Schlick Phenomenology

Wiley
International Phenomenological Society

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Schlick's Critique of Phenomenological Propositions
Author(s): M. M. Van De Pitte
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Dec., 1984), pp. 195-225
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
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Philosophyand PhenomenologicalResearch
Vol. XLV, No. 2, December1984
Schlick'sCritiqueof
Phenomenological
Propositions
M. M. VAN DE
PITTE
The University
of Alberta
in general,and thenatureofphenomenologicalproposiPhenomenology
tions in particular,has long been misrepresented
to English-speaking
readersbyMoritzSchlick'sstylistically
lucid,forceful,
and muchanthologizedarticleentitled"Is Therea FactualA Priori?"It firstappearedin the
Jahresbericht
der PhilosophischenGesellschaftan
Wissenschaftlicher
der Universititzu Wien furdas VereinsjahrI9 30/3I . Upon its publicationin translationin Feigl and Sellar'sReadingsin PhilosophicalAnalysis, in I949, itbecamerequiredreadingfora generationto Anglo-American philosophers.
The views of phenomenologyexpressedthereare presentedin much
thesame formin otherof Schlick'sworksthathave appearedin translationin recentyears.Chiefamong theseare his magnumopus, The General Theoryof Knowledge,'and thearticlesof Volume One of thePhilosophicalPapersentitled"The NatureofTruthin ModernLogic" and "Is
ThereIntuitiveKnowledge?"3 These new translations
will again givecurbut
an
unfortunate
not
rencyto
whollyerroneouspictureofthenatureof
phenomenologicalpropositions.It thus seems appropriate,even at this
late date, to point out some of the difficulties
in Schlick'sposition.
Butthereare otherreasonsfordoingso as well. One ofthesereasonsis
thattheviewthatsomepropositionsmightafterall be bothsynthetic
and
a prior has regaineda degreeof respectability
for
Kripke'sargument,
example,has been takenveryseriouslyevenbythosewho striveto prove
thatit is artfullycontrivedconventionalism.4
The factof the renewed
I (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.)
' Translatedby A. E. Blumbergand H. Feigl (New York: SpringerVerlag, I974).
3 Editedby H. L. Mulder and B. F. B. Van de Velde-Schlick.
Translatedby PeterHeath
(Dordrecht:Reidel, 1979).
4 Cf. "Namingand Necessity"in Semantics
and Natural Languages,editedby D. David-
son andG. Harmon(Dordrecht:

Reidel,197z).
SCHLICKIS
CRITIQUE
OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL
PROPOSITIONS
I95
a priorisis important,
becauseithas longbeenthe
debateabout synthetic
case forsome philosophersto refusephenomenologyseriousconsideration fortheverysimplereason thatit purportsto be a sciencemade up
exclusivelyof synthetica prioripropositions.Because of the positivist
of the
doctrine,to whichSchlickappeals, concerningtheunintelligibility
a priori,whateverresultsphenomenologicalanalysis
notionofa synthetic
But, now, if it
producesare presumedto be, at best,pseudo-scientific.
should prove thatphilosophersworkingwithinthe empiricisttradition
can no longertake it as axiomaticthatthereare no synthetica prioris,
thenone of Schlick's(and empiricism's)majorweapons againstphenomenologyis deniedhim.
A closelyrelatedreason for re-assessingSchlick'scritiqueis this
itsclaim
mightbe expectedto strengthen
now,justwhenphenomenology
because the empiricist
to seriousattentionfromnon-phenomenologists
dogma on synthetica priorisis being questionedfromwithinits own
ranks,the phenomenologists'dogma that phenomenologicalproposia priorihas beenchallengedfromwithinphenomenoltionsare synthetic
ogy's own ranks.RobertSokolowskisupposes thesepropositionsto be
tautologies.5He is thusin agreementwithone ofthetwo conclusionsthat
Schlickreachesin the"FactualA Priori"article.(Althoughhe agreeswith
Schlickin believingphenomenologicalpropositionsto be tautologies,he
would disagreewithSchlick'ssecond conclusion- thatforthatreason
therecannot be a scienceof phenomenology.)
But Sokolowskiand Schlickarguethesame conclusionfromradically
different
readingsoftherelevantphepremises,and fromwildlydifferent
nomenological texts (particularlyHusserl's Logical Investigations).
Clearly,then,at mostonlyone of themis rightfortherightreasons.The
purposeofthepresentstudyis merelyto showthatitis notSchlick.A full
study of the logical status of phenomenologicalpropositionswould
involvelookingat the sortsof reasons Sokolowskioffersforregarding
themas tautological.It would of coursealso involvelookingat theconthemas synthetic
a priori.Anditwould be
ventionalreasonsforregarding
necessaryas wellto considertherarelyheardargumentthatsomeofthem
are in factsynthetic
Here we confineourselvesto disclosing,
a posteriori.6
by meansof a critiqueof Schlick'scritique,somethingabout what phenomenologicalpropositionsare not, and to indicatingin a verygeneral
what theyare.
way how to set about determining
In his HusserlianMeditations:How Words PresentThings(Evanston:Northwestern

Press,1974).
University
Cf. Richard Schmitt,"Phenomenology,"The Encyclopediaof Philosophy,ed. P. A.
Vol. VI, pp. 135-51.

Edwards,
I96
M. M. VAN DE PITTE
A few preliminaryremarksabout the Husserl-Schlickconnection

mightbe seento be in order,ifonlyto prepareus to expectto findthemat
loggerheads.So faras anyoneknowstherewas neveranydirectcontact,
muchless genuinephilosophicaldialoguebetweenthem.7Theirfewpublishedexchangesreveala bitterantagonism.Schlickclearlythoughtthat
themountinginfluence
ofHusserl'sphilosophywas positivelydangerous.
He viewed Husserl as the cleverest,most persuasiveand thusthe most
insidiousmemberof a new groupof idealistswhomhe took to be benton
therapproachment
and mutualadvanceofphilosophyand scidestroying
ence underthe aegis of positivism.He thereforethoughtit proper to
devoteconsiderablespace in the firsteditionof The General Theoryof
Knowledgeto thesystematic
dismemberment
of Husserl'sposition,real
or imaginary.
Husserlresponded,causticallyand tersely,to Schlick'scritiquein his
"Forward" to Volume II of thesecond editionof the Logical Investigations.He agreesthatthepositionSchlickattributesto himis completely
"inane," butdeniesthatitis his.His frustration
withSchlick'sattackwas
suchas to permithimto insinuatethatitwas intellectual
rather
dishonesty
thancarelessscholarshipthataccountedforSchlick'smisrepresentation
of his position.
SchlickaddressesHusserl'sresponsein a lengthyfootnotein Section
i8, of the second edition of the General Theory of Knowledge. He
defends his characterizationof the phenomenologist'sposition as
"satisfactorily
clear,"butconcedesthathe had misunderstood
thecrucial
conceptof ideationin at leastone importantrespect.He deniesthatHusserl's "verysharp comments"influencedhis decisionto deletethe long
criticaldiscussionof thephenomenologicalmethodthathad appearedin
thefirstedition,buthe deleteditnonetheless.Buthis sporadicattackson
phenomenology
continued,finallyextendingovera periodof nearlytwo
decades.
Husserl,forhispart,had obviouslyratherearlyon relegatedSchlickto
that sizable group of his interpreters
whom he thoughtunwillingor
unable to understandhim,and upon whom painstakingand instructive
responseswere lost. (This group seems to have includedthe positivists
7
The collectionofHusserl'scorrespondence
containsno lettersto or fromSchlick.Butin a
letterto HermannWeylthatno longersurvives,Husserlmusthave expressedhis irritaofphenomenology,
forin a letterto HusserldatedMarch
tionwithSchlick'spresentation
SchlickszfirPhdnomez6, i92i, Weyl remarks:"Uber die lacherlichenBemerkungen
um so mehr,als seinBuch bedauerlicher
-, aber
nologiehabe auch ich michgedrgert,
den grosstenAnklang
theoretischen
Physikern
unterden fuhrenden
verstandlicherweise
oftheHusserlArchivesat Louvain,for
to Dr. SamuelIJsseling
findet"(sic.) (I am grateful
thisinformation.)
SCHLICK
S CRITIQUE
OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL
PROPOSITIONS
197
generally,exceptforCarnap fora ratherbriefperiod.)

A reviewofthe'FactualA Priori'articlewillprovidea framework
fora
discussionof Schlick'scritique.The article,mostreaderswill remember,
is cast as a defenseof Kant (whose greatestachievement,accordingto
Schlick,was to have clearlyformulatedand appliedtheconceptof thea
priori).Kant is beingdefendedagainstthephenomenologists,
who claim
to employKant'sconceptofthea prioributin factradicallydistortit.The
phenomenologists
quarrelwithKant about theprecisenatureof universallyvalidpropositionsand intheendrejecthiscentralinsight- thatthey
are all and onlypurelyformal.Theybelieveon thecontrary
thatpropositionsof a purelyformalcharactermake up onlya verysmallpartof the
class ofa prioripropositions.The vastmajorityhavematerialcontentand
thuspresumablydisclosesomethingsubstantiveabout experience.
Moreover,phenomenologists
-represent
themselvesas beingin agreementwithKantabout intuitionas thesourceofa prioripropositions,but
thentheysubstitutetheirown brand of intuition('eidetic') for Kant's
notionof 'pure' intuition.Theydo not adequatelyclarifythechangeling
conceptexceptto assertthat,unlikeKant's pure intuition,eideticintuition(Wesenschau)does therequiredworkof disclosingmaterialcontent.
to criticizeKantfor(a)
SchlicknexttakesHusserlto taskforpresuming
makingthe domain of logic coextensivewith the principleof contradiction,and (b) forhavingfailedto clarifythenotionof analyticthought.
SchlickentirelyagreeswithKant thatlogic restson theprincipleof contradiction.Because of thisagreement,
he sees no need forclarifying
the
natureof analyticthought.A prioripropositionsare tautologiesthatneitherneed nor permitclarification;and, thus,neitherdoes the kind of
thoughtthatproducesthem.
SchlickhimselfdisagreeswithKanton therebeingmorethantwo kinds
of propositions,theanalytic(thea priori)and thesynthetic
a posteriori.
Buthe insiststhatifone sees,as did Kant,a certainsetof propositionsas
beinggenuinelyanomalous,one is obligedto accountforthem.This Kant
attempted
to do in thefirstCritique,and he wentabout itin theonlyway
thatSchlickenvisionsas havinganyhope ofsuccess- thatis,bytrying
to
also recoggroundthemintheformofexperience.The phenomenologists
nize threesortsof propositions,but theyrejectKant's account of the
anomalousset,withoutsubstituting
an alternativeaccountof theirown.
If pressed,theyfall back as usual on the conceptof Wesenschau.They
a priori
claim thatthereis a specificepistemicprocesswhereinsynthetic
propositions,understoodas such,(i.e., as bothnecessaryand 'trueof the
world') are simply'seen' to be true.This is not good enough- Schlick
requiresreasonsforbelievingthatthepropositionsare in factwhatthey
I 9 8 M. M. VAN DE PITTE
to groundcognipurportto be. Althoughhe believesthatall suchefforts

