LEGAL ETHICS CASES

(Case Digest)
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#1 :Cayetano vs. Monsod

201 SCRA 210

September 1991

Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to

the position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because
allegedly Monsod does not posses required qualification of having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IXC: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not
have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine
Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law
is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceeding, the management of
such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services,
contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage,
enforcement of a creditors claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and
conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have
been held to constitute law practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsods past
work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of
industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor
verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC
chairman, The respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years
does In the view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.
*** The Supreme Court held that the appointment of Monsod is in accordance with the
requirement of law as having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Monsods past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyerentrepreneur of industry, a lawyer negotiator of contracts and a lawyer-legislator of both
the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Again, in the case of Philippine
Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
and litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident
to actions and social proceedings and other similar work which involves the determination
by a legal mind the legal effects of facts and conditions.
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#2: PHILIPPINE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION VS. CELEDONIO AGRAVA,
in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Offi ce
FACTS: A petition was filed by the petitioner for prohibition and injunction against
Celedonio
Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Offi ce. On May 27, 1957,
respondent
Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an
examination for
the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before
the

Philippines Patent Offi ce. The petitioner contends that one who has passed the bar
examinations
and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in
good
standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Offi ce and that
the respondent
Directors holding an examination for the purpose is in excess of his jurisdiction and
is in violation
of the law.
The respondent, in reply, maintains the prosecution of patent cases does not
involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific
and technical knowledge and training as a matter of actual practice so as to include
engineers and other individuals who passed the examination can practice before the
Patent offi ce. Furthermore, he stressed that for the long time he is holding tests, this
is the first time that his right has been questioned formally.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appearance before the patent Offi ce and the preparation
and the
prosecution of patent application, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of
law.
HELD: The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes such appearance
before the
Patent Offi ce, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and
the
prosecution of their applications for patent, their opposition thereto, or the
enforcement of their
rights in patent cases. Moreover, the practice before the patent Offi ce involves the
interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the
existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and
procedure. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in
court but also embraces all other matters connected with the law and any work
involving the determination by the legal mind of the legal effects of facts and
conditions. Furthermore, the law provides that any party may appeal to the Supreme
Court from any final order or decision of the director. Thus, if the transactions of
business in the Patent Offi ce involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific
knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or
judicial body, but rather to a board of
scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.
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#3 ALAWI V ALAUYA
PARTIES

ALAWI, sales rep of E.B. Villarosa

ALAUYA, incumbent executive clerk of court

FACTS

Through ALAWIS agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments
by ALAUYA of a housing unit

A housing loan was also granted to ALAUYA by the National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation (NHMFC)

Subsequently, ALAUYA wrote a letter to the President of Villarosa advising

termination of his contract on the grounds that his consent was vitiated by gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by ALAWI and
proceeded to expound using acerbic language

A copy of the letter, which bore no stamps, was sent to the VP of Villarosa

ALAUYA also wrote the NHMFC repudiating as void his contract with Villarosa and
asking for cancellation of his loan

Finally, ALAUYA wrote 3 other letters to officers of the SC to stop deductions from
his salary regarding the loan from NHMFC

NHMFC also wrote the SC requesting it to stop said deductions

Learning of the letters, ALAWI filed a complaint alleging that ALAUYA

o
o
ISSUE
HELD
RATIO

Committed malicious and libelous charges

Usurped the title of attorney
W/N ALAUYA VIOLATED THE CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS
FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES
YES, PARTICULARLY SECTION 4

Section 4 public officials and employees at all times respect the rights of others,
and refrain from doing acts contrary to law, public order, public safety and public
interest
ALAUYA, being a member of the Sharia Bar and an officer of the Court, may not
use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing or otherwise
improper
His radical deviation from these norms cannot be excused

ISSUE

W/N ALAUYA BEING A MEMBER OF THE SHARIA BAR CAN USE THE TITLE
ATTORNEY

HELD

NO, RESERVED ONLY FOR THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN ADMITTED AS MEMBERS
OF THE INTEGRATED BAR

RATIO

Court has already had an occasion to declare that persons who pass the Sharia Bar
are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar and may practice law only before
Sharia courts
ALAUYAS wish of not using counsellor because of confusion with councilor is
immaterial because disinclination to use said title does not warrant his use of the
title attorney

