Critique

ISSN: 0301-7605 (Print) 1748-8605 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcso20

The Islamic republic and the Iranian left

Yassamine Mather & David Mather
To cite this article: Yassamine Mather & David Mather (2002) The Islamic republic and the
Iranian left, Critique, 30:1, 179-191, DOI: 10.1080/03017600508413480
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03017600508413480

Published online: 18 May 2009.

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Critique 32-33

THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC AND THE IRANIAN

LEFT

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YASSAMINE MATHER AND DAVID MATHER

Iran's workers are on the streets again. May 1st 1999 in Tehran saw the first
nation-wide workers protests since the strikes and demonstrations that
helped bring down the Shah's regime in the revolution of 1979. Since then
workers protests have continued. Iranian workers have a lot to protest about.
Despite two decades of Islamic anti-western rhetoric, the Iranian economy
remains as dependant on western oil revenues as ever. And given the
continuing economic crisis, Iran's capitalists have responded in the only way
they know how: by closing factories and sacking thousands of workers, and
by the simple expedient of not paying tens of thousands of those who still
have jobs.
Officials at Iran's Ministry of Labour admit that at least 4 million workers in
Iran are unemployed. According to the director of the government
sponsored Khaneh Kargar, some 80,000 industrial workers have not
received any wages for 3 to 36 months. In Hamadan around 150 small and
medium size factories, in Kermanshah 292 factories, in Mazandaran 102
units and in Semnan 100 factories and production units have closed down.
In Karaj (near Tehran) the director of the Labour office puts the number of
those unemployed at 110,000. In Oct and November 2000, the Iranian press
reported 74 major workers protests all demanding unpaid wages.
Clearly non payment of salaries has become part of a concerted policy by
sections of Iranian capitalists to increase profits, all this in a country where
there is no unemployment benefit and no public health care for the majority.
Both in Iran and abroad, however news has been dominated by the latest
events of the factional infighting within the Islamic Republic. Iran's
president has finally accepted the resignation of the Minister of Culture and
claims he lacks the necessary powers to implement reforms. The trial has
begun in Tehran of 18 'rogue agents', presumed murderers of intellectuals
and dissidents killed at the end of 1998. In November and December 1998,

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two secular politicians and three writers were murdered in Tehran. In

January 1999, the Intelligence minister, Ghorbanali Dorri-Najafabadi,
admitted the implication of some of his "ministry's" agents but stated that no
high-ranking people of the ministry knew about these murders!! In June
1999, one of the main culprits, Saeed Ememai, a deputy minister of
Intelligence, committed suicide in strange circumstances, in his cell in Even
prison.
Serial political murders instigated by the Iranian government fuelled the
student protests of July 1999 and gave birth to what became known as: 'the
student movement for democracy in Iran'. Yet over the last few months
some 30 'reformist' papers have been banned and their editors, journalists
arrested. Failing to deal with the economic and political crises, the
rapprochement between Khatami, Iran's 'reformist' president and the more
'fundamentalist' faction of the Islamic regime reflects the end of the road for
'reform' within the frameworks of the Islamic regime in Iran.
This article discusses the possible future of the relation between the workers
protests and the students' movement for democracy. Will the 'liberal'
President be able to satisfy and contain the increasingly vocal protests and
demands of workers, students, women and others against the Islamic
system? Or will, there emerge for the first time in the recent history of the
Middle East, an independent movement from below, challenging the very
existence of Islamism?
And these questions raise one other crucial issue: the ability of Iranian
leftism, after twenty years of repression and defeat, to intervene and
influence the process.
THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION OF 1979
The Iranian Revolution of 1979 was a double surprise. Within a year an
island of capitalist stability in the Middle East and one of the strongest links
in the imperialist chain was seized by nationwide strikes demonstrations and
uprisings, providing inspiration to revolutionaries everywhere. But at the
same time this uprising was led and dominated by an apparently backward
fundamentalist Islamic movement which, within a year had imposed a new
Islamic dictatorship which, under the guise of anti-imperialism, suppressed

