would very likely respond to such a
campaign with attacks on US and allied bases throughout Asia. The US has no evident means to
cap the resulting escalation spiral, and no one could be sure it would stop below the nuclear
threshold. The possibility of nuclear attacks on US cities would have to be
considered . These new realities of power mean that today a US-China conflict would impose
equal risks and costs on both sides. And where costs and risks are equal, the advantage lies with
those who have more at stake, and hence greater resolve. China's leaders today seem to think
they hold this advantage, and they are probably right. It is therefore a big mistake to keep
assuming, as many people seem to do, that China would be sure to back off before a crisis over
Taiwan became a conflict.
Extinction-24 hours
TAKAI 9-Retired Colonel and Former Researcher in the military science faculty of the Staff
College for Japans Ground Self Defense Force [Mitsuo, U.S.-China nuclear strikes would spell
doomsday, October 7, http://www.upiasia.com/Security/2009/10/07/uschina_nuclear_strikes_would_spell_doomsday/7213/What would happen if China launched its 20 Dongfeng-5
intercontinental ballistic missiles, each with a 5-megaton warhead, at 20 major U.S. cities, DKP] edited for gendered language
What would happen if China launched its 20 Dongfeng-5 intercontinental ballistic missiles, each
at 20 major U.S. cities? Prevailing opinion in Washington D.C. until not so long ago was
that the raids would cause over 40 million casualties, annihilating much of the U nited
St ates. In order to avoid such a doomsday scenario, consensus was that the U nited S tates would
have to eliminate this potential threat at its source with preemptive strikes on China. But
with a 5-megaton warhead,
cool heads at institutions such as the Federation of American Scientists and the National Resource Defense Council examined the
facts and produced their own analyses in 2006, which differed from the hard-line views of their contemporaries. The FAS and NRDC
developed several scenarios involving nuclear strikes over ICBM sites deep in the Luoning Mountains in Chinas western province of
Henan, and analyzed their implications. One of the scenarios involved direct strikes on 60 locations
including 20 main missile silos and decoy silos hitting each with one W76-class, 100-kiloton multiple independently targetable
In order to destroy the hardened silos,

the strikes would aim for maximum impact by causing ground bursts near the silos'
entrances. Using air bursts similar to the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki would not be as effective, as the blasts and the
reentry vehicle carried on a submarine-launched ballistic missile.
heat would dissipate extensively. In this scenario, the 6 megatons of ground burst caused by the 60 attacks would create enormous
Within 24 hours following the

explosions, deadly fallout would spread from the mushroom clouds , driven by westerly
winds toward Nanjing and Shanghai. They would contaminate the cities' residents, water, foodstuff and
crops, causing irreversible damage. The impact of a 6-megaton nuclear explosion would be
360 times more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb, killing not less than 4 million people. Such massive
mushroom clouds over 12 kilometers high, composed of radioactive dirt and debris.
casualties among non-combatants would far exceed the military purpose of destroying the enemy's military power. This would cause
political harm and damage the United States ability to achieve its war aims, as it would lose international support. On the other
China could retaliate against U.S. troops in East Asia, employing intermediate-range
ballistic missiles including its DF-3, DF-4 and DF-21 missiles, based in Liaoning and Shandong provinces, which would still be
intact. If the United States wanted to destroy China's entire nuclear retaliatory capability , U.S.
forces would have to employ almost all their nuclear weapons, causing
catastrophic environmental hazards that could lead to the annihilation of
[hu]mankind.
hand,
Impact-Straits Times
Taiwan war causes extinction
Straits Times 2K (Regional Fallout: No one gains in war over Taiwan, June 25, Available Online via Lexis-Nexis)
THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait
war escalating into a full-scale war between the

US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its
national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would
embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a
nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and
logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means
South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate,
east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers
elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine
Europe 's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of
Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear
arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a
nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the
Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to
save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the
conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea
-- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to
there is little hope of winning a war against

short of using nuclear weapons . The US estimates that China possesses about
20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems
prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was
defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability,
China 50 years later ,
considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of
the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars
in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to
drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country
we would
see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the
prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be
ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.
risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass,
-Taiwan Impact Likely

Chinese military intervention to reclaim Taiwan very likely
Ermito 7/14 BA (Hons) in International Relations from the University of Bologna and an
MSc in Asian Politics from the School of Oriental and African Studies. His areas of research
include Northeast Asia security, the DPRK and Chinese foreign policy (Daniele, Tsai
Administration Faces New Tensions With Beijing, 7/14/16,
http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2016/07/14/tsai-administration-tensions-beijing/) JoS
Following the rise of the charismatic leadership of President Xi, the discourse on the
reunification has embodied a fundamental step towards the path of the Rejuvenation of the
Chinese Nation. Therefore, renouncing to Taiwan would represent a fatal strike to the credibility of
the CCP and an additional factor of instability in regions where the autonomist movements are
often seen as Beijing as a challenge to its authoritarian power. While under Ma Administration, relations with
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have substantially improved, Beijing has grown wary of President Tsais
political agenda, clearly not inclined to foster the same level of Taiwans engagement in Cross-strait
relations of her predecessor. Albeit after her election President Tsai stressed her intention, to not challenge any modification of
the status quo, traditionally mistrust over the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)s pro-independence represents a serious source of
concern for Beijing. The DPP has a long tradition of pro-independence support, whose leadership remains bound by the legacy of the
1999 Resolution of Taiwan that considers Taiwan as a sovereign and independent state. President Tsai Administration has stressed
The
unconditional respect for Taiwans democracy and values and determination to enhance
Taiwans role in the region, outside Beijings orbit represent a marked turning point compared
to the reconciliation policy pursued by the previous administration. In a recent speech for the celebration
of the 95th anniversary of the founding of the CCP, President Xi has voiced Chinas commitment to reject any
attempts to foster Taiwans independence cause. In the past, President Xi advanced the idea of granting special
her willingness to pursue a peaceful and stable development of the Cross-strait relations while setting an ambitious agenda.
legal, economic and political autonomy, following the model of one country, two systems. Yet, the proposal was strongly rejected
by Ma Administration, even before that Hong Kong became the epicentre of extensive protests against the CCPs decision to increase
its political control. The CCP has managed to establish positive relations with Ma Administration that culminated with the historical
meeting between President Ma and President Xi, last November after
nearly seven decades since two CCP and

KMT leaders met. Yet, the entente cordiale between Beijing and Taipei promoted by President
Ma Ying-jeou has rapidly switched to open and mutual mistrust between the CCP and the Tsai
Administration. The CCP considers the DPP as a dangerous catalyst of secessionist tendencies and under Chen Shui-bian
Administration (DPP) the issue of independence deeply inflamed the Taiwanese political debate, causing Beijings outrage. The
return of a DPP pro-independence president surely makes Beijing nervous and willing to wage
the threat of military intervention. In 1996, the CCP tried to influence the elections through military intimidation and
the escalation of tensions originated by DPP provocations in the Third Strait Crisis, whose dangerous evolution was prevented by the
US naval presence. With the election of a new DPP candidate, Beijings
military provocations have reached a new

