Contents

Art. 1039.................................................................................................................... 2
Cayetano vs Leonidas.............................................................................................. 2
Art 1043................................................................................................................... 10
Borromeo vs Borromeo......................................................................................... 10
Art 1051 - 1053........................................................................................................ 32
Imperial vs ca........................................................................................................ 32
Art 1058................................................................................................................... 40
Maloles II vs Philips -----...................................................................................... 40
Corona vs ca......................................................................................................... 40
Art. 1061.................................................................................................................. 44
Vda de tupas vs RTC............................................................................................. 44
Zaragoza vs ca...................................................................................................... 47
Arellano vs pascual............................................................................................... 53
Art 1062................................................................................................................... 61
Buhay de roma vs ca............................................................................................. 61
Art. 1078.................................................................................................................. 64
Noceda vs ca......................................................................................................... 64
Art. 1079.................................................................................................................. 74
Teves vs ca -----.................................................................................................... 74
Seraspi vs ca......................................................................................................... 74
Art. 1080.................................................................................................................. 79
Zaragoza vs ca -----.............................................................................................. 79
JLT agro vs balansag............................................................................................. 79
Art. 1082.................................................................................................................. 92
Crucillo vs IAC....................................................................................................... 92
Non vs CA............................................................................................................ 105
Pada-kilario v ca.................................................................................................. 108
Teves vs ca ----................................................................................................... 117
Unionbank vs santibanez..................................................................................... 117
1

Art. 1083................................................................................................................ 126

Santos vs santos................................................................................................. 126
In re: last will of Santiago...................................................................................140
Art. 1088................................................................................................................ 153
Garcia vs calaliman............................................................................................. 153
Baylon vs Amador............................................................................................... 161
Gentlemen:............................................................................................................ 161
Cua vs vargas...................................................................................................... 164
Primary structures vs Valencia............................................................................ 175
Unionbank vs santibanez----...............................................................................179
Alonzo vs IAC...................................................................................................... 179
Cabales vs ca...................................................................................................... 185
D E C I S I O N.................................................................................................... 186
Art. 1091................................................................................................................ 198
Teves va ca ---.................................................................................................... 198
Art. 1104................................................................................................................ 198
Non vs Ca ---....................................................................................................... 198
Reillo vs heirs of san jose and santo...................................................................198
Present:.................................................................................................................. 198
Art. 1105................................................................................................................ 213
Landayan vs bacani............................................................................................. 213
Mendoza vs iac.................................................................................................... 216
Aznar brothers realty vs ca.................................................................................222
Fernandez vs Fernandez...................................................................................... 232

Art. 1039
Cayetano vs Leonidas
G.R. No. L-54919 May 30, 1984

POLLY
CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of
Branch XXXVIII, Court of First Instance of Manila and NENITA
CAMPOS PAGUIA, respondents.
Ermelo P. Guzman for petitioner.
Armando Z. Gonzales for private respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to annul the order of the
respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXXVIII,
which admitted to and allowed the probate of the last will and testament of
Adoracion C. Campos, after an ex-parte presentation of evidence by herein
private respondent.
On January 31, 1977, Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father,
petitioner Hermogenes Campos and her sisters, private respondent Nenita C.
Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta C. Medina as the surviving heirs. As
Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit
of Adjudication under Rule 74, Section I of the Rules of Court whereby he
adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of the deceased
Adoracion Campos.
Eleven months after, on November 25, 1977, Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition
for the reprobate of a will of the deceased, Adoracion Campos, which was
allegedly executed in the United States and for her appointment as
administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix.
In her petition, Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at
the time of her death and was a permanent resident of 4633 Ditman Street,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the testatrix died in Manila on
January 31, 1977 while temporarily residing with her sister at 2167 Leveriza,
Malate, Manila; that during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last wig and
testament on July 10, 1975, according to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.,
nominating Wilfredo Barzaga of New Jersey as executor; that after the
3

testatrix death, her last will and testament was presented, probated,
allowed, and registered with the Registry of Wins at the County of
Philadelphia, U.S.A., that Clement L. McLaughlin, the administrator who was
appointed after Dr. Barzaga had declined and waived his appointment as
executor in favor of the former, is also a resident of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and
that therefore, there is an urgent need for the appointment of an
administratrix to administer and eventually distribute the properties of the
estate located in the Philippines.
On January 11, 1978, an opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by
herein petitioner alleging among other things, that he has every reason to
believe that the will in question is a forgery; that the intrinsic provisions of
the will are null and void; and that even if pertinent American laws on
intrinsic provisions are invoked, the same could not apply inasmuch as they
would work injustice and injury to him.
On December 1, 1978, however, the petitioner through his counsel, Atty.
Franco Loyola, filed a Motion to Dismiss Opposition (With Waiver of Rights or
Interests) stating that he "has been able to verify the veracity thereof (of
the will) and now confirms the same to be truly the probated will of his
daughter Adoracion." Hence, an ex-partepresentation of evidence for the
reprobate of the questioned will was made.
On January 10, 1979, the respondent judge issued an order, to wit:
At the hearing, it has been satisfactorily established that
Adoracion C. Campos, in her lifetime, was a citizen of the United
States of America with a permanent residence at 4633 Ditman
Street, Philadelphia, PA 19124, (Exhibit D) that when alive,
Adoracion C. Campos executed a Last Will and Testament in the
county of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A., according to the
laws thereat (Exhibits E-3 to E-3-b) that while in temporary
sojourn in the Philippines, Adoracion C. Campos died in the City
of Manila (Exhibit C) leaving property both in the Philippines and
in the United States of America; that the Last Will and Testament
of the late Adoracion C. Campos was admitted and granted
probate by the Orphan's Court Division of the Court of Common
Pleas, the probate court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and letters of administration were
4

issued in favor of Clement J. McLaughlin all in accordance with

the laws of the said foreign country on procedure and allowance
of wills (Exhibits E to E-10); and that the petitioner is not
suffering from any disqualification which would render her unfit
as administratrix of the estate in the Philippines of the late
Adoracion C. Campos.
WHEREFORE, the Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion
C. Campos is hereby admitted to and allowed probate in the
Philippines, and Nenita Campos Paguia is hereby appointed
Administratrix of the estate of said decedent; let Letters of
Administration with the Will annexed issue in favor of said
Administratrix upon her filing of a bond in the amount of
P5,000.00 conditioned under the provisions of Section I, Rule 81
of the Rules of Court.
Another manifestation was filed by the petitioner on April 14, 1979,
confirming the withdrawal of his opposition, acknowledging the same to be
his voluntary act and deed.
On May 25, 1979, Hermogenes Campos filed a petition for relief, praying
that the order allowing the will be set aside on the ground that the
withdrawal of his opposition to the same was secured through fraudulent
means. According to him, the "Motion to Dismiss Opposition" was inserted
among the papers which he signed in connection with two Deeds of
Conditional Sales which he executed with the Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP). He also alleged that the lawyer who
filed the withdrawal of the opposition was not his counsel-of-record in the
special proceedings case.
The petition for relief was set for hearing but the petitioner failed to appear.
He made several motions for postponement until the hearing was set on May
29, 1980.
On May 18, 1980, petitioner filed another motion entitled "Motion to Vacate
and/or Set Aside the Order of January 10, 1979, and/or dismiss the case for
lack of jurisdiction. In this motion, the notice of hearing provided:

Please include this motion in your calendar for hearing on May

29, 1980 at 8:30 in the morning for submission for
reconsideration and resolution of the Honorable Court. Until this
Motion is resolved, may I also request for the future setting of
the case for hearing on the Oppositor's motion to set aside
previously filed.
The hearing of May 29, 1980 was re-set by the court for June 19, 1980.
When the case was called for hearing on this date, the counsel for petitioner
tried to argue his motion to vacate instead of adducing evidence in support
of the petition for relief. Thus, the respondent judge issued an order
dismissing the petition for relief for failure to present evidence in support
thereof. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was
denied. In the same order, respondent judge also denied the motion to
vacate for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.
Meanwhile, on June 6,1982, petitioner Hermogenes Campos died and left a
will, which, incidentally has been questioned by the respondent, his children
and forced heirs as, on its face, patently null and void, and a fabrication,
appointing Polly Cayetano as the executrix of his last will and testament.
Cayetano, therefore, filed a motion to substitute herself as petitioner in the
instant case which was granted by the court on September 13, 1982.
A motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the rights of the
petitioner Hermogenes Campos merged upon his death with the rights of the
respondent and her sisters, only remaining children and forced heirs was
denied on September 12, 1983.
Petitioner Cayetano persists with the allegations that the respondent judge
acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction when:
1) He ruled the petitioner lost his standing in court deprived the
Right to Notice (sic) upon the filing of the Motion to Dismiss
opposition with waiver of rights or interests against the estate of
deceased Adoracion C. Campos, thus, paving the way for the
hearing ex-parte of the petition for the probate of decedent will.
2) He ruled that petitioner can waive, renounce or repudiate (not
made in a public or authenticated instrument), or by way of a
6

petition presented to the court but by way of a motion presented

prior to an order for the distribution of the estate-the law
especially providing that repudiation of an inheritance must be
presented, within 30 days after it has issued an order for the
distribution of the estate in accordance with the rules of Court.
3) He ruled that the right of a forced heir to his legitime can be
divested by a decree admitting a will to probate in which no
provision is made for the forced heir in complete disregard of
Law of Succession
4) He denied petitioner's petition for Relief on the ground that no
evidence was adduced to support the Petition for Relief when no
Notice nor hearing was set to afford petitioner to prove the merit
of his petition a denial of the due process and a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
5) He acquired no jurisdiction over the testate case, the fact that
the Testator at the time of death was a usual resident of
Dasmarias, Cavite, consequently Cavite Court of First Instance
has exclusive jurisdiction over the case (De Borja vs. Tan, G.R.
No. L-7792, July 1955).
The first two issues raised by the petitioner are anchored on the allegation
that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he
allowed the withdrawal of the petitioner's opposition to the reprobate of the
will.
We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge. No
proof was adduced to support petitioner's contention that the motion to
withdraw was secured through fraudulent means and that Atty. Franco
Loyola was not his counsel of record. The records show that after the firing
of the contested motion, the petitioner at a later date, filed a manifestation
wherein he confirmed that the Motion to Dismiss Opposition was his
voluntary act and deed. Moreover, at the time the motion was filed, the
petitioner's former counsel, Atty. Jose P. Lagrosa had long withdrawn from
the case and had been substituted by Atty. Franco Loyola who in turn filed
the motion. The present petitioner cannot, therefore, maintain that the old
man's attorney of record was Atty. Lagrosa at the time of filing the motion.
7

Since the withdrawal was in order, the respondent judge acted correctly in
hearing the probate of the will ex-parte, there being no other opposition to
the same.
The third issue raised deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. As
a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic
validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary
capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by
law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the court has
declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon,
even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue. (Maninang vs.
Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478).
In the case at bar, the petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge
allowed the reprobate of Adoracion's will, Hermogenes C. Campos was
divested of his legitime which was reserved by the law for him.
This contention is without merit.
Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and
thus, the respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the
private respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the
time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and
1039 of the Civil Code which respectively provide:
Art. 16 par. (2).
xxx xxx xxx
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the
nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein
said property may be found.
Art. 1039.
8

Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the

decedent.
the law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania,
U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit
that the Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that all the
estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the
petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it would be
contrary to the sound and established public policy and would run counter to
the specific provisions of Philippine Law.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of
the will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the
national law of the decedent must apply. This was squarely applied in the
case ofBellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358) wherein we ruled:
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good
customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress
has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign
nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the
amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law.
Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
xxx xxx xxx
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a
citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and under the law of Texas,
there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the
intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the
Philippine Law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of
Amos G. Bellis.
As regards the alleged absence of notice of hearing for the petition for relief,
the records wig bear the fact that what was repeatedly scheduled for hearing
on separate dates until June 19, 1980 was the petitioner's petition for relief
and not his motion to vacate the order of January 10, 1979. There is no
reason why the petitioner should have been led to believe otherwise. The
court even admonished the petitioner's failing to adduce evidence when his
9

petition for relief was repeatedly set for hearing. There was no denial of due
process. The fact that he requested "for the future setting of the case for
hearing . . ." did not mean that at the next hearing, the motion to vacate
would be heard and given preference in lieu of the petition for relief.
Furthermore, such request should be embodied in a motion and not in a
mere notice of hearing.
Finally, we find the contention of the petition as to the issue of jurisdiction
utterly devoid of merit. Under Rule 73, Section 1, of the Rules of Court, it is
provided that:
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the
decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his
death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance in the province in which he resided at the
time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country,
the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had
estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion
of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as
it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original
case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly
filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila where she had an estate since
it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at the time of her death was a
citizen and permanent resident of Pennsylvania, United States of America
and not a "usual resident of Cavite" as alleged by the petitioner. Moreover,
petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate
court in the petition for relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke
the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief, against his opponent
and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction. (See Saulog Transit, Inc. vs. Hon. Manuel Lazaro, et al., G. R.
No. 63 284, April 4, 1984).

10

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby dismissed

for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Art 1043
Borromeo vs Borromeo
G.R. No. L-41171

July 23, 1987

INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VITO BORROMEO, PATROCINIO

BORROMEO-HERRERA, petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNATO BORROMEO and HON. FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II, respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
No. L-55000

July 23, 1987

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF VITO BORROMEO, DECEASED,

PILAR N. BORROMEO, MARIA B. PUTONG, FEDERICO V. BORROMEO,
JOSE BORROMEO, CONSUELO B. MORALES, AND CANUTO V.
BORROMEO,
JR., heirs-appellants,
vs.
FORTUNATO BORROMEO, claimant-appellee.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
No. L-62895

July 23, 1987

JOSE
CUENCO
BORROMEO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, As
presiding Judge of the (now) Regional Trial Court, Branch XV, Region
VII, RICARDO V. REYES, as Administrator of the Estate of Vito
Borromeo in Sp. Proc. No. 916-R, NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO and
DOMINGO L. ANTIGUA, respondents.
11

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
No. L-63818

July 23, 1987

DOMINGO ANTIGUA AND RICARDO V. REYES, as Administrator of the

Intestate Estate of VITO BORROMEO, Sp. Proceedings No. 916-R,
Regional Trial Court of Cebu, joined by HON. JUDGE FRANCISCO P.
BURGOS, as Presiding Judge of Branch XV of the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu, as a formal party, and ATTYS. FRANCIS M. ZOSA, GAUDIOSO
RUIZ
and
NUMERIANO
ESTENZO, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JOSE CUENCO
BORROMEO, and PETRA O. BORROMEO, respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
No. L-65995

July 23, 1987

PETRA BORROMEO, VITALIANA BORROMEO, AMELINDA BORROMEO,

and
JOSE
CUENCO
BORROMEO,petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, Presiding Judge of Branch XV,
Regional Trial Court of Cebu; RICARDO V. REYES, Administrator of
the Estate of VITO BORROMEO in Sp. Proc. No. 916-R; and DOMINGO
L. ANTIGUA, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
These cases before us all stem from SP. PROC. NO. 916-R of the then Court
of First Instance of Cebu.
G.R. No. 41171
Vito Borromeo, a widower and permanent resident of Cebu City, died on
March 13, 1952, in Paranaque, Rizal at the age of 88 years, without forced
heirs but leaving extensive properties in the province of Cebu.
On April 19, 1952, Jose Junquera filed with the Court of First Instance of
Cebu a petition for the probate of a one page document as the last will and
testament left by the said deceased, devising all his properties to Tomas,
12

Fortunato and Amelia, all surnamed Borromeo, in equal and undivided

shares, and designating Junquera as executor thereof. The case was
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 916-R. The document, drafted in
Spanish, was allegedly signed and thumbmarked by the deceased in the
presence of Cornelio Gandionco, Eusebio Cabiluna, and Felixberto Leonardo
who acted as witnesses.
Oppositions to the probate of the will were filed. On May 28, 1960, after due
trial, the probate court held that the document presented as the will of the
deceased was a forgery.
On appeal to this Court, the decision of the probate court disallowing the
probate of the will was affirmed inTestate Estate of Vito Borromeo, Jose H.
Junquera et al. v. Crispin Borromeo et al. (19 SCRA 656).
The testate proceedings was converted into an intestate proceedings.
Several parties came before the court filing claims or petitions alleging
themselves as heirs of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo.
The following petitions or claims were filed:
1. On August 29, 1967, the heirs of Jose Ma. Borromeo and Cosme
Borromeo filed a petition for declaration of heirs and determination of
heirship. There was no opposition filed against said petition.
2. On November 26, 1967, Vitaliana Borromeo also filed a petition for
declaration as heir. The heirs of Jose Ma. Borromeo and Cosme
Borromeo filed an opposition to this petition.
3. On December 13, 1967, Jose Barcenilla, Jr., Anecita Ocampo de
Castro, Ramon Ocampo, Lourdes Ocampo, Elena Ocampo, Isagani
Morre, Rosario Morre, Aurora Morre, Lila Morre, Lamberto Morre, and
Patricia Morre, filed a petition for declaration of heirs and
determination of shares. The petition was opposed by the heirs of Jose
and Cosme Borromeo.
4. On December 2, 1968, Maria Borromeo Atega, Luz Borromeo,
Hermenegilda Borromeo Nonnenkamp, Rosario Borromeo, and Fe
Borromeo Queroz filed a claim. Jose Cuenco Borromeo, Crispin
13

Borromeo, Vitaliana Borromeo and the heirs of Carlos Borromeo

represented by Jose Talam filed oppositions to this claim.
When the aforementioned petitions and claims were heard jointly, the
following facts were established:
1. Maximo Borromeo and Hermenegilda Galan, husband and wife (the latter
having predeceased the former), were survived by their eight (8) children,
namely,
Jose Ma. Borromeo
Cosme Borromeo
Pantaleon Borromeo
Vito Borromeo
Paulo Borromeo
Anecita Borromeo
Quirino Borromeo and
Julian Borromeo
2. Vito Borromeo died a widower on March 13, 1952, without any issue, and
all his brothers and sisters predeceased him.
3. Vito's brother Pantaleon Borromeo died leaving the following children:
a. Ismaela Borromeo,who died on Oct. 16, 1939
b. Teofilo Borromeo, who died on Aug. 1, 1955, or 3 years after the
death of Vito Borromeo. He was married to Remedios Cuenco
Borromeo, who died on March 28, 1968. He had an only son-Atty. Jose
Cuenco Borromeo one of the petitioners herein.
c. Crispin Borromeo, who is still alive.

14

4. Anecita Borromeo, sister of Vito Borromeo, died ahead of him and left an
only daughter, Aurora B. Ocampo, who died on Jan. 30, 1950 leaving the
following children:
a. Anecita Ocampo Castro
b. Ramon Ocampo
c. Lourdes Ocampo
d. Elena Ocampo, all living, and
e. Antonieta Ocampo Barcenilla (deceased), survived by claimant Jose
Barcenilla, Jr.
5. Cosme Borromeo, another brother of Vito Borromeo, died before the war
and left the following children:
a. Marcial Borromeo
b. Carlos Borromeo,who died on Jan. 18, 1965,survived by his wife,
Remedios Alfonso, and his only daughter, Amelinda Borromeo Talam
c. Asuncion Borromeo
d. Florentina Borromeo, who died in 1948.
e. Amilio Borromeo, who died in 1944.
f. Carmen Borromeo, who died in 1925.
The last three died leaving no issue.
6. Jose Ma. Borromeo, another brother of Vito Borromeo, died before the
war and left the following children:
a. Exequiel Borromeo,who died on December 29, 1949
b. Canuto Borromeo, who died on Dec. 31, 1959, leaving the following
children:

15

aa. Federico Borromeo

bb. Marisol Borromeo (Maria B. Putong, Rec. p. 85)
cc. Canuto Borromeo, Jr.
dd. Jose Borromeo
ee. Consuelo Borromeo
ff. Pilar Borromeo
gg. Salud Borromeo
hh. Patrocinio Borromeo Herrera
c. Maximo Borromeo, who died in July, 1948
d. Matilde Borromeo, who died on Aug. 6, 1946
e. Andres Borromeo, who died on Jan. 3, 1923, but survived by his
children:
aa. Maria Borromeo Atega
bb. Luz Borromeo
cc. Hermenegilda Borromeo Nonnenkamp
dd. Rosario Borromeo
ee. Fe Borromeo Queroz
On April 10, 1969, the trial court, invoking Art. 972 of the Civil Code, issued
an order declaring the following, to the exclusion of all others, as the
intestate heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo:
1. Jose Cuenco Borromeo
2. Judge Crispin Borromeo

16

3. Vitaliana Borromeo
4. Patrocinio Borromeo Herrera
5. Salud Borromeo
6. Asuncion Borromeo
7. Marcial Borromeo
8. Amelinda Borromeo de Talam, and
9. The heirs of Canuto Borromeo
The court also ordered that the assets of the intestate estate of Vito
Borromeo shall be divided into 4/9 and 5/9 groups and distributed in equal
and equitable shares among the 9 abovenamed declared intestate heirs.
On April 21 and 30, 1969, the declared heirs, with the exception of
Patrocinio B. Herrera, signed an agreement of partition of the properties of
the deceased Vito Borromeo which was approved by the trial court, in its
order of August 15, 1969. In this same order, the trial court ordered the
administrator, Atty Jesus Gaboya, Jr., to partition the properties of the
deceased in the way and manner they are divided and partitioned in the said
Agreement of Partition and further ordered that 40% of the market value of
the 4/9 and 5/9 of the estate shall be segregated. All attorney's fees shall be
taken and paid from this segregated portion.
On August 25, 1972, respondent Fortunato Borromeo, who had earlier
claimed as heir under the forged will, filed a motion before the trial court
praying that he be declared as one of the heirs of the deceased Vito
Borromeo, alleging that he is an illegitimate son of the deceased and that in
the declaration of heirs made by the trial court, he was omitted, in disregard
of the law making him a forced heir entitled to receive a legitime like all
other forced heirs. As an acknowledged illegitimate child, he stated that he
was entitled to a legitime equal in every case to four-fifths of the legitime of
an acknowledged natural child.
Finding that the motion of Fortunato Borromeo was already barred by the
order of the court dated April 12, 1969 declaring the persons named therein
17

as the legal heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo, the court dismissed the
motion on June 25, 1973.
Fortunato Borromeo filed a motion for reconsideration. In the memorandum
he submitted to support his motion for reconsideration, Fortunato changed
the basis for his claim to a portion of the estate. He asserted and
incorporated a Waiver of Hereditary Rights dated July 31, 1967, supposedly
signed by Pilar N. Borromeo, Maria B. Putong, Jose Borromeo, Canuto V.
Borromeo, Jr., Salud Borromeo, Patrocinio Borromeo-Herrera, Marcial
Borromeo, Asuncion Borromeo, Federico V. Borromeo, Consuelo B. Morales,
Remedios Alfonso and Amelinda B. Talam In the waiver, five of the nine heirs
relinquished to Fortunato their shares in the disputed estate. The motion was
opposed on the ground that the trial court, acting as a probate court, had no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim; that respondent Fortunato
Borromeo is estopped from asserting the waiver agreement; that the waiver
agreement is void as it was executed before the declaration of heirs; that the
same is void having been executed before the distribution of the estate and
before the acceptance of the inheritance; and that it is void ab initio and
inexistent for lack of subject matter.
On December 24, 1974, after due hearing, the trial court concluding that the
five declared heirs who signed the waiver agreement assigning their
hereditary rights to Fortunato Borromeo had lost the same rights, declared
the latter as entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo.
A motion for reconsideration of this order was denied on July 7, 1975.
In the present petition, the petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the trial
court's order dated December 24, 1974, declaring respondent Fortunato
Borromeo entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo and the July 7, 1975
order, denying the motion for reconsideration.
The petitioner argues that the trial court had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the claim of respondent Fortunato Borromeo because it is not
a money claim against the decedent but a claim for properties, real and
personal, which constitute all of the shares of the heirs in the decedent's
estate, heirs who allegedly waived their rights in his favor. The claim of the
private respondent under the waiver agreement, according to the petitioner,
may be likened to that of a creditor of the heirs which is improper. He alleges
18

that the claim of the private respondent under the waiver agreement was
filed beyond the time allowed for filing of claims as it was filed only
sometime in 1973, after there had been a declaration of heirs (April 10,
1969), an agreement of partition (April 30, 1969), the approval of the
agreement of partition and an order directing the administrator to partition
the estate (August 15, 1969), when in a mere memorandum, the existence
of the waiver agreement was brought out.
It is further argued by the petitioner that the document entitled " waiver of
Hereditary Rights" executed on July 31, 1967, aside from having been
cancelled and revoked on June 29, 1968, by Tomas L. Borromeo, Fortunato
Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo, is without force and effect because there
can be no effective waiver of hereditary rights before there has been a valid
acceptance of the inheritance the heirs intend to transfer. Pursuant to Article
1043 of the Civil Code, to make acceptance or repudiation of inheritance
valid, the person must be certain of the death of the one from whom he is to
inherit and of his right to the inheritance. Since the petitioner and her coheirs were not certain of their right to the inheritance until they were
declared heirs, their rights were, therefore, uncertain. This view, according
to the petitioner, is also supported by Article 1057 of the same Code which
directs heirs, devicees, and legatees to signify their acceptance or
repudiation within thirty days after the court has issued an order for the
distribution of the estate.
Respondent Fortunato Borromeo on the other hand, contends that under
Article 1043 of the Civil Code there is no need for a person to be first
declared as heir before he can accept or repudiate an inheritance. What is
required is that he must first be certain of the death of the person from
whom he is to inherit and that he must be certain of his right to the
inheritance. He points out that at the time of the signing of the waiver
document on July 31, 1967, the signatories to the waiver document were
certain that Vito Borromeo was already dead as well as of their rights to the
inheritance as shown in the waiver document itself.
With respect to the issue of jurisdiction of the trial court to pass upon the
validity of the waiver of hereditary rights, respondent Borromeo asserts that
since the waiver or renunciation of hereditary rights took place after the
court assumed jurisdiction over the properties of the estate it partakes of the
nature of a partition of the properties of the estate needing approval of the
19

court because it was executed in the course of the proceedings. lie further
maintains that the probate court loses jurisdiction of the estate only after
the payment of all the debts of the estate and the remaining estate is
distributed to those entitled to the same.
The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary rights is that "the
properties included in an existing inheritance cannot be considered as
belonging to third persons with respect to the heirs, who by fiction of law
continue the personality of the former. Nor do such properties have the
character of future property, because the heirs acquire a right to succession
from the moment of the death of the deceased, by principle established in
article 657 and applied by article 661 of the Civil Code, according to which
the heirs succeed the deceased by the mere fact of death. More or less, time
may elapse from the moment of the death of the deceased until the heirs
enter into possession of the hereditary property, but the acceptance in any
event retroacts to the moment of the death, in accordance with article 989
of the Civil Code. The right is vested, although conditioned upon the
adjudication of the corresponding hereditary portion." (Osorio v. Osorio and
Ynchausti Steamship Co., 41 Phil., 531). The heirs, therefore, could waive
their hereditary rights in 1967 even if the order to partition the estate was
issued only in 1969.
In this case, however, the purported "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" cannot be
considered to be effective. For a waiver to exist, three elements are
essential: (1) the existence of a right; (2) the knowledge of the existence
thereof; and (3) an intention to relinquish such right. (People v. Salvador,
(CA) 53 O.G. No. 22, p. 8116, 8120). The intention to waive a right or
advantage must be shown clearly and convincingly, and when the only proof
of intention rests in what a party does, his act should be so manifestly
consistent with, and indicative of an intent to, voluntarily relinquish the
particular right or advantage that no other reasonable explanation of his
conduct is possible (67 C.J., 311). (Fernandez v. Sebido, et al., 70 Phil., 151,
159).
The circumstances of this case show that the signatories to the waiver
document did not have the clear and convincing intention to relinquish their
rights, Thus: (1) On October 27, 1967. Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia
Borromeo filed a pleading entitled "Compliance" wherein they submitted a
proposal for the amicable settlement of the case. In that Compliance, they
20

proposed to concede to all the eight (8) intestate heirs of Vito Borromeo all
properties, personal and real, including all cash and sums of money in the
hands of the Special Administrator, as of October 31, 1967, not contested or
claimed by them in any action then pending in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu. In turn, the heirs would waive and concede to them all the 14
contested lots. In this document, the respondent recognizes and concedes
that the petitioner, like the other signatories to the waiver document, is an
heir of the deceased Vito Borromeo, entitled to share in the estate. This
shows that the "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" was never meant to be what
the respondent now purports it to be. Had the intent been otherwise, there
would not be any reason for Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo to
mention the heirs in the offer to settle the case amicably, and offer to
concede to them parts of the estate of the deceased; (2) On April 21 and 30,
1969, the majority of the declared heirs executed an Agreement on how the
estate they inherited shall be distributed. This Agreement of Partition was
approved by the trial court on August 15, 1969; (3) On June 29, 1968, the
petitioner, among others, signed a document entitled Deed of Assignment"
purporting to transfer and assign in favor of the respondent and Tomas and
Amelia Borromeo all her (Patrocinio B. Herrera's) rights, interests, and
participation as an intestate heir in the estate of the deceased Vito
Borromeo. The stated consideration for said assignment was P100,000.00;
(4) On the same date, June 29, 1968, the respondent Tomas, and Amelia
Borromeo (assignees in the aforementioned deed of assignment) in turn
executed a "Deed of Reconveyance" in favor of the heirs-assignors named in
the same deed of assignment. The stated consideration was P50,000.00; (5)
A Cancellation of Deed of Assignment and Deed of Reconveyance was signed
by Tomas Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo on October 15, 1968, while
Fortunato Borromeo signed this document on March 24, 1969.
With respect to the issue of jurisdiction, we hold that the trial court had
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the waiver agreement. It must be
noted that in Special Proceedings No. 916-R the lower court disallowed the
probate of the will and declared it as fake. Upon appeal, this Court affirmed
the decision of the lower court on March 30, 1967, in G.R. No. L-18498.
Subsequently, several parties came before the lower court filing claims or
petitions alleging themselves as heirs of the intestate estate of Vito
Borromeo. We see no impediment to the trial court in exercising jurisdiction
and trying the said claims or petitions. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the trial
21

court extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its

recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate.
In view of the foregoing, the questioned order of the trial court dated
December 24, 1974, is hereby SET ASIDE.
G.R. No. 55000
This case was originally an appeal to the Court of Appeals from an order of
the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 11, dated December 24, 1974,
declaring the waiver document earlier discussed in G.R. No. 41171 valid. The
appellate court certified this case to this Court as the questions raised are all
of law.
The appellants not only assail the validity of the waiver agreement but they
also question the jurisdiction of the lower court to hear and decide the action
filed by claimant Fortunato Borromeo.
The appellants argue that when the waiver of hereditary right was executed
on July 31, 1967, Pilar Borromeo and her children did not yet possess or own
any hereditary right in the intestate estate of the deceased Vito Borromeo
because said hereditary right was only acquired and owned by them on April
10, 1969, when the estate was ordered distributed.
They further argue that in contemplation of law, there is no such contract of
waiver of hereditary right in the present case because there was no object,
which is hereditary right, that could be the subject matter of said waiver,
and, therefore, said waiver of hereditary right was not only null and void ab
initio but was inexistent.
With respect to the issue of jurisdiction, the appellants contend that without
any formal pleading filed by the lawyers of Fortunato Borromeo for the
approval of the waiver agreement and without notice to the parties
concerned, two things which are necessary so that the lower court would be
vested with authority and jurisdiction to hear and decide the validity of said
waiver agreement, nevertheless, the lower court set the hearing on
September 25, 1973 and without asking for the requisite pleading. This
resulted in the issuance of the appealed order of December 24, 1974, which

22

approved the validity of the waiver agreement. The appellants contend that
this constitutes an error in the exercise of jurisdiction.
The appellee on the other hand, maintains that by waiving their hereditary
rights in favor of Fortunato Borromeo, the signatories to the waiver
document tacitly and irrevocably accepted the inheritance and by virtue of
the same act, they lost their rights because the rights from that moment on
became vested in Fortunato Borromeo.
It is also argued by the appellee that under Article 1043 of the Civil Code
there is no need for a person to be declared as heir first before he can
accept or repudiate an inheritance. What is required is that he is certain of
the death of the person from whom he is to inherit, and of his right to the
inheritance. At the time of the signing of the waiver document on July 31,
1967, the signatories to the waiver document were certain that Vito
Borromeo was already dead and they were also certain of their right to the
inheritance as shown by the waiver document itself.
On the allegation of the appellants that the lower court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the claim because of the alleged lack of a pleading invoking
its jurisdiction to decide the claim, the appellee asserts that on August 23,
1973, the lower court issued an order specifically calling on all oppositors to
the waiver document to submit their comments within ten days from notice
and setting the same for hearing on September 25, 1973. The appellee also
avers that the claim as to a 5/9 share in the inheritance involves no question
of title to property and, therefore, the probate court can decide the question.
The issues in this case are similar to the issues raised in G.R. No. 41171.
The appellants in this case, who are all declared heirs of the late Vito
Borromeo are contesting the validity of the trial court's order dated
December 24, 1974, declaring Fortunato Borromeo entitled to 5/9 of the
estate of Vito Borromeo under the waiver agreement.
As stated in G.R. No. 41171, the supposed waiver of hereditary rights can
not be validated. The essential elements of a waiver, especially the clear and
convincing intention to relinquish hereditary rights, are not found in this
case.

23

The October 27, 1967 proposal for an amicable settlement conceding to all
the eight (8) intestate heirs various properties in consideration for the heirs
giving to the respondent and to Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo the fourteen
(14) contested lots was filed inspite of the fact that on July 31, 1967, some
of the heirs had allegedly already waived or sold their hereditary rights to
the respondent.
The agreement on how the estate is to be distributed, the June 29, 1968
deed of assignment, the deed of reconveyance, and the subsequent
cancellation of the deed of assignment and deed of reconveyance all argue
against the purported waiver of hereditary rights.
Concerning the issue of jurisdiction, we have already stated in G.R. No.
41171 that the trial court acquired jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of
the waiver agreement because the trial court's jurisdiction extends to
matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in
handling the settlement of the estate.
The questioned order is, therefore, SET ASIDE.
G.R. No. 62895
A motion dated April 28, 1972, was filed by Atty. Raul M. Sesbreno,
representative of some of the heirs-distributees, praying for the immediate
closure of Special Proceeding No. 916-R. A similar motion dated May 29,
1979 was filed by Atty. Jose Amadora. Both motions were grounded on the
fact that there was nothing more to be done after the payment of all the
obligations of the estate since the order of partition and distribution had long
become final.
Alleging that respondent Judge Francisco P. Burgos failed or refused to
resolve the aforesaid motions, petitioner Jose Cuenco Borromeo-filed a
petition for mandamus before the Court of Appeals to compel the respondent
judge to terminate and close Special Proceedings No. 916-R.
Finding that the inaction of the respondent judge was due to pending
motions to compel the petitioner, as co-administrator, to submit an inventory
of the real properties of the estate and an accounting of the cash in his
hands, pending claims for attorney's fees, and that mandamus will not lie to
24

compel the performance of a discretionary function, the appellate court

denied the petition on May 14, 1982. The petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.
The petitioner's stand is that the inaction of the respondent judge on the
motion filed on April 28, 1972 for the closure of the administration
proceeding cannot be justified by the filing of the motion for inventory and
accounting because the latter motion was filed only on March 2, 1979. He
claimed that under the then Constitution, it is the duty of the respondent
judge to decide or resolve a case or matter within three months from the
date of its submission.
The respondents contend that the motion to close the administration had
already been resolved when the respondent judge cancelled all settings of all
incidents previously set in his court in an order dated June 4, 1979, pursuant
to the resolution and restraining order issued by the Court of Appeals
enjoining him to maintain status quo on the case.
As stated in G.R. No. 41171, on April 21 and 30, 1969, the declared heirs,
with the exception of Patrocinio B. Herrera, signed an agreement of partition
of the properties of the deceased Vito Borromeo which was approved by the
trial court, in its order dated August 15, 1969. In this same order, the trial
court ordered the administrator, Atty. Jesus Gaboya, Jr., to partition the
properties of the deceased in the way and manner they are divided and
partitioned in the said Agreement of Partition and further ordered that 40%
of the market value of the 4/9 and 5/9 of the estate shall be segregated and
reserved for attorney's fees.
According to the manifestation of Judge Francisco Burgos dated July 5, 1982,
(p. 197, Rollo, G. R. No. 41171) his court has not finally distributed to the
nine (9) declared heirs the properties due to the following circumstances:
1. The court's determination of the market value of the estate in order
to segregate the 40% reserved for attorney's fees;
2. The order of December 24, 1974, declaring Fortunato Borromeo as
beneficiary of the 5/9 of the estate because of the waiver agreement
signed by the heirs representing the 5/9 group which is still pending
resolution by this Court (G.R. No. 4117 1);
25

3. The refusal of administrator Jose Cuenco Borromeo to render his

accounting; and
4. The claim of Marcela Villegas for 1/2 of the estate causing
annotations of notices of lis pendens on the different titles of the
properties of the estate.
Since there are still real properties of the estate that were not vet distributed
to some of the declared heirs, particularly the 5/9 group of heirs due to the
pending resolution of the waiver agreement, this Court in its resolution of
June 15, 1983, required the judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
Branch 11, to expedite the determination of Special Proceedings No. 916-R
and ordered the co-administrator Jose Cuenco Borromeo to submit an
inventory of real properties of the estate and to render an accounting of cash
and bank deposits realized from rents of several properties.
The matter of attorney's fees shall be discussed in G.R. No. 65995.
Considering the pronouncements stated in:
1. G.R. No. 41171 & G.R. No. 55000, setting aside the Order of the
trial court dated December 24, 1974;
2. G.R. No. 63818, denying the petition for review seeking to modify
the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court insofar as it
disqualifies and inhibits Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further hearing
the Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo and ordering the remand of the
case to the Executive,Judge of the Regional trial Court of Cebu for reraffling; and
3. G.R. No. 65995, granting the petition to restrain the respondents
from further acting on any and all incidents in Special proceedings No.
916-11 because of the affirmation of the decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court in G.R. No. 63818.
the trial court may now terminate and close Special Proceedings No. 916-R,
subject to the submission of an inventory of the real properties of the estate
and an accounting of the call and bank deposits of the petitioner, as coadministrator of the estate, if he has not vet done so, as required by this
26

Court in its Resolution dated June 15, 1983. This must be effected with all
deliberate speed.
G.R. No. 63818
On June 9, 1979, respondents Jose Cuenco Borromeo and Petra 0. Borromeo
filed a motion for inhibition in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 11,
presided over by Judge Francisco P. Burgos to inhibit the judge from further
acting in Special Proceedings No. 916-R. 'The movants alleged, among
others, the following:
xxx

xxx

xxx

6. To keep the agitation to sell moving, Atty. Antigua filed a motion for
the production of the certificates of title and to deposit the same with
the Branch Clerk of Court, presumably for the ready inspection of
interested buyers. Said motion was granted by the Hon. Court in its
order of October 2, 1978 which, however, became the subject of
various motions for reconsideration from heirs-distributees who
contended that as owners they cannot be deprived of their titles for
the flimsy reasons advanced by Atty, Antigua. In view of the motions
for reconsideration, Atty Antigua ultimately withdraw his motions for
production of titles.
7. The incident concerning the production of titles triggered another
incident involving Atty. Raul H. Sesbreno who was then the counsel of
herein movants Petra O. Borromeo and Amelinda B. Talam In
connection with said incident, Atty. Sesbreno filed a pleading which the
tion. presiding, Judge Considered direct contempt because among
others, Atty. Sesbreno insinuated that the Hon. Presiding Judge stands
to receive "fat commission" from the sale of the entire property.
Indeed, Atty. Sesbreno was seriously in danger of being declared in
contempt of court with the dim prospect of suspension from the
practice of his profession. But obviously to extricate himself from the
prospect of contempt and suspension. Atty. Sesbreno chose
rapproachment and ultimately joined forces with Atty. Antigua, et al.,
who, together, continued to harass administrator
xxx

xxx

xxx
27

9. The herein movants are informed and so they allege, that a brother
of the Hon. Presiding Judge is married to a sister of Atty. Domingo L.
Antigua.
10. There is now a clear tug of war bet ween Atty. Antigua, et al. who
are agitating for the sale of the entire estate or to buy out the
individual heirs, on the one hand, and the herein movants, on the
other, who are not willing to sell their distributive shares under the
terms and conditions presently proposed. In this tug of war, a pattern
of harassment has become apparent against the herein movants,
especially Jose Cuenco Borromeo. Among the harassments employed
by Atty Antigua et al. are the pending motions for the removal of
administrator
Jose
Cuenco
Borromeo,
the
subpoena duces
tecum issued to the bank which seeks to invade into the privacy of the
personal account of Jose Cuenco Borromeo, and the other matters
mentioned in paragraph 8 hereof. More harassment motions are
expected until the herein movants shall finally yield to the proposed
sale. In such a situation, the herein movants beg for an entirely
independent and impartial judge to pass upon the merits of said
incidents.
11. Should the Hon. Presiding Judge continue to sit and take
cognizance of this proceeding, including the incidents abovementioned, he is liable to be misunderstood as being biased in favor of
Atty Antigua, et al. and prejudiced against the herein movants.
Incidents which may create this impression need not be enumerated
herein. (pp. 39-41, Rollo)
The motion for inhibition was denied by Judge Francisco P. Burgos. Their
motion for reconsideration having been denied, the private respondents filed
a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition with preliminary injunction before
the Intermediate Appellate Court.
In the appellate court, the private respondents alleged, among others, the
following:
xxx

xxx

xxx

28

16. With all due respect, petitioners regret the necessity of having to
state herein that respondent Hon. Francisco P. Burgos has shown
undue interest in pursing the sale initiated by Atty. Domingo L.
Antigua, et al. Significantly, a brother of respondent Hon. Francisco P.
Burgos is married to a sister of Atty. Domingo L. Antigua.
17. Evidence the proposed sale of the entire properties of the estate
cannot be legally done without the conformity of the heirs-distributees
because the certificates of title are already registered in their names
Hence, in pursuit of the agitation to sell, respondent Hon. Francisco P.
Burgos urged the heirs-distributees to sell the entire property based
on the rationale that proceeds thereof deposited in the bank will earn
interest more than the present income of the so called estate. Most of
the heirs-distributees, however. have been petitioner timid to say their
piece. Only the 4/9 group of heirs led by Jose Cuenco Borromeo have
had the courage to stand up and refuse the proposal to sell clearly
favored by respondent Hon. Francisco P. Burgos.
xxx

xxx

xxx

20. Petitioners will refrain from discussing herein the merits of the
shotgun motion of Atty. Domingo L. Antigua as well as other incidents
now pending in the court below which smack of harassment against
the herein petitioners. For, regardless of the merits of said incidents,
petitioners respectfully contend that it is highly improper for
respondent Hon. Francisco P. Burgos to continue to preside over Sp.
Proc. No. 916-R by reason of the following circumstances:
(a) He has shown undue interest in the sale of the properties as
initiated by Atty. Domingo L. Antigua whose sister is married to a
brother of respondent.
(b) The proposed sale cannot be legally done without the
conformity of the heirs-distributees, and petitioners have openly
refused the sale, to the great disappointment of respondent.
(c) The shot gun motion of Atty. Antigua and similar incidents
are clearly intended to harass and embarrass administrator Jose

29

Cuenco Borromeo in order to pressure him into acceding to the

proposed sale.
(d) Respondent has shown bias and prejudice against petitioners
by failing to resolve the claim for attorney's fees filed by Jose
Cuenco Borromeo and the late Crispin Borromeo. Similar claims
by the other lawyers were resolved by respondent after
petitioners refused the proposed sale. (pp. 41-43, Rollo)
On March 1, 1983, the appellate court rendered its decision granting the
petition for certiorari and/or prohibition and disqualifying Judge Francisco P.
Burgos from taking further cognizance of Special Proceedings No. 916-R.
The court also ordered the transmission of the records of the case to the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Region VII for re-raffling.
A motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied by the appellate
court on April 11, 1983. Hence, the present petition for review seeking to
modify the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court insofar as it
disqualifies and inhibits Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further hearing the
case of Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo and orders the remand of the case
to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu for re-raffling.
The principal issue in this case has become moot and academic because
Judge Francisco P. Burgos decided to retire from the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu sometime before the latest reorganization of the judiciary. However, we
decide the petition on its merits for the guidance of the judge to whom this
case will be reassigned and others concerned.
The petitioners deny that respondent Jose Cuenco Borromeo has been
harassed. They contend that Judge Burgos has benn shown unusual interest
in the proposed sale of the entire estate for P6,700,000.00 in favor of the
buyers of Atty. Antigua. They claim that this disinterest is shown by the
judge's order of March 2, 1979 assessing the property of the estate at
P15,000,000.00. They add that he only ordered the administrator to sell so
much of the properties of the estate to pay the attorney's fees of the
lawyers-claimants. To them, the inhibition of Judge Burgos would have been
unreasonable because his orders against the failure of Jose Cuenco
Borromeo, as administrator, to give an accounting and inventory of the
estate were all affirmed by the appellate court. They claim that the
30

respondent court, should also have taken judicial notice of the resolution of
this Court directing the said judge to "expedite the settlement and
adjudication of the case" in G.R. No. 54232. And finally, they state that the
disqualification of judge Burgos would delay further the closing of the
administration proceeding as he is the only judge who is conversant with the
47 volumes of the records of the case.
Respondent Jose Cuenco Borromeo, to show that he had been harassed.
countered that Judge Burgos appointed Ricardo V. Reyes as co-administrator
of the estate on October 11, 1972, yet Borromeo was singled out to make an
accounting of what t he was supposed to have received as rentals for the
land upon which the Juliana Trade Center is erected, from January, 1977 to
February 1982, inclusive, without mentioning the withholding tax for the
Bureau of Internal Revenue. In order to bolster the agitation to sell as
proposed by Domingo L. Antigua, Judge Burgos invited Antonio Barredo, Jr.,
to a series of conferences from February 26 to 28, 1979. During the
conferences, Atty. Antonio Barredo, Jr., offered to buy the shares of the
heirs-distributees presumably to cover up the projected sale initiated by
Atty. Antigua.
On March 2, 1979, or two days after the conferences, a motion was filed by
petitioner Domingo L. Antigua praying that Jose Cuenco Borromeo be
required to file an inventory when he has already filed one to account for
cash, a report on which the administrators had already rendered: and to
appear and be examined under oath in a proceeding conducted by Judge
Burgos lt was also prayed that subpoena duces tecum be issued for the
appearance of the Manager of the Consolidated Bank and Trust Co., bringing
all the bank records in the name of Jose Cuenco Borromeo jointly with his
wife as well as the appearance of heirs-distributees Amelinda Borromeo
Talam and another heir distributee Vitaliana Borromeo. Simultaneously with
the filing of the motion of Domingo Antigua, Atty. Raul H. Sesbreno filed a
request for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum to the Manager of
Consolidated Bank and 'Trust Co., Inc.; Register of Deeds of Cebu City;
Register of Deeds for the Province of Cebu and another subpoena duces
tecum to Atty. Jose Cuenco Borromeo.
On the same date, the Branch Clerk of Court issued a subpoena duces tecum
to the Managert of the bank, the Register of deeds for the City of Cebu, the
Register of Deeds for the Province, of Cebu. and to Jose Cuenco Borromeo.
31

On the following day, March 3, 1979, Atty Gaudioso v. Villagonzalo in behalf

of the heirs of Marcial Borromeo who had a common cause with Atty
Barredo, Jr., joined petitioner Domingo L. Antigua by filing a motion for relief
of the administrator.
On March 5, 1979, Atty. Villagonzalo filed a request for the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum to private respondent Jose Cuenco Borromeo to bring
and produce all the owners" copies of the titles in the court presided order
by Judge Burgos.
Consequently. the Branch Clerk of Court issued a subpoena duces
tecum commanding Atty. Jose Cuenco Borromeo to bring and produce the
titles in court.
All the above-incidents were set for hearing on June 7, 1979 but on June 14,
1979, before the date of the hearing, Judge Burgos issued an order denying
the private respondents' motion for reconsideration and the motion to quash
the subpoena.1avvphi1
It was further argued by the private respondents that if ,judge Francisco P.
Burgos is not inhibited or disqualified from trying Sp. Proc. No. 916-R, there
would be a miscarriage of justice Because for the past twelve years, he had
not done anything towards the closure of the estate proceedings except to
sell the properties of the heirs-distributees as initiated by petitioner Domingo
L. Antigua at 6.7 million pesos while the Intestate Court had already
evaluated it at 15 million pesos.
The allegations of the private respondents in their motion for inhibition,
more specifically, the insistence of the trial judge to sell the entire estate at
P6,700,000.00, where 4/9 group of heirs objected, cannot easily be ignored.
Suspicion of partiality on the part of a trial judge must be avoided at all
costs. In the case of Bautista v. Rebeuno(81 SCRA 535), this Court stated:
... The Judge must maintain and preserve the trust and faith of the
parties litigants. He must hold himself above reproach and suspicion.
At the very first sign of lack of faith and trust to his actions, whether
well grounded or not, the Judge has no other alternative but inhibit
himself from the case. A judge may not be legally Prohibited from
sitting in a litigation, but when circumstances appear that will induce
32

doubt to his honest actuations and probity in favor or of either partly

or incite such state of mind, he should conduct a careful selfexamination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the
people's faith in the Courts of Justice is not impaired, "The better
course for the Judge under such circumstances is to disqualify himself
"That way he avoids being misunderstood, his reputation for probity
and objectivity is preserve ed. what is more important, the Ideal of
impartial administration of justice is lived up to.
In this case, the fervent distrust of the private respondents is based on
sound reasons. As Earlier stated, however, the petition for review seeking to
modify the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court insofar as it
disqualifies and inhibits Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further hearing the
Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo case and ordering the remand of the case
to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court for re-raffling should be
DENIED for the decision is not only valid but the issue itself has become
moot and academic.
G.R. No. 65995
The petitioners seek to restrain the respondents from further acting on any
and all incidents in Special Proceedings No. 916-R during the pendency of
this petition and No. 63818. They also pray that all acts of the respondents
related to the said special proceedings after March 1, 1983 when the
respondent Judge was disqualified by the appellate court be declared null
and void and without force and effect whatsoever.
The petitioners state that the respondent Judge has set for hearing all
incidents in Special Proceedings No. 916-R, including the reversion from the
heirs-distributees to the estate, of the distributed properties already titled in
their names as early as 1970, notwithstanding the pending inhibition case
elevated before this Court which is docketed as G.R. No. 63818.
The petitioners further argue that the present status of Special Proceeding
No. 916-R requires only the appraisal of the attorney's fees of the lawyersclaimants who were individually hired by their respective heirs-clients, so
their attorney's fees should be legally charged against their respective
clients and not against the estate.

33

On the other hand, the respondents maintain that the petition is a dilatory
one and barred by res judicata because this Court on July 8, 1981, in G.R.
No. 54232 directed the respondent Judge to expedite the settlement and
liquidation of the decedent's estate. They claim that this resolution, which
was already final and executory, was in effect reversed and nullified by the
Intermediate Appellate Court in its case-AC G.R.-No. SP - 11145 when it
granted the petition for certiorari and or prohibition and disqualified Judge
Francisco P. Burgos from taking further cognizance of Special Proceedings
No. 916R as well as ordering the transmission of the records of the case to
the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Region VII for re-raffling
on March 1, 1983, which was appealed to this Court by means of a Petition
for Review (G.R. No. 63818).
We agree with the petitioners' contention that attorney's fees are not the
obligation of the estate but of the individual heirs who individually hired their
respective lawyers. The portion, therefore, of the Order of August 15, 1969,
segregating the exhorbitantly excessive amount of 40% of the market value
of the estate from which attorney's fees shall be taken and paid should be
deleted.
Due to our affirmance of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court in
G.R. No. 63818, we grant the petition.
WHEREFORE,
(1) In G.R. No. 41171, the order of the respondent judge dated
December 24, 1974, declaring the respondent entitled to 5/9 of the
estate of the late Vito Borromeo and the order dated July 7, 1975,
denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the
aforementioned order are hereby SET ASIDE for being NULL and
VOID;
(2) In G.R. No. 55000, the order of the trial court declaring the waiver
document valid is hereby SET ASIDE;
(3) In G.R. No. 63818, the petition is hereby DENIED. The issue in the
decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court disqualifying and ordering
the inhibition of Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further hearing Special
Proceedings No. 916-R is declared moot and academic. The judge who
34

has taken over the sala of retired Judge Francisco P. Burgos shall
immediately conduct hearings with a view to terminating the
proceedings. In the event that the successor-judge is likewise
disqualified, the order of the Intermediate Appellate Court directing
the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu to re-raffle the
case shall be implemented:
(4) In G.R. No. 65995, the petition is hereby GRANTED. 'The issue
seeking to restrain Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further acting in
G.R. No. 63818 is MOOT and ACADEMIC:
(5) In G.R, No, 62895, the trial court is hereby ordered to speedily
terminate the close Special Proceedings No. 916-R, subject to the
submission of an inventory of the real properties of the estate and an
accounting of the cash and bank deposits by the petitioneradministrator of the estate as required by this Court in its Resolution
dated June 15, 1983; and
(6) The portion of the Order of August 15, 1969, segregating 40% of
the market value of the estate from which attorney's fees shall be
taken and paid should be, as it is hereby DELETED. The lawyers should
collect from the heirs-distributees who individually hired them,
attorney's fees according to the nature of the services rendered but in
amounts which should not exceed more than 20% of the market value
of the property the latter acquired from the estate as beneficiaries.
SO ORDERED.