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most of the democratic and socialist forces which had helped it come to
power.
The uprising was a direct result of the failures of the Shah's regime to
respond to the economic crisis that followed the economic boom of the
early 1970s. Most skilled workers faced a drop in their living standards in
1976. The White Revolution had left massive numbers of peasants landless
and penniless in search of seasonal jobs in major cities. Recession in the
Iranian economy left them unemployed and destitute in shantytowns. In
addition to the above two groups, the small independent producers, had
been forced out of business (made bankrupt) with the help of Iran's
Chamber of Commerce to rescue the already privileged position of big
industrialists. Corruption and the rule of a clique around the Royal court
meant that many traditional merchants, often associated with the bazaar
were deprived of large profits available to the more privileged sections of
the ruling class. Political discontent with the arrogant dictatorship of the
Royal family was increasing all the time.
The suppression of the leftists and all secular opposition allowed sections of
the clergy and the Islamic movement to mobilise class discontent in the
language of religion.
The clergy who had survived the repressive measures of the Shah's
dictatorship by comprising with the regime, was in a much better position
to benefit from political discontent than secular, socialist groups who had
lost many in their ranks through execution and imprisonment's.
By the summer of 1978 religious demonstrations in major cities were lead
by the clergy, financed by the bazaar, supported by independent producers,
the urban poor as well as students.
By mid 78 the workers movement was also taking shape, councils (shoras)
were formed in major industries where workers were organising strikes, go
slows initially for minor economic demands, gradually becoming more
political with demands for repeal of the labour laws and expulsion of
SAVAK (Shah's secret police) agents from the factory. This movement
although supported by various groups of the left had no clear leadership and
remained subordinate to the Islamist movement.

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Some of the most important shoras were formed in Khouzestan province in

the oil and steel industries were maj'or strikes shook the regime in the latter
part of 1978 and early 1979. However these shoras never became
nationwide shoras and although at times they took up political slogans , the
arguments put forward by some that a situation of dual power existd in Iran
1979 is completely false.
POLITICAL FORCES OPPOSED TO THE SHAH
As in many countries, Iran's revolutionary left emerged in the late 1960s and
1970s as a response to suppression and failures of nationalist forces and the
pro Soviet Tudeh Party.
Various factions and parties of the National Front played an important role
paving the way for a political take over by the clergy. These politicians
who represented the dissatisfied sections of the bourgeoisie survived the
witch hunts after the coup d'tat of 1953 and the overthrow of premier
Mossadegh.
Bazargan was dismissed during the US embassy take over, many of his
ministers had lost power months before. The National Front remains the
semi legal opposition inside Iran, calling for liberalisation of the Islamic
regime. Its offices are often raided by Hizbollah, and despite repeated
attempts to register a candidate in a number of presidential or parliamentary
elections, its candidates are invariably disqualified for failing the religious
criteria set by the Council of Guardians.
The Tudeh Party was the official Stalinist pro-Moscow communist party.
By the 1940s it had acquired a sizeable popular and trade union base, but
its politics were always determined by those of its northern neighbour. It
opposed an independent Azerbaijan Republic, then supported one set when
it was set up by Soviet troops in 1946. It defended Mossadegh's
nationalisation Of Iranian oil in 1952, but notoriously opposed it once it
became clear that Soviet oil would also be nationalised. Most notoriously,
its inconsistent position towards Mossagegh' government led to its failure to
anticipate and oppose the Shah' coup in 1953 and to build an effective