peak. In the last months, Beijing has increased the level of pressure on Taiwan, opposing Taiwan
activities within the international organizations and boosting the level of military operations
across the strait. On May, few days before President Tsais presidential inauguration, the 31th Army based in Fujian held
military drills on the costs, testing its power projection over the straits while last July, the CCTV showed the footage of
PLA military drills, attacking a mock-up of Taiwan presidential palace. In the last decade, the
expansion of ground, air and naval capabilities of PLA reflects Beijings determination to
enhance its ability to project power and extend its operational capability over the region. Beijing
considers of primary importance increasing the level of preparedness in the event of a potential invasion of Taiwan that could
virtually be disrupt by the unilateral decision of Taipei to declare the independence of the island. Washingtons approach to an old
dilemma Albeit Washington has shifted the recognition of China to the PRC in 1979, for over forty years the American government
has maintained close relations with Taipei. Through the Taiwan Relations Act, Washington has increased its commitment to the
peaceful resolution of the confrontation between Beijing and Taipei, fostering peace and stability in the region and preventing the
alteration of the status quo by other than peaceful means. On the other hand, the expansion of the Chinese military power, the
intensifying competition with the US to shape a new regional order coupled with Beijings adamant determination to project its
power in the region is undermining Washingtons credibility to maintain a preeminent position in the region as a security provider.
Obama Administrations attempt to encourage Beijing to act as a responsible stakeholder has produced limited results so far and
the massive expansion of the Chinese maritime power in the region represents the most evident
threat to a large number of the ASEAN nations. Since 2012, when Hu Jintao formulated a new maritime power
doctrine, Taiwan has become the pivotal point of the Chinese strategic interest and the main gate
to expand its power projection to the South China Sea, currently claimed by Beijing. Chinese
leaders consider the reunification of Taiwan to the motherland a strategic goal that could
substantially enhance the PLAN presence in the region, far beyond the first island chain and
toward the fulfillment of Beijings territorial claims over the South China Sea. This would have
seriously affected the regional security architecture supported by Washington and it would
increase the sense of insecurity and entanglement of valuable allies such as Japan and Korea , not
to mention, frustrating Obama Administrations attempt to expand the US-ASEAN strategic cooperation in response to Beijings
land reclamation and infrastructure building projects in the South China Sea. Therefore, losing
Taiwan would be
perceived as a direct threat not only to Washingtons strategic interest in the region, but it would
also jeopardize the core structure of the American regional security system. The confrontation
between Beijing and Taiwan is not an issue that merely affects the cross-strait relations, but it is
characterized by wider geo-strategic implications for the region and remains one of the most
central points in the Sino-American relations. While in the last few years, Washington has maintained an
ambiguous position in the attempt to not alienate Beijings leadership and its calls for the development of A New Type of Great
Power Relationship, the ties with Taiwan have downgraded. Yet the emergence of a new Administration, less inclined to make
concessions to Beijing and increasingly open to enhance the relations with the United States could represent a valuable ally for
Washington. In addition, DPPs decision to foster a more reliant indigenous defense industry, critical to deter any military threat
This new
vision promoted by Tsai Administration could turn Taiwan into a vital piece in the US-PRC race
for the hegemony in the region, but it could also trigger dangerous confrontation with Beijing, in
a region whose security architecture remains dangerously unsteady.
coming from the other side of the strait, shows Taipeis determination to safeguard its sovereignty and democracy.
-Timeframe
China takes Taiwan by 2020
Today Online 15 (No author, Today Online, China set to invade; retake Taiwan by 2020:
Taipei, http://www.todayonline.com/chinaindia/china/china-set-invade-retake-taiwan-2020taipei, 006)
China has completed its planned build-up of joint forces for military engagement against Taiwan
and is on its way to ensure victory in a decisive battle by 2020, Taiwans Defence Ministry said in its National Defence Report -
The 13th edition of the biennial report states that China has recently held military
exercises simulating attacks by the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) on Taiwans landmarks and
government buildings. The PLA has possessed an adequate deterrent force capable of launching joint military operations
against Taiwan, it said. The PLA also continues to step up the deployment of missiles against
Taiwan and aims to upgrade its long-range strike capability. Its goal is to be in complete
combat readiness status to invade Taiwan by 2020, the report said. Apart from the deployment against Taiwan,
released today.
China is strengthening the combat readiness of its navy and air force in the west Pacific region to avoid any foreign intervention in
cross-strait conflicts, it said. Chinas navy and air force have successfully penetrated the first island chain on numerous occasions
and hope to be able to deter foreign intervention should a war break out in the Taiwan Strait, it said. The first
island chain
refers to a strategic concept of an offshore defence line extending from Japans Okinawa and
Taiwan down to the Philippines and Indonesia.
Impact-SCS
Defense doesnt apply to SCS- supersedes mutual interests
Seng 16 (January 14th. Teng Chee citing Bates Gill, Visiting Professor of the US Studies
Centre at the University of Sydney and an expert on US Sino Relations. Strategic constraints
keep risk of China-US conflict low: Expert) http://www.todayonline.com/world/strategicconstraints-keep-risk-china-us-conflict-low-expert) JTE
Yet, Prof
Gill cautioned, there is always the possibility for inadvertent conflict between
Washington and Beijing particularly when it comes to the issue of Chinas territorial disputes
with US allies like Japan or the Philippines in the East China Sea and the South China Sea ,
respectively. If a US treaty ally in the region acts well beyond what Washington wants to see, it may
drag the US into a conflict that it does not want with China, he warned. China has been operating ships within
Japanese territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands, claiming the islands as Diaoyu, as well as carrying out land reclamation work
in the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. Fortunately, as Prof Gill observed yesterday, Washington has so far been able
to urge restraint upon its allies such as Japan, Taiwan and, increasingly, the Philippines. Similarly, China has also acted very
cautiously in handling its disputes with US allies. Beijing claims most of the South China Sea, through which more than US$5 trillion
(S$7.1 trillion) in ship-borne trade passes every year. Territorial disputes involving China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan,
Malaysia and Brunei have flared on and off for years. Tensions flared again recently when Beijing conducted three plane testlandings last week on an island it has built in the disputed South China Sea, prompting diplomatic backlash from Hanoi, Manila,
London and Washington. On how countries should best navigate their relations with China, Prof Gill says the most pragmatic and
feasible solution would be to continue engaging China economically, while preparing for the possibility of armed conflict. He said
Chinas growing military and economic might can shape its relationship with other countries in ways especially in territorial
disputes that are more favourable to itself. As such, countries
in the region are turning to the US to act as a

balance against China, he observed. An example is how Manila has resurrected its military
alliance with Washington after a hiatus of more than a decade. The US obviously is a more
powerful country ... that in fact does not have direct territorial, or even direct strategic interests
in some of the more meddlesome territorial issues (in Asia), said Prof Gill. It is because they
(the smaller states) want to play an engagement hedge game, but cant by themselves. They need
more support to do so, and I think the US is prepared to offer that carefully, he said.
AFF
Non-UQ
Reform Inev
Major reform has already happenedthe PLA feels the Sword of
Damocles
Mr. Xi, son of a famous revolutionary commander, came
to power in 2012 making clear he was determined to

clean up the PLA and reaffirm Maos maxim, The Party commands the gun. His main weapon
has been a nationwide anticorruption drive. At least 41 serving generals have been
detained or convicted since 2013. So widespread was corruption that evidence from
investigations now acts as a Sword of Damocles hanging over any officer foolish
enough to question Mr. Xis plans, said James Mulvenon, a Chinese military expert at Defense Group Inc., a
Virginia-based research firm. As part of his plan, Mr. Xi on Jan. 11 dissolved the four main PLA General
Departments political, general staff, armaments, logisticsthat top generals ran like personal fiefs.
Replacing them are 15 less-powerful offices under the Central Military Commissions direct
control, letting Mr. Xi oversee everything from procurement to intelligence. On Feb. 1, he scrapped
Chinas seven Military Regions, which the PLA operated like mini-states with their own schools,
hospitals, hotels and newspapers, many of them moneymaking. The regions resisted central supervision and
focused more on internal management than preparing for combat. He moved to cut
noncombat roles , shutting the newspapers in January. Several acrobatic, operatic, theatrical and
song-and-dance troupes the PLA established in the 1930s to spread propagandaand which have been a
source of corruption are being merged and reduced in size. The seven regions were
replaced with five new Theater Commands, designed to have more fluid boundaries and focus
more on projecting power outward, according to military insiders. Each commands head will have moredirect operational control of all air, naval, ground and conventional missile forces in its area ,
much like heads of U.S. regional commands, experts said. This should improve response time and
effectiveness, said Phillip Saunders, a PLA expert at the U.S. National Defense University. Theyve looked at how
the U.S. has fought and see a lot of advantages to this joint kind of concept, adding that it took the
U.S. 15 to 20 years to really get it right. Mr. Xi appears to have made some compromises, appointing Army officers to head all the
further personnel changes are likely in the coming months. To

reduce the Armys authority, Mr. Xi has established a new Army General Command handling
only ground forces, a Rocket Force overseeing missiles, and a Strategic Support Force
combining capabilities in space, cyber and electronic warfare. Most of those areas were previously under
Army control. That puts the Army, which had higher status than other services, on more-equal footing, giving
the others more say over budgets and operations. Ground forces are expected to account for many of the troop
new Theater Commands, although
reductions. Some officers support Mr. Xis changes, especially combat-operations leaders frustrated by graft, said people who have
spoken to senior PLA figures. Resentment, they said, comes
from generals who controlled large budgets

and are reduced to running relatively lowly offices. Senior officers find it harder to supplement
salaries with other, sometimes illicit, activities and have lost perks such as luxury cars. Some
senior officers might feel : I used to be a commander, Im a general, I controlled a military
region, said Gen. Xu Guangyu, a former vice president of the PLA Defense Institute who held a senior post in the general staff
department, but after these cuts, I dont command anyone.
NU China military reform fast now