Art 1051 - 1053

Imperial vs ca
G.R. No. 112483 October 8, 1999
ELOY
IMPERIAL, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LEGASPI CITY,
CESAR VILLALON, JR., TERESA VILLALON, ANTONIO VILLALON,
35

AUGUSTO VILLALON, ROBERTO VILLALON, RICARDO VILLALON and

ESTHER VILLALON, respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Petitioner seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals
in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 31976 1, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Legaspi City 2, which rendered inofficious the donation made by
Leoncio Imperial in favor of herein petitioner, to the extent that it impairs the
legitime of Victor Imperial, and ordering petitioner to convey to herein
private respondents, heirs of said Victor Imperial, that portion of the
donated land proportionate to Victor Imperial's legitime.
Leoncio Imperial was the registered owner of a 32,837-square meter parcel
of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 200, also known as Lot 45
of the Cadastral Survey of Albay. On July 7, 1951, Leoncio sold the said lot
for P1.00 to his acknowledged natural son, petitioner herein, who then
acquired title over the land and proceeded to subdivide it into several lots.
Petitioner and private respondents admit that despite the contract's
designation as one of "Absolute Sale", the transaction was in fact a
donation.1wphi1.nt
On July 28, 1953, or barely two years after the donation, Leoncio filed a
complaint for annulment of the said Deed of Absolute Sale, docketed as Civil
Case No. 1177, in the then Court of First Instance of Albay, on the ground
that he was deceived by petitioner herein into signing the said document.
The dispute, however, was resolved through a compromise agreement,
approved by the Court of First Instance of Albay on November 3, 1961 3,
under which terms: (1) Leoncio recognized the legality and validity of the
rights of petitioner to the land donated; and (2) petitioner agreed to sell a
designated 1,000-square meter portion of the donated land, and to deposit
the proceeds thereof in a bank, for the convenient disposal of Leoncio. In
case of Leoncio's death, it was agreed that the balance of the deposit will be
withdrawn by petitioner to defray burial costs.
On January 8, 1962, and pending execution of the above judgment, Leoncio
died, leaving only two heirs the herein petitioner, who is his acknowledged
natural son, and an adopted son, Victor Imperial. On March 8, 1962, Victor
was substituted in place of Leoncio in the above-mentioned case, and it was
36

he who moved for execution of judgment. On March 15, 1962, the motion
for execution was duly granted.
Fifteen years thereafter, or on July 26, 1977, Victor died single and without
issue, survived only by his natural father, Ricardo Villalon, who was a lessee
of a portion of the disputed land. Four years hence, or on September 25,
1981, Ricardo died, leaving as his only heirs his two children, Cesar and
Teresa Villalon.
Five years thereafter, or sometime in 1986, Cesar and Teresa filed a
complaint for annulment of the donation with the Regional Trial Court of
Legazpi City, docketed as Civil Case No. 7646. Petitioner moved to dismiss
on the ground of res judicata, by virtue of the compromise judgment
rendered by the Court of First Instance of Albay. The trial court granted the
motion to dismiss, but the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order
and remanded the case for further proceedings.
On October 18, 1989, Cesar and Teresa filed an amended complaint in the
same case, Civil Case No. 7646, for "Annulment of Documents,
Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession" with the Regional Trial Court of
Legazpi City, seeking the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale affecting
the above property, on grounds of fraud, deceit and inofficiousness. In the
amended complaint, it was alleged that petitioner caused Leoncio to execute
the donation by taking undue advantage of the latter's physical weakness
and mental unfitness, and that the conveyance of said property in favor of
petitioner impaired the legitime of Victor Imperial, their natural brother and
predecessor-in-interest. 4
In his Answer, petitioner: (1) alleged that Leoncio had conveyed sufficient
property to Victor to cover his legitime, consisting of 563 hectares of
agricultural land in Manito, Albay; (2) reiterated the defense of res judicata,
and (3) raised the additional defenses of prescription and laches.
Plaintiff Cesar Villalon died on December 26, 1989, while the case was
pending in the Regional Trial Court, and was substituted in this action by his
sons, namely, Antonio, Roberto, Augusto, Ricardo and Cesar, Jr., all
surnamed Villalon, and his widow, Esther H. Villalon.

37

The RTC held the donation to be inofficious and impairing the legitime of
Victor, on the basis of its finding that at the time of Leoncio's death, he left
no property other than the 32,837-square meter parcel of land which he had
donated to petitioner. The RTC went on further to state that petitioner's
allegation that other properties existed and were inherited by Victor was not
substantiated by the evidence. 5
The legitime of Victor was determined by the trial court in this manner:
Considering that the property donated is 32,837 square meters,
one half of that or 16,418 square meters becomes the free
portion of Leoncio which could be absorbed in the donation to
defendant. The other half, which is also 16,418 square meters is
where the legitime of the adopted son Victor Imperial has to be
taken.
The proportion of the legitime of the legitimate child (including
the adopted child) in relation to the acknowledged natural child
(defendant) is 10 is to 5[,] with the acknowledged natural child
getting 1/2 of the legitime of the legitimate (adopted) child, in
accordance with Art. 895 of the New Civil Code which provides:
The legitime of each of the acknowledged natural
children and each of the natural children by legal
fiction shall consist of one-half of the legitime of each
of the legitimate children or descendants.
From the 16,418 square meters left (after the free portion has
been taken) plaintiffs are therefore entitled to 10,940 square
meters while defendant gets 5,420 square meters. 6
The trial court likewise held that the applicable prescriptive period is 30
years under Article 1141 of the Civil Code 7, reckoned from March 15, 1962,
when the writ of execution of the compromise judgment in Civil Case 1177
was issued, and that the original complaint having been filed in 1986, the
action has not yet prescribed. In addition, the trial court regarded the
defense of prescription as having been waived, this not being one of the
issues agreed upon at pre-trial.

38

Thus, the dispositive portion of the RTC's Decision of December 13, 1990
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Deed of Absolute Sale
otherwise known as Doc. No. 8; Book No. 14; Page No. 1; Series
of 1951 of the Notarial file of Pompeyo B. Calleja which is
considered a donation, is hereby reduced proportionately insofar
as it affected the legitime of the late Victor Imperial, which share
is inherited by the plaintiffs herein, to the extent that plaintiffs
are ordered to be given by defendant a portion of 10,940 square
meters thereof.
In order to avoid further conflict, the 10,940 share to be given to
plaintiffs should include the portion which they are presently
occupying, by virtue of the extended lease to their father Ricardo
Villalon, where the bungalow in question stands.
The remaining portion to be given to plaintiffs may come from
any other portion that may be agreed upon by the parties,
otherwise, this court will appoint a commissioner to undertake
the partition.
The other 21,897 square meters should go to the defendant as
part of his legitime and by virtue of the reduced donation.
No pronouncement as to damages as they were not sufficiently
proved.
SO ORDERED.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in toto.

Before us, petitioner questions the following findings of respondent court:
(1) that there was no res judicata, there being no identity of parties and
cause of action between the instant case and Civil Case No. 1177; (2) that
private respondents had a right to question the donation; (3) that private
respondents' action is barred by prescription, laches and estoppel; and (4)
that the donation was inofficious and should be reduced.

39

It is an indispensable requirement in res judicata that there be, between the

first and second action, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of
action. 9 A perusal of the records leads us to conclude that there is no
identity of parties and of cause of action as between Civil Case No. 1177 and
Civil Case No. 7646. Civil Case No. 1177 was instituted by Leoncio in his
capacity as donor of the questioned donation. While it is true that upon his
death, Victor was substituted as plaintiff of the action, such does not alter
the fact that Victor's participation in the case was in representation of the
interests of the original plaintiff, Leoncio. The purpose behind the rule on
substitution of parties is to ensure that the deceased party would continue to
be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal
representative of the estate 10, or his heir, as in this case, for which no court
appointment is required. 11 Petitioner's argument, therefore, that there is
substantial identity between Leoncio and private respondents, being heirs
and successors-in-interest of Victor, is unavailing.
Moreover, Leoncio's cause of action as donor of the property was fraud,
purportedly employed upon him by petitioner in the execution of the
donation. While the same circumstances of fraud and deceit are alleged in
private respondents' complaint, it also raises the additional ground of
inofficiousness of donation.
Contrary to petitioner's contentions, inofficiousness of donation does not,
and could not, form part of Leoncio's cause of action in Civil Case No. 1177.
Inofficiousness as a cause of action may arise only upon the death of the
donor, as the value of the donation will then be contrasted with the net value
of the estate of the donor-deceased.12
Consequently, while in Civil Case No. 1177, Leoncio sought the revocation in
full of the donation on ground of fraud, the instant case actually has two
alternative causes of action. First, for fraud and deceit, under the same
circumstances as alleged in Leoncio's complaint, which seeks the annulment
in full of the donation, and which the trial court correctly dismissed because
the compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 1177 served as a ratification
and waiver on the part of Leoncio of whatever defects in voluntariness and
consent may have been attendant in the making of the donation. The second
cause of action is the alleged inofficiousness of the donation, resulting in the
impairment of Victor's legitime, which seeks the annulment, not of the entire
donation, but only of that portion diminishing the legitime. 13 It is on the
40

basis of this second cause of action that private respondents prevailed in the
lower courts.
Petitioner next questions the right of private respondents to contest the
donation. Petitioner sources his argument from Article 772 of the Civil Code,
thus:
Only those who at the time of the donor's death have a right to
the legitime and their heirs and successors in interest may ask
for the reduction of inofficious donations . . . .
As argued by petitioner, when Leoncio died on January 8, 1962, it was only
Victor who was entitled to question the donation. However, instead of filing
an action to contest the donation, Victor asked to be substituted as plaintiff
in Civil Case No. 1177 and even moved for execution of the compromise
judgment therein.
No renunciation of legitime may be presumed from the foregoing acts. It
must be remembered that at the time of the substitution, the judgment
approving the compromise agreement has already been rendered. Victor
merely participated in the execution of the compromise judgment. He was
not a party to the compromise agreement.
More importantly, our law on succession does not countenance tacit
repudiation of inheritance. Rather, it requires an express act on the part of
the heir. Thus, under Article 1051 of Civil Code:
The repudiation of an inheritance shall be made in a public or
authentic instrument, or by petition presented to the court
having jurisdiction over the testamentary or intestate
proceedings.
Thus, when Victor substituted Leoncio in Civil Case No. 1177 upon the
latter's death, his act of moving for execution of the compromise judgment
cannot be considered an act of renunciation of his legitime. He was,
therefore, not precluded or estopped from subsequently seeking the
reduction of the donation, under Article 772. Nor are Victor's heirs, upon his
death, precluded from doing so, as their right to do so is expressly
recognized under Article 772, and also in Article 1053:
41

If the heir should die without having accepted or repudiated the

inheritance, his right shall be transmitted to his heirs.
Be that as it may, we find merit in petitioner's other assignment of errors.
Having ascertained this action as one for reduction of an inofficious donation,
we cannot sustain the holding of both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals that the applicable prescriptive period is thirty years, under Article
1141 of the Civil Code. The sense of both courts that this case is a "real
action over an immovable" allots undue credence to private respondents'
description of their complaint, as one for "Annulment of Documents,
Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession of Property", which suggests the
action to be, in part, a real action enforced by those with claim of title over
the disputed land.1wphi1.nt
Unfortunately for private respondents, a claim for legitime does not amount
to a claim of title. In the recent case ofVizconde vs. Court of
Appeals 14, we declared that what is brought to collation is not the donated
property itself, but the value of the property at the time it was donated. The
rationale for this is that the donation is a real alienation which conveys
ownership upon its acceptance, hence, any increase in value or any
deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or donee. 15
What, then, is the prescriptive period for an action for reduction of an
inofficious donation? The Civil Code specifies the following instances of
reduction or revocation of donations: (1) four years, in cases of subsequent
birth, appearance, recognition or adoption of a child; 16 (2) four years, for
non-compliance with conditions of the donation; 17 and (3) at any time
during the lifetime of the donor and his relatives entitled to support, for
failure
of
the
donor
to
reserve
property
for
his
or
their
18
19
support.
Interestingly, donations as in the instant case,
the reduction of
which hinges upon the allegation of impairment of legitime, are not
controlled by a particular prescriptive period, for which reason we must
resort to the ordinary rules of prescription.
Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions upon an obligation created by
law must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action
accrues. Thus, the ten-year prescriptive period applies to the obligation to
reduce inofficious donations, required under Article 771 of the Civil Code, to
the extent that they impair the legitime of compulsory heirs.
42

From when shall the ten-year period be reckoned? The case of Mateo vs.
Lagua, 29 SCRA 864, which involved the reduction for inofficiousness of a
donation propter nuptias, recognized that the cause of action to enforce a
legitime accrues upon the death of the donor-decedent. Clearly so, since it is
only then that the net estate may be ascertained and on which basis, the
legitimes may be determined.
It took private respondents 24 years since the death of Leoncio to initiate
this case. The action, therefore, has long prescribed.
As for the trial court's holding that the defense of prescription had been
waived, it not being one of the issues agreed upon at pre-trial, suffice it to
say that while the terms of the pre-trial order bind the parties as to the
matters to be taken up in trial, it would be the height of injustice for us to
adhere to this technicality when the fact of prescription is manifest in the
pleadings of the parties, as well as the findings of fact of the lower courts. 20
A perusal of the factual antecedents reveals that not only has prescription
set in, private respondents are also guilty of estoppel by laches. It may be
recalled that Leoncio died on January 8, 1962. Fifteen years later, Victor
died, leaving as his sole heir Ricardo Villalon, who also died four years later.
While Victor was alive, he gave no indication of any interest to contest the
donation of his deceased father. As we have discussed earlier, the fact that
he actively participated in Civil Case No. 1177 did not amount to a
renunciation of his inheritance and does not preclude him from bringing an
action to claim his legitime. These are matters that Victor could not possibly
be unaware of, considering that he is a lawyer 21. Ricardo Villalon was even a
lessee of a portion of the donated property, and could have instituted the
action as sole heir of his natural son, or at the very least, raised the matter
of legitime by way of counterclaim in an ejectment case 22 filed against him
by petitioner in 1979. Neither does it help private respondents' cause that
five years have elapsed since the death of Ricardo in 1981 before they filed
their complaint with the RTC.
Estoppel by laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable or
unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier, warranting a presumption that the
person has abandoned his right or declined to assert it. 23 We find the

43

necessity for the application of the principle of estoppel by laches in this

case, in order to avoid an injustice.
A final word on collation of donations. We observe that after finding the
donation to be inofficious because Leoncio had no other property at the time
of his death, the RTC computed the legitime of Victor based on the area of
the donated property. Hence, in its dispositive portion, it awarded a portion
of the property to private respondents as Victor's legitime. This was upheld
by the Court of Appeals.
Our rules of succession require that before any conclusion as to the legal
share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, the following steps must be
taken: (1) the net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting
all the payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned
by the deceased at the time of his death; (2) the value of all donations
subject to collation would be added to it. 24
Thus, it is the value of the property at the time it is donated, and not the
property itself, which is brought to collation. Consequently, even when the
donation is found inofficious and reduced to the extent that it impaired
Victor's legitime, private respondents will not receive a corresponding share
in the property donated. Thus, in this case where the collatable property is
an immovable, what may be received is: (1) an equivalent, as much as
possible, in property of the same nature, class and quality; 25 (2) if such is
impracticable, the equivalent value of the impaired legitime in cash or
marketable securities; 26 or (3) in the absence of cash or securities in the
estate, so much of such other property as may be necessary, to be sold in
public auction. 27
We believe this worth mentioning, even as we grant the petition on grounds
of prescription and laches.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No.
31976, affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case
No. 7646, is reversed and set aside. No costs.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

44

Art 1058
Maloles II vs Philips ----Corona vs ca
G.R. No. L-59821 August 30, 1982
ROWENA
F.
CORONA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, ROMARICO G. VITUG, AVELINO L.
CASTILLO, NICANOR CASTILLO, KATHLEEN D. LUCHANGCO,
GUILLERMO LUCHANGCO, JR., ANTONIO LUCHANGCO, RODOLFO
TORRES,
REYNALDO
TORRES
and
PURISIMA
T.
POLINTAN, respondents.
N.J. Quisumbing for petitioner.
Jose F. Tiburcio for respondents Luchangcos, Torres and Polintan.
Ricardo S. Inton for respondents Castillos.
Rufino V. Javier for respondent Vitug.
&
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:1wph1.t
A Petition to review on certiorari the judgment of the Court of Appeals 1 (CAG.R. No. 12404-SP) of August 11, 1981, upholding the appointment by the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig, Branch VI, of respondent Romarico G.
Vitug, as Special Administrator, although in the Will of his deceased wife, she
had disinherited him, as well as the Appellate Court's Resolution of February
17, 1982 denying reconsideration.
On November 10, 1980, Dolores Luchangco Vitug died in New York, U.S.A.,
leaving two Wills: one, a holographic Will dated October 3, 1980, which
excluded her husband, respondent Romarico G. Vitug, as one of her heirs,
and the other, a formal Will sworn to on October 24, 1980, or about three
weeks thereafter, which expressly disinherited her husband Romarico "for
reason of his improper and immoral conduct amounting to concubinage,
45

which is a ground for legal separation under Philippine Law"; bequeathed her
properties in equal shares to her sisters Exaltacion L. Allarde, Vicenta L.
Faustino and Gloria L. Teoxon, and her nieces Rowena F. Corona and Jennifer
F. Way; and appointed Rowena F. Corona, herein petitioner, as her Executrix.
On November 21, 1980, Rowena filed a petition for the probate of the Wills
before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI (Spec.Procs. No. 9398),
and for the appointment of Nenita P. Alonte as Administrator because she
(Rowena) is presently employed in the United Nations in New York City.
On December 2, 1980, upon Rowena's urgent Motion, the Probate Court
appointed Nenita P. Alonte as Special Administratrix, upon a P100,000.00
bond.
On December 12, 1980, the surviving husband, Romarico Vitug, filed an
"Opposition and Motion" and prayed that the Petition for Probate be denied
and that the two Wills be disallowed on the ground that they were procured
through undue and improper pressure and influence, having been executed
at a time when the decedent was seriously ill and under the medical care of
Dr. Antonio P. Corona,, petitioner's husband, and that the holographic Will
impaired his legitime. Romarico further prayed for his appointment as
Special Administrator because the Special Administratrix appointed is not
related to the heirs and has no interest to be protected, besides, the
surviving spouse is qualified to administer.
Oppositions to probate with almost Identical arguments and prayers were
also filed by respondent (1) Avelino L. Castillo and Nicanor Castillo,
legitimate children of Constancia Luchangco, full blood sister of the
decedent; (2) Guillermo Luchangco, full blood brother of the decedent; (3)
Rodolfo Torres, Reynaldo Torres, and Purisima Torres Polintan, all legitimate
children of the deceased Lourdes Luchangco Torres, full blood sister of the
decedent.
On December 18, 1980, Nenita P. Alonte posted her bond and took her oath
of office before a Notary Public.
On February 6, 1981, the Probate Court set aside its Order of December 2,
1980 appointing Nenita as Special Administratrix, and appointed instead the
surviving husband, Romarico as Special Administrator with a bond of
46

P200,000.00, essentially for the reasons that under Section 6, Rule 78, of
the Rules of Court, the surviving spouse is first in the order of preference for
appointment as Administrator as he has an interest in the estate; that the
disinheritance of the surviving spouse is not among the grounds of
disqualification for appointment as Administrator; that the next of kin is
appointed only where the surviving spouse is not competent or is unwilling
to serve besides the fact that the Executrix appointed, is not the next of kin
but merely a niece, and that the decedent's estate is nothing more than half
of the unliquidated conjugal partnership property.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration with an alternate Motion for the
appointment of co-Special Administrators to which private respondents filed
their Opposition. Reconsideration having been denied, petitioner resorted to
a Petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals to annul, for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion, the Order setting aside the
appointment of Nenita as Special Administratrix and appointing in her stead
the surviving spouse Romarico.
On August 11, 1981, the Court of Appeals found no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Probate Court and dismissed the Petition stating that the
Probate Court strictly observed the order of preference established by the
Rules; that petitioner though named Executrix in the alleged Will, declined
the trust and instead nominated a stranger as Special Administrator; that
the surviving husband has legitimate interests to protect which are not
adverse to the decedent's estate which is merely part of the conjugal
property; and that disinheritance is not a disqualification to appointment as
Special Administrator besides the fact that the legality of the disinheritance
would involve a determination of the intrinsic validity of the Will which is
decidedly premature at this stage.
On March 24, 1982, petitioner elevated the case to this Court for review on
certiorari after her Motion for Reconconsideration was turned down by the
Court of Appeals.
Petitioner stresses that the order of preference laid down in the Rules should
not be followed where the surviving spouse is expressly disinherited,
opposes probate, and clearly possesses an adverse interest to the estate
which would disqualify him from the trust.

47

The three sets of Oppositors, all respondents herein, in the Comments which
they respectively filed, essentially claimed lack of grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Appellate Court in upholding the appointment of the
surviving husband as Special Administrator; that certiorari is improper and
unavailing as the appointment of a Special Administrator is discretionary
with the Court and is unappealable; that co-administratorship is impractical
and unsound and as between the surviving husband, who was responsible
for the accumulation of the estate by his acumen and who must be deemed
to have a beneficial interest in the entire estate, and a stranger, respondent
Court had made the correct choice; and that the legality of the
disinheritance made by the decedent cannot affect the appointment of a
Special Administrator.
This Court, in resolving to give due course to the Petition taking into account
the allegations, arguments and issues raised by the parties, is of the
considered opinion that petitioner's nominee, Nenita F. Alonte, should be
appointed as co-Special Administrator. The executrix's choice of Special
Administrator, considering her own inability to serve and the wide latitude of
discretion given her by the testatrix in her Will (Annex "A-1"), is entitled to
the highest consideration. Objections to Nenita's appointment on grounds of
impracticality and lack of kinship are over-shadowed by the fact that justice
and equity demand that the side of the deceased wife and the faction of the
surviving husband be represented in the management of the decedent's
estate. 2
En passant, it is apropos to remind the Special Administrators that while
they may have respective interests to protect, they are officers of the Court
subject to the supervision and control of the Probate Court and are expected
to work for the best interests of the entire estate, its smooth administration,
and its earliest settlement.
WHEREFORE, modifying the judgment under review, the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch VI, is hereby ordered, in Special Proceedings No.
9398 pending before it, to appoint Nenita F. Alonte as co-Special
Administrator, properly bonded, who shall act as such jointly with the other
Special Administrator on all matters affecting the estate.
No costs.

48

Art. 1061
Vda de tupas vs RTC
G.R. No. L-65800 October 3, 1986
PARTENZA
LUCERNA
VDA.
DE
TUPAS, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
BRANCH XLIII of the HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL,
respondent,
and
TUPAS
FOUNDATION,
INC.,
private respondent-appellee.
Abraham D. Caa for petitioner-appellant.
Jose R. Edis for private respondent-appellee.

NARVASA, J.:
Involved in this appeal is the question of whether or not a donation inter
vivos by a donor now deceased is inofficious and should be reduced at the
instance of the donor's widow.
Epifanio R. Tupas died on August 20, 1978 in Bacolod City, childless, leaving
his widow, Partenza Lucerna, as his only surviving compulsory heir. He also
left a win dated May 18, 1976, which was admitted to probate on September
30, 1980 in Special Proceedings No. 13994 of the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental. Among the assets listed in his will were lots Nos. 837,
838 and 839 of the Sagay Cadastre, admittedly his private capital. However,
at the time of his death, these lots were no longer owned by him, he having
donated them the year before (on August 2, 1977) to the Tupas Foundation,
Inc., which had thereafter obtained title to said lots.
Claiming that said donation had left her practically destitute of any
inheritance, Tupas' widow brought suit against Tupas Foundation, Inc. in the
same Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental (docketed as Civil Case
No. 16089) to have the donation declared inofficious insofar as it prejudiced
her legitime, therefore reducible " ... by one-half or such proportion as ...
49

(might be deemed) justified ... and " ... the resulting deduction ... " restored
and conveyed or delivered to her. The complaint also prayed for attorney's
fees and such other relief as might be proper.
The Trial Court did not see things her way. Upon the facts above stated, on
which the parties stipulated, 1 said Court dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit, rejecting her claim on several grounds, viz.:
... (1) Article 900 relied upon by plaintiff is not applicable
because the properties which were disposed of by way of
donation one year before the death of Epifanio Tupas were no
longer part of his hereditary estate at the time of his death on
August 20, 1978; (2) the donation properties were Epifanio's
capital or separate estate; and (3) Tupas Foundation, Inc. being
a stranger and not a compulsory heir, the donation inter
vivos made in its favor was not subject to collation under Art.
106 1, C.C. 2
The Trial Court is in error on all counts and must be reversed.
A person's prerogative to make donations is subject to certain limitations,
one of which is that he cannot give by donation more than he can give by
will (Art. 752, Civil Code). 3 If he does, so much of what is donated as
exceeds what he can give by will is deemed inofficious and the donation is
reducible to the extent of such excess, though without prejudice to its taking
effect in the donor's lifetime or the donee's appropriating the fruits of the
thing donated (Art. 771, Civil Code). Such a donation is, moreover,
collationable that is, its value is imputable into the hereditary estate of the
donor at the tune of his death for the purpose of determining the legitime of
the forced or compulsory heirs and the freely disposable portion of the
estate. This is true as well of donations to strangers as of gifts to compulsory
heirs, although the language of Article 1061 of the Civil Code would seem to
limit collation to the latter class of donations. And this has been held to be a
long-established rule in Liguez vs. Honorable Court of Appeals, et
al., 4 where this Court said:
... Hence, the forced heirs are entitled to have the donation set
aside in so far as inofficious: i.e., in excess of the portion of free
disposal (Civil Code of 1889, Articles 636, 645), computed as
50

provided in Articles 818 and 819, and bearing in mind that

collationable gifts' under Article 818 should include gifts made
not only in favor of the forced heirs, but even those made in
favor of strangers, as decided by the Supreme Court of Spain in
its decision of 4 May 1899 and 16 June 1902. So that in
computing the legitimes, the value of the property donated to
herein appellant, Conchita Liguez, should be considered part of
the donor's estate. Once again, only the court of origin has the
requisite data to determine whether the donation is inofficious or
not. 5
The fact, therefore, that the donated property no longer actually formed part
of the estate of the donor at the time of his death cannot be asserted to
prevent its being brought to collation. Indeed, it is an obvious proposition
that collation contemplates and particularly applies to gifts inter vivos. 6 The
further fact that the lots donated were admittedly capital or separate
property of the donor is of no moment, because a claim of inofficiousness
does not assert that the donor gave what was not his, but that he gave more
than what was within his power to give.
Since it is clear that the questioned donation is collationable and that, having
been made to a stranger (to the donor) it is, by law 7 chargeable to the
freely disposable portion of the donor's estate, to be reduced insofar as
inofficious, i.e., it exceeds said portion and thus impairs the legitime of the
compulsory heirs, in order to find out whether it is inofficious or not,
recourse must be had to the rules established by the Civil Code for the
determination of the legitime and, by extension, of the disposable portion.
These rules are set forth in Articles 908, 909 and 910 of the Code, on the
basis of which the following step-by-step procedure has been correctly
outlined:
(1) determination of the value of the property which remains at
the time of the testator's death;
(2) determination of the obligations, debts, and charges which
have to be paid out or deducted from the value of the property
thus left;

51

(3) the determination of the difference between the assets and

the liabilities, giving rise to the hereditary estate;
(4) the addition to the net value thus found, of the value, at the
time they were made, of donations subject to collation; and
(5) the determination of the amount of the legitimes by getting
from the total thus found the portion that the law provides as
the legitime of each respective compulsory heir. 8
Deducting the legitimes from the net value of the hereditary estate leaves
the freely disposable portion by which the donation in question here must be
measured. If the value of the donation at the time it was made does not
exceed that difference, then it must be allowed to stand. But if it does, the
donation is inofficious as to the excess and must be reduced by the amount
of said excess. In this case, if any excess be shown, it shall be returned or
reverted to the petitioner-appellant as the sole compulsory heir of the
deceased Epifanio R. Tupas.
For obvious reasons, this determination cannot now be made, as it requires
appreciation of data not before this Court and may necessitate the
production of evidence in the Court a quo.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and petitioner-appellant
Partenza Lucerna Vda. de Tupas is adjudged entitled to so much of the
donated property in question, as may be found in excess of the freely
disposable portion of the estate of Epifanio B. Tupas, determined in the
manner above-indicated. Let the case be remanded to the Trial Court for
further appropriate proceedings in accordance with this decision.
SO ORDERED.

Zaragoza vs ca
[G.R. No. 106401. September 29, 2000]

52

SPOUSES FLORENTINO ZARAGOZA and ERLINDA ENRIQUEZZARAGOZA, petitioners, vs.

THE
HONORABLE
COURT
OF
APPEALS, ALBERTA ZARAGOZA MORGAN, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari, which seeks (1) the
reversal of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals promulgated on March 27,
1992 in CA - G.R. CV No. 12587, which affirmed the decision [2]of the
Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 14178, except the dismissal of private
respondent's claim over lot 943; (2) the dismissal of the complaint filed by
private respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo; and (3) the
declaration of the deed of sale executed by Flavio Zaragoza covering Lot 943
as valid.
The facts of the case as found by the Court of Appeals and on record are
as follows:
Flavio Zaragoza Cano was the registered owner of certain parcels of land
situated at the Municipalities of Cabatuan, New Lucena and Sta. Barbara,
Province of Iloilo. He had four children: Gloria, Zacariaz, Florentino and
Alberta, all surnamed Zaragoza. On December 9, 1964, he died without a
will and was survived by his four children.
On December 28, 1981, private respondent Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan
filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo against Spouses
Florentino and Erlinda, herein petitioners, for delivery of her inheritance
share, consisting of Lots 943 and 871, and for payment of damages. She
claims that she is a natural born Filipino citizen and the youngest child of the
late Flavio. She further alleged that her father, in his lifetime, partitioned the
aforecited properties among his four children. The shares of her brothers
and sister were given to them in advance by way of deed of sale, but without
valid consideration, while her share, which consists of lots no. 871 and 943,
was not conveyed by way of deed of sale then. She averred that because of
her marriage, she became an American citizen and was prohibited to acquire
lands in the Philippines except by hereditary succession. For this reason, no

53

formal deed of conveyance was executed in her favor covering these lots
during her father's lifetime.
Petitioners, in their Answer, admitted their affinity with private
respondent and the allegations on the properties of their father. They,
however, denied knowledge of an alleged distribution by way of deeds of sale
to them by their father. They said that lot 871 is still registered in their
father's name, while lot 943 was sold by him to them for a valuable
consideration. They denied knowledge of the alleged intention of their father
to convey the cited lots to Alberta, much more, the reason for his failure to
do so because she became an American citizen. They denied that there was
partitioning of the estate of their father during his lifetime.
On November 23, 1983, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, on the
ground that the complaint did not state a cause of action and it failed to
implead indispensable parties. The resolution of said Motion was deferred by
the lower court until the case was tried on the merits.
On October 7, 1986, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo promulgated its
decision, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the above findings, judgment is hereby rendered,
adjudicating Lot 871 in the name of Flavio Zaragoza Cano to plaintiff Alberta
Zaragoza-Morgan as appertaining her share in his estate and ordering
defendants to vacate its premises and deliver immediately the portion
occupied by them to herein plaintiff. Plaintiff's claim against defendants over
Lot 943 is dismissed as well as claims for damages interposed against each
other.[3]
In the above decision, the RTC found that Flavio partitioned his
properties during his lifetime among his three children by deeds of sales;
that the conveyance of Lot 943 to petitioners was part of his plan to
distribute his properties among his children during his lifetime; and that he
intended Lot 871 to be the share of private respondent.[4]
Not satisfied with the above decision, both parties interposed an appeal
in the Court of Appeals docketed as CA -GR CV No. 12587.

54

On March 27, 1992, respondent court rendered the assailed decision, the
decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, WE reverse the decision appealed from, insofar as defendantappellants, spouses Florentino Zaragoza and Erlinda E. Zaragoza, were
adjudged owner of Lot 943. In all other respects, the decision appealed from
is hereby AFFIRMED.[5]
The appellate court gave weight to the testimonial and documentary
evidence presented by private respondent to support its finding that Lots
871 and 943 were inheritance share of private respondent. Specifically, it
noted the admission by petitioner in his letter in 1981 to private
respondent's counsel, that their father had given them their inheritance.
[6]
Further, public respondent found that the alleged sale of lot 943 in favor of
petitioner Florentino was fictitious and void. The signature of Don Flavio in
the said document was markedly different from his other signatures
appearing in other documents he signed from January to February 1957.
[7]
The Motion for Reconsideration was denied in a Resolution [8] dated June
26, 1992.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari,[9] with a supplemental
petition, raising the following assigned errors:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT LOTS 871 AND 943
ARE THE INHERITANCE SHARE OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE DECEDENT FLAVIO
ZARAGOZA HAS NOT EXECUTED ANY WILL NOR ANY DOCUMENT
GIVING THESE TWO PROPERTIES IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT;
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ADMITTING AND GIVING WEIGHT
TO THE TESTIMONIES OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S WITNESSES TO
THE EFFECT THAT LOTS 871 AND 943 ARE THE INHERITANCE SHARE
OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT AS TOLD TO THEM BY FLAVIO ZARAGOZA
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THESE TESTIMONIES ARE HEARSAY;
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE DEED OF
SALE EXECUTED BY FLAVIO ZARAGOZA IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER
OVER LOT 943 IS A FORGERY, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT:
55

1. THE THEORY THAT THE AFORESAID DEED OF SALE WAS A

FORGERY WAS NEVER RAISED IN THE COMPLAINT NOR
ESTABLISHED BY EVIDENCE.
2. THE SAID DEED OF SALE WAS IN A PUBLIC INSTRUMENT.
3. NO WITNESSES WAS EVER PRESENTED TO ASSAIL
GENUINENESS OF THE SIGNATURE OF FLAVIO ZARAGOZA.

THE

4. THE SAID DEED OF SALE WAS EVEN WITNESSED BY HIS OTHER

DAUGHTER GLORIA ZARAGOZA NUEZ AND NOTARIZED BY NOTARY
PUBLIC ATTY. EDURESE.
D. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN MODIFYING THE
DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT WITH RESPECT TO LOT 943 WHEN
THE LATTER SUSTAINED THE GENUINENESS OF THE SIGNATURE OF
PETITIONER'S FATHER FOUND IN EXH. I.
E. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF
ESTOPPEL, IGNORING THE FACT THAT IT IS THE LAW ON INTESTATE
SUCCESSION, AND THE CORRESPONDING RULES OF COURT ON THE
SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE THAT IS APPLICABLE ON THIS CASE.[10]
In their Supplemental Petition for Review dated October 29, 1992,
petitioners additionally raised:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING
THE COMPLAINT FILED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT FOR FAILURE
TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION,
II. ALTERNATIVELY, THE COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT
LOTS TRANSFERRED INTER VIVOS TO THE OTHER HEIRS SHOULD
HAVE BEEN COLLATED TO THE MASS OF THE ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED FLAVIO ZARAGOZA (y) CANO.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING AS
LAWFUL AND VALID ALL THE DISPOSITIONS MADE BY THE
DECEASED FLAVIO ZARAGOZA (y) CANO EXCEPT LOT # 943
DESPITE UTTER LACK OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT ITS FINDING
THAT THE SIGNATURE OF THE LATE FLAVIO ZARAGOZA (y) CANO
56

IN EXH. "M-11-A" APPEARING IN THE DEED OF SALE DATED

FEBRUARY 5, 1957 (EXH. "1", FLORENTINO) WAS A FORGERY.
IV. THE COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT TRANSFER
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-35946 (EXHIBIT 2) COVERING LOT
943 IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER CONCLUSIVELY EVIDENCES
THE LATTER'S OWNERSHIP THEREOF.[11]
Essentially, we are asked to resolve two issues: (1) whether the
partition inter vivos by Flavio Zaragoza Cano of his properties, which include
Lots 871 and 943, is valid; and (2) whether the validity of the Deed of Sale
and consequently, the Transfer Certificate of Title over Lot 943 registered in
the name of the petitioners, can be a valid subject matter of the entire
proceeding for the delivery of inheritance share.
On the first issue. It is the main contention of the petitioner that the
adjudication of Lots 943 and 871 in favor of private respondent, as her
inheritance share, has no legal basis since there is no will nor any document
that will support the transfer.
Both the trial court and the public respondent found that during the
lifetime of Flavio, he already partitioned and distributed his properties
among his three children, excepting private respondent, through deeds of
sale. A deed of sale was not executed in favor of private respondent because
she had become an American citizen and the Constitution prohibited a sale in
her favor. Petitioner admitted Lots 871 and 943 were inheritance shares of
the private respondent. These are factual determinations of the Court of
Appeals, based on documentary and testimonial evidence. As a rule, we are
bound by findings of facts of the Court of Appeals. [12] Was the partition done
during the lifetime of Flavio Zaragoza Cano valid? We think so. It is basic in
the law of succession that a partition inter vivos may be done for as long as
legitimes are not prejudiced. Art. 1080 of the Civil Code is clear on this.
[13]
The legitime of compulsory heirs is determined after collation, as
provided for in Article 1061:
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must
bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have
received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of
donation, or any other gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in
57

the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the
partition.
Unfortunately, collation can not be done in this case where the original
petition for delivery of inheritance share only impleaded one of the other
compulsory heirs. The petition must therefore be dismissed without
prejudice to the institution of a new proceeding where all the indispensable
parties are present for the rightful determination of their respective legitime
and if the legitimes were prejudiced by the partitioning inter vivos.
We now come to the second issue. Private respondent, in submitting her
petition for the delivery of inheritance share, was in effect questioning the
validity of the deed of sale covering Lot 943 in favor of petitioner and
consequently, the Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the latter's
name. Although the trial court, as an obiter, made a finding of validity of the
conveyance of Lot 943 in favor of petitioners, since according to it, private
respondent did not question the genuineness of the signature of the
deceased, nevertheless, when the case was elevated to the Court of Appeals,
the latter declared the sale to be fictitious because of finding of marked
differences in the signature of Flavio in the Deed of Sale vis--vis signatures
found in earlier documents. Could this be done? The petition is a collateral
attack. It is not allowed by Sec. 48 of the Presidential Decree No. 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, which provides:
Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate of title
shall not be subject to collateral attack. It can not be altered, modified, or
cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
We have reiterated this rule in the case of Halili vs. Court of Industrial
Relations,[14] citing the earlier cases of Constantino vs. Espiritu[15] and Co vs.
Court of Appeals.[16] In Halili, we held that a certificate of title accumulates in
one document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee
held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of
title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once
registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned,
altered, changed, modified, enlarged or diminished, except in some direct
proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise, all security in registered titles
would be lost. In Constantino, the Court decided that the certificate, in the
absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest
58

of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not
thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged or diminished,
except in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all security in
registered titles would be lost. And in Co, we stated that a Torrens title
cannot be collaterally attacked. The issue on the validity of title, i.e.,
whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action
expressly instituted for that purpose.
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the instant
petition for review. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 27,
1992 in CA-G.R. CV No. 12587, entitled Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan vs.
Spouses Florentino Zaragoza and Erlinda Enriquez-Zaragoza is VACATED and
SET ASIDE. The complaint for delivery of inheritance share in the Regional
Trial Court, for failure to implead indispensable parties, is also
DISMISSED without prejudice to the institution of the proper proceedings.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Arellano vs pascual
AMELIA
P.
ARELLANO,
represented
by
her
duly
appointed guardians, AGNES P.
ARELLANO
and
NONA
P.
ARELLANO,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 189776

Present:
CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,
PERALTA,*
BERSAMIN,
MENDOZA,** and
SERENO, JJ.

- versus -

FRANCISCO
PASCUAL
and
MIGUEL PASCUAL,
Promulgated:
Respondents
December 15, 2010
.
x-------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
59

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs
his siblings, namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her
daughters[1] Agnes P. Arellano (Agnes) and Nona P. Arellano, and
respondents Francisco Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual. [2]
In a petition for Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of
Letters of Administration, docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. M-5034,
filed by respondents on April 28, 2000 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati, respondents alleged, inter alia, that a parcel of land (the donated
property) located in Teresa Village, Makati, which was, by Deed of Donation,
transferred by the decedent to petitioner the validity of which donation
respondents assailed, may be considered as an advance legitime of
petitioner.
Respondents nephew Victor was, as they prayed for, appointed
Administrator of the estate by Branch 135 of the Makati RTC.[3]

as

Respecting the donated property, now covered in the name of

petitioner by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 181889 of the Register of Deeds
of Makati, which respondents assailed but which they, in any event, posited
that it may be considered as an advance legitime to petitioner, the trial
court, acting as probate court, held that it was precluded from determining
the validity of the donation.
Provisionally passing, however, upon the question of title to the
donated property only for the purpose of determining whether it formed part
of the decedents estate,[4] the probate court found the Deed of Donation
valid in light of the presumption of validity of notarized documents. It thus
went on to hold that it is subject to collation following Article 1061 of the
New Civil Code which reads:[5]
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other
compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any
property or right which he may have received from the decedent,
60

during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other

gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in the
determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of
the partition.

The probate court thereafter partitioned the properties of the intestate

estate. Thus it disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring that:
1.

The property covered by TCT No. 181889 of the

Register of Deeds of Makati as part of the estate of Angel N.
Pascual;

2.

The property covered by TCT No. 181889 to be subject

to collation;

3.

1/3 of the rental receivables due on the property at

the mezzanine and the 3rd floor of Unit 1110 Tanay
St., Makati City form part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual;

4.

The following properties form part of the estate of

Angel N. Pascual:
a.

1/3 share in the House and Lot at 1110 Tanay St.,

Rizal Village Makati TCT No. 348341 and 1/3 share in
the rental income thereon;

b.

1/3 share in the Vacant Lot with an area of 271

square meters located at Tanay St., Rizal Village, Makati
City, TCT No. 119063;

c.

Agricultural land with an area of 3.8 hectares

located at Puerta Galera Mindoro covered by OCT No. P2159;

d.

Shares of stocks in San Miguel Corporation covered

by the following Certificate Numbers: A0011036,
A006144, A082906, A006087, A065796, A11979,
A049521, C86950, C63096, C55316, C54824, C120328,
A011026, C12865, A10439, A021401, A007218, A0371,
S29239, S40128, S58308, S69309;
61

e.

Shares of stocks in Paper Industries Corp. covered

by the following Certificate Numbers: S29239, S40128,
S58308, S69309, A006708, 07680, A020786, S18539,
S14649;

f.

share in Eduardo Pascuals shares in Baguio Gold

Mining Co.;

g. Cash in Banco De Oro Savings Account No. 2 014 12292

4 in the name of Nona Arellano;
i.

Property previously covered by TCT No. 119053 now

covered by TCT No. 181889, Register of Deeds of
Makati City;

j.

Rental receivables from Raul Arellano per Order

issued by Branch 64 of the Court on November 17,
1995.

5. AND the properties are partitioned as follows:

a.

To heir Amelia P. Arellano-the property covered by

TCT No. 181889;

b.

To heirs Francisco N. Pascual and Miguel N. Pascualthe real properties covered by TCT Nos. 348341 and
119063 of the Register of Deeds of Makati City and the
property covered by OCT No. 2159, to be divided
equally between them up to the extent that each of
their share have been equalized with the actual value of
the property in 5(a) at the time of donation, the value
of which shall be determined by an independent
appraiser to be designated by Amelia P. Arellano, Miguel
N. Pascual and Francisco N. Pascual. If the real
properties are not sufficient to equalize the shares, then
Franciscos and Miguels shares may be satisfied from
either in cash property or shares of stocks, at the rate
of quotation. The remaining properties shall be divided
equally among Francisco, Miguel and Amelia.(emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

62

Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner faulted the trial court in holding
that
I
. . . THE PROPERTY DONATED TO APPELLANT AMELIA PASCUAL
ARELLANO IS PART OF THE ESTATE OF ANGEL PASCUAL, JR.
II
. . . THE PROPERTY DONATED TO APPELLANT IS SUBJECT TO
COLLATION UNDER ARTICLE 1061 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.
III
. . . APPELLEES WHO ARE MERELY COLLATERAL RELATIVES OF
DECEASED ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR. AS HIS COMPULSORY
HEIRS ENTITLED TO LEGITIMES.
xxxx
and
V
. . . IN NOT PARTITIONING THE ESTATE OF ANGEL N. PASCUAL
JR. EQUALLY AMONG HIS LEGAL OR INTESTATE HEIRS.
[6]
(underscoring supplied)

By Decision[7] of July 20, 2009, the Court of Appeals found petitioners

appeal partly meritorious. It sustained the probate courts ruling that the
property donated to petitioner is subject to collation in this wise:
Bearing in mind that in intestate succession, what governs
is the rule on equality of division, We hold that the property
subject of donation inter vivos in favor of Amelia is
subject to collation. Amelia cannot be considered a creditor of
the decedent and we believe that under the circumstances, the
value of such immovable though not strictly in the concept of
advance legitime, should be deducted from her share in the net
63

hereditary estate. The trial court therefore committed no

reversible error when it included the said property as forming
part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual.[8] (citation omitted;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The appellate court, however, held that, contrary to the ruling of the
probate court, herein petitioner was able to submit prima facie evidence of
shares of stocks owned by the [decedent] which have not been included in
the inventory submitted by the administrator.
Thus, the appellate court disposed, quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is
hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated January 29, 2008
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 135 in Special
Proceeding Case No. M-5034 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE insofar as the order of inclusion of properties of the
Intestate Estate of Angel N. Pascual, Jr. as well as the partition
and distribution of the same to the co-heirs are concerned.
The case is hereby REMANDED to the said court for further
proceedings in accordance with the disquisitions herein.
[9]
(underscoring supplied)

Petitioners Partial Motion for Reconsideration [10] having been denied by

the appellate court by Resolution [11] of October 7, 2009, the present petition
for review on certiorari was filed, ascribing as errors of the appellate court its
ruling
I
. . . THAT THE PROPERTY DONATED BY ANGEL N. PASCUAL, JR.
TO PETITIONER AMELIA PASCUAL ARELLANO IS PART OF HIS
ESTATE AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH.
II
. . . THAT THE PROPERTY DONATED TO PETITIONER IS SUBJECT
TO COLLATION UNDER ARTICLE 1061 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.
64

III
. . . THAT RESPONDENTS ARE COMPULSORY HEIRS OF THEIR
DECEASED BROTHER ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR. AND ARE ENTITLED
TO LEGITIMES.
IV
. . . IN NOT PARTITIONING THE ESTATE OF ANGEL N. PASCUAL,
JR. EQUALLY AMONG PETITIONER AND RESPONDENTS, AS HIS
LEGAL OR INTESTATE HEIRS.[12] (underscoring supplied)

Petitioners thus raise the issues of whether the property donated to

petitioner is subject to collation; and whether the property of the estate
should have been ordered equally distributed among the parties.
On the first issue:
The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is a mere
mathematical operation by the addition of the value of donations made by
the testator to the value of the hereditary estate; and second, it is the return
to the hereditary estate of property disposed of by lucrative title by the
testator during his lifetime.[13]
The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory
heirs in so far as is possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding
the legitime, so that inofficious donations may be reduced. [14]
Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its
purposes being to determine the legitime and the free portion. If there is no
compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be safeguarded. [15]
The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or
concurring compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are
his collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime that
part of the testators property which he cannot dispose of because the law
has reserved it for compulsory heirs.[16]
65

The compulsory heirs may be classified into (1) primary, (2)

secondary, and (3) concurring. The primary compulsory heirs are
those who have precedence over and exclude other compulsory
heirs; legitimate children and descendants are primary
compulsory heirs. The secondary compulsory heirs are those
who succeed only in the absence of the primary heirs; the
legitimate parents and ascendants are secondary compulsory
heirs. The concurring compulsory heirs are those who succeed
together with the primary or the secondary compulsory heirs;
the illegitimate children, and the surviving spouse are concurring
compulsory heirs.[17]

The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to
any legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing
was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to
petitioner, assuming that it was valid,[18] is deemed as donation made to a
stranger, chargeable against the free portion of the estate. [19] There being no
compulsory heir, however, the donated property is not subject to collation.
On the second issue:
The
decedents
remaining
estate
should
thus
be
partitioned equally among his heirs-siblings-collateral relatives, herein
petitioner and respondents, pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code, viz:
Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in
accordance with the following articles. (underscoring supplied)
Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and
sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal
shares. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision

ordering the collation of the property donated to petitioner, Amelia N.
Arellano, to the estate of the deceased Angel N. Pascual, Jr. is SET ASIDE.

66

Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the court of origin,

Branch 135 of the Makati Regional Trial Court, which is ordered to conduct
further proceedings in the case for the purpose of determining what finally
forms part of the estate, and thereafter to divide whatever remains of it
equally among the parties.
SO ORDERED.

Art 1062
Buhay de roma vs ca
G.R. No. L-46903

July 23, 1987

BUHAY
DE
ROMA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and FELICIDAD CARINGAL, as
Guardian of Rosalinda de Roma,respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted daughters, Buhay de Roma and
Rosalinda de Roma. She died intestate on April 30, 1971, and administration
proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Laguna by the
private respondent as guardian of Rosalinda. Buhay was appointed
administratrix and in due time filed an inventory of the estate. This was
opposed by Rosalinda on the ground that certain properties earlier donated
by Candelaria to Buhay, and the fruits thereof, had not been included. 1
The properties in question consisted of seven parcels of coconut land worth
P10,297.50.2 There is no dispute regarding their evaluation; what the parties
cannot agree upon is whether these lands are subject to collation. The
private respondent rigorously argues that it is, conformably to Article 1061
of the Civil Code. Buhay, for her part, citing Article 1062, claims she has no
obligation to collate because the decedent prohibited such collation and the
donation was not officious.
The two articles provide as follows:

67

Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other

compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property
or right which he may have received from the decedent during the
lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title,
in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime
of each heir, and in the account of the partition.
Article 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory
heirs if the donor should have so expressly provided, or if the
donor should repudiate the inheritance, unless the donation
should be reduced as inofficious.
The issue was resolved in favor of the petitioner by the trial
court,* which held that the decedent, when she made the donation in
favor of Buhay, expressly prohibited collation. Moreover, the donation
did not impair the legitimes of the two adopted daughters as it could
be accommodated in, and in fact was imputed to, the free portion of
Candelaria's estate.3
On appeal, the order of the trial court was reversed, the respondent
court** holding that the deed of donation contained no express
prohibition to collate as an exception to Article 1062. Accordingly, it
ordered collation and equally divided the net estate of the decedent,
including the fruits of the donated property, between Buhay and
Rosalinda.4
The pertinent portions of the deed of donation are as follows:
IKALAWA. Na alang-alang sa aking pagmamahal, pagtingin at
pagsisilbi sa akin ng aking anak na si BUHAY DE ROMA, kasal kay
Arabella Castaneda, may karampatang gulang, mamamayang Pilipino
at naninirahan at may pahatirang-sulat din dito sa Lunsod ng San
Pablo sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito ay kusang-loob kong
ibinibigay, ipinagkakaloob at inililipat sa nabanggit na BUHAY DE
ROMA, sa kanyang mga kahalili at tagapagmana, sa pamamagitan ng
pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli, ang lahat ng mga lagay ng lupa
na sinasabi sa itaas, sa ilalim ng kasunduan na ngayon pa ay siya na
ang nagmamay-aring tunay ng mga lupang ito at kanya nang maaring
ipalipat ang mga hoja declaratoria ng mga lupang ito sa kanyang
68

pangalan, datapwa't samantalang ako ay nabubuhay, ay ako rin ang

makikinabang sa mga mapuputi at mamomosesion sa mga nasabing
lupa;
IKATLO. Na pinagtibay ko na ako ay marami pang ibang mga pag-aari
sa sapat pang aking ikabuhay at sa pagbibigay kong ito ay hindi
masisira ang legitimate ng mga tao na dapat magmana sa akin,
sapagkat ang mga lupang sinasabi sa itaas ay bahagui ng aking
kabuhayan na ako ay may layang ipamigay kahit na kaninong tao na
kung tawagin ay Libre Disposicion. 5
We agree with the respondent court that there is nothing in the above
provisions expressly prohibiting the collation of the donated properties. As
the said court correctly observed, the phrase "sa pamamagitan ng
pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli" merely described the donation as
"irrevocable" and should not be construed as an express prohibition against
collation.6 The fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily
exempt the subject thereof from the collation required under Article 1061.
We surmise from the use of such terms as "legitime" and "free portion" in
the deed of donation that it was prepared by a lawyer, and we may also
presume he understood the legal consequences of the donation being made.
It is reasonable to suppose, given the precise language of the document,
that he would have included therein an express prohibition to collate if that
had been the donor's intention.
Anything less than such express prohibition will not suffice under the clear
language of Article 1062.1awphil The suggestion that there was
an implied prohibition because the properties donated were imputable to the
free portion of the decedent's estate merits little consideration. Imputation is
not the question here, nor is it claimed that the disputed donation is officious
The sole issue is whether or not there was an express prohibition to collate,
and we see none.
The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and
unequivocally as an exception to the general rule announced in Article 1062.
Absent such a clear indication of that intention, we apply not the exception
but the rule, which is categorical enough.