tions in the formof cognitiveconsciousnesswill issue in an untenable
metaphysical
position(subjectiveidealism),stilltheeffortmustbe made
propositional
byanyonewho recognizesthattherearethesecontroversial
he says,
contentthemselves,
and cognitivetypes.The phenomenologists
withdogmaticallypositingthem.
The latterportionofthearticleclarifiestheprecisenatureofphenomenologicalpropositions.In so doing,Schlickestablishesthatphenomenologistsare mistakenin thinkingthemto be synthetica priori.
Examples of phenomenologicalpropositionsare: "Every tone has
red
intensity
and pitch,"and "The same surfacecannotbe simultaneously
and green."A logical positivistmustdeterminewhat is meantby these
propositionswhen theyare properlyused. There are only two proper
formsof languageuse - (a) to communicatea cognizedstateof affairs,
a propositioninto its equivalent.
and (b) to formallytransform
But,Schlicknotes,phenomenologicalpropositionsare used in neither
of theseways. In fact,theyare not used at all. They are not metwithin
ordinarylanguagebecause it is completelypointlessto utterthem.What
theyexpressis commonknowledgeto everyonewho sharesa naturallanguage. They are not used thennot because theyare nonsensicalor false,
are entirely
true.Thus thephenomenologists
butbecausetheyare trivially
sound in theirbeliefthatthesepropositionsare a priori.
In sayingthattheyaretrivially
true,Schlickis alreadydeclaringthetautologouscharacterof phenomenologicalpropositions.He asks nonetheand notmerelyformal.However
lesswhethertheymightnotbe synthetic
trivial,theexampleshe has chosenseem to be about theworld,because
theyare made up of termsrelatingto visual and auditoryexperience.
Schlickrhetoricallyasks whetherthe necessitythat characterizesthem
thenis logical,or whetherit springsfromthenatureof things.The questionis rhetoricalbecause logicalnecessityis theonlykindofnecessity.To
say thatthereis some kind of naturalnecessityis to confuseratio and
whichis oftentakento be a systemofsyncausa. For example,geometry,
thetica prioritruths,is doubtlessin a sense"caused" bythefacts,butthe
systemitselfis nothingbut a tissueof logical truths.An examinationof
geometry
qua mathematicalsystemsaysnothingabout itsfiton thefacts.
The only responsethat the phenomenologistcan make to this is to
claim,again,thathe has a specialintuitivecapacitythatreveals,e.g.,geometricalpropositionsas expressionsof the structureof the physical
world. Schlick'srejoinderis thatit would be necessaryto appeal to an
exoticcognitivefacultyonly ifthe truthof thesepropositionscould be
accountedfor
accountedforin no otherway.Buttheirtruthis sufficiently
material
content.
as
devoid
of
when theyare recognized tautologies
SCHLICK
S CRITIQUE
OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL
PROPOSITIONS
I99
So farSchlickhas notoffereda reasonedargumentagainstsynthetic

a
prioris.He has simplyapplied the positivistconceptionof philosophy,
and thepositivistdefinition
ofvariousterms,and has foundphenomenologywanting,because,giventhosedefinitions
and thatframework,
there
a prioris.What mightbe a genuineargusimplycannotbe any synthetic
ment,althoughrigorously
tiedto positivistpresuppositions,
comesat the
end
is
of
and
it
very
thearticle,
characteristically
simple.Schlicklooks at
thepropositionsfroma "purelylogicalpointof view" in orderto prove
theirtautologouscharacter.Their banalityaside, thereis nothingproblematicabout propositionslike "A surfacecannotbe simultaneously
red
and green."Butthecontradictories
of suchpropositionsare problematic
indeed- involvingformalcontradiction
of the'S is and is notP' variety.
Hence thecontradictories
do notmean anythingand of coursecannotbe
understood.The conclusion:clearlyit does not requireWesenschauinto
theultimatestructure
ofrealityto understandthetautologiespairedwith
thesecontradictions.
This because
. . .They say nothingabout existence,or about thenatureof anything,
but ratheronly
exhibitthecontentof our concepts,thatis, themode and mannerin whichwe employthe
wordsofourlanguage.Giventhemeaningofthewords,theyarea priori,butpurelyformaltautological,as indeedare all othera prioripropositions.As expressionswhichhavenothing
to say, theybringno knowledge,and cannotserveas the foundationof a special science.
Such a scienceas the phenomenologists
have promisedus just does not exist.8
In the discussionof Schlick'sposition that now follows,it must be

thatwhateveris said about phenomenological
bornein mindthroughout
propositionsis meantonlyofthosepropositionsthatwould formthecontentof Husserl's genuinephilosophicalscience.By 'phenomenological
proposition'we obviouslydo notmeansimplythosepropositionsthatare
employedbyphilosophersspeakingor writingfrom'thephenomenological perspective',
sincethesemayor maynotbe 'phenomenological'in the
strictsense.
(i) Much ofthepositivist-phenomenologist
conflictevincedin Schlick's
articlestemsfromterminologicaldifferences.
Schlickis fastidiouswith
language,and usuallyemploysa vocabularyof clearlyarticulatedand
univocalterms.He appliesitwithProcrusteansimplicity
to
presumptively
But theimportanttermsin thedebateabout thelogical
phenomenology.
status of phenomenological propositions - terms like 'analytic',
'a priori','empirical',etc.- are,we now know,farfromuniv'synthetic',
ocal. The issueofwhetheror notthephenomenologists
sharethepositivists'usagewhen,e.g.,theysay thattheirgenuinelyphilosophicalpropositionsaresynthetic
a priori,is a matterofcrucialimportance.We can learn
8 Feigl and Sellars,p. 285.
00
M. M. VAN DE
PITTE
muchabout the natureof phenomenologicalpropositionsby exploring

the confusionsgeneratedby the fluidcharacterof propositionalpredicates.
ofone ofthesetermsin an
Schlickhimselfgetstangledin theambiguity
earlypassageinhisarticle.This is theterm'formal'.Whileacknowledging
and hencenon-formala prioripropositions,he
Kant's beliefin synthetic
praisesKantfor
immediately,
withwhatseemsto be patentinconsistency,
thea prioriwiththeformal.Thisis doubtlesspartlybecausehe
identifying
has lefta greatdeal unsaidinhis discussionof Kant.Schlickknows,as we
logic
do, thatonlythepropositionsofpureas opposed to transcendental
are 'formal'in the standardpositivistsense of thatterm.That is, only
thosepropositions- in Kant's case thismeans onlythosepropositions
- are truesolelyin virtueof the
thatmakeup theAristoteliansyllogistic
On thisreadingof'formal',itis falsethatKant
principleofcontradiction.
identifies
the a prioriwiththe formal.
a
Schlickof coursedoes not believethatthereare or can be synthetic
prioripropositions,and so we shouldexpectthatthisis theonlysenseof
Yet he introducestwoothersenses.
'formal'thathe is willingto entertain.
a
The firstof thesealternatesensesis one peculiarto Kantiansynthetic
prioripropositions,and itis one thatSchlickis reluctantto dismissout of
he is towardit.Here,'formal'refersto the
hand,howeverunsympathetic
'formofexperience'thatconsciousnessgivesto all knowledge,and itis to
be unpackedin termsof thenotionsof thepureformsof intuition(space
and time),thecategories,and theunityof apperception.Only ifSchlick
lumpstogetherthispeculiarlyKantian sense of 'formal'withthe usual
senseinvolvingtheprincipleof contradictioncan he say trulythatKant
equates the a prioriwiththe formal.It is verymisleadingto do thisof
perspective
course,because it impliesa toleranceforthe transcendental
thatSchlickdoes notin factfeel.The reasonthathe does notdismissthis
second sense out of hand is because, althoughhe does not understand
Kantas havingshownthatthereare synthetic
a prioristhatare formalin
thissense,he does not categorically
disallowthepossibilitythatsomeone
else might.
The thirdand mostinteresting
senseof'formal'appearsneartheendof
is creditedwithhavingprovidedtheinsight.
thearticle,and Wittgenstein
Schlickcontendsthat
The errorcommittedbytheproponentsof thefactuala priorican be understoodas arising
fromthefactthatitis notclearlyrealizedthatsuchconceptsas thoseofcolorshavea formal
structure
just as do numbersor spatial concepts,and thatthisstructuredeterminestheir
meaningwithoutremainder.9
9 Ibid.
SCHLICK'S
CRITIQUE
OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL
PROPOSITIONS
ZO0
It is not clearthatKant is guiltyof theerrorhereascribedto himas a

are
"proponentofthefactuala priori,"butclearlythephenomenologists
not. Nothingis more centralto phenomenologythan the insightthat
everyconcepthas a formalstructure.The formalstructureof concepts
(consideredas categoriesofpossiblebeing),is preciselywhatis meantby
the crucial phenomenologicalnotion of "essence." Phenomenological
propositions,in an ideal phenomenologicalscience,merelylay out these
structural
principles.When Husserl assertsthat some a prioriproposilaw.
tionshave materialcontent,he meansthattheypresenta structural
So Schlickis caughtina contradiction
whenhe maintainsthatthereareno
a prioripropositionswithmaterialcontent,whileaffirming
thatthereare
a prioripropositionsthatexpressstructurallaws.
thatSchlickis so wide ofthemark.That he is
It is ratherextraordinary
can perhapsbe attributedto thefactthathe completelymisunderstands
theconceptof Wesenschauand the natureof intuitedobjects.We shall
returnto thispoint shortly.
For themoment,we see that'formal'is a richand complextermand
whetheritis appropriately
propositionswill
appliedto phenomenological
dependupon whichof itsnuanceswe have in mind.Husserl,forhispart,
seemsnotonlyto haverecognized,butalso to haveacceptedas applicable
to phenomenologicalpropositions,all threeof the senses to whichwe
have called attention.
Schlick'sfirstsense (thisis theone he almostexclusivelyfallsback on)
linksthe formalwiththeprincipleof contradiction.Husserlinsiststhat
phenomenologicalpropositionsare 'apodictic'.The necessitydesignated
bytheterm'apodictic'is neitherempiricalnorpsychological.(A propositionis empirically
it,
necessarywhen all theempiricalevidenceconfirms
when there is no evidence to the contrary. A proposition is
psychologically
necessarywhenwe are constrainedto positit.)'0 Mathematics provides the paradigm of phenomenological apodicticity."
withlogicalnecessity,
DespiteHusserl'sreluctanceto equate apodicticity
in a
itwould seemthatin factwe are dealingherewithlogicalnecessity,
the
of
that
would
contradictosense 'logicalnecessity'
satisfySchlick,i.e.,
riesof apodicticallytruephenomenologicalpropositionsare unintelligible.Thisis ofcoursepreciselySchlick'spoint.He is farfromwronginputting phenomenologicalpropositionsto the test of the principleof
What he failsto understandis thatthephenomenologists
contradiction.
need not necessarilyobject.
0 Cf. e.g., ErstePhilosophieII, editedby RudolfBoehm (The Hague: MartinusNijhoff,