Cheng 3/1/16 http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm49cl.pdf
Cheng Li is a senior fellow and

director of research at the Brookings Institution's John L. Thornton China Center. Li grew up in Shanghai during the Cultural
Revolution. In 1985, he came to the United States, where he received an MA in Asian studies from the University of California,
Berkeley, and a PhD in political science from Princeton University.
While Chinas economic slowdown and the resulting socioeconomic tensions with in the country
have dominated public concerns both in China and abroad over the past few months, President Xi Jinping has
won a milestone victory in restructuring the PLA . With this unprecedentedly large - scale and
multi faceted transformation, known as the military reform ( ), Xi Jinping has profoundly revamped
the PLA administrative lineup , re structured the operational theaters , and reshuffled officers across departments, regions , and
services . These
far - reaching changes are also paving the way for the rapid promotion of young
guards, many of whom are seen either as Xis long - time protgs or his new loyalists.
Impact Turn
Reform Good-Stability
PLA reform stabilizes East Asia and decreases the likelihood of
conflict
Miranda 7-28 [Erika Villanueva, writer for Yibada, President Xi Jinping Calls for More
Military Reforms, Adjust PLA to Be Compatible with Changing International Situations, Yibada,
http://en.yibada.com/articles/145994/20160728/president-xi-jinping-calls-for-more-militaryreforms-adjust-pla-to-be-compatible-with-changing-international-situations.htm RD; AD
7/29/16]
Chinese President Xi Jinping called for more reforms in the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in
order to establish a military force compatible with the current international environment. On
Wednesday, the Global Times reported how Xi who also serves as the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee
reiterated his call for better Chinese military force. Like Us on Facebook He said that the country needs military reforms
that would drive "a comprehensive and revolutionary change" that could cope with the changing international situation. Reforms Needed Xi first
introduced the idea of reform in the Chinese military in 2012. Speaking to the 18th National Congress of the CPC, he emphasized the significance of
defense and military changes. Since then, Chinese lawmakers acted on his request. Following the conclusion of the third plenary session of the 18th
CPC Central Committee, the Central Military Commission (CMC) drafted a reform plan and created a group that would lead it. The first draft of the
reforms indicated the need for the establishment of the PLA Rocket Force, the PLA Strategic Support Force, and the general command of the PLA.
Aside from that, areas of command in the military had also been regrouped from seven into five theater commands and four military departments. All
these and more are expected to be implemented in order to make PLA a "mighty, modernized, new-style" military force, per a more recent report from
the Global Times. "Our troops originated from army, developed on the basis of army, and have roots in the army," said Xi, praising the Chinese
military's "immortal and meritorious achievements." Other changes
to be implemented in the PLA include an

improved military training particularly in certain skill sets that require development like speedy
responses, precise strikes, seizing key forts, long-distance maneuvers, and sabotage operations.
The International Community There is little mentioned about what sort of international situations that the Chinese military should be prepared for but
a wild guess would dictate that it has something to do with conflict. However, China-US Focus believes that the
massive reform in the

military force of China brings forth a positive effect on its neighbors in Asia by servings as a
sergeant at arms in preventing devastating warfare. Because of the reforms, China is now considered a
powerful disciplinarian of those who incite conflict among neighboring countries particularly in East Asia where
the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Straits are traditional hotspots for conflict. China also served as an
effective pacifier for the extremist terrorism that plagued Central and West Asia, not to mention its
active participation in rescue and relief operations in neighboring countries.
Economy
PLA reform creates deterrence and bolsters anti-corruption efforts
that are key to long-term economic growth
Mulvenon 7-19 [James, Deputy Director, Advanced Analysis at DGI's Center for
Intelligence Research and Analysis, term member of the Council on Foreign Relations, a
founding member of the Cyber Conflict Studies Association, member of the National Committee
for U.S.-China Relations and the Association for Asian Studies, Ph.D. in political science from
the University of California, Los Angeles, and attended Fudan University in Shanghai, PLA
Divestiture 2.0: We Mean It This Time, Hoover Institution,
http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm50jm.pdf RD; AD 7/29/16]
The Benefits of Completing Divestiture: An Assessment As in 1998, the timing of the second wave of divestiture was prompted by
multiple strategic concerns for the political leadership, including the related goals of bolstering military capabilities, supporting the PLAs
unprecedented reorganization, and fighting military corruption. Bolstering Military Capabilities In recent years, Xi
Jinping has
consistently exhorted the military to boost its battlefield capabilities and address its weaknesses
in order to cope with the more complicated security challenges caused by the countrys rising
economic might. Specifically, Xi called on the PLA to be able to fight and win, and provide
strong support for realizing the Chinese dream and the strong army dream. 6 Drawing a direct link between
the distraction of economic activity and warfighting, a 28 March 2016 Liberation Army Daily editorial simply asserted, the militarys basic
function is to fight, and deviating from that core activity will bring endless disaster. More to the point,
the commentators argued that profits will distract the military from strengthening its combat
capabilities.7 The same editorial quoted National Defense University Professor Gong Fangbin, who argued that the divestiture aims to
improve the militarys combat capability.8 Finally, a May 2016 Global Times article quoted an unnamed officer who analyzed the situation with typical
Chinese bluntness: The
duty of the army is getting ready for wars. How can they battle if they are
shooting on the training ground, and at the same time calculating how much money they can
make from a contract they just signed?9 Supporting the PLAs Unprecedented Reorganization The PLA is currently embarked
on a massive, unprecedented reorganization. The leadership has announced a cut of 300,000 troops or 13 percent of force by end of 2017, the
consolidation of seven military regions into five theater warzones, the consolidation of four General Departments into a streamlined command
structure under CMC, the establishment of Army and Rocket Force service branches, and the founding of Strategic Support Force, not to mention
dozens of smaller but significant changes.1011 The spirit of these changes is to remove entities and structures from the military system that are
outdated or impede the PLAs joint warfare development goals and fail to increase warfighting capability. By those criteria, the divestiture of paid
services from the military is entirely simpatico with the reorganization and may in fact remove key obstacles. Fighting Military Corruption. Perhaps
the most obvious motivation for the second phase of divestiture is to deepen the anti-corruption push within the military. NDU Professor Gong Fangbin
won the award for understatement when he told Global Times that paid services can sometimes encourage corruption. 12 Indeed, the same article
described the change as the toughest move against military commercialization in Chinas history, [which] will put an end to a practice that has existed
for three decades, has long been a hotbed for corruption and has led to many top generals falling in disgrace due to dodgy real estate deals in recent
years. 13 Gong was more specific, arguing that the
corruption case of Gu Junshan and those of other senior

officers were closely connected to their involvement in businesses. 14 The Global Times author continued the
thought, linking the move to other high-profile PLA corruption cases and revealing new information: Among the nearly 50 tigers who were cracked
down in Chinas fight against corruption in the military, many are from the general logistics department or in charge of the approval of real estaterelated projects. The fall of Gu Junshan, the former Deputy Director of the PLA General Logistics Department from December 2009 to February 2012,
and Xu Caihou, former Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission, are both related to real estate projects that they oversaw. Wu Fangfang, the
daughter-in-law of the disgraced Guo Boxiong, former vice chairman of the CMC, for example, operated a fabric wholesale market on a small plot of
military land in Xiasha in 2007, where she made 800 million yuan selling leases for market space to tenants. Although the land was only allowed to be
leased for 15 years, Wu sold them as being for 30 years and many investors were conned. Officials from the Zhejiang Military Region, who turned a
blind eye to Wus illegal dealings, were also convicted after Guos fall.15 Finally, Professor
Gong broadened his comments to

the macro level, linking the anticorruption push to defense budgeting and the overall
development of the PRC economy: The militarys involvement in the commercial sector has also
aroused suspicion about whether it properly uses defense funds. . . . Moreover, there have been
concerns that the PLA would use its advantages in a race for profits and overpower civilian competitors.16
In sum, both the political and military parts of the Chinese system saw direct benefits from completion
of the divestiture process, and believed that it could help some of the most disruptive and controversial reform
efforts under way within the PLA. Only time will tell whether this latest divestiture will truly be
final, or perhaps portions of it will fall prey to the same political exigencies that prevented it from completion in 1998.
Reform Good: Accidents

Chinese military reform decrease risk of accidents
Weitz 3/15/16 http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/18215/pla-military-reforms-defense-power-with-chinesecharacteristics Richard Weitz is a senior fellow and director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at Hudson Institute.
To Beijings chagrin, the
PLAs previous structure gave the regional commanders and other senior
officers ample opportunities to evade central direction . That facilitated corruption and the privileging of local
interests over national ones, ultimately wasting resources, hurting morale and undermining combat effectiveness. Another
source of decreasing CPC control has been the wider decline of ideology in Chinese society, due
to the governments abandonment of the socialist command economy in favor of market reforms
and other deviations from traditional Marxist-Leninist doctrines. Furthermore, fewer Chinese civilian
leaders have served as senior PLA commanders, ending the previous pattern of soldier-statesmen. Nor has China cultivated the
generation of civilian strategists now seen in Western research institutions and think tanks, resulting in a shortage of strategic
Meanwhile, military technology and tactics have become more complex since
the days of the Mao Zedong-era Peoples War, prompting civilian leaders to defer to military
expertise on defense issues. However, a hands-off civilian leadership could complicate crisis
management, which requires rapid decisions and close civil-military coordination. Prior to Xis
presidency, moreover, the military appeared to take actionssuch as shooting down a space satellite in 2007
thinkers outside the PLA.
or ostentatiously showing off a new stealth fighter when former U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates visited Beijing in 2011
without fully informing the political leadership in advance. The new reforms will tighten CPC
oversight of the military.
Impact D
No Impact to Reform
No impactno change to agenda or troop structure
SHAH 4/20-Research Assistant @ Observer Research Foundation [Kriti, Xi strengthens his hold over Chinas military,
The main implications of the reform include the reduction in power and influence of the PLA. While the reforms enable the PLA to
concentrate on territorial defence and combat, it also increases the jointness between the PLA navy, air force and rocket force.
Discussing the implications of the reforms for India , General Narasimhan highlighted how the
vastness of western theatre command geographic area would perhaps affect its military
capability. While earlier India was dealing with two military regions, it would only deal with one the western command. In addition, the reduction of troops over a period of time as the geographic area of command
stabilises over time could mean that they will be fewer troops in operation against India. The large area
under the western commander will also make it difficult for the theatre commander to orchestrate his actions. The reforms
and their affect on China and its neighbours will play out in time, as Xi implements them in
steady phases. The question and answer session raised some important queries with regard to whether the PLA had been
weakened due to Xis centralisation of power, who would head Chinas out-of-area missions under the new army structure, whether
the central theatre command would form the nucleus of the army as it looked after Beijing and how the present reforms would look
change the way China behaved with US and its allies, vis--vis matters in the South China Sea. The speaker responded reiterating
that in
China, the survival of the regime was of paramount importance, and therefore the political
department of the PLA would always remain strong. In addition, the headmaster of the outof
area contingency operations would remain with the CMC. General Naramsinhan also stated his
belief that there would be no major change in Chinese interest in the South China Sea. Since
only the command and control structure had changed, with no major change in troop structure,
the US and its allies would therefore view Chinese outofarea operations in the same way. In
addition, any change in how the US and allies would view the PLA reforms, would only be seen as
the reform continue to steadily roll out over a period of time.
A2-Rougue PLA/Lashout
No risk of rogue PLAtheir ev is all speculative at bestempirics
Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) In this area, the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA)
is a fundamental actor. But this has to