69

There is no need to dwell long on the other error assigned by the petitioner
regarding the decision of the appealed case by the respondent court beyond
the 12-month period prescribed by Article X, Section 11 (1) of the 1973
Constitution. As we held in Marcelino v. Cruz,7 the said provision was merely
directory and failure to decide on time would not deprive the corresponding
courts of jurisdiction or render their decisions invalid.
It is worth stressing that the aforementioned provision has now been
reworded in Article VIII, Section 15, of the 1987 Constitution, which also
impresses upon the courts of justice, indeed with greater urgency, the need
for the speedy disposition of the cases that have been clogging their dockets
these many years. Serious studies and efforts are now being taken by the
Court to meet that need.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against
the petitioner. It is so ordered.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Paras and Gancayco, JJ., concur.

Art. 1078
Noceda vs ca
[G.R. No. 119730. September 2, 1999]
RODOLFO NOCEDA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and AURORA
ARBIZO DIRECTO, respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeks to reverse the decision dated March 31, 1995 of the respondent Court
of Appeals[1] in CA GR CV No. 38126, affirming with modification the decision
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 71, of Iba, Zambales, [2] in an action by
private respondent against petitioner for recovery of possession and
ownership and rescission/annulment of donation.
70

The facts of the case as summarized by the respondent Court are as

follows:[3]
On June 1, 1981, plaintiff Aurora Directo, defendant Rodolfo Noceda, and
Maria Arbizo, the daughter, grandson, and widow, respectively, of the late
Celestino Arbizo, who died in 1956, extrajudicially settled a parcel of land,
Lot 1121, located at Bitaog, San Isidro, Cabangan, Zambales, which was
said to have an area of 66,530 square meters. Plaintiff Directos share was
11,426 square meters, defendant Noceda got 13,294 square meters, and the
remaining 41,810 square meters went to Maria Arbizo (Exhibit G). On the
same date, plaintiff Directo donated 625 square meters of her share to
defendant Noceda, who is her nephew being the son of her deceased sister,
Carolina (Exhibit D). However, on August 17, 1981, another extrajudicial
settlement-partition of Lot 1121 was executed by plaintiff Directo, defendant
Noceda, and Maria Arbizo. Three fifths of the said land went to Maria Arbizo
while plaintiff Directo and defendant Noceda got only one-fifth each. In said
extrajudicial settlement-partition as well as in the Tax Declaration 16-0032
over Lot 1121 in the name of the late Celestino Arbizo, the said parcel of
land was said to have an area of only 29,845 square meters (Exhibit
C). Sometime in 1981, defendant Noceda constructed his house on the land
donated to him by plaintiff Directo. Plaintiff Directo fenced the portion
allotted to her in the extrajudicial settlement, excluding the donated portion,
and constructed thereon three huts. But in 1985, defendant Noceda removed
the fence earlier constructed by plaintiff Directo, occupied the three huts (3)
and fenced the entire land of plaintiff Directo without her consent. Plaintiff
Directo demanded from defendant Noceda to vacate her land, but the latter
refused. Hence, plaintiff Directo filed the present suit, a complaint for the
recovery of possession and ownership and rescission/annulment of donation,
against defendant Noceda before the lower court. During the trial, the lower
court ordered that a relocation survey of Lot 1121 be conducted by Engr.
Edilberto Quejada of the Bureau of Lands. After the survey of Lot 1121 in the
presence of both parties, Engr. Edilberto Quejada reported that the area of
Lot 1121 stated in the extrajudicial settlement-partition of August 17, 1981
was smaller than the actual area of Lot 1121 which is 127,298 square
meters. Engr. Quejada subdivided Lot 1121, excluding the portions occupied
by third persons, known as Lot 8, the salvage zone and the road lot, on the
basis of the actual occupancy of Lot 1121 by the heirs of the late Celestino
Arbizo and the extrajudicial settlement-partition of August 17, 1981. The
71

portion denominated as Lot A, with an area of 12,957 square meters was the
share of defendant Noceda; Lot C, with the same area as that of Lot A, was
the share of plaintiff Directo, a portion of which was donated to defendant
Noceda; and Lot B, with an area of 38,872 square meters, went to Maria
Arbizo (Exhibit E).
On November 6, 1991, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 71, of Iba,
Zambales rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:[4]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby
renders judgment:
(a) Declaring the Extra-Judicial Settlement-Partition dated August 19, 1981,
valid;
(b) Declaring the Deed of Donation dated June 1, 1981, revoked;
(c) Ordering the defendant to vacate and reconvey that donated portion of
Lot 2, Lot 1121 subject of the Deed of Donation dated June 1, 1981 to the
plaintiff or her heirs or assigns;
(d) Ordering the defendant to remove the house built inside the donated
portion at the defendants expense or pay a monthly rental of P300.00
Philippine Currency;
(e) Ordering the defendant
of P5,000.00; and

to

pay

attorneys

fees

in

the

amount

(f) To pay the cost.

Rodolfo Nocedo appealed to the respondent Court which affirmed the trial
court as follows:[5]
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ORDERING defendant Rodolfo
Noceda to VACATE the portion known as Lot C of Lot 1121 per Exhibit E,
which was allotted to plaintiff Aurora Arbizo Directo. Except for this
modification, the Decision, dated November 6, 1991, of the RTC-Iba,
Zambales, Branch 71, in Civil Case No. RTC-354-I, is hereby AFFIRMED in all
other respects. Costs against defendant Rodolfo Noceda.
72

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition for review with the
following assignment of errors:[6]
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY
IDENTIFIED AS LOT 1121 CONTAINS AN AREA IN EXCESS OF THAT STATED
IN ITS TAX DECLARATION.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT LOT 1121 SHOULD BE
PARTITIONED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT
DATED 17 AUGUST 1981.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ADJUDICATING AND ALLOTING LOT C AS
APPEARING IN THE SURVEY PLAN PREPARED BY GEODETIC ENGINEER
EDILBERTO QUEJADA TO THE RESPONDENT.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER
USURPED AN AREA ADJUDICATED TO THE RESPONDENT.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVOKING THE DEED OF DONATION
DATED 1 JUNE 1981.
The first issue raised refers to the actual area of the subject lot known as
Lot 1121, which was registered under Tax Declaration No. 16-0032 under
the name of the late Celestino Arbizo. Petitioner claims that Tax Declaration
No. 16-0032 contains only an area of 29,845 sq. meter; thus the respondent
Court exceeded its judicial authority when it sustained the lower courts
findings that the subject property actually contains an area of 127,289
square meters.
We find the argument unmeritorious. The records disclose that the trial
court in an Order dated June 8, 1987 gave both parties to this case the
chance to have the subject property re-surveyed by a licensed surveyor to
determine the actual area of Lot 1121. [7] Plaintiff Aurora Directo filed a
motion/compliance where she suggested that Geodetic Engineer Edilberto V.
Quejada of the Bureau of Lands, Iba, Zambales be commissioned to
undertake the survey[8] said motion was also sent to defendants counsel,
Atty. Eufracio Pagunuran for Comment, [9] but Atty. Pagunuran however failed
to file his Comment within the given period. Thus the trial court designated
Engineer Quejada to undertake the survey of Lot 1121. [10] Petitioner Noceda
73

through counsel belatedly filed his Comment without any opposition to the
appointment of Engineer Quejada but proposed that the latter be tasked to
solely (a) re-survey, determine and identify the metes and bounds of the lot
covered by Tax Declaration No. 16-0032; (b) to identify the areas occupied
by the parties therein; and (c) to conduct the re-survey with notice and in
the presence of the parties therein and their respective counsels. [11] The
Comment was not, however, acted upon by the trial court in view of its
earlier Order directing Engineer Quejada to undertake the survey of the
land.[12] Engr. Quejada conducted the survey with the conformity and in the
presence of both parties, taking into consideration the extrajudicial partition
dated August 17, 1981, deed of donation dated June 1, 1981 executed by
plaintiff Aurora Directo in favor of defendant Rodolfo Noceda and the actual
area occupied by the parties,[13] as well as the sketch plan[14] and the
technical description of Lot 1121 taken from the Records Section of the
Bureau of Lands, Manila.[15] The report and the survey plan submitted by
Engr. Quejada were approved by the Trial Court in an Order dated December
7, 1987.[16] These circumstances show that the lower court ordered the resurvey of the lot to determine the actual area of Lot 1121 and such survey
was done with the conformity and in the presence of both parties. The actual
land area based on the survey plan which was conducted in the presence of
both parties, showed a much bigger area than the area declared in the tax
declaration but such differences are not uncommon as early tax declarations
are, more often than not, based on approximation or estimation rather than
on computation.[17] We hold that the respondent court did not err in
sustaining the trial courts findings that the actual area of Lot 1121 is
127,289 square meters.
Petitioner also contends that said judicial determination improperly
encroaches on the rights and claims of third persons who were never
impleaded below; that the subject lot was also declared in the name of one
Cecilia Obispo and a Free Patent over the said lot was also issued in her
name and that there are several residential houses constructed and existing
on Lot 8 of lot 1121, thus these possessors/occupants of Lot 8 should be
joined as defendants for their non-inclusion would be fatal to respondents
cause of action.
We find no merit in this argument. The respondent Court correctly
ratiocinated on this issue as follows:[18]

74

The fact that Cecilia Obispo has tax declarations in her name over Lot 1121
and several persons occupied a portion thereof did not make them
indispensable parties in the present case. Defendant Noceda merely
presented the tax declarations in the name of Cecilia Obispo without the
alleged free patent in her name. Moreover, no evidence was presented
showing that Cecilia Obispo possessed or claimed possession of Lot
1121. Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for tax purposes are not
conclusive evidence of ownership of property (Republic vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 224 SCRA 285).
It was not necessary that the occupants of a portion of Lot 1121, designated
as Lot 8, be impleaded in the present case. Lot 8, though part of Lot 1121,
was excluded by Engr. Quejada in determining the respective portions of Lot
1121 occupied by plaintiff Directo, defendant Noceda and Maria Arbizo
pursuant to the extrajudicial settlement which they executed on August 17,
1981. The result of the present suit shall not in any way affect the occupants
of Lot 8, since the issues involved in the present case are the usurpation by
defendant Noceda of the land adjudicated to plaintiff Directo and the
propriety of the cancellation of the deed of donation in favor of defendant
Noceda due to his ingratitude to plaintiff Directo.
Notably, defendants counsel requested for the appearance of Cecilia
Obispo and despite notice to her to appear in court and bring with her the
alleged free patent in her name,[19] she failed to appear and even failed to
intervene to protect whatever interest and right she has over the subject
lot. As to the other possessors of residential houses in Lot 8 of Lot 1121,
they are not considered as indispensable parties to this case. A party is not
indispensable to the suit if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is
distinct and divisible from the interest of the other parties and will not
necessarily be prejudiced by a judgment which does complete justice to the
parties in court.[20] Private respondent is not claiming the entire area of Lot
1121 but only a portion thereof which was adjudicated to her based on the
August 17, 1981 extrajudicial settlement and which was denominated in the
survey plan as Lot C of Lot 1121; thus there was no need to implead the
occupants of Lot 8.
Petitioner further claims that the subject property could not be
partitioned based on the extrajudicial settlement-partition dated August 17,
1981, since the distributive share of the heirs of the late Celestino Arbizo
75

and the area of Lot 1121 stated therein were different from the extrajudicial
settlement executed on June 1, 1981; that the discrepancies between the
two deeds of partition with respect to the area of Lot 1121 and the
respective share of the parties therein indicated that they never intended
that any of the deeds to be the final determination of the portions of Lot
1121 allotted to them; that the extrajudicial settlement-partition of August
17, 1981 could not effectively subdivide Lot 1121 because it partitioned only
29,845 square meters, and not its actual area of 127,298 square meters.
We see no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the respondent Court
as follows:[21]
The discrepancies between the extrajudicial settlements executed by plaintiff
Directo, defendant Noceda and Maria Arbizo on June 1, 1981 and August 17,
1981 only meant that the latter was intended to supersede the former. The
signature of defendant Noceda in the extrajudicial settlement of August 17,
1981 would show his conformity to the new apportionment of Lot 1121
among the heirs of the late Celestino Arbizo. The fact that defendant Noceda
occupied the portion allotted to him in the extrajudicial settlement, as well
as the donated portion of the share of plaintiff Directo, presupposes his
knowledge of the extent of boundaries of the portion of Lot 1121 allotted to
him. Moreover, the statement in the extrajudicial settlement of August 17,
1981 with respect to the area of Lot 1121, which was 29,845 square meters,
is not conclusive because it was found out, after the relocation survey was
conducted on Lot 1121, that the parties therein occupied an area larger than
what they were supposed to possess per the extrajudicial settlementpartition of August 17, 1981.
Although in the extrajudicial settlement dated August 17, 1981 the heirs
of Celestino Arbizo partitioned only a 29,845 square meter lot to conform
with the area declared under tax declaration 16-0032 yet the heirs were
each actually occupying a bigger portion the total area of which exceeded
29,845 square meters. This was confirmed by Geodetic Engineer Quejada in
his report submitted to the trial court where he stated among other things:
[22]

7. that upon computation of actual survey, it is informed (sic) that

the area dated (sic) as per extrajudicial settlement-partition in the

76

name of Celestino Arbizo was smaller than the computed lots of

their actual occupancy as per survey on the ground;
8. The Lot A, Lot B, and Lot C as appearing on prepared plan for
ready reference was subdivided, base (sic) on stated sharing as per
EXTRA JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT-PARTITION base (sic) on actual
occupancy.
The survey conducted on Lot 1121 was only a confirmation of the actual
areas being occupied by the heirs taking into account the percentage
proportion adjudicated to each heir on the basis of their August 17, 1981
extrajudicial settlement.
Petitioner further alleges that the said partition tries to vest in favor of a
third person, Maria Arbizo, a right over the said property notwithstanding the
absence of evidence establishing that she is an heir of the late Celestino
Arbizo since Maria Arbizo was never impleaded as a party in this case and
her interest over Lot 1121 was not established.
Such contention deserves scant consideration. We find no compelling
basis to disturb the finding of the trial court on this factual issue, as follows:
[23]

In effect, the defendant denies the allegation of the plaintiff that Maria
Arbizo was the third wife of Celestino Arbizo and Agripina is her half sister
with a common father. On this point, the Court believes the version of the
plaintiff. The Court observes that in the Extra-Judicial SettlementPartition(Exhibit C), Maria Arbizo is named one of the co-heirs of the
defendant, being the widow of his grandfather, Celestino Arbizo. The names
of Anacleto and Agripina do not also appear in the Extra-judicial Settlement
and Partition because according to the plaintiff, they had sold their shares to
Maria Arbizo. And the defendant is one of the signatories to the said Deed of
Extra-judicial Settlement-Partition acknowledged before Notary Public
Artemio Maranon. Under the circumstances, the Court is convinced that the
defendant knew that Maria Arbizo was the widow of Celestino Arbizo and he
knew of the sale of the share of Anacleto Arbizo his share, as well as that of
Agripina. When the defendant signed the Extra-Judicial Settlement, he was
already an adult since when he testified in 1989, he gave his age as 50
years old. So that in 1981, he was already 41 years old. If he did not know
77

all of these, the defendant would have not agreed to the sharing and signed
this document and acknowledged it before the Notary Public. And who could
have a better knowledge of the relationship of Agripina and Maria Arbizo to
Celestino Arbizo than the latters daughter? Besides, at the time of the
execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement-Partition by the plaintiff and
defendant, they were still in good terms. There was no reason for the
plaintiff to favor Maria Arbizo and Agripina Arbizo over the
defendant. Furthermore, the defendant had failed to support his allegation
that when his grandfather died he had no wife and child.
We likewise find unmeritorious petitioners claim that there exist no
factual and legal basis for the adjudication of Lot C of Lot 1121 to private
respondent Aurora Directo. It bears stress that the relocation survey plan
prepared by Geodetic Engineer Quejada was based on the extrajudicial
settlement dated August 17, 1981, and the actual possession by the parties
and the technical description of Lot 1121. It was established by the survey
plan that based on the actual possession of the parties, and the extrajudicial
settlement among the heirs the portion denominated as Lot C of Lot 1121 of
the survey plan was being occupied by private respondent Aurora Directo
and it was also shown that it is in Lot C where the 625 square meter area
donated by private respondent Directo to petitioner is located. There is no
obstacle to adjudicate Lot C to private respondent as her rightful share
allotted to her in the extrajudicial settlement.
Petitioner argues that he did not usurp the property of respondent
Directo since, to date, the metes and bounds of the parcel of land left by
their predecessor in interest, Celestino Arbizo, are still undetermined since
no final determination as to the exact areas properly pertaining to the
parties herein; hence they are still considered as co-owners thereof.
We do not agree.
In this case the source of co-ownership among the heirs was intestate
succession. Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the
decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs subject to
the payment of debts of the deceased. [24] Partition, in general, is the
separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those
to whom it may belong.[25] The purpose of partition is to put an end to coownership. It seeks a severance of the individual interest of each co-owner,
78

vesting in each a sole estate in specific property and giving to each one a
right to enjoy his estate without supervision or interference from the other.
[26]
And one way of effecting a partition of the decedents estate is by the
heirs themselves extrajudicially. The heirs of the late Celestino Arbizo
namely Maria Arbizo, Aurora A. Directo (private respondent) and Rodolfo
Noceda (petitioner) entered into an extrajudicial settlement of the estate on
August 17, 1981 and agreed to adjudicate among themselves the property
left by their predecessor-in-interest in the following manner:
To Rodolfo Noceda goes the northern one-fifth (1/5) portion containing an
area of 5,989 sq. meters;
To Maria Arbizo goes the middle three-fifths (3/5) portion;
and To Aurora Arbizo goes the southern one-fifth (1/5) portion. [27]
In the survey plan submitted by Engineer Quejada, the portions indicated by
red lines and numbered alphabetically were based on the percentage
proportion in the extrajudicial settlement and the actual occupancy of each
heir which resulted to these divisions as follows: [28]
Lot A; the area is 2,957 sq.m.- goes to Rodolfo A. Noceda (1/5)
Lot B; 38,872 sq.m Maria Arbizo (3/5)
Lot C 12,957 sq.m. Aurora Arbizo (1/5)
Thus, the areas allotted to each heir are now specifically delineated in the
survey plan. There is no co-ownership where portion owned is concretely
determined and identifiable, though not technically described, or that said
portions are still embraced in one and the same certificate of title does not
make said portions less determinable or identifiable, or distinguishable, one
from the other, nor that dominion over each portion less exclusive, in their
respective owners.[29] A partition legally made confers upon each heir the
exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him. [30]
We also find unmeritorious petitioners argument that since there was no
effective and real partition of the subject lot there exists no basis for the
charge of usurpation and hence there is also no basis for finding ingratitude
against him. It was established that petitioner Noceda occupied not only the
79

portion donated to him by private respondent Aurora Arbizo-Directo but he

also fenced the whole area of Lot C which belongs to private respondent
Directo, thus petitioners act of occupying the portion pertaining to private
respondent Directo without the latters knowledge and consent is an act of
usurpation which is an offense against the property of the donor and
considered as an act of ingratitude of a donee against the donor.[31] The law
does not require conviction of the donee; it is enough that the offense be
proved in the action for revocation.[32]
Finally, petitioner contends that granting revocation is proper, the right to
enforce the same had already prescribed since as admitted by private
respondent, petitioner usurped her property in the first week of September
1985 while the complaint for revocation was filed on September 16, 1986,
thus more than one (1) year had passed from the alleged usurpation by
petitioner of private respondents share in Lot 1121. We are not
persuaded. The respondent Court rejected such argument in this wise:
Article 769 of the New Civil Code states that: The action granted to the
donor by reason of ingratitude cannot be renounced in advance. This action
prescribes within one year to be counted from the time the donor had
knowledge of the fact and it was possible for him to bring the action. As
expressly stated, the donor must file the action to revoke his donation within
one year from the time he had knowledge of the ingratitude of the
donee. Also, it must be shown that it was possible for the donor to institute
the said action within the same period. The concurrence of these two
requisites must be shown by defendant Noceda in order to bar the present
action. Defendant Noceda failed to do so. He reckoned the one year
prescriptive period from the occurrence of the usurpation of the property of
plaintiff Directo in the first week of September, 1985, and not from the time
the latter had the knowledge of the usurpation. Moreover, defendant Noceda
failed to prove that at the time plaintiff Directo acquired knowledge of his
usurpation, it was possible for plaintiff Directo to institute an action for
revocation of her donation.
The action to revoke by reason of ingratitude prescribes within one (1)
year to be counted from the time (a) the donor had knowledge of the fact;
(b) provided that it was possible for him to bring the action. It is incumbent
upon petitioner to show proof of the concurrence of these two conditions in
order that the one (1) year period for bringing the action be considered to
80

have already prescribed. No competent proof was adduced by petitioner to

prove his allegation. In Civil Cases, the party having the burden of proof
must establish his case by preponderance of evidence. [33]He who alleges a
fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence. [34]
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, supported by substantial
evidence on record are final and conclusive on the parties and carry even
more weight when the Court of Appeals affirms the factual findings of the
trial court;[35] for it is not the function of this Court to re-examine all over
again the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties unless
the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are not supported by the
evidence on record or the judgment is based on the misapprehension of
facts.[36] The jurisdiction of this court is thus limited to reviewing errors of
law unless there is a showing that the findings complained of are totally
devoid of support in the record or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to
constitute serious abuse of discretion. [37] We find no such showing in this
case.
We find that both the trial court and the respondent Court had carefully
considered the questions of fact raised below and the respondent Courts
conclusions are based on the evidence on record. No cogent reason exists
for disturbing such findings. [38] We also note that petitioner in this petition
merely rehashed the same issues and arguments raised in the respondent
Court in whose decision we find no reversible error. Clearly, petitioner failed
to present any substantial argument to justify a reversal of the assailed
decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED. Costs against
appellant.
SO ORDERED.

81

Art. 1079
Teves vs ca ----Seraspi vs ca
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 135602. April 28, 2000]
HEIRS
OF
QUIRICO
SERASPI
AND
PURIFICACION
R.
SERASPI, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
AND
SIMEON
RECASA, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.: olanski
This case is here for review of the decision [1] of the Court of Appeals, dated
May 15, 1998, reversing the decision of Branch 1 of the Regional Trial Court,
Kalibo, Aklan and dismissing, on the ground of prescription, the complaint
filed by petitioners for the recovery of possession and ownership of two
parcels of land in Banga, Aklan.
The facts are as follows:
Marcelino Recasa was the owner of two parcels of land described as follows:
PARCEL I: A parcel of cocal land located at Barangay Lapnag,
Banga, Aklan, with an area of 770 square meters, more or less;
bounded North by Lazaro Navarra, now Flocerfina Ibit; South by
Celsa Retis; East by Banga-Libacao Provincial Road; and West by
Aklan River, which parcel of land declared in the name of
Marcelino Recasa under Tax Declaration No. 3721, Series of
1984, with an assessed value of P2,440.00;
PARCEL II: A parcel of cocal land with an area of 3,648 square
meters, more or less, located in Barangay Lapnag, Banga, Aklan;
bounded North by Concepcion Navarra; South by Diosdado
Navarra; East by Gabriel Reloj; and West by National Road;
covered by Tax Declaration No. 11079 in the name of Purificacion
82

Seraspi, Series of 1984, and having an assessed value of

P1,650.00.
During his lifetime, Marcelino contracted three (3) marriages. At the time of
his death in 1943, he had fifteen (15) children from his three marriages. In
1948, his intestate estate was partitioned into three parts by his heirs, each
part corresponding to the share of the heirs in each marriage.
In the same year, Patronicio Recasa, representing the heirs of the first
marriage, sold the share of the heirs in the estate to Dominador Recasa, an
heir of the second marriage. On June 15, 1950, Dominador, representing the
heirs of the second marriage, in turn sold the share of the heirs to Quirico
and Purificacion Seraspi whose heirs are the present petitioners. Included in
this sale was the property sold by Patronicio to Dominador. Sdaad
In 1958, the Seraspis obtained a loan from the Kalibo Rural Bank, Inc.
(KRBI) on the security of the lands in question to finance improvements on
the lands. However, they failed to pay the loan for which reason the
mortgage was foreclosed and the lands were sold to KRBI as the highest
bidder. Subsequently, the lands were sold by KRBI to Manuel Rata, brotherin-law of Quirico Seraspi. It appears that Rata, as owner of the property,
allowed Quirico Seraspi to administer the property.
In 1974, private respondent Simeon Recasa, Marcelinos child by his third
wife, taking advantage of the illness of Quirico Seraspi, who had been
paralyzed due to a stroke, forcibly entered the lands in question and took
possession thereof.
In 1983, the Seraspis purchased the lands from Manuel Rata and afterwards
filed a complaint against Simeon Recasa for recovery of possession of the
lands.
The trial court ruled in favor of the Seraspis, stating that they had acquired
the property through a sale and acquisitive prescription. However, on appeal,
the Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the action of the Seraspis
was barred by the statute of limitations. Hence, this petition filed by Quirico
Seraspi who, in the meantime, had passed away and was thus substituted by
his heirs.

83

Two issues are presented: (1) whether petitioners action is barred by

extinctive prescription; and (2) whether private respondent Simeon Recasa
acquired ownership of the properties in question through acquisitive
prescription.
We rule for petitioners.
The Court of Appeals, while ruling that petitioners were able to establish the
identity of the property as well as the credibility of their title the elements
required to prove ones claim for recovery of property [2] nonetheless held that
the action was barred by prescription. Citing Arradaza v. Court of Appeals,
[3]
it held that an action for recovery of title or possession of real property or
an interest therein can only be brought within ten (10) years after the cause
of action has accrued. Since the action for recovery of possession and
ownership was filed by petitioners only on April 12, 1987, i.e., thirteen (13)
years after their predecessor-in-interest had been allegedly deprived of the
possession of the property by private respondent, it was held that the action
had prescribed. Scsdaad
Arradaza involves acquisitive, not extinctive, prescription. What is more, the
facts in that case arose before the effectivity of the Civil Code. Accordingly,
what was applied was 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides that
title by prescription is acquired after ten (10) years, in whatever manner
possession may have been commenced or continued, and regardless of good
faith or with just title. On the other hand, what is involved here is extinctive
prescription, and the applicable law is Art. 1141 of the Civil Code which
provides:
Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years.
This provision is without prejudice to what is established for the
acquisition of ownership and other real rights by prescription.
The question, therefore, is whether private respondent has acquired the
ownership of the two lands by prescription. On this point, the Civil Code
provides:
Art. 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real
rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.
84

Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in

good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law.
Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable
property are acquired by ordinary prescription through
possession of ten years.
Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also
prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for
thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.
Thus, acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be
ordinary or extraordinary, depending on whether the property is possessed
in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law. [4] Private
respondent contends that he acquired the ownership of the questioned
property by ordinary prescription through adverse possession for ten (10)
years.
The contention has no merit, because he has neither just title nor good faith.
As Art. 1129 provides: Supremax
For the purposes of prescription, there is just title when the
adverse claimant came into possession of the property through
one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of
ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the
owner or could not transmit any right.
In the case at bar, private respondent did not acquire possession of the
property through any of the modes recognized by the Civil Code, to wit: (1)
occupation, (2) intellectual creation, (3) law, (4) donation, (5) succession,
(6) tradition in consequence of certain contracts, and (7) prescription. [5]
Private respondent could not have acquired ownership over the property
through occupation since, under Art. 714 of the Civil Code, the ownership of
a piece of land cannot be acquired by occupation. Nor can he base his
ownership on succession for the property was not part of those distributed to
the heirs of the third marriage, to which private respondent belongs. It must
be remembered that in the partition of the intestate estate of Marcelino
Recasa, the properties were divided into three parts, each part being
85

reserved for each group of heirs belonging to one of the three marriages
Marcelino entered into. Since the contested parcels of land were adjudicated
to the heirs of the first and second marriages, it follows that private
respondent, as heir of the third marriage, has no right over the parcels of
land. While, as heir to the intestate estate of his father, private respondent
was co-owner of all of his fathers properties, such co-ownership rights were
effectively dissolved by the partition agreed upon by the heirs of Marcelino
Recasa.
Neither can private respondent claim good faith in his favor. Good faith
consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom the possessor
received the thing was its owner but could not transmit the ownership
thereof.[6] Private respondent entered the property without the consent of
the previous owner. For all intents and purposes, he is a mere
usurper. Jurissc
Like private respondent, petitioners have not acquired the property through
any of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership. The
basis of petitioners claim of ownership is the contract of sale they had with
Rata, but this by itself is insufficient to make them owners of the property.
For while a contract of sale is perfected by the meeting of minds upon the
thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price, [7] the ownership
of the thing sold is not transferred to the vendee until actual or constructive
delivery of the property.[8] Hence, the maxim non nudis pactis, sed traditione
dominia dominica rerum transferuntur (not mere agreements but tradition
transfers the ownership of things).
Consequently, petitioners are not the owners of the property since it has not
been delivered to them. At the time they bought the property from Rata in
1983, the property was in the possession of private respondent.
However, this does not give private respondent a right to remain in
possession of the property. Petitioners title to the property prevails over
private respondents possession in fact but without basis in law. As held
in Waite v. Peterson,[9] when the property belonging to a person is unlawfully
taken by another, the former has the right of action against the latter for the
recovery of the property. Such right may be transferred by the sale or
assignment of the property, and the transferee can maintain such action
against the wrongdoer.
86

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby

REVERSED, and private respondent Simeon Recasa is ordered to return the
possession of the contested parcels of land to petitioners as heirs of Quirico
and Purificacion Seraspi.
SO ORDERED.

Art. 1080
Zaragoza vs ca ----JLT agro vs balansag

[G.R. No. 141882. March 11, 2005]

J.L.T.

AGRO, INC., represented by its Manager, JULIAN L.

TEVES, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO BALANSAG and HILARIA
CADAYDAY, respondents.

DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Once again, the Court is faced with the perennial conflict of property
claims between two sets of heirs, a conflict ironically made grievous by the
fact that the decedent in this case had resorted to great lengths to allocate
which properties should go to which set of heirs.
This is a Rule 45 petition assailing the Decision[1] dated 30 September
1999 of the Court of Appeals which reversed the Decision[2] dated 7 May
1993 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 45, of Bais City, Negros
Oriental.
The factual antecedents follow.
Don Julian L. Teves (Don Julian) contracted two marriages, first with
Antonia Baena (Antonia), and after her death, with Milagros Donio Teves
(Milagros Donio). Don Julian had two children with Antonia, namely: Josefa
Teves Escao (Josefa) and Emilio Teves (Emilio). He had also four (4) children
with Milagros Donio, namely: Maria Evelyn Donio Teves (Maria Evelyn), Jose
87

Catalino Donio Teves (Jose Catalino), Milagros Reyes Teves (Milagros Reyes)
and Pedro Reyes Teves (Pedro).[3]
The present controversy involves a parcel of land covering nine hundred
and fifty-four (954) square meters, known as Lot No. 63 of the Bais
Cadastre, which was originally registered in the name of the conjugal
partnership of Don Julian and Antonia under Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 5203 of the Registry of Deeds of Bais City. When Antonia died, the
land was among the properties involved in an action for partition and
damages docketed as Civil Case No. 3443 entitled Josefa Teves Escao v.
Julian Teves, Emilio B. Teves, et al.[4] Milagros Donio, the second wife of Don
Julian, participated as an intervenor. Thereafter, the parties to the case
entered into a Compromise Agreement[5] which embodied the partition of all
the properties of Don Julian.
On the basis of the compromise agreement and approving the same, the
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Negros Oriental, 12 th Judicial District,
rendered a Decision[6] dated 31 January 1964. The CFI decision declared a
tract of land known as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa as property owned in
common by Don Julian and his two (2) children of the first marriage. The
property was to remain undivided during the lifetime of Don Julian. [7] Josefa
and Emilio likewise were given other properties at Bais, including the electric
plant, the movie property, the commercial areas, and the house where Don
Julian was living. The remainder of the properties was retained by Don
Julian, including Lot No. 63.
Paragraph 13 of the Compromise Agreement, at the heart of the present
dispute, lays down the effect of the eventual death of Don Julian vis--vis his
heirs:
13. That in the event of death of Julian L. Teves, the properties hereinafter
adjudicated to Josefa Teves Escao and Emilio B. Teves, (excluding the
properties comprised as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa together with all its
accessories and accessions) shall be understood as including not only their
one-half share which they inherited from their mother but also the legitimes
and other successional rights which would correspond to them of the other
half belonging to their father, Julian L. Teves. In other words, the
properties now selected and adjudicated to Julian L. Teves (not
including his share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa) shall
exclusively be adjudicated to the wife in second marriage of Julian L.
Teves and his four minor children, namely, Milagros Donio Teves, his two
acknowledged natural children Milagros Reyes Teves and Pedro Reyes Teves
and his two legitimated children Maria Evelyn Donio Teves and Jose Catalino
Donio Teves. (Emphasis supplied)

88

On 16 November 1972, Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed a Deed of

Assignment of Assets with Assumption of Liabilities [8] in favor of J.L.T. Agro,
Inc. (petitioner). Less than a year later, Don Julian, Josefa and Emilio also
executed an instrument entitledSupplemental to the Deed of Assignment of
Assets with the Assumption of Liabilities (Supplemental Deed) [9] dated 31
July 1973. This instrument which constitutes a supplement to the earlier
deed of assignment transferred ownership over Lot No. 63, among other
properties, in favor of petitioner.[10] On 14 April 1974, Don Julian died
intestate.
On the strength of the Supplemental Deed in its favor, petitioner sought
the registration of the subject lot in its name. A court, so it appeared, issued
an order[11] cancelling OCT No. 5203 in the name of spouses Don Julian and
Antonia on 12 November 1979, and on the same date TCT No. T-375 was
issued in the name of petitioner.[12] Since then, petitioner has been paying
taxes assessed on the subject lot.[13]
Meanwhile, Milagros Donio and her children had immediately taken
possession over the subject lot after the execution of the Compromise
Agreement. In 1974, they entered into a yearly lease agreement with
spouses Antonio Balansag and Hilaria Cadayday, respondents herein. [14] On
Lot No. 63, respondents temporarily established their home and constructed
a lumber yard. Subsequently, Milagros Donio and her children executed
a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate [15] dated 18 March 1980. In
the deed of partition, Lot No. 63 was allotted to Milagros Donio and her two
(2) children, Maria Evelyn and Jose Catalino. Unaware that the subject lot
was already registered in the name of petitioner in 1979, respondents
bought Lot No. 63 from Milagros Donio as evidenced by the Deed of
Absolute Sale of Real Estate[16] dated 9 November 1983.
At the Register of Deeds while trying to register the deed of absolute
sale, respondents discovered that the lot was already titled in the name of
petitioner. Thus, they failed to register the deed.[17]
Respondents, as vendees of Lot No. 63, filed a complaint before the RTC
Branch 45 of Bais City, seeking the declaration of nullity and cancellation of
TCT No. T-375 in the name of petitioner and the transfer of the title to Lot
No. 63 in their names, plus damages.[18]
After hearing, the trial court dismissed the complaint
respondents. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

filed

by

WHEREFORE, premises considered, by preponderance of evidence, this Court

finds judgment in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff, and thus
hereby orders:
(1) That complaint be dismissed;
89

(2) That plaintiffs vacate the subject land, particularly identified as

Lot No. 63 registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T375;
(3) That plaintiffs pay costs.
Finding no basis on the counterclaim by defendant, the same is hereby
ordered dismissed.[19]
The trial court ruled that the resolution of the case specifically hinged on
the interpretation of paragraph 13 of the Compromise Agreement.[20] It
added that the direct adjudication of the properties listed in the Compromise
Agreement was only in favor of Don Julian and his two children by the first
marriage, Josefa and Emilio.[21] Paragraph 13 served only as an amplification
of the terms of the adjudication in favor of Don Julian and his two children
by the first marriage.
According to the trial court, the properties adjudicated in favor of Josefa
and Emilio comprised their shares in the estate of their deceased mother
Antonia, as well as their potential share in the estate of Don Julian upon the
latters death. Thus, upon Don Julians death, Josefa and Emilio could not
claim any share in his estate, except their proper share in the Hacienda
Medalla Milagrosa which was adjudicated in favor of Don Julian in
the Compromise Agreement. As such, the properties adjudicated in favor of
Don Julian, except Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa, were free from the forced
legitimary rights of Josefa and Emilio, and Don Julian was under no
impediment to allocate the subject lot, among his other properties, to
Milagros Donio and her four (4) children.[22]
The trial court further stressed that with the use of the words shall be,
the adjudication in favor of Milagros Donio and her four (4) children was not
final and operative, as the lot was still subject to future disposition by Don
Julian during his lifetime.[23] It cited paragraph 14[24] of the Compromise
Agreement in support of his conclusion.[25] With Lot No. 63 being the
conjugal property of Don Julian and Antonia, the trial court also declared
that Milagros Donio and her children had no hereditary rights thereto except
as to the conjugal share of Don Julian, which they could claim only upon the
death of the latter.[26]
The trial court ruled that at the time of Don Julians death on 14 April
1974, Lot No. 63 was no longer a part of his estate since he had earlier
assigned it to petitioner on 31 July 1973. Consequently, the lot could not be
a proper subject of extrajudicial partition by Milagros Donio and her children,
and not being the owners they could not have sold it. Had respondents
exercised prudence before buying the subject lot by investigating the
registration of the same with the Registry of Deeds, they would have
90

discovered that five (5) years earlier, OCT No. 5203 had already been
cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T-375 in the name of petitioner, the trial
court added.[27]
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the trial courts decision. The
decretal part of the appellate decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered declaring the Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-375 registered in the name of J.L.T. Agro, Inc. as
null and void.
With costs against defendant J.L.T. Agro, Inc. represented by its Manager,
Julian L. Teves.
SO ORDERED.[28]
Per the appellate court, the Compromise Agreement incorporated in CFI
decision dated 31 January 1964, particularly paragraph 13 thereof,
determined, adjudicated and reserved to Don Julians two sets of heirs their
future legitimes in his estate except as regards his (Don Julians) share in
Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa.[29] The two sets of heirs acquired full ownership
and possession of the properties respectively adjudicated to them in the CFI
decision and Don Julian himself could no longer dispose of the same,
including Lot No. 63. The disposition in the CFI decision constitutes res
judicata.[30] Don Julian could have disposed of only his conjugal share in the
Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa.[31]
The appellate court likewise emphasized that nobody in his right
judgment would preterit his legal heirs by simply executing a document like
the Supplemental Deed which practically covers all properties which Don
Julian had reserved in favor of his heirs from the second marriage. It also
found out that the blanks reserved for the Book No. and Page No. at the
upper right corner of TCT No. T-375, to identify the exact location where the
said title was registered or transferred, were not filled up, thereby indicating
that the TCT is spurious and of dubious origin. [32]
Aggrieved by the appellate courts decision, petitioner elevated it to this
Court via a petition for review on certiorari, raising pure questions of law.
Before this Court, petitioner assigns as errors the following rulings of the
appellate court, to wit: (a) that future legitime can be determined,
adjudicated and reserved prior to the death of Don Julian; (b) that Don
Julian had no right to dispose of or assign Lot No. 63 to petitioner because
he reserved the same for his heirs from the second marriage pursuant to
the Compromise
Agreement;
(c)
that
the Supplemental
Deed was
91

tantamount to a preterition of his heirs from the second marriage; and (d)
that TCT No. T-375 in the name of petitioner is spurious for not containing
entries on the Book No. and Page No.[33]
While most of petitioners legal arguments have merit, the application of
the appropriate provisions of law to the facts borne out by the evidence on
record nonetheless warrants the affirmance of the result reached by the
Court of Appeals in favor of respondents.
Being the key adjudicative provision, paragraph 13 of the Compromise
Agreement has to be quoted again:
13. That in the event of death of Julian L. Teves, the properties herein
adjudicated to Josefa Teves Escao and Emilio B. Teves, (excluding the
properties comprised as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa together with all its
accessories and accessions) shall be understood as including not only their
one-half share which they inherited from their mother but also the legitimes
and other successional rights which would correspond to them of the other
half belonging to their father, Julian L.Teves. In other words, the
properties now selected and adjudicated to Julian L. Teves (not
including his share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa) shall
exclusively be adjudicated to the wife in second marriage of Julian L.
Teves and his four minor children, namely, Milagros Donio Teves, his
two acknowledged natural children Milagros Reyes Teves and Pedro
Reyes Teves and his two legitimated children Maria Evelyn Donio
Teves and Jose Catalino Donio Teves. (Emphasis supplied)
With the quoted paragraph as basis, the Court of Appeals ruled that the
adjudication in favor of the heirs of Don Julian from the second marriage
became automatically operative upon the approval of the Compromise
Agreement, thereby vesting on them the right to validly dispose of Lot No.
63 in favor of respondents.
Petitioner argues that the appellate court erred in holding that future
legitime can be determined, adjudicated and reserved prior to the death of
Don Julian. The Court agrees. Our declaration in Blas v. Santos[34] is
relevant, where we defined future inheritance as any property or right not
in existence or capable of determination at the time of the
contract, that a person may in the future acquire by succession. Article
1347 of the New Civil Code explicitly provides:
ART. 1347. All things which are not outside the commerce of men, including
future things, may be the object of a contract. All rights which are not
intransmissible may also be the object of contracts.

92

No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in

cases expressly authorized by law.
All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy may likewise be the object of a contract.
Well-entrenched is the rule that all things, even future ones, which are
not outside the commerce of man may be the object of a contract. The
exception is that no contract may be entered into with respect to future
inheritance, and the exception to the exception is the partition inter
vivos referred to in Article 1080.[35]
For the inheritance to be considered future, the succession must not
have been opened at the time of the contract. [36] A contract may be classified
as a contract upon future inheritance, prohibited under the second
paragraph of Article 1347, where the following requisites concur:
(1) That the succession has not yet been opened;
(2) That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and
(3) That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a
right which is purely hereditary in nature.[37]
The first paragraph of Article 1080, which provides the exception to the
exception and therefore aligns with the general rule on future things, reads:
ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter
vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not
prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.
....
In interpreting this provision, Justice Edgardo Paras advanced the opinion
that if the partition is made by an act inter vivos, no formalities are
prescribed by the Article.[38] The partition will of course be effective
only after death. It does not necessarily require the formalities of a will for
after all it is not the partition that is the mode of acquiring ownership.
Neither will the formalities of a donation be required since donation will not
be the mode of acquiring the ownership here after death; since no will has
been made it follows that the mode will be succession (intestate succession).
Besides, the partition here is merely the physical determination of the part
to be given to each heir.[39]
The historical antecedent of Article 1080 of the New Civil Code is Article
1056[40] of the old Civil Code. The only change in the provision is that Article
1080 now permits any person (not a testator, as under the old law) to
93

partition his estate by act inter vivos. This was intended to abrogate the
then prevailing doctrine that for a testator to partition his estate by an
act inter vivos, he must first make a will with all the formalities provided by
law.[41]
Article 1056 of the old Civil Code (now Article 1080) authorizes a testator
to partition inter vivos his property, and distribute them among his heirs,
and this partition is neither a donation nor a testament, but an instrument
of a special character, sui generis,which is revocable at any time by
the causante during his lifetime, and does not operate as a
conveyance of title until his death. It derives its binding force on the
heirs from the respect due to the will of the owner of the property, limited
only by his creditors and the intangibility of the legitime of the forced heirs.
[42]

The partition inter vivos of the properties of Don Julian is undoubtedly

valid pursuant to Article 1347. However, considering that it would become
legally operative only upon the death of Don Julian, the right of his heirs
from the second marriage to the properties adjudicated to him under the
compromise agreement was but a mere expectancy. It was a bare hope of
succession to the property of their father. Being the prospect of a future
acquisition, the interest by its nature was inchoate. It had no attribute of
property, and the interest to which it related was at the time nonexistent and
might never exist.[43]
Evidently, at the time of the execution of the deed of assignment
covering Lot No. 63 in favor of petitioner, Don Julian remained the owner of
the property since ownership over the subject lot would only pass to his
heirs from the second marriage at the time of his death. Thus, as the owner
of the subject lot, Don Julian retained the absolute right to dispose of it
during his lifetime. His right cannot be challenged by Milagros Donio and her
children on the ground that it had already been adjudicated to them by
virtue of the compromise agreement.
Emerging as the crucial question in this case is whether Don Julian had
validly transferred ownership of the subject lot during his lifetime. The lower
court ruled that he had done so through the Supplemental Deed. The
appellate court disagreed, holding that theSupplemental Deed is not valid,
containing as it does a prohibited preterition of Don Julians heirs from the
second marriage. Petitioner contends that the ruling of the Court of Appeals
is erroneous. The contention is well-founded.
Article 854 provides that the preterition or omission of one, some, or all
of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the
institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they
94

are not inofficious. Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the heir in
the will, either by not naming him at all or, while mentioning him as father,
son, etc., by not instituting him as heir without disinheriting him expressly,
nor assigning to him some part of the properties. [44] It is the total omission
of a compulsory heir in the direct line from inheritance. [45] It consists in the
silence of the testator with regard to a compulsory heir, omitting him in
the testament, either by not mentioning him at all, or by not giving him
anything in the hereditary property but without expressly disinheriting him,
even if he is mentioned in the will in the latter case. [46] But there is no
preterition where the testator allotted to a descendant a share less than the
legitime, since there was no total omission of a forced heir.[47]
In the case at bar, Don Julian did not execute a will since what he
resorted to was a partition inter vivos of his properties, as evidenced by the
court approved Compromise Agreement. Thus, it is premature if not
irrelevant to speak of preterition prior to the death of Don Julian in the
absence of a will depriving a legal heir of his legitime. Besides, there are
other properties which the heirs from the second marriage could inherit from
Don Julian upon his death. A couple of provisions in the Compromise
Agreement are indicative of Don Julians desire along this line. [48] Hence, the
total omission from inheritance of Don Julians heirs from the second
marriage, a requirement for preterition to exist, is hardly imaginable as it is
unfounded.
Despite the debunking of respondents argument on preterition, still the
petition would ultimately rise or fall on whether there was a valid transfer
effected by Don Julian to petitioner. Notably, Don Julian was also the
president and director of petitioner, and his daughter from the first marriage,
Josefa, was the treasurer thereof. There is of course no legal prohibition
against such a transfer to a family corporation. Yet close scrutiny is in order,
especially considering that such transfer would remove Lot No. 63 from the
estate from which Milagros and her children could inherit. Both the alleged
transfer deed and the title which necessarily must have emanated from it
have to be subjected to incisive and detailed examination.
Well-settled, of course, is the rule that a certificate of title serves as
evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose
name appears therein.[49] A certificate of title accumulates in one document a
precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its
owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and
shows exactly the real interest of its owner.[50]
To successfully assail the juristic value of what a Torrens title establishes,
a sufficient and convincing quantum of evidence on the defect of the title
must be adduced to overcome the predisposition in law in favor of a holder
of a Torrens title. Thus, contrary to the appellate courts ruling, the
95

appearance of a mere thumbmark of Don Julian instead of his signature in

the Supplemental Deed would not affect the validity of petitioners title for
this Court has ruled that a thumbmark is a recognized mode of signature. [51]
The truth, however, is that the replacement of OCT No. 5203 in the name
of Julian by T.C.T. No. T-375 is marred by a grave irregularity which is also
an illegality, as it contravenes the orthodox, conventional and normal
process established by law. And, worse still, the illegality is reflected on the
face of both titles. Where, as in this case, the transferee relies on a
voluntary instrument to secure the issuance of a new title in his name such
instrument has to be presented to the Registry of Deeds. This is evident
from Sections 53 and 57 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 or
the Property Registration Decree. The sections read, thus:
SEC. 53. Presentation of owners duplicate upon entry of new certificate.
No voluntary instrument shall be registered by the Register of Deeds
unless the owners duplicate certificate is presented with such
instrument, except in cases expressly provided for in this Decree or upon
order of the court, for cause shown. (Emphasis supplied)
....
SEC. 57. Procedure in registration of conveyances. An owner desiring to
convey his registered land in fee simple shall execute and register a deed of
conveyance in a form sufficient in law. The Register of Deeds shall
thereafter make out in the registration book a new certificate of title to the
grantee and shall prepare and deliver to him an owners duplicate certificate.
The Register of Deeds shall note upon the original and duplicate certificate
the date of transfer, the volume and page of the registration book in which
the new certificate is registered and a reference by number to the last
preceding certificate. The original and the owners duplicate of the grantors
certificate shall be stamped cancelled. The deed of conveyance shall be
filed and endorsed with the number and the place of registration of
the certificate of title of the land conveyed. (Emphasis supplied)
As petitioner bases its right to the subject lot on the Supplemental
Deed, it should have presented it to the Register of Deeds to secure the
transfer of the title in its name. Apparently, it had not done so. There is
nothing on OCT No. 5203 or on the succeeding TCT No. T-375 either which
shows that it had presented the Supplemental Deed. In fact, there is
absolutely no mention of a reference to said document in the original and
transfer certificates of title. It is in this regard that the finding of the Court of
Appeals concerning the absence of entries on the blanks intended for the
Book No. and Page No. gains significant relevance. Indeed, this aspect
fortifies the conclusion that the cancellation of OCT No. 5203 and the
96

consequent issuance of TCT No. T-375 in its place are not predicated on a
valid transaction.
What appears instead on OCT No. 5203 is the following pertinent entry:
Entry No. 1374: Kind: Order: Executed in favor of J.L.T. AGRO, INC.
CONDITIONS: Lost owners duplicate is hereby cancelled, and null and
void and a new Certificate of Title No. 375 is issued per Order of the
Court of First Instance on file in this office.
Date of Instrument: November 12, 1979
Date of Inscription: Nov. 12, 1979 4:00 P.M.
(SGD) MANUEL C. MONTESA
Acting Deputy Register of Deeds II
(Emphasis supplied)[52]
What the entry indicates is that the owners duplicate of OCT No. 5203
was lost, a petition for the reconstitution of the said owners duplicate was
filed in court, and the court issued an order for the reconstitution of the
owners duplicate and its replacement with a new one. But if the entry is to
be believed, the court concerned (CFI, according to the entry) issued an
order for the issuance of a new title which is TCT No. T-375 although the
original of OCT No. 5203 on file with the Registry of Deeds had not been
lost.
Going by the legal, accepted and normal process, the reconstitution court
may order the reconstitution and replacement of the lost title only, nothing
else. Since what was lost is the owners copy of OCT No. 5203, only that
owners copy could be ordered replaced. Thus, the Register of Deeds
exceeded his authority in issuing not just a reconstituted owners copy of the
original certificate of title but a new transfer certificate of title in place of the
original certificate of title. But if the court order, as the entry intimates,
directed the issuance of a new transfer certificate of titleeven designating
the very number of the new transfer certificate of title itselfthe order would
be patently unlawful. A court cannot legally order the cancellation and
replacement of the original of the O.C.T. which has not been lost, [53] as the
petition for reconstitution is premised on the loss merely of the owners
duplicate of the OCT
Apparently, petitioner had resorted to the court order as a convenient
contrivance to effect the transfer of title to the subject lot in its name,
instead of the Supplemental Deed which should be its proper course of
action. It was so constrained to do because theSupplemental Deed does not
constitute a deed of conveyance of the registered land in fee simple in a
form sufficient in law, as required by Section 57 of P.D. No. 1529.
97

A plain reading of the pertinent provisions of the Supplemental

Deed discloses that the assignment is not supported by any consideration.
The provision reads:
....
WHEREAS, in the Deed of Assignment of Assets with the Assumption of
Liabilities executed by Julian L. Teves, Emilio B. Teves and Josefa T. Escao at
Dumaguete City on 16th day of November 1972 and ratified in the City of
Dumaguete before Notary Public Lenin Victoriano, and entered in the latters
notarial register as Doc. No. 367; Page No. 17; Book No. V; series of 1972,
Julian L. Teves, Emilio B. Teves and Josefa T. Escao, transferred, conveyed
and assigned unto J.L.T. AGRO, INC., all its assets and liabilities as reflected
in the Balance Sheet of the former as of December 31, 1971.
WHEREAS, on the compromise agreement, as mentioned in the Decision
made in the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, 12 th Judicial District
Branch II, on Dec. 31, 1964 pertaining to Civil Case No. 3443 the following
properties were adjudicated to Don Julian L. Teves. We quote.
From the properties at Bais
Adjudicated to Don Julian L.Teves
....
Lot No. 63, Tax Dec. No. 33, Certificate of Title No. 5203, together with all
improvements. Assessed value - P2,720.00
....
WHEREAS, this Deed of Assignment is executed by the parties herein in
order to effect the registration of the transfer of the above corporation.
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the above premises the
ASSIGNOR hereby transfers, conveys, and assigns unto J.L.T. AGRO, INC.,
the above described parcel of land[s] with a fair market value of
EIGHTY-FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P84,000.00), Philippine Currency,
and which transfer, conveyance and assignment shall become absolute upon
signing.[54] (Emphasis supplied)
The amount of P84,000.00 adverted to in the dispositive portion of the
instrument does not represent the consideration for the assignment made by
Don Julian. Rather, it is a mere statement of the fair market value of all the
nineteen (19) properties enumerated in the instrument, of which Lot No. 63
98

is just one, that were transferred by Don Julian in favor of petitioner.