1959), p. 311.
Ibid. Cf. also Formaland TranscendentalLogic, ?98.
ZOZ
M. M. VAN DE
PITTE
So far,ithas beenestablishedthatHusserluses 'formal'intwo compatiblesenses,bothofwhichare acceptableto Schlick.The one senserefersto

and the
what lies withinthejurisdictionof theprincipleof contradiction
law. However,Schlickand Husserldifotherto whatpresentsa structural
ferin thatHusserlalso acknowledgesthe specifically'Kantian' sense of
ofaccountingforthetruthofsynthetic
formalthatrefersto thepossibility
a priorisin termsof an analysisof cognitiveconsciousness.As we have
seen, Schlickdoes not, not because he understandsit to be false,but
because he does not understandKant's solutionto be true.
Husserl's approach is unlike Kant's in its particulars,but it is still
squarelyin accordwiththespiritof theKantianprogram.He claimsthat
an adequateand completeunderstanding
ofa phenomenological
propositioncannotrestinthepropositionalone,butmustincludean understandingof itsgenesisin theconstituting
consciousness.For all thecomplexity
ofthisnotion,it amountsat bottomto a claimthatno propositionis adequatelyand apodicticallyunderstoodunless,interalia, itsepistemological underpinnings
are understoodas well.
Whetherthis is feasible,whetherKant, Husserl,or anyone else,has
doneit,is notimmediately
It is important
to noteonlythatthis
important.
sense of 'formal',havingto do with the formof experience,does not
conflict
withor compromisetheothertwo sensesthatSchlickand Husserl
recognizeand employ.It seemsthen,thatvis a' vis theconceptof theformal, Schlickand Husserlare not so seriouslyat odds as one mighthave
supposed.We shall see in moredetailhow the matterstandswithother
predicatesused to describepropositions,as we discusstheconceptofphenomenologicalintuitionand Husserl's critiqueof Kant.
(ii) It is painfullyclearin the'FactualA Priori'articlethatSchlickfinds
thephenomenologist's
notionofintuitionobjectionable,butthegrounds
forhis aversionto it are but roughlyindicated.He saysonlythatwhatis
allegedlyunderstoodby means of phenomenologicalintuitionis "a
remarkable Gesetzmdssigkeit des Soseins" (lawful structure of
a priorisgiven
essences)." What is expressedin thecase of thesynthetic
as examplesis some a prioriregulation"whichforbidsa greensurfaceto
be at thesame timered,or forbidsa toneto existunlessit has a determinatepitch."'3Schlickfindsthistoo remarkableto be believed.What little
he saysis enoughto indicatethathe sharesthestandardpositivistviewof
phenomenological"essences" - theyare "Platonic" or "ontological"
formsthatpredetermine
the structureof reality.
FeiglandSellars,p. z84.
Ibid.
SCHLICK'S
CRITIQUE
OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL
PROPOSITIONS
ZO3
To learn the detailsof Schlick'sPlatonistconstructionof Husserlian

essencesone mustturnto his article,"The Nature of Truthin Modern
Logic." The argumentagainstHusserltherefollowsthegenerallinetaken
bycriticsof Husserlianidealismbothwithinand outsideofphenomenology,exceptthatSchlickpresentsHusserlin a rathermoreFregeanlight
thanmost.He takesitthatHusserl,in hiseffort
to safeguardtheobjectivityof logical laws by disassociatingthemfromthepsychologicalconditionsof theirproduction,ultimately
makesTruthand Falsityantecedent
to beingand hence,thathe makes thetruthof specificjudgmentsreally
subsistent.
There is in factone passage in theFormaland TranscendentalLogic
whereHusserl does discuss "Truthand Falsityin themselves."'4But he
does so onlyto makeitclearthattheseare merely(quasi-Kantian)regulativeideas.'5He is highlycriticaloflogicalabsolutismgenerally,and especiallyof the logical absolutismunjustlyascribedto him- thatis, precisely the view that phenomenological evidence has to do with
He makes it veryclear thatphenomenologyconcerns
"truth-in-itself."
itselfwiththeideas ofrelativeand absolutetruth,and nothingmore.Husserlsays thetruthof experience,of practicaland scientific
life,is essentiallyrelative.
Nonetheless,it is indisputablethat Husserl is given to talk about
"existent"truth.The mostobvious exampleis in theProlegomenato the
wherehe arguesthat logical truthsdo not owe
Logical Investigations,
theirexistenceto mentalprocesses.In his defenseof logic againstMilleshe is in factconstrainedto accord an awesome indepenian empiricism,
dence to propositionaltruth.'6(How else does one make a case against
reducinglogicto psychologicaland statisticalgrounds?)Butin thesecond
Investigation
of thatsame work,he explicitlydeniesthatby "existence"
he means "real existence."'" He makesmentionsthereof thetraditional
Platonistinterpretation
of universalsas metaphysicalhypostatizations
but declinesto addressthe issue,takingit to be an errorlong since disposed of.'8
Husserldoes feelobligedto addressthequestionofhis "Platonism"in
theIdeas though,becausetheLogical Investigations
was itselfrepeatedly
criticizedforrepresenting
thatveryversionofthetheoryofuniversalsthat
14
579
15Cf.
i6
17
i8
?? io-6.
thisoccasionsin hislaterwork,cf.D. M. Levin,Reason

For an accountofthedifficulties
and Evidence in Husserl's Phenomenology(Evanston,Illinois: NorthwesternUniversityPress,1970).
Cf. ?II.
Cf.?7.
Z04
M. M. VAN DE
PITTE
Husserl thoughtbeneathdiscussion.The beginningof the strongestof

thesepassages in Ideas, whereinHusserldisassociateshimselffromPlatonism,remindsone of his bittercommenton Schlick'sreadingof the
Husserl says:
Investigations.
It has everand anon been a special cause of offencethatas 'Platonizingrealists'we set up
Ideas or Essenceas objects,and ascribeto themas to otherobjectstrueBeing,and so correlajust as in thecase of empiricalrealities.
tivelythecapacityto be graspedthroughintuition,
We here disregardthat,alas! most frequenttypeof superficialreaderwho foistson the
in readingabsurdities
authorhis own whollyalien conceptions,and thenhas no difficulty
"
into the author'sstatements.
The factthatHusserl thinksthatPlatonicrealismis absurd suggests

ofhisphenomethatitwould be wellto seekan alternative
interpretation
nology.ButsupposingthatHusserlis nota Platonicrealist,is he justified
at all in talkingabout the"existence"ofideas?Schlick,forone,thinksso.
In a passage in The GeneralTheoryof Knowledgein whichhe has been
discussingthe factthat the ambiguityof the term"thought-structure"
view of logic,he remarks:
contributedto thepsychologistic
Thispsychologistic
lapse,however,seemsto meto be no moredangerousforthefoundation
of philosophythan the explicitand carefullythoughtout doctrinethatlogical structures
of the real
make up a sphereof theirown, a domain of ideas that'exists' independently
world.Thisdoctrineis notfalseat all providedwe takethewords'exist'and 'independent'in
a propersense.
Schlickdoes not say whata "proper"senseis. But itis not

Unfortunately
clearthatthesenseHusserlinvokesin his refutation
of logicalpsychologism would be unacceptable to Schlick, once it has been clearly
establishedthata Platonistreadingof it is wrong.
We have seen that Husserl identifiesas one of the many absurdities
ascribedto himtheview thatessencesor phenomenologicalobjectssubsist.To believein subsistentessencesis to conflatethereal and theideal.
This errorcould notarise,Husserlnotes,ifone pays attentionto theprecisesenseinwhichhe definestheterm'object'. It is whatevercan function
as the subjectof a true,affirmative,
categoricalstatement."Thus not
onlyare flowersand poems,mathematicalpropositionsand philosophical arguments,
objects,so are centaursand square-cirphenomenological
cles.This becausewe understandstatements
like "The centauris a mythi-
9 ?zzA (Boyce-Gibsontranslation,8o).
Op. cit.,p. 136.
" Cf.Ideas
?zzA (Boyce-Gibsontranslation,
8o). EmmanuelLevinas'readingis somewhat
moreontological:"essencesaremadeup ofa setofpredicatesthatan objectmusthavein
orderto have otherpredicates."Cf. his The Theoryof Intuitionin Husserl'sPhenomePress,1973), p. I1z.
University
nology(Evanston,Illinois:Northwestern
SCHLICK
S CRITIQUE
OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL
PROPOSITIONS
Z05
isanimpossible
calbeast,"and"Thesquare-circle
object."Nothing
inall
in thisor in an
thisimpliesanything
about'existence'or 'subsistence'
ontologically
prior("Platonic")world.
To the query whether,given this a-metaphysical
construalof
phenomenologicall
object,"we maynotthenregardthephenomenologist's"essences"as "concepts,"Husserlrespondsthatindeedwe may,
provided
thatwe do notconfuse"concept"with"conceiving"
(thatis,
providedwe do notlapse intopsychologism).22
Although
clearlyconon conceiving,
ceptsare dependent
theyare logicallydistinguishable
therefrom.
as "theorizing,"
"Theory"doesnotmeanthesamething
"the
novel" does not mean "novel writing,""number"does not mean
ofthemembers
ofthepairsof
"counting,"
despitethecloserelationship
Fromallthiswecanconcludethatphenomenological
is
concepts.
analysis
ofconceptual
alia a species,however
distinctive,
inter
analysisandis not
method.
a metaphysical
wellhavemettheobjectionofPlatonism
Husserlmight
usinganother
lineofargument
thatemphasizes
thehypothetical
natureofphenomenologicalpropositions.
Phenomenology
systematically
avoidsmetaphysical
problemsby makingno existenceclaimswhatever.
Husserlexplicitly
ofpossibility.
statesthatitisnomorethana philosophy
Itisthatperforce,
becausethequestion
of"whatthereis" islogically
undecidable.
Butinsofaras phenomenological
propositions
expressthepossibletheydo disaboutreality.
ormeanings
ofcourse,something
close,indirectly
Concepts
are universals
valid of all possibleinstances.Thus we can construct
propositions
oftheform:"Ifanything
is an x, thenithassuchandsuch
characteristics."
Schlick'sexamplesof Husserl'sfactuala prioristhen
become(as Kenneth
Gallagher
notes:)"Ifthereisanexistent
tone,thenit
musthavea pitch";"Ifthereissomething
red,thenitcannotbegreen."3
One can,withSchlick,
as expressions
regardthesehypotheticals
ofa Gedes Soseins,butnowthisbecomesharmless
ratherthan
setzmdssigkeit
becauseof theradicalalteration
of the senseof
perverse
Platonizing
"factual"in "factuala priori."Such factuala prioripropositionsare not
"trueofexperience"
at all,intheKantiansense,a sensethatcanonlybe
in categorical
expressed
propositions.24
In fact,theysay nothingat all
23
Ideas ?zzBC (Boyce-Gibsontranslation,8i). Cf. also Formal and Transcendental

as
Logic ?85, whereintentionalobjects (judgmentsin the context)are distinguished
sensesor meanings.
pp.
"Kant and Husserl on the SyntheticA Priori," Kant-Studien,Band 63 (1972),
341-5 2, 348.
'4
Husserl'spositioncould be made evenmorepalatable to Schlickbyconstruing

thephenomenologist'shypotheticalpropositionsin a "linguistic"manner.That is, one could
veryreadilysay thatphenomenologicalpropositionsexpresswhat words mean when
zo6
M. M. VAN DE
PITTE
about "reality"exceptin an oblique "possible worlds" sense.