be viewed in the context that properly understands that the PLA is as much a servant of the Party as is the
MFA, perhaps even more so, and remains answerable to the Party, just as it was on its foundation
in the 1920s as the Red Army.[20] Its fundamental task during the era of Reform and Opening Up since the late 1970s has
been to assist the Party and government in creating a strong, prospering, secure China, and one therefore with a powerful
economy. Over the last decade, the Chinese Ministry of Defence has issued White Papers outlining its
holistic vision for the role of the PLA in China, and the ways it relates to the Party and government. The latest, in
2015, states simply that: Building a strong national defense and powerful armed forces is a strategic task of Chinas modernization
drive and a security guarantee for Chinas peaceful development. To this end, the PLA focuses on the following core priorities:
Building a strong military Implementing the military strategic guideline of active defense Accelerating the modernization of national
defense and armed forces, Resolutely safeguarding Chinas sovereignty, security and development interests Providing a strong
guarantee for achieving the national strategic goal of the two centenaries Realizing the Chinese dream of achieving the great
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation[21] Specifically on the South China Sea issue, the White Paper states: On the issues concerning
Chinas territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, some of its offshore neighbors take provocative actions and
reinforce their military presence on Chinas reefs and islands that they have illegally occupied. Some external countries are also busy
meddling in South China Sea affairs; a tiny few maintain constant close-in air and sea surveillance and reconnaissance against
For all the talk of the

PLA being bellicose, sabre rattling and itching to promote its new prowess and gain some
combat experience, it is often forgotten just how much it is a creature of the
politicians. The PLA has never defied the Party in the way that the USSR Red Army turned against the
China. It is thus a long-standing task for China to safeguard its maritime rights and interests.[22]
Communist Party in the 1980s, and then played a role in bringing down its leadership and putting a new government in power in
1991. The
recent anti-corruption struggle has lapped at the doors of the PLA, ensuring
it is even more disciplined and politically circumscribed. And while there are a few
vociferous PLA official s stating that China needs to be pushier and tougher with its neighbours, and that the PLA
might be able to articulate an area of policy unilaterally or even take a lead, these claims are highly speculative.
There is simply no hard evidence that this is the case nor any real indication it might
become so. As proof of this, one only has to look at the case of Rear Admiral Yang Yi, writing in the
government owned Global Times Chinese newspaper in October 2015, where he warned that China would deliver a
head-on blow to any foreign forces violating Chinas sovereignty. He went on to state that,
Safeguarding maritime rights calls for force and power.[23] Despite this, when the U.S. destroyer
did sail through the disputed waters , there were no immediate Chinese military response . In
the words of Australian journalist John Garnaut, when the United States tested this thesis by sailing a guided missile
destroyer close to one of those islands, China barely raised a murmur .[24] It is hard to think that Xi
Jinping and his colleagues therefore are structuring the framework of their policy around the South China Sea
on considerations about placating the PLA. This is not to claim that the PLA does not figure in their thinking, but
it is only one of a number of voices, and has a tightly circumscribed space. Elite Party officials
under Xi do not hope that tensions in the South China Sea are ratcheted up in order to satisfy the
generals, nor have there been signs at least since 2012 that local military leaders are able to make
decisions about action on their own (the most visible case of this possibly happening was that of Hu Jintao appearing to
The
PLA conceptualises its work in ways that mean it is hard to imagine it ideologically, militarily, or
politically having sufficient policy autonomy, or a narrative of it own power that would set it
against the Party. It is part of the Party, within the Party, and gains its raison dtre from the
Party. That has not changed, and is unlikely to do so.
be blind sighted during a visit by a U.S. Secretary of Defence who brought up the testing of a new stealth jet in January 2011).
No Impact-Liberalism Locked In
US international order locked inmassive economic, technological,
and military advantagesChina isnt even close
BROOKS* and WOHLFORTH** 16-*Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, PhD @ Yale,
**Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, PhD and MA in Political Science @ Yale [Stephen, William, The
Once and Future Superpower-Why China Wont Overtake the United States, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2016,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-04-13/once-and-future-superpower, DKP]
Ater two and a half decades, is
the United States run as the worlds sole superpower coming to an end? Many
say yes, seeing a rising China ready to catch up to or even surpass the United States in the near future. By many
measures, after all, Chinas economy is on track to become the worlds biggest, and even if its growth slows, it will still outpace that of the United States
for many years. Its coffers overflowing, Beijing has used its new wealth to attract friends, deter enemies, modernize its military, and aggressively assert
But this
is wishful, or fearful, thinking . Economic growth no longer translates as directly into
military power as it did in the past, which means that it is now harder than ever for rising powers to rise and
established ones to fall. And China the only country with the raw potential to become a true global peer of the United States
also faces a more daunting challenge than previous rising states because of how far it lags behind
technologically. Even though the U nited S tates economic dominance has eroded from its peak, the countrys military
superiority is not going anywhere, nor is the globe-spanning alliance structure that
constitutes the core of the existing liberal international order (unless Washington unwisely decides to
throw it away). Rather than expecting a power transition in international politics, everyone shoul d start
getting used to a world in which the U nited S tates remains the sole superpower for decades to
come. Lasting preeminence will help the United States ward off the greatest traditional international danger, war
between the worlds major powers. And it will give Washington options for dealing with nonstate threats
such as terrorism and transnational challenges such as climate change. But it will also impose burdens of leadership and
sovereignty claims in its periphery. For many, therefore, the question is not whether China will become a superpower but just how soon.
force choices among competing priorities, particularly as finances grow more straitened. With great power comes great responsibility, as the saying
goes, and playing its leading role successfully will require Washington to display a maturity that U.S. foreign policy has all too often lacked. THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS In
forecasts of Chinas future power position, much has been made of the countrys pressing
slowing economy, polluted environment, widespread corruption, perilous financial
markets, nonexistent social safety net, rapidly aging population, and restive middle class. But as
harmful as these problems are, Chinas true Achilles heel on the world stage is something else: its low
level of technological expertise compared with the United States. Relative to past rising powers, China has a much
wider technological gap to close with the leading power. China may export container after container of high-tech
goods, but in a world of globalized production, that doesnt reveal much. Half of all Chinese exports consist o f
what economists call processing trade, meaning that parts are imported into China for assembly and then exported afterward. And the
vast majority of these Chinese exports are directed not by Chinese firms but by corporations from more
developed countries. When looking at measures of technological prowess that better reflect the national origin of the expertise, Chinas true
position becomes clear. World Bank data on payments for the use of intellectual property, for example, indicate
that the U nited S tates is far and away the lead ing source of innovative technologies, boasting
$128 billion in receipts in 2013more than four times as much as the country in second place, Japan. China, by contrast, imports
technologies on a massive scale yet received less than $1 billion in receipts in 2013 for the use of its intellectual property. Another
good indicator of the technological gap is the number of so-called triadic patents, those registered in the United States, Europe,
and Japan. In 2012, nearly 14,000 such patents originated in the United States, compared with just under 2,000 in China. The distribution of
highly influential articles in science and engineeringthose in the top one percent of citations, as measured by the National Science
domestic challenges: its
Foundationtells
the same story, with the United States accounting for almost half of these articles, more than eight times Chinas share.
So does the breakdown of Nobel Prizes in Physics, Chemistry, and Physiology or Medicine. Since 1990, 114 have gone to U.S.based researchers. China-based researchers have received two. Precisely because the Chinese economy is so unlike the U.S. economy, the measure
fueling expectations of a power shift, GDP,
greatly underestimates the true economic gap between the two countries. For
immense destruction that China is now wreaking on its environment counts favorably
toward its GDP, even though it will reduce economic capacity over time by shortening life spans and
raising cleanup and health-care costs. For another thing, GDP was originally designed to measure midtwentieth-century manufacturing economies, and so the more knowledge-based and globalized a
countrys production is, the more its GDP underestimates its economys true size. A new statistic
one thing, the
developed by the UN suggests the degree to which GDP inflates Chinas relative power. Called inclusive wealth, this measure represents economists
most systematic effort to date to calculate a states wealth. As a UN report explained, it counts a countrys stock of assets in three areas: (i)
manufactured capital (roads, buildings, machines, and equipment), (ii) human capital (skills, education, health), and (iii) natural capital (sub-soil
resources, ecosystems, the atmosphere). Added up,
the U nited S tates inclusive wealth comes to almost
$144 trillion
4.5 times Chinas $32 trillion. The true size of Chinas economy relative to the United States may lie somewhere in between the
numbers provided by GDP and inclusive wealth, and admittedly, the latter measure has yet to receive the same level of scrutiny as GDP. The problem
with GDP, however, is that it measures a flow (typically, the value of goods and services produced in a year), whereas inclusive wealth measures a stock.
As The Economist put it, Gauging
an economy by its GDP is like judging a company by its quarterly