Consequently, the testimony[55] of petitioners accountant that the assignment
is supported by consideration cannot prevail over the clear provision to the
contrary in the Supplemental Deed.
The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, apparently considered the 1948
mortgage which is annotated on the back of the TCT No. T-375 as the
consideration for the assignment.[56] However, the said annotation[57] shows
that the mortgage was actually executed in favor of Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation, not of petitioner.[58] Clearly, said mortgage, executed as it was
in favor of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation and there being no
showing that petitioner itself paid off the mortgate obligation, could not have
been the consideration for the assignment to petitioner.
Article 1318 of the New Civil Code enumerates the requisites of a valid
contract, namely: (1) consent of the contracting parties; (2) object certain
which is the subject matter of the contract; and (3) Cause of the obligation
which is established.
Thus, Article 1352 declares that contracts without cause, or with unlawful
cause produce no effect whatsoever. Those contracts lack an essential
element and they are not only voidable but void or inexistent pursuant to
Article 1409, paragraph (2).[59] The absence of the usual recital of
consideration in a transaction which normally should be supported by a
consideration such as the assignment made by Don Julian of all nineteen
(19) lots he still had at the time, coupled with the fact that the assignee is a
corporation of which Don Julian himself was also the President and Director,
forecloses the application of the presumption of existence of consideration
established by law.[60]
Neither could the Supplemental Deed validly operate as a donation.
Article 749 of the New Civil Code is clear on the point, thus:
Art. 749. In order that the donation of the immovable may be valid, it must
be made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and
the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate
public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done during the
lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be
notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both
instruments.

99

In Sumipat, et al v. Banga, et al.,[61] this Court declared that title to

immovable property does not pass from the donor to the donee by virtue of
a deed of donation until and unless it has been accepted in a public
instrument and the donor duly notified thereof. The acceptance may be
made in the very same instrument of donation. If the acceptance does not
appear in the same document, it must be made in another. Where the deed
of donation fails to show the acceptance, or where the formal notice of the
acceptance, made in a separate instrument, is either not given to the donor
or else not noted in the deed of donation and in the separate acceptance,
the donation is null and void.
In the case at bar, although the Supplemental Deed appears in a public
document,[62] the absence of acceptance by the donee in the same deed or
even in a separate document is a glaring violation of the requirement.
One final note. From the substantive and procedural standpoints, the
cardinal objectives to write finis to a protracted litigation and avoid
multiplicity of suits are worth pursuing at all times. [63] Thus, this Court has
ruled that appellate courts have ample authority to rule on specific matters
not assigned as errors or otherwise not raised in an appeal, if these are
indispensable or necessary to the just resolution of the pleaded issues.
[64]
Specifically, matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of
which are necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of
the case, or to serve the interest of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal
justice.[65]
In the instant case, the correct characterization of the Supplemental
Deed, i.e., whether it is valid or void, is unmistakably determinative of the
underlying controversy. In other words, the issue of validity or nullity of the
instrument which is at the core of the controversy is interwoven with the
issues adopted by the parties and the rulings of the trial court and the
appellate court.[66] Thus, this Court is also resolute in striking down the
alleged deed in this case, especially as it appears on its face to be a blatant
nullity.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision dated 30
September 1999 of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner J.L.T. Agro, Inc.
SO ORDERED.

100

Art. 1082
Crucillo vs IAC
[G.R. No. 65416. October 26, 1999]
CARLOMAGNO A. CRUCILLO, ADELAIDA C. PERENA, LUCIA ROZUL,
PRIMITIVA MENDOZA SUMAGUI, YOLANDA ROZUL, PABLITA
ROZUL, PETRITA ROZUL, ROSALINA ROZUL, MAXIMINO
CRUCILLO, NICASIO SARMIENTO, MARCIAL SARMIENTO,
CIPRIANO SARMIENTO, CONRADO CRUCILLO, LOURDES
CRUCILLO, MIGUEL CRUCILLO, FELICIDAD CRUCILLO, and
MIGUELA
CRUCILLO, petitioners,
vs.THE
INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, LUCIO PERENA, RAFAEL A. CRUCILLO,
MIGUEL R. PERLADO, FELIX NOCEDA, BENITA GATPANDAN
NOCEDA,
and
THE
PROVINCIAL
ASSESSOR
OF
CAVITE,respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court seeking a reversal of the Resolution, [1] dated October 7, 1983,
of the former Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) in ACG.R. No. CV-61084.
The facts that matter are as follows:
Balbino A. Crucillo was married to Juana Aure. They were blessed with
eight (8) children, namely, Elena, Maximino, Perpetua, Santiago, Adelaida,
Miguel, Rafael, and Vicente, all surnamed Crucillo.
Balbino A. Crucillo died intestate in 1909. Juana Aure died on November
19, 1949. Balbino A. Crucillo left, among other things, two (2) parcels of
unregistered land situated at General Luna Street, Mendez-Nunez, Cavite,
with a total area of 1,998 square meters under Tax Declaration No. 376 [2] of
the Office of the Provincial Assessor of Cavite. He was survived by his heirs,
who became co-owners of the aforesaid lots and thereafter, entered into the
possession thereof.
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It is worthy to note that when the present case was commenced below,
the only surviving children of Balbino A. Crucillo were Adelaida Crucillo,
Miguel Crucillo, and Rafael Crucillo. The other children above-named died,
and were survived by their respective heirs, to wit:
1. Elena Crucillo-Mendoza
1.1 Primitiva Mendoza (daughter)
1.2 Lolita Mendoza-Rozul (daughter), deceased, with the following heirs:
1.2.1 Yolanda Rozul
1.2.2 Pablita Rozul
1.2.3 Petrita Rozul
1.2.4 Lucia Rozul
1.2.5 Rosalina Rozul
2. Maximino Crucillo
2.1 Carlomagno Crucillo
2.2 Maximino Crucillo, Jr.
2.3 Vicente Crucillo
3. Perpetua Crucillo-Sarmiento
3.1 Nicasio Sarmiento
3.2 Cipriano Sarmiento
3.3 Marcial Sarmiento
3.4 Buenaventurada Sarmiento
4. Santiago Crucillo

102

4.1 Conrado Crucillo

4.2 Lourdes Crucillo
5. Vicente Crucillo
5.1 Felicidad M. Crucillo (widow)
5.2 Nicolas Crucillo (son-now deceased)
5.3 Miguela C. Crucillo (widow of Nicolas)
Soon after the death of Balbino A. Crucillo, the following persons
occupied and possessed portions of subject parcels of land:
1. Rafael Crucillo occupied and resided in the ancestral house erected
on a portion of subject lots;
2. Nicasio Sarmiento, son of Perpetua Crucillo Sarmiento, caused a
residential lot situated at Gen. Trias St., Mendez, Cavite, to be
registered in his name;
3. Miguel Crucillo possessed exclusively a residential lot situated at
Gen. Trias St., Mendez, Cavite;
4. Vicente Crucillo, Buenaventurada Sarmiento (daughter of the
deceased Perpetua Crucillo-Sarmiento), and Atty. Conrado Crucillo
(son of the deceased Santiago Crucillo) owned in common an
agricultural land situated in Sitio Niko, Mendez, Cavite, covered by
Tax Declaration No. 1179;[3]
5. The heirs of Elena Crucillo-Mendoza, Adelaida Crucillo, and Nicasio
Sarmiento owned in common an agricultural land in Pulong Munti,
covered by Tax Declaration No. 375;[4]
6. Buenaventurada Sarmiento and Vicente Crucillo owned in common
another property covered by Tax Declaration No. 663;[5]
7. Primitiva Mendoza possessed an agricultural land in Pulong Munti
and in Niko, Mendez, Cavite;
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8. Carlomagno Crucillo possessed an agricultural land situated in Sitio

Maykiling, Mendez, Cavite; and
9. Miguel Crucillo occupied exclusively an agricultural land in Pulong
Munti and Ulo ng Bukal.
On March 28, 1969, respondent Rafael A. Crucillo executed and entered
into a Patuluyang Bilihan Ng Isang Lagay Na Lupa [6] with the co-respondents,
spouses Felix Noceda and Benita Gatpandan-Noceda, whereby Rafael A.
Crucillo, for the price of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos, sold and
conveyed to the spouses Noceda a parcel of land more particularly
described:
Isang lagay na lupang (solar) na may luang na APAT AT WALOMPONG (480)
metro cuadrados, humiguit kumulang (labing dalawang (12) metro and (sic)
haba simula sa linderong Ibaba hanggang Ilaya at apat na pung (40) metro
and haba simula sa kalye sa Kanluran hangang sa linderong Silangan)
bahagui ng isang lagay na lupang nasasaad sa Hoja Declaratoria Bilang 376
at kung tuluyang mapahiwalay sa kalihon ay libot ng mga sumusunod na
karatig: Sa Ibaba, lupang pagaari ni Adelaida Crucillo; sa Ilaya, Santiago
Crucillo (ngayon, Carlomagno Crucillo); sa Silangan, Crispin Llamado
(ngayon, Simeon Manalo); at sa Kanluran, Kalye General Luna, sa libot ng
bakod na bato at iba pang matitibay na pananda sa panabi.
which parcel of land formed part of the estate of Balbino A. Crucillo.
The spouses Noceda delivered the amount of P4,000.00 to Rafael A.
Crucillo as partial payment of the price agreed upon.
On April 15, 1969, the petitioner, Conrado Crucillo, wrote the Register of
Deeds of Cavite requesting the latter to hold in abeyance the registration of
the said land transaction for the reason that the same was done without the
knowledge, consent and authority of the co-owners of subject property and
consequently, null and void.[7] In connection therewith, petitioner
Carlomagno Crucillo and Anita Perena (daughter of petitioner Adelaida
Crucillo) returned to respondents Noceda the amount of P4,000.00 which the
latter had partially paid to their co-respondent, Rafael Crucillo.

104

Sometime in February 1971, respondent Rafael Crucillo presented to the

office of the Provincial Assessor of Cavite, Trece Martires City, Cavite, a
Kasulatan Sa Partihang Labas sa Hukuman [8] dated February 17, 1971,
executed by and between petitioners Primitiva Mendoza, Carlomagno
Crucillo, Adelaida A. Crucillo, and respondent Rafael Crucillo; dividing the
estate into five (5) equal parts with the following beneficiaries:
1. Heirs of Elena A. Crucillo
2. Heirs of Maximino Crucillo
3. Adelaida A. Crucillo
4. Rafael A. Crucillo
5. Carlomagno A. Crucillo
On February 19, 1971, respondent Rafael A. Crucillo and the corespondents spouses, Felix Noceda and Benita Gatpandan-Noceda, executed
a Kasulatan Sa Ganap Na Bilihan[9] whereby Rafael A. Crucillo conveyed and
sold to his said co-respondents, for and in consideration of the sum
of P25,000.00, a parcel of land more particularly described as:
Isang lagay na lupa na nasa poblacion, munisipyo ng Mendez - Nunez,
Kabite, may luang na DALAWANG DAAN AT APAT NA PU AT LIMANG (245)
metros cuadrados, humiguit kumulang nasasaad sa Hoja Declaratoria Bilang
___ at libot ng mga sumusunod na karatig: Sa Ibaba, lupang pag-aari ni
Adelaida A. Crucillo; Sa Ilaya, Santiago A. Crucillo, ngayon ay Carlomagno A.
Crucillo; sa Silangan, Carlomagno A. Crucillo at sa Kanluran, Kalye General
Trias, at libot ng bakod na bato at iba pang buhay na bakod at mga panabi o
hanganan.
On February 23, 1971, the respondent Provincial Assessor of Cavite, by
virtue of the Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan and Kasulatan sa Partihang
Labas sa Hukuman, cancelled Tax Declaration No. 376 [10] in the name of
Balbino A. Crucillo and issued in lieu thereof the following new tax
declarations:
a. Tax Declaration No. 5413[11] in the name of the heirs of Elena A.
Crucillo;
105

b. Tax Declaration No. 5414[12] in the name of the heirs of Maximino

Crucillo;
c. Tax Declaration No. 5415[13] in the name of Adelaida A. Crucillo;
d. Tax Declaration No. 5416[14] in the name of Carlomagno A. Crucillo,
married to Felicitas de Keyser; and
e. Tax Declaration No. 5417[15] in the name of the Spouses Felix
Noceda and Benita Gatpandan Noceda.
Subsequently, the respondent spouses, Felix Noceda and Benita
Gatpandan Noceda, started possessing the property sold to them by Rafael
Crucillo, occupied the ancestral house standing on the property, and
introduced improvements thereon.
On March 12, 1971, petitioner Carlomagno Crucillos lawyer, Abraham
Sarmiento (later to become Associate Justice of this Supreme Court) wrote
the Provincial Assessor of Cavite, Trece Martires City, to request the latter to
withhold any future transactions on or transfers of the parcel of land covered
by Tax Declaration No. 5417 until the question of ownership of the land
involved shall have been settled by judicial adjudication. [16]
On August 14, 1971, the petitioners counsel wrote respondent Felix
Noceda, asking the latter to stop or refrain immediately from continuing any
work or construction which [you] may have started upon receipt of this letter
and to vacate the portion of land that you have occupied without the consent
of all the heirs of Balbino Crucillo xxx.[17]
On August 13, 1971, petitioners brought a complaint [18] against the
respondents for Annulment of Extrajudicial Partition, Deed of Sale, and Tax
Declaration Nos. 5413, 5414, 5415, 5416 and 5417 of the Office of the
Provincial Assessor of Cavite, with Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. TG190, before Branch IV of the defunct Court of First Instance of Cavite but the
same was dismissed for plaintiffs failure to exert earnest efforts towards a
compromise, as required by Article 222 of the New Civil Code.
On May 4, 1972, when efforts to settle amicably failed, petitioners filed a
substantially similar Complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-204, which
106

Complaint was amended on August 29, 1972 to implead as co-plaintiffs, the

petitioners, Felicidad Crucillo and Miguela Crucillo.[19]
The petitioners, Primitiva Mendoza-Sumagui, Yolanda Rozul, Pablita
Rozul, Petrita Rozul, Lucia Rozul, Rosalina Rozul, Vicente Crucillo, Conrado
Crucillo, Lourdes Crucillo, Felicidad Crucillo, and Miguela Crucillo, were
declared non-suited for failure to attend the pre-trial conference on October
2, 1972.
On October 31, 1975, after trial on the merits, the trial court came out
with a Decision,[20] disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
A) Declaring the Deed of Partition, Exh. A, null and void;
b) Declaring the defendants-spouses Felix Noceda and Benita Gatpandan to
be the true and lawful owners of the ancestral house and the lot upon which
it is erected, consisting of 249.75 square meters, more or less. Pursuant to
Art. 1623 of the New Civil Code however, the plaintiffs are hereby given
thirty (30) days from notice to their counsel within which to exercise their
right of legal redemption;
c) Declaring Tax Declaration Nos. 5413, 5414, 5415, 5416, and 5417 of the
Office of the Provincial Assessor of Cavite (Exhs. C, C-1 to C-4) null and
void, and directing the Provincial Assessor of Cavite to cancel the same;
d) Directing the Provincial Assessor of Cavite to issue new Tax Declaration in
lieu of Tax Declarations No. 376 (Exh. C-5), as follows:
1) To the Heirs of Elena Crucillo, for a parcel of land containing an area of
249.75 sq.m., in lieu of Tax Declaration No. 6413;
2) To the Heirs of Maximino Crucillo for a parcel of land containing an area of
249,75 square meters in lieu of Tax Declaration No. 5414.
3) To Adelaida Crucillo for a parcel of land containing an area of 249.75
square meters, in lieu of Tax Declaration No. 5415;

107

4) To Carlomagno Crucillo for a parcel of land containing an area of 249.75

square meters, in lieu of Tax Declaration No. 5416;
5) To the Spouses Felix Noceda and Benita Gatpandan for a parcel of land
containing an area of 249.75 square meters and the house erected thereon,
in lieu of Tax Declaration No. 5417;
6) To the Heirs of Vicente Crucillo for a parcel of land containing an area of
249.75 square meters;
7) To the Heirs of Perpetua Crucillo for a parcel of land containing an area of
249.75 square meters;
8) To Miguel Crucillo for a parcel of land containing an area of 249.75 square
meters; all in accordance with the Sketch Plan (Exhs. X and Y);
e) Dismissing plaintiffs second and third causes of action;
f) Dismissing defendants counterclaim for insufficiency of evidence.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
The petitioners and respondents interposed Motions for Reconsideration
on January 7, 1976 and January 10, 1976, respectively, but the same were
both denied for lack of merit in the Order of September 30, 1976.
On October 19, 1976, petitioners appealed the trial courts Decision to the
then Intermediate Appellate Court which, in a Decision [21] dated May 25,
1983, modified the judgment of the trial court as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the judgment of the lower
court is hereby modified, in conformity with the above findings. Judgment is
hereby rendered:
1) Declaring the Deed of Sale (Exh. B) null and void. Appellees, spouses
Felix and Benita Noceda and/all persons claiming under them are hereby
directed to vacate the premises of the land subject of the Deed of Sale
aforementioned, and to surrender peacefully the possession thereof to
108

appellants, so that the same shall be returned or collated into the intestate
estate of Balbino Crucillo;
2) All alterations made by appellees spouses Felix and Benita Noceda in the
ancestral house and the lot upon which it is erected are hereby forfeited in
favor of appellants. Appellants are hereby ordered to pay jointly and
severally appellants the amount of P10,000.00 for actual damages,
andP10,000.00 for and in the concept of moral damages;
3) Appellees are hereby also directed to pay jointly and severally appellants
the sum of P10,000.00 by way of attorneys fees and cost of the suit.
SO ORDERED.
Private respondents presented a Motion for Reconsideration, dated June
21, 1983, of the said Decision of the appellate Court, and acting thereupon,
the appellate court resolved:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the decision of this Court on
May 24, 1983 is hereby set aside. Judgment is hereby rendered sustaining
the decision a quo declaring the Deed of Sale (Exhibit B) valid and binding
and declaring the defendants-appellees Spouses Felix Noceda and Benita
Gatpandan to be the true and lawful owners of the ancestral house and lot
upon which it is erected consisting of 249.75 square meters more or
less. Moreover, plaintiffs-appellants have no right of legal redemption since it
is not sanctioned by law and evidence. Except for this modification, the
judgment under appeal is hereby affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.[22]
Undaunted, petitioners found their way to this Court via the present
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
theorizing that:
I
IN SETTING ASIDE ITS OWN DECISION PROMULGATED ON MAY 25, 1983,
ANNEX B HEREOF, AND RECONSIDERING IT BY SUSTAINING THE DECISION
DATED OCTOBER 31, 1975, AMENDED RECORD ON APPEAL, 158-179,
ANNEX E HEREOF, OF THE COURTA QUO, TO THE EFFECT THAT THE
109

RESPONDENTS HAVE SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED THE EXISTENCE OF A

PRIOR ORAL PARTITION OF THE ESTATE INHERITED FROM BALBINO A.
CRUCILLO, BY THE HEIRS OF BALBINO A. CRUCILLO, THE RESPONDENT
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR
JURISPRUDENCE.
II
IN SETTING ASIDE ITS OWN DECISION PROMULGATED ON MAY 25, 1983,
ANNEX B HEREOF, AND RECONSIDERING IT BY SUSTAINING THE DECISION
OF THE COURT A QUO DATED OCTOBER 31, 1975, AMENDED RECORD ON
APPEAL, 158-179, ANNEX E HEREOF, TO THE EFFECT THAT THE
RESPONDENT RAFAEL A. CRUCILLO VALIDLY SOLD THE LOT SUBJECT
MATTER OF THE KASULATAN SA GANAP NA BILIHAN, EXHIBIT B, ALSO
EXHIBIT 2 (ALSO ANNEX 2 COMPLAINT, AMENDED RECORD ON APPEAL, 4346, ANNEX E HEREOF), THE RESPONDENT INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY PROBABLY
NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR JURISPRUDENCE.
III
IN SETTING ASIDE ITS OWN DECISION PROMULGATED ON MAY 25, 1983,
ANNEX B HEREOF, AND RECONSIDERING IT BY SUSTAINING THE DECISION
DATED OCTOBER 31, 1975, AMENDED RECORD ON APPEAL, 158-179,
ANNEX E HEREOF, OF THE COURTA QUO, TO THE EFFECT THAT
THE KASULATAN SA GANAP NA BILIHAN, EXHIBIT B, ALSO EXHIBIT 2 (ALSO
ANNEX C, COMPLAINT, AMENDED RECORD ON APPEAL, 43-46, ANNEX E
HEREOF) WAS VALID, THAT THE RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES FELIX NOCEDA
AND BENITA GATPANDAN-NOCEDA ARE THE TRUE AND LAWFUL OWNERS OF
THE LOT SUBJECT MATTER OF EXHIBIT B, ALSO EXHIBIT 2, AS WELL AS OF
THE ANCESTRAL HOUSE LOCATED THEREON, AND THAT THE PETITIONERS
HAVE NO RIGHT OF LEGAL REDEMPTION THEREOF, THE RESPONDENT
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR
JURISPRUDENCE.
IV

110

IN SETTING ASIDE ITS OWN DECISION PROMULGATED ON MAY 25, 1983,

AND AFFIRMING WITH MODIFICATION THE DECISION OF THE COURT A
QUO DATED OCTOBER 31, 1975, AMENDED RECORD ON APPEAL, 158-179,
ANNEX E HEREOF, AND SUSTAINING, CONSEQUENTLY, THE FOLLOWING
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT A QUO:
xxx xxx xxx
c) Declaring Tax Declaration Nos. 5413, 5414, 5415, 5416, and 5417 of the
Office of the Provincial Assessor of Cavite (Exhs. C, C-1 to C-4) null and
void, and directing the Provincial Assessor of Cavite to cancel the same;
d) Directing the Provincial Assessor of Cavite to issue new Tax Declaration in
lieu of Tax Declarations No. 376 (Exh. C-5), as follows:
1) To the Heirs of Elena Crucillo, for a parcel of land containing an area of
249.75 sq.m., in lieu of Tax Declaration No. 5413;
2) To the Heirs of Maximino Crucillo, for a parcel of land containing an area
of 249,75 square meters in lieu of Tax Declaration No. 5414.
3) To Adelaida Crucillo, for a parcel of land containing an area of 249.75
square meters, in lieu of Tax Declaration No. 5415;
4) To Carlomagno Crucillo, for a parcel of land containing an area of 249.75
square meters, in lieu of Tax Declaration No. 5416;
5) To the Spouses Felix Noceda and Benita Gatpandan, for a parcel of land
containing an area of 249.75 square meters and the house erected thereon,
in lieu of Tax Declaration No. 5417;
6) To the Heirs of Vicente Crucillo, for a parcel of land containing an area of
249.75 square meters;
7) To the Heirs of Perpetua Crucillo, for a parcel of land containing an area of
249.75 square meters;
8) To Miguel Crucillo, for a parcel of land containing an area of 249.75
square meters; all in accordance with the Sketch Plan (Exhs. X and Y);

111

e) Dismissing plaintiffs second and third causes of action;

xxx xxx xxx
THE RESPONDENT INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT HAS DECIDED A
QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW
OR JURISPRUDENCE.
It is petitioners submission that the fact that Balbino A. Crucillos heirs
have actually occupied, sold, taken possession of their respective shares
from Balbino A. Crucillos estate does not suffice to establish a prior oral
agreement by and among the heirs of Balbino Crucillo.
The petition raises questions of fact which are not proper in an appeal
on certiorari.[23] Petitioners cited exceptions to the rule -- as when the factual
findings of the trial court and the appellate court conflict, when the appealed
decision is clearly contradicted by the evidence on record, or when the
appellate court miscomprehended the facts [24]-- justifying a review, but the
exceptions aforecited are inapplicable to the case under consideration, it
appearing that the appellate court correctly appreciated the facts in arriving
at its questioned resolution.
Even granting arguendo that the petition falls under any of the above
exceptions justifying a factual review of the findings of the respondent court,
the petition cannot prosper. The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that
the assailed Resolution of the respondent court has sufficient evidentiary
support, on the basis of which the respondent court abandoned its earlier
Decision.
To begin with, the oral agreement for the partition of the property owned
in common is valid, binding and enforceable on the parties. [25]
On the issue as to whether an oral partition, effected by the heirs of
Balbino A. Crucillo of his estate, has been sufficiently established, the Court
rules in the affirmative. It has been shown that upon the death of Juana
Aure, the petitioners and the respondent Rafael Crucillo partitioned the
estate among themselves, with each one of them possessing their respective
shares and exercising acts of ownership. Thus, the trial court found:

112

xxx Thus, aside from the disputed lot, Rafael had sold two other lots
belonging to the estate. Nicasio Sarmiento (son of Perpetua Crucillo) has
caused a residential lot situated at Gen. Trias St., Mendez, Cavite to be
registered in his name alone, Miguel Crucillo is in exclusive possession of a
residential lot located at General Trias St., Mendez, Cavite. An agricultural
land located at Sitio Niko, Mendez, Cavite, covered by Tax Declaration No.
1179 (Exh. 6), is owned in common by Vicente Crucillo (now occupied by his
surviving spouse Felicidad M. Crucillo). Buenaventurada Sarmiento (daughter
of the deceased Perpetua Crucillo), Adelaida Crucillo, and Atty. Conrado
Crucillo (son of the deceased Santiago Crucillo). Another agricultural land
situated at Pulong Munti, covered by Tax Declaration No. 375 (Exh. 7), is
owned in common by the Heirs of Elena Crucillo, Adelaida Crucillo, and
Nicasio Sarmiento. Still another property covered by Tax Declaration No. 653
(Exh. 10) is owned in common by Buenaventurada Sarmiento and Vicente
Crucillo, whose share was acquired by Miguel Crucillo.
Additionally, Primitiva Mendoza is in possession of an agricultural land in
Pulong Munti and also in Niko, Mendez, Cavite, while Carlomagno Crucillo
possesses an agricultural land at Sitio Maykiling, Mendez, Cavite, Miguel
Crucillo is exclusively occupying an agricultural land at Pulong Munti and Ulo
ng Bukal, and the remaining portion another agricultural land after the other
portion thereof had been sold by Rafael Crucillo.
xxx
When the Court conducted an ocular inspection of the property in dispute, it
observed that Dr. Carlomagno Crucillo had erected a building of strong
materials, which he utilizes as his clinic, on the southern portion of said land
fronting Gen. Luna St., that Adelaida Crucillo had constructed her residence,
which is also of strong materials, on the northern portion of said land
fronting Gen. Luna St.; that between the clinic of Dr. Carlomagno Crucillo
and the residential house of Adelaida Crucillo is the ancestral house, which is
erected on that portion of the said land which Rafael Crucillo sold to the
defendants-spouses; and that the Heirs of Elena Crucillo had constructed a
house of strong materials on the northern portion of said land fronting Aure
St., (of Exhs. X and Y) The Court further observed that a hollow block party
wall separates the respective portion occupied by the residential house of
Adelaida, the ancestral house, and the clinic of Dr. Carlomagno Crucillo,
Judging from their appearance and condition, the improvements erected by
113

Adelaida Crucillo, Dr. Carlomagno Crucillo, and the Heirs of Elena Crucillo are
not less than then (10) years old. (Decision, Court of First Instance; see
Amended Record on Appeal)
From the foregoing facts, it can be gleaned unerringly that the heirs of
Balbino A. Crucillo agreed to orally partition subject estate among
themselves, as evinced by their possession of the inherited premises, their
construction of improvements thereon, and their having declared in their
names for taxation purposes their respective shares. These are indications
that the heirs of Balbino A. Crucillo agreed to divide subject estate among
themselves, for why should they construct improvements thereon, pay the
taxes therefor, and exercise other acts of ownership, if they did not firmly
believe that the property was theirs. It is certainly foolhardy for petitioners
to claim that no oral partition was made when their acts showed
otherwise. Moreover, it is unbelievable that the possession of the heirs was
by mere tolerance, judging from the introduction of improvements thereon
and the length of time that such improvements have been in existence. Then
too, after exercising acts of ownership over their respective portions of the
contested estate, petitioners are estopped from denying or contesting the
existence of an oral partition.[26]
Anent the second and third issues -- whether there was a valid
conveyance by Rafael Crucillo of the lot subject matter of the Kasulatan Sa
Ganap Na Bilihan to the spouses Felix Noceda and Benita GatpandanNoceda, and whether the latter spouses acquired true and lawful ownership
thereof, including the ancestral house standing thereon, the Court also rules
in the affirmative. As the existence of the oral partition of the estate of
Balbino A. Crucillo by his heirs has been well established, it stands to reason
and conclude that Rafael Crucillo could validly convey his share therein to
the spouses Felix Noceda and Benita Gatpandan-Noceda who then became
the true and lawful owners thereof, including the ancestral house existing
thereon. Petitioners have, therefore, no right to redeem the same property
from the spouses Noceda because when the sale was made they were no
longer co-owners thereof, the same having become the sole property of
respondent Rafael Crucillo.
As regards petitioners prayer for an award to them of actual and moral
damages and attorneys fees, the same is denied for want of proper basis in
law and jurisprudence.
114

WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated October 7, 1983 of the former

Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) is AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Non vs CA
[G.R. No. 137287. February 15, 2000]
REBECCA VIADO NON, JOSE A. NON and DELIA VIADO, petitioners,
vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ALICIA N. VIADO, CHERRI
VIADO and FE FIDES VIADO, respondents. LEX
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Petitioners, in their petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seek a reversal of the 29th May 1996 decision of the Court of
Appeals, basically affirming that rendered on 30 April 1991 by the Regional
Trial Court ("RTC") of Quezon City, Branch 23, adjudicating the property
subject matter of the litigation to respondents. The case and the factual
setting found by the Court of Appeals do not appear to deviate significantly
from that made by the trial court.
During their lifetime, the spouses Julian C. Viado and Virginia P. Viado owned
several pieces of property, among them a house and lot located at 147
Isarog Street, La Loma, Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 42682. Virginia P. Viado died on 20 October 1982. Julian C. Viado died
three years later on 15 November 1985. Surviving them were their children
-- Nilo Viado, Leah Viado Jacobs, and herein petitioners Rebecca Viado,
married to Jose Non, and Delia Viado. Nilo Viado and Leah Viado Jacobs both
died on 22 April 1987. Nilo Viado left behind as his own sole heirs herein
respondents --- his wife Alicia Viado and their two children Cherri Viado and
Fe Fides Viado.

115

Petitioners and respondents shared, since 1977, a common residence at the

Isarog property. Soon, however, tension would appear to have escalated
between petitioner Rebecca Viado and respondent Alicia Viado after the
former had asked that the property be equally divided between the two
families to make room for the growing children. Respondents, forthwith,
claimed absolute ownership over the entire property and demanded that
petitioners vacate the portion occupied by the latter. On 01 February 1988,
petitioners, asserting co-ownership over the property in question, filed a
case for partition before the Quezon City RTC (Branch 93). Jj sc
Respondents predicated their claim of absolute ownership over the subject
property on two documents --- a deed of donation executed by the late
Julian Viado covering his one-half conjugal share of the Isarog property in
favor of Nilo Viado and a deed of extrajudicial settlement in which Julian
Viado, Leah Viado Jacobs (through a power of attorney in favor of Nilo
Viado) and petitioner Rebecca Viado waived in favor of Nilo Viado their rights
and interests over their share of the property inherited from Virginia Viado.
Both instruments were executed on 26 August 1983 and registered on 07
January 1988 by virtue of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42682 was
cancelled and new Transfer Certificate of Title No. 373646 was issued to the
heirs of Nilo Viado.
Petitioners, in their action for partition, attacked the validity of the foregoing
instruments, contending that the late Nilo Viado employed forgery and
undue influence to coerce Julian Viado to execute the deed of donation.
Petitioner Rebecca Viado, in her particular case, averred that her brother Nilo
Viado employed fraud to procure her signature to the deed of extrajudicial
settlement. She added that the exclusion of her retardate sister, Delia Viado,
in the extrajudicial settlement, resulted in the latter's preterition that should
warrant its annulment. Finally, petitioners asseverated at the assailed
instruments, although executed on 23 August 1983, were registered only
five years later, on 07 January 1988, when the three parties thereto, namely,
Julian Viado, Nilo Viado and Leah Viado Jacobs had already died. Sc jj
Assessing the evidence before it, the trial court found for respondents and
adjudged Alicia Viado and her children as being the true owners of the
disputed property.

116

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court with
modification by ordering the remand of the records of the case to the court a
quo for further proceedings to determine the value of the property and the
amount respondents should pay to petitioner Delia Viado for having been
preterited in the deed of extrajudicial settlement.
Petitioners are now before the Supreme Court to seek the reversal of the
decision of the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court ruled correctly.
When Virginia P. Viado died intestate in 1982, her part of the conjugal
property, the Isarog property in question included, was transmitted to her
heirs --- her husband Julian and their children Nilo Viado, Rebecca Viado,
Leah Viado and Delia Viado. The inheritance, which vested from the moment
of death of the decedent,[1] remained under a co-ownership regime [2] among
the heirs until partition. [3] Every act intended to put an end to indivision
among co-heirs and legatees or devisees would be a partition although it
would purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, a donation or an
extrajudicial settlement.[4]
In debunking the continued existence of a co-ownership among the parties
hereto, respondents rely on the deed of donation and deed of extrajudicial
settlement which consolidated the title solely to Nilo Viado. Petitioners assail
the due execution of the documents on the grounds heretofore expressed. Sj
cj
Unfortunately for petitioners, the issues they have raised boil down to the
appreciation of the evidence, a matter that has been resolved by both the
trial court and the appellate court. The Court of Appeals, in sustaining the
court a quo, has found the evidence submitted by petitioners to be utterly
wanting, consisting of, by and large, self-serving testimonies. While
asserting that Nilo Viado employed fraud, forgery and undue influence in
procuring the signatures of the parties to the deeds of donation and of
extrajudicial settlement, petitioners are vague, however, on how and in what
manner those supposed vices occurred. Neither have petitioners shown proof
why Julian Viado should be held incapable of exercising sufficient judgment
in ceding his rights and interest over the property to Nilo Viado. The
asseveration of petitioner Rebecca Viado that she has signed the deed of
117

extrajudicial settlement on the mistaken belief that the instrument merely

pertained to the administration of the property is too tenuous to accept. It is
also quite difficult to believe that Rebecca Viado, a teacher by profession,
could have misunderstood the tenor of the assailed document.
The fact alone that the two deeds were registered five years after the date of
their execution did not adversely affect their validity nor would such
circumstance alone be indicative of fraud. The registration of the documents
was a ministerial act[5] and merely created a constructive notice of its
contents against all third persons. [6] Among the parties, the instruments
remained completely valid and binding. Supreme
The exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged to be a retardate, from the
deed of extrajudicial settlement verily has had the effect of preterition. This
kind of preterition, however, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith,
does not justify a collateral attack on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 373646.
The relief, as so correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, instead rests
on Article 1104 of the Civil Code to the effect that where the preterition is
not attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but
the preterited heir shall be paid the value of the share pertaining to her.
Again, the appellate court has thus acted properly in ordering the remand of
the case for further proceedings to make the proper valuation of the Isarog
property and ascertainment of the amount due petitioner Delia Viado.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED, and the decision, dated May
29, 1996, in CA-G.R. No. 37272 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No
special pronouncement on costs. Court
SO ORDERED.

Pada-kilario v ca
[G.R. No. 134329. January 19, 2000]
VERONA PADA-KILARIO and RICARDO KILARIO petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SILVERIO PADA, respondents. ULANDU
DECISION

118

DE LEON, JR., J.:

The victory[1] of petitioner spouses Ricardo and Verona Kilario in the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court[2] in an ejectment suit[3] filed against them by
private respondent Silverio Pada, was foiled by its reversal [4] by the Regional
Trial Court[5] on appeal. They elevated their cause[6] to respondent Court of
Appeals[7] which, however, promulgated a Decision [8] on May 20, 1998,
affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court.
The following facts are undisputed:
One Jacinto Pada had six (6) children, namely, Marciano, Ananias, Amador,
Higino, Valentina and Ruperta. He died intestate. His estate included a parcel
of land of residential and coconut land located at Poblacion, Matalom, Leyte,
denominated as Cadastral Lot No. 5581 with an area of 1,301.92 square
meters. It is the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 which is the
subject of the instant controversy.
During the lifetime of Jacinto Pada, his half-brother, Feliciano Pada, obtained
permission from him to build a house on the northern portion of Cadastral
Lot No. 5581. When Feliciano died, his son, Pastor, continued living in the
house together with his eight children. Petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, one of
Pastor's children, has been living in that house since 1960.
Sometime in May, 1951, the heirs of Jacinto Pada entered into an extrajudicial partition of his estate. For this purpose, they executed a private
document which they, however, never registered in the Office of the
Registrar of Deeds of Leyte.
At the execution of the extra-judicial partition, Ananias was himself present
while his other brothers were represented by their children. Their sisters,
Valentina and Ruperta, both died without any issue. Marciano was
represented by his daughter, Maria; Amador was represented by his
daughter, Concordia; and Higino was represented by his son, Silverio who is
the private respondent in this case. It was to both Ananias and Marciano,
represented by his daughter, Maria, that Cadastral Lot No. 5581 was
allocated during the said partition. When Ananias died, his daughter, Juanita,
succeeded to his right as co-owner of said property.

119

On June 14, 1978, Juanita Pada sold to Engr. Ernesto Paderes, the right of
his father, Ananias, as co-owner of Cadastral Lot No. 5881.
On November 17, 1993, it was the turn of Maria Pada to sell the coownership right of his father, Marciano. Private respondent, who is the first
cousin of Maria, was the buyer.
Thereafter, private respondent demanded that petitioner spouses vacate the
northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 so his family can utilize the said
area. They went through a series of meetings with the barangay officials
concerned for the purpose of amicable settlement, but all earnest efforts
toward that end, failed.
On June 26, 1995, private respondent filed in the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Matalom, Leyte, a complaint for ejectment with prayer for damages
against petitioner spouses. Korte
On July 24, 1995, the heirs of Amador Pada, namely, Esperanza Pada-Pavo,
Concordia Pada-Bartolome, and Angelito Pada, executed a Deed of
Donation[9] transferring to petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, their respective
shares as co-owners of Cadastral Lot No. 5581.
On February 12, 1996, petitioner spouses filed their Answer averring that
the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 had already been donated to
them by the heirs of Amador Pada. They contended that the extra-judicial
partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada executed in 1951 was invalid and
ineffectual since no special power of attorney was executed by either
Marciano, Amador or Higino in favor of their respective children who
represented them in the extra-judicial partition. Moreover, it was effectuated
only through a private document that was never registered in the office of
the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte.
The Municipal Circuit Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner
spouses. It made the following findings:
"After a careful study of the evidence submitted by both parties,
the court finds that the evidence adduced by plaintiff failed to
establish his ownership over x x x Cadastral Lot No. 5581 x x x
while defendants has [sic] successfully proved by preponderance
120

of evidence that said property is still under a community of

ownership among the heirs of the late Jacinto Pada who died
intestate. If there was some truth that Marciano Pada and
Ananias Pada has [sic] been adjudicated jointly of [sic] the
above-described residential property x x x as their share of the
inheritance on the basis of the alleged extra judicial settlement,
how come that since 1951, the date of partition, the share of the
late Marciano Pada was not transferred in the name of his heirs,
one of them Maria Pada-Pavo and still remain [sic] in the name
of Jacinto Pada up to the present while the part pertaining to the
share of Ananias Pada was easily transferred in the name of his
heirs x x x.
"The alleged extra judicial settlement was made in private
writing and the genuineness and due execution of said document
was assailed as doubtful and it appears that most of the heirs
were not participants and signatories of said settlement, and
there was lack of special power of attorney to [sic] those who
claimed to have represented their co-heirs in the participation
[sic] and signing of the said extra judicial statement. Sclaw
"Defendants were already occupying the northern portion of the
above-described property long before the sale of said property
on November 17, 1993 was executed between Maria Pada-Pavo,
as vendor and the plaintiff, as vendee. They are in possession of
said portion of the above-described property since the year 1960
with the consent of some of the heirs of Jacinto Pada and up to
the [sic] present some of the heirs of Jacinto Pada has [sic]
donated x x x their share of [sic] the above-described property
to them, virtually converting defendants' standing as co-owners
of the land under controversy. Thus, defendants as co-owners
became the undivided owners of the whole estate x x x. As coowners of x x x Cadastral Lot No. 5581 x x x their possession in
the northern portion is being [sic] lawful."[10]
From the foregoing decision, private respondent appealed to the Regional
Trial Court. On November 6, 1997, it rendered a judgment of reversal. It
held:

121

"x x x [T]he said conveyances executed by Juanita Pada and

Maria Pada Pavo were never questioned or assailed by their coheirs for more than 40 years, thereby lending credence on [sic]
the fact that the two vendors were indeed legal and lawful
owners of properties ceded or sold. x x x At any rate, granting
that the co-heirs of Juanita Pada and Maria Pada Pavo have some
interests on the very lot assigned to Marciano and Ananias,
nevertheless, said interests had long been sadly lost by
prescription, if not laches or estoppel.
"It is true that an action for partition does not prescribe, as a
general rule, but this doctrine of imprescriptibility cannot be
invoked when one of the heirs possessed the property as an
owner and for a period sufficient to acquire it by prescription
because from the moment one of the co-heirs claim [sic] that he
is the absolute owner and denies the rest their share of the
community property, the question then involved is no longer one
for partition but of ownership. x x x Since [sic] 1951 up to 1993
covers a period of 42 long years. Clearly, whatever right some of
the co-heirs may have, was long extinguished by laches,
estoppel or prescription. Sc lex
"x x x
"x x x [T]he deed of donation executed by the Heirs of Amador
Pada, a brother of Marciano Pada, took place only during the
inception of the case or after the lapse of more than 40 years
reckoned from the time the extrajudicial partition was made in
1951. Therefore, said donation is illegal and invalid [sic] the
donors, among others, were absolutely bereft of any right in
donating the very property in question."[11]
The dispositive portion of the decision of the Regional Trial Court reads as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, a judgment is hereby rendered, reversing the
judgment earlier promulgated by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
of Matalom, Leyte, [sic] consequently, defendants-appellees are
hereby ordered:
122

"1. To vacate the premises in issue and return peaceful

possession to the appellant, being the lawful possessor in
concept of owner;
"2. To remove their house at their expense unless appellant
exercises the option of acquiring the same, in which case the
pertinent provisions of the New Civil Code has to be applied;
"3. Ordering the defendants-appellees to pay monthly rental for
their occupancy and use of the portion of the land in question in
the sum of P100.00 commencing on June 26, 1995 when the
case was filed and until the termination of the present case;
"4. Ordering the defendants to pay to the appellant the sum of
P5,000.00 as moral damages and the further sum of P5,000.00
as attorney's fees;
"5. Taxing defendants to pay the costs of suit."[12]
Petitioners filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for review of the foregoing
decision of the Regional Trial Court.
On May 20, 1998, respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment
dismissing said petition. It explained: x law
"Well-settled is the rule that in an ejectment suit, the only issue
is possession de facto or physical or material possession and
not de jure. Hence, even if the question of ownership is raised in
the pleadings, the court may pass upon such issue but only to
determine the question of possession, specially if the former is
inseparably linked with the latter. It cannot dispose with finality
the issue of ownership, such issue being inutile in an ejectment
suit except to throw light on the question of possession x x x.
"Private respondent Silverio Pada anchors his claim to the
portion of the land possessed by petitioners on the Deed of Sale
executed in his favor by vendor Maria Pada-Pavo, a daughter of
Marciano, son of Jacinto Pada who was the registered owner of
the subject lot. The right of vendee Maria Pada to sell the
property was derived from the extra-judicial partition executed in
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May 1951 among the heirs of Jacinto Pada, which was written in
a Bisayan dialect signed by the heirs, wherein the subject land
was adjudicated to Marciano, Maria Pavo's father, and Ananias
Pada. Although the authenticity and genuineness of the extrajudicial partition is now being questioned by the heirs of Amador
Pada, no action was ever previously filed in court to question the
validity of such partition.
"Notably, petitioners in their petition admitted among the
antecedent facts that Maria Pavo is one of the co-owners of the
property originally owned by Jacinto Pada x x x and that the
disputed lot was adjudicated to Marciano (father of Maria Pavo)
and Ananias, and upon the death of Marciano and Ananias, their
heirs took possession of said lot, i.e. Maria Pavo the vendor for
Marciano's share and Juanita for Ananias' share x x x. Moreover,
petitioners do not dispute the findings of the respondent court
that during the cadastral survey of Matalom, Leyte, the share of
Maria Pada Pavo was denominated as Lot No. 5581, while the
share of Juanita Pada was denominated as Lot No. 6047, and
that both Maria Pada Pavo and Juanita were in possession of
their respective hereditary shares. Further, petitioners in their
Answer admitted that they have been occupying a portion of Lot
No. 5581, now in dispute without paying any rental owing to the
liberality of the plaintiff x x x. Petitioners cannot now impugn the
aforestated extrajudicial partition executed by the heirs in 1951.
As owner and possessor of the disputed property, Maria Pada,
and her vendee, private respondent, is entitled to possession. A
voluntary division of the estate of the deceased by the heirs
among themselves is conclusive and confers upon said heirs
exclusive ownership of the respective portions assigned to them
x x x.
"The equally belated donation of a portion of the property in
dispute made by the heirs of Amador Pada, namely, Concordia,
Esperanza and Angelito, in favor of petitioner Verona Pada is a
futile attempt to confer upon the latter the status of co-owner,
since the donors had no interest nor right to transfer. x x x This
gesture appears to be a mere afterthought to help petitioners to
prolong their stay in the premises. Furthermore, the respondent
124

court correctly pointed out that the equitable principle of laches

and estoppel come into play due to the donors' failure to assert
their claims and alleged ownership for more than forty (40)
years x x x. Accordingly, private respondent was subrogated to
the rights of the vendor over Lot No. 5581 which include [sic]
the portion occupied by petitioners."[13] Sc
Petitioner spouses filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing
decision.
On June 16, 1998, respondent Court of Appeals issued a Resolution denying
said motion.
Hence this petition raising the following issues:
"I.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT
PETITIONERS, AS CO-OWNERS, CANNOT BE EJECTED FROM THE
PREMISES CONSIDERING THAT THE HEIRS OF JACINTO PADA
DONATED TO THEM THEIR UNDIVIDED INTEREST IN THE
PROPERTY IN DISPUTE.
"II.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT
WHAT MARIA PADA SOLD WAS HER UNDIVIDED SHARE IN THE
PROPERTY IN DISPUTE.
"III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS ARE BUILDERS IN GOOD
FAITH."[14]
There is no merit to the instant petition.
First. We hold that the extrajudicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada
among his heirs made in 1951 is valid, albeit executed in an unregistered
private document. No law requires partition among heirs to be in writing and
be registered in order to be valid. [15] The requirement in Sec. 1, Rule 74 of
125

the Revised Rules of Court that a partition be put in a public document and
registered, has for its purpose the protection of creditors and the heirs
themselves against tardy claims.[16] The object of registration is to serve as
constructive notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of
partition not executed with the prescribed formalities is not undermined
when no creditors are involved.[17] Without creditors to take into
consideration, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an
agreement for distribution thereof in a manner and upon a plan different
from those provided by the rules from which, in the first place, nothing can
be inferred that a writing or other formality is essential for the partition to be
valid.[18] The partition of inherited property need not be embodied in a public
document so as to be effective as regards the heirs that participated therein.
[19]
The requirement of Article 1358 of the Civil Code that acts which have for
their object the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of
real rights over immovable property, must appear in a public instrument, is
only for convenience, non-compliance with which does not affect the validity
or enforceability of the acts of the parties as among themselves. [20] And
neither does the Statute of Frauds under Article 1403 of the New Civil Code
apply because partition among heirs is not legally deemed a conveyance of
real property, considering that it involves not a transfer of property from one
to the other but rather, a confirmation or ratification of title or right of
property that an heir is renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and
receives the inheritance.[21] The 1951 extrajudicial partition of Jacinto Pada's
estate being legal and effective as among his heirs, Juanita and Maria Pada
validly transferred their ownership rights over Cadastral Lot No. 5581 to
Engr. Paderes and private respondent, respectively.[22] Scmis
Second. The extrajudicial partition which the heirs of Jacinto Pada executed
voluntarily and spontaneously in 1951 has produced a legal status. [23] When
they discussed and agreed on the division of the estate of Jacinto Pada, it is
presumed that they did so in furtherance of their mutual interests. As such,
their division is conclusive, unless and until it is shown that there were debts
existing against the estate which had not been paid. [24] No showing,
however, has been made of any unpaid charges against the estate of Jacinto
Pada. Thus, there is no reason why the heirs should not be bound by their
voluntary acts.
The belated act of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito, who are the heirs of
Amador Pada, of donating the subject property to petitioners after forty four
126

(44) years of never having disputed the validity of the 1951 extrajudicial
partition that allocated the subject property to Marciano and Ananias,
produced no legal effect. In the said partition, what was allocated to Amador
Pada was not the subject property which was a parcel of residential land in
Sto. Nino, Matalom, Leyte, but rather, one-half of a parcel of coconut land in
the interior of Sto. Nino St., Sabang, Matalom, Leyte and one-half of a parcel
of rice land in Itum, Sta. Fe, Matalom, Leyte. The donation made by his heirs
to petitioners of the subject property, thus, is void for they were not the
owners thereof. At any rate it is too late in the day for the heirs of Amador
Pada to repudiate the legal effects of the 1951 extrajudicial partition as
prescription and laches have equally set in.
Third. Petitioners are estopped from impugning the extrajudicial partition
executed by the heirs of Jacinto Pada after explicitly admitting in their
Answer that they had been occupying the subject property since 1960
without ever paying any rental as they only relied on the liberality and
tolerance of the Pada family.[25] Their admissions are evidence of a high order
and bind them insofar as the character of their possession of the subject
property is concerned.
Considering that petitioners were in possession of the subject property by
sheer tolerance of its owners, they knew that their occupation of the
premises may be terminated any time. Persons who occupy the land of
another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between
them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that they will vacate the
same upon demand, failing in which a summary action for ejectment is the
proper remedy against them.[26] Thus, they cannot be considered possessors
nor builders in good faith. It is well-settled that both Article 448 [27]and Article
546[28] of the New Civil Code which allow full reimbursement of useful
improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made,
apply only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the
belief that he is the owner thereof.[29] Verily, persons whose occupation of a
realty is by sheer tolerance of its owners are not possessors in good faith.
Neither did the promise of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito Pada that they
were going to donate the premises to petitioners convert them into builders
in good faith for at the time the improvements were built on the premises,
such promise was not yet fulfilled, i.e., it was a mere expectancy of
ownership that may or may not be realized. [30] More importantly, even as
that promise was fulfilled, the donation is void for Concordia, Esperanza and
127

Angelito Pada were not the owners of Cadastral Lot No. 5581. As such,
petitioners cannot be said to be entitled to the value of the improvements
that they built on the said lot.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is HEREBY DENIED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Teves vs ca ---Unionbank vs santibanez

[G.R. No. 149926. February 23, 2005]
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. EDMUND
SANTIBAEZ and FLORENCE SANTIBAEZ ARIOLA, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
Revised Rules of Court which seeks the reversal of the Decision [1] of
Court of Appeals dated May 30, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 48831 affirming
dismissal[2] of the petitioners complaint in Civil Case No. 18909 by
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63.

the
the
the
the

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and
Efraim M. Santibaez entered into a loan agreement [3] in the amount
of P128,000.00. The amount was intended for the payment of the purchase
price of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor. In
view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in
favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal annual
amortizations of P43,745.96 due on May 31, 1981 and every May
31st thereafter up to May 31, 1985.
128

On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan
agreement,[4] this time in the amount of P123,156.00. It was intended to pay
the balance of the purchase price of another unit of Ford 6600 Agricultural
All-Purpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories, and one (1) unit Howard
Rotamotor Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a
promissory note for the said amount in favor of the FCCC. Aside from such
promissory note, they also signed a Continuing Guaranty Agreement [5] for
the loan dated December 13, 1980.
Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will.
Subsequently in March 1981, testate proceedings commenced before the
RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 7, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 2706. On
April 9, 1981, Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed as the special
administrator of the estate of the decedent. [7] During the pendency of the
testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence
Santibaez Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement [8] dated July 22, 1981, wherein
they agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the three
(3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for Edmund and one (1) tractor for
Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late father
to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them.
[6]

On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of

Liabilities[9] was executed by and between FCCC and Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor, among others, assigned
all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank.
Demand letters[10] for the settlement of his account were sent by
petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the latter
failed to heed the same and refused to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, the
petitioner filed a Complaint[11] for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim
Santibaez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 150,
docketed as Civil Case No. 18909. Summonses were issued against both, but
the one intended for Edmund was not served since he was in the United
States and there was no information on his address or the date of his return
to the Philippines.[12] Accordingly, the complaint was narrowed down to
respondent Florence S. Ariola.
On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence S. Ariola filed her
Answer[13] and alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since she
129

was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint agreement signed by her
and her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null
and void; hence, she was not liable to the petitioner under the joint
agreement.
On January 29, 1990, the case was unloaded and re-raffled to the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 63.[14] Consequently, trial on the merits ensued and a
decision was subsequently rendered by the court dismissing the complaint
for lack of merit. The decretal portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint for
lack of merit.[15]
The trial court found that the claim of the petitioner should have been
filed with the probate court before which the testate estate of the late Efraim
Santibaez was pending, as the sum of money being claimed was an
obligation incurred by the said decedent. The trial court also found that the
Joint Agreement apparently executed by his heirs, Edmund and Florence, on
July 22, 1981, was, in effect, a partition of the estate of the decedent.
However, the said agreement was void, considering that it had not been
approved by the probate court, and that there can be no valid partition until
after the will has been probated. The trial court further declared that
petitioner failed to prove that it was the now defunct Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC had assigned its assets and liabilities. The
court also agreed to the contention of respondent Florence S. Ariola that the
list of assets and liabilities of the FCCC assigned to Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank did not clearly refer to the decedents account. Ruling that
the joint agreement executed by the heirs was null and void, the trial court
held that the petitioners cause of action against respondent Florence S.
Ariola must necessarily fail.
The petitioner appealed from the RTC decision and elevated its case to
the Court of Appeals (CA), assigning the following as errors of the trial court:
1.