We have seenthatSchlickrejectsthephenomenologist's
theoryofintuitionbecausehe mistakenly
believesthattheobjectofthatintuitionis held
to be subsistent.But he is evenmoredismayedbythephenomenologist's
view of the natureof the intuitiveprocess itself,whateverits object.
Again, the "Factual A Priori" article says little about what is
objectionablein Wesenschau.It indicatesonlythatphenomenologists
use
Wesenschauas a sort of magical solutionto philosophicalproblems."5
Schlick'smajor argumentsagainstit are to be foundin a sectionof The
GeneralTheoryofKnowledgeentitled"What Knowledgeis Not" and in
the I9I3 articleentitled"Is There IntuitiveKnowledge?"
For Schlick,knowledgeis essentiallycomplex,involvinga comparison
of some sort,or an incorporationof data intoa conceptualscheme.Both
and judgment are relational processes. Genuine
concept-formation
knowledgeis neverde novo then. It always involvessomethingbeing
knownand beingknownas somethinginparticular,i.e., somethingbeing
recognizedas thesame as or similarto somethingelsewithwhichwe have
previouslybecome familiar."6Thereforethere is no "discovery" in
knowledge,but thereis "rediscovery,"the rediscoveryof one thingin
another.
Intuition,on the otherhand, is a precognitionin which the subject
encountersor, better,becomes "acquainted" with,raw data. Schlick's
examplesofintuitive
objectsare suchthingsas redpatchesand feelingsof
anxiety.The importantthingabout themis thattheyare absolutelysimple.
Whatoccursin intuitive
in theintuitive
experienceis a totalimmersion
object.Schlicktalksoflosingoneselfintheblueofthesky,inexperiencing
blue, in blueness.Anythingthatexceeds mereperceptionof the sensory
datumceases to be intuition.Apperception,
involuntary
association,consciouscomparisonare all on theside of knowledgeratherthanon thatof
intuition.Intuitionlacks not onlyreflection,
comparison,judgment,etc.,
buteventhatmostbasic featureof knowledge- thatof designatingby
means of conceptsor symbols.This because it is tied to the singular,
'5
z6
Ifsomeonetalksoftoneswithoutpitch,or oftawnylionsthatare
theyare usedcorrectly.
entirely
blue,he talksnonsense,because his usage violatesthe (shared)sense.Whatever
the importantdifferences
betweenphenomenologyand linguisticanalysis,we should
rememberthatspecificphenomenologicalanalysescan be re-castas linguisticanalyses.
The possibility
thatlinguistic
analysiscan serveas a "check" on phenomenologicalanalysiswarrantsseriousconsideration.
It is ratherironicthatSchlickhimself"naively"appeals to intuitionwhenhe talksabout
theself-evident
truthofanalyticpropositionsand about theself-evident
factthatanalytic
thinkingrequiresno justification.
Cf. "Is There IntuitiveKnowledge?"pp. 144-45.
SCHLICK'S
CRITIQUE
OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL
PROPOSITIONS
207
whereas,Schlicksays,
The would-beknowermustascendintothesphereof theuniversal,wherehe findstheconceptshe has needofin orderto designatetheindividual;thedevoteeofintuitionis tiedfrom
the startto the individual,whichhe cannot get freefromand therefore
cannot know.27
Given thisroughsketchof the natureof knowledgeand of intuition

respectively,
"intuitiveknowledge"is a contradictionin terms.Intuitive
objectsare merelyexperiencedand neverunderstood.Intuitionsare nonclaim thathis propositions
discursive,and hencethephenomenologist's
preexpressthemis nonsense.Mutatismutandi,thephenomenologist's
tensionto be in commandofa sortofminimalist"logic" ofdiscoverythat
developproducestruthsdeterminative
of the futurecourseof scientific
mentbutinaccessibleto scientific
proceduresis groundless.No scientific
truths,no metascientific
truths,are derivablefromintuitions.
Were phenomenologicalintuitionto resembleSchlick'saccount,we
would be forcedto agreethatHusserl'sideal of a philosophicalscienceis
fruitless.8However, even the circumstantialevidence suggeststhat
Schlickerrsin viewingphenomenologicalintuitionas a naivequasi-mystical and somewhatcheap mechanism,rigidlypatternedon the sensory
model,forwinningphilosophicaltruths.For one thing,he tars Husserl
and no two
and Bergsonwiththesamebrushinhisattackon intuitionists,
opposed thanthesetwo. Husphilosopherscould be morefundamentally
serl'stask is to re-fashionphilosophyas a strictscience- by whichhe
means a completelycoherent account of theoreticalconsciousness
itself.9 His firstmove is to systematicallyand permanentlyexclude
metaphysical
questionsfromphilosophy.Bergson,on theotherhand,is a
metaphysician
franklyinterestedin what escapes theoreticalconsciousness,in what the "poet" can see but the scientistcannot.In Bergsonian
we do in factdiscoversomethingthatwe did not know before.
intuition,
In Husserlianintuition,as we shall see, we do not.
Secondly,Schlickrecognizesthat the second volume of the Logical
containssome majorphilosophicalinsightsand thatthese
Investigations
have been gained,so he believes,not by intuition"but preciselyrather
and description;
througha skilledprocessof coordination,classification
'7
A8
'9
Ibid.,p. 150.
in,on theone hand

Husserlprotests,in Ideas ?zo, againstthepositivist'sinconsistency
thatone
sensesof "intuition"and,on theother,insisting
thevariouslegitimate
conflating
to groundscience,is the
sensealone, a sensethat,as Schlicksays,is clearlyinsufficient
"true" sense of the term.
to avoid thisview of Husserl's
EmmanuelLevinashas triedfordecades,unsuccessfully,
purpose.Cf. AndreOrianne's "Forward" to his translationof Levinas' The Theoryof
Intuitionin Husserl's Phenomenology.
z0o8 M. M. VAN DE PITTE
not through'contemplationof essences',but by methodsof comparison

and symbolization."30
SinceHusserlthoughtthathe was somehowusing
intuitionin hisphilosophicalanalysisthere,itis worthinquiringwhether
intuitionis perhapsa lessexoticand moredifficult
process,or,rather,the
terminalstep in a processakin to ordinaryphilosophicalreflection."
Evena cursoryglanceat Husserl'sideas on intuitionshowsthatSchlick
has not done justiceto the phenomenologist'sposition.To beginwith,
Husserl sees "intuition"as a verycomplexgenerictermcoveringboth
philosophicaland pre-philosophicalepistemologicalforms.3"And not
eventhemostordinaryof thepre-philosophical
formsmanifests
thesimplicityand purityof Schlick'snon-cognitive
intuition.
The respectiveaccounts of empirical intuitiondifferin essential
aspects.Schlick'snotionof sensoryintuition,whichforhimis intuition
toutcourt,is rootedin sensedata theory,a doctrinethatHusserlrejects,
forreasonsonlylaterrecognizedas sound.Weretheultimatedata to consistofbluepatches,etc.,one could talkas does Schlickofimmersing
oneselfin "thisblue" and consequently,of the simplicityand directnessof
intuitive
experience.Butrealityis notmade up ofcolourpatchesand feelingslices.Ratherthanbeingconstituted
ofsensorybits,itis constituted
of
sensoryobjects. These latter are invariablycomplex and it is to be
expectedthatourexperienceofthemwillbe complexas well.Whatinfact
occurs in empiricalintuitionis that a specificobject or a featureof an
object,is singledout of a complexfieldforour attention.That whichis
exceptedwhen somethingis made primaryin thisfashiondoes not just
disappearand formno partof theexperience.It remainsthere,albeitin
thebackground("horizonally,"Husserlwould say) and henceis in some
sensestilla featureof theintentional(intuitive)experience.3Moreover,
thefocuson an intuitiveobjectis perspectivaland is, in that
bydefinition
obvious sense,limited.It is limitedalso by the factthatit occursunder
specificmaterialconditions,conditionsthat are in principlevariable.
Thus thereis nevereventhe mostpedestrianintuitiveexperiencethatis
not somehow slanted,"one-sided,"inadequate.34Althoughin fact no
empiricalintuitionis ever adequate, and it is highlyquestionablethat
intuitions(withthe exceptionof thoseof transcendental
non-empirical
consciousness)are everbothadequate and apodictic,stillHusserlinsists
on thenotionof completeand adequate intuition(a fullycomprehensive,
30
3
3
33
34
"Is ThereIntuitiveKnowledge?"pp. 150-51.

On the difficulty
of intuition,cf. Ideas ?6i.
AlthoughLevinas' book on thetopicappearedoriginallyin 1930,
overviewof Husserl'sposition.
Cf., e.g., Ideas ? 3 5.
Cf. ibid., ? 3
SCHLICK'S
CRITIQUE
OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL
it stilloffersthebest
PROPOSITIONS
Z09
"perspectiveless"awareness of the intentionalobject) as a regulative

principle.He agreeswithSchlickon therestriction
of empiricalintuition
to theindividual,and does not construeit as a processofconcept-formation as Schlickimplies.35
Husserldoes howeverposit a quite different
formof intuition- cat- whichhas a universalobject(somesortofcategory
egorialintuition
or
classconcept).Examplesofcategoricalobjectsare "being,"notas a predicate of coursebut as thecategorialformof statements
expressedin the
copula, and whateverothercategorialformsare necessaryforstatementsuch as "a," "the," "and," "or," "if," "none," "something,"
formation,
"nothing,"etc.Husserl'sinterest
in categorialintuitionis notstrictly
limited to propositionalelementsotherthan substantiveterms.Rather,it
properlyextendsto the higher-order
categorialforms- "generality,"
"conditionality,5""disjunctivity,5"
"probability," "whole," "part,"
"number,""stateof affairs,"
whose workingsare indicatedbythe
propositionalelements.Again,thereis nothingsimpleand directabout
theprocessof categorialintuition,
noris itsobjectsingleand transparent
as Schlickwould want it to be, were he to envisionthe possibilityof a
non-sensory
intuitive
object.The categoriesare forHusserlconstructs
of
consciousness,thepreciseformofwhichhas beenpartiallydetermined
by
thenatureofthedata theycorrelate.The objectsofcategorialthinking
are
not "out there"or "real" - theyare,as Kant saw, strictly
tiedto subjectiveperformances.
Unpackingthemeaningof a category,thecontentof a
categorialintuition,
involvesthefarfromsimplematterof layingout the
objectiveand subjectivecomponentsof a constitutedobject. Nor is the
completedAuslegung,anymorethan any otherin phenomenology(not
directlyof transcendental
So here
consciousness)necessarilyirrefragible.
again, intuitiveknowledgedoes not come cheaply.
Anothersort of pre-philosophicalintuitionwithwhichHusserl concernshimselfis thesortinvolvedin analyticthinking.
We have mentioned
above (footnotez5) thatSchlick,too, despitehisformaldenial,infactrecognizesthisformofintuition,
althoughitclearlydepartsfromhissensory
experiencemodel.ThisoccursinthecontextofhisdefenseofKantagainst
theobjectionthathe neglectedto investigateanalyticthought.He says:
"Whoeverhas graspedthemeaningof a tautology,has in doingso seenit
to be true.
"e,6 Most of us are happy enough to acknowledge an
"intuition"ofthetruthof analyticpropositionsand further,
ofthestructuralprinciplesgoverningformalsystemsthatare of course themselves
analyticpropositionsin Schlick'sand Husserl'ssense.It is, formostofus,
.
35
3
ZIO
.,
Cf. ibid.
"Is There a Factual A Priori?"p. 278.
M. M. VAN DE
PITTE
as good a way as mostto referto thekindof understanding

