Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Diaz vs IAC................................................................................................................. 1
Pascual vs Pascual Bautista..................................................................................... 7
Corpus vs Estate of Teodoro R. Yangco....................................................................13
In the matter of the Intestate Estate of Suntay vs Suntay......................................18
Sandejas vs Lina...................................................................................................... 35
Calisterio vs Calisterio.............................................................................................. 47
Del Rosario vs Conanan............................................................................................ 52
Diaz vs IAC
G.R. No. L-66574 June 17, 1987
ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and
MIGUEL, all surnamed SANTERO, petitioners, and FELIXBERTA
PACURSA
guardian
of
FEDERICO
SANTERO,
et
al.,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE
COURT
and
FELISA
PAMUTI
JARDIN, respondents.
Ambrosia Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioners.
Pedro S. Sarino for respondent F.P. Jardin.
PARAS, J.:
Private respondent filed a Petition dated January 23, 1976 with the Court of
First Instance of Cavite in Sp. Proc. Case No. B-21, "In The Matter of the
Intestate Estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero," praying among
other things, that the corresponding letters of Administration be issued in
her
13,
the
the
Felixberta Pacursa guardian for her minor children, filed thru counsel, her
Manifestation of March 14, 1980 adopting the Opposition and Motion to
Exclude Felisa Pamuti, filed by Anselma Diaz.
On May 20, 1980, Judge Ildefonso M. Bleza issued an order excluding Felisa
Jardin "from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of the
intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the
intestate estates of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero and declared her to
be, not an heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero." 3
After her Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the trial court in its order
dated November 1, 1980, Felisa P. Jardin filed her appeal to the Intermediate
Appellate Court in CA-G.R. No. 69814-R. A decision 4 was rendered by the
Intermediate Appellate Court on December 14, 1983 (reversing the decision
of the trial court) the dispositive portion of which reads
WHEREFORE, finding the Order appealed from not consistent
with the facts and law applicable, the same is hereby set aside
and another one entered sustaining the Orders of December 1
and 9, 1976 declaring the petitioner as the sole heir of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero and ordering oppositors-appellees not to
interfere in the proceeding for the declaration of heirship in the
estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Costs against the oppositors-appellees.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by oppositors-appellees (petitioners
herein) was denied by the same respondent court in its order dated February
17, 1984 hence, the present petition for Review with the following:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I. The Decision erred in ignoring the right to intestate succession
of petitioners grandchildren Santero as direct descending line
3
the rule in Article 941 (Old Civil Code) and recognizes the right of
representation (Art. 970) to descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate
and that Art. 941, Spanish Civil Code denied illegitimate children the right to
represent their deceased parents and inherit from their deceased
grandparents, but that Rule was expressly changed and/or amended by Art.
990 New Civil Code which expressly grants the illegitimate children the right
to represent their deceased father (Pablo Santero) in the estate of their
grandmother Simona Pamuti)." 5
Petitioners' contention holds no water. Since the heridatary conflict refers
solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, who is the
legitimate mother of Pablo Santero, the applicable law is the provision of Art.
992 of the Civil Code which reads as follows:
ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato
from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or
mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimate child. (943a)
Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child. On the
other hand, the oppositors (petitioners herein) are the illegitimate children of
Pablo Santero.
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it
prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child
and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said
legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992, Between the legitimate
family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening
antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked
down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by the
illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former,
and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in
the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a
blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by
avoiding further grounds of resentment. 6
Thus, petitioners herein cannot represent their father Pablo Santero in the
succession of the letter to the intestate estate of his legitimate mother
5
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, because of the barrier provided for under
Art. 992 of the New Civil Code.
In answer to the erroneous contention of petitioners that Article 941 of the
Spanish Civil Code is changed by Article 990 of the New Civil Code, We are
reproducing herewith the Reflections of the Illustrious Hon. Justice Jose B.L.
Reyes which also finds full support from other civilists, to wit:
In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was
admitted only within the legitimate family; so much so that
Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child can
riot inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives
of his father and mother. The Civil Code of the Philippines
apparently adhered to this principle since it reproduced Article
943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992, but with fine
inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995 and 998) our
Code allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to
pass to his own descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate.
So that while Art. 992 prevents the illegitimate issue of a
legitimate child from representing him in the intestate succession
of the grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can
now do so. This difference being indefensible and unwarranted,
in the future revision of the Civil Code we shall have to make a
choice and decide either that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all
cases the right of representation, in which case Art. 992 must be
suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said article and modify
Articles 995 and 998. The first solution would be more in accord
with an enlightened attitude vis-a-vis illegitimate children.
(Reflections on the Reform of Hereditary Succession, JOURNAL of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, First Quater, 1976, Volume
4, Number 1, pp. 40-41).
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase
"legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" includes all the kindred of the
person spoken of. 7 The record shows that from the commencement of this
case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor
natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are
6
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set
aside: (a) the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 dated April 29, 1988 in CAG.R. SP. No. 14010 entitled "Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual v.
Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista, Manuel C. Pascual, Jose Pascual, Susana C.