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#4 AGUIRRE vs. RANA
FACTS:
Respondent Edwin L. Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.
Respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May
2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers of Mandaon,
Masbate and filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal
Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in some Precincts for the Offi ce
of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself as "counsel for and
in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan," and signed the pleading as
counsel for George Bunan. Furthermore, respondent also signed as counsel for Emily
Estipona-Hao on 19 May 2001 in the petition filed before the MBEC praying for the
proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon,
Masbate. On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of
successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna
Marie Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar.
On 22 May 2001, respondent was allowed to take the lawyers oath but was
disallowed from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges
against him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent shall be denied Admission to the Bar.
RULING:
Respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the
proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so.
Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent
called himself "counsel" knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar.
Having held himself out as "counsel" knowing that he had no authority to practice
law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is
limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly

ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of

integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust since a
lawyer is an offi cer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to
practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a
privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations,
if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license. True,
respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers oath.
However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a fullfledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial.
Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law.
Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had
to be performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by this Court and his
signature in the Roll of Attorneys.
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#5 IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS
BM No. 2540 September 24, 2013
Statement of Facts:
Petitioner Michael Medado, who obtained his law degree in the year 1979, took
and passed the same years bar examinations and took the Attorneys Oath, failed to
sign the Attorneys Roll. After more than 30 years of practicing the profession of law,
he filed the instant Petition on February 2012, praying that he be allowed to sign in
the Roll of Attorneys. Medado said that he was not able to sign the Roll of Attorneys
because he misplaced the notice given to him and he believed that since he had
already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys is not urgent, nor as
crucial to his status as a lawyer.
The Offi ce of the Bar Confidant (OBC) after conducting clarificatory conference
on the matter recommended to the Supreme Court that the instant petition be
denied for petitioners gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit.
Issue:
WON the petitioner be allowed to sign in the roll of attorneys?
Ruling:
Yes, the Court allowed the petitioner to sign the Roll of Attorneys subject to the
payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the
practice of law.
The Court cannot forbid the petitioner from signing the Roll of Attorneys because
such action constitutes disbarment. Such penalty is reserved to the most serious
ethical transgressions of members of the Bar.
The Court cited three main points which demonstrate Medados worth to become
a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar. First, Medado demonstrated good faith
and good moral character when he finally filed the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll
of Attorneys. It was Medado himself who admitted his own error and not any third
person. Second, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification
from the practice of law. He strove to adhere to the strict requirements of the ethics
of the profession and that he has prima facie shown that he possesses the character
required to be a member of the Philippine Bar. Third, Medado appears to have been a
competent and able legal practitioner, having held various positions at the Laurel
Law Offi ce, Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine National Oil Company, and
the Energy Development Corporation.
However, the Court cannot fully free Medado from all liability for his years of
inaction. His justification of his action, that it was neither willful nor intentional but
based on a mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment was opposed by the
Court.
A mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone
is presumed to know the law and its consequences. Although an honest mistake of
fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences of his acts he
could no longer claim it as a valid justification by the moment he realized that what

he had signed was merely an attendance record. His action of continuing the
practice of law in spite of his knowledge of the need to take the necessary steps to
complete all requirements for the admission to the bar constitutes unauthorized
practice of law. Such action transgresses Canon 9 of 'the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 9 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized
practice of law.
With respect to the penalty, previous violations of Canon 9 have warranted the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law. However, in the instant case the
Court could not warrant the penalty of suspension from the practice of law to
Medado because he is not yet a full-fledged lawyer. Instead, the Court see it fit to
impose upon him a penalty similar to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll
of Attorneys one ( 1) year after receipt of the Resolution and to fine him in the
amount of P32,000.
The instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is Affi rmed. Petitioner
Michael A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after
receipt of the Resolution. Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of P32,000 for
his unauthorized practice of law. During the one year period, petitioner is NOT
ALLOWED to practice law, and is STERNLY WARNED that doing any act that
constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt
with severely by the Court.
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#6 Petition for Leave To Resume Practice of Law, Benjamin M. Dacanay
B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007
Facts: Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until
he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He
subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canadas free medical aid
program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and ReAcquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he
took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in
Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his
law practice.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner lost his membership in the bar when he gave up his
Philippine citizenship.
Holding: The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines
shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law. Since Filipino citizenship
is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the
Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other
words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the
Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of
another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have
lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]." Therefore, a Filipino
lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his
Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also
deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right
to resume law practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he
reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper
authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice." Stated otherwise, before a
lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice,
he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;

(b) the payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this
is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine laws and
update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not only remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
The Court granted the petition subject to compliance with the conditions stated above and
submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his
oath as a member of the Philippine bar.

