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21 ARMY GROUP

CLEARING OF
SCHELDT ESTU
OCT - NOV 1944

INCLUDING OPERATIONS:

SWITCHBACK
VITALITY I & II
INFATUATE I & II

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REPORT ON "CLEARITG OF TI~ SCEIDT ESTUARY"

The Undcer Secretary of State,

The War Office - MO 1 (Records) (For attention of Col. W.R.D. Robertson)
MT 16 (12 copies)
MT (L) (50 copies)
for Under Secretary of State, The Adcmirality
Under Secretary of State, The Air Ministry
The Supreme Allied c oCrmaander,
Mediterranean Theatre (3)
The Coriaander - in -- Chief, Home Forces (15)
The Commander - in - Chief, Middle East
The Commander - in - Chief, Allied Land Forces,
South-East Asia Comrand (3) *
Tho Sup .o CGrander,
South E at A4ca Gca-ocd. ():
His Exolloncy,
The CC:-rj or-in-Chicf, India (3)
The Australian Ay Roprcsentative,
Australia House-(3)
British Ar:; Staff, raashington (3)
S.. The Ca:r'a.ndants.,
T
SStaff ColloCG, Ca::.brlcy 2)
Staff Collocgo Hai-if- 2)
Stoaf CollcSo, Quotta 2
School of A tilloxr, Larkhhill
School of Sigal1s,
School of Infantry,
School of Military Engin ring
School of Air Support.
.IT tSA- for War Department, Washington.
9 .)
;i. me :Headquarters,
: ... llied Ecpeditionary Force (5) (Including Historical Section),
lhedl Naval Camander - in - Chief, Expeditionary Force,
Twe fth Ariyr Group , G-3 Div),
- 1ih
Ar y Group, (G-3 Div)
Leo a. Tactical Airforce, (4),
'ir#G Canadian Amy (16)
SeCcod Amy (4)
Co:andeer, Force "'T"
7'9. OAoure Division. (2)
52 (L) Division (2)
IHQ, 'L of C.

4 O ornando - Brigade.
Any hibian Training Centre,
l.arine Parade,
Towyn, Merionethshire,
Ma3o rT. Boon,
Offices of the War Cabinet,
Historical Section,
8, Barton Street, S.W.1.

Copies to:- HQ 21 Amy Group:

lMAto C-in-C
PA to C-of-S
G Plans)
G SD)
PA to MGA
 MEN%

Tr IO LEARPITC.OF THE SCN TiDT STUARY

Including Operations - SNIT CLIBiQK

VITAlLITIY I & .EI
INF1PATUATE I & II

I1 D ZX
Section,
PAZRT I INITRO]DUCTION 1.5
UII S ~ LI G OI.TE :OTT BL.ELND IST H US 6- 9
Hr III CII'ld-I1T Ti.J,1 SOUSJ2i B' K 0OP-
TIE scnii2LD.
ORTION S. T,-C-iBACi 10o-32
Ut IV CIL ,IlIKC OF SOUTHiIBIJZLAL]'D
OP RATIONS VI'TALIY. I & II 33 - 56
it V COEI; IT I0N OFO y iPR'1' ION $ i! CrIIBACK 57 - 62

TIIE ASSAlUU..OL t .{ i IT h.ll i\

" II
OP-."TIONS IN.'IAUA';T I & II 63 - 109

CONCLUS ION 110 - 111

't I I
0Oi;'wNTS ' ', POINTS O 'INIEPST 112 -123

POST SCWT

DIAGIii.M1 (7Tnra1 Zap of' the 0Oper tions.

t 22 ;Tap of assault across L OPOKi OARA.:

L.

ap
Fl3 of SOUTH BETE.,IAD. VITAiLITY I a~nd, II.

" Ipof ,LCLER1 N. IXFAT2-LkPE I and II.

Ii 5 1./lpof 1"LUSLGo

. PPENDIX 1 .v to over o;showring f1alood ing, of LAPN

2 Artiller y in Operation ';ITKIC .

14~ ~!jr
1r r s3 r 2 F
 ' 0CLP
iT .. - SoIfLD-S1 ' Y .*i

Ref Maps: 1/250,000, Sheets 2, :3, ..2. .nZd:

and attached Diagrams 1 - 5.