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opposition afterwards. By the 1960s the Tudeh Party had become widely
discredited amongst a new generation of Iranian radicals and socialists.
The Fedaiin Khalgh .In the late sixties a number of small groups influenced
by "activism" in Europe and Latin America joined to form a guerrilla group
with the aim of starting an armed uprising against the Shah . Most of the
original members of the group were executed others were arrested and
spent most of the last years of the Shah's rule in prison. However by the
mid 1970s the group had substantial support amongst university students
and intellectuals inside and outside Iran.
THE RELIGIOUS OPPOSITION
The Clergy
Iran's clergy backed the Shah's 1953 coup which toppled the nationalist
government of Mossadegh . In the 1960s sections of the clergy opposed the
Shah's White Revolution - a US sponsored programme of modernisation
from above. In particular Khomeini opposed the land reform bill and voting
rights for women, this lead to his exile. The rest of the clergy were mainly
quiet and conservative however the mosques remained the only places
where legal gatherings of more than two people could take place and as the
movement against the Shah gathered pace this together with the ability of
the Islamist movement to show a more radical image played an important
role.
The Mojahedin
In the 1960s a third worldist Islamic movement developed in the Iranian
universities, was drawing on the writings of Ali Shariati, a French educated
Islamist scholar, influenced by Franz Fanon.
More practically they were impressed by the growing influence of Marxism
in Iranian campuses and attempted their own synthesis of socialism and
Islam.
The most visible of the Islamist groups were the People's Mojahedin,who
combined a nationalistic blend of Islamic radicalism together with "heroic"
military actions against the Shah's secret service.

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Attempts to forge an alliance with exiled Khomeini were rebuffed because

of their apparent non Islamic sympathies. The most conservative faction of
this movement associated with clerics such as Rafsanjani, forced a Marxist
split from the Mojahedin in 1974. The split called itself Sazman Mojahedin
Khalgh Marxist -Leninist, later this group became known as Peykar. Some
believe that the violent manner of this split inside the Mojahedin (a number
of people were killed as a direct result of the split) strengthened the right in
Mojahedin, people who subsequently gained the leadership and were keen
to support Khomeini and the clergy at least until 1981.
THE LEFT POST 1979
Faced with continuing demands by various sections of the population the
new Islamic government showed its repressive character soon after coming
to power. The women's demonstration of March 1979 was attacked by
Hezbollah, less than a month after Khomeini came to power. In the summer
of 1979, the government (still lead by Bazargan) used its popularity to
suppress the demands of the Kurdish people for autonomy. Workers shoras
were dismantled and workers strikes and protests were attacked by the army
and the Islamic guards. When peasants in Torkman Sahra took over the land
they worked on and started co-operative agriculture the government sent the
troops, the response of the Left to these events was a disaster. As Khomeini
announced holy war against the Kurdish people in 1979, against the
peasants of Turkoman Sahra, against the Arabs in Khouzestan, the Tudeh
Party and Majority Fedaiin, (the majority of the Central committee of the
Fedaiin) supported the 'anti imperialist' government against revolution.
Various factions and parties of the National Front had played an important
role paving the way for a political take over by the clergy. These politicians
who represented the dissatisfied sections of the bourgeoisie survived the
witch hunts after the coup d'tat of 1953 and the overthrow of premier
Mossadegh. They were alarmed by the radicalisation of the workers
movement and were adamant to control this movement from the beginning.
Khomeini's first prime minister Bazargan, who came from this political
grouping summarised the political position of this group in his comment
regarding the events of Feb. 1979: we wanted rain we got floods. As the
clergy strengthened its position, the need for 'professional' politicians of the

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National front reduced and the latter lost their influence and eventually
their political posts. Bazargan was dismissed during the US embassy take
over, many of his ministers had lost power months before.
Bazargan was dismissed during the US embassy take over, many of his
ministers had lost power months before. The National Front remains the
semi legal opposition inside Iran, calling for liberalisation of the Islamic
regime .Its offices are often raided by Hizbollah, and despite repeated
attempts to register a candidate in a number of presidential or parliamentary
elections, its candidates are invariably disqualified for failing the religious
criteria set by the Council of Guardians.
When the staff at the American embassy were taken hostage, mainly to
divert attention from the advances of workers' shoras, Tudeh party and
Majority Fedaiin together with all the Maoists and Trotskyists groups who
considered the regime progressive for its anti US stance, fell in line and
called for unconditional support of 'Imam's line'. When the war with Iraq
broke out, all these groups called on workers to stop their strikes, to support
the 'anti-imperialist' government. In most cases a simplistic analysis of
equating anti us rhetoric with anti imperialism lead to serious political
mistakes. Centrists within most organisations of the left were soon forced
to choose between these two camps, by autumn 1980 they supported the
opposition to the regime, it took the Mojahedin another year to oppose the
government, however Tudeh Party, majority and sections of the 4th
International continued supporting the Islamic government well into 1983,
when they themselves were arrested .
The blood bath of 1981 marked the defeat of the revolutionary movement
By the mid 1980 as Iran made a mockery of the clerical claims to anti
imperialism and as the defeat in the war with Iraq was making the
government unpopular, the mass movement and the left had long been
defeated and in no position to benefit from the tide of anger and disillusion
with Islamic fundamentalism.
What was the main ideological basis of the polarisation and division of the
Iranian left into these two camps, pro and anti the government? Contrary to
the analysis sometimes spread by socialists abroad, including in Britain, the
division was not between Stalinists and anti-Stalinists, and was not centred