profits, without ever peeking at its balance-sheet. Because inclusive wealth measures the pool
of resources a government can conceivably draw on to achieve its strategic objectives, it is the more useful
metric when thinking about geopolitical competition. But no matter how one compares the size of the U.S. and Chinese
economies, it is clear that the U nited S tates is far more capable of converting its resources
into military might. In the past, rising states had levels of technological prowess similar to
those of leading ones. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, for example, the United States didnt lag far behind the
United Kingdom in terms of technology, nor did Germany lag far behind the erstwhile Allies during the interwar years, nor was the Soviet Union
backward technologically compared with the United States during the early Cold War. This
meant that when these challengers

rose economically, they could soon mount a serious military challenge to the dominant power. Chinas
relative technological backwardness today, however, means that even if its economy continues to
gain ground , it will not be easy for it to catch up militarily and become a true global
strategic peer , as opposed to a merely a major player in its own neighborhood.
A2-China Military Rise

The gap in military capacity between the US and China is massive and
would take decades for it to become even somewhat close
The technological and economic differences between China and the United States wouldnt matter much if all it
took to gain superpower status were the ability to use force locally. But what makes the U nited S tates a
superpower is its ability to operate globally , and the bar for that capability is high. It means
having what the political scientist Barry Posen has called command of the commonsthat is, control over the air,
space, and the open sea, along with the necessary infrastructure for managing these domains. When one
measures the 14 categories of systems that create this capability (everything from nuclear attack submarines to
satellites to transport aircraft), what emerges is an overwhelming U.S. advantage in each area , the
result of decades of advances on multiple fronts. It would take a very long time for
China to approach U.S. power on any of these fronts, let alone all of them. For one thing, the
United States has built up a massive scientific and industrial base. China is rapidly enhancing its
technological inputs, increasing its R & D spending and its numbers of graduates with degrees in science and engineering. But there
are limits to how fast any country can leap forward in such matters, and there are various obstacles in
Chinas waysuch as a lack of effective intellectual property protections and inefficient methods of
allocating capitalthat will be extremely hard to change given its rigid political system. Adding to the difficulty,
China is chasing a moving target. In 2012, the United States spent $79 billion on military R & D, more
than 13 times as much as Chinas estimated amount, so even rapid Chinese advances might be
insufficient to close the gap. Then there are the decades the United States has spent procuring
advanced weapons systems, which have grown only more complex over time. In the 1960s, aircraft took about five
years to develop, but by the 1990s, as the number of parts and lines of code ballooned, the figure reached ten years. Today, it takes 15 to
20 years to design and build the most advanced fighter aircraft , and military satellites can
take even longer. So even if another country managed to build the scientific and industrial base
to develop the many types of weapons that give the United States command of the commons, there would be a lengthy lag
before it could actually possess them. Even Chinese defense planners recognize the scale of the
challenge. Command of the commons also requires the ability to supervise a wide range of giant defense projects. For all the
hullabaloo over the evils of the military-industrial complex and the waste, fraud, and abuse in the
Pentagon, in the United States, research labs, contractors, and bureaucrats have painstakingly acquired this
expertise over many decades, and their Chinese counterparts do not yet have it. This
kind of learning by doing experience resides in organizations, not in individuals. It can be
transferred only through demonstration and instruction, so cybertheft or other forms of
espionage are not an effective shortcut for acquiring it. Chinas defense industry is
still in its infancy , and as the scholar Richard Bitzinger and his colleagues have concluded, Aside from a few pockets of excellence such as
ballistic missiles, the Chinese military-industrial complex has appeared to demonstrate few capacities
for designing and producing relatively advanced conventional weapon systems. For example, China
still cannot mass-produce high-performance aircraft engines, despite the immense resources it has thrown at the
effort, and relies instead on second-rate Russian models. In other areas, Beijing has not even bothered competing. Take
China is poorly equipped for antisubmarine warfare and is doing very little
to improve. And only now is the country capable of producing nuclear-powered attack
submarines that are comparable in quietness to the kinds that the U.S. Navy commissioned in the
1950s. Since then, however, the U.S. government has invested hundreds of billions of dollars and six
decades of effort in its current generation of Virginia-class submarines, which have achieved absolute levels of
silencing. Finally, it takes a very particular set of skills and infrastructure to actually use all these weapons.
Employing them is difficult not just because the weapons themselves tend to be so complex but also because
they typically need to be used in a coordinated manner. It is an incredibly complicated endeavor ,
for example, to deploy a carrier battle group; the many associated ships and aircraft must work together in real time. Even
systems that may seem simple require a complex surrounding architecture in order to be truly effective.
Drones, for example, work best when a military has the highly trained personnel to operate them and
the technological and organizational capacity to rapidly gather, process, and act on information collected
from them. Developing the necessary infrastructure to seek command of the commons would
take any military a very long time. And since the task places a high premium on flexibility and
delegation, Chinas centralized and hierarchical forces are particularly ill suited for
it.
undersea warfare.
Even if China somehow acquires the latent capabilities to become

hegemonic they have no incentive to challenge the US orderalso heg
is sweet
In the 1930s alone, Japan escaped the depths of depression and morphed into a rampaging military machine, Germany transformed
from the disarmed loser of World War I into a juggernaut capable of conquering Europe, and the Soviet Union recovered from war
and revolution to become a formidable land power. The next decade saw the United States own sprint from military also-ran to
few seriously anticipate another

world war , or even another cold war, but many observers argue that these past experiences reveal
just how quickly countries can become dangerous once they try to extract military capabilities from their
economies. But what is taking place now is not your grandfathers power transition . One can
debate whether China will soon reach the first major milestone on the journey from great power to
superpower: having the requisite economic resources. But a giant economy alone wont
make China the worlds second superpower, nor would overcoming the next big hurdle, attaining the
requisite technological capacity. After that lies the challenge of transforming all this
latent power into the full range of systems needed for global power projection and learning
how to use them. Each of these steps is time consuming and fraught with difficult y. As a result,
China will, for a long time, continue to hover somewhere between a great power and a superpower. You
might call it an emerging potential superpower: thanks to its economic growth, China has broken free from the great-power
pack, but it still has a long way to go before it might gain the economic and technological
capacity to become a superpower. Chinas quest for superpower status is undermined by
something else, too: weak incentives to make the sacrifices required. The United States owes its
far-reaching military capabilities to the existential imperatives of the Cold War. The country would
global superpower, with a nuclear Soviet Union close on its heels. Today,
never have borne the burden it did had policymakers not faced the challenge of balancing the Soviet Union, a superpower with the
potential to dominate Eurasia. (Indeed, it is no surprise that two and a half decades after the Soviet Union collapsed, it is Russia that
China faces nothing like the Cold War

pressures that led the United States to invest so much in its military. The United States is a far less threatening
possesses the second-greatest military capability in the world.) Today,
superpower than the Soviet Union was: however aggravating Chinese policymakers find
U.S. foreign policy, it is unlikely to engender the level of fear that motivated
Washington during the Cold War. Stacking the odds against China even more, the U nited
S tates has few incentives to give up power, thanks to the web of alliances it has long
boasted. A list of U.S. allies reads as a whos who of the worlds most advanced economies , and these
partners have lowered the price of maintaining the United States superpower status. U.S. defense spending stood at around
three percent of GDP at the end of the 1990s, rose to around five percent in the next decade on account of the wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq, and has
now fallen back to close to three percent. Washington has been able to
sustain a global military capacity with relatively little effort thanks in part to the bases
its allies host and the top-end weapons they help develop. Chinas only steadfast ally is
North Korea , which is often more trouble than it is worth. Given the barriers thwarting
Chinas path to superpower status, as well as the low incentives for trying to overcome them, the
future of the international system hinges most on whether the United States continues to bear the
much lower burden of sustaining what we and others have called deep engagement, the globe-girdling grand strategy
it has followed for some 70 years. And barring some odd change of heart that results in a true abnegation of its global
role (as opposed to overwrought, politicized charges sometimes made about its already having done so), Washington will
be well positioned for decades to maintain the core military capabilities, alliances, and
commitments that secure key regions, backstop the global economy, and foster cooperation on
transnational problems. The benefits of this grand strategy can be difficult to discern, especially in light of the United
States foreign misadventures in recent years. Fiascos such as the invasion of Iraq stand as stark reminders of
the difficulty of using force to alter domestic politics abroad. But power is as much about preventing
unfavorable outcomes as it is about causing favorable ones , and here Washington has done a much better job
than most Americans appreciate. For a largely satisfied power leading the international system, having enough strength to deter or
block challengers is in fact more valuable than having the ability to improve ones position further on the margins. A
crucial
objective of U.S. grand strategy over the decades has been to prevent a much more dangerous
world from emerging, and its success in this endeavor can be measured largely by the absence of
outcomes common to history: important regions destabilized by severe security dilemmas,
tattered alliances unable to contain breakout challengers, rapid weapons proliferation, greatpower arms races, and a descent into competitive economic or military blocs. Were Washington
to truly pull back from the world, more of these challenges would emerge, and transnational threats
would likely loom even larger than they do today. Even if such threats did not grow, the task of
addressing them would become immeasurably harder if the United States had to grapple with a much
less stable global order at the same time. And as difficult as it sometimes is today for the United States to pull together
coalitions to address transnational challenges, it would be even harder to do so if the country abdicated its
leadership role and retreated to tend its garden, as a growing number of analysts and policymakersand a large swath of the
publicare now calling for.
Interdependence checks escalation DEPSITE Xi bullying