PART I

INT~RODU1.GIONT

1. AS a result of the Second British Army' s rap-id drive from the R

SEINE, iiEP,
Jh the second largest port in EUROPE, was captured intact on
4 September. Though enemy elements still remained in the Northern sub-
urbs of the city, the speed of our advance, and the activities of the
resistance movement, had prevented .any appreciable dndage being done to
the port installations."

ith one corps temporarily .grounded, for administrative reasons,

just NORTH of the SEIE, and leaving one division to hold iNT 'ERP, Second
British Army then swung EAST towards. the aLBERT CLNAL. At the same time,
First Canadian Army, dropping 1 British Corps to capture .I, HAV R, pressed
on to the.PAS DE CLAIS and the Channel ports.

2. The enemy decided to deny us the use of LE HAI

I and the Channel
Ports as long as possible, and accordingly reinforced their garrisons from
his retreating columns. Although the vigour of the Canadian advance en-
abled DIEPPE , and subsequently OSTEND, to be taken in their stride, a-series
of deliberate operations was necessary for the reduction of the remaining
ports, and this delay prevented the complete destruction of the retreating
enemy. There were approximately five German divisions who continued the
withdrawal in front of the Canadian Army's advance, which was led by the
POLISH Armoured Division on the RIGI., and 4 Canadian Armoured Division on
the LEFT. The.enemy's object was to get to the SGIELDT, across which lay
the only escape route left open, and to defend on the SOUTH side the area
of BPSSKENS - CADZA D - KKOCKE, whose long range batteries commanded the
estuary in conjunction with those on 1uLCIT:iEN and SOUTH BEVELA D.

3. During the second half of September, the First Canadian Army

closed up on the SCELDT. On the RIGLT, 2 Canadian Infantry Division
took over IdANTERP on 1u September. With the assistance of the DUTCH
resistance movement, the enemy was gradually evicted from the area be-
tween the port and .TERNEUZN' , while further EST he was driven to the
NORTH bank of the LiOPOID CikNAL over which he blew all the bridges. By
the end of the month, all the Channel Ports except DU\KIR had been cap-
tured, and the enemy was confined to the "island" formed by the SAVOJAARDS
PLrLT, the LEOPOLD C.JAL and the sea. Here he was contained by the 4
Canadian Armoured Division.

E~EIY DISPOSITIONS

4. At the beginning of October 1944 there were four main enemy

groups opposing our clearance of the country commanding the SC-ELDT
Estuary. Two of those were operating respectively in the areas between
BREDA and the AiT'tERP - TU.NHOUT Canal and between BERGIT OP ZOOM and
\TWTERP. IIOLLAND SOUTH of the SChI-LDT Estuary, was held by units of
.64 Infantry Division. This division contained a high proportion of
leave personnel from units fighting on the Russian Front who had been
drawn on to help form the Division as an emergency measure. These
z: |
je ., / a. experienced
.. *. ., i l '
'-Y '.aijj'J
 - 2 -

battle experienced troops were the backbone of the Division which

fought surprisingly well. SOUTH BEVELM2D and ,WALCIEREIN,. on the other
hand, were garrisoned by .troops of 70 Infantry Division in which had
been concentrated numbers of low category men suffering from various
internal disorders.

OUTLINE PLAN

5. The plan to clear the SCHELDT estuary may be divided into

three parts :-

First: To seal, off the isthmus leading to SOUTH BEVELIAD, and

to clear the BRESKENS "island".

.Second:. to clear SOUTHL BLVEL.D by an advance along the. isthmus,..

in conjunction with an assault across the estuary from
the SOUTH. .

Third: To clear Wi LChER by concentric assaults from the

EAST, SOUTH and SEST. This involved a second cross-
ing of the estuary, and a seaborne expedition from one
of the Channel ports. It was decided to neutralize
the fixed and heavy defences of WAiLC-HK by bombing
the sea dykes and flooding the: island.
 -3-

A..T..
PA II

SEALING-OFF SOU EIB EVELAND ITlMJS. .