Pascual-Bautista, Erlinda C. Pascual, Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr., et al." which
dismissed the petition and in effect affirmed the decision of the trial court
and (b) the resolution dated July 14, 1988 denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged
natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood
brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, petition, p. 17).
Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue,
legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children and was
survived by the following:
(a) Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouses;
(b) Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full blood
of the deceased, to wit:
Esperanza
Manuel
Jose
Susana
C.
C.
C.
C.
Pascual-Bautista
Pascual
Pascual
Pascual-Bautista
Erlinda
C.
Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr.
Pascual
Pascual
10
13
14
AQUINO, J.:
Teodoro R. Yangco died in Manila on April 20, 1939 at the age of seventyseven years. His will dated August 29, 1934 was probated in the Court of
First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No. 54863. The decree of
probate was affirmed in this Court's 1941 decision in Corpus vs. Yangco, 73
Phil. 527. The complete text of the will is quoted in that decision.
Yangco had no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his nearest relatives
were (1) his half brother, Luis R. Yangco, (2) his half sister, Paz Yangco, the
wife of Miguel Ossorio (3) Amalia Corpus, Jose A. V. Corpus, and Ramon L.
Corpus, the children of his half brother, Pablo Corpus, and (4) Juana
(Juanita) Corpus, the daughter of his half brother Jose Corpus. Juanita died
in October, 1944 at Palauig, Zambales.
Teodoro R. Yangco was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona Arguelles,
the widow of Tomas Corpus. Before her union with Luis Rafael Yangco,
Ramona had begotten five children with Tomas Corpus, two of whom were
the aforenamed Pablo Corpus and Jose Corpus.
Pursuant to the order of the probate court, a project of partition dated
November 26, 1945 was submitted by the administrator and the legatees
named in the will. That project of partition was opposed by the estate of Luis
R. Yangco whose counsel contended that an intestacy should be declared
Because the will does not contain an institution of heir. It was also opposed
by Atty. Roman A. Cruz, who represented Juanita Corpus, Pedro Martinez
15
and Juliana de Castro. Juanita Corpus was already dead when Atty. Cruz
appeared as her counsel.
Atty. Cruz alleged in his opposition that the proposed partion was not in
conformity with the will because the testator intended that the estate.
should be "conserved" and not physically partitioned. Atty. Cruz prayed "que
declare que el finado no dispuso en su testamento de sus bienes y negocios
y que ha lugar a sucession intestadocon respecio a los raismos y que same
un dia en esta causa para la recepcion de pruebas previa a la declaracion de
quienes son los herederos legales o abintestato del difunto."
The Probate court in its order of December 26, 1946 approved the project of
partition. It held that in certain clauses of the will the testator intended to
conserve his properties not in the sense of disposing of them after his death
but for the purpose of Preventing that "tales bienes fuesen malgastados o
desfilpar radios por los legatarios" and that if the testator intended a
Perpetual prohibition against alienation, that conch tion would be regarded
"como no puesta o no existents". it concluded that "no hay motives legales o
morales para que la sucession de Don Teodoro R. Yangco sea declarada
intestada (See Barretto vs. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888, which cites article 785 of
the Spanish Civil Code as prohibiting perpetual entails, and Rodriguez vs.
Court of Appeals, L-28734, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 546.)
From that order, Pedro Martinez, Juliana de Castro , Juanita Corpus
(deceased) and the estate of Luis R. Yangco aped to this Court (L-1476).
Those appeals were dismissed in tills Court's resolutions of October 10 and
31, 1947 after the legatees and the appellants entered into compromise
agreements. In the compromise dated October 7, 1947 the legatees agreed
to pay P35,000 to Pedro Martinez, the heirs of Pio V. Corpus, the heirs of
Isabel Corpus and the heir of Juanita Corpus. Herein appellant Tomas Corpus
signed that compromise settlement as the sole heir of Juanita Corpus. The
estate of Luis R. Yangco entered into a similar compromise a ment A the
resolution dismissing the appeal became, final and executory on October 14
and November 4, 1947, entries of judgment were made on those dates.
Pursuant to the compromise agreement, Tomas Corpus Signed a receipt
dated October 24, 1947 wherein he acknowledge that he received from the
Yangco estate the sum of two thousand pesos (P2,000) "as settlement in full
16
and sisters in accordance with the rules established for legitimate brothers
and sisters." Hence, Teodoro R. Yangco's half brothers on the Corpus side,
who were legitimate, had no right to succeed to his estate under the rules of
intestacy.
Following the rule in article 992, formerly article 943, it was held that the
legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child
(Cacho vs. Udan L- 19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693. See De Guzman vs.
Sevilla, 47 Phil. 991).
Where the testatrix, Rosario Table was the legitimate daughter of Jose Table
the two acknowledged natural children of her uncle, Ramon Table her
father's brother, were held not to be her legal heirs (Grey vs. Table 88 Phil.
128).
By reason of that same rule, the natural child cannot represent his natural
father in the succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent (Llorente
vs. Rodriguez, 10 Phil. 585; Centeno vs. Centeno, 52 Phil. 322; Allarde vs.
Abaya, 57 Phil. 909).
The natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle, a
legitimate brother of her natural mother (Anuran vs. Aquino and Ortiz, 38
Phil. 29).