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT

AGREEMENT (EXHIBIT A) SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE PROBATE
COURT.

130

2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO

VALID PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS UNTIL AFTER THE WILL HAS
BEEN PROBATED.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT
HAD WAIVED HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN
THE ESTATE PROCEEDING.[16]
The petitioner asserted before the CA that the obligation of the deceased
had passed to his legitimate children and heirs, in this case, Edmund and
Florence; the unconditional signing of the joint agreement marked as Exhibit
A estopped respondent Florence S. Ariola, and that she cannot deny her
liability under the said document; as the agreement had been signed by both
heirs in their personal capacity, it was no longer necessary to present the
same before the probate court for approval; the property partitioned in the
agreement was not one of those enumerated in the holographic will made by
the deceased; and the active participation of the heirs, particularly
respondent Florence S. Ariola, in the present ordinary civil action was
tantamount to a waiver to re-litigate the claim in the estate proceedings.
On the other hand, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintained that the
money claim of the petitioner should have been presented before the
probate court.[17]
The appellate court found that the appeal was not meritorious and held
that the petitioner should have filed its claim with the probate court as
provided under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. It further
held that the partition made in the agreement was null and void, since no
valid partition may be had until after the will has been probated. According
to the CA, page 2, paragraph (e) of the holographic will covered the subject
properties (tractors) in generic terms when the deceased referred to them as
all other properties. Moreover, the active participation of respondent Florence
S. Ariola in the case did not amount to a waiver. Thus, the CA affirmed the
RTC decision, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[18]
131

In the present recourse, the petitioner ascribes the following errors to

the CA:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT
AGREEMENT SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO VALID
PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS OF THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ UNTIL
AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT
HAD WAIVED HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE
PROCEEDING.
IV.
RESPONDENTS CAN, IN FACT, BE HELD JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE
WITH THE PRINCIPAL DEBTOR THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ ON THE
STRENGTH OF THE CONTINUING GUARANTY AGREEMENT EXECUTED IN
FAVOR OF PETITIONER-APPELLANT UNION BANK.
V.
THE PROMISSORY NOTES DATED MAY 31, 1980 IN THE SUM
OF P128,000.00 AND DECEMBER 13, 1980 IN THE AMOUNT OF P123,000.00
CATEGORICALLY ESTABLISHED THE FACT THAT THE RESPONDENTS BOUND
THEMSELVES JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE LATE DEBTOR
EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER UNION BANK.[19]
The petitioner claims that the obligations of the deceased were
transmitted to the heirs as provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code; there
was thus no need for the probate court to approve the joint agreement
where the heirs partitioned the tractors owned by the deceased and
assumed the obligations related thereto. Since respondent Florence S. Ariola
132

signed the joint agreement without any condition, she is now estopped from
asserting any position contrary thereto. The petitioner also points out that
the holographic will of the deceased did not include nor mention any of the
tractors subject of the complaint, and, as such was beyond the ambit of the
said will. The active participation and resistance of respondent Florence S.
Ariola in the ordinary civil action against the petitioners claim amounts to a
waiver of the right to have the claim presented in the probate proceedings,
and to allow any one of the heirs who executed the joint agreement to
escape liability to pay the value of the tractors under consideration would be
equivalent to allowing the said heirs to enrich themselves to the damage and
prejudice of the petitioner.
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the decisions of both the trial and
appellate courts failed to consider the fact that respondent Florence S. Ariola
and her brother Edmund executed loan documents, all establishing
the vinculum juris or the legal bond between the late Efraim Santibaez and
his heirs to be in the nature of a solidary obligation. Furthermore, the
Promissory Notes dated May 31, 1980 and December 13, 1980 executed by
the late Efraim Santibaez, together with his heirs, Edmund and respondent
Florence, made the obligation solidary as far as the said heirs are concerned.
The petitioner also proffers that, considering the express provisions of the
continuing guaranty agreement and the promissory notes executed by the
named respondents, the latter must be held liable jointly and severally liable
thereon. Thus, there was no need for the petitioner to file its money claim
before the probate court. Finally, the petitioner stresses that both surviving
heirs are being sued in their respective personal capacities, not as heirs of
the deceased.
In her comment to the petition, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintains
that the petitioner is trying to recover a sum of money from the deceased
Efraim Santibaez; thus the claim should have been filed with the probate
court. She points out that at the time of the execution of the joint
agreement there was already an existing probate proceedings of which the
petitioner knew about. However, to avoid a claim in the probate court which
might delay payment of the obligation, the petitioner opted to require them
to execute the said agreement.
According to the respondent, the trial court and the CA did not err in
declaring that the agreement was null and void. She asserts that even if the
133

agreement was voluntarily executed by her and her brother Edmund, it

should still have been subjected to the approval of the court as it may
prejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties. Furthermore, she had not
waived any rights, as she even stated in her answer in the court a quo that
the claim should be filed with the probate court. Thus, the petitioner could
not invoke or claim that she is in estoppel.
Respondent Florence S. Ariola further asserts that she had not signed
any continuing guaranty agreement, nor was there any document presented
as evidence to show that she had caused herself to be bound by the
obligation of her late father.
The petition is bereft of merit.
The Court is posed to resolve the following issues: a) whether or not the
partition in the Agreement executed by the heirs is valid; b) whether or not
the heirs assumption of the indebtedness of the deceased is valid; and c)
whether the petitioner can hold the heirs liable on the obligation of the
deceased.
At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the
jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the deceased, to determine
whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered.[20] The said court is primarily concerned with
the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate. [21]
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among
the heirs until after the will has been probated:
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until
after the will has been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and
the public requires it, because unless a will is probated and notice thereof
given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by
will may be rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will decides no other
question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the
compliance with those requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes
for the validity of a will.[22]

134

This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the

same properties embraced in the will. [23] In the present case, the deceased,
Efraim Santibaez, left a holographic will [24] which contained, inter alia, the
provision which reads as follows:
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered
later after my demise, shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the
immediately preceding paragraph in favor of Edmund and Florence, my
children.
We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted is an allencompassing provision embracing all the properties left by the decedent
which might have escaped his mind at that time he was making his will, and
other properties he may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the three
(3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said tractors
among the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement [25] executed by Edmund
and Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid,
specially so since at the time of its execution, there was already a pending
proceeding for the probate of their late fathers holographic will covering the
said tractors.
It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired
jurisdiction over all the properties of the deceased, including the three (3)
tractors. To dispose of them in any way without the probate courts approval
is tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction which the Court cannot allow.
[26]
Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and
legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport
to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction. [27] Thus,
in executing any joint agreement which appears to be in the nature of an
extra-judicial partition, as in the case at bar, court approval is imperative,
and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over that part of
the estate. Moreover, it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to
determine the identity of the heirs of the decedent. [28] In the instant case,
there is no showing that the signatories in the joint agreement were the only
heirs of the decedent. When it was executed, the probate of the will was still
pending before the court and the latter had yet to determine who the heirs
of the decedent were. Thus, for Edmund and respondent Florence S. Ariola
to adjudicate unto themselves the three (3) tractors was a premature act,

135

and prejudicial to the other possible heirs and creditors who may have a
valid claim against the estate of the deceased.
The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs assumption of
the indebtedness of the decedent is binding. We rule in the negative.
Perusing the joint agreement, it provides that the heirs as parties
thereto have agreed to divide between themselves and take possession and
use the above-described chattel and each of them to assume the
indebtedness corresponding to the chattel taken as herein after stated which
is in favor of First Countryside Credit Corp. [29] The assumption of liability was
conditioned upon the happening of an event, that is, that each heir shall
take possession and use of their respective share under the agreement. It
was made dependent on the validity of the partition, and that they were to
assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel that they were each
to receive. The partition being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs in effect
did not receive any such tractor. It follows then that the assumption of
liability cannot be given any force and effect.
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The
petitioner, purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibaez, should have
thus filed its money claim with the probate court in accordance with Section
5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed barred;
exceptions. All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract,
express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all
claims for funeral expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and
judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time
limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that they
may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or
administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an executor or
administrator commences an action, or prosecutes an action already
commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by
answer the claims he has against the decedent, instead of presenting them
independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual claims may be set
off against each other in such action; and if final judgment is rendered in
favor of the defendant, the amount so determined shall be considered the
true balance against the estate, as though the claim had been presented

136

directly before the court in the administration proceedings. Claims not yet
due, or contingent, may be approved at their present value.
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate
court is mandatory.[30] As we held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v.
Herrera:[31]
This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased
by informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus
enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper
one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the
speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the
property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. `The law strictly requires the
prompt presentation and disposition of the claims against the decedent's
estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off
its debts and distribute the residue.[32]
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold private
respondent Florence S. Ariola accountable for any liability incurred by her
late father. The documentary evidence presented, particularly the promissory
notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and signed
only by the late Efraim Santibaez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner
failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go
after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said promissory notes
and continuing guaranty, of course, subject to any defenses Edmund may
have as against the petitioner. As the court had not acquired jurisdiction over
the person of Edmund, we find it unnecessary to delve into the matter
further.
We agree with the finding of the trial court that the petitioner had not
sufficiently shown that it is the successor-in-interest of the Union Savings
and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC assigned its assets and liabilities.
[33]
The petitioner in its complaint alleged thatby virtue of the Deed of
Assignment dated August 20, 1981 executed by and between First
Countryside
Credit
Corporation
and
Union
Bank
of
the
[34]
[35]
Philippines
However, the documentary evidence
clearly reflects that the
parties in the deed of assignment with assumption of liabilities were the
FCCC, and the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, with the conformity of
Bancom Philippine Holdings, Inc. Nowhere can the petitioners participation
137

therein as a party be found. Furthermore, no documentary or testimonial

evidence was presented during trial to show that Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank is now, in fact, petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines. As
the trial court declared in its decision:
[T]he court also finds merit to the contention of defendant that plaintiff
failed to prove or did not present evidence to prove that Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank is now the Union Bank of the Philippines. Judicial notice does
not apply here. The power to take judicial notice is to [be] exercised by the
courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists;
and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be promptly resolved in
the negative. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 107 SCRA 504). [36]
This being the case, the petitioners personality to file the complaint is
wanting. Consequently, it failed to establish its cause of action. Thus, the
trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint, and the CA in affirming the
same.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED.
The assailed Court of Appeals Decision is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Art. 1083
Santos vs santos
[G.R. No. 139524. October 12, 2000]
PHILIP C. SANTOS and HEIRS OF ELISEO M. SANTOS, petitioners,
vs. LADISLAO M. SANTOS represented herein by his AttorneyIn-Fact NOE M. SANTOS, respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

138

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the January 8,

1999 Decision[1]of the Court of Appeals[2] in CA-G.R. CV No. 48576 which
reversed the decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court[4] of San Mateo, Rizal
(Branch 76) and which declared Ladislao M. Santos and Eliseo M. Santos as
entitled to pro indiviso shares in the property of Isidra M. Santos. The
dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appeal is granted. The
Decision appealed from is REVERSED. Judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of the Appellant and against the Appellees as follows:
1. Tax Declaration Nos. 04-0566 and 04-0016, Exhibits 8 and 9,
under the name of Appellee Philip Santos and the Deed of Sale of
Unregistered Residential Land (Exhibit 15) are hereby declared
inefficacious insofar as the undivided one-half portion of the
Appellant in the Isidra property is concerned;
2. The Appellant and the Appellee Eliseo Santos are hereby declared
each entitled to pro indiviso shares in the Isidra property;
3. The Court a quo is hereby ordered to effect the partition of the
subject lot conformably with Rule 69 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
procedure.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
The following facts as narrated by the Court of Appeals are undisputed:
On May 13, 1993, Ladislao Santos, a resident in the United States of
America, the Appellant in the present recourse, through his Attorney-in-fact,
Noe Santos, filed a complaint, with the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, against
his brother, Eliseo Santos and the latters son, Philip Santos, the Appellees in
the present recourse, for Judicial Partition.
The Appellant averred, inter alia, in his complaint, that, when his and Eliseo
Santos sister, Isidra Santos, died intestate on April 1, 1967, without any
issue, they inherited her parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration 1115,
issued by the Provincial Assessor of Rizal located along General Luna Street,
139

Gitnangbayan, San Mateo, Rizal; that, sometime, in February 1, 1993, the

Appellant discovered that Tax Declaration No. 1115 had been cancelled by
Tax Declaration No. 7892, under the name of his nephew, Appellee Philip
Santos, and that, on December 16, 1980, Virgilio Santos executed a Deed
of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Residential Land on the basis of which
Tax Declaration No. 04-0016 was issued to the Appellee Philip Santos. The
Appellant prayed the Court that judgment be rendered in his favor as
follows:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that after
due hearing judgment be rendered as follows:
(1) Ordering the division of the intestate estate of the late Isidra Santos
between petitioner and respondent Eliseo M. Santos;
(2) Declaring Tax Declaration No. 04-0015 in the name of Virgilio Santos as
null and void;
(3) Declaring the Deed of Sale dated December 11, 1980, executed by
Virgilio Santos in favor of Philip Santos as null and void;
(4) Declaring Tax Declaration No. 04-00161 (sic) in the name of Philip
Santos as null and void;
Petitioner prays for other relief which this Court may deem just and
equitable in the premises. (at page 3, Records)
In their Answer to the complaint, the Appellees admitted that, upon the
demise of Isidra Santos, the Appellant and the Appellee Eliseo Santos
inherited the said property and the latters share in Lot 1522 of the San
Mateo Cadastre, which they and their sister, Isidra Santos, inherited from
their father, Bonifacio Santos who died before the outbreak of the Second
World War but insisted that the Appellant and the Appellee Eliseo Santos had
agreed, in 1969, after the death of Isidra Santos, on April 1, 1967, to
partition Lot 1522, under which a portion of Lot 1522, with an area of 3,387
square meters, was adjudicated to the Appellant, and a portion of the same
lot, with an area of 3,000 square meters, was conveyed to the Appellee
Eliseo Santos and the parcel of land left by Isidra Santos was conveyed
by Appellee Eliseo Santos to Virgilio Santos, who, from infancy had been
140

under the care of Isidra Santos, to approximately equalize the share of the
Appellee Eliseo Santos in the estate of Bonifacio Santos. The Appellees
further averred that Appellees had acquired the Isidra property by
acquisitive prescription.
Neither Appellant Ladislao Santos nor Appellee Eliseo Santos testified in the
Court a quo. Although the Appellee Eliseo Santos was present during the
proceeding, he did not testify anymore because of senility being then about
88 years old. Virginia Santos, the widow of Virgilio Santos, testified, in the
Court a quo, and declared, that she and Virgilio Santos married, on
February 12, 1967, and resided in the house of Isidra Santos until the sale,
by Virgilio Santos, of the Isidra property to his brother, the Appellee Philip
Santos and in exchange with the property of the latter located at Kambal
Street, Gitnangbayan, San Mateo, Rizal, where the couple and, after Virgilio
Santos death, on April 5, 1984, had been residing. Virginia Santos likewise
declared that Appellant Ladislao Santos and the Appellee Eliseo Santos had
an agreement, notarized by Atty. Sixto Natividad, that Virgilio Santos and
Virginia Santos became the new owners of the Isidra property. The copy of
the Agreement given Virgilio Santos was xeroxed and the xerox copy was
given to Appellee Philip Santos while Virgilio Santos copy was filed with the
Provincial Assessors Office on the basis of which, Tax Declaration No. 7892
was issued under his name. The Appellee Philip Santos, on the other hand,
declared that the Appellant Ladislao Santos and the Appellee Eliseo Santos
and their respective Spouses executed a Combined Deed of Partition, in
1969, covering the Lot 1522 and the Isidra Property, wherein it was
covenanted that the Isidra Property was deeded to Appellee Eliseo
Santos. The Appellee Philip Santos further declared that he was then about
20 years old, and saw the said Combined Deed of Partition in the
possession of Appellee Eliseo Santos.
After due proceedings, the Court a quo promulgated a Decision dismissing
Appellants complaint on the ground that the Appellant failed to adduce proof
of his entitlement to the relief prayed for by him and on the ground of
acquisitive prescription.
The present recourse stemmed from the following factual backdrop - when
Bonifacio Santos died intestate, he was survived by his two (2) sons, namely
Ladislao Santos, the Appellant in the present recourse, and Appellee Eliseo
Santos, one of the Appellees in the present recourse and their sister, Isidra
141

Santos. The latter was the owner of a parcel of land, hereinafter referred to,
for brevitys sake, as the Isidra property, located in General Luna Street,
Gitnangbayan, San Mateo, Rizal, with an area of 391 square meters, more or
less, covered by Tax Declaration No. 655, located in front of but oblique to
and about fifty (50) meters away from the property, with an area of 6,340
square meters, covered by Tax Declaration No. 383 of the Provincial
Assessors Office, (Exhibit L-3). She had a house constructed on her lot
where she had been residing ever since.
In the meantime, on November 10, 1964, a cadastral survey of lands in San
Mateo, Rizal, was undertaken. The property, with an area of 6,340 square
meters was identified as Lot 1522, Cadastre No. 375-D. Tax Declaration No.
655, covering the Isidra Property was later cancelled by Tax Declaration
1115 under her name, effective 1966 (Exhibit 4).
On May 29, 1967, the Appellant and his wife, Leonila Mateo executed
a Deed of Absolute Conveyance with Right of Way over the
southwestern portion of Lot 1522, with an area of 3,000 square meters, in
favor of his brother, the Appellee Eliseo Santos for the price of P500.00, with
a provision for a right of way.
On April 1, 1967, Isidra Santos died intestate and was survived by her two
(2) brothers, the Appellant and the Appellee Eliseo Santos.
On September 9, 1969, the Provincial Assessor issued Tax Declaration No.
7892, over the Isidra property, under the name of Virgilio Santos and
Virginia Santos, thereby canceling Tax Declaration No. 1115 under the name
of Isidra Santos (Exhibit 5). In 1972, Tax Declaration No. 7892 was
cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 5043, still under the names of Virgilio
Santos and Virginia Santos, effective 1974 (Exhibit 4) and by Tax
Declaration No. 04-0015, effective 1980 (Exhibit 7).
On December 16, 1980, Virgilio Santos executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
of Unregistered Residential Land in favor of his brother, the Appellee
Philip Santos, over the Isidra Property at the time covered by Tax
Declaration No. 04-0015, for the price of P24,460.00 (Exhibit H). On the
basis of said deed, Tax Declaration No. 04-0015 was cancelled by Tax
Declaration No. 04-0566, under the name of Appellee Philip Santos, effective
1981 (Exhibit E). The Spouses Virgilio Santos vacated the said property and
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resided at Kambal Street, Gitnangbayan I, San Mateo, Rizal formerly owned

by Philip Santos . The latter, in turn, had the house on the lot demolished
and had his shop installed in the Isidra Property. Since then, Philip Santos
had been paying the realty taxes therefor. On April 5, 1984, Virgilio Santos
died intestate and was survived by his wife, Virginia Santos. In the
meantime, the Appellant and Appellee Philip Santos left the Philippines and
resided in the United States of America.
Despite the Deed of Absolute Conveyance With Right of Way executed
by the Appellant in favor of Appellee Eliseo Santos, the children of the
Appellant and their uncle, the Appellee Eliseo Santos, signed an Application,
on September 26, 1984 and filed the same with the Regional Trial Court of
Rizal (at San Mateo) for the registration of their title over Lots 1522 and
2433 of Cadastre 375-D. The Applicants alleged, inter alia in said
application, that Noe Santos, et al., (children of Ladislao Santos), were
occupying a portion of Lot 1522, with an area of 3,430 square meters, while
Appellee Eliseo Santos was occupying a portion of the same lot, with an area
of 3,000 square meters, more or less, as a site of cockpit building (Exhibit
5). On July 16, 1986, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a
Decision granting the application, the decretal portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby declares herein applicants the
absolute owners of that parcels of land identified as Lot 1522 and Lot
2433, both of Plan AP-04-001205 marked as Exhibit D and in
consequence thereof, it is hereby Ordered that the said parcels of
land be registered in the names of the applicants, to wit:
1. Noe Santos, married to Felicidad Santos; Asuncion S. Ramos,
married to Virgilio Ramos; LADISLAO SANTOS, JR., married to Regina
Linco; NELIA S. MACALALAD, married to Jacinto Macalalad; OFELIA
SANTOS, single; RECTO SANTOS, single, all of legal ages, Filipino
citizens and all are residents of Gen. Luna St., San Mateo, Rizal, an
undivided portion of 3,387 square meters of that parcel of land
identified as Lot 1522 of Plan AP-04-001205, marked as Exhibit D
and undivided rights, interest and participation of that parcel of land
identified as Lot 2433 of the above-mentioned Plan with an area of
43 square meters, all in equal shares (pro-indiviso);

143

2. ELISEO SANTOS, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Virginia

Santos and resident of Gen. Luna St., San Mateo, Rizal, an undivided
portion of 3,000 square meters of that parcel of land identified as Lot
1522 of Plan AP-04-001205.
Once this Decision becomes final, let an Order of the issuance of a
Decree of Registration issue (Exhibits 26-E and 26-F)
On the basis of the Decision of the Court, Noe Santos, et al., and Appellee
Eliseo Santos, were issued an Original Certificate of Title No. ON-1146, on
November 18, 1986 over Lot 1522 (Exhibit M).
Noe Santos, for and in behalf of his siblings and Appellee Eliseo Santos had a
subdivision plan prepared, subdividing Lot 1522 into two (2) subdivision lots,
namely, Lot 1522-A, with an area of 3,000 square meters (Exhibit 15A) and Lot 1522-B, with an area of 3,387 square meters (Exhibit 15B).
In June, 1987, Noe Santos and his siblings and their uncle, Appellee Eliseo
Santos, executed a Partition Agreement adjudicating Lot 1522-A, with
an area of 3,000 square meters unto Appellee Eliseo Santos, and Lot 1522B, with an area of 3,387 square meters, unto Noe Santos, et al., (Exhibit
13). On the basis of said deed, Original Certificate of Title No. ON-1146 was
cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 148892 was issued to Appellee
Eliseo Santos over Lot 1522-A (Exhibit 11).
On March 17, 1993, Appellant Ladislao Santos, through counsel, sent a letter
to the Appellee Philip Santos alleging that the Appellant had discovered that
the Isidra property inherited by Appellant and Appellee Eliseo, had been
declared, for taxation purposes, under the name of Appellee Philip Santos,
on the basis of a Deed of Sale executed by Virgilio Santos and suggesting a
conference regarding the matter (Exhibit J). The Appellee Philip Santos
wrote to the counsel of the Appellant, declaring, inter alia, that the Isidra
property, with the portion and Lot 1522-A, with an area of3,000 square
meters, formed part of the share of Appellee Eliseo Santos in the estate
of his father, Bonifacio Santos; that Appellee Eliseo Santos transferred the
Isidra property to his son, Virgilio Santos, who, in turn, sold the said
property to Appellee Philip Santos, for the amount of P24,600.00, as part of
the consideration of the conveyance, by Appellee Philip Santos, of his
144

property located in Kambal Street, Gitnangbayan, San Mateo, Rizal, where

Virgilio Santos widow and family had been residing (Exhibit 24) and the
redemption, by Appellee Philip Santos, of the Mortgage of the property by
Virgilio Santos from the Rural Bank of San Mateo.[5]
On May 13, 1993, herein respondent Ladislao Santos filed an action for
the judicial partition of the Isidra property. After due proceedings, the trial
court promulgated a decision dismissing Ladislaos complaint on the ground
that the latter failed to adduce proof of his entitlement to the relief prayed
for by him and on the ground of acquisitive prescription. Specifically, the trial
court cited the following reasons: (1) the subject property was
registered/declared for taxation purposes only in the name of Isidra Santos;
(2) the fact of co-ownership thereof by reason of inheritance was not
reflected in the tax declaration; (3) there was no proof presented that the
cancellation of the tax declaration in Isidras name and the issuance of
another in Virgilios name had been effected through fraud and
misrepresentation; (4) there is no proof that a fake document was presented
to the provincial assessor for the cancellation of the tax declaration and the
issuance of another in lieu thereof as all assessment records were destroyed
by the fire which gutted the office of the provincial assessor; and (5) from
the time of Isidras death in 1967 up to May 13, 1993 when this case was
filed, acquisitive prescription may have already set in.
In due course, the Court of Appeals, as earlier stated, rendered its
assailed Decision granting the appeal, reversing the trial courts decision and
declaring that Ladislao Santos and Eliseo Santos are each entitled to pro
indiviso shares in the Isidra property.
Hence, this appeal to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
raising the following issues:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING
THE LEGALITY AND REGULARITY OF THE TRANSFER OF ISIDRA
PROPERTY TO VIRGILIO SANTOS AND LATER TO PETITIONER
PHILIP C. SANTOS.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING ONEHALF (1/2) PORTION PRO INDIVISO OF ISIDRA PROPERTY IN
FAVOR OF RESPONDENT DESPITE AND INSPITE OF THE ABSENCE
145

OF PROOF OF ALLEGED FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE

CANCELLATION OF THE TAX DECLARATION IN ISIDRAS NAME ANT
ITS SUBSEQUENT TRANSFER TO VIRGILIO SANTOS NAME.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING
THAT ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION HAS ALREADY SET IN AS TO
BAR THE INSTANT ACTION FOR PARTITION.
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING
THAT RESPONDENTS RIGHT TO FILE THIS INSTANT ACTION FOR
PARTITION HAS ALREADY PRESCRIBED.
V. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING
THAT LACHES HAS ALREADY SET IN AS TO BAR RESPONDENT IN
ASSERTING HIS CLAIM UNDER THE PETITION.
VI. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING
THE RIGHT OF PETITIONER PHILIP SANTOS AS BUYER IN GOOD
FAITH AND FOR VALUE.[6]
The material aspects of the issues are closely intertwined; hence, they
are consolidated into two main issues specifically dealing with the following
subjects: (1) the validity of the transfers of the property originally belonging
to Isidra M. Santos (the Isidra property) from Eliseo Santos to Virgilio Santos
and then to Philip Santos; and (2) whether the action for partition is already
barred by ordinary acquisitive prescription of ten years and estoppel by
laches.
The petition is not meritorious.
The controversy involves a 391 square meter parcel of land situated in
San Mateo, Rizal, owned by Isidra Santos, a spinster who died intestate and
without issue in 1967. She was survived by her two brothers, Ladislao and
Eliseo. Sometime in 1993, Ladislao through his attorney-in-fact Noe M.
Santos filed an action for judicial partition of the Isidra property against his
brother Eliseo and the latters son Philip. While admitting that Ladislao and
Eliseo inherited the subject Isidra property, Eliseo and Philip submitted
that Eliseo Santos and wife and Ladsilao and wife signed a
document wherein Eliseo acquired the subject lot from the combined
146

partition of the estate of their father Bonifacio Santos and their sister Isidra
Santos. Bonifacios estate was composed of 6,387 square meters while that
of Isidra Santos is the subject property with an area of 391 square
meters. Out of this combined parcels of land, respondent got 3,387 square
meters while Eliseo got 3,000 square meters and the subject Isidra property
with an area of 391 square meters. Eliseo, in turn, donated the subject
Isidra property to his son, Virgilio Santos.
Considering that petitioners Eliseo and Philip disputed the status of
Ladislao as co-owner on the ground that the brothers entered into a
Combined Deed of Partition wherein the entire Isidra property was conveyed
to Eliseo, It was then incumbent upon them to present the best evidence
obtainable to prove the same. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the
claim of a subsisting co-ownership by Ladislao over the Isidra property has
not been effectively refuted by Eliseo and Philip, and that Eliseo and his
successors-in-interest (Virgilio and Philip) did not acquire exclusive title over
the entire Isidra property.
Petitioners insist that they have effectively refuted the co-ownership
between Ladislao and Eliseo based on a lawful document proven as follows in
the court a quo: (1) the annotation at the back of Tax Declaration No. 1115
which states: cancelled by Tax No. 7892, dated September 9, 1969, Virgilio
and Virginia Cruz-Santos; (2) Rodolfo Bautista, municipal assessor of San
Mateo, Rizal testified on the existence of the document authorizing the
cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 1115 in favor of the issuance of Tax
Declaration No. 7892 in Virgilios name; (3) Virginia Santos (wife of Virgilio),
Philip and a certain Dr. Linco testified on the existence of said document. In
relation to the foregoing, petitioners argue that the Isidra property was
acquired through a valid document inscribed in the tax declaration; [7] that
the existence and nature of this document was proved by testimonial
evidence; and that respondent was not able to show that the document
registered with the provincial assessors office was not the combined partition
or deed of transfer by brothers Ladislao and Eliseo.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that only the original document is the
best evidence of the fact as to whether the brothers Ladislao and Eliseo
Santos executed a Combined Deed of Partition wherein the entire property of
Isidra Santos was conveyed to Eliseo.In the absence of such document,
petitioners arguments regarding said partition must fail. The testimonies of
147

Virginia Santos and Philip Santos on the existence of and the contents of the
aforesaid documents are, at most, secondary evidence, which are
inadmissible considering that the petitioners as the offerors failed to prove
any of the exceptions provided in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court[8] and to establish the conditions for their admissibility.[9] We quote
with favor the findings of the Court of Appeals, thus:
Even if we assumed, for the nonce, that indeed, Lot 1522 was inherited by
the Appellant and his brother, the Appellee Eliseo Santos, however, we are
not convinced that the Appellant and his wife deeded to the Appellee Eliseo
Santos and the latter to Virgilio Santos the Isidra Property under aDeed of
Transfer as testified to by Virginia Santos or under a Combined Deed of
Partition as testified to by Appellee Philip Santos. The Appellees never
adduced in evidence any copy of the said deed executed by the Appellant
and the Appellee Eliseo Santos and their respective spouses.Since the
subject of inquiry was the subject of said deed, it was incumbent on the
Appellees to adduce in evidence the original of the deed or a copy of the
original of the deed conformably with Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Evidence. The Appellees failed to do so. The Court a quo allowed the
Appellees to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the said
deed, but it was inappropriate for the Court a quo to do so over the
objections of the Appellant. This is so because, before the Appellees are
allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original
of the deed, the Appellees had to prove, with the requisite quantum of
evidence, the loss or destruction or unavailability of all the copies of the
original of the deed. As former Supreme Court Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran
declared:
Where there are two or more originals, it must appear that all of them have
been lost, destroyed or cannot be produced before secondary evidence can
be given of any one. For example, a lease was executed in duplicate, one
being retained by the lessor and the other by the lessee. Either copy was,
therefore, an original, and could have been introduced as evidence of the
contract without the production of the other. One of these originals could not
be found. The non-production of the other was not accounted for it was held
that under these circumstances, the rule is that no secondary evidence of
the contents of either is admissible until it is shown that originals must be
accounted for before secondary evidence can be given of any one. (Moran,

148

Comments on the Rules of Court, Volume V, 1970 ed. at pages 90-91, supra,
underscoring supplied)
Indeed, before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the
contents of the original of the deed, the offeror is mandated to prove the
following:
(a) the execution and existence of the original (b) the loss and destruction of
the original or its non-production in court; and (c) unavailability of the
original is not due to bad faith on the part of the offeror. (Francisco, Rules of
Court, Part I, Volume VII, 1997 ed. at page 154).
When she testified in the Court a quo, Virginia Santos declared that there
were three (3) copies of the deed signed by the parties thereof. One copy of
the deed was given to Virgilio Santos, one copy was retained by the Appellee
Eliseo Santos, and one copy was retained by Atty. Sixto Natividad, the
Notary Public. Virgilio Santos had his copy xeroxed and gave the xerox copy
to Appellee Philip Santos. Virgilio Sanots copy was later filed with the
Provincial Assessors Office. x x x.
x x x x x x x x x.
When he testified in the Court a quo, the Appellee Philip Santos admitted
that he saw a copy of the deed in the possession of his father, the Appellee
Eliseo Santos:
x x x x x x x x x.
While the Appellees adduced evidence that the copy filed with the Provincial
Assessors Office was burned when the Office of the Provincial Assessor was
burned on April 7, 1977, however, the Appellees failed to adduce proof that
the copy in the possession of Atty. Sixto Natividad was lost or destroyed. It
bears stressing that a Notary Public is mandated, under the Notarial Law, to
retain two (2) copies of every deed involving real estate as part of his
notarial record, a copy of which he is to submit to the Notarial Section of the
Regional Trial Court.
The Appellees could very well have procured, by subpoenae ad testificandum
and duces tecum, the attendance of Atty. Sixto Natividad before the Court a
quo and bring with him his copy of the deed. After all, there is no evidence
149

on record that he was already dead or was unavailable at the time of the
trial in the Court a quo. The Appellees did not. Moreover, the Appellees failed
to prove the loss or destruction of the copy on file with the Notarial Section
of the Regional Trial Court or of the copy in the possession of the Appellee
Eliseo Santos. Assuming, for the nonce, that the Appellees mustered the
requisite quantum of evidence to prove the loss or destruction of all the
copies of the original of the deed, however, Section 5 of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Evidence provides that, before testimonial evidence may be
adduced to prove the contents of the original of the deed, the offeror is
mandated to prove the loss or non-availability of any copy of the original or
of some authentic document reciting the contents thereof: x x x.
x x x x x x x x x.
In the present recourse, Virginia Santos admitted that a xerox copy of the
deed was given to the Appellee Philip Santos. However, when she testified in
the Court a quo, she admitted not having inquired from the Appellee Philip
Santos if he still had the xerox copy of all deeds that Virgilio gave him. x x x.
[10]

We also agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioners evidence

consisting of the tax declarations in Virgilios name and then in Philips name
are not conclusive and indisputable evidence to show that the lot in question
was conveyed to Virgilio Santos, Philips predecessor-in-interest. A mere tax
declaration does not vest ownership of the property upon the
declarant. Neither do tax receipts nor declarations of ownership for taxation
purposes constitute adequate evidence of ownership or of the right to
possess realty.[11]
As for the much-vaunted testimony of the municipal assessor of San
Mateo, Rizal, the Court of Appeals had this to say:
The Appellees presented Rodolfo Bautista, the representative of the Rizal
Provincial Assessor, to prove that Tax Declaration No. 7892, under the name
of Virgilio Santos and Virginia Santos, cancelled Tax Declaration No. 1115,
under the name of Isidra Santos, on the basis of the Combined Deed of
Partition purportedly executed by the Appellant and his wife, in tandem
with the Appellee Eliseo Santos and his wife, which was, however, burned
when the Provincial Assessors Office was gutted by fire on April 7,
150

1977. However, Rodolfo Bautista himself unabashedly admitted, when he

testified in the Court a quo that he had no knowledge of the nature of the
deed that was used for the cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 1115 under
the name of Isidra Santos or the previous document burned or gutted by the
fire.
Atty. Ferry:
Q: When you testified last March 14, 1994, Mr. Bautista, you declared
that you assumed your position in the Office of the Municipal Assessor
only on January 6, 1982. Before that, you were not connected with the
Municipal Assessor?
A: I am not yet connected, sir.
Q: So for the first time you learned, in your official capacity, the alleged
lost of all records in the Office of the Provincial Assessor bearing dates
1977 down was only recently?
A: No, sir.
Q: When?
A: When I took over in 1982, sir.
Q: But the fact is, you will agree with me in so far as the present
controversy is concerned, you have no way of determining the
particular document presented to the Office of the Provincial Assessor
which was made the basis in effecting the transfer of tax declaration in
the name of Isidra Santos in favor of Virgilio Santos marked in
evidence as Exh. 4. You have no way of determining or identifying the
particular document used or presented to the Office of the Provincial
Assessor which was made the basis for the cancellation of tax
declaration in the name of Isidra Santos and that paved the issuance
of the tax declaration in the name of Virgilio Santos marked in
evidence by the defendants as Exh. 5. You will not be able to know
that simply on the basis of this document? You are in no position to
tell or determine what particular document was presented in the Office
of the Provincial Assessor which paved the way to the cancellation of
Exh. 4 which is tax declaration no. 1115 in the name of Isidra Santos
151

and the issuance of another one in the name of Virgilio Santos marked
in evidence as Exh. 5?
A: I do not know, sir (t.s.n. Bautista, at pages 9-10, April 18, 1994,
underscoring supplied)
The Appellees can find no solstice [12] on the face of Tax Declaration No. 1115,
Exhibit 4, which contains the following entry:
Cancelled by:
Tax Declaration No. 7892
Dated: Sept. 9, 1969
Virgilio & Virginia Cruz Santos
(Exhibit 4-B)
This is so because the entry does not contain any clue of the nature of the
deed, if it was a deed at all, used for the cancellation of Tax Declaration No.
1155, the parties who executed the said deed or the beneficiary of said
deed. Indeed, the Court admitted, in its Decision, that there was no way of
identifying the document used as basis for the issuance of a new tax
declaration under the name of Virgilio Santos (t.s.n. Bautista,
supra). Virgilio Santos could very well have executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate and of Self-Adjudication of Real
Property covering the Isidra Property and filed the same with the Provincial
Assessor on the basis of which he was issued Tax Declaration No. 7892 over
the property. But then, such a deed did not prejudice the share of the
Appellant in the Isidra Property. It is not legally possible for one to
adjudicate unto himself a property he was not the owner of. Hence, We find
and so declare that the Isidra Property remained the property of the
Appellant and the Appellee Eliseo Santos as their inheritance from Isidra
Santos. As our Supreme Court declared in an avuncular case:
Despite admission during the hearing on the identify of the land in question
(see p. 21, Record on Appeal), Marias counsel, on appeal, re-emphasized her
original claim that the two parcels of land in her possession were acquired
from the Sps. Placido Biduya and Margarita Bose. However, the private
152

document relative to the purchase, was not produced at the trial, allegedly
because they were placed in a trunk in their house which were burned
during the Japanese Occupation. In 1945, Maria sold the riceland. No written
evidence was submitted for all intents therefore, the riceland remained
inherited property (Maria Bicarme, et al., versus Court of Appeals, et
al., 186 SCRA 294, at pages 298-299).
In the light of our findings and disquisitions, Virgilio Santos did not acquire
title over the Isidra Property. Hence, Virgilio Santos could not have lawfully
sold the said property to his brother, the Appellee Philip Santos. As the Latin
aphorism goes: NEMO DAT QUOD NON HABET.[13]
All told, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, Virginia Santos,
Philip Santos and Rodolfo Bautista, on the existence of said document,
specifically, the Combined Deed of Partition, cannot be considered in favor of
the petitioners, the same being, at most, secondary evidence.
Anent the second issue, petitioners insist that acquisitive prescription has
already set in; and that estoppel lies to bar the instant action for
partition. According to petitioners, Virgilio Santos was already in possession
of the subject property since after the death of Isidra Santos on April 1,
1967. Thereafter, Philip Santos took possession of the subject property on
December 16, 1980 upon its sale on said date. They reason out that more
than 13 years had lapsed from April 1, 1967 to December 16, 1980; and
that more than 12 years had lapsed from the time Philip Santos took
possession of the property on December 16, 1980 up to the time Ladislao
Santos filed the action for partition on May 13, 1993. Petitioners conclude
that the instant action is already barred by ordinary acquisitive prescription
of ten years. Further, it is argued that the possession of Virgilio Santos could
be tacked with the possession of Philip Santos bringing to a total of 26 years
the time that elapsed before the filing of the case in 1993. They add that
these 26 years of inaction call for the application of the principle of estoppel
by laches.
Considering that there was no proof that Ladislao Santos executed
any Combined Deed of Partition in tandem with the Eliseo Santos, we rule
that a co-ownership still subsists between the brothers over the Isidra
property. This being the case, we apply Article 494 of the Civil Code which
states that, prescription does not run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir
153

against his co-owners or his co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly

recognizes the co-ownership. In Adile vs. Court of Appeals,[14] it was held:
x x x. Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership,
must have been preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of
repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner
repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made
known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and
conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the period required
by law.
There is no showing that Eliseo Santos had complied with these
requisites. We are not convinced that Eliseo had repudiated the coownership, and even if he did, there is no showing that the same had been
clearly made known to Ladislao. As aptly observed by the Court of Appeals:
Under Article 1119 of the New Civil Code, acts of possessory character
executed in virtue of license or tolerance of the owners shall not be available
for the purposes of possession.
Indeed, Filipino family ties being close and well-knit as they are, and
considering that Virgilio Santos was the ward of Isidra Santos ever since
when Virgilio Santos was still an infant, it was but natural that the Appellant
did not interpose any objection to the continued stay of Virgilio Santos and
his family on the property and even acquiesce thereto. Appellant must have
assumed too, that his brother, the Appellee Eliseo Santos, allowed his son to
occupy the property and use the same for the time being. Hence, such
possession by Virgilio Santos and Philip Santos of the property does not
constitute a repudiation of the co-ownership by the Appellee Eliseo Santos
and of his privies for that matter. As our Supreme Court succinctly observed:
x x x [A]nd it is probable that said conduct was simply tolerated by the
plaintiffs on account of his being their uncle, and they never thought that by
said conduct the defendant was attempting to oust them forever from the
inheritance, nor that the defendant would have so intended in any way,
dealing as we do here with the acquisition of a thing by prescription, the
evidence must be so clear and conclusive as to establish said prescription
without any shadow of doubt. This does not happen in the instant case, for
154

the defendant did not even try to prove that he has expressly or impliedly
refused plaintiffs right over an aliquot part of the inheritance. (at page 875,
supra)[15]
Penultimately, the action for partition is not barred by laches. An action
to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches. Each
co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property.[16]
As a final note, it must be stated that since Ladislao has successfully
hurdled the issue of co-ownership of the property sought to be partitioned,
there is the secondary issue of how the property is to be divided between
the two brothers.[17] This Court cannot proceed forthwith with the actual
partitioning of the property involved, hence, we reiterate the order of the
Court of Appeals for the trial court to effect the partition of the subject
property in conformity with Rule 69 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

In re: last will of Santiago

IN
RE: PETITION
FOR
PROBATE OF LAST WILL AND
TESTAMENT
OF
BASILIOSANTIAGO,
MA. PILAR SANTIAGO
CLEMENTE SANTIAGO,
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 179859

Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,

and BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,*
ABAD,** and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

- versus ZOILO
S.
SANTIAGO,
FELICIDAD
SANTIAGORIVERA,
HEIRS
OF
RICARDOSANTIAGO,
HEIRS
OF
CIPRIANO SANTIAGO,
HEIRS OF TOMAS SANTIAGO,
Respondents.
155

FILEMON
SOCO,
LEONILA
SOCO,
ANANIAS
SOCO,
URBANO SOCO, GERTRUDES
Promulgated:
SOCO
AND
HEIRS
OF
August 9, 2010
CONSOLACION SOCO,
Oppositors.
x-------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Basilio Santiago (Basilio) contracted three marriagesthe first to Bibiana
Lopez, the second to Irene Santiago, and the third to Cecilia
Lomotan. Basilio and his first wife bore two offsprings, Irene and Marta, the
mother of herein oppositors Felimon, Leonila, Consolacion, Ananias, Urbano,
and Gertrudes, all surnamed Soco.
Basilio and his second wife had six offsprings, Tomas, Cipriano,
Ricardo, respondents Zoilo and Felicidad, and petitioner Ma. Pilar, all
surnamed Santiago.
Basilio and his third wife bore three children, Eugenia herein petitioner
Clemente, and Cleotilde, all surnamed Santiago.[1]
After Basilio died testate on September 16, 1973, his daughter by the
second marriage petitioner Ma. Pilar filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bulacan[2] a petition for the probate of Basilios will, docketed as SP
No. 1549-M. The will was admitted to probate by Branch 10 of the RTC and
Ma. Pilar was appointed executrix.
156

The will contained the following provisions, among others:

4. Ang mga ari-arian ko na nasasaysay sa itaas ay
INIWAN, IPINAGKAKALOOB, IBINIBIGAY, at IPINAMAMANA ko
sa aking mga nasabing tagapagmana sa ilalim ng gaya ng
sumusunod:

xxxx
c) ang aking anak na si Ma. Pilar ang magpapalakad at
mamamahala ng balutan na nasa Santiago, Malolos, Bulacan,
na nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(y);
d) Sa pamamahala ng bigasan, pagawaan ng pagkain ng
hayop at lupat bahay sa Maynila, ang lahat ng solar sa danay
ng daang Malolos-Paombong na nasa Malolos, Bulacan, kasali
at kasama ang palaisdaan na nasa likuran niyon, ay ililipat sa
pangalan nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente; ngunit ang kita ng
palaisdaan ay siyang gagamitin nila sa lahat at anomang
kailangang gugol, maging majora o roperacion [sic], sa lupat
bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(c);
e) Ang lupat bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na
nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(c) ay ililipat at ilalagay sa
pangalan nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente hindi bilang pamana
ko sa kanila kundi upang pamahalaan at pangalagaan
lamang nila at nang ang sinoman sa aking mga anak
sampu ng apo at kaapuapuhan ko sa habang panahon
ay may tutuluyan kung magnanais na mag-aral sa
Maynila o kalapit na mga lunsod x x x.
f) Ang bigasan, mga makina at pagawaan ng pagkain ng
hayop ay ipinamamana ko sa aking asawa, Cecilia Lomotan, at
mga anak na Zoilo, Ma. Pilar, Ricardo, Cipriano, Felicidad,
Eugenia, Clemente, at Cleotilde nang pare-pareho. Ngunit, sa
loob ng dalawampong (20) taon mula sa araw ng aking
kamatayan, hindi nila papartihin ito at pamamahalaan
ito ni Clemente at ang maghahawak ng salaping kikitain
ay si Ma. Pilar na siyang magpaparte. Ang papartihin
lamang ay ang kita ng mga iyon matapos na ang gugol na
kakailanganin niyon, bilang reparacion, pagpapalit o
157

pagpapalaki ay maawas na. Ninais ko ang ganito sa aking

pagmamahal sa kanila at pagaaring ibinubuhay ko sa kanila
lahat, bukod sa yaon ay sa kanila ding kapakinabangan at
kabutihan.
g) Ang lahat ng lupa, liban sa lupat bahay sa
Lunsod ng Maynila, ay ipinapamana ko sa aking
nasabing asawa, Cecilia Lomotan, at mga anak na
Tomas, Zoilo, Ma. Pilar, Ricardo, Cipriano, Felicidad,
Eugenia,
Clemente
at
Cleotilde
nang
parepareho.Datapwat, gaya din ng mga bigasan, makina at
gawaan ng pagkain ng hayop, ito ay hindi papartihin sa
loob ng dalawampong (20) taon mula sa aking
pagpanaw, at pamamahalaan din nila Ma. Pilar at
Clemente. Ang mapaparte lamang ay ang kita o ani ng
nasabing mga pag-aari matapos bayaran ang buwis at/o
patubig at iba pang mga gugol na kailangan. Si Ma. Pilar din
ang hahawak ng ani o salaping manggagaling dito. (emphasis
and underscoring supplied)[3]
The oppositors-children of Marta, a daughter of Basilio
his first wife, were, on their motion, allowed to intervene.[4]

and

After the executrix-petitioner Ma. Pilar filed a Final Accounting,

Partition and Distribution in Accordance with the Will, [5] the probate court
approved the will by Order of August 14, 1978 and directed the registers
of deeds of Bulacan andManila to register the certificates of title indicated
therein.[6] Accordingly, the titles to Lot Nos. 786, 837, 7922, 836 and 838 in
Malolos, Bulacan and Lot No. 8-C in Manila were transferred in the name of
petitioners Ma. Pilar and Clemente.[7]
The oppositors thereafter filed a Complaint-in-Intervention [8] with the
probate court, alleging that Basilios second wife was not Irene but a certain
Maria Arellano with whom he had no child; and that Basilios will violates
Articles 979-981 of the Civil Code.[9]
The probate court dismissed the Complaint-in-Intervention, citing its
previous approval of the Final Accounting, Partition, and Distribution in
Accordance with the Will.[10]

158

The oppositors-heirs of the first marriage thereupon filed a complaint

for completion of legitime before the Bulacan RTC, docketed as Civil
Case No. 562-M-90,[11] against the heirs of the second and third marriages.
In their complaint, oppositors-heirs of the first marriage essentially
maintained that they were partially preterited by Basilios will because their
legitime was reduced.[12] They thus prayed, inter alia, that an inventory and
appraisal of all the properties of Basilio be conducted and that Ma. Pilar and
Clemente be required to submit a fresh accounting of all the incomes of the
properties from the time of Basilios death up to the time of the filing of Civil
Case No. 562-M-90.[13]
RTC-Branch 17 decided Civil Case No. 562-M-90 (for completion of
legitime) in favor of the oppositors-heirs of the first marriage.
On appeal (docketed as CA G.R. No. 45801), the Court of Appeals, by
Decision of January 25, 2002, [14] annulled the decision of RTC-Branch 17,
holding that the RTC Branch 17 dismissal of the Complaint-in-Intervention in
SP No. 1549-M and its August 14, 1978 Order approving the probate of the
will constitute res judicata with respect to Civil Case No. 562-M-90. [15] Thus
the appellate court disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is
hereby GRANTED. The Decision in Civil Case No. 562-M-90 is
hereby ANNULLED on the ground of res judicata. Let the
Decree
of
Distribution
of
the
Estate
of
Basilio Santiago remain UNDISTURBED.
SO
ORDERED.[16] (emphasis
underscoring supplied)

in

the

original;

Oppositors-heirs of the first marriage challenged the appellate courts

decision in CA G.R. No. 45801 by petition for review, docketed as G.R. No.
155606, which this Court denied. [17] The denial became final and executory
on April 9, 2003.[18]

159

In the interregnum, or on October 17, 2000, respondent-heirs of

the second marriage filed before the probate court (RTC-Branch 10)
a Motion for Termination of Administration, for Accounting, and for
Transfer of Titles in the Names of the Legatees.[19] Citing the earlier
quoted portions of Basilios will, they alleged that:
x x x x the twenty (20) year period within which
subject properties should be under administration of [Ma.]
Pilar Santiago and
Clemente
Santiago expired
on September 16, 1993.
Consequently,
[Ma.]
Pilar Santiago and
Clemente
Santiago should have ceased as such administrator[s] way
back on September 16, 1993 and they should have transferred
the above said titles to the named legatees in the Last Will
and Testament of the testator by then.Said named legatees in
the Last Will and Testament are no[ne] other than the
following:
xxxx
Said [Ma.] Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago should
have also rendered an accounting of their administration from
such death of the testator up to the present or until transfer of
said properties and its administration to the said legatees.
x x x x[20]

Respondents prayed that petitioners be ordered:

1)

To surrender the above-enumerated titles

presently in their names to [the] Honorable Court
and to transfer the same in the names of the
designated legatees in the Last Will and Testament,
to wit:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)

asawa, Cecilia Lomotan, at mga anak na

Tomas
Zoilo
Ma. Pilar
Ricardo
160

6) Cipriano
7) Felicidad
8) Eugenia
9) Clemente at
10) Cleotilde
(all surnamed SANTIAGO)
2)

To
peacefully
surrender
possession
and
administration of subject properties, including any
and all improvements thereon, to said legatees.