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The Islamic Republic & the Iranian Left

on the relation between anti-imperialism versus class straggle. Rather the

division was between those who championed the interests of the Soviet
Union and the Socialist camp and those who did not. Many of the problems
of the Iranian were not unrelated to a mistaken view of seeing anti US
rhetoric to be the same anti imperialism, to fall into the trap of thinking that
whatever the problems of the Soviet Union at the end of the day in the battle
between the Imperialist camp and the 'socialist' (be it degenerated worker
state or revisionist) camp, one had to side with the latter. All the various
groups of the Iranian Left who fell on the side of supporting Khomeini did
have illusions about the Soviet Union. Their belief that 'guerrilla activism'
separated and saved them from the 'passivity' of Tudeh was already
challenged in 1979, as many cadres saw their isolation from the working
class (itself a necessity caused by clandestine politics) as a major weakness.
By 1980 as it became internationally less of a stigma to support SU, many
in Fedaiin gradually moved towards a more pro Soviet position. By the
time the Central Committee of the organisation took a clear pro government
and pro Soviet position, some in the membership were ready for this
change, however the majority of the members and a minority in the central
committee formed Fedaiin Minority without a clear agenda or policies more
as an alliance of small groups who opposed the Islamic government and
were still critical of the Soviet Union to varying degrees. The split in the
Fedaiin marked the separation of what I have called 'revolution' and 'counter
revolution ' in Iran. Similar split occurred amongst Maoists and Trostkyist
tendencies both within the Fourth International and outside it.
Those who saw Iranian regime as an 'anti imperialist' war (anti US) sided
with it supporting almost uncritically every aspect of its repressive policies.
Its war with Iraq was an "anti imperialist" war and as in previous cases of
such wars they decided that 'strikes against a government fighting the US
are counter revolutionary that demonstrations against such a government
must be the work of CIA agents... Many have hence concluded that this
proves the limitations of anti imperialism , I would argue that quite the
contrary it shows the limitations of their understandings of anti imperialism,
some in the left including sections of the Trotskyist movement argued that
as the Iranian working class is backward a 'democratic' bourgeois revolution
is needed during which the proletariat is educated and organised!

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The radical Left in Iran always understood anti imperialism to mean anti
capitalism and pursuing the battle for socialism and democracy, in such a
definition there is no place for anti US rhetoric, no place for 'critical support'
of reactionary regimes. Whatever their mistakes, many in the Iranian left
stayed true to this principle.
Other mistakes are all too familiar, minority Fedaiin was a coalition of many
tendencies, inevitably as the repression increased, as the leadership was
forced into exile first in Kurdistan and later abroad, 5 major splits and many
smaller divisions decimated the organisation which was at the time of the
revolution one of the largest political groups of the left in the region. A
religious approach to Marxism lead to endless discussions on abstract
concepts irrelevant to the 1970s Iran. An obsession with debates
surrounding the Russian Revolution, disrespect for independent actions of
the working class, an illusion that the vanguard knows more than all others,
were all symptomatic of Minority Fedaiin and other political organisations
that did not fall into the trap of supporting the regime.
KHATAMI: IRAN'S GORBACHEV ?
In May 1997, a "moderate" cleric known for his tolerance of non Islamic
codes of behaviour was elected by two thirds of those who voted. His
election was more than anything else a rejection of fundamentalism as
personified by the candidate supported by Khamneii, the supreme clerical
leader, but it also marks the beginning of the end for Shia Fundamentalism
and the ideas of Khomeini. The clergy's hypocritical interference in peoples
lives that was overwhelmingly rejected in elections of 1997 and repeated in
local council elections in 1999 Women, victims of twenty years of sexual
apartheid, the youth, alienated from the religious establishment were the
main forces behind the election of a more 'moderate' Islamic president
Khatami in 1997.
However it is worth remembering that 4 out of 284 ISLAMIC candidates
were allowed to be nominated; the least fundamentalist of these candidates
was Khatami.