WHEREFORE the lower court's judgment is affirmed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
CARPIO, J.,
20
Chairperson,
- versus -
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
PEREZ,* JJ.
ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Unlike Pope Alexander VI[1] who, faced with the impasse between Spain and
Portugal, deftly and literally divided the exploration, or more appropriately,
the riches of the New World by issuing the Inter Caetera,[2] we are
confronted with the difficult, albeit, all too familiar tale of another family
imbroglio over the estate of a decedent.[3]
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949,
[4]
reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 78,
Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. [5]
21
During his lifetime, Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco, and they
begot three children, namely: herein respondent, Isabel; Margarita; and
Emilio II, all surnamed Cojuangco-Suntay. Emilio Is marriage to Isabel
Cojuangco was subsequently annulled. Thereafter, Emilio I had two children
out of wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita Suntay Taedo (Nenita), by two different
women, Concepcion Mendoza and Isabel Santos, respectively.
22
Subsequently, the trial court granted Emilio IIIs Motion for Leave to
Intervene considering his interest in the outcome of the case. Emilio III filed
his Opposition-In-Intervention, which essentially echoed the allegations in
his grandfathers opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III,
was better equipped than respondent to administer and manage the estate
of the decedent, Cristina. Additionally, Emilio III averred his own
qualifications that: [he] is presently engaged in aquaculture and banking; he
was trained by the decedent to work in his early age by involving him in the
activities of the Emilio Aguinaldo Foundation which was established in 1979
24
(1)
To make and return within three (3) months,
a true and complete inventory;
(2)
To administer the estate and to pay and
discharge all debts, legatees, and charge on the same, or
dividends thereon;
25
(3)
To render a true and just account within one
(1) year, and at any other time when required by the court, and
(4)
SO ORDERED.[11]
Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal before the CA, which reversed
and set aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration
issued to Emilio III, and appointed respondent as administratrix of the
intestate estate of the decedent, Cristina, to wit:
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[12]
26
The motion for reconsideration of Emilio III having been denied, he appeals
by certiorari to this Court, raising the following issues:
deceased father in the estate of the latters legitimate mother, the decedent.
On the whole, the CA pronounced that Emilio III, who was merely nominated
by Federico, and which nomination hinged upon the latters appointment as
administrator of the decedents estate, cannot be appointed as the
administrator of the decedents estate for the following reasons: [15]
The pivotal issue in this case turns on who, as between Emilio III and
respondent, is better qualified to act as administrator of the decedents
estate.
29
2. The basis for Article 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as the iron
curtain bar rule,[18] is quite the opposite scenario in the facts obtaining herein
for the actual relationship between Federico and Cristina, on one hand, and
Emilio III, on the other, was akin to the normal relationship of legitimate
relatives;
3. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and
her husband, Federico, who both acknowledged him as their grandchild;
30
thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that administration be granted to
some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
32
Similarly, the subject estate in this case calls to the succession other
putative heirs, including another illegitimate grandchild of Cristina and
Federico, Nenita Taedo, but who was likewise adopted by Federico, and the
two (2) siblings of respondent Isabel, Margarita and Emilio II. In all,
considering the conflicting claims of the putative heirs, and the unliquidated
conjugal partnership of Cristina and Federico which forms part of their
respective estates, we are impelled to move in only one direction, i.e., joint
administration of the subject estate.
One final note. Counsel for petitioner meticulously argues that Article
992 of the Civil Code, the successional bar between the legitimate and
illegitimate relatives of a decedent, does not apply in this instance where
facts indubitably demonstrate the contrary Emilio III, an illegitimate
grandchild of the decedent, was actually treated by the decedent and her
husband as their own son, reared from infancy, educated and trained in their
businesses, and eventually legally adopted by decedents husband, the
original oppositor to respondents petition for letters of administration.
Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis
of intestate succession, i.e., love first descends, for the decedent, Cristina,
did not distinguish between her legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren.
Neither did her husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally raised the status of
Emilio III from an illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate child. The
34
Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart from the
foregoing admonition:
35
SO ORDERED.
Sandejas vs Lina
[G.R. No. 141634. February 5, 2001]
Heirs
36
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A contract of sale is not invalidated by the fact that it is subject to
probate court approval. The transaction remains binding on the seller-heir,
but not on the other heirs who have not given their consent to it. In settling
the estate of the deceased, a probate court has jurisdiction over matters
incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers. Such
matters include selling, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty
belonging to the estate. Rule 89, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, deals with
the conveyance of real property contracted by the decedent while still
alive. In contrast with Sections 2 and 4 of the same Rule, the said provision
does not limit to the executor or administrator the right to file the application
for authority to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber realty under
administration. The standing to pursue such course of action before the
probate court inures to any person who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment or to be entitled to the avails of the suit.
The Case
37
The assailed
disposition.
Resolution
denied
reconsideration
of
the
foregoing
The Facts
The facts of the case, as narrated by the Court of Appeals (CA), are as
follows:[4]
On February 17, 1981, Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. filed a petition (Record, SP.