involvedin
logico-mathematical
reasoning.It is importantto note that forHusserl
involvedis alwaysofthe(necessary)connectheintuitive
comprehension
tionsexpressedin analyticpropositionsand henceis to thatextentcomplex (i.e., likeSchlick'scharacterization
of cognitionbut unlikehis charof
acterization
intuition). Obviously intuitionthat can be put in
propositionalform- thisis the onlysortwe are interestedin - has at
least enoughcomplexityto permitthis,thatis, as much complexityas
havesententialstructures.
One would thinkthenthatSchlickwould have
to givegroundon hiscontentionthatintuitions
are notevergenuinecases
ofknowing,thattheircontentis inexpressible,
etc.,or else he would have
to abandon talk of simply"seeing" the truthof analyticpropositions.
We mightadd herethat"intuition"suitablycharacterizesnotonlythe
we have of theconnectionoftermswithinpropositions;it
understanding
also designatestheunderstanding
we have of connectionsamongpropositions.Aristotelians
have all along thoughtthatseeingthecorrectness
of
a syllogisminvolves"seeing"theconclusionin thepremises.Husserlconformsto thistraditionin thinkingthatwe recognizethevalidityof argumentformsin an immediatebut highlycomplex cognitiveact.
This bringsus to thephilosophicallymostinteresting
formofintuition,
to Wesenschauas an aspectof philosophical
Wesenschau- specifically
Wesenschauneed not be specifically
reflection.
"phenomenological"nor
needitbe muchdifferent
fromtheintuitionofanalyticpropositionsmentionedabove. Wesenschau,too,yieldsan understanding
ofa class concept
to understanda trivially
and, certainly,
truepropositionlike "A bachelor
is an unmarriedman," is to understanda class concept,or a Husserlian
"essence." (All class concepts,like "bachelor"in theexample,have more
than one element.Husserl would say thattheyare wholes made up of
parts.)But ifwhat Wesenschaueffectsis an insightintoclass structures,
in a propositionexpressingboth
an insightthatideallycan be formulated
it is difficult
to
conditionsforclass membership,
necessaryand sufficient
see whatis objectionableabout thenotion- especiallynow thatwe have
itclearlyinmindthatconcepts,classes,essences,orwhathaveyou,do not
"subsist."Nor is themannerin whichthesesortsof objectsare intuited
obviouslyobjectionable.In ordinaryWesenschau,thesortwe encounter
in all philosophicalwritingsince the timeof the Greeks,the insightin
questiondoes not come cheaply,ifit comesat all. Plato strugglesdown a
inch
via negativaafter"piety,""rightconduct,"etc.Our contemporaries
"time,"
etc.
toward
Ordinary
"metaphor," "game," "evaluation,"
Wesenschau (and indeed phenomenological Wesenschau) is simply
"realization"of meaning- an ideal rarelyapproximated,and thenonly
SCHLICK
S CRITIQUE
OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL
PROPOSITIONS
ZII
on thebasis of hardphilosophicalwork.It is, ifyou will,merelythefinal

momentin puzzle solving- themomentin whichwe see thateverything
really,finally,
hangstogether.In thatwe can givereasonsforWesenschau
it has a genuineclaim to considerationas knowledge.
"Phenomenological"(or accordingto Husserl "philosophical")intuition is more complicatedthan ordinaryphilosophical and scientific
insightinto- formulateithow you will: themeaningof a term,theconof a
tentof a concept,an eidos or essence,a class structure,
thestructure
formulationsare so many
categoryof possible being. These different
emphasesgivenin thediscussionof a singleproblem.Husserl'semphasis
is on the structureof a categoryof possible being,a structurewithout
Here the intimationsof anawhichan objectwould be inconceivable.37
lyticity
are obvious.The propositionsproducedbyphilosophicalWesenschau are a prioriin precisely,and only,thesensethattheyexpresswhat
conditionsmustobtain foran object to exist as the particularkind of
objectthatitis - a flower,a cat,a workofart,a memory,a mathematical
propositionor whatever.The meansofobtainingthisinsightis a reflective
process involving,interalia, the methodicsuspensionof metaphysical
assumptions,and a processof imaginativevariationsimilarto thosewe
encounterin the writingsof Descartes and Pierce and, in more recent
times,in the writingsof philosopherswho make use of the methodof
The matteris further
counter-example.
complicatedby the factthatthe
objects of phenomenologicalintuitionare noem-ata-intentional
rather
thanrealobjects.Genuineunderstanding
ofthemthen,supposingwe can
go so far,would incorporatean understanding
ofthepreciseformsofthe
noeticprocesses,thespecificintentionalities,
to whichtheystandas correlates.Ultimately,
itwould requireand understanding
oftheentiresubjectivecontribution(analogous to Kant's formsof experience)towardthe
constitution of meanings.
In sum,it does notrequireevena carefulreadingof Husserlto see that

he did not use the term "intuition"cavalierly- he neitherfailed to
explainit,nor does his explanationresembleits allegedmodel,thatis, a
Schlickianconceptof empiricalintuition.It was forhim a major philohe carvedup intomajor
sophicproblemthat,withteutonicthoroughness,
sections (empirical, categorial, essential . . . ) and finely-honedsubsec-
x as physicalobject,animateorganism,social phetions(understanding
nomena . . . ) and he analyzed at least the major divisions painstak-
ingly.Perhaps forhistoricalreasons "intuition"is now a bull-baiting

term,but one sharesHusserl'spuzzlementoverhow Schlickcould have
takensuchexceptionto it,how he could possiblyhave understooda term
37
ZI1
Cf.,e.g.,Ideas ?9i.
M. M. VAN DE
PITTE
designatingthe exceedinglyrarefinalmomentin an arduous processof

themoment,themove,in whichthe
"successful"philosophicalreflection,
problemcomes to be solved (or so we think),how he could have understood thisto mean a quick glance into the empyreanat transempirical
with
realities,ratherthana "settingofelementsinrelation"in conformity
Schlick'sidea of cognition.
Some of Schlick'smisconceptionsabout phenomenologicalintuition
goal.
doubtlessarisefromthefactthathe has mistakenphenomenology's
does not pretendto discoveranythingnew, much
The phenomenologist
ofscience.His taskis simthatmightchallengethefindings
less anything
plyto reflect
uponwhatwe alreadyknow. One Husserlscholar,Sokolowski,puts it thisway:
Philosophyseemsto elbow othersout of the way, to claim thatit can informthemabout
what is necessaryin thethingstheyexperience.But thisis not philosophy'swork; theman
and experiencedin a givendomainis theone who recognizeswhatis essenwho is intelligent
tial and what is adventitious.His achievementis firstand utterlyirreplaceable.Philosophy
thathas becomemanifestto him;itdoes notestablisha difference
thinksabout a difference
he is unaware of."8
FiftyyearsearlierHusserlput it, less happily,thus:
To judgein a naiveevidenceis to judgeon thebasisofa givingofsomethingitself,whileconexpression- accordinglyitis
tinuallyaskingwhatcan be actually'seen' and givenfaithful
to judgebythesame methodthata cautiouslyshrewdpersonfollowsin practicallifewheneveritis seriouslyimportantto himto 'findout how mattersactuallyare'. That is thebeginningofall wisdom,thoughnotitsend; and itis a wisdomwe can neverdo without,no matter
practisein the
how deep we go withour theorizings- a wisdom thatwe musttherefore
same fashionwhenat last we are judgingin theabsolutephenomenologicalsphere.For,as
has alreadybeenmentionedon severaloccasions,itis essentially
necessarythatnaiveexperiencingand naive judgingcome first.39
The phenomenologistreflectsupon ordinary,i.e., non-philosophical

experience,and on the ordinarylanguage in which that experienceis
expressed.Later on, he can also reflectupon philosophicalexperience
itselfofcourse,butwilldo so profitably
onlyon conditionthathe remember thatphilosophicalexperienceis nothing
butreflectionon ordinary
experience.This is not quitethesame thingas Schlick'scharacterization
on whatis actuallymeant
ofphilosophyas "themereprocessofreflecting
to
bythesentencesthathavecometo be so puzzling;on whatone is trying
say by means of them,"40but it is not so totallyat variancewith it as
38
39
40
Presence and Absence: A Philosophical Investigationof Language and Being

Press,1978), p. 138.
(Bloomington:Indian University
Formal and TranscendentalLogic (?105), translatedby Dorion Cairns (The Hague:
MartinusNijhoff,i969), pp. 278-79.
"Is Therea Factual A Priori?"p. z8i.
SCHLICK'S
CRITIQUE
OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL
PROPOSITIONS
ZI3
Schlickwould have us believe.

(iii) We are now in a somewhatbetterpositionto assess the firstof
Schlick'stwo thesesin the"FactualA Priori"article- thatthephenomenologist'scritiqueof Kant is unjustified.
Husserl regardsKant as being,along withDescartesand Hume, the
precursorof phenomenology.Kant alone, in his opinion,actuallyfunctionedon a genuinelyphenomenologicallevel.4'Thus Husserl does not
hesitateto declarehisconcurrencewiththebroadoutlinesof Kant'sposition. Kant is not so much "wrong" then,not evenin his positionof the
natureof purelogic, as he is unclear.The problemwithhis sketchof a
When
purelogic is thathe inadequatelydefinedits scope and content.42
generality,Husserl believes
looked at froma standpointof sufficient
Kant'sargumentformsa viciouscircle.The inconsistent
resultsofthiscircle is thatwhatis beingsetoffas a 'pure' logic is functionally
rootedin a
transcendental
psychologism.Hence Husserl,afterexpressinghisgeneral
betweenpureand appliedlogic,feelsitnecapprovalofKant'sdistinction
essaryto add theseprovisos:
and reaWe will naturallynot accept Kant's confusing,mythicconceptsof understanding
son, by whichhe setssuch store,and whichhe uses in such questionabledemarcations,as
or reason,as thedispositionsof
being,in a propersense,facultiesofthesoul. Understanding
a certainnormalthoughtattitude,presupposepure logic-which definesnormality-in
theirconcept:ifwe therefore
have seriousrecourseto them,we shall be no wiserthanif,in
likecase, we tryto explaintheartofdancingbythedancingfaculty,i.e. thefacultyofdancing artfully,the art of paintingby the paintingfacultyetc. We rathertake the terms
and 'reason' as merelyindicatinga directionto the'formofthinking'and its
'understanding'
ideal laws, whichlogic,as opposed to an empiricalpsychologyof knowledge,mustfollow.
we accordinglyfeelclose to
Aftersuch reservations,
interpretations,
closerqualifications,
Kant's doctrine.43
stem fromthe fact that he

Husserl believes that Kant's difficulties
rushesto the rescue of mathematics,naturalscience,and metaphysics
straightinto a metaphysicalepistemologybefore,Husserl says,
He has subjected knowledge as such, the whole sphere of acts in which pre-logical
critiqueand analysisof
objectification
and logical thoughtare performed,
to a clarifying
essence,and beforehe has tracedback theprimitive
logicalconceptsand laws to theirphenomenologicalsources.
It is thispassage thatperhapsgave greatestoffenseto Schlick,particularlywhen Husserl adds that:
4I
41
43
Cf. Ideas, ?6z.