Although Chinas relationship with the United States has long been a priority for Chinese
leaders, Xi has increasingly been willing to test it and it occupies less of his attention than it did
of his predecessors. He has not only criticized U.S. alliances, questioned the role of non- Asian powers in Asian affairs, and
built alternative institutional struc - tures excluding the United States, but has also continued Chinas rapid military modernization
even as the Chinese economy slows. As China asserts its vital national interests, one of which is limiting the U.S. role in Asian affairs
and related power projection capabilities, Beijings posi - tions on matters ranging from the U.S. alliance system in Asia, to free dom of navigation, to human rights, to the territorial integrity of Japan, to the rise of India, to the future of Taiwan will come into
sustained ten - sion with U.S. national interests, policies, commitments, and values. Nevertheless,
Chinas growing
geopolitical ambitions are tem - pered by the reality of its economic relationship with the United
States and a variety of shared international interests between the two coun - tries. China will
continue to seek to expand its influence and in some instances will compete directly with the
United States, and Xi may criti - cize Washington to score points at home, but bilateral
economic inter - dependence will, in most cases, provide a floor for the relationship. This is, of
course, different from the longtime U.S. objective of constrain - ing and ultimately moderating
Chinese behavior by broadly integrat - ing China into the international system , a strategy that appears
not to have substantially shaped Chinas more assertive external policies. In sum , Xi does not want to trigger a
confrontation with the United States, especially during a period of economic uncertainty in
China.
A2-Agro China
US is overwhelmingly more powerful than China despite a closing
gap, aggressiveness and overreaction only risks unnecessary conflict
and instability
Ever since the Soviet Unions demise, the United States dramatic power advantage over other states
has been accompanied by the risk of self-inflicted wounds, as occurred in Iraq. But the slippage in the
United States economic position may have the beneficial effect of forcing U.S. leaders to focus more on
the core mission of the countrys grand strategy rather than being sucked into messy peripheral
conflicts. Indeed, that has been the guiding logic behind President Barack Obamas foreign policy.
Nonetheless, a world of lasting U.S. military preeminence and declining U.S. economic dominance
will continue to test the United States capacity for restraint, in four main ways. First is the temptation to
bully or exploit American allies in the pursuit of self-interested gain. U.S. allies are dependent on Washington
in many ways, and leaning on them to provide favors in returnwhether approving of controversial U.S. policies, refraining from
activities the United States opposes, or agreeing to lopsided terms in mutually beneficial dealsseems like something only a chump
would forgo. (Think of the Republican presidential candidate Donald Trumps frequent claims that the United States always loses in
its dealings with foreigners, including crucial allies, and that he would restore the countrys ability to win.) But
the basic
contract at the heart of the contemporary international order is that if its members put aside the
quest for relative military advantage, join a dense web of institutional networks, and agree to
play by common rules, then the United States will not take advantage of its dominance to extract
undue returns from its allies. It would be asking too much to expect Washington to never use its
leverage to seek better deals, and a wide range of presidentsincluding John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, George W. Bush, and
Obamahave done so at various times. But if Washington too often uses its power to achieve narrowly
self-interested gains, rather than to protect and advance the system as a whole , it will run a real risk
of eroding the legitimacy of both its leadership and the existing order. Second, the
U nited S tates will be increasingly tempted to overreact when other statesnamely, Chinause
their growing economic clout on the world stage. Most of the recent rising powers of note, including
Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union, were stronger militarily than economically. China, by contrast , will
for decades be stronger economically than militarily. This is a good thing , since
military challenges to global order can turn ugly quickly. But it means that China will mount economic
challenges instead, and these will need to be handled wisely. Most of Chinas efforts along
these lines will likely involve only minor or cosmetic alterations to the existing order,
important for burnishing Beijings prestige but not threatening to the orders basic arrangements or
principles. Washington should respond to these gracefully and with forbearance ,
recognizing that paying a modest price for including Beijing within the order is
preferable to risking provoking a more fundamental challenge to the structure in
general. The recent fracas over the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is a good example of how not
to behave. China proposed the AIIB in 2013 as a means to bolster its status and provide investment in infrastructure in Asia.
Although its criteria for loans might turn out to be less constructive than desired, it is not likely to do major harm to the
region or
undermine the structure of the global economy. And yet the United States responded by launching
a public diplomatic campaign to dissuade its allies from joining. They balked at U.S. opposition and
signed up eagerly. By its reflexive opposition both to a relatively constructive Chinese initiative and to its allies participation in it,
Washington created an unnecessary zero-sum battle that ended in a humiliating

diplomatic defeat. (A failure by the U.S. Congress to pass the Trans-Pacific Partnership as negotiated, meanwhile, would be
an even greater fiasco, leading to serious questions abroad about U.S. global leadership.) Third, the United States will still
face the temptation that always accompanies power, to intervene in places where its core national
interests are not in play (or to expand the definition of its core national interests so much as to hollow out the concept).
That temptation can exist in the midst of a superpower struggle the United States got bogged down in Vietnam during
the Cold War, as did the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and it clearly exists today, at a time when the United States has no
peer rivals. Obama has carefully guarded against this temptation. He attracted much criticism for elevating
Dont do stupid stuff to a grand-strategic maxim. But if doing stupid stuff threatens the United States ability to
sustain its grand strategy and associated global presence, then he had a point. Missing, though, was a corollary: Keep your eye on
the ball. And for nearly seven decades, that has meant continuing Washingtons core mission of fostering stability in key regions
and keeping the global economy and wider order humming. Finally,
Washington will need to avoid

adopting overly aggressive military postures even when core interests are at stake ,
such as with Chinas increasingly assertive stance in its periphery. It is true that Beijings antiaccess/area-denial capabilities have greatly raised the costs and risks of operating U.S. aircraft
and surface ships (but not submarines) near China. How Washington should respond to Beijings newfound local military
capability, however, depends on what Washingtons strategic goals are. To regain all the military freedom of action
the United States enjoyed during its extraordinary dominance throughout the 1990s would indeed be difficult, and the
actions necessary would increase the risk of future confrontations. Yet if Washingtons goals are
more limitedsecuring regional allies and sustaining a favorable institutional and economic order then the challenge
should be manageable. By adopting its own area-denial strategy, for example, the United States could still deter
Chinese aggression and protect U.S. allies despite Chinas rising military power. Unlike the muchdiscussed Air-Sea Battle doctrine for a Pacific conflict, this approach would not envision hostilities rapidly
escalating to strikes on the Chinese mainland. Rather, it would be designed to curtail Chinas ability
during a conflict to operate within what is commonly known as the first island chain, encompassing parts of Japan, the
Philippines, and Taiwan. Under this strategy, the United States and its allies would employ the same mix of capabilitiessuch as
And it
could turn the tables and force China to compete in areas where it remains very weak, most
notably, undersea warfare. The premise of such a strategy is that even if China were able to deny U.S.
surface forces and aircraft access to the area near its coast, it would not be able to use that space
as a launching pad for projecting military power farther during a conflict. Chinas coastal waters, in this
scenario, would turn into a sort of no mans sea , in which neither state could make much use of surface ships or
aircraft. This would be a far cry from the situation that prevailed during the 1990s , when China could not
mines and mobile antiship missilesthat China itself has used to push U.S. surface ships and aircraft away from its coast.
stop the worlds leading military power from enjoying unfettered access to its airspace and ocean right up to its territorial border.
But the change needs to be put in perspective:
it is only natural that after spending tens of billions of dollars
over decades, China has begun to reverse this unusual vulnerability , one the United States would never accept
for itself. While this area-denial strategy would help solve a long-term problem, it would do little to address the most immediate
challenge from China: the military facilities it is steadily building on artificial islands in the South China Sea. There is no easy
Washington should avoid too aggressive a reaction, which could spark a