3)

To render an accounting of their administration of

said properties and other properties of the testator
under their administration, from death of testator
Basilio Santiago on September 16, 1973 up to the
present and until possession and administration
thereof is transferred to said legatees.[21]

Opposing the motion, petitioners argued that with the approval of the
Final Accounting, Partition and Distribution in Accordance with the Will, and
with the subsequent issuance of certificates of title covering the properties
involved, the case had long since been closed and terminated. [22]
The probate court, finding that the properties in question would be
transferred to petitioners Ma. Pilar and Clemente for purposes of
administration only, granted the motion, by Order of September 5, 2003,
[23]
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for
Termination of Administration, for Accounting, and for Transfer
of Titles in the Names of the Legatees dated October 3,
2000 filed by some heirs of the testator Basilio Santiago xxx is
hereby GRANTED.Accordingly, the administratrix [sic] Ma.
Pilar Santiago and
Mr.
Clemente
Santiago
are
hereby DIRECTED, as follows:
a.)

To
surrender
the
above-enumerated
titles
presently in their names to this Honorable Court and
to transfer the same in the names of the designated
legatees in the Last Will and Testament, to wit: 1.)
asawa, Cecilia Lomotan at mga anak na 2.) Tomas 3).
161

Zoilo 4.) Ma. Pilar 5.) Ricardo 6.) Cipriano 7.)

Felicidad 8.) Eugenia 9.) Clemente and 10.) Cleotilde
all named SANTIAGO.
b.) To
peacefully
surrender
possession
and
administration of subject properties including any and
all improvements thereon, to said legatees; and
c.) To render an accounting of their administration of
subject
properties,
including
any
and
all
improvements thereon, to said legatees; and
d.) To submit an accounting of their administration of
the above-mentioned estate of the testator or all the
above said lots including the rice mill, animal feeds
factory, and all improvements thereon from August
14, 1978 up to the present.
e.) To submit a proposed Project of Partition,
indicating how the parties may actually partition or
adjudicate all the above said properties including the
properties already in the name of all the said legatees
xxx.
x x x x.
Further, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan are
hereby DIRECTED to cancel and consider as no force and
effects Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-249177 (RT-46294)
[Lot No. 786], T-249175 (RT-46295) [Lot No. 837], T-249174
(RT-46296) [Lot No. 7922], T-249173 (RT-46297) [Lot No.
836], and T-249176 (RT-46293) [Lot No. 838] in the names of
Ma. Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago and to issue new
ones in the lieu thereof in the names of Cecilia LomotanSantiago, Tomas Santiago, Zoilo Santiago, Ma. Pilar Santiago,
Ricardo Santiago, Cipriano Santiago, Felicidad Santiago,
Eugenia Santiago, Clemente Santiago, and Cleotilde Santiago.
Moreover, the Register of Deeds of Manila is
hereby DIRECTED to cancel and consider as no force and
effect Transfer Certificate of Title No. 131044 [Lot No. 8-C] in
the names of Ma. Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago and to
issue new ones in lieu thereof in the names of the Heirs of
Bibiana Lopez, the Heirs of Irene Santiago, and the Heirs of
Cecilia Lomotan.
The Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed by Filemon,
Leonila, Ma. Concepcion, Ananias, Urbano and Gertrudes, all
162

surnamed
Soco,
dated December
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.[24]

3,

2002,

is

Respecting petitioners argument that the case had long been closed
and terminated, the trial court held:
x x x x [I]t is clear from the Last Will and Testament
that subject properties cannot actually be partitioned until
after 20 years from the death of the testator Basilio Santiago
x x x x. It is, therefore, clear that something more has to be
done after the approval of said Final Accounting, Partition, and
Distribution. The testator Basilio Santiago died on September
16, 1973, hence, the present action can only be filed
after September 16, 1993. Movants cause of action accrues
only from the said date and for which no prescription of action
has set in.
The principle of res judicata does not apply in the
present probate proceeding which is continuing in
character, and terminates only after and until the final
distribution or settlement of the whole estate of the
deceased in accordance with the provision of the will of
the testator. The Order dated August 14, 1978 refers only to
the accounting, partition, and distribution of the estate of the
deceased for the period covering from the date of the filing of
the petition for probate on December 27, 1973 up to August
14, 1978. And in the said August 14, 1978 order it does not
terminate
the
appointment
of
petitioner[s]
Ma.
Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago as executrix and
administrator, respectively, of the estate of the deceased
particularly of those properties which were prohibited by the
testator to be partitioned within 20 years from his
death. Since then up to the present, Ma. Pilar Santiago and
Clemente Santiago remain the executor and administrator of
the estate of the deceased and as such, they are required by
law to render an accounting thereof from August 14, 1978up
to the present; there is also now a need to partition and

163

distribute the aforesaid properties as the prohibition period to

do so has elapsed. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) [25]

Petitioners, together with the oppositors, filed a motion for

reconsideration,[26] which the probate court denied, drawing them to appeal
to the Court of Appeals which docketed it as CA G.R. No. 83094.

[27]

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the probate court,

hence, the petition[28] which raises the following grounds:
I.
CAN THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS REVERSE
ITSELF
A.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT BINDING

ITSELF WITH ITS PREVIOUS DECISION INVOLVING
THE SAME PARTIES AND SAME PROPERTIES;
B.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
RTC AS IT AGREED WITH THE RTC THAT THIS CASE
IS NOT BARRED BY RES JUDICATA;
C.
IN C.A.-G.R. NO. 45801, THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS HELD THAT THERE WAS RES JUDICATA;
IN C.A.-G.R. CV NO. 83094, THERE WAS NO RES
JUDICATA.
II.
GRANTING THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS ALL
THE COMPETENCE AND JURISDICTION TO REVERSE
ITSELF, STILL THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING
THE
RTCS
ORDER
TO
TRANSFER
THE MANILAPROPERTY COVERED BY TCT NO. 131004
TO
THE
NAMES
OF
CECILIA
LOMOTAN,
TOMAS, ZOILO, MA.
PILAR,
RICARDO,
CIPRIANO
FELICIDAD, EUGENIA, CLEMENTE AND CLEOTILDE, ALL
SURNAMED SANTIAGO.[29] (emphasis in the original)
164

The petition lacks merit.

Petitioners argument that the decision of the appellate court in the
earlier CA-G.R. NO. 45801 (upheld by this Court in G.R. No. 155606)
constitutes res judicata to the subsequent CA G.R. No. 83094 (the subject of
the present petition for review) fails.
Res judicata has two aspects, which are embodied in Sections 47 (b)
and 47 (c) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. [30] The first, known as
bar by prior judgment, proscribes the prosecution of a second action upon
the same claim, demand or cause of action already settled in a prior action.
[31]
The second, known as conclusiveness of judgment, ordains that issues
actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any
future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action.
[32]

Both aspects of res judicata, however, do not find application in the

present case. The final judgment regarding oppositors complaint on the
reduction of their legitime in CA-G.R. NO. 45801 does not dent the present
petition, which solely tackles the propriety of the termination of
administration, accounting and transfer of titles in the names of the
legatees-heirs of the second and third marriages. There is clearly no
similarity of claim, demand or cause of action between the present petition
and G.R. No. 155606.
While as between the two cases there is identity of
parties, conclusiveness of judgment cannot likewise be invoked. Again, the
judgment in G.R. No. 155606 would only serve as an estoppel as regards the
issue on oppositors supposed preterition and reduction of legitime, which
issue is not even a subject, or at the very least even invoked, in the present
petition.
What is clear is that petitioners can invoke res judicata insofar as the
judgment in G.R. No. 155606 is concerned against the oppositors
165

only. The records reveal, however, that the oppositors did not appeal the
decision of the appellate court in this case and were only impleaded pro
forma parties.
Apparently, petitioners emphasize on the directive of the appellate
court in CA G.R. No. 45801 that the decree of distribution of the estate of
Basilio should remain undisturbed. But this directive goes only so far as to
prohibit the interference of the oppositors in the distribution of Basilios
estate and does not pertain to respondents supervening right to demand the
termination of administration, accounting and transfer of titles in their
names.
Thus, the Order of September 5, 2003 by the probate court granting
respondents Motion for Termination of Administration, for Accounting, and
for Transfer of Titles in the Names of the Legatees is a proper and necessary
continuation of theAugust 14, 1978 Order that approved the accounting,
partition and distribution of Basilios estate. As did the appellate court, the
Court notes that the August 14, 1978 Order was yet to become final pending
the whole settlement of the estate. And final settlement of the estate, in this
case, would culminate after 20 years or on September 16, 1993, when the
prohibition to partition the properties of the decedent would be lifted.
Finally, petitioners object to the inclusion of the house and lot in
Manila, covered by TCT No. 131044, among those to be transferred to the
legatees-heirs as it would contravene the testators intent that no one is to
own the same.
The Court is not persuaded. It is clear from Basilios will that he
intended the house and lot in Manila to be transferred in petitioners names
for administration purposes only, and that the property be owned by the
heirs in common, thus:
e) Ang lupat bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na nasasaysay
sa itaas na 2(c) ay ililipat at ilalagay sa pangalan nila Ma. Pilar
at Clemente hindi bilang pamana ko sa kanila kundi
upang pamahalaan at pangalagaan lamang nila at nang
ang sinoman sa aking mga anak sampu ng apo at
166

kaapuapuhan ko sa habang panahon ay may tutuluyan kung

magnanais na mag-aral sa Maynila o kalapit na mga lunsod sa
medaling salita, ang bahay at lupang itoy walang
magmamay-ari bagkus ay gagamitin habang panahon ng
sinomang magnanais sa aking kaapuapuhan na tumuklas ng
karunungan sa paaralan sa Maynila at katabing mga lunsod x
x x x[33] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

But the condition set by the decedent on the propertys indivisibility is

subject to a statutory limitation. On this point, the Court agrees with the
ruling of the appellate court, viz:
For this Court to sustain without qualification,
[petitioners]s contention, is to go against the provisions of
law, particularly Articles 494, 870, and 1083 of the Civil
Code, which provide that the prohibition to divide a
property in a co-ownership can only last for twenty (20)
years x x x x
xxxx
x x x x Although the Civil Code is silent as to the effect
of the indivision of a property for more than twenty years, it
would be contrary to public policy to sanction co-ownership
beyond the period expressly mandated by the Civil Code x x x
x[34]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

167

Art. 1088
Garcia vs calaliman
G.R. No. L-26855 April 17, 1989
FRANCISCO GARCIA, PAZ GARCIA, and MARIA GARCIA, petitioners,
vs.
JOSE CALALIMAN, PACIENCIA TRABADILLO & HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, Third Division, respondents.
Jose Gaton for petitioners.
Ricardo Q. Castro for respondents.

PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 22179-R, promulgated on August 31, 1966,
reversing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo ** in Civil Case
No. 3489, and rendering a new one dismissing the complaint of petitioner
herein, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed
and another entered, dismissing plaintiff's complaint. No
pronouncement as to costs. (p. 29 Rollo)
The facts of the case are as follows:
On February 11, 1946, one Gelacio Garcia died intestate, leaving a parcel of
unregistered land about 372 sq. meters, situated in the Municipality of
Tubungan, Province of Iloilo (Exhibits, p. 19). On his death the property was
inherited by his nephews, nieces, grandnephews who are the descendants of
his late brothers, Pedro, Simeon, Buenaventura and Marcos (TSN, Sept.
6,1956, p. 3).
On December 3, 1954, the heirs, Juanita Bertomo, Joaquin Garcia, Porfirio
Garcia, Dioscoro Garcia, Flora Garcia, Consolacion Garcia, Remedios Garcia,
Trinidad Garcia, Baltazar Garcia signed a document entitled, "Extra-judicial
168

Partition and Deed of Sale" (Exhibits, p. 19). The parcel of land subject of
the document was described as follows:
A parcel of residential land, about 372 square meters, lst class,
Identified as Assessor's Lot No. 107, Block No. 8, bounded on
the north by Paz and Federal Streets; on the south by
Tabaosares and Antonia Tacalinar; on the East by Piedad Street;
and on the West by Paz Street. This parcel of land has no
concrete monuments to indicate its boundaries but there are
dikes, stones and temporary fences used as landmarks and
boundary signals. This parcel of land is covered by Tax
Declaration No. 1149, S. of 1947, in the name of Gelacio Garcia,
and its assessed value of P110.00. (p. 19, Exhibits)
The last paragraph of the same document states:
That for and in consideration of the sum of FIVE HUNDRED
PESOS (P500.00), Philippine Currency, to us in hand paid by the
spouses, JOSE CALALIMAN, and PACIENCIA TRABADILLO, all of
legal age, Filipinos and residents of the municipality of
Tubungan, province of Iloilo, Philippines, receipt of which we
hereby acknowledged and confessed to our entire satisfaction,
do by these presents, cede, sell, convey and transfer the abovedescribed parcel of land unto the said spouses, Jose Calaliman
and Paciencia Trabadillo, their heirs, successors and assigns free
from all liens and encumbrances whatever. (p. 19, Exhibits)
The document was inscribed in the Register of Deeds of Iloilo on February
24,1955, Inscription No. 20814, Page 270, Vol. 64 (Exhibits, p. 20).
On December 17, 1954 another group of heirs, Rosario Garcia, Margarita
Garcia, Dolores Rufino, Resurreccion Tagarao, Serafin Tagarao, Buenaventura
Tagarao, Fortunata Garcia and Simeon Garcia, all residents of Isabela,
Negros Occidental, also sold to the spouses Jose Calaliman and Paciencia
Trabadillo through their attorney-in-fact, Juanito Bertomo, their shares,
rights, interest and participation in the same parcel of land. The Deed of Sale
was registered in the Register of Deeds of Iloilo also on December 22, 1954,
Inscription No. 20640, p. 88, Vol. 64 (Exhibits, p. 2122).

169

On May 7, 1955 the heirs Francisco Garcia, Paz Garcia, and Maria Garcia,
petitioners herein, filed against the spouses Jose Calaliman and Paciencia
Trabadillo, private respondents herein, Civil Case No. 3489 with the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo, for legal redemption of the 3/4 portion of the parcel
of land inherited by the heirs from the late Gelacio Garcia, which portion was
sold by their co-heirs to the defendants. In the complaint (Record on Appeal,
p. 4) plaintiffs alleged, among others:
5. That, plaintiffs' co-owners had never offered for sale their
interest and shares over the said land to the plaintiffs prior to
the sale in favor of the defendants, nor given notice of such
intention on their part; and that, no notice in writing has been
given by said co-owners to the plaintiffs of the said sale, such
that, plaintiffs came to learn of it only from other source;
6. That, plaintiffs would have purchased the interest and shares
of their co-owners had the latter offered the same to them prior
to the sale thereof to the defendants; and that, within 30 days
after learning of the sale made to the defendants under annexes
'A', 'B' and 'B-l', plaintiffs made repeated offer to the defendants
to allow them to redeem said interest and shares acquired by the
defendants in accordance with the right granted to the plaintiffs
by law in such a case, offering a reasonable price thereof of P300
taking into consideration the fact that the defendants had
acquired only 3/4 of the land of 372 square meters more or less,
in area with assessed value of P110 and a fair market value of
372 at Pl per square meter, the price actually obtaining in the
locality at the time of the sale thereof under Annexes 'A', 'B' and
'B-l'; however, the defendants refused and have until the present
refused to grant redemption thereof giving no reason why other
than challenging the plaintiffs to bring their case in court:
7. That, the circumstances surrounding the transaction between
the defendants and plaintiffs' co-owners, the vendors, were such
that defendants could not have actually paid nor the vendors
actually received the total price of P800 as stipulated in the
deeds Annexes 'A', 'B' and 'B-l' while the said price fixed is
grossly excessive and highly exaggerated and prohibitive for
evidently ulterior motive:
170

8. That, the land herein described is an ancestral property and

plaintiffs have actually a house standing thereon and having
lived thereon ever since, such that, the defendants' refusal to
allow redemption thereof has caused the plaintiffs mental
torture, worry and anxiety, forcing them to litigate and retain
services of counsel, therefore, plaintiffs demand against the
defendants P500 for moral damage, P500 for exemplary
damage, P300 for attorney's fees, aside from actual expenses
incurred; and, furthermore, P5 monthly as reasonable value of
defendants' occupation of a portion of the premises counting
from the filing of this complaint.
They prayed that the trial court render judgment:
1. Declaring the plaintiffs to be entitled to redeem from the
defendants for the price of P300 or for such reasonable price as
may be determined by this Honorable Court the interest and
shares over the land described in this complaint of plaintiffs' coowners, Joaquin, Porfirio, Flora, Dioscoro, Consolacion,
Remedios, Trinidad, Baltazar, Rosario, Margarita, Dolores,
Fortunata and Simon, all surnamed Garcia, and Resurreccion,
Serafin and Buenaventura, all surnamed Tagarao, sold by them
to the defendants under the deeds of sale Annexes 'A', 'B' and
'B-l' of this complaint; and ordering the defendants to execute
the proper instrument of reconveyance or redemption thereof in
favor of the plaintiffs; and, ordering them to vacate the
premises;
2. Condemning the defendants to pay to the plaintiffs P500 for
moral damage; P500 for exemplary damage; P300 for attorney's
fees and actual expenses incurred; P5 monthly from the filing of
this complaint as reasonable value of defendants' occupation of a
portion of the land; the costs of this action; and, for such other
relief and remedy as may be legal, just and equitable."
On the other hand, the defendants, private respondents herein, alleged in
their answer the following special affirmative defenses (Record on Appeal, p.
14):

171

1. That plaintiffs have no cause of action against the herein

defendants;
2. That due notices in writing have been sent to plaintiff
Francisco Garcia at his residence at 2875 Felix Huertas St., Sta.
Cruz, Manila, sometime last June 1953, in which plaintiff
Francisco Garcia was informed of his co-owners signified
intention to sell their shares, and likewise, the other plaintiffs
Paz and Maria Garcia were personally notified of the same hence,
for that reason, they are now barred to claim legal redemption of
the land in question, having filed their belated claim too late."
The trial court rendered judgment on September 12, 1957 in favor of the
plaintiffs (Record on Appeal, p. 15), the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Sentencing the defendants to resell the property to the
plaintiffs for P800.00 which is the total consideration of the two
deeds of sale Exhibits A and B;
(b) In the event that the defendants fail to execute the deed of
resale within ten days from the date this decision becomes final,
the Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to execute the
corresponding deed pursuant to the provisions of Section 10 of
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court;
(c) Without pronouncement as to costs.
On October 14, 1957 plaintiffs filed their notice of Appeal predicated on "(a)
failure of the Court to adjudge the real or reasonable price of the sale or
otherwise the redemption value thereof; (b) failure of the Court to adjudge
damages including attorney's fees in favor of the plaintiffs and the costs."
(Record on Appeal, p. 18).
Defendants filed their own notice of appeal on October 15, 1957 (Record on
Appeal, p. 19).

172

On appeal the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 31,

1966 reversed the decision of the trial court and rendered another one
dismissing plaintiff's complaint with no pronouncement as to costs (Rollo, p.
22).
The instant petition for review by certiorari was filed with the Court on
December 12, 1966 (Rollo, p. 11). The Court at first dismissed the petition in
a resolution dated December 22, 1966, for insufficient supporting papers
(Rollo, p. 35) but reconsidered the said Resolution of Dismissal later in a
Resolution dated February 8, 1967 (Rollo, p. 97) as prayed for in a motion
for reconsideration filed by petitioners on February 1, 1967 (Rollo, p. 38).
The same Resolution of February 8, 1967 gave due course to the petition.
The Brief for the Petitioners was filed on June 9,1967 (Rollo, p. 106); the
Brief for the Respondents was received in the Court on August 31, 1967
(Rollo, p. 119).
Petitioners having manifested they would not file reply brief on September
14,1967 (Rollo, p. 122) the Court considered the case submitted for
decision, in a Resolution dated September 21, 1967 (Rollo, p. 124).
Petitioners assign the following errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING
THAT THE 30-DAY PERIOD PRESCRIBED IN ARTICLE 1088 OF
THE NEW CIVIL CODE FOR A CO-HEIR TO EXERCISE HIS RIGHT
OF LEGAL REDEMPTION, HAD ALREADY ELAPSED WHEN THE
HEREIN PLAINTIFFS FILED THE ACTION ON MAY 7,1955.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING
THAT THERE WAS NO OFFER TO REIMBURSE THE DEFENDANTS
FOR THE PORTION OF THE LAND IN QUESTION SOLD TO THEM
BY THE CO-HEIRS OF THE PLAINTIFFS.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING
THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT, AND IN NOT
ADJUDGING DAMAGES, ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS IN FAVOR
OF THE PLAINTIFFS.
(Brief for the Petitioners, p. 1)
173

There is no question that the provision of law applicable in the instant case is
Art. 1088 of the New Civil Code (Art. 1067, Old Civil Code) as the matter
concerns heirs and inheritance not yet distributed (Wenceslao v. Calimon, 46
Phil. 906 [1923]). Art. 1088 states:
Article 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to
a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be
subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for
the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of
one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale
by the vendor.
The main issue is whether or not petitioners took all the necessary steps to
effectuate their exercise of the right of legal redemption within the period
fixed by Art. 1088 of the Civil Code.
It is undisputed that no notification in writing was ever received by
petitioners about the sale of the hereditary interest of some of their co-heirs
in the parcel of land they inherited from the late Gelacio Garcia, although in
a letter dated June 23, 1953 petitioner Francisco Garcia wrote one of his coheirs, Joaquin Garcia, who is an uncle of petitioners, proposing to buy the
hereditary interests of his co-heirs in their unpartitioned inheritance,
(Exhibit, p. 3). Although said petitioner asked that his letter be answered "in
order that I will know the results of what I have requested you," (Exhibit, p.
14) there is no proof that he was favored with one.
Petitioners came to know that their co-heirs were selling the property on
December 3, 1954 when one of the heirs, Juanito Bertomo, asked Petitioner
Paz Garcia to sign a document prepared in the Municipality of Tubungan
because the land they inherited was going to be sold to private respondent,
Jose Calaliman (TSN, September 6, 1957, p. 60). The document mentioned
by petitioner Paz Garcia could be no other than the one entitled "ExtraJudicial Partition and Deed of Sale" dated December 3, 1954 as it is in this
document that the name of Paz Garcia, Maria Garcia and Amado Garcia
appear unsigned by them (Exhibits, p. 19).
It is not known whether the other heirs whose names appear in the
document had already signed the document at the time Paz Garcia was
approached by Juanito Bertomo. Paz Garcia, however, testified that she
174

immediately informed her brother Francisco that Juanita Bertomo wanted to

sell the land to Jose Calaliman (TSN, September 6,1957, p. 62). On
December 26, 1954 he wrote respondents giving them notice of his desire to
exercise the right of legal redemption and that he will resort to court action
if denied the right (Exhibits, p. 8). The respondents received the letter on
January 13, 1955 but petitioner Francisco Garcia did not get any answer
from them. Neither did respondents show him a copy of the document of
sale nor inform him about the price they paid for the sale when he went
home to Tubungan from Manila sometime in March 1955 and went to see the
respondent spouse about the matter on March 24,1955 (TSN, September
6,1957, p. 18).
Because of the refusal of respondent Jose Calaliman to show him the
document of sale or reveal to him the price paid for the parcel of land,
petitioner Francisco Garcia went to the Office of the Register of Deeds on the
same date, March 24,1955 and there found two documents of sale regarding
the same parcel of land (TSN, Ibid, p. 19).
Petitioners filed the case for legal redemption with the trial court on May 7,
1955. Respondents claim that the 30-day period prescribed in Article 1088 of
the New Civil Code for petitioners to exercise the right to legal redemption
had already elapsed at that time and that the requirement of Article 1088 of
the New Civil Code that notice would be in writing is deemed satisfied
because written notice would be superfluous, the purpose of the law having
been fully served when petitioner Francisco Garcia went to the Office of the
Register of Deeds and saw for himself, read and understood the contents of
the deeds of sale (Brief for respondents, p. 6).
The issue has been squarely settled in the case of Castillo v. Samonte,
where this Court observed:
Both the letter and spirit of the new Civil Code argue against any
attempt to widen the scope of the notice specified in Article 1088
by including therein any other kind of notice, such as verbal or
by registration. If the intention of the law had been to include
verbal notice or any other means of information as sufficient to
give the effect of this notice, then there would have been no
necessity or reasons to specify in Article 1088 of the New Civil
Code that the said notice be made in writing for, under the old
175

law, a verbal notice or information was sufficient (106 Phil. 1023

[1960]).
In the above-quoted decision the Court did not consider the registration of
the deed of sale with the Register of Deeds sufficient notice, most specially
because the property involved was unregistered land, as in the instant case.
The Court took note of the fact that the registration of the deed of sale as
sufficient notice of a sale under the provision of Section 51 of Act No. 496
applies only to registered lands and has no application whatsoever to a case
where the property involved is, admittedly, unregistered land.
Consistent with aforesaid ruling, in the interpretation of a related provision
(Article 1623 of the New Civil Code) this Court had stressed that written
notice is indispensable, actual knowledge of the sale acquired in some other
manners by the redemptioner, notwithstanding. He or she is still entitled to
written notice, as exacted by the Code, to remove all uncertainty as to the
sale, its terms and its validity, and to quiet any doubt that the alienation is
not definitive. The law not having provided for any alternative, the method
of notifications remains exclusive, though the Code does not prescribe any
particular form of written notice nor any distinctive method for written
notification of redemption (Conejero et al. v. Court of Appeals et al., 16
SCRA 775 [1966]; Etcuban v. Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 507 [1987];
Cabrera v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 75069, April 15,1988).
Petitioners fault the appellate court in not awarding them damages,
attorney's fees and costs. After finding in favor of respondent spouses and
against petitioners herein it is untenable for petitioners to expect that the
appellate court would award damages and attorney's fees and costs.
However as already discussed, petitioners have not lost their right to
redeem, for in the absence of a written notification of the sale by the
vendors, the 30-day period has not even begun to run. Petitioners clearly
can claim attorney's fees for bad faith on the part of respondents, first, for
refusing redemption, and secondly for declaring the entire land as theirs,
although they knew some heirs had not sold their shares.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED
and the decision of the trial court is REINSTATED with the modification that
petitioners be awarded damages, attorney's fees and costs in the amount
prayed for.
176

SO ORDERED.

Baylon vs Amador
[G.R. No. 160701. February 9, 2004]
BAYLON vs. AMADOR
THIRD DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court
dated FEB 9 2004.
G.R. No. 160701 (Fulton Baylon vs. Terencio Amador.)
Petitioner assails the July 30, 2001 decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 54363 which modified the January 22, 1996 consolidated
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon, Branch 52 in Civil
Cases 91-5653 (specific performance) and 92-5747 (certiorari).
On August 26, 1987, private respondent filed an ejectment case against
petitioner at the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bacon, Sorsogon, alleging
that the latter defaulted in payment of rentals and refused to vacate the
subject property owned by private respondent despite repeated demands.
On December 28, 1990, after the parties submitted their respective
position papers, the MTC decided in favor of private respondent and ordered
petitioner to vacate the subject premises.
In retaliation, petitioner filed Civil Case No. 91-5663 before the Sorsogon
RTC for specific performance alleging that their contract of lease also
contained an option to buy through which private respondent gave petitioner
the preferential right to purchase the subject property in the event the same
was put on sale.

177

In the meantime, private respondent's ex parte motion for execution of

judgment in the ejectment case was granted and on April 19, 1992, the MTC
issued an alias writ of execution.
To prevent imminent ejectment, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with prayer for issuance of temporary restraining
order (TRO) at the Sorsogon RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 92-5747.
Meanwhile, without notice to private respondent, petitioner acquired a
"3/9 portion" of the subject property from one of the co-owners.
Trial of both Civil Case Nos. 91-5653 and 92-5747 ensued. Thereafter the
Sorsogon RTC, Branch 52 rendered the January 22, 1996 decision. The
dispositive portion stated:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of the plaintiff (Civil Case No. 5633), the petitioner in Civil Case No. 5747
and against the defendant in (Civil Case No. 5633) and the respondent in
(Civil Case No. 5747).
1. Finding that the plaintiff has .the preferential right to acquire the
property in question in the event defendant sells/alienate the remaining
portion of the property in question.
2. To permanently enjoin the lower court from enforcing the alias writ of
execution in Civil Case 183.
3. Declaring plaintiff to be co-owner of the house and lot in question for
having acquired by purchase at least 3/9 portion of the questioned property.
4. Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 as
attorney's fees and the sum of P5,000.00 as litigation expenses.
5. The counterclaim of defendant is hereby dismissed.
6. Defendant shall pay the cost of the suit.[2]
Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals.

178

On July 30, 2001, the appellate court modified the decision of the
Sorsogon RTC:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision dated January
22, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 52) in Sorsogon, Sorsogon in
Civil Cases Nos. 91-5653 and 92-5747, is hereby MODIFIED in that:
(1) The plaintiff-appellee has lost his preferential right to buy the
property in question; and
(2) The defendant-appellant be given a period of thirty (30) days
from finality of this judgment within which to redeem that portion
which had been acquired by the plaintiff-appellee;
but AFFIRMED in all other respects. No costs. Let the records be remanded
to the court a quo for appropriate action.[3]
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on November 6, 2003.
Petitioner argues that the appellate court committed reversible error
when it declared him to have lost his preferential right to buy the subject
property and gave private respondent 30 days from finality of judgment to
redeem the "3/9 portion" of the disputed property acquired by petitioner
from private respondent's co-owner.
The petition is without merit.
As correctly ruled by the appellate court, even if the parties originally
had a contract of lease with option to buy, when the lease contract expired,
the tacit renewal of the contract was limited only to those terms of the
contract which were germane to the petitioner's right of continued lease over
the property and did not extend to alien matters like the option to buy the
leased premises.[4]
The Court has ruled that, in case of implicit renewal of a contract of lease
on a monthly basis, the terms of the original lease contract which are
revived in the implied new lease under Article 1670 of the New Civil Code
are only those terms germane to the lessee's right of continued possession
and enjoyment of the property leased. Therefore, in this case, the implied
new lease did not ipso facto carry with it the revival of petitioner's option to
179

buy the leased premises because said option was alien to the lease. Stated
differently, petitioner's right to exercise the option to purchase expired with
the termination of the original contract of lease.[5]
Regarding private respondent's right of redemption, Article 1088 of the
New Civil Code explicitly states that, should any of the heirs sell his
hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs
may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the
price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from
the time they were notified in writing by the vendor.
The requirement of a written notice is mandatory. This Court has long
established the rule that, notwithstanding actual knowledge of a co-owner,
the latter is still entitled to a written notice from the selling co-owner in
order to remove all uncertainties about the sale, its terms and conditions as
well as its efficacy and status.[6]
Private respondent was never given such written notice. He thus still has
the right to redeem said one-third portion of the subject property. On
account of the lack of written notice of the sale by the other co-heirs, the
30-day period never commenced.
All told, the Court finds no reversible error committed by the appellate
court in rendering the assailed decision.
WHEREFORE, petition is hereby denied due course.
SO ORDERED.

Cua vs vargas
JOSEPH CUA, G.R. No. 156536
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
versus - CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.
180

Promulgated:
GLORIA A. VARGAS, AURORA
VARGAS, RAMON VARGAS, October 31, 2006
MARITES VARGAS, EDELINA
VARGAS AND GEMMA VARGAS,
Respondents.
x
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
the

reversal

of

the

decision[1] dated

March

26,

2002,

and

the

resolution[2] dated December 17, 2002, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP

No.

59869

entitled

Gloria

A.

Vargas,

Aurora

Vargas,

Ramon

Vargas, Marites Vargas, Edelina Vargas and Gemma Vargas v. Joseph Cua.
The facts are as follows:
A parcel of residential land with an area of 99 square meters located
in San Juan, Virac, Catanduanes was left behind by the late Paulina Vargas.
On February 4, 1994, a notarized Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was
executed

by

and

among Paulina Vargas

Vargas, Visitacion Vargas,

V. Forteza,

Andres

Juan

heirs,

namely

Vargas, Zenaida V. Matienzo,

Vargas,

Gloria

Ester
Rosario

Vargas, Antonina Vargas

and Florentino Vargas, partitioning and adjudicating unto themselves the lot
in

question,

each

one

of

them

getting

share

of

11

square

meters. Florentino, Andres, Antonina and Gloria, however, did not sign the

181

document. Only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario signed it. The
Extra

Judicial

Settlement

Among

Heirs

was

published

in

the Catanduanes Tribune for three consecutive weeks.[3]

On November 15, 1994, an Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs
with Sale[4] was again executed by and among the same heirs over the same
property and also with the same sharings. Once more, only Ester, Visitacion,
Juan, Zenaida and Rosario signed the document and their respective shares
totaling 55 square meters were sold to Joseph Cua, petitioner herein.
According to Gloria Vargas, the widow of Santiago Vargas and one of
respondents herein, she came to know of the Extra Judicial Settlement
Among Heirs with Sale dated November 16, 1994 only when the original
house built on the lot was being demolished sometime in May 1995. [5] She
likewise claimed she was unaware that an earlier Extra Judicial Settlement
Among Heirs dated February 4, 1994 involving the same property had been
published in the Catanduanes Tribune.[6]
After knowing of the sale of the 55 square meters to petitioner, Gloria
Vargas tried to redeem the property, with the following letter [7] sent to
petitioner on her behalf:
29th June 1995
Mr. Joseph Cua
Capilihan, Virac, Catanduanes
Sir:
This is in behalf of my client, Ms. Aurora Vargas, [8] (c/o Atty.
Prospero V. Tablizo) one of the lawful heirs of the
late Paulina Vargas,
original
owner
of
Lot
No.
214
of Virac, Poblacion covered by ARP No. 031-0031 in her name.

182

I understand that a document Extra Judicial Settlement Among

Heirs with Sale was executed by some of my clients co-heirs and
alleged representatives of other co-heirs, by virtue of which
document you acquired by purchase from the signatories to the
said document, five (5) shares with a total area of fifty-five
square meters of the above-described land.
This is to serve you notice that my client shall exercise her right
of legal redemption of said five (5) shares as well as other shares
which you may likewise have acquired by purchase. And you are
hereby given an option to agree to legal redemption within a
period of fifteen (15) days from your receipt hereof.
Should you fail to convey to me your agreement within said 15day-period, proper legal action shall be taken by my client to
redeem said shares.
Thank you.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.)
JUAN G. ATENCIA

When the offer to redeem was refused and after having failed to reach
an amicable settlement at the barangay level,[9] Gloria Vargas filed a case for
annulment of Extra Judicial Settlement and Legal Redemption of the lot with
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Virac, Catanduanes against petitioner and
consigned the amount of P100,000 which is the amount of the purchase with
the Clerk of Court on May 20, 1996. [10] Joining her in the action were her
children

with

Santiago,

namely,

Aurora,

Ramon, Marites, Edelina and Gemma, all surnamed Vargas.

Subsequently, Carlos Gianan, Jr. and Gloria Arcilla, heirs of the alleged
primitive owner of the lot in question, Pedro Lakandula, intervened in the
case.[11]

183

Respondents claimed that as co-owners of the property, they may be

subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him the price of
the sale. They likewise alleged that the 30-day period following a written
notice by the vendors to their co-owners for them to exercise the right of
redemption of the property had not yet set in as no written notice was sent
to them. In effect, they claimed that the Extra Judicial Settlement Among
Heirs and the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs withSale were null and
void and had no legal and binding effect on them. [12]
After trial on the merits, the MTC rendered a decision [13] in favor of
petitioner, dismissing the complaint as well as the complaint-in-intervention
for lack of merit, and declaring the Deed of Extra Judicial Settlement Among
Heirs with Sale valid and binding. The MTC upheld the sale to petitioner
because the transaction purportedly occurred after the partition of the
property among the co-owner heirs. The MTC opined that the other heirs
could validly dispose of their respective shares. Moreover, the MTC found
that although there was a failure to strictly comply with the requirements
under Article 1088 of the Civil Code [14] for a written notice of sale to be
served upon respondents by the vendors prior to the exercise of the formers
right of redemption, this deficiency was cured by respondents actual
knowledge of the sale, which was more than 30 days before the filing of
their complaint, and their consignation of the purchase price with the Clerk
of Court, so that the latter action came too late. Finally, the MTC ruled that
respondents failed to establish by competent proof petitioners bad faith in
purchasing the portion of the property owned by respondents co-heirs. [15]
On

appeal,

the

Regional

Trial

Court

(RTC),

Branch

42,

of Virac, Catanduanes affirmed the MTC decision in a judgment dated

November 25, 1999. The matter was thereafter raised to the Court of
Appeals (CA).

184

The CA reversed the ruling of both lower courts in the assailed decision
dated March 26, 2002, declaring that the Extra Judicial Settlement Among
Heirs

and

the

Extra

Judicial

Settlement

Among

Heirs

with Sale,

dated February 4, 1994 andNovember 15, 1994, respectively, were void and
without any legal effect. The CA held that, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of
the Rules of Court, [16] the extrajudicial settlement made by the other coheirs is not binding upon respondents considering the latter never
participated in it nor did they ever signify their consent to the same.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the
present petition for review.
The issues are:
Whether heirs are deemed constructively notified and
bound, regardless of their failure to participate therein, by an
extrajudicial settlement and partition of estate when the
extrajudicial settlement and partition has been duly published;
and,
Assuming a published extrajudicial settlement and partition
does not bind persons who did not participate therein, whether
the written notice required to be served by an heir to his co-heirs
in connection with the sale of hereditary rights to a stranger
before partition under Article 1088 of the Civil Code [17] can be
dispensed with when such co-heirs have actual knowledge of the
sale such that the 30-day period within which a co-heir can
exercise the right to be subrogated to the rights of a purchaser
shall commence from the date of actual knowledge of the sale.

Petitioner argues, as follows:

Firstly, the acquisition by petitioner of the subject property subsequent
to the extrajudicial partition was valid because the partition was duly
published. The publication of the same constitutes due notice to respondents
and signifies their implied acquiescence thereon. Respondents are therefore
185

estopped from denying the validity of the partition and sale at this late
stage. Considering that the partition was valid, respondents no longer have
the right to redeem the property.

Secondly, petitioner is a possessor and builder in good faith.

Thirdly, the MTC had no jurisdiction over the complaint because its
subject matter was incapable of pecuniary estimation. The complaint should
have been filed with the RTC.
Fourthly, there was a non-joinder of indispensable parties, the co-heirs
who sold their interest in the subject property not having been impleaded by
respondents.
Fifthly, the appeal to the CA should have been dismissed as it was not
properly verified by respondents. Gloria Vargas failed to indicate that she
was authorized to represent the other respondents (petitioners therein) to
initiate the petition. Moreover, the verification was inadequate because it did
not state the basis of the alleged truth and/or correctness of the material
allegations in the petition.
The petition lacks merit.
The

procedure

outlined

in

Section

of

Rule

74

is

an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly states, however, that persons who
do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be
bound thereby.[18] It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or
186

issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a
notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of
extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement has
already been executed[19] as what happened in the instant case with the
publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.
The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive
notice to the heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because
the same was notice after the fact of execution. The requirement of
publication is geared for the protection of creditors and was never intended
to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the decedents estate. In this
connection, the records of the present case confirm that respondents never
signed either of the settlement documents, having discovered their existence
only shortly before the filing of the present complaint. Following Rule 74,
these extrajudicial settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition
made without their knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as they are
concerned.

This is not to say, though, that respondents co-heirs cannot validly sell
their hereditary rights to third persons even before the partition of the
estate. The heirs who actually participated in the execution of the
extrajudicial

settlements,

which

included

the

sale

to

petitioner

of

their pro indiviso shares in the subject property, are bound by the same.
Nevertheless, respondents are given the right to redeem these shares
pursuant to Article 1088 of the Civil Code. The right to redeem was never
lost because respondents were never notified in writing of the actual sale by
their co-heirs. Based on the provision, there is a need for written notice to
start the period of redemption, thus:
Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a
stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be
187

subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for

the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period
of one month from the time they were notified in writing
of the sale by the vendor. (Emphasis supplied.)
It bears emphasis that the period of one month shall be reckoned from
the time that a co-heir is notified in writing by the vendor of the actual
sale. Written notice is indispensable and mandatory,[20] actual knowledge of
the

sale

acquired

in

some

other

manner

by

the

redemptioner

notwithstanding. It cannot be counted from the time advance notice is given

of an impending or contemplated sale. The law gives the co-heir thirty days
from the time written notice of the actual sale within which to make up his
or her mind and decide to repurchase or effect the redemption. [21]

Though the Code does not prescribe any particular form of written
notice nor any distinctive method for written notification of redemption, the
method of notification remains exclusive, there being no alternative provided
by law.[22] This proceeds from the very purpose of Article 1088, which is to
keep strangers to the family out of a joint ownership, if, as is often the case,
the presence of outsiders be undesirable and the other heir or heirs be
willing and in a position to repurchase the share sold. [23]

It should be kept in mind that the obligation to serve written notice

devolves upon the vendor co-heirs because the latter are in the best position
to know the other co-owners who, under the law, must be notified of the
sale.[24] This will remove all uncertainty as to the fact of the sale, its terms
and its perfection and validity, and quiet any doubt that the alienation is not
definitive.[25] As a result, the party notified need not entertain doubt that the
seller may still contest the alienation.

[26]

188

Considering, therefore, that respondents co-heirs failed to comply with

this requirement, there is no legal impediment to allowing respondents to
redeem the shares sold to petitioner given the formers obvious willingness
and capacity to do so.
Likewise untenable is petitioners contention that he is a builder in good
faith. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land the latter is
building on is ones own without knowledge of any defect or flaw in ones title.
[27]

Petitioner derived his title from the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs

With Sale dated November 15, 1994. He was very much aware that not all of
the heirs participated therein as it was evident on the face of the document
itself. Because the property had not yet been partitioned in accordance with
the Rules of Court, no particular portion of the property could have been
identified as yet and delineated as the object of the sale. This is because the
alienation made by respondents co-heirs was limited to the portion which
may be allotted to them in the division upon the termination of the coownership. Despite this glaring fact, and over the protests of respondents,
petitioner still constructed improvements on the property. For this reason,
his claim of good faith lacks credence.
As to the issue of lack of jurisdiction, petitioner is estopped from
raising the same for the first time on appeal. Petitioner actively participated
in the proceedings below and sought affirmative ruling from the lower courts
to uphold the validity of the sale to him of a portion of the subject property
embodied in the extrajudicial settlement among heirs. Having failed to
seasonably raise this defense, he cannot, under the peculiar circumstances
of this case, be permitted to challenge the jurisdiction of the lower court at
this late stage. While it is a rule that a jurisdictional question may be raised
at any time, an exception arises where estoppel has already supervened.

189

Estoppel sets in when a party participates in all stages of a case before

challenging the jurisdiction of the lower court. One cannot belatedly reject or
repudiate its decision after voluntarily submitting to its jurisdiction, just to
secure affirmative relief against one's opponent or after failing to obtain such
relief. The Court has, time and again, frowned upon the undesirable practice
of a party submitting a case for decision and then accepting the judgment,
only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse. [28]
Petitioners

fourth

argument,

that

there

is

non-joinder of

indispensable parties, similarly lacks merit. An indispensable party is a

party-in-interest without whom there can be no final determination of an
action and who is required to be joined as either plaintiff or defendant.
[29]

The party's interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief

sought

is

so

inextricably

intertwined

with

the

other

parties

that

the formers legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute

necessity. Hence, an indispensable party is one whose interest will be
directly affected by the court's action in the litigation. In the absence of such
indispensable party, there cannot be a resolution of the controversy before
the court which is effective, complete, or equitable.[30]
In relation to this, it must be kept in mind that the complaint filed by
respondents ultimately prayed that they be allowed to redeem the shares in
the property sold by their co-heirs. Significantly, the right of the other heirs
to sell their undivided share in the property to petitioner is not in dispute.
Respondents concede that the other heirs acted within their hereditary rights
in doing so to the effect that the latter completely and effectively
relinquished their interests in the property in favor of petitioner. Petitioner
thus stepped into the shoes of the other heirs to become a co-owner of the
property with respondents. As a result, only petitioners presence is
190

absolutely required for a complete and final determination of the controversy

because what respondents seek is to be subrogated to his rights as a
purchaser.
Finally, petitioner contends that the petition filed by respondents with
the CA should have been dismissed because the verification and certificate of
non-forum shopping appended to it were defective, citing specifically the
failure of respondent Gloria Vargas to: (1) indicate that she was authorized
to represent her co-respondents in the petition, and (2) state the basis of
the alleged truth of the allegations.
The general rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be
signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case and the signature of only
one of them is insufficient.[31] Nevertheless, the rules on forum shopping,
which were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of
justice, should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert
their own ultimate and legitimate objective. Strict compliance with the
provisions

regarding

the

certificate

of

non-forum

shopping

merely

underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be

altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded.
[32]

Under justifiable circumstances, the Court has relaxed the rule requiring

the submission of such certification considering that although it is obligatory,

it is not jurisdictional.[33]
Thus, when all the petitioners share a common interest and invoke a
common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in
the
certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the rules.
[34]

The co-respondents of respondent Gloria Vargas in this case were her

children. In order not to defeat the ends of justice, the Court deems it

191

sufficient that she signed the petition on their behalf and as their
representative.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Primary structures vs Valencia

[G.R. No. 150060. August 19, 2003]
PRIMARY STRUCTURES CORP. represented herein by its President
ENGR. WILLIAM C. LIU, petitioner, vs. SPS. ANTHONY S.
VALENCIA and SUSAN T. VALENCIA, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
On appeal is the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
59960, promulgated on 13 February 2001, which has affirmed in toto the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City dismissing the complaint of
petitioners for legal redemption over certain rural lots sold to respondents.
Petitioner is a private corporation based in Cebu City and the registered
owner of Lot 4523 situated in Liloan, Cebu, with an area of 22,214 square
meters. Adjacent to the lot of petitioner are parcels of land, identified to be
Lot 4527, Lot 4528, and Lot 4529 with a total combined area of 3,751
square meters. The three lots, aforenumbered, have been sold by
Hermogenes Mendoza to respondent spouses sometime in December
1994. Petitioner learned of the sale of the lots only in January, 1996, when
Hermogenes Mendoza sold to petitioner Lot No. 4820, a parcel also adjacent
to Lot 4523 belonging to the latter. Forthwith, it sent a letter to respondents,
on 30 January 1996, signifying its intention to redeem the three lots. On 30
May 1996, petitioner sent another letter to respondents tendering payment
of the price paid to Mendoza by respondents for the lots. Respondents, in
192

response, informed petitioner that they had no intention of selling the

parcels. Thereupon, invoking the provisions of Articles 1621 and 1623,
petitioner filed an action against respondents to compel the latter to allow
the legal redemption. Petitioner claimed that neither Mendoza, the previous
owner, nor respondents gave formal or even just a verbal notice of the sale
of the lots as so required by Article 1623 of the Civil Code.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu dismissed petitioners
complaint and respondents' counterclaim; both parties appealed the decision
of the trial court to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the
assailed decision.
Basically, the issues posed for resolution by the Court in the instant
petition focus on the application of Article 1621 and Article 1623 of the Civil
Code, which read:
ART. 1621. The owners of adjoining lands shall also have the right of
redemption when a piece of rural land, the area of which does not exceed
one hectare, is alienated unless the grantee does not own any rural land.
This right is not applicable to adjacent lands which are separated by brooks,
drains, ravines, roads and other apparent servitudes for the benefit of other
estates.
If two or more adjoining owners desire to exercise the right of redemption at
the same time, the owner of the adjoining land of smaller area shall be
preferred; and should both lands have the same area, the one who first
requested the redemption.
ART. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be
exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the
prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale
shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an
affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible
redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners.
Whenever a piece of rural land not exceeding one hectare is alienated,
the law grants to the adjoining owners a right of redemption except when
193

the grantee or buyer does not own any other rural land. [1] In order that the
right may arise, the land sought to be redeemed and the adjacent property
belonging to the person exercising the right of redemption must both be
rural lands. If one or both are urban lands, the right cannot be invoked. [2]
The trial court found the lots involved to be rural lands. Unlike the case
of Fabia vs. Intermediate Appellate Court [3] (which ruled, on the issue of
whether a piece of land was rural or not, that the use of the property for
agricultural purpose would be essential in order that the land might be
characterized as rural land for purposes of legal redemption), respondents in
the instant case, however, did not dispute before the Court of Appeals the
holding of the trial court that the lots in question are rural lands. In failing to
assail this factual finding on appeal, respondents would be hardput to now
belatedly question such finding and to ask the Court to still entertain that
issue.
Article 1621 of the Civil Code expresses that the right of redemption it
grants to an adjoining owner of the property conveyed may be defeated if it
can be shown that the buyer or grantee does not own any other rural
land. The appellate court, sustaining the trial court, has said that there has
been no evidence proffered to show that respondents are not themselves
owners of rural lands for the exclusionary clause of the law to apply.
With respect to the second issue, Article 1623 of the Civil Code provides
that the right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised
except within thirty days from notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or
by the vendor, as the case may be. In stressing the mandatory character of
the requirement, the law states that the deed of sale shall not be recorded in
the Registry of Property unless the same is accompanied by an affidavit of
the vendor that he has given notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
The Court of Appeals has equated the statement in the deed of sale to
the effect that the vendors have complied with the provisions of Article 1623
of the Civil Code, as being the written affirmation under oath, as well as the
evidence, that the required written notice to petitioner under Article 1623
has been met. Respondents, like the appellate court, overlook the fact that
petitioner is not a party to the deed of sale between respondents and
Mendoza and has had no hand in the preparation and execution of the deed

194

of sale.It could not thus be considered a binding equivalent of the obligatory

written notice prescribed by the Code.
In Verdad vs. Court of Appeals[4] this court ruled:
We hold that the right of redemption was timely exercised by private
respondents. Concededly, no written notice of the sale was given by the
Burdeos heirs (vendors) to the co-owners required under Article 1623 of the
Civil Code xxxxxxxxx
Hence, the thirty-day period of redemption had yet to commence when
private respondent Rosales sought to exercise the right of redemption on 31
March 1987, a day after she discovered the sale from the Office of the City
Treasurer of Butuan City, or when the case was initiated, on 16 October
1987, before the trial court.
The written notice of sale is mandatory. This Court has long established the
rule that notwithstanding actual knowledge of a co-owner, the latter is still
entitled to a written notice from the selling co-owner in order to remove all
uncertainties about the sale, its terms and conditions, as well as its efficacy
and status.
Even in Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (150 SCRA 259), relied
upon by petitioner in contending that actual knowledge should be an
equivalent to a written notice of sale, the Court made it clear that it was not
reversing the prevailing jurisprudence; said the Court:
We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are deviating from the
strict letter of the law, which the respondent court understandably applied
pursuant to existing jurisprudence. The said court acted properly as it had
no competence to reverse the doctrines laid down by this Court in the
above-cited cases. In fact, and this should be clearly stressed, we ourselves
are not abandoning the De Conejero and Buttle doctrines. What we are
doing simply is adopting an exception to the general rule, in view of the
peculiar circumstances of this case.
In Alonzo, the right of legal redemption was invoked several years, not just
days or months, after the consummation of the contracts of sale. The
195

complaint for legal redemption itself was there filed more than thirteen years
after the sales were concluded.[5]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the assailed decision
of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner is hereby
given a period of thirty days from finality of this decision within which to
exercise its right of legal redemption.No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Unionbank vs santibanez---Alonzo vs IAC

G.R. No. 72873 May 28, 1987
CARLOS
ALONZO
and
CASIMIRA
ALONZO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA, respondents.
Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo for petitioners.
Luis R. Reyes for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:
The question is sometimes asked, in serious inquiry or in curious conjecture,
whether we are a court of law or a court of justice. Do we apply the law even
if it is unjust or do we administer justice even against the law? Thus queried,
we do not equivocate. The answer is that we do neither because we are a
court both of law and of justice. We apply the law with justice for that is our
mission and purpose in the scheme of our Republic. This case is an
illustration.
Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of
land registered in 'the name of their deceased parents under OCT No. 10977
of the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac. 1
196

On March 15, 1963, one of them, Celestino Padua, transferred his undivided
share of the herein petitioners for the sum of P550.00 by way of absolute
sale. 2 One year later, on April 22, 1964, Eustaquia Padua, his sister, sold her
own share to the same vendees, in an instrument denominated "Con Pacto
de Retro Sale," for the sum of P 440.00. 3
By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said sales,
an area corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot, representing the portions
sold to them. The vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. In
1975, with their consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semiconcrete house on a part of the enclosed area. 4
On February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the five coheirs, sought to
redeem the area sold to the spouses Alonzo, but his complaint was
dismissed when it appeared that he was an American citizen . 5 On May 27,
1977, however, Tecla Padua, another co-heir, filed her own complaint
invoking the same right of redemption claimed by her brother.6
The trial court * also dismiss this complaint, now on the ground that the
right had lapsed, not having been exercised within thirty days from notice of
the sales in 1963 and 1964. Although there was no written notice, it was
held that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the
requirement of the law. 7
In truth, such actual notice as acquired by the co-heirs cannot be plausibly
denied. The other co-heirs, including Tecla Padua, lived on the same lot,
which consisted of only 604 square meters, including the portions sold to the
petitioners . 8 Eustaquia herself, who had sold her portion, was staying in the
same house with her sister Tecla, who later claimed redemption
petition. 9 Moreover, the petitioners and the private respondents were close
friends and neighbors whose children went to school together. 10
It is highly improbable that the other co-heirs were unaware of the sales and
that they thought, as they alleged, that the area occupied by the petitioners
had merely been mortgaged by Celestino and Eustaquia. In the
circumstances just narrated, it was impossible for Tecla not to know that the
area occupied by the petitioners had been purchased by them from the
other. co-heirs. Especially significant was the erection thereon of the

197

permanent semi-concrete structure by the petitioners' son, which was done

without objection on her part or of any of the other co-heirs.
The only real question in this case, therefore, is the correct interpretation
and application of the pertinent law as invoked, interestingly enough, by
both the petitioners and the private respondents. This is Article 1088 of the
Civil Code, providing as follows:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a
stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be
subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for
the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of
one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale
by the vendor.
In reversing the trial court, the respondent court ** declared that the notice
required by the said article was written notice and that actual notice would
not suffice as a substitute. Citing the same case of De Conejero v. Court of
Appeals 11 applied by the trial court, the respondent court held that that
decision, interpreting a like rule in Article 1623, stressed the need for written
notice although no particular form was required.
Thus, according to Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who was the ponente of the Court,
furnishing the co-heirs with a copy of the deed of sale of the property
subject to redemption would satisfy the requirement for written notice. "So
long, therefore, as the latter (i.e., the redemptioner) is informed in writing of
the sale and the particulars thereof," he declared, "the thirty days for
redemption start running. "
In the earlier decision of Butte v. UY, 12 " the Court, speaking through the
same learned jurist, emphasized that the written notice should be given by
the vendor and not the vendees, conformably to a similar requirement under
Article 1623, reading as follows:
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not
be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing
by the prospective vendor, or by the vendors, as the case may
be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of

198

Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that

he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of the
adjoining owners.
As "it is thus apparent that the Philippine legislature in Article 1623
deliberately selected a particular method of giving notice, and that notice
must be deemed exclusive," the Court held that notice given by
the vendees and not the vendor would not toll the running of the 30-day
period.
The petition before us appears to be an illustration of the Holmes dictum
that "hard cases make bad laws" as the petitioners obviously cannot argue
against the fact that there was really no written notice given by the vendors
to their co-heirs. Strictly applied and interpreted, Article 1088 can lead to
only one conclusion, to wit, that in view of such deficiency, the 30 day period
for redemption had not begun to run, much less expired in 1977.
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and
likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking
the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover
in its provisions the in tent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should
never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never
within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for
we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance
with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To
be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary
when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In
such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and
functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their
language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the
will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly
apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command
without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by
199

sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice

Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond
them." 13 While we admittedly may not legislate, we nevertheless have the
power to interpret the law in such a way as to reflect the will of the
legislature. While we may not read into the law a purpose that is not there,
we nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment.
In doing so, we defer not to "the letter that killeth" but to "the spirit that
vivifieth," to give effect to the law maker's will.
The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its
construction, hence, a statute must be read according to its
spirit or intent. For what is within the spirit is within the letter
but although it is not within the letter thereof, and that which is
within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute.
Stated differently, a thing which is within the intent of the
lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter;
and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within
the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers. 14
In requiring written notice, Article 1088 seeks to ensure that the
redemptioner is properly notified of the sale and to indicate the
date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day period of
redemption. Considering the shortness of the period, it is really
necessary, as a general rule, to pinpoint the precise date it is
supposed to begin, to obviate any problem of alleged delays,
sometimes consisting of only a day or two.
The instant case presents no such problem because the right of redemption
was invoked not days but years after the sales were made in 1963 and
1964. The complaint was filed by Tecla Padua in 1977, thirteen years after
the first sale and fourteen years after the second sale. The delay invoked by
the petitioners extends to more than a decade, assuming of course that
there was a valid notice that tolled the running of the period of redemption.
Was there a valid notice? Granting that the law requires the notice to be
written, would such notice be necessary in this case? Assuming there was a
valid notice although it was not in writing. would there be any question that
the 30-day period for redemption had expired long before the complaint was
filed in 1977?
200

In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private

respondents' pretense that they were unaware of the sales made by their
brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. By requiring written proof of such
notice, we would be closing our eyes to the obvious truth in favor of their
palpably false claim of ignorance, thus exalting the letter of the law over its
purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to make sure that the redemptioners
are duly notified. We are satisfied that in this case the other brothers and
sisters were actually informed, although not in writing, of the sales made in
1963 and 1964, and that such notice was sufficient.
Now, when did the 30-day period of redemption begin?
While we do not here declare that this period started from the dates of such
sales in 1963 and 1964, we do say that sometime between those years and
1976, when the first complaint for redemption was filed, the other co-heirs
were actually informed of the sale and that thereafter the 30-day period
started running and ultimately expired. This could have happened any time
during the interval of thirteen years, when none of the co-heirs made a
move to redeem the properties sold. By 1977, in other words, when Tecla
Padua filed her complaint, the right of redemption had already been
extinguished because the period for its exercise had already expired.
The following doctrine is also worth noting:
While the general rule is, that to charge a party with laches in
the assertion of an alleged right it is essential that he should
have knowledge of the facts upon which he bases his claim, yet
if the circumstances were such as should have induced inquiry,
and the means of ascertaining the truth were readily available
upon inquiry, but the party neglects to make it, he will be
chargeable with laches, the same as if he had known the
facts. 15
It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-heirs to wonder why the spouses
Alonzo, who were not among them, should enclose a portion of the inherited
lot and build thereon a house of strong materials. This definitely was not the
act of a temporary possessor or a mere mortgagee. This certainly looked like
an act of ownership. Yet, given this unseemly situation, none of the co-heirs
saw fit to object or at least inquire, to ascertain the facts, which were readily
201

available. It took all of thirteen years before one of them chose to claim the
right of redemption, but then it was already too late.
We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are deviating from the
strict letter of the law, which the respondent court understandably applied
pursuant to existing jurisprudence. The said court acted properly as it had
no competence to reverse the doctrines laid down by this Court in the
above-cited cases. In fact, and this should be clearly stressed, we ourselves
are not abandoning the De Conejero and Buttle doctrines. What we are
doing simply is adopting an exception to the general rule, in view of the
peculiar circumstances of this case.
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no
notice in writing was given them. And there is no doubt either that the 30day period began and ended during the 14 years between the sales in
question and the filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977, without the
co-heirs exercising their right of redemption. These are the justifications for
this exception.
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant
and perpetual wish to render every one his due." 16 That wish continues to
motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case
brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its
decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that
will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to
begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. So we have done in this
case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the respondent court is
REVERSED and that of the trial court is reinstated, without any
pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera Gutierrez, Jr., Paras,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Fernan and Feliciano, JJ., are on leave.