Cf. Logical Investigations,Prolegomena,?3.
Ibid., Prolegomena,?58 (Findlaytranslation,p.
Z14
Z14).
M. M. VAN DE PITTE
It was ominousthatKant (to whomwe nevertheless

feelourselvesquite close) shouldhave
thoughtthathe had donejusticeto thedomainofpurelogicinthenarrowestsense,bysaying
thatitfellundertheprincipleofcontradiction.
Not onlydid he neversee how littlethelaws
of logic are all analyticpropositionsin the sense laid down by his own definition,
but he
failedto see how littlehisdraggingin ofan evidentprincipleforanalyticpropositionsreally
helped to clear up the achievementsof analyticthinking.44
Schlick,who is no moresympathetic
thanis Husserlto theolderempiricistaccountoflogic,mustshareHusserl'sdissatisfaction
withKant's use
of facultytheoryin his philosophyof logic. One would thinkalso thathe
would have to applaud Husserl'ssuggestionthatif"understanding"and
"reason" are to be analyzedat all, itshouldbe merelybyway ofintroduction to a non-metaphysically
biased analysisof cognitivefunctioning.
That,accordingto Schlick,is theonlywaythatwe can makesense,ifsense
is to be made, of our capacityto understandsynthetic
a prioripropositions.The crucialpointof difference,
then,betweenSchlickand Husserl
Did Kant adequatelyclarifythe
centersaround the issue of analyticity.
concept?Do all thepropositionsof his pure logic in factconformto his
of analyticity?
own criterion
Butmoreimportantyetthanthesequestions
is thepriorquestionthatSchlickraisesand answersin thenegative- is
Kant underany obligationto addresstheseissues?
Husserl'sreasonforansweringin theaffirmative
is simplythathe has
looked at Kant's logic and foundit wanting.He says:
Purelogic,whichintruthis above science,ought,accordingto Kant,to be 'briefand dry','as
is requiredbythescholasticexpositionofa theoryoftheelementsoftheunderstanding'
(Cr.
to Tr. Logic I). Everyoneis familiarwithKant'slectures,pubofPure Reason, Introduction
lishedby Jdsche,and knows to what a questionableextenttheyfulfillthischaracteristic
demand.Shall thisunutterably
defectivelogic be themodelwe shouldstriveto imitate?No
one willlook kindlyon thethoughtofpushingscienceback to thestandpointoftheAristotelean-Scholasticlogic,whichseemswhat Kant's treatment
amountsto, sincehe himselfsays
thatlogic has had thecharacterof a closed sciencesincethetimeof Aristotle.A scholastic
elaborationofsyllogistics,
is
prefacedbysomesolemnlypronouncedconceptualdefinitions,
surelyno inspiringprogram.45
Husserl'sharshjudgmentconcerningtheinadequacyof Kant's logicin

termsof itsscope and contentis universallyshared.Our contemporaries
knowbetterthanKant about thenatureand limitsoflogicthanksin part
to Kant's own pioneeringworkof course,butis he entirelyblameless,as
to developmorecompletelytheconSchlickwould have it, forneglecting
forfailingto transform
it intoa transcendental
ceptof analyticity,
probof
lem?Afterall,he had beforehimLeibniz'thoughtsaboutthepossibility
aboutthepossiblediscoveryand
therebeingdifferent
kindsofanalyticity,
44
45
Ibid., Investigation
VI, ?66 (Findlaytranslation,p. 833).
Ibid., Prolegomena,?58 (Findlaytranslation,pp. 214-15).
SCHLICK'S
CRITIQUE
OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL
PROPOSITIONS
215
proof of the analyticcharacterof certainpropositions.Since Leibniz'

viewschallengeso directlyKant's own, theyshould have meritedmore
attentionfromhim than theyin factreceived.In factin principle,had
in doingso, he shouldhave beenable to pose to himKantbeeninterested
selfthecentralissuesthathave animatedthedebateabout analyticpropositionsduringthepasteightyyears- aboutkindsofanalyticpropositions
(propositionswithidenticalsubjectand predicateterms,those without
thoseexpressingargumentor proofforms,thosenecesverbalrepetition,
forthosestipulating
linguisticconsaryto understandas a pre-condition
and possible
ventions,etc.) about degrees(weak, strong)of analyticity,
verbaland nonabout analyticity,
incompleteness
of analyticstatements,
verbal facts,about analyticityand discoveryand the problem of the
"paradoxofanalysis,"etc.He had in factenoughmaterialsat hisdisposal
(withtheexceptionof thefamilyresemblancenotionthatyieldsa quasito worrymuchmoredeeplyabout the
metaphoricalsenseof analyticity)
in
thanhe factdid. Had he done so, itis mostunlikely
natureofanalyticity
thathe would have consideredpure logic already'done,' (althoughit is
improbablethathe himselfwould have been inclinedto develop it further).
century,
forQuine
It is strangethatwe had to wait untilmid-twentieth
as a transcendental
et al., to takeup analyticity
problem.It
(-syntheticity)
would seemthat,in thecourseof his generalcritiqueof cognition,Kant
was not onlyequipped,but in some sense also obliged,to put the transcendentalquestionconcerningtheconditionsforthepossibilityof analyticthinking.But in a senseit is evenstrangerthatSchlickand theearly
and
positivistsshouldnothave understoodthatthenatureof analyticity,
consequentlythe recognitionof analyticpropositions,is an important
philosophicalproblem.It did not require"Two Dogmas," or familiarity
withthe debate promptedby the attemptsof Strawson,Benfield,Plantinga, Kripke, et al. to rehabilitatesynthetica prioris,to see that
and "tautological"cannot
"analytic,""a priori" "necessary,""formal,"5
be facilelytreatedin Schlick'smanner- as thoughtheywerestrictly
synonymous.Even withKant, the meaningof "analytic"shifts,depending
upon whetherhe is talkingabout conceptsor about judgments.Schlick
severalsensesof the term,
should have notedthatHusserl distinguishes
onlysome of whichare peculiarlyappropriateto logic.6 He shouldhave
remarkedalso theimportantdifference
betweenthetraditionalsense of
"analytic"as involvingessentialpredication(a senserevivedby Morton
White)and his own (and Quine's) view of it as 'merely'tautological.He
46
uiberHusserlsVerhdltniszu Kant
Cf. Iso Kern,Husserl und Kant: Eine Untersuchung
und zum Neukantianismus(Den Haag: MartinusNijhoff,i964), p. 136, n. 5.
i6
M. M. VAN DE
PITTE
should have noted above all the deliberateand veryproblematicvagueness of the notionlyingat the heartof the logical positivistdoctrineof
Hume's notionof a 'relationof ideas'.
analyticity
- becauseitis doubtful
Thispointneednotbe belabouredfurther
that
any philosopherof whateverpersuasionwould now disagreethat the
natureand originof analyticity
is a philosophicalproblemand, whatever
themeritsor liabilitiesof Husserl'sown positionon thetopic,at leasthe
was justifiedin insistingthatit be seen as a problem.
Thereis a secondpointin Schlick'sobjectionto thephenomenologist's
critiqueof Kant thatwarrantscomment.Schlickcontendsthatthephenomenologistsaccept the (to him,entirelyunnecessary)conceptof the
a priori,whilerejectingtheonlygroundspresently
synthetic
availablefor
adoptingit- thatis, thosegroundsofferedbyKant in thefirstCritique.
In effect,Schlickaccuses the phenomenologistsof treatingsynthetica
prioriswiththe same degreeof naivetywithwhichKant treatsanalytic
propositions.
Buthereagain,Schlickgivesphenomenologyshortshrift.Husserl,for
one, believesthathe is doingpreciselywhatSchlickdemandsof believers
a prioris,thatis, takingup Kant's taskanew to see ifa more
in synthetic
convincingcase, but one stillalong the Kantianline (theonlyplausible
line to pursue,accordingto Schlick)can be workedout.
It could not be otherwise:the objectivesof transcendental
phenomenologyare thesame,in theirgeneraloutline,as thoseof Kant's transcendentalphilosophy,exceptthattheyare broader.They have to do with
and the correlations
possibleworlds and possible formsof subjectivity,
remainstiedto theactual,47
betweenthese.Kant's philosophyultimately
and so functionsas a particularcase, as a phenomenologyof the
"commonsenseperspective
ofordinaryhumanbeings"ifyouwill,within
Husserl's philosophyof the possible. Husserl neverrejectsKant - we
have seen thathe repeatedlyaffirms
hisintellectualaffinity
to him- but
he does tryto transcendthose of Kant's limitationsthathe takes to be
attributableto the factthathis outlook is fundamentally
anthropological."8In his opinion,thisoutlook preventsKant fromadoptinga genuinely"transcendental"
approach.WhenHusserlsetsout to do whatKant
as a logicalcategoryand correlateit
neglectedto do - analyzeanalyticity
he proceedsin a highly
withthesubjectivecategoryofanalyticalthinking,
Kantianfashion.He developsfirstthecrucialconceptof 'category',and
4
48
Cf.Gallagher,
op. cit.,pp. 341-52.
On Kant's anthropologism,
cf. M. Heidegger,Kant and the Problemof Metaphysics,
Press,i962), and F. P.
translatedby F. S. Churchill(Bloomington:Indiana University
Van De Pitte,Kant as PhilosophicalAnthropologist(The Hague: MartinusNijhoff,
1971).
SCHLICK'S
CRITIQUE
OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL
PROPOSITIONS
ZI7
identifies
thoseof itsformsrelevantfirstto analyticand thento synthetic
thinking.
In factin one passageintheIdeas, he talksspecifically
about the
issue withwhichSchlickis concerned.He providesa rule of thumbfor
correlating
his conceptof synthetic
propositionsbelongingto purelogic
(and hence a priori)withKant's. This passage disclosesHusserl's basic
acceptanceof the firstCritiqueposition.Husserl says there:
in fundamental
If,despitenotabledifferences
outlookwhichare notincompatiblehowever
one wishesto maintainapproval of Kant's Critiqueof theReason,
withan inneraffinity,
theregionalaxiomsas synthetic
one has onlyto interpret
cognitionsa priori,and we should
thenhave as manyirreducibleclassesof suchformsof knowledgeas thereare regions.The
'synthetic
primaryconcepts'or categorieswould be theregionalprimaryconcepts(related
to theregionin questionand itssynthetic
essentially
principles)and we shouldhaveas many
different
groupsof categoriesas thereare regionsto be distinguished.49
Of course thispassage reallyonly shows that Husserl thinksthat a

fairlyeasyaccommodationis possiblebetweenhisand Kant'spurelogics.
of Kant's groundingof rational
It does not implyan actual endorsement
is infactwithheldforthereasonsgivenabove forms.Thatendorsement
and psychologismin the firstCritique.But
thevitiatinganthropologism
accordingto Husserl,thefirstCritique,indeedKant's entirework,is not
beyondrepair.He says:
. . . Kant,forhis part,has no idea thatin his philosophizinghe standson unquestioned
presuppositions
and thattheundoubtedlygreatdiscoveriesin histheoriesare thereonlyin
are
concealment;thatis,theyare notthereas finished
results,justas thetheoriesthemselves
not finishedtheories,i.e., do not have a definitive
form.What he offersdemands
scientific
new work and, above all, criticalanalysis.5"
Husserlsaw himselfas executingthisnew work,as completing,parfora genuine