conflict. After all, these small, exposed islands arguably leave the overall military balance
unchanged, since they would be all but impossible to defend in a conflict. Chinas assertiveness
may even be backfiring. Last year, the Philippinesreal islands with extremely valuable basing facilities
welcomed U.S. forces back onto its shores after a 24-year absence. And the United States is now in talks
to base long-range bombers in Australia. To date, the Obama administration has chosen to conduct so-called
freedom-of-navigation operations in order to contest Chinas maritime claims. But as the leader of the order it largely shaped, the
answer, but
United States has many other arrows in its quiver. To place the burden of escalation on China, the United Statesor,
even better, its alliescould take a page from Chinas playbook and ramp up quasi-official research voyages in the area.
Another asset Washington has is international law. Pressure is mounting on China to

submit its territorial disputes to arbitration in international courts, and if Beijing continues to
resist doing so, it will lose legitimacy and could find itself a target of sanctions and other
diplomatic punishments. And if Beijing tried to extract economic gains from contested regions,
Washington could facilitate a process along the lines of the proportional punishment strategy it
helped make part of the World Trade Organization: let the Permanent Court of Arbitration, in The Hague, determine the gains of
Chinas illegal actions, place a temporary tariff on Chinese exports to collect exactly that much revenue while the sovereignty claims
are being adjudicated, and then distribute them once the matter is settled before the International Court of Justice. Whatever
approach is adopted, what matters for U.S. global interests is not the islands themselves or the nature of the claims per se but what
Although China can pose problems without catching up, in

the words of the political scientist Thomas Christensen, the bottom line is that the U nited S tates global
position gives it room to maneuver. The key is to exploit the advantages of
standing on the defensive : as a raft of strategic thinkers have pointed out, challenging a
settled status quo is very hard to do.
these provocations do to the wider order.
A2-US-China War
No U.S.-China war
AD 7/25/16]
Armed conflict between the U.S. and China is highly unlikely in the coming decade. Xi Jinping is a
nationalist. And China, both the U.S. and Chinas neighbors have concluded, is displaying newfound assertiveness in pursuing its hard security interests
in the region. But there is, nonetheless, a very low risk of any form of direct conflict involving the armed forces of China and the U.S. over the next
decade. It
is not in the national interests of either country for any such conflict to occur; and it
would be disastrous for both, not to mention for the rest of the world. Despite the deep difficulties in the
relationship, no Cold War standoff between them yet exists, only a strategic chill. In fact, there is a high
level of economic inter-dependency in the relationship, which some international relations
scholars think puts a fundamental brake on the possibility of any open hostilities. Although it should be
noted the U.S. is no longer as important to the Chinese economy as it once was. However, armed conflict could feasibly arise through one of two
scenarios: Either an accidental collision between U.S. and Chinese aircraft or naval vessels followed by a badly managed crisis; or Through a collision
(accidental or deliberate) between Chinese military assets and those of a regional U.S. ally, most obviously Japan or the Philippines. In the case of
Japan, the report argues that, after bilateral tensions reached unprecedented heights during 2013-14, Beijing and Tokyo took steps in late 2014 to deescalate their standoff over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Hotlines
between the two militaries are now being

established, reducing the possibility of accidental conflict escalation. However, the same cannot be said of the
South China Sea, where China continues its large-scale land reclamation efforts, where tensions with Vietnam and the Philippines remain high, and
where mil-to-mil protocols are undeveloped. Xi Jinping has neither the interest, room for maneuver or personal predisposition to refrain from an
assertive defense of these territorial claims, or to submit them to any form of external arbitration. More remote contingencies remain for conflict
between the U.S. and China, notably on the Korean Peninsula and over Taiwan. On North Korea, this is improbable in the extreme given Xi Jinpings
dissatisfaction with Kim Jong-Un over his continuing nuclear program, and his concern that a nuclear crisis on the Peninsula would fundamentally
derail Chinas 20 U.S.-China 21: The Future of U.S.-China Relations Under Xi Jinping economic transformation. Under Xi, U.S.-China strategic
dialogue on North Korea is deepening, but anything is always possible on the part of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) regime, as are
the consequences for regional stability. As for Taiwan, the period of six years of political and economic engagement between Beijing and Taipei under
Ma Ying-jeou s (Ma Yingjiu ) administration may be coming to an end. If the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) wins the
Taiwanese Presidential elections in 2016, and if it were to flirt again with the idea of a referendum on independence, Xi would likely take a harder line
than his predecessors. And for the U.S., the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act have not changed. Of
course, Xi Jinping has no

interest in triggering armed conflict with the U.S., a nightmare scenario that would
fundamentally undermine Chinas economic rise. Furthermore, there are few, if any, credible
military scenarios in the immediate period ahead in which China could militarily prevail in a
direct conflict with the U.S. This explains Xis determination to oversee the professionalization and modernization of the Peoples
Liberation Army (PLA) into a credible, war-fighting and war-winning machine. Xi Jinping is an intelligent consumer of
strategic literature and would have concluded that risking any premature military engagement
with the U.S. would be foolish. Traditional Chinese strategic thinking is unequivocal in its advice
not to engage an enemy unless you are in a position of overwhelming strength. Under Xi, the ultimate
purpose of Chinas military expansion and modernization is not to inflict defeat on the U.S., but to deter the U.S. Navy from intervening in Chinas
immediate periphery by creating sufficient doubt in the minds of American strategists as to their ability to prevail. In the medium term, the report
analyzes the vulnerability of the U.S.-China relationship to the dynamics of Thucydides Trap, whereby rising great powers have historically ended up
at war with established great powers when one has sought to pre-empt the other at a time of perceived maximum strategic opportunity. According to
case studies, such situations have resulted in war in 12 out of 16 instances over the last 500 years. 6 Xi
Jinping is deeply aware of this

strategic literature and potential implications for U.S.-China relations. This has, in part,
underpinned his desire to reframe U.S.-China relations from strategic competition to a new
type of great power relationship. In the longer term, neither Xi Jinping nor his advisors necessarily
accept the proposition of the inevitability of U.S. economic, political and military decline that is often publicized
6 Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can the U.S. and China Escape Thucydides Trap? Forthcoming. Please see http://
belfercenter.org/publications/ for details. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School 21 in the Chinese media and by
the academy. More sober minds in Xis administration are mindful of the capacity of the U.S. political system and economy to rebound and reinvent
itself. Moreover, Xi is also aware of his own countrys date with demographic destiny when the population begins to shrink, while the populations of the
U.S. and those of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) economies will continue to increase. For these reasons,
the report
concludes that the likelihood of U.S.-China conflict in the medium to long term remains remote.
This is why Xi Jinping is more attracted to the idea of expanding Chinas regional and global footprint by economic and political means. This is where
he will likely direct Chinas diplomatic activism over the decade ahead.
No US China war
Rudd 15 (Honorable Kevin Rudd, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International
AffairsFormer Prime Minister, Australia. Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science
and International Affairs: The Future of U.S.-China Relations Under Xi Jinping Toward a new
Framework of Constructive Realism for a Common Purpose
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Summary%20Report%20US-China%2021.pdf) JTE
Of course, Xi Jinping has no interest in triggering armed conflict with the U.S., a nightmare
scenario that would fundamentally undermine Chinas economic rise. Furthermore, there are
few, if any, credible military scenarios in the immediate period ahead in which China could
militarily prevail in a direct conflict with the U.S. This explains Xis determination to oversee the
professionalization and modernization of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) into a credible,
war-fighting and war-winning machine. Xi Jinping is an intelligent consumer of strategic
literature and would have concluded that risking any premature military engagement with the
U.S. would be foolish. Traditional Chinese strategic thinking is unequivocal in its advice not to
engage an enemy unless you are in a position of overwhelming strength. Under Xi, the ultimate
purpose of Chinas military expansion and modernization is not to inflict defeat on the U.S., but
to deter the U.S. Navy from intervening in Chinas immediate periphery by creating sufficient
doubt in the minds of American strategists as to their ability to prevail.
China wont challenge the US militarily

In the longer term, neither Xi Jinping nor his advisors necessarily accept the proposition of the
inevitability of U.S. economic, political and military decline that is often publicized in the
Chinese media and by the academy. More sober minds in Xis administration are mindful of the
capacity of the U.S. political system and economy to rebound and reinvent itself. Moreover, Xi is
also aware of his own countrys date with demographic destiny when the population begins to
shrink, while the populations of the U.S. and those of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) economies will continue to increase. For these reasons, the report
concludes that the likelihood of U.S.-China conflict in the medium to long term remains remote.
This is why Xi Jinping is more attracted to the idea of expanding Chinas regional and global
footprint by economic and political means. This is where he will likely direct Chinas diplomatic
activism over the decade ahead.
No US China War
Seng 16 (January 14th. Teng Chee citing Bates Gill, Visiting Professor of the US Studies
Centre at the University of Sydney and an expert on US Sino Relations. Strategic constraints
keep risk of China-US conflict low: Expert) http://www.todayonline.com/world/strategicconstraints-keep-risk-china-us-conflict-low-expert) JTE
SINGAPORE The risk of imminent conflict between China and the United States is low
because of the geographic limitations on their conventional forces, nuclear deterrence, and the
shared strategic objectives between the two countries, said an expert on Sino-US relations
yesterday. Speaking during a lecture held under the auspices of the Tan Chin Tuan Chinese
Culture and Civilisation Programme at Yale-NUS College, Professor Bates Gill, Visiting
Professor of the US Studies Centre at the University of Sydney, explained that Chinas geostrategic position is not particularly advantageous. Not only due to the fact that four of its closest
neighbours South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and Thailand, are US treaty allies, but also
because its sea-borne import and export routes are vulnerable to attack or disruption. At the
same time, both countries have a significant nuclear arsenal and this is also a key factor holding
them back from full-scale conflict. Chinas (nuclear) capability is growing stronger with each
passing year, and in the harsh logic of nuclear weapons, it is probably a stabilising factor in USChina relations, said Prof Gill, who is also a director at China Matters, a not-for-profit advisory
based in Sydney. But above all, he stressed, both countries do share common strategic
objectives. The US and China do share common aims: Combating violent extremism, limiting
nuclear proliferation, bolstering the global economy, (and) mitigating climate change ... Most
importantly, they share the goal of avoiding an overt US-China conflict, said the professor.
A2-War Over Korea