Proc. No. R-83-15601, pp. 8-10) in the lower court praying that letters of
administration be issued in his favor for the settlement of the estate of his
wife, REMEDIOS R. SANDEJAS, who died on April 17, 1955. On July 1, 1981,
Letters of Administration [were issued by the lower court appointing Eliodoro
Sandejas, Sr. as administrator of the estate of the late Remedios Sandejas
(Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, p. 16). Likewise on the same date,
Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. took his oath as administrator (Record,SP. Proc. No.
R-83-15601, p. 17). x x x.
On November 19, 1981, the 4th floor of Manila City Hall was burned and
among the records burned were the records of Branch XI of the Court of
First Instance of Manila. As a result, [A]dministrator Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr.
filed a [M]otion for [R]econstitution of the records of the case on February 9,
1983 (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, pp. 1-5). On February 16, 1983,
the lower court in its [O]rder granted the said motion (Record, SP. Proc. No.
R-83-15601, pp. 28-29).
On April 19, 1983, an Omnibus Pleading for motion to intervene and
petition-in-intervention was filed by [M]ovant Alex A. Lina alleging among
others that on June 7, 1982, movant and [A]dministrator Eliodoro P.
Sandejas, in his capacity as seller, bound and obligated himself, his heirs,
administrators, and assigns, to sell forever and absolutely and in their
entirety the following parcels of land which formed part of the estate of the
late Remedios R. Sandejas, to wit:
1. A parcel of land (Lot No. 22 Block No. 45 of the subdivision plan Psd21121, being a portion of Block 45 described on plan Psd-19508, G.L.R.O.
Rec. No. 2029), situated in the Municipality of Makati, province of Rizal,
containing an area of TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY (270) SQUARE METERS,
more or less, with TCT No. 13465;
38
2. A parcel of land (Lot No. 21 Block No. 45 of the subdivision plan Psd21141, being a portion of Block 45 described on plan Psd-19508 G.L.R.O.
Rec. No. 2029), situated in the Municipality of Makati, Province of Rizal,
containing an area of TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY (270) SQUARE METERS,
more or less, with TCT No. 13464;
3. A parcel of land (Lot No. 5 Block No. 45 of the subdivision plan Psd21141, being a portion of Block 45 described on plan Psd-19508 G.L.R.O.
Rec. No. 2029), situated in the Municipality of Makati, Province of Rizal,
containing an area of TWO HUNDRED EIGHT (208) SQUARE METERS, more
or less, with TCT No. 13468;
4. A parcel of land (Lot No. 6, Block No. 45 of the subdivision plan Psd21141, being a portion of Block 45 described on plan Psd-19508 G.L.R.O.
Rec. No. 2029), situated in the Municipality of Makati, Province of Rizal,
containing an area of TWO HUNDRED EIGHT (208) SQUARE METERS, more
or less, with TCT No. 13468;
The [R]eceipt of the [E]arnest [M]oney with [P]romise to [S]ell and to [B]uy
is hereunder quoted, to wit:
Received today from MR. ALEX A. LINA the sum of ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, per Metropolitan
Bank & Trust Company Chec[k] No. 319913 dated today for P100,000.00, x
x x as additional earnest money for the following:
xxxxxxxxx
all registered with the Registry of Deeds of the [P]rovince of Rizal (Makati
Branch Office) in the name of SELLER ELIODORO SANDEJAS, Filipino Citizen,
of legal age, married to Remedios Reyes de Sandejas; and which
undersigned, as SELLER, binds and obligates himself, his heirs,
administrators and assigns, to sell forever and absolutely in their entirety (all
of the four (4) parcels of land above described, which are contiguous to each
other as to form one big lot) to said Mr. Alex A. Lina, who has agreed to buy
all of them, also binding on his heirs, administrators and assigns, for the
consideration of ONE MILLION (P1,000,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency,
upon such reasonable terms of payment as may be agreed upon by
39
them. The parties have, however, agreed on the following terms and
conditions:
1. The P100,000.00 herein received is in addition to the P70,000.00 earnest
money already received by SELLER from BUYER, all of which shall form part
of, and shall be deducted from, the purchase price of P1,000,000.00, once
the deed of absolute [sale] shall be executed;
2. As a consideration separate and distinct from the price, undersigned
SELLER also acknowledges receipt from Mr. Alex A. Lina of the sum of ONE
THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, per Metropolitan Bank
& Trust Company Check No. 319912 dated today and payable to SELLER for
P1,000.00;
3. Considering that Mrs. Remedios Reyes de Sandejas is already deceased
and as there is a pending intestate proceedings for the settlement of her
estate (Spec. Proc. No. 138393, Manila CFI, Branch XI), wherein SELLER was
appointed as administrator of said Estate, and as SELLER, in his capacity as
administrator of said Estate, has informed BUYER that he (SELLER) already
filed a [M]otion with the Court for authority to sell the above parcels of land
to herein BUYER, but which has been delayed due to the burning of the
records of said Spec. Pro. No. 138398, which records are presently under
reconstitution, the parties shall have at least ninety (90) days from receipt of
the Order authorizing SELLER, in his capacity as administrator, to sell all THE
ABOVE DESCRIBED PARCELS OF LAND TO HEREIN BUYER (but extendible for
another period of ninety (90) days upon the request of either of the parties
upon the other), within which to execute the deed of absolute sale covering
all above parcels of land;
4. In the event the deed of absolute sale shall not proceed or not be
executed for causes either due to SELLERS fault, or for causes of which the
BUYER is innocent, SELLER binds himself to personally return to Mr. Alex A.