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#7 IN RE: PETITION TO RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES,

EPIFANIO B. MUNESES, Petitioner.
IN RE EPIFANIO MUNESES
(Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship)
B.M. No. 2112

Keywords:

Petitioner Epifanio B.
Muneses became a lawyer in
1966 but acquired American
citizenship in 1981

Restored citizenship in
2006 by virtue of RA 9225

A Filipino lawyer who reacquires citizenship remains

to be a member of the
Philippine Bar but must apply
for a license or permit to
engage in law practice.

On June 8, 2009, petitioner Epifanio B. Muneses with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC)
praying that he be granted the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.
Petitioner became a member of the IBP in 1966 but lost his privilege to practice law when
he became a American citizen in 1981. In 2006, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship
pursuant to RA 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003 by
taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate in
Washington, D.C. He intends to retire in the Philippines and if granted, to resume the
practice of law.
The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar and
is, in fact, a continuing requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof means
termination of the petitioners membership in the bar; ipso jure the privilege to engage in
the practice of law. Under R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed to
have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the
Republic. Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country and later reacquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, remains to be a member of the
Philippine Bar. However, as stated in Dacanay, the right to resume the practice of law is
not automatic. R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who intends to practice his profession
in the Philippines must apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in
such practice.
Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the practice of law, the
OBC required, and incompliance thereof, petitioner submitted the following:
1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship issued by the Bureau of
Immigration, in lieu of the IC;
5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City

Chapter attesting to his good moral character as well as his updated payment of annual
membership dues;
6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;
7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd compliance period; and
8. Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator, UCMCLE Program,
University of Cebu, College of Law attesting to his compliance with the MCLE.
The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with the
MCLE. After all the requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding that the
petitioner has met all the qualifications, the OBC recommended that the petitioner be
allowed to resume his practice of law.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby GRANTED, subject to
the condition that he shall re-take the Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set by the Court and
subject to the payment of appropriate fees.
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#8 Javellana vs. DILG
Facts:
This petition for review on certiorari involves the right of a public offi cial to engage
inthe practice of his profession while employed in the Government. Attorney Erwin B.
Javellanawas an elected City Councilor of Bago City, Negros Occidental. City
Engineer Ernesto C.Divinagracia filed Administrative Case No. C-10-90 against
Javellana for: (1) violation of Department of Local Government (DLG) Memorandum
Circular No. 80-38 dated June 10, 1980in relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No.
74-58 and of Section 7, paragraph b, No. 2 of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise
known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Offi cials and
Employees," and (2) for oppression, misconduct and abuse of
authority.Divinagracia's complaint alleged that Javellana, an incumbent member of
the City Council or Sanggunian Panglungsod of Bago City, and a lawyer by
profession, has continuously engaged inthe practice of law without securing
authority for that purpose from the Regional Director,Department of Local
Government, as required by DLG Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 inrelation to DLG
Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 of the same department.On the other hand,
Javellana filed a Motion to Dismiss the administrative case againsthim on the ground
mainly that DLG Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 areunconstitutional
because the Supreme Court has the sole and exclusive authority to regulate the
practice of law
Held:
Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and
DLGMemorandum Circular No. 90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution
iscompletely off tangent. Neither the statute nor the circular trenches upon the
Supreme Court's power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law. The
Local Government Code andDLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe
rules of conduct for public offi cials toavoid conflicts of interest between the
discharge of their public duties and the private practice of their profession, in those
instances where the law allows it.Section 90 of the Local Government Code does not
discriminate against lawyers anddoctors. It applies to all provincial and municipal
offi cials in the professions or engaged in anyoccupation. Section 90 explicitly
provides that sanggunian members "may practice their professions, engage in any
occupation, or teach in schools expect during session hours." If thereare some
prohibitions that apply particularly to lawyers, it is because of all the professions,
the practice of law is more likely than others to relate to, or affect, the area of public
service
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#9 WILFREDO M. CATU vs. ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA
A.C. No. 5738, February 19, 2008
Facts.