tiallyon thebasis of Kant's foundations,therequirements
transcendental
philosophy.To missthispointis to misswhathisphenomenologyis all about.
(iv) The interesting
questionraisedbySchlick'scritiqueofHusserlis of
coursehow to bestdescribephenomenologicalpropositions.The answer
willentaila carefulanalysisofthevarioussensespropositionalpredicates
will bear. Here we can onlygivetheroughestindicationof theformthat
analysismighttake.
So farour investigation
has touchedupon certainkindsof ambiguity
attachingto propositionalpredicates.We have noted,forexample,that
theterm"formal"has at leastthreeobviouslydistinctsenses.To say of a
4
5?
S I6 (Boyce-Gibsontranslation,p. 70).
The Crisis of European Sciences and TranscendentalPhenomenology,translatedby
Press,1970), PartIII, para. z8,
University
David Carr (Evanston,Illinois:Northwestern
p. 103.
zi8
M. M. VAN DE
PITTE
propositionthatitis "formal"maymeanthatitssenseis governedexcluHere "formal"appliesdirectly

sivelybytheprincipleof contradiction.
to
to thosefilled-out
emptypropositionaland argumenttypes,and indirectly
propositionaland argumentformsthat are immediatelyreducibleto
these.Or, to say of a propositionthatit is "formal"may mean thatit
expressesa structural
law, thenecessarilyrelated"parts" thatmake up a
and controversial
categorial"whole." Or, and thisis the most difficult
sensewe havementioned- to sayofa propositionthatitis "formal"may
meanthatitis a formulation
ofone ofthefoundationalexperientialprinciples(theformsof apperception,thecategories,. . .) whichlegitimize
cognition.
Partlybecauseofitsconventionalconnectionwith"formal,"themeaningof "analytic"is similarlynuanced.We have variousoffhandways of
to analyticpropositionsthatare not reducibleto a unequivocal
referring
sense.We say of themthattheyexpressrelationsof ideas, (butgenerally
neglectto fillin what "relationof ideas" comprehends).Or we say that
theyare known by reason alone, by "analysis" in the sense of picking
aparta conceptor networkof conceptsin orderto discernessentialfeaturesand theirinterconnections,
and by inference
strictly
tiedto conceptual analysis.Or we say of themthattheyare propositionsin whichthe
predicatetermis somehowcontainedin thesubjectterm- thattheyare
trueex vi terminorum,
conventionally
true,indicativeof how people use
language. . . . Or we say that they are true in virtueof theirformalone,
in virtueof the infinitesubstitutivity

of theirvariables,in virtueof the
principle of contradiction.
. .
. Or, because we customarily conflate
we sayofthemthattheyaretrivially
propositionaldescriptions,
true,necessarilytrue,tautological,a priori,etc.
Even Kant,whomSchlickbelievesto have tidiedup propositionalterminologyto the point where we can regard "analytic," "formal," "a
priori,"and "tautological" as functionally
equivalent,uses "analysis"
and "analytic"in two importantly
different
senses.This difference
goes
beyondthat alreadymentioned- a difference
stemmingfromthe fact
thateithera conceptor a judgmentis beingdescribedas analytic.Thisfuris that betweenthe logical and the phenomenological
therdifference
sensesof "analytic,"the formercenteringon thenotionof thepredicate
termbeing"containedin" thesubjectterm,thelatteron thenotionofone
thingbeing "thoughtin" another.Kantian phenomenologicalanalysis/
has epistemologicalovertoneslackingto logicalanalysis/anaanalyticity
lyticity.
feelforthefluidity
We now have sufficient
of propositionalpredicates
to know that,werewe to be asked ifphenomenologicalpropositionsare
SCHLICK
S CRITIQUE
OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL
PROPOSITIONS
219
analytic,we shouldfirsthave to determine

whatwas beingasked,before
we could venturea response.5'In what sense are theyanalytic?They
are not analyticin accord withHusserl'sown use of theterm,
definitely
That is, one cannotdeterminetheirtruth
whichis narrowlyformalistic.
value on the basis of an inspectionof theirsyncategorematic
elements
alone.
Aretheyanalyticin Schlick'ssensethen?That is a moredifficult
question.Schlickidentifies
"analytic"with"formal,"butthenwaffleson the
senseof "formal."He thusperforcewaffleson themeaningof "analytic."
inhis approachto anato be as narrowlyformalistic
Despitehisintention
lyticity
as is Husserl,he goes beyondtheinitialsenseof emptyformality,
to the"how people use language"notion,to theveryexpansivenotionof
the analytic(formal)as a formulationof a structurallaw.
Phenomenologicalpropositions,withthe exceptionof those in apophanticanalyticsare not merelylogicallyor syntactically
trueand hence
are not emptilyformal.So strictlyspeakingtheyare not analyticin the
firstof Schlick'ssenses.Theydo howeversubmitto theprincipleof contradiction,but onlyif one has due regardfortheprecisemeaningsconveyedbythesemanticelements.Schlick'sown "proof"of theanalyticity
ofphenomenological
propositionscenteredaroundthemeaningofterms,
not simplyon the formalcomponents.This suggeststhe truismthatto
determine
whethera givensubstantive
propositionis reducibleto a purely
formala priorirequiresthepriorrecognitionof themateriala priori.To
put it anotherway, it is not quite rightto deny the materiala priori
that thereare
(Schlick'sGesetzmissigkeitdes Soseins) while affirming
non-formalpropositionsthat are reducibleto formalones. In any case
here,in thecontextofphenomenology,
we have propositionsthatsatisfy
one (use ofthecontradiction
principle),butnottheother(pureformality)
ofthealternatecriteriaSchlickofferson histightest
rendering
ofanalyticity.
This,thefactthattheprincipleofcontradiction
appliesto phenomenoof
logicalpropositionsand itsapplicationpresupposesan understanding
semantic
indicates
the
that
(non-formal)elementsof a proposition,
Schlick'stwo weakersensesof "analytic"are in factapplicable to phenomenologicalpropositions.At leastthisis arguablythecase forthefirst
of theseothersenses- the "how people use language" sense. Husserl
of phenomenologiwould certainlynot be happywitha characterization
"'
W. F. Vallicella,in his reviewof RobertSokolowski'sHusserlianMeditations,in CulturalHermeneutics(I976), pp. 93-i06, givesseveralreasonswhyphenomenological

propositionsare notanalytic,reasonsthatdependforthemostparton featuresofSokolowski's interpretation.
220
M. M. VAN DE
PITTE
cal propositionsas expressionsofsemanticequivalencesor ofhow people

use language,but only because he conceivesof himselfas havingmore
fundamental
workto do and notbecausehe sees no pointto thesemantic
approach.Butif,as seemslikely,itshouldturnout to be thecase thatthe
resultsof anyphenomenologicalanalysiscan be recastas a descriptionof
how we talk,of how we defineterms,thenphenomenologicalpropositionsare at worstonly"obliquely"analyticand are reducibleto propositionsthatare strictly
analyticin the semanticsense.
Phenomenologicalpropositionsare clearlyanalyticin the second of
Schlick'sweakersensesof "analytic."They display"relationsof ideas"
on therichestpossiblereadingofthatphrase- theypresentthestructural
principlesof determinate
categoriesof objects. When Schlickconcedes
thatqualitativenotionsare as formal,as strictly
determinate,
as quantitativenotions,he is acknowledging"substantive"or "material"a priori
propositions.This is preciselywhat Husserl means by "synthetic"a
prior.
How do phenomenologicalpropositionsaccordwithKant's notion(s)
of analyticity?
We know of course thattheydo not qualifyas analytic
insofaras theyare nottrueinvirtueoftheirformsalone,buthow do they
fitwiththe more suggestivenotion that in an analyticpropositionthe
predicatetermis somehow "contained" in the subjectterm?
ofthemprimarily
Husserlrejectsthischaracterization
becausehe takes
itthatthatwould indicatethatphenomenological
propositionsaremerely
true.Theymayindeedbe semantically
semantically
true,buttheyare not
merelyso. Ifsemantictruthcharacterizes
phenomenological
propositions
at all, it does so as a happyconcommitant
of a morefundamentaltruth
theessentialstructure
ofpossiblebeing.The factofthematter
concerning
is thatphenomenologists
are usuallyappropriately
charyof postulating
vast real distinctionsbetweencategories(language/thought/reality)
that
clearlyoverlapbeneaththeconceptualdistinctions
we makein describing
them.
But notwithstanding
Husserl's rejectionof the "predicatetermcontained in the subject term" sort of descriptionof phenomenological
propositions,itwould seemthatwithcarefulqualificationit is not inappropriately
appliedto them.Iftheyare used to describethenecessaryfeaturesof categoriesof intentionalobjects, the necessaryand sufficient
"parts" makingup a categorial"whole," thenit is not implausibleto
thinkthat the propositionsthemselveshave a correlativepart/whole
the predicateterm(part) being "containedin" the subject
structure
term(whole).
SCHLICK'S CRITIQUE OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL PROPOSITIONS
221
We shall notexamineheretheterm"tautological,"whichis preferred

bySokolowskito Schlick'sterm,"analytic,"as a descriptionofphenomenologicalpropositions.We shallmerelynotethatittoo has diverseshades
senseattachingto it in virtueof itsextenof meaning.Thereis a different
sion- e.g.,some assumeitto be coextensivewiththeentireclass of analyticpropositions,while othersrestrictit to thoseanalyticpropositions
Therearesignificant
intensionaldifferences
as
involvingverbalrepetition.
well.Sokolowskiforexampleplayswiththreeofthese:thefirsttwo (synto thelevelofmeaning,while
tacticand semantictautology)are restricted
thethird,whichrequiresattentionto an object,has a bearingon experience.5
We haveseenthatphenomenological
propositionsmightbe analyticon
somereadingsof "analytic"butnoton others.This raisesthequestionof
as well,in preciselythosesenses
whethertheymightnotthenbe-synthetic
in whichtheyare not analytic.There mightalso be additionalsensesof
"synthetic"thatapplyto them,whichhave not alreadybeen indirectly
Let us thenbrieflylook at
disclosedin the roughsketchof analyticity.
of "synthetic,"
some of themoreprominentcharacterizations
to see ifin
closenessto
factany of themfitHusserlianpropositionswithsufficient
a priori.
rendermoreplausiblehis claim thattheyare synthetic
It is customaryto pair off "synthetic"with "contingent"and,
of contingent
followingHume's characterization
propositions,to regard
themas expressing"mattersof fact."But Humean "facts" are radically
fromHusserlian "Tatsachen." The latter,we know, are the
different
structures
ofeideticobjects.The ultimateHusserlianfactsare thelaws of
transcendentalconsciousness.Propositionsexpressingthese sorts of
facts,the eideticlaws of possible experience,are clearlynoncontingent
in thesenseof thattermthatwe retroactively
and so cannotbe synthetic
Hume
to
seen
afterKant).
attribute
(as
None of thesensesof "synthetic"thatimportcontingency
will fitphenomenologicalpropositions,because, these propositionsbeing all a
priori,thatwould yielda flat-outcontradiction,
justas Schlicksupposes.
(Of courseityieldsa contradiction
onlyif"synthetic"and "a priori"are
meanton thesame level.But if,e.g., "synthetic"characterizesa propositional structureand "a priori"the mannerin which the propositionis
posited,then no contradictionis involved.)This apparentlyrules out
because theyare
describingphenomenologicalpropositionsas synthetic
experientially
known,unlessit is somehowworkedout thattheexperiencein questionis ofmeaningsnotofthings,i.e.,thatwe are dealingwith
possible or transcendentalexperience.That would, though,make the
" Cf. his HusserlianMeditations585.
222
M. M. VAN DE
PITTE
phrase "experientiallyknown" altogethertoo Pickwickian,because it