Lina the entire ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THOUSAND ([P]170,000.00) PESOS
in earnest money received from said Mr. Lina by SELLER, plus fourteen
(14%) percentum interest per annum, all of which shall be considered as
liens of said parcels of land, or at least on the share therein of herein
SELLER;
40
LINA PETITIONER, [for letters of administration] (Record, SP. Proc. No. 8533707, pp. 1-7). On November 29, 1985, Branch XXXVI of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila issued an [O]rder consolidating SP. Proc. No. 85-33707, with
SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601 (Record, SP. Proc. No.85-33707, p. 13). Likewise,
on December 13, 1985, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XI, issued
an [O]rder stating that this Court has no objection to the consolidation of
Special Proceedings No. 85-331707, now pending before Branch XXXVI of
this Court, with the present proceedings now pending before this Branch
(Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, p. 279).
On January 15, 1986, Intervenor Alex A. Lina filed [a] Motion for his
appointment as a new administrator of the Intestate Estate of Remedios R.
Sandejas on the following reasons:
5.01. FIRST, as of this date, [i]ntervenor has not received any motion on the
part of the heirs Sixto, Antonio, Roberto and Benjamin, all surnamed
Sandejas, for the appointment of a new [a]dministrator in place of their
father, Mr. Eliodoro P. Sandejas, Sr.;
5.02. SECOND, since Sp. Proc. 85-33707, wherein the [p]etitioner is herein
Intervenor Alex A. Lina and the instant Sp. PROC. R-83-15601, in effect are
already consolidated, then the appointment of Mr. Alex Lina as
[a]dministrator of the Intestate Estate of Remedios R. Sandejas in instant
Sp. Proc. R-83-15601, would be beneficial to the heirs and also to the
Intervenor;
5.03. THIRD, of course, Mr. Alex A. Lina would be willing to give way at
anytime to any [a]dministrator who may be proposed by the heirs of the
deceased Remedios R. Sandejas, so long as such [a]dministrator is
qualified. (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, pp. 281-283)
On May 15, 1986, the lower court issued an order granting the [M]otion of
Alex A. Lina as the new [a]dministrator of the Intestate Estate of Remedios
R. Sandejas in this proceedings. (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, pp. 288290)
On August 28, 1986, heirs Sixto, Roberto, Antonio and Benjamin, all
surnamed Sandejas, and heirs [sic] filed a [M]otion for [R]econsideration
and the appointment of another administrator Mr. Sixto Sandejas, in lieu of
42
[I]ntervenor Alex A. Lina stating among others that it [was] only lately that
Mr. Sixto Sandejas, a son and heir, expressed his willingness to act as a new
administrator of the intestate estate of his mother, Remedios R. Sandejas
(Record, SP. Proc. No. 85-33707, pp. 29-31). On October 2, 1986,
Intervenor Alex A. Lina filed his [M]anifestation and [C]ounter [M]otion
alleging that he ha[d] no objection to the appointment of Sixto Sandejas as
[a]dministrator of the [i]ntestate [e]state of his mother Remedios R.
Sandejas (Sp. Proc. No. 85-15601), provided that Sixto Sandejas be also
appointed as administrator of the [i]ntestate [e]state of his father, Eliodoro
P. Sandejas, Sr. (Spec. Proc. No. 85-33707), which two (2) cases have been
consolidated (Record, SP. Proc. No. 85-33707, pp. 34-36). On March 30,
1987, the lower court granted the said [M]otion and substituted Alex Lina
with Sixto Sandejas as petitioner in the said [P]etitions (Record, SP. Proc.
No. 85-33707, p.52). After the payment of the administrators bond (Record,
SP. Proc. No. 83-15601, pp. 348-349) and approval thereof by the court
(Record, SP. Proc. No. 83-15601, p. 361), Administrator Sixto Sandejas on
January 16, 1989 took his oath as administrator of the estate of the
deceased Remedios R. Sandejas and Eliodoro P. Sandejas (Record, SP. Proc.
No. 83-15601, p. 367) and was likewise issued Letters of Administration on
the same day (Record, SP. Proc. No. 83-15601, p. 366).
On November 29, 1993, Intervenor filed [an] Omnibus Motion (a) to approve
the deed of conditional sale executed between Plaintiff-in-Intervention Alex
A. Lina and Elidioro [sic] Sandejas, Sr. on June 7, 1982; (b) to compel the
heirs of Remedios Sandejas and Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. thru their
administrator, to execute a deed of absolute sale in favor of [I]ntervenor
Alex A. Lina pursuant to said conditional deed of sale (Record, SP. Proc. No.
83-15601, pp. 554-561) to which the administrator filed a [M]otion to
[D]ismiss and/or [O]pposition to said omnibus motion on December 13,
1993 (Record, SP. Proc. No. 83-15601, pp. 591-603).
On January 13, 1995, the lower court rendered the questioned order
granting intervenors [M]otion for the [A]pproval of the Receipt of Earnest
Money with promise to buy between Plaintiff-in-Intervention Alex A. Lina and
Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. dated June 7, 1982 (Record, SP. Proc. No. 83-15601,
pp. 652-654). x x x.