Petitioner initiated a complaint against Elizabeth Catu and Antonio Pastor who were
occupying one of the units in a building in Malate which was owned by the former. The said
complaint was filed in the
Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of Manila where
Respondent was the
punong barangay. The parties, having been summoned for conciliation proceedings and
failing to arrive at an amicable settlement, were issued by the respondent a certification for
the filing of the appropriate action in court.
Petitioner, thus, filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila where respondent entered his appearance as counsel for
the defendants. Because of this, petitioner filed the instant administrative complaint
against the respondent on the ground that he committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer
and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he
presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.
In his defense, respondent claimed that as punong barangay, he performed his task
without bias and that he acceded to Elizabeths request to handle the case for free as she
was financially distressed.
The complaint was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) where after
evaluation, they found sufficient ground to discipline respondent. According to them,
respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and, as an elective
official, the prohibition under Section 7(b) (2) of RA6713. Consequently, for the violation of
the latter prohibition, respondent committed a breach of Canon 1. Respondent was then
recommended for suspension from the practice of law.
Issue. Whether or not Atty. Rellosa violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Ruling. Yes.
A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully
at the disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the
written permission of the head of the department concerned in accordance with Section 12,
Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules.
Notwithstanding all of these, respondent still should have procured a prior permission or
authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations. For
this failure, responded violated his oath as a lawyer, that is, to obey the laws, Rule 1.01,
CPR and, for not complying with the ethical standards of the legal profession, Canon 7,
CPR.
Respondent was found GUILTY of professional misconduct, SUSPENDED from the practice of
law and was strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word
delicadeza.
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#10 ATTY. EVELYN J. MAGNO V. ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA
A.C. No. 6296, 22 November 2005, THIRD DIVISION (Garcia, J.)
Atty. Evelyn Magno (Magno) had a disagreement with her uncle, Lorenzo Inos (inos)
over a landscaping contract they had entered into. In order to set things right, Magno
addressed a letter, styled Sumbong to Bonifacio Alcantara (Alcantara), their barangay
captain. During the conciliation/confrontation proceedings, Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba
(Jacoba) appeared for Inos, on the strength of a Special Power of Attorney, together with
Inos son, Lorenzito. When Magno objected to Jacobas appearance, the latter said that she
was there not as counsel, but only as attorney-in-fact.
However, Jacoba, according to Magnos evidence, acted as counsel during the
proceedings, asserting her procedural know-how into every stage thereof, which made the
proceedings drag on longer than normal. It was because of these numerous instances that
Magno charged Jacoba with willful violation of the Local Government Code and the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba is guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility
HELD:

Jacoba alleged that the administrative complaint was filed with the Office of the
Punong Barangay, instead of before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, and heard by Punong
Barangay Bonifacio Alcantara alone, instead of the collegial Lupon or a conciliation panel
known as pangkat. Prescinding from this premise, she submits that the prohibition against
a lawyer appearing to assist a client in katarungan pambarangay proceedings does not
apply. Further, she argued that her appearance was not as a lawyer, but only as an
attorney-in-fact.

The rationale behind the personal appearance requirement in the LGC is to enable
the lupon to secure first hand and direct information about the facts and issues, the
exception being in cases where minors or incompetents are parties. There can be no
quibbling that laymen of goodwill can easily agree to conciliate and settle their disputes
between themselves without what sometimes is the unsettling assistance of lawyers whose
presence could sometimes obfuscate and confuse issues. Worse still, the participation of
lawyers with their penchant to use their analytical skills and legal knowledge tend to
prolong instead of expedite settlement of the case.

The prohibition against the presence of a lawyer in a barangay conciliation

proceedings was not, to be sure, lost on respondent. Her defense that the aforequoted
Section 415 of the LGC does not apply since complainant addressed her Sumbong to the
barangay captain of Brgy. San Pascual who thereafter proceeded to hear the same is
specious at best. In this regard, suffice it to state that complainant wrote her Sumbong with
the end in view of availing herself of the benefits of barangay justice. That she addressed
her Sumbong to the barangay captain is really of little moment since the latter chairs the
Lupong Tagapamayapa.

Given the above perspective, the Supreme Court joins the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline in its determination that respondent transgressed the prohibition prescribed in
Section 415 of the LGC. However, its recommended penalty of mere admonition must have
to be modified. Doubtless, respondents conduct tended to undermine the laudable
purpose of the katarungan pambarangay system. What compounded matters was when
respondent repeatedly ignored complainants protestation against her continued
appearance in the barangay conciliation proceedings.