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FACTIONAL INFIGHTING
Khatami, who is often called Iran's Gorbachev, realises that old ideas and
methods will not work that in order to survive the Islamic regime has to
reform itself. For ten years between 1982 and 1992, he held ministerial
positions in the Islamic Republic including minister of culture. During
most of this period, which coincided with the consolidation of the new
regime, Khatami went along with repressive policies: books were
systematically censored and some book publishers had their licenses
revoked. By 1992, Khatami had come to the conclusion that in order to
remain in power, the Islamic state has to reform itself. However his limited
relaxation of the censorship laws worried the more fundamentalist faction
in the parliament, who considered Khatami to be too liberal and he was
forced out of the government.
The attempt by Iran's Shia clerics to create the first truly Islamic
government on earth is facing defeat. The majority of the Iranian population
(most of whom are under 25) have clearly rejected the concept of an Islamic
Republic and the rule of Shariah - The current factional fighting inside the
Iranian regime is the culmination of a debate between those who believe
that the survival of the current regime depends on liberalisation, tolerance of
secularism and those who believe that with repression and dictatorship Iran's
multinational population can be forced to accept the rule of Shia Islam. As
always the crisis in the government is a reflection of the crisis below where
poverty, unemployment, cynicism about the religious state have left the
regime with few supporters.
The dilemma for Iran's president, Khatami and his supporters is that the
tolerant, civil society they profess to defend has inevitably raised the issue
of separation of state and religion, questioning the 'Islamic' character of the
Iranian state. Poverty, cynicism about religious state and high birth rates
encouraged during the war with Iraq have all brought major socio-political
changes in Iranian society. Incompetence, rampant corruption of the postwar years, when under president Rafsanjani, clerics, technocrats and their
associates accumulated huge fortunes at the expense of the "dispossessed",
has left the gap between the rich and poor wider than ever before in Iran.

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Critique 32-33

Following defeat in the war with Iraq, the death of Khomeini, after
revelations surrounding Irangate and at a time when corruption amongst the
clerical rulers has reached unprecedented, levels, the Islamic revolution has
ran out of steam. The spread of mass media (satellite television/videos/
internet) have dramatically changed the lives and attitudes of the youth in
urban areas. Even those in government admit that the creation of a
monolithic Islamic /Shia state is not a realistic aim. Instead the concerns of
the Iranian people are the concerns of the peoples of most other developing
countries: economic crisis, low pay, rising gap between the rich and the
poor, repression. In addition the Iranian people are harassed daily by
particular forms of repression caused by the intervention of the religious
state in various aspects of their private lives, from the music they listen to,
to the clothes they wear.
The economic problems facing Iran are no different to those facing other
developing capitalist countries. As the Iranian Majles debates whether state
intervention to reduce poverty is acceptable or not the pro market faction of
the regime argues in terminology reminiscent of the middle ages, that such
intervention will delay the appearance of the Twelfth Shia Imam, who
disappeared in the 13th century and is supposed to rise from death when
poverty corruption engulfs the world. But irrespective of the ancient
language, the essence of the argument is all too familiar. Here new factions
within the two main factions will further complicate any future political
struggle.
The severe economic crisis and the sharp drop in the price of oil, economic
sanctions ... mean that many workers have not been paid for more than six
months, over 4000 small manufacturing plant are closing down. The
government admits to 800,000 unemployed school leavers. The rate of
inflation is 30-40% and unemployment is estimated as 20-30% - The
problem for the Iranian clergy is that the majority of the population
remember the idealist egalitarian slogans of 1979 and the war years, while
the leadership has moved on to become the new elite. Today 75 per cent of
the population is below 25, (following a policy of encoring birth during the
war with Iraq) the majority of this younger population is literate and
urbanised , yet high levels of unemployment, and a worsening economic
crisis has left little hope for this section of the population . As they join the