No US China war over Korea
More remote contingencies remain for conflict between the U.S. and China, notably on the
Korean Peninsula and over Taiwan. On North Korea, this is improbable in the extreme given Xi
Jinpings dissatisfaction with Kim Jong-Un over his continuing nuclear program, and his
concern that a nuclear crisis on the Peninsula would fundamentally derail Chinas economic
transformation. Under Xi, U.S.-China strategic dialogue on North Korea is deepening, but
anything is always possible on the part of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK)
regime, as are the consequences for regional stability. As for Taiwan, the period of six years of
political and economic engagement between Beijing and Taipei under Ma Ying-jeou s (Ma
Yingjiu ) administration may be coming to an end. If the pro-independence Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP) wins the Taiwanese Presidential elections in 2016, and if it were to flirt
again with the idea of a referendum on independence, Xi would likely take a harder line than his
predecessors. And for the U.S., the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act have not changed.
A2-Taiwan
Taiwan conflict wont escalate
White 15 [Hugh, professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University in
Canberra, Would America Risk a Nuclear War with China over Taiwan, The National Interest,
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/would-america-risk-nuclear-war-china-over-taiwan12808?page=2 RD; AD 7/29/16]
After a decade of relative harmony, tensions between Beijing and Taipei are rising again. As Taiwan's leaders and voters face big choices about their
future relations with China, America must think carefully about its commitments to Taiwan. Would America be willing go to war with China to prevent
Taiwan being forcibly united with the mainland? J. Michael Cole, responding in The National Interestto a recent op-ed of mine in Singapore's Straits
Times, expresses a widely held assumption that it would, and should. To many people it
seems self-evident that America would

honor the commitments enshrined in the Taiwan Relations Act. But the TRA was passed in
1979, when China's GDP was 1/20th the size of America's, its place in the global economy was
miniscule, its navy and air force were negligible, and its prospects for progress depended
completely on America's goodwill. So back then a US-China conflict carried much bigger economic and military risks for China than
for America. That made the TRA's commitments both highly credible and very unlikely to be tested. Washington could safely assume that Beijing would
back off to avoid a conflict in which China had so much more to lose than America. Things are different today. China's economy is now so big and so
central to global trade and capital flows that the consequences of any disruption would be just as serious for America as for China. Militarily,
America can no longer expect a swift and certain victory in a war over Taiwan. China's anti-access/areadenial capabilities would preclude direct US intervention unless those capabilities had first been degraded by a sustained and wide-ranging strike
campaign against Chinese bases and forces. China
would very likely respond to such a campaign with attacks on

US and allied bases throughout Asia. The US has no evident means to cap the resulting
escalation spiral, and no one could be sure it would stop below the nuclear threshold. The possibility of nuclear attacks on US cities would have to
be considered. These new realities of power mean that today a US-China conflict would impose equal
risks and costs on both sides. And where costs and risks are equal, the advantage lies with those who have
more at stake, and hence greater resolve. China's leaders today seem to think they hold this advantage, and
they are probably right. It is therefore a big mistake to keep assuming, as many people seem to do, that
China would be sure to back off before a crisis over Taiwan became a conflict. US leaders must therefore
ask what happens if Beijing does not back down as a crisis escalates. At what point would they back down instead? What would be the damage to US
global leadership if Washington brought on a confrontation with China and then blinked first? What could happen if Washington didn't blink first? Is
Taiwan's status quo worth a global economic collapse? It is worth a real risk of nuclear war with China? These are the questions America's
leaders would have to confront in considering military action to defend Taiwan, and their answer would very likely be that the
status of Taiwan is not worth risking nuclear war or economic collapse over. And that means American
leaders and policy analysts must confront these questions now, as they decide whether to maintain the old commitments to defend Taiwan. The
promises that America was willing and able to keep in 1979 might not be ones it is willing or able to keep now. What about America's allies and friends
in Asia? Wouldn't they help America defend Taiwan, if only because they are so worried themselves about China? Many Americans seem to assume they
would. But even
Australia, America's most reliable ally in Asia, is uncertain about this. And if Australia is
uncertain, it is pure wishful thinking to expect the likes of India, Singapore, Vietnam or even the
Philippines to offer anything more than mild diplomatic support to America over Taiwan. The
exception is Japan, which under Shinzo Abe might be expected to join the fight, especially after last week's visit to Washington. But does Mr. Abe really
speak for Japan? Will future Japanese leaders take the same view? And even if they did, how exactly would that help America? How would Japan's
support change the answers to the hard questions posed above, and increase the chances that America would indeed come to Taiwan's aid? So no one
should lightly assert that America or its allies would help defend Taiwan from China. But should they? This is a big subject. Suffice to say here that the
question is not answered simply by using the word appeasement to invoke the memory of Munich. There are hard questions to be answered about
how far we should be willing to go to accommodate (or, if you prefer, to appease) China's ambitions for a bigger regional leadership role as its power
grows. Any
substantial accommodation would mean a shift away from the US-led order of recent
decades, which would be risky and unsettling. It seems much easier to evade these questions by
refusing to contemplate any accommodation at all. But that would carry high costs. Those who assume that those
costs must be worth paying might not have thought carefully enough about just how high the price
could go. And those who assume that it will be impossible to accommodate China because it proved impossible to appease Hitler perhaps assume
that there are no material differences between the situations in Europe in 1938 and in Asia now, or between Nazi Germany and today's China. They
perhaps also assume that there are no alternatives to the old US-led order in Asia except Chinese hegemony. The
magnitude of the
issues at stake including for the people of Taiwan suggest that these assumptions need more
careful scrutiny.

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Notes

challenge for Xi is that the campaign against corruption

In the months ahead, as the crucial 19th

The plan is a major win for Xiincreased US engagement is k2 agenda

is China so keen on a New Type of Great Power Relations and on creating

points: 1) no conflict or confrontation, through emphasizing dialogue and

wants to be viewed as an equal. By using

CCP collapse causes extinction

political and economic collapse in the

fragmented China could also result in another nightmare

nuclear weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible local provincial

[Minxin, Minxin Pei: Political jockeying hinders real

calendar makes it inconceivable that

now and the 19th congress, the

economy grew at its slowest quarterly pace

aren't quite as bad as expected. Growth in the most

expansion in 2017 is expected to slow

are also concerns that President Xi Jinping's

A wrong turn in the economic transition leads to economic stagnation

the government does not tackle the

debt burden has rattled some potential

Economic transition key to financial success

everyone is aware of the slowdown in China, very few expect a

to the outside world China

Chinese practice of buying multiple apartments to store personal

dilatory attitude resulted in extreme volatility in the "A" share market,

the closure, the government participated in the market aggressively to boost

Growth of consumer sector crucial to creation of ten million jobs

Economic growth key to social reforms and innovation

time, larger families will

surely contribute to growth.

End of 2016 key to economic stability

Econ growth is needed to make China financially stable

the economic transition in China. This topic is important for the

concerns are the economys reliance on

major reforms to the financial system needed to improve the

we should be alert to the risk of adverse developments that could lead

Econ Instability is affecting housing demand

long-term factor affecting housing demand is

supply-side reform initiative announced by central

Economic Transition key to labor intensive services sector

Chinese economy downfall results in global economic hardship

to force bankers, traders and economists to speak comprehensible English). Quartz

theres any good news, the slowdown in Chinas manufacturing activity

Xi Jinpings donning of uniform and giving him his

the extent of corruption, you can

Xi is stepping up anti-corruption now, but hes fighting an uphill

recent months the discipline campaign appears to have become

the party would "kick out" two-faced members who promised to

Washington will no doubt respond strongly

will argue that

the ruling creates a dilemma f or China. Hard-liners in Beijing

was limited appetite

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang

Beijing has been going on the

Xi Strong but losing grip

activists have little

Xis view, positive US ties will come on condition of America

U.S.-China cooperation increases Xis political capital

instead on common action in resolving common problems.

Cooperation is framed as a win win for China and enhances Xis

The U.S.-China bilateral

The main message is that cooperation is key and all

State Councilor Yang Jiechis characterization of the