202

Cabales vs ca
NELSON CABALES and G.R. No. 162421
RITO CABALES,
Petitioners,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- versus - CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.
COURT OF APPEALS, Promulgated:
JESUS FELIANO and
ANUNCIACION FELIANO,
Respondents. August 31, 2007

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the

decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated October 27, 2003, in CA-G.R. CV
No. 68319 entitled Nelson Cabales and Rito Cabales v. Jesus Feliano and

203

Anunciacion Feliano, which affirmed with modification the decision[2] of the

Regional Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25, dated August 11,
2000, in Civil Case No. R-2878. The resolution of the Court of Appeals
dated February

23,

2004,

which

denied

petitioners

motion

for

reconsideration, is likewise herein assailed.

The facts as found by the trial court and the appellate court are well
established.

Rufino Cabales died on July 4, 1966 and left a 5,714-square meter

parcel of land located in Brgy. Rizal, Sogod, Southern Leyte, covered by Tax
Declaration No. 17270 to his surviving wife Saturnina and children Bonifacio,
Albino, Francisco, Leonora, Alberto and petitioner Rito.

On July 26, 1971, brothers and co-owners Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto sold
the subject property to Dr. Cayetano Corrompido for P2,000.00, with right to
repurchase within eight (8) years. The three (3) siblings divided the
proceeds of the sale among themselves, each getting a share of P666.66.

The following month or on August 18, 1971, Alberto secured a note (vale)
from Dr. Corrompido in the amount of P300.00.

In 1972, Alberto died leaving his wife and son, petitioner Nelson.

On December 18, 1975, within the eight-year redemption period, Bonifacio

and Albino tendered their payment of P666.66 each to Dr. Corrompido. But
204

Dr. Corrompido only released the document of sale with pacto de retro after
Saturnina paid for the share of her deceased son, Alberto, including his vale
of P300.00.

On even date, Saturnina and her four (4) children Bonifacio, Albino,
Francisco and Leonora sold the subject parcel of land to respondentsspouses

Jesus

and

Anunciacion

Feliano

for P8,000.00. The

Deed

of Sale provided in its last paragraph, thus:

It is hereby declared and understood that the amount of

TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX PESOS
(P2,286.00) corresponding and belonging to the Heirs of Alberto
Cabales and to Rito Cabales who are still minors upon the
execution of this instrument are held
in trust by the VENDEE and to be paid and delivered only to
them upon reaching the age of 21.

On December 17, 1985, the Register of Deeds of Southern Leyte issued

Original Certificate of Title No. 17035 over the purchased land in the names
of respondents-spouses.

On December 30, 1985, Saturnina and her four (4) children executed
an affidavit to the effect that petitioner Nelson would only receive the
amount of P176.34 from respondents-spouses when he reaches the age of
21 considering that Saturnina paid Dr. Corrompido P966.66 for the obligation
of petitioner Nelsons late father Alberto, i.e., P666.66 for his share in the
redemption of the sale with pacto de retro as well as his vale of P300.00.

205

On July 24, 1986, 24-year old petitioner Rito Cabales acknowledged receipt
of the sum of P1,143.00 from respondent Jesus Feliano, representing the
formers share in the proceeds of the sale of subject property.

In 1988, Saturnina died. Petitioner Nelson, then residing in Manila, went

back to his fathers hometown in Southern Leyte. That same year, he learned
from his uncle, petitioner Rito, of the sale of subject property. In 1993, he
signified

his

intention

to

redeem

the

subject

land

during

a barangay conciliation process that he initiated.

On January 12, 1995, contending that they could not have sold their
respective shares in subject property when they were minors, petitioners
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte, a complaint
for redemption of the subject land plus damages.

In their answer, respondents-spouses maintained that petitioners were

estopped from claiming any right over subject property considering that (1)
petitioner Rito had already received the amount corresponding to his share
of the proceeds of the sale of subject property, and (2) that petitioner Nelson
failed to consign to the court the total amount of the redemption price
necessary for legal redemption. They prayed for the dismissal of the case on
the grounds of laches and prescription.

No amicable settlement was reached at pre-trial. Trial ensued and on August

11, 2000, the trial court ruled against petitioners. It held that (1) Alberto or,
by his death, any of his heirs including petitioner Nelson lost their right to
subject land when not one of them repurchased it from Dr. Corrompido; (2)
206

Saturnina was effectively subrogated to the rights and interests of Alberto

when she paid for Albertos share as well as his obligation to Dr. Corrompido;
and (3) petitioner Rito had no more right to redeem his share to subject
property as the sale by Saturnina, his legal guardian pursuant to Section 7,
Rule 93 of the Rules of Court, was perfectly valid; and it was shown that he
received his share of the proceeds of the sale on July 24, 1986, when he was
24 years old.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial

court. It held that the sale by Saturnina of petitioner Ritos undivided share
to

the

property

was

unenforceable

for

lack

of

authority

or

legal

representation but that the contract was effectively ratified by petitioner

Ritos receipt of the proceeds on July 24, 1986. The appellate court also ruled
that petitioner Nelson is co-owner to the extent of one-seventh (1/7) of
subject property as Saturnina was not subrogated to Albertos rights when
she repurchased his share to the property. It further directed petitioner
Nelson to pay the estate of the late Saturnina Cabales the amount
of P966.66, representing the amount which the latter paid for the obligation
of petitioner Nelsons late father Alberto. Finally, however, it denied petitioner
Nelsons claim for redemption for his failure to tender or consign in court the
redemption money within the period prescribed by law.

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners contend that the

Court of Appeals erred in (1) recognizing petitioner Nelson Cabales as coowner of subject land but denied him the right of legal redemption, and (2)
not recognizing petitioner Rito Cabales as co-owner of subject land with
similar right of legal redemption.

207

First, we shall delineate the rights of petitioners to subject land.

When Rufino Cabales died intestate, his wife Saturnina and his six (6)
children, Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco, Leonora, Alberto and petitioner Rito,
survived and succeeded him. Article 996 of the New Civil Code provides that
[i]f a widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the
surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as that of each of the
children. Verily,

the

seven

(7)

heirs

inherited

equally

on

subject

property. Petitioner Rito and Alberto, petitioner Nelsons father, inherited in

their own rights and with equal shares as the others.

But before partition of subject land was effected, Alberto died. By

operation of law, his rights and obligations to one-seventh of subject land
were transferred to his legal heirs his wife and his son petitioner Nelson.

We shall now discuss the effects of the two (2) sales of subject land to
the rights of the parties.
The first sale with pacto de retro to Dr. Corrompido by the brothers
and co-owners Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto was valid but only as to
their pro-indiviso shares to the land. When Alberto died prior to repurchasing
his share, his rights and obligations were transferred to and assumed by his
heirs, namely his wife and his son, petitioner Nelson. But the records show
that it was Saturnina, Albertos mother, and not his heirs, who repurchased
for him. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, Saturnina was not
subrogated to Albertos or his heirs rights to the property when she
repurchased the share.

208

In Paulmitan v. Court of Appeals,[3] we held that a co-owner who

redeemed the property in its entirety did not make her the owner of all of
it. The property remained in a condition of co-ownership as the redemption
did not provide for a mode of terminating a co-ownership. [4] But the one who
redeemed had the right to be reimbursed for the redemption price and until
reimbursed, holds a lien upon the subject property for the amount due.
[5]

Necessarily, when Saturnina redeemed for Albertos heirs who had then

acquired his pro-indiviso share in subject property, it did not vest in her
ownership over the pro-indiviso share she redeemed. But she had the right
to be reimbursed for the redemption price and held a lien upon the property
for the amount due until reimbursement. The result is that the heirs of
Alberto, i.e., his wife and his son petitioner Nelson, retained ownership over
their pro-indiviso share.
Upon redemption from Dr. Corrompido, the subject property was
resold to respondents-spouses by the co-owners. Petitioners Rito and Nelson
were then minors and as indicated in the Deed of Sale, their shares in the
proceeds were held in trust by respondents-spouses to be paid and delivered
to them upon reaching the age of majority.

As to petitioner Rito, the contract of sale was unenforceable as

correctly held by the Court of Appeals. Articles 320 and 326 of the New Civil
Code[6] state that:
Art. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother, is the
legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under
parental authority. If the property is worth more than two
thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject
to the approval of the Court of First Instance.

209

Art. 326. When the property of the child is worth more

than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall be
considered a guardian of the childs property, subject to the
duties and obligations of guardians under the Rules of Court.
In other words, the father, or, in his absence, the mother, is considered legal
administrator of the property pertaining to the child under his or her
parental authority without need of giving a bond in case the amount of the
property of the child does not exceed two thousand pesos. [7] Corollary to
this, Rule 93, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, applicable to
this case, automatically designates the parent as legal guardian of the child
without need of any judicial appointment in case the latters property does
not exceed two thousand pesos,[8] thus:
Sec. 7. Parents as guardians. When the property of the
child under parental authority is worth two thousand pesos or
less, the father or the mother, without the necessity of court
appointment, shall be his legal guardian x x x x[9]

Saturnina was clearly petitioner Ritos legal guardian without necessity of

court appointment considering that the amount of his property or oneseventh of subject property was P1,143.00, which is less than two thousand
pesos. However, Rule 96, Sec. 1[10] provides that:
Section 1. To what guardianship shall extend. A guardian
appointed shall have the care and custody of the person of his
ward, and the management of his estate, or the management of
the estate only, as the case may be. The guardian of the estate
of a nonresident shall have the management of all the estate of
the ward within the Philippines, and no court other than that in
which such guardian was appointed shall have jurisdiction over
the guardianship.

210

Indeed, the legal guardian only has the plenary power of administration of
the minors property. It does not include the power of alienation which needs
judicial authority.[11] Thus, when Saturnina, as legal guardian of petitioner
Rito, sold the latters pro-indiviso share in subject land, she did not have the
legal authority to do so.

Article 1403 of the New Civil Code provides, thus:

Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable,
unless they are ratified:

(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by

one who has been given no authority or legal representation, or
who has acted beyond his powers;

xxxx
Accordingly, the contract of sale as to the pro-indiviso share of petitioner
Rito was unenforceable. However, when he acknowledged receipt of the
proceeds of the sale on July 24, 1986, petitioner Rito effectively ratified
it. This act of ratification rendered the sale valid and binding as to him.
With respect to petitioner Nelson, on the other hand, the contract of sale
was void. He was a minor at the time of the sale. Saturnina or any and all
the other co-owners were not his legal guardians with judicial authority to
alienate or encumber his property. It was his mother who was his legal
guardian and, if duly authorized by the courts, could validly sell his
undivided share to the property. She did not. Necessarily, when Saturnina
and the others sold the subject property in its entirety to respondentsspouses, they only sold and transferred title to their pro-indiviso shares and

211

not

that

part

which

pertained

to

petitioner

Nelson

and

his

mother. Consequently, petitioner Nelson and his mother retained ownership

over their undivided share of subject property.[12]

But may petitioners redeem the subject land from respondentsspouses? Articles 1088 and 1623 of the New Civil Code are pertinent:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights
to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may
be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him
for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of
one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale
by the vendor.

Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption

shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice
in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the
case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the
Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the
vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible
redemptioners.

The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of

adjoining owners.

Clearly, legal redemption may only be exercised by the co-owner or coowners who did not part with his or their pro-indiviso share in the property
held in common. As demonstrated, the sale as to the undivided share of
petitioner Rito became valid and binding upon his ratification on July 24,
1986. As a result, he lost his right to redeem subject property.
212

However, as likewise established, the sale as to the undivided share of

petitioner Nelson and his mother was not valid such that they were not
divested of their ownership thereto. Necessarily, they may redeem the
subject property from respondents-spouses. But they must do so within
thirty days from notice in writing of the sale by their co-owners vendors. In
reckoning this period, we held in Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate
Court,[13] thus:
x x x we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may
add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the
meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to
discover
in
its
provisions
the
intent
of
the
lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted
in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the
legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for
we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render
justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of

but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable,
and we must keep them so. x x x x
x x x x While we may not read into the law a purpose that
is not there, we nevertheless have the right to read out of it the
reason for its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to the letter
that killeth but to the spirit that vivifieth, to give effect to the
lawmakers will.

In requiring written notice, Article 1088 (and Article 1623

for that matter)[14] seeks to ensure that the redemptioner is
properly notified of the sale and to indicate the date of such
notice as the starting time of the 30-day period of
redemption. Considering the shortness of the period, it is really
213

necessary, as a general rule, to pinpoint the precise date it is

supposed to begin, to obviate the problem of alleged delays,
sometimes consisting of only a day or two.
In the instant case, the right of redemption was invoked not days but
years after the sale was made in 1978. We are not unmindful of the fact that
petitioner Nelson was a minor when the sale was perfected. Nevertheless,
the records show that in 1988, petitioner Nelson, then of majority age, was
informed of the sale of subject property. Moreover, it was noted by the
appellate court that petitioner Nelson was likewise informed thereof in 1993
and

he

signified

his

intention

to

redeem

subject

property

during

a barangay conciliation process. But he only filed the complaint for legal
redemption and damages on January 12, 1995, certainly more than thirty
days from learning about the sale.

In the face of the established facts, petitioner Nelson cannot feign

ignorance of the sale of subject property in 1978. To require strict proof of
written notice of the sale would be to countenance an obvious false claim of
lack of knowledge thereof, thus commending the letter of the law over its
purpose, i.e., the notification of redemptioners.

The Court is satisfied that there was sufficient notice of the sale to
petitioner Nelson. The thirty-day redemption period commenced in 1993,
after petitioner Nelson sought the barangay conciliation process to redeem
his property. By January 12, 1995, when petitioner Nelson filed a complaint
for legal redemption and damages, it is clear that the thirty-day period had
already expired.

214

As in Alonzo, the Court, after due consideration of the facts of the

instant case, hereby interprets the law in a way that will render justice. [15]

Petitioner Nelson, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, can no

longer redeem subject property. But he and his mother remain co-owners
thereof with respondents-spouses. Accordingly, title to subject property must
include them.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision

and resolution of the Court of Appeals of October 27, 2003 and February 23,
2004 are

AFFIRMED

WITH

MODIFICATION. The

Register

of

Deeds

of

Southern Leyte is ORDERED to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. 17035

and to issue in lieu thereof a new certificate of title in the name of
respondents-spouses Jesus and Anunciacion Feliano for the 6/7 portion, and
petitioner Nelson Cabales and his mother for the remaining 1/7 portion, pro
indiviso.

SO ORDERED.

215

Art. 1091
Teves va ca --Art. 1104
Non vs Ca --Reillo vs heirs of san jose and santo
CRISTINA F. REILLO, LEONOR F. G.R. No. 166393
PUSO,
ADELIA
F.
ROCAMORA,
SOFRONIO S.J. FERNANDO, EFREN
S.J.
FERNANDO,
ZOSIMO
S.J.
FERNANDO, JR., and MA. TERESA F.
PION,
Petitioners,

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

- versus -

Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GALICANO
E.S.
SAN
JOSE,
represented by his Attorneys-inFact, ANNALISA S.J. RUIZ and
RODELIO S. SAN JOSE, VICTORIA
S.J. REDONGO, CATALINA S.J. DEL
ROSARIO
and MARIBETH
S.J.
CORTEZ, collectively known as the
HEIRS OF QUITERIO SAN JOSE and
ANTONINA ESPIRITU SANTO,
Respondents.

216

VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:
June 18, 2009

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision[1] dated
August 31, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 69261
which affirmed the Order dated May 9, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Morong, Rizal, Branch 78, granting the motion for judgment on the
pleadings and the motion to dismiss counter petition for partition filed by
respondents in Civil Case No. 99-1148-M. Also questioned is the CA
Resolution[2] dated December 14, 2004 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
Spouses Quiterio San Jose (Quiterio) and Antonina Espiritu Santo
(Antonina) were the original registered owners of a parcel of land located in
E. Rodriguez Sr. Avenue, Teresa, Rizal covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 458396 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal. The said parcel of land is
217

now registered in the name of Ma. Teresa F. Pion (Teresa) under TCT No. M94400.

Quiterio and Antonina had five children, namely, Virginia, Virgilio,

Galicano, Victoria and Catalina. Antonina died on July 1, 1970, while Quiterio
died on October 19, 1976. Virginia and Virgilio are also now deceased.
Virginia was survived by her husband Zosimo Fernando, Sr. (Zosimo Sr.) and
their seven children, while Virgilio was survived by his wife Julita Gonzales
and children, among whom is Maribeth S.J. Cortez (Maribeth).

On October 26, 1999, Galicano, represented by his children and attorneysin-fact, Annalisa S.J. Ruiz and Rodegelio San Jose, Victoria, Catalina, and
Maribeth (respondents) filed with the RTC a Complaint [3] for annulment of
title, annulment of deed of extra-judicial settlement, partition and damages
against Zosimo Sr. and his children Cristina F. Reillo, Leonor F. Puso, Adelia F.
Rocamora, Sofronio S.J. Fernando, Efren S.J. Fernando, Zosimo S.J.
Fernando, Jr. and Ma. Teresa (petitioners) and the Register of Deeds
of Morong, Rizal. The complaint alleged among other things:
6. Under date of January 23, 1998, defendants FERNANDO et al,
without the knowledge and consent of all the other surviving
heirs of the deceased spouses QUITERIO SAN JOSE and
ANTONINA ESPIRITU SANTO, including herein plaintiffs, executed
a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate Among Heirs with
Waiver of Rights making it appear therein that they are the
legitimate descendants and sole heirs of QUITERIO SAN JOSE
and ANTONINA ESPIRITU SANTO; and adjudicating among
themselves, the subject parcel of land.

6.1 In the same document, defendants ZOSIMO SR., CRISTINA,

LEONOR, ADELIA, SOFRONIO, EFREN and ZOSIMO JR., waived
all their rights, participation and interests over the subject parcel
of land in favor of their co-defendant MA. TERESA F. PION (a.k.a
MA. TERESA S.J. FERNANDO).
218

xxxx
7. On the strength of the said falsified Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate, defendant MA. TERESA PION (a.k.a MA.
TERESA S.J. FERNANDO) succeeded in causing the cancellation
of TCT No. 458396 in the name of SPS. QUITERIO SAN JOSE and
ANTONINA ESPIRITU SANTO and the issuance of a new Transfer
Certificate of Title in her name only, to the extreme prejudice of
all the other heirs of the deceased SPS. QUITERIO SAN JOSE and
ANTONINA ESPIRITU SANTO, specifically, the herein plaintiffs
who were deprived of their lawful participation over the subject
parcel of land.

7.1 Thus, on July 6, 1999, Transfer Certificate of Title No. M94400 was issued in the name of defendant MA. TERESA S.J.
FERNANDO.

xxxx
8. As a result, the herein plaintiffs and the other surviving heirs
of the deceased spouses QUITERIO SAN JOSE and ANTONINA
ESPIRITU SANTO, who are legally entitled to inherit from the
latters respective estates, in accordance with the laws of
intestate succession, have been duly deprived of their respective
rights, interests and participation over the subject parcel of land.

8.1 Thus, there is sufficient ground to annul the subject Deed of

Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate Among Heirs with Waiver of
Rights dated January 23, 1998, and all other documents issued
on the strength thereof, particularly Transfer Certificate of Title
No. M-94400.[4]

219

It was also alleged that respondents filed a complaint before the Lupong
Tagapamayapa of their Barangay which issued the required certification to
file action for failure of the parties to settle the matter amicably.
Petitioners filed their Answer with Counter-Petition and with
Compulsory Counterclaim[5] denying that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement
of Estate Among Heirs with Waiver of Rights which was the basis of the
issuance of TCT No. M-94400, was falsified and that the settlement was
made and implemented in accordance with law. They admitted that the
deceased spouses Quiterio and Antonina had five children; that the subject
property was not the only property of spouses Quiterio and Antonina and
submitted in their counter-petition for partition the list of the other 12
parcels of land of the deceased spouses Quiterio and Antonina that
petitioners alleged are in respondents possession and control.

On January 18, 2000, respondents filed a Motion for Judgment on the

Pleadings[6] alleging that: (1) the denials made by petitioners in their answer
were in the form of negative pregnant; (2) petitioners failed to state the
basis that the questioned document was not falsified; (3) they failed to
specifically deny the allegations in the complaint that petitioners committed
misrepresentations by stating that they are the sole heirs and legitimate
descendants of Quiterio and Antonina; and (4) by making reference to their
allegations in their counter-petition for partition to support their denials,
petitioners impliedly admitted that they are not the sole heirs of Quiterio and
Antonina.

Respondents filed a Reply to Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim [7] with a

motion to dismiss the counter-petition for partition on the ground that
petitioners failed to pay the required docket fees for their counter-petition
for partition. Petitioners filed their Rejoinder[8] without tackling the issue of
non-payment of docket fees.

220

On February 4, 2000, petitioners filed their Comment [9] to respondents

motion for judgment on the pleading and prayed that the instant action be
decided on the basis of the pleadings with the exception of respondents
unverified Reply.Petitioners also filed an Opposition to the motion to dismiss
the counter-petition for partition.

On May 9, 2000, the RTC rendered its Order,[10] the dispositive portion of
which reads:

1.
The Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
Among Heirs with Waiver of Rights, dated January 23, 1998 and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. M-94400 in the name of Ma.
Teresa S.J. Fernando are declared null and void;

2.
The Register of Deeds of Rizal, Morong
Branch, is directed to cancel TCT No. 94400; and

3.
The Heirs of Quiterio San Jose and Antonina
Espiritu Santo is (sic) directed to partition the subject parcel of
land covered by TCT No. M-458396 in accordance with the law of
intestate succession.[11]

SO ORDERED.

The RTC found that, based on the allegations contained in the

pleadings filed by the parties, petitioners misrepresented themselves when
221

they alleged in the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate Among Heirs

with Waiver of Rights that they are the sole heirs of the deceased spouses
Quiterio and Antonina; that petitioners prayed for a counter-petition
for partition involving several parcels of land left by the deceased spouses
Quiterio and Antonina which bolstered respondents claim that petitioners
falsified the Extrajudicial Settlement which became the basis for the issuance
of TCT No. M-94400 in Ma. Teresas name; thus, a ground to annul the Deed
of Extrajudicial Settlement and the title. The RTC did not consider as filed
petitioners Counter-Petition for Partition since they did not pay the
corresponding docket fees.
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration, which the RTC denied in an
Order[12] dated August 29, 2000.

Dissatisfied, petitioners filed an appeal with the CA. After the parties filed
their respective briefs, the case was submitted for decision.

On August 31, 2004, the CA rendered its assailed Decision affirming the May
9, 2000 Order of the RTC.
The CA found that, while the subject matter of respondents complaint
was the nullity of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate among Heirs
with Waiver of Rights that resulted in the issuance of TCT No. M-94400 in
Ma. Teresas name, petitioners included in their Answer a Counter-Petition for
Partition involving 12 other parcels of land of spouses Quiterio and Antonina
which was in the nature of a permissive counterclaim; that petitioners, being
the plaintiffs in the counter-petition for partition, must pay the docket fees
otherwise the court will not acquire jurisdiction over the case. The CA ruled
that petitioners cannot pass the blame to the RTC for their omission to pay
the docket fees.

The CA affirmed the RTCs judgment on the pleadings since petitioners

admitted that the deceased spouses Quiterio and Antonina had five children
222

which included herein plaintiffs; thus, petitioners misrepresented themselves

when they stated in the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement that they are the
legitimate descendants and sole heirs of the deceased spouses Quiterio and
Antonina; that the deed is null and void on such ground since respondents
were deprived of their rightful share in the subject property and petitioners
cannot transfer the property in favor of Ma. Teresa without respondents
consent; that TCT No. M-94400 must be cancelled for lack of basis. The CA
affirmed the RTCs Order of partition of the subject property in accordance
with the rules on intestate succession in the absence of a will.

Petitioners filed the instant petition for review on certiorari raising the
following assignment of errors, to wit:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT GIVING DUE
COURSE TO THE APPEAL OF THE DEFENDANTS (HEREIN
PETITIONERS) AND IN EVENTUALLY UPHOLDING THE DECISION
OF THE COURT OF ORIGIN, CONSIDERING THAT SUCH RULING
WILL RESULT TO MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS BETWEEN THE SAME
PARTIES AND IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTY OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW & PROPERTY AND
PROPERTY RIGHTS.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT VACATING THE
ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT IN PARTITIONING THE ESTATE
WITHOUT PUBLICATION AS REQUIRED BY RULE 74 AND 76 OF
THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. [13]

Petitioners contend that in their Comment to respondents motion for

judgment on the pleadings, they stated that they will not oppose the same
provided that their Answer with Counter-Petition for Partition and Rejoinder
will be taken into consideration in deciding the case; however, the RTC
decided the case on the basis alone of respondents complaint; that the
Answer stated that the deed was not a falsified document and was made and
implemented in accordance with law, thus, it was sufficient enough to tender
223

an issue and was very far from admitting the material allegations of
respondents complaint.

Petitioners also fault the RTC for disregarding their claim for partition of the
other parcels of land owned by the deceased spouses Quiterio and Antonina
for their failure to pay the court docket fees when the RTC could have simply
directed petitioners to pay the same; and that this error if not corrected will
result to multiplicity of suits.
Petitioners argue that the RTC erred in ordering the partition of the subject
property as it violates the basic law on intestate succession that the heirs
should be named and qualified through a formal petition for intestate
succession whereby blood relationship should be established first by the
claiming heirs before they shall be entitled to receive from the estate of the
deceased; that the order of partition was rendered without jurisdiction for
lack of publication as required under Rules 74 and 76 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure for testate or intestate succession.
We find no merit in the petition.

The CA committed no reversible error in affirming the judgment on the

pleadings rendered by the RTC.

Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court, states:

SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an

answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse partys pleading, the court may, on
motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. x x x.

224

Where a motion for judgment on the pleadings is filed, the essential

question is whether there are issues generated by the pleadings. In a proper
case for judgment on the pleadings, there is no ostensible issue at all
because of the failure of the defending partys answer to raise an issue.
[14]
The answer would fail to tender an issue, of course, if it does not deny
the material allegations in the complaint or admits said material allegations
of the adverse partys pleadings by confessing the truthfulness thereof
and/or omitting to deal with them at all.[15]

In this case, respondents principal action was for the annulment of the
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate Among Heirs with Waiver of Rights
executed by petitioners and annulment of title on the ground that petitioners
stated in the said Deed that they are the legitimate descendants and sole
heirs of the spouses Quiterio and Antonina. Although petitioners denied in
their Answer that the Deed was falsified, they, however, admitted
respondents allegation that spouses Quiterio and Antonina had 5 children,
thus, supporting respondents claim that petitioners are not the sole heirs of
the deceased spouses. Petitioners denial/admission in his Answer to the
complaint should be considered in its entirety and not truncated parts.
Considering that petitioners already admitted that respondents Galicano,
Victoria, Catalina and Maribeth are the children and grandchild, respectively,
of the spouses Quiterio and Antonina, who were the original registered
owners of the subject property, and thus excluding respondents from the
deed of settlement of the subject property, there is no more genuine issue
between the parties generated by the pleadings, thus, the RTC committed no
reversible error in rendering the judgment on the pleadings.

A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of

the heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent
and vicious.[16] The deed of settlement made by petitioners was invalid
because it excluded respondents who were entitled to equal shares in the
subject property. Under the rule, no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding
upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.
225

Thus, the RTC correctly annulled the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of

Estate Among Heirs with Waiver of Rights dated January 23, 1998 and TCT
No. M-94400 in the name of Ma. Teresa S.J. Fernando issued pursuant to
such deed.
[17]

Petitioners claim that had there been a trial, they could have presented
testamentary and documentary evidence that the subject land is the
inheritance of their deceased mother from her deceased parents, deserves
scant consideration. A perusal of petitioners Answer, as well as their
Rejoinder, never raised such a defense. In fact, nowhere in the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs with Waiver of Rights executed by
petitioners was there a statement that the subject property was inherited by
petitioners mother Virginia from her deceased parents Quiterio and
Antonina. Notably, petitioners never opposed respondents motion for
judgment on the pleadings.

We also find no merit in petitioners contention that the CounterPetition for Partition in their Answer was in the nature of a compulsory
counterclaim which does not require the payment of docket fees.

A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against

an opposing party.[18] It may either be permissive or compulsory. It is
permissive if it does not arise out of or is not necessarily connected with the
subject matter of the opposing partys claim. [19] A permissive counterclaim is
essentially an independent claim that may be filed separately in another
case.

A counterclaim is compulsory when its object arises out of or is

necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the
subject matter of the opposing partys claim and does not require for its
226

adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction.[20] Unlike permissive counterclaims, compulsory counterclaims
should be set up in the same action; otherwise, they would be barred
forever.

Respondents action was for the annulment of the Deed of Extrajudicial

Settlement, title and partition of the property subject of the Deed. On the
other hand, in the Counter-Petition filed by petitioners in their Answer to
respondents complaint, they were asking for the partition and accounting of
the other 12 parcels of land of the deceased spouses Quiterio and Antonina,
which are entirely different from the subject matter of the respondents
action. Petitioners claim does not arise out of or is necessarily connected
with the action for the Annulment of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of
the property covered by TCT No. 458396. Thus, payment of docket fees is
necessary before the RTC could acquire jurisdiction over petitioners petition
for partition.

Petitioners, however, argue that the RTC could have simply issued a
directive ordering them to pay the docket fees, for its non-payment should
not result in the automatic dismissal of the case.

We find apropos the disquisition of the CA on this matter, thus:

The rule regarding the payment of docket fees upon the
filing of the initiatory pleading is not without exception. It has
been held that if the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of docket fees, the court may allow
payment of the fee within reasonable time but in no case beyond
the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

It is apparent from the arguments of the defendantsappellants that they are blaming the trial court for their omission
to pay the docket fees. It is, however, our opinion that the
227

defendants-appellants cannot pass on to the trial court the

performance of a positive duty imposed upon them by the law. It
should be noted that their omission to file the docket fees was
raised as one of the grounds to dismiss the counter petition for
partition. The defendants-appellants opposed the said motion
without, however, offering an answer to the said ground raised
by the plaintiffs-appellees. In fact, during the period the motion
was being heard by the trial court, the defendantsappellants
never paid the docket fees for their petition so that it could have
at least brought to the attention of the trial court their payment
of the docket fees although belatedly done. They did not even
ask the trial court for time within which to pay the docket fees
for their petition. When the trial court ruled to dismiss the
petition of the defendants-appellants, the latter did not, in their
motion for reconsideration, ask the trial court to reconsider the
dismissal of their petition by paying the required docket fees,
neither did they ask for time within which to pay their docket
fees. In other words, the trial court could have issued an order
allowing the defendants-appellants a period to pay the docket
fees for their petition if the defendants-appellants made such
manifestation. What is apparent from the factual circumstances
of the case is that the defendants-appellants have been
neglectful in complying with this positive duty imposed upon
them by law as plaintiffs of the counter petition for partition.
Because of their omission to comply with their duty, no grave
error was committed by the trial court in dismissing the
defendants-appellants counter petition for partition. [21]

Petitioners argue that with the dismissal of their Counter-Petition for

Partition, the partition of the other parcels of land owned by the deceased
spouses Quiterio and Antonina will result to multiplicity of suits.

We are not persuaded.

Significantly, in petitioners Answer with Counter-Petition for Partition,
they enumerated 12 other parcels of land owned by the deceased spouses
228

Quiterio and Antonina. They alleged that some of these properties had
already been disposed of by respondents and some are still generating
income under the control and administration of respondents, and these
properties should be collated back by respondents to be partitioned by all
the heirs of the deceased spouses. It bears stressing that the action filed by
respondents in the RTC was an ordinary civil action for annulment of title,
annulment of the deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition of a parcel of
land now covered by TCT No. M-94400; hence, the authority of the court is
limited to the property described in the pleading. The RTC cannot order the
collation and partition of the other properties which were not included in the
partition that was the subject matter of the respondents action for
annulment. Thus, a separate proceeding is indeed proper for the partition of
the estate of the deceased spouses Quiterio and Antonina.

Finally, petitioners contend that the RTC erred when it ordered the
heirs of Quiterio and Antonina to partition the subject parcel of land covered
by TCT No. 458396 in accordance with the laws of intestate succession; that
the RTC violated the requirement of publication under Sections 1 and 2 of
Rule 74 and Section 3 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court.
We do not agree.
We find the ruling of the CA on the matter of the RTCs order of
partition of land subject of the annulled deed of extrajudicial settlement
worth quoting, thus:
Considering that the subject document and the
corresponding title were canceled, the logical consequence is
that the property in dispute, which was the subject of the
extrajudicial settlement, reverted back to the estate of its
original owners, the deceased spouses Quiterio and Antonina
San Jose. Since, it was admitted that all the parties to the
instant suit are legal heirs of the deceased spouses, they owned
the subject property in common. It is a basic rule that any act
229

which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs or

co-owners is deemed to be a partition. Therefore, there was no
reversible error committed by the trial court in ordering the
partition of the subject property. We find nothing wrong with
such ruling considering that the trial court ordered the partition
of the subject property in accordance with the rules on intestate
succession. The trial court found the property to be originally
owned by the deceased spouses Quiterio and Antonina San Jose
and, in the absence of a will left by the deceased spouses, it
must be partitioned in accordance with the rules on intestate
succession.[22]

As the RTC nullified the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate

Among Heirs with Waiver of Rights executed by petitioners and the title
issued in accordance therewith, the order of partition of the land subject of
the settlement in accordance with the laws on intestate succession is proper
as respondents action filed in the RTC and respondents prayer in their
complaint asked for the partition of the subject property in accordance with
intestate succession. The applicable law is Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of
Court, which deals with action for partition, to wit:

SECTION 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate.

A person having the right to compel the partition of real estate
may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint
the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of
the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as
defendants all other persons interested in the property.

And, under this law, there is no requirement for publication.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated

August 31, 2004 and the Resolution dated December 14, 2004, of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69261, are AFFIRMED.
230

SO ORDERED.

Art. 1105
Landayan vs bacani
G.R. No. L-30455 September 30, 1982
MARIA
LANDAYAN,
et
vs.
HON. ANGEL BACANI, et al., respondents.

al., petitioners,

Anastacio E. Caoayan for petitioners.

Felipe V. Avenojar for respondents.

VASQUEZ, J.:
In his lifetime, Teodoro Abenojar owned several parcels of land located in
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, and a house and lot in Manila. The said properties
were all covered by Torrens Titles in his name. He died intestate in Urdaneta,
on March 20, 1948.
On February 3, 1949, private respondents Maxima Andrada, the surviving
spouse of Teodoro Abenojar, and Severino Abenojar, executed a public
document, entitled "Extra-Judicial Agreement of Partition" whereby they
adjudicated between themselves the properties left by Teodoro Abenojar.
Severino Abenojar represented himself in said document as "the only forced
heir and descendant" of the late Teodoro Abenojar.
On March 6, 1968, petitioners herein filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan presided over by the respondent Judge seeking a
judicial declaration that they are legal heirs of the deceased Teodoro
Abenojar, and that private respondents be ordered to surrender the
ownership and possession of some of the properties that they acquired
231

under the deed of extra-judicial settlement corresponding to the shares of

the petitioners and that the said deed of extra- judicial settlement and the
subsequent deed of donation executed in favor of private respondents,
spouses Liberata Abenojar and Jose Serrano, in consequence thereof be
declared nun and void.
In their complaint, petitioners Maria, Segundo, Marcial and Lucio, all
surnamed LANDAYAN (the rest of the petitioners being their respective
spouses), alleged that they are the legitimate children of Guillerma Abenojar,
then already deceased, who was the only child of Teodoro Abenojar with his
first wife named Florencia Bautista; and that while Teodoro Abenojar
contracted a second marriage with Antera Mandap and a third with private
respondent Maxima Andrada, he did not have any offspring in any of the said
second and third marriages. They aver that private respondent Severino
Abenojar is an illegitimate son of Guillerma Abenojar. They accordingly pray
that they be declared as among the legal heirs of the deceased Teodoro
Abenojar entitled to share in his estate.
Private respondents, on the other hand, have alleged in their pleadings that
Teodoro Abenojar married only once, and that was with private respondent
Maxima Andrada. They claimed that private respondent Severino Abenojar is
an acknowledged natural child of Teodoro Abenojar with Florencia Bautista.
They disclaimed the allegation of the petitioners that their mother Guillerma
Abenojar was a legitimate daughter of Teodoro Abenojar and Florencia
Bautista, the truth being allegedly that Guillerma Abenojar, the mother of
the Landayans, was Teodoro Abenojar's spurious child with Antera Mandap
who was then married to another man.
As their affirmative and special defense, the private respondents alleged that
the action of the petitioners had already prescribed, the same having been
filed more than 18 years after the execution of the documents that they seek
to annul.
After a preliminary hearing on said affirmative defense, the respondent
Judge issued an Order sustaining the contention that the action is barred by
prescription and dismissing the case as a consequence thereof.
The finding that prescription had set in was rationalized on two main
considerations, namely; (1) the action for the annulment of the deed of
232

extra-judicial partition and the deed of donation is based on fraud, the

prescriptive period of which is four years from the discovery of the fraud,
such discovery being presumed to have taken place upon the registration of
the documents in the Office of the Registry of Deeds and the issuance of new
titles in the names of the transferees which, in this case, had occurred on
November 21, 1951; and (2) the deed of extra-judicial partition is not an
inexistent and void contract the action for the declaration of which does not
prescribe, the said document being at most a voidable contract, subject to
the operation of the statute of limitations.
We find the dismissal of the action filed by the petitioners to be precipitious
and erroneous. Although the principles relied upon by the respondent Judge
are legally correct, he had unqualifiedly assumed the extra-judicial partition
to be merely a voidable contract and not a void one. This question may not
be resolved by determining alone the ground for the annulment of the
contract. It requires an inquiry into the legal status of private respondent
Severino Abenojar, particularly as to whether he may be considered as a
"legal heir" of Teodoro Abenojar and as such entitled to participate in an
extra-judicial partition of the estate of said deceased. This is a most material
point on which the parties have asserted conflicting claims. Understandably
so, inasmuch as the question of whether the question document is void or
merely voidable depends largely on such determination.
As stated above, petitioners contend that Severino Abenojar is not a legal
heir of Teodoro Abenojar, he being only an acknowledged natural child of
Guillerma Abenojar, the mother of petitioners, whom they claim to be the
sole legitimate daughter in first marriage of Teodoro Abenojar. If this claim is
correct, Severino Abenojar has no rights of legal succession from Teodoro
Abenojar in view of the express provision of Article 992 of the Civil Code,
which reads as follows:
ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father
or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimate child.
The right of Severino Abenojar to be considered a legal heir of Teodoro
Abenojar depends on the truth of his allegations that he is not an illegitimate
child of Guillerma Abenojar, but an acknowledged natural child of Teodoro
233

Abenojar. On this assumption, his right to inherit from Teodoro Abenojar is

recognized by law (Art. 998, Civil Code). He even claims that he is the sole
legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar inasmuch as the petitioners Landayans, who
are admittedly the children of the deceased Guillerma Abenojar, have no
legal successional rights from Teodoro Abenojar, their mother being a
spurious child of Teodoro Abenojar.
Should the petitioners be able to substantiate their contention that Severino
Abenojar is an illegitimate son of Guillerma Abenojar, he is not a legal heir of
Teodoro Abenojar. The right of representation is denied by law to an
illegitimate child who is disqualified to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of Ms father. (Art. 992, Civil Code). On this
supposition, the subject deed of extra- judicial partition is one that included
a person who is not an heir of the descendant whose estate is being
partitioned. Such a deed is governed by Article 1105 of the Civil Code,
reading as follows:
Art. 1105. A partition which includes a person believed to be an
heir, but who is not, shall be void only with respect to such
person.
It could be gathered from the pleadings filed by the petitioners that they do
not seek the nullification of the entire deed of extra-judicial partition but only
insofar as the same deprived them of their shares in the inheritance from
the estate of Teodoro Abenojar; Should it be proved, therefore, that
Severino Abenojar is, indeed, not a legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar, the
portion of the deed of extra-judicial partition adjudicating certain properties
of Teodoro Abenojar in his favor shall be deemed inexistent and void from
the beginning in accordance with Articles 1409, par. (7) and 1105 of the Civil
Code. By the express provision of Article 1410 of the Civil Code, the action
to seek a declaration of the nullity of the same does not prescribe.
WHEREFORE, the Order appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The respondent Judge is ordered to try the case on the merits and render
the corresponding judgment thereon. The private respondents shall pay the
costs.
SO ORDERED.