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protest movement their contribution to the radicalisation of the opposition

can be crucial.
In the 12 months between March 1999 and March 2000, the Solidarity
Campaign with Iranian Workers noted 124 protests against non-payment of
wages, 59 cases of protests against sackings, 8 protests for improved
working conditions. Of these 127 cases were protests in front of the factory
or government centres, there were 41 cases of strike, 21 cases of sit in and 9
marches and demonstrations, 49 cases of petitions and protest letters. With
this explanation that 74 of these took place outside the workplace or in front
of government offices and 31 cases of these protest took place in the
workplace. In at least 11 cases the protest was accompanied by a strike.
There were 7 cases of blocking the road and created road blocks by workers
all of which show the spread and their rise compared with previous years.
Beside these forms of struggle, there were cases of kidnapping the manager
and members of the board of management, ransacking of the offices of the
Industry and Agriculture building in Ahvaz by unemployed workers, one
case meeting with Parliamentary deputies, one case of taking control of the
factory and stopping any products leaving the workplace.
The above figures are more impressive if one considers that going on strike
is illegal in Iran, that workers protests are considered as waging war on god
and Islam and the minimum punishment for such protests is imprisonmentThe last three years have no doubt been the most eventful years since the
Feb uprising of 1979. The factional fighting inside the Iranian government
has allowed a more open expression of dissent. Some 30 daily papers were
published in Iran and although they all claimed to be Islamic, there is no
doubt that secular journalists are challenging Iran's censorship laws daily.
Papers are banned regularly yet the same writers, journalists reliant their
paper under a new name. Book publisher are enjoying more freedom, many
translations, many Persian books banned for two decades are getting
published and some 1000 women publishers have given women writers and
poets new opportunities. In fact Iranian women have been notably
successful in challenging every aspect of Islamic fundamentalism especially
its interference in the private lives of Iranians.
A burgeoning students movement started by supporting the 'reformist
faction' of the regime, however it has continuously been radicalised over the

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last few years. Today the student movement openly challenges the very
existence of the Islamic state. They have continuously demanded more
freedom, an open society, freedom for all political prisoners ...
Iran's intellectuals have paid heavily for the so called liberalisations, now
that death sentences can not be dished out as easily as before the regime is
using death squads to silence the opposition. Many writers and dissidents
have been killed by death squads over the last few years as the two factions
of the regime tried to blame each other as well as "foreign agents" for these
murdersMost of the Iranian left has had to rethink its past, however it is doubtful if
all the lessons have been learned. Unlike the rest of the opposition, large
sections of the Left who did not support the clergy and indeed bore the
brunt of its repression, still benefit from some credibility and a degree of
support. There is no doubt that the debate inside the Iranian left, is facing a
serious crisis and many believe that the only way out of the present crisis
in Iran lies in a complete break with traditional organisations and the
formation of new groupings of the left. As a major section of the Iranian
Left considered the Soviet Union and its satellites to be socialist and
mistakenly called them the Socialist Camp, a clarification of this issue is
important because in Iran it lead the supporters of such ideas to defend a
reactionary government simply on the basis of it anti American rhetoric.
The election of Khatami has once again started the debate on the issue of
supporting reformists within the Islamic regime on the agenda. Such
policies have always failed and will do so in the future, worst of all they
highlight the principle weakness of sections of the Iranian left in seeking
solution above and beyond the involvement of the working class.
Realignment with those who have not learnt from the bitter experiences of
the last 20 years will be foolish. However new alliances, both for practical
co-operation but also continued and constructive debate are being formed.
Workers left Unity is an example of such a new type of coalition.
For news of Iranian workers struggles please see:
http://www.etehadchap.com/worker

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