The Order of the intestate court[5] disposed as follows:
43
Overturning the RTC ruling, the CA held that the contract between
Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. and respondent was merely a contract to sell, not a
perfected contract of sale. It ruled that the ownership of the four lots was to
remain in the intestate estate of Remedios Sandejas until the approval of the
sale was obtained from the settlement court. That approval was a positive
suspensive condition, the nonfulfillment of which was not tantamount to a
breach. It was simply an event that prevented the obligation from maturing
or becoming effective. If the condition did not happen, the obligation would
not arise or come into existence.
The CA held that Section 1, Rule 89[7] of the Rules of Court was
inapplicable, because the lack of written notice to the other heirs showed the
lack of consent of those heirs other than Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. For this
reason, bad faith was imputed to him, for no one is allowed to enjoy a claim
arising from ones own wrongdoing. Thus, Eliodoro Sr. was bound, as a
matter of justice and good faith, to comply with his contractual commitments
as an owner and heir. When he entered into the agreement with respondent,
he bound his conjugal and successional shares in the property.
Hence, this Petition.[8]
Issues
b) Whether or not Eliodoro P. Sandejas Sr. was guilty of bad faith despite the
conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the respondent [bore] the burden of
proving that a motion for authority to sell ha[d] been filed in court;
c) Whether or not the undivided shares of Eliodoro P. Sandejas Sr. in the
subject property is three-fifth (3/5) and the administrator of the latter
should execute deeds of conveyance therefor within thirty days from receipt
of the balance of the purchase price from the respondent; and
d) Whether or not the respondents petition-in-intervention was converted to
a money claim and whether the [trial court] acting as a probate court could
approve the sale and compel the petitioners to execute [a] deed of
conveyance even for the share alone of Eliodoro P. Sandejas Sr.[9]
In brief, the Petition poses the main issue of whether the CA erred in
modifying the trial courts Decision and in obligating petitioners to sell 3/5 of
the disputed properties to respondent, even if the suspensive condition had
not been fulfilled. It also raises the following collateral issues: (1) the
settlement courts jurisdiction; (2) respondent-intervenors standing to file an
application for the approval of the sale of realty in the settlement case, (3)
the decedents bad faith, and (4) the computation of the decedents share in
the realty under administration.
This Courts Ruling
45
46
the earnest money paid plus interest at fourteen percent per annum. But the
sale was approved by the intestate court; hence, the proviso does not apply.
Because petitioners did not consent to the sale of their ideal shares in
the disputed lots, the CA correctly limited the scope of the Receipt to
the pro-indiviso share of Eliodoro Sr. Thus, it correctly modified the intestate
courts ruling by excluding their shares from the ambit of the transaction.
First Collateral Issue:
the estate in a speedy manner, so that the benefits that may flow from such
settlement may be immediately enjoyed by the heirs and the beneficiaries.
[16]
In the present case, the Motion for Approval was meant to settle the
decedents obligation to respondent; hence, that obligation clearly falls under
the jurisdiction of the settlement court. To require respondent to file a
separate action -- on whether petitioners should convey the title to Eliodoro
Sr.s share of the disputed realty -- will unnecessarily prolong the settlement
of the intestate estates of the deceased spouses.
The suspensive condition did not reduce the conditional sale between
Eliodoro Sr. and respondent to one that was not a definite, clear and
absolute document of sale, as contended by petitioners. Upon the
occurrence of the condition, the conditional sale became a reciprocally
demandable obligation that is binding upon the parties. [17] That Acebedo also
involved a conditional sale of real property[18] proves that the existence of
the suspensive condition did not remove that property from the jurisdiction
of the intestate court.
Second Collateral Issue: Intervenors Standing
Petitioners contend that under said Rule 89, only the executor or
administrator is authorized to apply for the approval of a sale of realty under
administration. Hence, the settlement court allegedly erred in entertaining
and granting respondents Motion for Approval.
We read no such limitation. Section 8, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court,
provides:
SEC. 8. When court may authorize conveyance of realty which deceased
contracted to convey. Notice. Effect of deed.Where the deceased was in his
lifetime under contract, binding in law, to deed real property, or an interest
therein, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, on application for
that purpose, authorize the executor or administrator to convey such
property according to such contract, or with such modifications as are
agreed upon by the parties and approved by the court; and if the contract is
to convey real property to the executor or administrator, the clerk of the
court shall execute the deed. x x x.
48
Petitioners assert that Eliodoro Sr. was not in bad faith, because (a) he
informed respondent of the need to secure court approval prior to the sale of
the lots, and (2) he did not promise that he could obtain the approval.
We agree. Eliodoro Sr. did not misrepresent these lots to respondent as
his own properties to which he alone had a title in fee simple. The fact that
he failed to obtain the approval of the conditional sale did not automatically
imply bad faith on his part. The CA held him in bad faith only for the purpose
of binding him to the conditional sale. This was unnecessary because his
being bound to it is, as already shown, beyond cavil.