234

Mendoza vs iac
G.R. No. L-63132

July 30, 1987

ELIAS S. MENDOZA and EUSTIQUIA S. MENDOZA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, BUENAVENTURA GABUYA
and SEVERA FERNANDEZ,respondents.
FERNAN, J.:
Petitioners-spouses Elias and Eustiquia Mendoza seek a review of the
decision dated September 8, 1982 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos.
58815-58816-17-R entitled Elias Mendoza, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus Buenaventura Gabuya, et al., Defendants-Appellees" as well as the
resolution of January 3, 1983, denying their motion for reconsideration.
The antecedents are as follows:
Sometime in November and December of 1969, three [3] complaints were
filed before the then Court of First Instance of Cebu; viz: 11 Civil Case No.
R-11485 instituted by herein petitioners-spouses Mendoza against private
respondents-spouses Buenaventura Gabuya and Severa Fernandez for
partition of Lot No. 3597 of the Cadastral Survey of Cebu, located at Pardo,
Cebu City, with an area of 2,992 square meters, more or less, and covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 43910 issued in the names of
"Buenaventura Gabuya, married to Severa Fernandez ... and Elias S.
Mendoza, married to Eustiquia S. Mendoza ... with one-half [1/2] share
each"1 and damages; 2) Civil Case No. R-11486 commenced by spouses
Modesta Gabuya and Dominador Delima, likewise against private
respondents-spouses Buenaventura Gabuya and Severa Fernandez for
partition of Lot No. 3506 of the Cadastral Survey of Cebu, located at Pardo,
Cebu, with an area of 2,799 square meters, more or less, and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 43909 issued in the names of Buenaventura
Gabuya, married to Severa Fernandez and Modesta Gabuya, married to
Dominador Delima, and damages; and, 3] Civil Case No. R-1152 filed by
private respondents-spouses Buenaventura Gabuya and Severa Fernandez
against the spouses Modesta Gabuya and Dominador Delima and petitionersspouses Mendoza for the annulment of: a) the extra-judicial settlement of
235

the estate of the late Evaristo Gabuya, dated March 12, 1969 covering Lot
Nos. 3506 and 3597, Cebu Cadastre; b) the sale of one-half [1/2] portion of
Lot No. 3597 dated December 31, 1968 in favor of spouses Mendoza; and,
c) Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 43909 and 43910, covering Lot Nos.
3506 and 3597, respectively; and damages.
Because they involved the same parties and properties, the cases were
heard and tried jointly.
Thereafter, on September 12, 1972, the trial court rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, based on all the foregoing considerations, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff Buenaventura Gabuya in the
third case and against defendant-spouses Modesta Gabuya and
Dominador Delima and Atty. Elias S. Mendoza and Eustiquia S.
Mendoza:
1] Declaring null and void and without force and effect:
a) The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Evaristo
Gabuya insofar as the shares of defendant Modesta Gabuya in
Lot Nos. 3506 and 3597 are concerned;
b) The Deed of Absolute Sale Modesta Gabuya executed on
December 31, 1968 in favor of her co-defendants-spouses Atty.
Elias S. Mendoza and Eustiquia S. Mendoza, covering Lot No.
3597 without prejudice to the rights of the latter spousesvendors to demand from Modesta Gabuya reimbursement of any
amounts they have paid on account of the sale;
c) Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 43909 and 43910 insofar as
the respective recorded one-half [1/2] undivided shares of the
spouses Modesta Gabuya married to Dominador Delima and Atty.
Elias S. Mendoza married to Eustiquia S. Mendoza in each of Lot
Nos. 3506 and 3597 with plaintiff Buenaventura Gabuya married
to Severa Fernandez are concerned;

236

2] Condemning the two defendants-spouses to pay jointly and

severally to the plaintiff the amount of P500.00 as moral damages,
P750.00 as attorney's fees; and,
3] To pay the costs.
The Register of Deeds of Cebu is hereby directed to cancel the
recorded one-half [1/2] share each of the defendants-spouses Modesta
Gabuya married to Dominador Delima and Atty. Elias S. Mendoza
married to Eustiquia S. Mendoza in Lot Nos. 3506 and 3597 covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 43909 and 43910, respectively. 2
Dissatisfied with said decision, the spouses Mendoza and the spouses Delima
appealed to the Court of Appeals, which, however, affirmed in toto the
decision of the trial court. Their motion for reconsideration likewise proved
unavailing.1awphil
Thus, on February 14, 1983, within the extended period granted, the
spouses Mendoza filed the petition at bar. After private respondents had filed
their comment thereon, and petitioners, their Reply to said comment, the
Court, on September 19, 1983, gave due course to the petition. 3 In due
time, the parties submitted their respective memoranda.
On July 10, 1985, Atty. Paterno S. Compra entered his appearance as
counsel for spouses Modesta Gabuya and Dominador Delima, and on July 19,
1985, filed a Notice of Death, informing this Court that respondent
Buenaventura Gabuya died on October 21, 1981 and that Severa Fernandez
likewise died on October 14, 1983, allegedly leaving no legal heirs except
Modesta Gabuya.4
Acting on said Notice of Death, the Court resolved on September 18, 1985,
"to Direct [1] the legal representatives of the deceased respondents
Buenaventura Gabuya and Severa Fernandez to appear and to be substituted
for the latter, within a period of thirty [30] days from notice; and [2] the
petitioners to amend their petition within ten [10] days from receipt of the
notice of appearance and substitution by the legal representatives of the
aforesaid respondents, so as to conform with the latest development in the
case."5

237

It appears that sometime between September 18, 1985 and November 27,
1985, Venerando Gabuya, a sixth degree collateral relative of Buenaventura
Gabuya, filed a motion dated October 31, 1985 to substitute the latter in the
case at bar. While the motion itself does not appear in the rollo, the same
was granted by the Court in its resolution of November 27, 1985.
Meanwhile, on November 20, 1985, the petitioners filed an Amended
Petition, naming the spouses Modesta Gabuya and Dominador Delima as copetitioners therein. Said "petitioners" Modesta Gabuya and Dominador
Delima prayed in the Amended Petition that Modesta Gabuya be declared the
sole legal heir of Buenaventura Gabuya. Said spouses Delima likewise filed a
motion for reconsideration of the resolution of November 27, 1985, which
granted Venerando Gabuya's motion for substitution. However, since the
resolution of the motion for reconsideration would entail going into the
merits of the case, its resolution was held in abeyance.
The sole issue presented by the petition is couched by petitioners, thus:
Whether or not under the Civil Code of Spain, a natural child without
any judicial decree or deed of acknowledgment in his favor by his
natural parent may succeed said natural parent under certain
circumstances. 6
The factual backdrop of this legal query, as found by the trial court and
sustained by the appellate court, is as follows:
That Buenaventura, Nicolasa and Teresa, all surnamed Gabuya, are the
legitimate children of the spouses Evaristo Gabuya and Susana
Sabandija, who died intestate many years ago, the first in 1926 and
the second in 1912; that both Nicolasa and Teresa died single, the first
in 1943 and the second in 1964; that Modesta Gabuya is the
illegitimate daughter of Nicolasa [Exhs. G & 7-B-Gabuya]; that Lot
Nos. 3506 and 3597 of the Cebu Cadastre were some of the original
properties left by the late Evaristo Gabuya both located at Pardo, Cebu
City, formerly covered by Original Certificate [sic] of Title Nos. 6353
and 6597 in the name of Evaristo Gabuya and containing 2,799 square
meters and 2,992 square meters, respectively; that sometime in
February, 1969, Modesta Gabuya accompanied by Atty. Elias S.
Mendoza went to the house of Buenaventura Gabuya who wanted to
238

see the titles of these two parcels of land and Buenaventura was
instructed by Modesto to look for them so that they be reconstituted;
that some days later the two, Modesta Gabuya and Elias S. Mendoza
visited him again at his house and Mode took the titles but this time
Buenaventura went with them to the Cebu Capitol Building; that
Buenaventura and Modesto signed a document and acknowledged
before Atty. Salvador B. Mendoza but the latter did not read to the
signatories the contents of the document; that this document dated
March 12, 1969 turned out to be an Extrajudicial settlement of the
Estate of Evaristo Gabuya [Exhs. A and 1-B-Gabuya] whereby
Buenaventura and Modesto appear to have divided and partitioned
between themselves pro visio and share and share alike [1/2 each] Lot
Nos. 3506 and 3597; that this Extrajudicial settlement of the Estate of
Evaristo Gabuya was duly published [Exh. B] in the Morning Times and
registered with the Register of Deeds [Exhs. B-1 & B-2] and the
document itself was also similarly registered [Exhs. A-1 and A-2]; that
on December 31, 1968, prior to the execution of the Extra-Judicial
Settlement document, a Deed of Absolute Sale [Exhs. 2-B-Gabuya]
was executed by Modesta Gabuya in favor of the spouses Atty. and
Mrs. Elias S. Mendoza covering her alleged one-half [1/2] undivided
share in Lot No. 3597 for a consideration of P10,000.00; that pursuant
to the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement [Exhs. A & 1-B-Gabuya], and
the Deed of Absolute Sale [Exh. 2-B-Gabuya], Original Certificates of
Title Nos. 6353 and 6597 in the name of the late Evaristo Gabuya,
father of Buenaventura Gabuya, were cancelled and in liue thereof
were issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 43909 and 43910 [Exh.
C] The first in the names of spouses Buenaventura Gabuya married to
Severa Fernandez, and Modesta Gabuya married to Dominador Delima
and the second, in the names of Buenaventura Gabuya married to
Severa Fernandez and Atty. Elias S. Mendoza married to Eustiquia S.
Mendoza; that Atty. Elias S. Mendoza and Modesta Gabuya have
respectively asked from Buenaventura Gabuya the partition of the lots
which they are co-owners of the undivided one-half [1/2] portions;
and that Buenaventura refused to do so claiming that ModestaGabuya
is not entitled to inherit from the estate of his late father Evaristo
Gabuya. 7

239

Under the Civil Code of Spain, the law in force at the time of the death in
1943 of Nicolasa Gabuya, the mother of Modesta, full successional rights
were granted only to legitimate and legitimated children [Arts. 114 and 122,
respectively]. Acknowledged natural children were given limited successional
rights in that they were entitled to inherit only from the acknowledging
parent [Art. 134], while illegitimate children who did not possess the status
of natural children had no successional rights whatsoever [Art. 139]. The
latter were only entitled to support. Adopted children become heirs of the
adopting parents only if the adopting parents had agreed to confer the
adopted children such rights in the deed of adoption, or had instituted them
as heirs in a will.8
Recognition or acknowledgment of a natural child under said Code must be
made in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in
some other public document. 9 In the case at bar, the only document
presented by Modesta Gabuya to prove that she was recognized by her
mother was the certificate of birth and baptism signed by Rev. Fr. Filomeno
Singson, Assistant Parish Priest of Pardo, Cebu City, stating therein that
Modesta Gabuya is an illegitimate daughter of Nicolasa Gabuya. 10 However,
Philippine jurisprudence is consistent and uniform in ruling that the canonical
certificate of baptism is not sufficient to prove recognition. 11The rationale for
this ruling, enunciated in the case of Civ v. Burnaman, 24 SCRA 434, is that
while the baptismal certificate in the parish records was a public document
before the effectivity of General Order No. 68 and Act 190, this certificate
did not constitute a sufficient act of acknowledgment, since the latter must
be executed by the child's father or mother, and the parish priest can not
acknowledge in their stead.
Neither could the alleged continuous possession by Modesta Gabuya of the
status of a natural child improve her condition. In Alabat v. vda. de Alabat,
21 SCRA 1479, 1481, it was stressed that:
It is an elementary and basic principle in our law of succession that the
rights of a natural child spring not from the filiation itself but from the
child's acknowledgment by the natural parent, made voluntarily or by
court decree. Equally basic and elementary . . . is the fact that
possession or enjoyment of the status of natural child is per se not a
sufficient operative acknowledgment but only a ground to compel the
parent to acknowledge the child.
240

The case of Ramos, et al. v. Ramos, et al., 61 SCRA 284, heavily relied upon
by petitioners, does not apply to the case at bar. Unlike in said case,
Modesta Gabuya failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that she
was in continuous possession of the status of a natural child.
That this petition must fail is a foregone conclusion. Modesta Gabuya, not
having been acknowledged in the manner provided by law by her mother,
Nicolasa, was not entitled to succeed the latter. The extrajudicial settlement
of the estate of Evaristo Gabuya is, therefore, null and void insofar as
Modesta Gabuya is concerned per Article 1105 of the New Civil Code which
states:
A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is
not, shall be void only with respect to such person.
Since the ownership of the one-half [1/2] pro indiviso portion of Lot No.
3597 never passed on to Modesta Gabuya, it follows that the sale thereof to
petitioners-spouses Elias and Eustiquia Mendoza is likewise null and void. 12
One last point. During the pendency of this case, the spouses Modesta
Gabuya and Dominador Delima joined the spouses Mendoza as petitioners in
this case by submitting an amended petition, ostensibly in compliance with
Our resolution of September 18, 1985. In said Amended Petition,
aforementioned spouses Delima prayed that Modesta Gabuya Delima be
declared the sole heir of the deceased private respondent Buenaventura
Gabuya, to the exclusion of substitute Venerando Gabuya. It must be
remembered, however, that the Delima spouses not having joined
petitioners-spouses Mendoza in the instant petition for review. the decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos. 58815-58816-17-R has become final
and executory as to said spouses Delima. With the pronouncement of the
appellate court that Modesta Gabuya-Delima was not entitled to inherit from
her mother, in conjunction with our affirmance thereof, it is clear that her
prayer in the amended petition cannot be granted.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby denied. The decision of the
appellate court in CA-G.R. Nos. 58815-5881617-R, is affirmed in toto. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
241

Aznar brothers realty vs ca

[G.R. No. 128102. March 7, 2000]
AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, LUIS AYING, DEMETRIO SIDA, FELOMINO AUGUSTO,
FEDERICO ABING, and ROMEO AUGUSTO, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the 26 March 1996 Decision [1] of
the Court of Appeals declaring the private respondents the rightful
possessors de facto of the subject lot and permanently enjoining Sheriff Juan
Gato or his representative from effecting the demolition of private
respondents houses.
Culled from the evidence proffered by petitioner Aznar Brothers Realty Co.
(hereafter AZNAR), it appears that Lot No. 4399 containing an area of
34,325 square meters located at Brgy. Mactan, Lapu-Lapu City, was acquired
by AZNAR from the heirs of Crisanta Maloloy-on by virtue of an Extrajudicial
Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale dated 3 March 1964. This
deed was registered with the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City on 6
March 1964 as shown on the face thereof. After the sale, petitioner AZNAR
declared this property under its name for taxation purposes and regularly
paid the taxes thereon. Herein private respondents were allegedly allowed to
occupy portions of Lot No. 4399 by mere tolerance provided that they leave
the land in the event that the company would use the property for its
purposes. Later, AZNAR entered into a joint venture with Sta. Lucia Realty
Development Corporation for the development of the subject lot into a multimillion peso housing subdivision and beach resort. When its demands for the
private respondents to vacate the land failed, AZNAR filed with the Municipal
Trial Court (MTCC) of Lapu-Lapu City a case for unlawful detainer and
damages, which was docketed as Civil Case No. R-1027.
On the other hand, the private respondents alleged that they are the
successors and descendants of the eight children of the late Crisanta
242

Maloloy-on, whose names appear as the registered owners in the Original

Certificate of Title No. RC-2856. They had been residing and occupying the
subject portion of the land in the concept of owner since the time of their
parents and grandparents, except for Teodorica Andales who was not a
resident in said premises. Private respondents claimed that the Extrajudicial
Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale is void ab initio for being
simulated and fraudulent, and they came to know of the fraud only when
AZNAR entered into the land in the last quarter of 1991 and destroyed its
vegetation. They then filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lapu-Lapu
City a complaint seeking to declare the subject document null and void. This
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 2930-L.
On 1 February 1994, the MTCC rendered a decision ordering the private
respondents to (a) vacate the land in question upon the finality of the
judgment; and (b) pay P8,000 as attorneys fees and P2,000 as litigation
expenses, plus costs.[2]
The MTCC delved into the issue of ownership in order to resolve the issue of
possession. It found that petitioner AZNAR acquired ownership of Lot No.
4399 by virtue of the Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by the Heirs of Crisanta Maloloy-on on 3 March
1964, which was registered with the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City on
6 March 1964 as appearing on the face thereof. Private respondents
allegation that two of the signatories were not heirs of the registered
owners; that some of the signatories were already dead at the date of the
execution of the deed; and that many heirs were not parties to the
extrajudicial partition is a form of a negative pregnant, which had the effect
of admitting that the vendors, except those mentioned in the specific denial,
were heirs and had the legal right to sell the subject land to petitioner. The
fact that some or most heirs had not signed the deed did not make the
document null and void ab initio but only annullable, unless the action had
already prescribed. Since the private respondents occupied the land merely
by tolerance, they could be judicially ejected therefrom. That the Deed has
not been annotated on OCT RO-2856 is of no moment, since said title was
reconstituted only on 25 August 1988, while the subject Deed was executed
on 3 March 1964. Lastly, the reconstituted title has not as yet been
transferred to a purchaser for value.

243

Aggrieved by the decision of the MTCC, private respondents appealed to the

RTC.
During the pendency of the appeal, or on 8 March 1994, the RTC, upon
Aznars ex parte motion, issued an order granting the issuance of a writ of
execution pursuant to Section 8, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court in
view of the failure of private respondents to put up a supersedeas bond. A
week later, a writ of execution was issued. The sheriff then served upon
private respondents the said writ of execution together with a notice to
vacate. On 11 April 1994, the sheriff padlocked their houses, but later in the
day, private respondents re-entered their houses. Thus, on 6 May 1994,
AZNAR filed an omnibus motion for the issuance of a writ of demolition,
which private respondents opposed. This motion was set for hearing three
times, but the parties opted to submit a consolidated memorandum and
agreed to submit the same for resolution.[3]
On 22 July 1994, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTCC and ordered the
issuance of a writ of demolition directing the sheriff to demolish private
respondents houses and other improvements which might be found on the
subject premises.[4]
On 29 July 1994, a writ of demolition was issued, and notices of demolition
were served upon private respondents. Per Sheriffs Report, [5] private
respondents houses were demolished on 3 August 1994, except for two
houses which were moved outside the premises in question upon the plea of
the owners thereof.
On appeal by the private respondents, the Court of Appeals reversed and set
aside the decision of the RTC; declared the private respondents as the
rightful possessors de facto of the land in question; and permanently
enjoined Sheriff Juan Gato or whoever was acting in his stead from
effectuating the demolition of the houses of the private respondents.
In arriving at its challenged decision, the Court of Appeals noted that at the
time AZNAR entered the property, the private respondents had already been
in possession thereof peacefully, continuously, adversely and notoriously
since time immemorial. There was no evidence that petitioner was ever in
possession of the property. Its claim of ownership was based only on an
Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale, which private respondents,
244

however, claimed to be null and void for being simulated and fraudulently
obtained. The Court of Appeals further held that where not all the known
heirs had participated in the extrajudicial agreement of partition, the
instrument would be null and void and therefore could not be registered.
[6]
Moreover, AZNAR was estopped to assert ownership of the property in
question, since it had admitted in a pleading in the reconstitution
proceedings that the property had never been conveyed by the decreed
owners. Additionally, from 1988 up to the filing of the ejectment case on 4
August 1993, AZNAR never registered the extrajudicial partition despite
opportunities to do so. Its allegation that private respondents occupied the
property by mere tolerance was not proved. Pursuant to the ruling in Vda.
de Legazpi v. Avendano,[7] the fact that the right of the private respondents
was so seriously placed in issue and the execution of the decision in the
ejectment case would have meant demolition of private respondents houses
constituted an equitable reason to suspend the enforcement of the writ of
execution and order of demolition.
AZNAR then elevated the case to this Court, via this petition for review
on certiorari, contending that respondent Court of Appeals erred in
1. ... reversing the judgments of the Municipal Trial Court and
the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City despite the finality of
the judgments and the full implementation thereof;
2. ... invoking lack of prior physical possession over the land in
question by the petitioner as one ground in its Decision sought to
be reviewed;
3. ... holding that the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of
Absolute Sale was null and void;
4. ...holding that petitioner was in estoppel in pais when it made
the allegation that the property was not sold or encumbered in
its petition for reconstitution of title;
5. ... applying the ruling in the case of Vda. de Legazpi vs.
Avendano (79 SCRA 135 [1977]).

245

We shall jointly discuss the first and fifth assigned errors for being
interrelated with each other.
In its first assigned error, petitioner argues that the decision of the MTCC of
Lapu-Lapu City had become final and immediately executory in view of the
undisputed failure of the private respondents to post a supersedeas bond as
required by Section 8, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court.
We do not agree. Since the private respondents had seasonably filed an
appeal with the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City, the judgment of the MTCC of LapuLapu City did not become final. And for reasons hereunder stated, the
perfection of the appeal was enough to stay the execution of the MTCC
decision.
Under the former Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, [8] if the judgment
of the municipal trial court in an ejectment case is adverse to the defendant,
execution shall issue immediately. To stay the immediate execution of the
judgment, the defendant must (1) perfect his appeal; (2) file
a supersedeas bond to answer for the rents, damages, and costs accruing
down to the time of the judgment appealed from; and (3) periodically
deposit the rentals falling due during the pendency of the appeal. [9]
As a rule, the filing of a supersedeas bond is mandatory and if not filed, the
plaintiff is entitled as a matter of right to the immediate execution of the
judgment. An exception is where the trial court did not make any findings
with respect to any amount in arrears, damages or costs against the
defendant,[10] in which case no bond is necessary to stay the execution of the
judgment. Thus, in Once v. Gonzales,[11] this Court ruled that the order of
execution premised on the failure to file a supersedeas bond was groundless
and void because no such bond was necessary there being no back rentals
adjudged in the appealed judgment.
Similarly, in the instant case, there was no need for the private respondents
to file a supersedeas bond because the judgment of the MTCC did not award
rentals in arrears or damages. The attorneys fees of P8,000 and the
litigation expenses of P2,000 awarded in favor of the petitioner need not be
covered by a bond, as these are not the damages contemplated in Section 8
of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. The damages referred to therein are the
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property which
246

are generally measured by its fair rental value and cannot refer to other
damages which are foreign to the enjoyment or material possession of the
property.[12] Neither were the private respondents obliged to deposit the
rentals falling due during the pendency of the appeal in order to secure a
stay of execution because the appealed judgment did not fix the reasonable
rental or compensation for the use of the premises. [13] Hence, it was error for
the RTC to order the execution of the judgment of the MTCC.
At any rate, pursuant to Section 21 of the Revised Rules of Summary
Procedure, the decision of the RTC affirming the decision of the MTCC has
become immediately executory, without prejudice to the appeal before the
Court of Appeals. The said Section repealed Section 10 of the Rules of Court
allowing during the pendency of the appeal with the Court of Appeals a stay
of execution of the RTC judgment with respect to the restoration of
possession where the defendant makes a periodic deposit of rentals. Thus,
immediate execution of the judgment becomes a ministerial duty of the
court. No new writ of execution was, however, issued. Nevertheless, the writ
of demolition thereafter issued was sufficient to constitute a writ of
execution, as it substantially complied with the form and contents of a writ
of execution as provided for under Section 8 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, private respondents were duly notified and heard on the omnibus
motion for the issuance of the writ of demolition and were given five days to
remove their houses.[14]
Invoking Legaspi v. Avendao,[15] the Court of Appeals held that there was an
equitable reason to suspend the enforcement of the writ of execution and
order of demolition until after the final determination of the civil case for the
nullification of the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale.
In Legaspi, this Court held:
Where the action ... is one of illegal detainer ... and the right of
the plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in
a proper judicial proceeding, it is more equitable and just and
less productive of confusion and disturbance of physical
possession, with all its concomitant inconvenience and expense
[f]or the court in which the issue of legal possession, whether
involving ownership or not, is brought to restrain, should a
petition for preliminary injunction be filed with it, the effects of
247

any order or decision in the unlawful detainer case in order to

await the final judgment in the more substantive case involving
legal possession or ownership.
In the instant case, private respondents petition for review with prayer for
the immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) or
preliminary injunction was mailed on 2 August 1994 but was received by the
Court of Appeals only on 30 August 1994. Meanwhile, on 3 August 1994, the
writ of demolition was implemented, resulting in the demolition of private
respondents houses. Hence, any relevant issue arising from the issuance or
enforcement of the writ had been rendered moot and academic. Injunction
would not lie anymore, as the acts sought to have been enjoined had already
become a fait accompli or an accomplished or consummated act.
Now on the applicability to unlawful detainer cases of the requirement of
prior physical possession of the disputed property. Contrary to the ruling of
the Court of Appeals, prior physical possession by the plaintiff of the subject
property is not an indispensable requirement in unlawful detainer cases,
although it is indispensable in an action for forcible entry. [16] The lack of prior
physical possession on the part of AZNAR is therefore of no moment, as its
cause of action in the unlawful detainer case is precisely to terminate private
respondents possession of the property in question. [17]
We now come to the issue of the validity of the Extrajudicial Partition with
Deed of Absolute Sale.
In an action for ejectment, the only issue involved is possession de
facto. However, when the issue of possession cannot be decided without
resolving the issue of ownership, the court may receive evidence upon the
question of title to the property but solely for the purpose of determining the
issue of possession.[18]
In the instant case, private respondents have set up the defense of
ownership and questioned the title of AZNAR to the subject lot, alleging that
the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale upon which petitioner
bases its title is null and void for being simulated and fraudulently made.
First, private respondents claim that not all the known heirs of Crisanta
Maloloy-on participated in the extrajudicial partition, and that two persons
248

who participated and were made parties thereto were not heirs of Crisanta.
This claim, even if true, would not warrant rescission of the deed. Under
Article 1104 of the Civil Code, "[a] partition made with preterition of any of
the compulsory heirs shall not be rescinded, unless it be proved that there
was bad faith or fraud on the part of the persons interested; but the latter
shall be proportionately obliged to pay to the person omitted the share
which belongs to him." In the present case, no evidence of bad faith or fraud
is extant from the records. As to the two parties to the deed who were
allegedly not heirs, Article 1105 is in point; it provides: "A partition which
includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be void only
with respect to such person." In other words, the participation of non-heirs
does not render the partition void in its entirety but only to the extent
corresponding to them.
Private respondents also allege that some of the persons who were made
parties to the deed were already dead, while others were still minors.
Moreover, the names of some parties thereto were misspelled, and others
who knew how to read and write their names were made to appear to have
affixed only their thumbmark in the questioned document. Likewise, the
signatures of those who were made parties were forged.
The foregoing are bare allegations with no leg to stand on. No birth or death
certificates were presented before the MTCC to support the allegations that
some of the parties to the deed were minors and others were already dead
at the time of the execution of the deed. What private respondents adduced
as evidence was merely a family tree, which was at most self-serving. It was
only when the case was on appeal with the RTC that the private respondents
presented as Annex "B" of their Memorandum and Appeal Brief a photocopy
of the certificate of death of Francisco Aying, [19] son of Crisanta Maloloy-on,
who reportedly died on 7 March 1963. This certificate was allegedly issued
on 17 January 1992 by the Parish Priest of Virgen de Regla Parish, LapuLapu City. The fact remains, however, that this photocopy was not certified
to be a true copy.
It is worthy to note that the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute
Sale is a notarized document. As such, it has in its favor the presumption of
regularity, and it carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with
respect to its due execution. [20] It is admissible in evidence without further
proof of authenticity[21] and is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.
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He who denies its due execution has the burden of proving that contrary
to the recital in the Acknowledgment he never appeared before the notary
public and acknowledged the deed to be his voluntary act. [23] It must also be
stressed that whoever alleges forgery has the burden of proving the same.
Forgery cannot be presumed but should be proved by clear and convincing
evidence.[24] Private respondents failed to discharge this burden of proof;
hence, the presumption in favor of the questioned deed stands.
[22]

Private respondents contend that there was violation of the Notarial Law
because the lawyer who prepared and notarized the document was AZNARs
representative in the execution of the said document. Under Section 22 of
the Spanish Notarial Law of 1889, a notary public could not authenticate a
contract which contained provisions in his favor or to which any of the
parties interested is a relative of his within the fourth civil degree or second
degree of affinity; otherwise, pursuant to Section 28 thereof, the document
would not have any effect. This rule on notarial disqualification no longer
holds true with the enactment of Act No. 496, which repealed the Spanish
Notarial Law.[25] Under the Notarial Law in force at the time of the
notarization of the questioned deed, Chapter 11 of the Revised
Administrative Code, only those who had been convicted of any crime
involving moral turpitude were disqualified to notarize documents. Thus, a
representative of a person in whose favor a contract was executed was not
necessarily so disqualified. Besides, there is no proof that Atty. Ramon Igaa
was a representative of petitioner in 1964; what appears on record is that he
was the Chief of the petitioners Legal Department in 1993. Additionally, this
alleged violation of the Notarial Law was raised only now.
Anent the non- annotation of the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of
Absolute Sale in the reconstituted Original Certificate of Title No. RO-2856,
the same does not render the deed legally defective. It must be borne in
mind that the act of registering a document is never necessary to give the
conveyance legal effect as between the parties [26] and the vendors heirs. As
between the parties to a sale, registration is not indispensable to make it
valid and effective. The peculiar force of a title is exhibited only when the
purchaser has sold to innocent third parties the land described in the
conveyance. The purpose of registration is merely to notify and protect the
interests of strangers to a given transaction, who may be ignorant thereof,
and the non-registration of the deed evidencing said transaction does not
relieve the parties thereto of their obligations thereunder.[27] Here, no right of
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innocent third persons or subsequent transferees of the subject lot is

involved; thus, the conveyance executed in favor of AZNAR by private
respondents and their predecessors is valid and binding upon them, and is
equally binding and effective against their heirs. [28]
The principle that registration is the operative act that gives validity to the
transfer or creates a lien upon the land "refers to cases involving conflicting
rights over registered property and those of innocent transferees who relied
on the clean title of the properties."[29]This principle has no bearing on the
present case, as no subsequent transfer of the subject lot to other persons
has been made either by private respondents or their predecessors-ininterest.[30]
By and large, it appears on the face of the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed
of Absolute Sale that the same was registered on 6 March 1964. The
registration was under Act No. 3344 on unregistered lands allegedly because
at the time, no title was existing in the files of the Register of Deeds of LapuLapu City, as it was allegedly lost during the last world war. It was only on 8
August 1988 that the title was reconstituted at the instance of the petitioner.
As to the fourth assigned error, we do not agree with the Court of Appeals
and the private respondents that petitioner is in estoppel to assert ownership
over the subject property because of petitioners own allegation in the
petition for reconstitution, to wit:
That certificates of title were issued thereto but were lost during
the last world war. That the same were not conveyed much less
offered as a collateral for any debt contracted or delivered for
the security of payment of any obligation in favor of any person
or lending institution.
The words "the same" in the second sentence of the afore-quoted paragraph
clearly refers to the certificates of title. This means that the certificates of
title, not necessarily the subject lot, were not conveyed or offered as a
collateral but were lost during the last world war. Indeed, as petitioner
contends, it would be very absurd and self-defeating construction if we were
to interpret the above-quoted allegation in the manner that the Court of
Appeals and the private respondents did, for how could petitioner, who is

251

claiming ownership over the subject property, logically allege that the
property was not sold to it?
It bears repeating that petitioners claim of possession over the subject lot is
anchored on its claim of ownership on the basis of the Extrajudicial Partition
with Deed of Absolute Sale. Our ruling on the issue of the validity of the
questioned deed is solely for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession
and is to be regarded merely as provisional, without prejudice, however, to
the final determination of the issue in the other case for the annulment or
cancellation of the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of public
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35060 is hereby REVERSED,
and the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Lapu-Lapu City, is
REINSTATED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Fernandez vs Fernandez
[G. R. No. 143256. August 28, 2001]
RODOLFO FERNANDEZ and MERCEDES CARANTO FERNANDEZ,
HUSBAND and WIFE, EDDIE C. FERNANDEZ and LUZ
FERNANDEZ, SPOUSES, petitioners, vs. ROMEO FERNANDEZ,
POTENCIANO FERNANDEZ, FRANCISCO FERNANDEZ, JULITA
FERNANDEZ,
WILLIAM
FERNANDEZ,
MARY
FERNANDEZ,
ALEJANDRO FERNANDEZ, GERARDO FERNANDEZ, RODOLFO
FERNANDEZ and GREGORIO FERNANDEZ,respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision[1] of
the respondent Court of Appeals dated December 22, 1999 affirming the
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decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court Branch 40, Dagupan City in an action
for nullity of contracts, partition, recovery of possession and damages in
favor of plaintiffs-appellees, herein respondents.
The facts as found by the respondent Court of Appeals, are as follows: [3]
The late Spouses Dr. Jose K. Fernandez, and Generosa A. de Venecia were
the registered owners of a parcel of land located at Dagupan City covered by
TCT No. T-9267 (525) consisting of 194 sq. meters, and the two-storey
building constructed thereon covered by Tax Declaration 22-592-1. It is
undisputed that Generosa gave birth to a baby boy named Rogelio who died
when he was only twelve (12) years old as paralytic. In the testimony of
Romeo Fernandez (TSN, Aug. 31, 1994, pp. 9-14) it was revealed that the
late Spouses being childless by the death of their son, purchased from a
certain Miliang for P20.00 a one (1) month baby boy. The boy being referred
to was later on identified as Rodolfo Fernandez, the herein
appellant. Appellant was taken care of by the couple and was sent to school
and became a dental technician. He lived with the couple until they became
old and disabled.
On July 20, 1982, Jose K. Fernandez died thereby leaving his wife Generosa
A. de Venecia and Rodolfo Fernandez and an estate consisting of the
following:
(a) A parcel of land (Lot 9132, before Lot No. 444-C, of the Cadastral
Survey of Dagupan, Cadastral Case No. 41, G.L.R.O. Cadastral
Record No. 925), situated in the Barrio of Pantal, City of
Dagupan. Bounded on the NE. by Lot No. 447; on the SE. by Lot
No. 9134; on the SW. by the Arellano Street; and on the NW. by
Lot No. 9131. Containing an area of One Hundred Ninety Four
(194) square meters, more or less. Covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 525 (T-9267) Pangasinan Registry of Deeds.
(b) A two (2) storey residential building made of concrete and wood,
G.I. roofing with a floor area of 154 square meters and 126 square
meters of the first and second floor, respectively. Declared under
Tax Decl. No. 22-592-1 and assessed therein at P26,000.00.

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On August 31, 1989, appellant and Generosa de Venecia executed a Deed of

Extra-judicial Partition dividing and allocating to themselves the following:
To: Generosa de Venecia Vda. De Fernandez
(a) 119.5 sq. m. located on the southwestern portion of the land;
(b) Whole residential house above-mentioned;
To: Rodolfo V. Fernandez
74.5 square meters to be taken on the northeastern portion of the land.
On the same day, Generosa de Venecia executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of Eddie Fernandez, appellants son over the following:
A portion of One Hundred Nineteen and One-Half (119.5) Square meters
including the building and/or all existing thereon to be taken from the
southwestern portion of the parcel of land described as follows, to wit:
A parcel of land (Lot No. 9132, before Lot No. 444-C, of the Cadastral
Survey of Dagupan, Cadastral Case No. 41, G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No.
925), situated in the Barrio of Pantal, City of Dagupan. Bounded on the NE.
by Lot No. 447; on the SE by Lot No. 9134; on the SW. by the Arellano
Street; and on the NW. by Lot No. 9131. Containing an area of One Hundred
and Ninety-Four (194), Square Meters, more or less, covered by TRANSFER
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 525 (T-9267) Pangasinan Registry of Deeds
(Exh. 8, Exhibits for the Defendants)
After learning the transaction, Romeo, Potenciano, Francisco, Julita, William,
Mary, Alejandro, Gerardo, Rodolfo and Gregorio, all surnamed Fernandez,
being nephews and nieces of the deceased Jose K. Fernandez, their father
Genaro being a brother of Jose, filed on September 21, 1994, an action to
declare the Extra-Judicial Partition of Estate and Deed of Sale void ab initio
(docketed as Civil Case No. 94-00016-D).
The complaint alleged that defendants (herein appellants), motivated by
unmitigated greed, deliberate and malicious acts of depriving the plaintiff
and other heirs (herein appellees) of the deceased spouses, without basis of
heirship or any iota of rights to succession or inheritance, taking advantage
254

of the total physical and mental incapacity of the deceased Generosa de

Venecia aggravated by unlawful scheme confederated, colluded and
conspired with each other in causing the fake, simulated grossly inauthentic
contracts purporting to be executed on August 31, 1989 and jointly on the
same date, caused the execution of the deed of absolute sale purportedly
signed by Generosa de Venecia covering the same property described in the
deed of extra-judicial partition and by virtue of the said acts, appellants were
able to secure new land titles in their favor (Records, pp. 3-4,
Complaint). Appellees thus prayed that the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition,
Deed of Absolute Sale and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 54641 be declared
void from the beginning.
Significantly, in their answer, defendants alleged:
16. That the deceased Sps. Jose K. Fernandez and Generosa were husband
and wife blessed with one child the herein defendant Rodolfo V.
Fernandez whom they acknowledged during their lifetime. (underscoring
supplied)
18. That the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Deed of Absolute
Sale executed by the late Generosa de Venecia and defendant
Rodolfo V. Fernandez which are now in question were all made
with the full knowledge, consent and approval of the parties
thereto and for value.(Records, pp. 20-21, Answer).
On May 10, 1996, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of
the plaintiffs, the dispositive portion reads:[4]
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against
the defendants;
1. Declaring the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition dated August 31,
1989 (Exh. 3), the Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 31, 1989
(Exh. 8), the TCT No. 54641, and the TCT No. 54693 null and void;
2. Ordering the defendants to reconvey to, and to peacefully
surrender to the plaintiffs the possession of the house and lot in
question;

255

3. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally to pay to plaintiffs

the following:
(a) P50,000.00 as compensatory damages;
(b) P100,000.00 as moral damages;
(c) P20,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
(d) P2,000.00 as litigation costs.
SO ORDERED.
In so ruling, the trial court found that defendant Rodolfo Fernandez was
not a legitimate nor a legally adopted child of spouses Dr. Jose Fernandez
and Generosa de Venecia Fernandez, hence Rodolfo could not inherit from
the spouses. Rodolfos claim as a son of the deceased spouses Fernandez was
negated by the fact that (1) he only reached high school and was told to
stop studying so that he could help in the clinic of Dr. Fernandez, (2) he
failed to present any birth certificate, (3) the book entitled Fercolla clan
which was compiled and edited by respected people such as Ambassador
Armando Fernandez, Justice Jorge Coquia and Teresita Coquia-Sison, showed
the geneology of the family of Dr. Jose and Generosa Fernandez without a
child; a pedigree may be admitted in evidence to prove the facts of
genealogy and that entries in a family bible or other family books or charts,
engravings or rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as
evidence of pedigree,[5] (4) the certification issued by the Records
Management and Archives Office that there was no available information
about the birth of petitioner Rodolfo to the spouses Fernandez, (5) the
application of Dr. Jose Fernandez for backpay certificate naming petitioner
Rodolfo as his son was doubtful considering that there were blemishes or
alteration in the original copy; (6) that Rodolfos baptismal certificate was
spurious and falsified since there were no available records of baptism with
the parish from June 7, 1930 to August 8, 1936, while Rodolfos baptismal
certificate which was issued in 1989 showed that he was baptized on
November 24, 1934. The court found that the extra-judicial partition and the
deed of absolute sale were prepared and executed under abnormal, unusual
and irregular circumstances which rendered the documents null and void.

256

Defendants Rodolfo Fernandez et. al appealed to the respondent Court of

Appeals which affirmed the trial courts judgment in its assailed decision
dated December 22, 1999.
In resolving the appeal, the respondent court delved into the legitimacy
of defendant-appellant Rodolfo Fernandez filiation with the deceased
spouses. It found that appellants evidence which consisted of a certificate of
baptism stating that he was a child of the spouses Fernandez and the
application for recognition of rights to back pay under RA 897 filed by Dr.
Jose Fernandez, wherein the latter referred to Rodolfo as his son, did not
acquire evidentiary weight to prove his filiation. The appellate court
concluded that while baptismal certificates may be considered public
documents, they were evidence only to prove the administration of the
sacraments on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the
statements or declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk; that
while the application for back pay was a public document, it was not
executed to admit the filiation of Jose K. Fernandez with Rodolfo V.
Fernandez, the herein appellant; that the public document contemplated in
Article 172 of the Family Code referred to the written admission of filiation
embodied in a public document purposely executed as an admission of
filiation and not as obtaining in this case wherein the public document was
executed as an application for the recognition of rights to back pay under
Republic Act No. 897. Appellants Rodolfo Fernandez et al filed their motion
for reconsideration which was denied in a resolution dated May 17, 2000. [6]
Rodolfo Fernandez et al filed the instant petition for review with the
following issues:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT OF THE
TRIAL COURT ORDERING THE DEFENDANTS, PETITIONERS HEREIN, TO
RECONVEY TO, AND PEACEFULLY SURRENDER TO THE PLAINTIFFS,
RESPONDENTS HEREIN, THE POSSESSION OF THE HOUSE AND LOT IN
QUESTION BECAUSE THE SAID ORDER IS PALPABLY CONTRARY TO THE
ADMITTED FACTS THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, FOR THE FOLLOWING
REASONS:

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(a) THE HOUSE AND LOT IN QUESTION ARE ADMITTED BY THE PARTIES TO
BE CONJUGAL PROPERTIES OF THE SPOUSES DR. JOSE K. FERNANDEZ AND
GENEROSA DE VENECIA, AND
(b) RESPONDENTS, WHO ARE NOT RELATED TO GENEROSA DE VENECIA BY
CONSANGUINITY, ARE NOT HER INTESTATE HEIRS AND CANNOT SUCCEED
AB INTESTATO TO HER INTESTATE ESTATE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT OF THE
TRIAL COURT DECLARING (1) THE DEED OF EXTRA-JUDICIAL PARTITION
DATED AUGUST 31, 1989 (EXH. 3), THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE ALSO
DATED AUGUST 31, 1989 (EXH. 8), TCT NO. 54641, AND TCT NO. 54693
NULL AND VOID FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
(a) IT HAS NO FACTUAL BASIS DULY ESTABLISHED BY THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD, AND
(b) RESPONDENTS, NOT BEING PARTIES TO THE QUESTIONED DEEDS,
HAVE NO PERSONALITY TO CONTEST THE VALIDITY OF SAID DOCUMENTS.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS FINDING
THAT THE PETITIONER RODOLFO FERNANDEZ WAS NOT THE CHILD OF
SPOUSES DR. JOSE K. FERNANDEZ AND GENEROSA DE VENECIA BECAUSE
(a) THE FILIATION OF PETITIONER RODOLFO FERNANDEZ COULD NOT BE
COLLATERALLY ATTACKED IN AN ACTION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
DOCUMENTS, PARTITION, RECOVERY OF POSSESSION AND DAMAGES, AND;
(b) THE DECISION AS AFFIRMED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT
DECLARE IN THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION THEREOF THAT PETITIONER
RODOLFO FERNANDEZ IS NOT THE CHILD OF SPOUSES DR. JOSE
FERNANDEZ AND GENEROSA FERNANDEZ.
IV

258

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF DAMAGES

AND ATTORNEYS FEES TO THE RESPONDENTS, THERE BEING NO FACTUAL
BASIS IN THE AFFIRMED DECISION TO JUSTIFY SUCH AWARD.
The principal issue for resolution in this case concerns the rights of the
parties to the conjugal property of the deceased spouses Fernandez.
Petitioners allege that the respondent court found the extra-judicial
partition executed by petitioner Rodolfo Fernandez and Generosa Fernandez,
widow of Dr. Jose Fernandez, null and void because the former allegedly
failed to prove legitimate filiation to his putative father, the late Dr.
Jose Fernandez. Petitioners, contend, however, that the burden of proof lies
with the respondents because they were the ones contesting the filiation of
Rodolfo Fernandez. They insist that both lower courts had no power to pass
upon the matter of filiation because it could not be collaterally attacked in
the present action but in a separate and independent action directly
impugning such filiation.
We are not persuaded.
It must be noted that the respondents principal action was for the
declaration of absolute nullity of two documents, namely: deed of extrajudicial partition and deed of absolute sale, and not an action to impugn
ones legitimacy. The respondent court ruled on the filiation of petitioner
Rodolfo Fernandez in order to determine Rodolfos right to the deed of extrajudicial partition as the alleged legitimate heir of the spouses
Fernandez. While we are aware that ones legitimacy can be questioned only
in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, this doctrine has no
application in the instant case considering that respondents claim was that
petitioner Rodolfo was not born to the deceased spouses Jose and Generosa
Fernandez; we do not have a situation wherein they (respondents) deny that
Rodolfo was a child of their uncles wife. The case of Benitez-Badua vs. Court
of Appeals,[7] which has a similar factual backdrop is instructive:
A careful reading of the above articles [8] will show that they do not
contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not
to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these
articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own
a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can
259

impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically

impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first
120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child;
(2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have
been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived through artificial
insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either parent was
obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence.
Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive
period within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action
impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court
did not err when it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench. For
the case at bench is not where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending
that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that
petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in CabatbatLim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the
impugned decision is apropos, viz:
Petitioners recourse to Art. 263 of the New Civil Code (now Art. 170 of the
Family Code) is not well taken. This legal provision refers to an action to
impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an action
to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents
to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They
do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of
the deceased, but that she is not the decedents child at all. Being neither
legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal
fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased.
Thus, it is necessary to pass upon the relationship of petitioner Rodolfo
Fernandez to the deceased spouses Fernandez for the purpose of
determining what legal right Rodolfo has in the property subject of the extrajudicial partition. In fact, the issue of whether or not Rodolfo Fernandez was
the son of the deceased spouses Jose Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia
was squarely raised by petitioners in their pre-trial brief [9] filed before the
trial court, hence they are now estopped from assailing the trial courts ruling
on Rodolfos status.
We agree with the respondent court when it found that petitioner Rodolfo
failed to prove his filiation with the deceased spouses Fernandez. Such is a
factual issue which has been thoroughly passed upon and settled both by the
260

trial court and the appellate court. Factual findings of the Court of Appeals
are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this Court and they carry
even more weight[10] when the Court of Appeals affirms the factual findings
of the trial court. [11] We accordingly find no cogent reason to disagree with
the respondent courts evaluation of the evidence presented, thus: [12]
The Records Management and Archives Office is bereft of any records of the
birth of appellant Rodolfo Fernandez. On October 11, 1995, it issued a
certification worded as follows:
This is to certify that the Register of Births for the Municipality of Dagupan,
Pangasinan in the year 1984 is not on file with the National Archives, hence,
there is no available information about the birth of Rodolfo V. Fernandez
alleged to have been born on November 24, 1934 to the spouses Jose K.
Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia in Dagupan, Pangasinan (Records, p.
146)
Appellant nonetheless, contends that the Application for Recognition of Back
Pay Rights Under Act No. 897 is a public document and a conclusive proof of
the legitimate filiation between him and the deceased spouses (Rollo, p. 41,
Appellants Brief). We do not agree.
It may be conceded that the Application for Recognition of Back Pay Rights
Under Act No. 897 is a public document nevertheless, it was not executed to
admit the filiation of Jose K. Fernandez with Rodolfo V. Fernandez, the herein
appellant. The public document contemplated in Article 172 of the Family
Code refer to the written admission of filiation embodied in a public
document purposely executed as an admission of filiation and not as
obtaining in this case wherein the public document was executed as an
application for the recognition of rights to back pay under Republic Act No.
897. Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
Sec. 32. Public documents as evidence Documents consisting of entries in
public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public documents
are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their
execution and of the date of the latter.

261

The rule is not absolute in the sense that the contents of a public document
are conclusive evidence against the contracting parties as to the truthfulness
of the statements made therein. They constitute only prima facie evidence of
the facts which give rise to their execution and of the date of the
latter. Thus, a baptismal certificate issued by a Spanish priest under the
Spanish regime constitutes prima facie evidence of the facts certified to by
the parish priest from his own knowledge such as the administration of the
sacrament on the day and in the place and manner set forth in the
certificate; but it does not constitute proof of the statements made therein
concerning the parentage of the person baptized (Francisco, Evidence, 1994
ed., p. 516, citing Garcia vs. Gajul, 53 Phil. 642; Adriano vs. de Jesus, 23
Phil. 350; Buan vs. Arquiza, 5 Phil. 193; Siguion vs. Siguion, 8 Phil.
7). Public documents are perfect evidence of the fact which give rise to their
execution and of the date of the latter if the act which the officer witnessed
and certified to or the date written by him are not shown to be false; but
they are not conclusive evidence with respect to the truthfulness of the
statements made therein by the interested parties (Martin, Rules of Court in
the Philippines with Note and Comments, vol. 4, p. 577).
Corollarily, the Application for Recognition of Back Pay Rights Under Act No.
897 is only a proof that Jose K. Fernandez filed said application on June 5,
1954 in Dagupan City but it does not prove the veracity of the declaration
and statement contained in the said application that concern the relationship
of the applicant with herein appellant. In like manner, it is not a conclusive
proof of the filiation of appellant with his alleged father, Jose K. Fernandez
the contents being, only prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
Additionally, appellant claims that he enjoyed and possessed the status of
being a legitimate child of the spouses openly and continuously until they
died (Rollo, p. 42; Appellants Brief). Open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child is meant the enjoyment by the child of the
position and privileges usually attached to the status of a legitimate child
such as bearing the paternal surname, treatment by the parents and family
of the child as legitimate, constant attendance to the childs support and
education, and giving the child the reputation of being a child of his parents
(Sempio-Diy, The Family Code of the Philippines, pp. 245-246). However, it
must be noted that, as was held in Quismundo vs. WCC, 132 SCRA 590,
possession of status of a child does not in itself constitute an

262

acknowledgment; it is only a ground for a child to compel recognition by his

assumed parent.
Lastly, to substantiate his claim of being a legitimate child appellant
presented a baptismal certificate issued by Fr. Rene Mendoza of the St. John
Metropolitan Cathedral of Dagupan City on August 10, 1989 stating therein
that appellant is a child of the late spouses having been born on November
15, 1934 and baptized on November 24, 1934 (Exh. "1 Exhibits for the
Defendants). As stated, while baptismal certificates may be considered
public documents, they are evidence only to prove the administration of the
sacraments on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the
statements or declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk
(Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439). It may be argued that a
baptismal certificate is one of the other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws of proving filiation but in this case, the authenticity of the
baptismal certificate was doubtful when Fr. Raymundo Q. de Guzman of St.
John the Evangelist Parish of Lingayen-Dagupan, Dagupan City issued a
certification on October 16, 1995 attesting that the records of baptism on
June 7, 1930 to August 8, 1936 were all damaged (Records, p. 148, Exh. G).
Neither the family portrait offered in evidence establishes a sufficient proof
of filiation Pictures do not constitute proof of filiation (Reyes vs. Court of
Appeals) (supra). In fine, the evidence presented by appellant did not
acquire evidentiary weight to prove his filiation. Consequently the ExtraJudicial Partition dated August 31, 1989 executed by appellant Rodolfo
Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia is null and void.
Considering the foregoing findings, petitioner Rodolfo is not a child by
nature of the spouses Fernandez and not a legal heir of Dr. Jose Fernandez ,
thus the subject deed of extra-judicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Jose
Fernandez between Generosa vda. de Fernandez and Rodolfo is null and void
insofar as Rodolfo is concerned[13] pursuant to Art.1105 of the New Civil Code
which states:
A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not,
shall be void only with respect to such person.
Petitioners next contend that respondents admitted that the property in
question was the conjugal property of the late spouses Dr. Jose Fernandez
and Generosa de Venecia, thus when Dr. Jose Fernandez died intestate in
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1982, his estate consisted solely of pro indiviso of the conjugal property and
the other half belonged to his wife Generosa de Venecia; that granting Dr.
Jose Fernandez was only survived by his wife, the respondents nephews and
nieces of Dr. Jose are entitled to inherit the share of the decedents estate
while the share of the conjugal property will still belong to Generosa as the
widow of Dr. Jose Fernandez, hence the trial courts order reconveying the
possession of the subject lot and building to respondents was contrary to the
admitted facts and law since respondents are not related by consanguinity to
Generosa vda de Fernandez.
We agree.
Article 1001 of the Civil Code provides:
Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one half of the inheritance and the
brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
Generosa was the widow of Dr. Jose Fernandez and as provided in the
above-quoted Article 1001, she is entitled to the of the inheritance and the
respondents to the other . In effect, pro indiviso is the share of Generosa as
the surviving spouse, i.e., as her share of the conjugal property estate and
of the remaining as share as heir from her husbands estate. Thus, we find
well taken the petitioners assertion that the annulment of the extra-judicial
partition between Generosa and petitioner Rodolfo does not necessarily
result in respondents having exclusive right to the conjugal property, as
erroneously found by the respondent court. Generosa, during her lifetime,
had the right to enjoy and dispose of her property without other limitations
than those established by law,[14] which right she exercised by executing a
deed of sale in favor of petitioner Eddie Fernandez.
Petitioners assails respondents right, not being heirs of Generosa, to
question the validity of the deed of sale since the action for the annulment of
contracts may only be instituted by all who are thereby obliged principally or
subsidiarily.[15]
We disagree.

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As a rule, a contract cannot be assailed by one who is not a party obliged

principally or subsidiarily under a contract. However, when a contract
prejudices the rights of a third person, he may exercise an action for nullity
of the contract if he is prejudiced in his rights with respect to one of the
contracting parties, and can show detriment which would positively result to
him from the contract in which he had no intervention. [16] As we have
discussed above, respondents are entitled to the of the entire conjugal
property, ie., lot and building; however considering that widow Generosa,
during her lifetime , sold the entire building to petitioner Eddie Fernandez,
respondents had been deprived of their share therein, thus the deed of sale
was prejudicial to the interest of respondents as regards their share in the
building. Respondents therefore, have a cause of action to seek the
annulment of said deed of sale.
Petitioners further allege that the respondent court erred in declaring null
and void the deed of sale executed between Generosa and petitioner Eddie
Fernandez concluding that the same was simulated or false and in affirming
the trial courts findings that the deed was prepared and executed under
abnormal, unusual and irregular circumstances without however, particularly
stating the circumstances.
We agree.
Respondents allege that the deed of sale was fictitious and simulated
because there was no consideration for the sale. However, this assertion was
controverted by vendee petitioner Eddie Fernandez declaration, that the
money he paid for the sale came from his savings as overseas contract
worker in Saudi Arabia from 1982-1989 which respondents failed to
controvert by presenting evidence to the contrary. The presumption that a
contract has sufficient consideration cannot be overthrown by a mere
assertion that it has no consideration. [17] Under Art. 1354 of the Civil Code,
consideration is presumed unless the contrary is proven.
Respondents also claim that the signature appearing in the deed of sale
was not that of Generosa because she was already bedridden with both legs
amputated before she died. Forgery cannot be presumed; it must be proved
by clear, positive and convincing evidence [18] and whoever alleges it has the
burden of proving the same;[19] a burden respondents failed to discharge.
The respondents had not presented any convincing proof to override the
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evidentiary value of the duly notarized deed of sale. A notarial document is

evidence of the facts in the clear unequivocal manner therein expressed. It
has in its favor the presumption of regularity. To contradict all these, there
must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant.[20]
We note however, that Generosa sold the entire 2 storey building to
petitioner Eddie Fernandez, i.e. she did not only sell her undivided share in
the building but also the share of the respondents. We rule, that such a sale
of the entire building without the consent of the respondents is not null and
void as only the rights of the co-owner seller are transferred, thereby
making the buyer, petitioner Eddie , a co-owner of the share of the building
together with the respondents who owned the share therein.[21]
Finally, anent the issue of actual and moral damages and attorneys
fees awarded by the trial court, we find them to be bereft of factual basis. A
party is entitled to an adequate compensation for such pecuniary loss
actually suffered by him as he has duly proven. [22] Such damages, to be
recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be proved
with a reasonable degree of certainty.[23] Courts cannot simply rely on
speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of
damages.[24] The testimony of respondent Romeo Fernandez that he suffered
around P100,000 actual damages was not supported by any documentary or
other admissible evidence. We also agree with the petitioners that the
respondent court should not have awarded moral damages in the amount of
P100,000 since they also failed to show proof of moral suffering, mental
anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social
humiliation. Attorneys fees should likewise be deleted for lack of factual
basis and legal justification. Both the lower courts did not cite specific factual
basis to justify the award of attorneys fees, which is in violation of the
proscription against the imposition of a penalty on the right to litigate. [25]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed judgment is hereby
Affirmed with Modification, as follows:
1. Respondents as legitimate heirs of Dr. Jose Fernandez are entitled to the
share of the conjugal lot and building of the deceased spouses Jose and
Generosa Fernandez who died childless and intestate;

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2. The deed of extra-judicial partition is nullified insofar as the share of

petitioner Rodolfo in the conjugal lot is concerned and the title issued
pursuant thereto in the name of Rodolfo Fernandez;
3. Considering that the deed of sale is valid insofar as the share of Generosa
sold to petitioner Eddie Fernandez, TCT No. 54693 is cancelled and a new
title should be issued in the names of petitioner Eddie Fernandez and
respondents as co-owners of the and shares respectively in the conjugal
building.
4. The awards of actual and moral damages and attorneys fees are deleted.
SO ORDERED.

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