would thenimportnecessity.
For those who like to distinguishbetween "experiential" and
"empirical,"53 it is equally untenable to describe phenomenological
propositionsas empiricallyknowable,because theyare generatedby a
methodthatincludesthesystematic
acsesisofempiricalreference.
Nor, as
we have seen,are theysynthetic
in theinnocuoussensethatthepredicate
term"adds something"to thesubjectterm,becausewhateveris expressed
in an eideticlaw is alreadycontainedin theeidos underinvestigation.
So
in any of the
phenomenologicalpropositionsdo not seemto be synthetic
usual senses.
The straightforward
answerto the question concerningthe sense in
whichHusserl'spropositionsare synthetic
is that"synthetic"is theterm
he uses to designateall those.a prioripropositions,i.e., thoseexpressing
necessarystructural
principles,whichlie outsidethestrictly
formaldisciplines.Schlickwe know readilyacknowledgesthatthereare suchpropositionsbut prefersto call them"analytic."
The basic difference
betweenSchlickand Husserlthenis not so much
about thenatureof non-logical,non-mathematical
a prioripropositions
as it is about what theyare to be called. Schlickplaces togetheremptily
formaland non-emptily
formal,i.e., "material"a priorisundertherubric
"analytic";Husserl reserves"analytic"forthe emptilyformaland uses
a priori"fortheothers.Thereseemnotto be compellingrea"synthetic
sons forfavouringone usage over the other- it is, ifnot a questionof
taste,a questionof whereto put theemphasis.Thereseemto be as good
thepositivist'ssubsumptionofthesynthetic
groundsforreversing
a priori
underthe analyticas formaintainingit.
Husserl'spreference
for"synthetic"to designatepropositionsdescribingthemateriala prioriwas in partmotivatedbyhisconsiderationofthe
modewherebythesepropositionscometo be formulated.
Theyareconsequentupon formallogic (apophanticanalytics)and formalontologyand
require,in additionto these,a transcendental
logic.Referenceto theconthatis the paradigstitutivefunctionof consciousness,to intentionality
maticsynthetic
act, is importedby "synthetic"and not by "analytic."
Certainlytheremaining
propositionalpredicates- "a priori,""a posteriori,""necessary,""contingent"- also standin need of clarification.
at "a priori"beforeconcluding,merelyto emphaWe shallglancebriefly
to thediscussionis comsizethatnoneoftheconceptsthatare important
pletelyfreeof ambiguity.
E.g.,R. Bradleyand N. Swartz,PossibleWorlds:An Introduction

to Logicand Its
Philosophy(Oxford: Basil Blackwell,I979), p.
SCHLICK
S CRITIQUE
I50.
OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL
PROPOSITIONS
223
For Schlick,"a priori" ("analytic,""formal,""tautological")means

"logicallynecessary."(We notedabove thatforhim,logical necessityis
theonlykindofnecessity.)More recently,
ithas beensuggestedbyKripke
be
et al. thatthisnaiveview replacedbyone in whicha strongdistinction
is made betweena prioriknowledgeand necessarytruth,theformer
being
construedas an epistemicconcept,and thelatteras a metaphysicalconcept. This distinctionis adumbratedby Kant and noted by Husserl,
althoughtheydo not use the contemporary
vocabulary.
In Kant, in fact,we discover (or thinkthat we do) threedistinct
readingsof "a priori"as appendedto "judgment."We thinkfirstof "a
priori"as meaning"independentofexperience."We now knowthatthat
descriptionmeritsexplicationbecause the distinctionbetweenordinary
and transcendental
experiencemustbe takeninto account. The second
Kantian characterizationof "a priori" that comes to mind is falsely
ascribedto Kant,notonlybySchlickbut,it would seem,bymostofthose
who read Kemp Smith'stranslationof the firstCritiqueratherthanthe
original.This is thereadingwhichhas "a priori"meaning"logicallynecessary."ActuallyforKant "analytic,"not "a priori,"means "logically
necessary."He does not use theodd locution"analytica priori"notonly
because thereare not, forhim,two different
classesof analyticpropositionsbut also because,if "a priori"also means "logicallynecessary,"to
append it to "analytic"would be glaringlyredundant.
The arguments
ofR. Wolff,et al., thatKantuses "a priori"adverbially
ratherthanadjectivelyas theKempSmithtranslationhas it are quitepersuasive.54This yieldsthe third,or rathersecond genuine sense of "a
a prioris,althoughnot necessaryin se, are
priori"in Kant. His synthetic
necessitatedin that,byvirtueof theworkingsof thepureformsof intuition, one is constrainedto posit them.Doubtless it was preciselythis
point,interalia, thatled Husserlto regardKantianismas a speciesofpsychologism.
Husserlhimselfsometimestalksabout theinconceivability
ofthefalsehood of apodicticphenomenologicalpropositions,butitwould be a mistaketo read thisas implicitpsychologist.Ifphenomenologicalpropositions happen to be ad aliquid undeniable,it is because theyare in se
necessary- ontologicallyas well as (or we should say, and therefore)
whatlogically.Theystatewhatmustbe thecase forthereto be anything
ever.
14
of the Argumentof the SubjectiveDeduction," in

Cf. R. P. Wolff,"A Reconstruction
Kant: A Collectionof CriticalEssays,ed. Wolff(GardenCity,N. J.:Doubleday, i967,
in Kant: TheArchep. 98, note i6). Wolff'spositionis developedbyW. H. Werkmeister
tectonicand Developmentof his Philosophy(La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, i980, pp.
66-68).
224
M. M. VAN DE
PITTE
turnin whichHusserlmakes transcendental

Withthe transcendental
consciousnesstheultimatea priori,theepistemologicala prioriis assimilatedto thelogicaland ontologicalsenses.This is headyand certainly
controversialstuff- this transcendentalbusiness of demonstratingthe
reducibility
of the logical/epistemological/ontological
dimensionsinto a
unifiedconceptof the a priori.But thatafterall is what transcendental
philosophyis all about; henceHusserl'sdescription
ofphenomenology
as
thephilosophyofthea priori.It is notnecessaryto countenanceHusserl's
conceptof thea priori,but itis necessaryto noteitspeculiarityand richness.It is exceedinglyodd thatSchlickdid notbotherto ask himselfwhat
Husserlmeantbya priori,butinsteadfacilelyassumedhimto meanwhat
logical positivistsmeantby it.
In sum,thereis an enormousamountofworkto be done to determine
fromnon-phenomaccuratelyhow phenomenological
propositionsdiffer
enologicalpropositions,and how theyare bestdescribedwiththepropositionalpredicatesat our disposal. CertainlyHusserlianphenomenology
is fraught
withenoughgenuinedifficulties
thatitis notnecessaryto manto
ufacturespuriousones by, paraphraseHusserl,foistingon Husserlour
own alien conceptions,and thenreadingabsurditiesinto his work.
SCHLICK
S CRITIQUE
OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL
PROPOSITIONS
225

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Wiley

International Phenomenological Society

Vol. XLV, No. 2, December1984

son andG. Harmon(Dordrecht:

In his HusserlianMeditations:How Words PresentThings(Evanston:Northwestern

Vol. VI, pp. 135-51.

A few preliminaryremarksabout the Husserl-Schlickconnection

generally,exceptforCarnap fora ratherbriefperiod.)

to groundcognipurportto be. Althoughhe believesthatall suchefforts

So farSchlickhas notoffereda reasonedargumentagainstsynthetic

In the discussionof Schlick'sposition that now follows,it must be

muchabout the natureof phenomenologicalpropositionsby exploring

It is not clearthatKant is guiltyof theerrorhereascribedto himas a

0 Cf. e.g., ErstePhilosophieII, editedby RudolfBoehm (The Hague: MartinusNijhoff,

So far,ithas beenestablishedthatHusserluses 'formal'intwo compatiblesenses,bothofwhichare acceptableto Schlick.The one senserefersto

To learn the detailsof Schlick'sPlatonistconstructionof Husserlian

thisoccasionsin hislaterwork,cf.D. M. Levin,Reason

Husserl thoughtbeneathdiscussion.The beginningof the strongestof

The factthatHusserl thinksthatPlatonicrealismis absurd suggests

Schlickdoes not say whata "proper"senseis. But itis not

Ideas ?zzBC (Boyce-Gibsontranslation,8i). Cf. also Formal and Transcendental

Husserl'spositioncould be made evenmorepalatable to Schlickbyconstruing

about "reality"exceptin an oblique "possible worlds" sense.

Given thisroughsketchof the natureof knowledgeand of intuition

in,on theone hand

z0o8 M. M. VAN DE PITTE

not through'contemplationof essences',but by methodsof comparison

"Is ThereIntuitiveKnowledge?"pp. 150-51.

"perspectiveless"awareness of the intentionalobject) as a regulative

as good a way as mostto referto thekindof understanding

on thebasis of hardphilosophicalwork.It is, ifyou will,merelythefinal

In sum,it does notrequireevena carefulreadingof Husserlto see that

ingly.Perhaps forhistoricalreasons "intuition"is now a bull-baiting

designatingthe exceedinglyrarefinalmomentin an arduous processof

The phenomenologistreflectsupon ordinary,i.e., non-philosophical

Presence and Absence: A Philosophical Investigationof Language and Being

Schlickwould have us believe.

stem fromthe fact that he

It is thispassage thatperhapsgave greatestoffenseto Schlick,particularlywhen Husserl adds that:

Cf. Ideas, ?6z.

It was ominousthatKant (to whomwe nevertheless

Husserl'sharshjudgmentconcerningtheinadequacyof Kant's logicin

proof of the analyticcharacterof certainpropositions.Since Leibniz'

Of course thispassage reallyonly shows that Husserl thinksthat a

Husserlsaw himselfas executingthisnew work,as completing,parfora genuine

propositionthatitis "formal"maymeanthatitssenseis governedexcluHere "formal"appliesdirectly

in virtueof the infinitesubstitutivity

. Or, because we customarily conflate

analytic,we shouldfirsthave to determine

W. F. Vallicella,in his reviewof RobertSokolowski'sHusserlianMeditations,in CulturalHermeneutics(I976), pp. 93-i06, givesseveralreasonswhyphenomenological

cal propositionsas expressionsofsemanticequivalencesor ofhow people

SCHLICK'S CRITIQUE OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL PROPOSITIONS

We shall notexamineheretheterm"tautological,"whichis preferred

phrase "experientiallyknown" altogethertoo Pickwickian,because it

E.g.,R. Bradleyand N. Swartz,PossibleWorlds:An Introduction

For Schlick,"a priori" ("analytic,""formal,""tautological")means

of the Argumentof the SubjectiveDeduction," in

turnin whichHusserlmakes transcendental

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