Fourth Collateral Issue: Computation of Eliodoros Share
Petitioners aver that the CAs computation of Eliodoro Sr.s share in the
disputed parcels of land was erroneous because, as the conjugal partner of
Remedios, he owned one half of these lots plus a further one tenth of the
remaining half, in his capacity as a one of her legal heirs. Hence, Eliodoros
share should be 11/20 of the entire property. Respondent poses no objection
to this computation.[22]
On the other hand, the CA held that, at the very least, the conditional
sale should cover the one half (1/2) pro indiviso conjugal share of Eliodoro
plus his one tenth (1/10) hereditary share as one of the ten legal heirs of the
decedent, or a total of three fifths (3/5) of the lots in administration. [23]
49
Calisterio vs Calisterio
[G.R. No. 136467. April 6, 2000]
ANTONIA
ARMAS
Y
CALISTERIO, respondent.
CALISTERIO, petitioner,
vs. MARIETTA
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
On 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels
of land with an estimated value of P604,750.00. Teodorico was survived by
his wife, herein respondent Marietta Calisterio. Esm
50
Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously been
married to James William Bounds on 13 January 1946 at Caloocan City.
James Bounds disappeared without a trace on 11 February 1947. Teodorico
and Marietta were married eleven years later, or on 08 May 1958, without
Marietta having priorly secured a court declaration that James was
presumptively dead. Esmsc
On 09 October 1992, herein petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a
surviving sister of Teodorico, filed with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of
Quezon City, Branch 104, a petition entitled, "In the Matter of Intestate
Estate of the Deceased Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos, Antonia Armas,
Petitioner," claiming to be inter alia, the sole surviving heir of Teodorico
Calisterio, the marriage between the latter and respondent Marietta Espinosa
Calisterio being allegedly bigamous and thereby null and void. She prayed
that her son Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., be appointed administrator, without
bond, of the estate of the deceased and that the inheritance be adjudicated
to her after all the obligations of the estate would have been settled.
Respondent Marietta opposed the petition. Marietta stated that her first
marriage with James Bounds had been dissolved due to the latter's absence,
his whereabouts being unknown, for more than eleven years before she
contracted her second marriage with Teodorico. Contending to be the
surviving spouse of Teodorico, she sought priority in the administration of
the estate of the decedent. Esmmis
On 05 February 1993, the trial court issued an order appointing jointly
Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., and respondent Marietta administrator and
administratrix, respectively, of the intestate estate of Teodorico.
On 17 January 1996, the lower court handed down its decision in favor of
petitioner Antonia; it adjudged:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding for the
petitioner and against the oppositor whereby herein petitioner,
Antonia Armas y Calisterio, is declared as the sole heir of the
estate of Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos."[1]
Respondent Marietta appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of
Appeals, formulating that51
"1. The trial court erred in applying the provisions of the Family
Code in the instant case despite the fact that the controversy
arose when the New Civil Code was the law in force.
"2. The trial court erred in holding that the marriage between
oppositor-appellant and the deceased Teodorico Calisterio is
bigamous for failure of the former to secure a decree of the
presumptive death of her first spouse.
"3. The trial court erred in not holding that the property situated
at No. 32 Batangas Street, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon
City, is the conjugal property of the oppositor-appellant and the
deceased Teodorico Calisterio. Esmso
"4. The trial court erred in holding that oppositor-appellant is not
a legal heir of deceased Teodorico Calisterio.
"5. The trial court erred in not holding that letters of
administration should be granted solely in favor of oppositorappellant."[2]
On 31 August 1998, the appellate court, through Mr. Justice Conrado M.
Vasquez, Jr., promulgated its now assailed decision, thus:
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision appealed from
is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and a new one entered declaring
as follows:
"(a) Marietta Calisterio's marriage to Teodorico remains valid;
"(b) The house and lot situated at #32 Batangas Street, San
Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, belong to the conjugal
partnership property with the concomitant obligation of the
partnership to pay the value of the land to Teodorico's estate as
of the time of the taking;
"(c) Marietta Calisterio, being Teodorico's compulsory heir, is
entitled to one half of her husband's estate, and Teodorico's
sister, herein petitioner Antonia Armas and her children, to the
other half; Msesm
52
absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years,
is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent
marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to
articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid
in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a
competent court."
Under the foregoing provisions, a subsequent marriage contracted during the
lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior
marriage is first annulled or dissolved. Paragraph (2) of the law gives
exceptions from the above rule. For the subsequent marriage referred to in
the three exceptional cases therein provided, to be held valid, the spouse
present (not the absentee spouse) so contracting the later marriage must
have done so in good faith. [6] Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose or some
moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong - it partakes of the nature of
fraud, a breach of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill will.
[7]
The Court does not find these circumstances to be here extant. Kycalr
A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not
necessary[8] as long as the prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally
noteworthy that the marriage in these exceptional cases are, by the explicit
mandate of Article 83, to be deemed valid "until declared null and void by a
competent court." It follows that the burden of proof would be, in these
cases, on the party assailing the second marriage. Calrky
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent
bigamous marriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the following
conditions must concur; viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party
must have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there
is danger of death under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil
Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a wellfounded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is,
unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee for which purpose the spouse present can institute a summary
proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last condition is
consistent and in consonance with the requirement of judicial intervention in
subsequent marriages as so provided in Article 41[9], in relation to Article 40,
[10]
of the Family Code. Mesm
54
55
MAKASIAR, J.:
Review of the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dated June 21,
1973, dismissing petitioner's petition for settlement and partition of estate.
On November 13, 1972, petitioner filed with the court below the above-said
petition, subject of which is the estate left by her late son, Felix L. del
Rosario, who died in a plane crash on September 12, 1969 at Antipolo, Rizal
(Partial Joint Stipulation of Facts, p. 2, petition, p. 6, rec.).
On March 17, 1973, respondents filed their opposition.
On April 26, 1973, the court a quo, pursuant to a verbal agreement forged
between the parties, issued an order requiring them to come up with a joint
stipulation of facts (p. 9, rec.).
On May 19, 1973, the parties submitted the following stipulation of facts:
OPPOSITOR admits that petitioner is the legitimate mother of the
late FELIX L. DEL ROSARIO.
PETITIONER admits that oppositor DOROTEA OTERA DEL
ROSARIO is the. legitimate surviving wife of the deceased FELIX
L. DEL ROSARIO.
56
58
excludes
the
legitimate
II
However, by virtue of the transcendental implications of the holding of the
court a quo in the sense that once wholly sustained, said holding would
preclude petitioner from re-filing the proper action a consequence which,
on the ground of equity and fair play, We cannot allow to befall on petitioner
We deemed it essential, for the guidance of the parties especially herein,
petitioner, to point out the demerits of the appealed verdict.
1. Which of the following articles of the New Civil Code will apply, Article 343
on the one hand, or Articles 341, 978 and 979 on the other; and
2. Whether the material data rule enuciated by Rule 41, Section 6 the New
Rules of Court should be followed, ex cathedra, in the present case:
A
The lower court found the following the new provisions of the New Civil Code
gername to the instant case:
Art. 341. The adoption shall:
(1) Give to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if
he were a legitimate child of the adopted;
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the parents by nature;
(3) Make the adopted person a legal heir of the adopted;
(4) Entitle the adopted person to use the adopter's surname."
Art. 978. Succession pertains, in the first place, to the decending
direct line.
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their decendants suceed the
parents and the other ascendants, without distinction as to sex
or age, and even if they should come from different marriages.
60
WE opine that the governing provision is the hereinafter quoted article 343
of the New Civil Code, in relation to Articles 893 and 1000 of said law, which
directs that:
Art. 343. If the adopter is survived by legitimate parents or
ascendants and by an adopted person. the latter shall not have
more successional rights than an acknowledged natural child.
Article 343 of the New Civil Code is qualification to Article 341
which gives an adopted child the same rights and duties as
though he were a legitimate child. The reason for this is that:
(I)t is unjuest to exclude the adopter's parents from the
inheritance in facor of an adopted person (Report of the Code
Commission, p. 92).
It is most unfair to accord more successional rights to the adopted, who is
only related artificially by fiction of law to the deceased, than those who are
naturally related to him by blood in the direct ascending line.
The applicability of Article 343 does not exclude the surviving parent of the
deceased adopter, not only because a contrary view would defeat the intent
of the framers of the law, but also because in intestate succession, where
legitimate parents or ascendants concur with the surviving spouse of the
deceased, the latter does not necessarily exclude the former from the
inheritance. This is affirmed by Article 893 of the New Civil Code which
states:
If the testator leaves no legitimate descendants, but leaves
legitimate ascendants, the surviving spouse shall have a right to
onefourth (only) of the hereditary estate.
This fourth shall be taken from the free portion.
Article 343 does not require that the concurring heirs should be the aodpted
child and the legitimate parents or ascendants only. The language of the law
is clear, and a contrary view cannot be presumed.
61
It is, thus, OUR view that Article 343 should be made to apply, consonant
with the cardinal rule in statutory construction that all the provisions of the
New Civil Code must be reconciled and given effect.
Under Article 343, an adopted child surviving with legitimate parents of the
deceased adopter, has the same successional rights as an acknowledged
natural child, which is comprehended in the term "illegitimate children".
Consequently , the respective shares of the surviving spouse, ascendant and
adopted child should be determined by Article 1000 of the New Civil Code,
which reads:
Art. 1000. If legitimate ascendants, the surviving spouse and
illegitimate children are left, the ascendants shall be entitled to
onehalf of the inheritance, and the other half shall be divided
between the surviving spouse and the illegitimate children so
that such widow or widower shall have one-fourth of the estate,
the illegitimate children the other fourth.
B
Anent the other issue, respondents, in their comment of June 29, 1973,
emphasize that the petitioner's record on appeal violates the material data
rule in that
It does not state when the notice of appeal and appeal bond
were filed with the lower court in disregard of the requirment of
Section 6, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court that the record on
appeal must contain such data as will show that the appeal was
perfected on time.
Recent jurisprudence has construed liberally the material data rule,
whenever circumstances and substantial justice warrant.
The cases of Berkenkotter vs. Court of Appeal, No. L-336629, September 28,
1973 (53 SCRA 228) andVillanueva vs. Court of Appeal (No. L-29719,
Novemner 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 216, 220) are particularly in point.
In Villanueva, WE held:
62
63
64