6. This was .the task of 2 Canadian Infantry Division, with 10

Canadian Armoured Regime.nt under command, and had..roughly two phases.
In the first, (1 - 7.October), the Division advanced from the.-line ANTTERP-
TUPTHOUT Canal - IvIERXEM, to the WO \SDPECHT area. In the period 8 - 22
October; it .operated-in the TOIIMSD:RECTI area and the dyke-land to the
WEST, encountering considerable -resistance

"7. On 1 October, 4 Canadian Infantry Brigade on the LEFT,. crossed the

canal into LERJIM without opposition. In',lhe CENTRE, 6 Canadian Infantry
Brigade held the NORTH bank of the ,NT2-lP-TUR HBOUT Canal, while 5 Canadian
Infantry Brigade on the RIGHT, formed a firm base in BRECHT. Enemy res-
istance was spasmodic, while he gradually withdrew R in face. of. steady
probing all along the front. By the evening of 4 October, 6 Canadian
Infantry Brigade had captured CAPELLET, while 4 Brigade, having cleared
the .ERXEM - EECKEEP area, was within two miles.of PUTTE. The: next day,
5 Canadian Infantry Brigade concentrated at' BRASSCHAERT, while 6 Brigade
was endeavouring to clear the road WEST from BRECHT to CAPPiELLE in the
face of strong opposition. 4 Brigade made good progress and reached the
DUTCH frontier near PUTTE, with patrols approaching SATTVLIET.

5 Canadian Infantry Brigade now moved NORTH through 4 Brigade to

the WY\OSDRECHT area, and on 7 October, one squadron of 8 Canadian Recce
Regiment occupied .SMiTTVLIET.

8. Opposition now stiffened considerably as the division approached

the isthmus. Attacks were launched by 5 .Canadian Infantry Brigade from
HOOGER 1~IDE on 8/9 October, with KORTEVET as the final objective,, but
were unsuccessful, and a further attempt was made o 13 October against
enemy paratroops who were dug in behind railway embankments and dykes SW
of TOENfSDREGCT. This too was unsuccessful, but."heavy enemy counter-
attacks failed to make any headway.

Active patrolling and probing along the divisional front con-

tinued, and in the early hours of 16 'October, the RHLI, (4 Canadian
Infantry Brigade) captured iO NSD RECHT. They were repeatedly counter-
attacked during the day from the NORTH and NE, by infantry and tanks,
There was penetration at some points, but the position, generally was
held firm.

5 .Canadian Infantry Brigade came up on their iEFT and edged

forward to the railway and main road LEST of the village.

9. T he next day, 4 Canadian.Armoured Divisiotr, which had been

containing, the eneny on the IEOPOLE -C. TL while 3 Canadian Infantry
Division. cleared the BRESIuSITS "pocket", was relieved of its task, and
moved through ANTiERP to. come up on the RIGHT of 2 Canadian Infantry
Division. By 20 October, they were' exerting considerable pressure in
the, wooded -areas about ACivaP- E B.RASSCFL T, and by the ,afternoon of 21
October, elements of the Infantry Brigade cG-roup were in ACHTERBROEK.
pushing on with vigour, the 4 Canadian Armoured Brigade crossed the
DUTCH frontier near ESSCHT ion the evening of 23 October. This, com-
bined with the gradual crumbling of the opposition- in the WOENSDRECHT;
sector, opened the way for the operations designed to secure SOUTH
BEVEILZilD.
 -4-
P RT III

CLE2iRNG THE SOUTH BilK OF T-HE SCiELDT. O:.cration "SWITC ACK' .

10. The 3 Canadian Infantry Division was. given the task. of clearing
this area, .This Division hd been engaged in liquidating "BOULOGN\Ea nd
CAAI:S, while 4' Canadian Armoured Division contained the enemy on the
I:panal line between SAVOJAi
lDSPLidLaT and ZEEBRUGGE. Completing the mopping-
:up process at CALAIS 0bi 30 September, the .Division arrived in its concen-
tration area, SOUTH of MALDEGEM, on the evening of ..4 October, except for
9 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group vwhich was :detached to the Gi-HETT area.

11. ... All available sources indicated that the bulk of the enemy
Stroops holding the "island" consisted of 64 Infantry Divis'ion. -Little
was known of the artillery and coastal defence units, or, possible
improvised battle: groups, but it was estimated that the garrison con-.
sisted of about 7,000 men, apart from administrative personnel.

12. The area is. completely flat, with a network of minor canals
and ditches, and numerous areas which<arc permanently flooded. It is
criss-crossed by dykes which 'mostly carry roads or 'tracks . The .fields,
or "polders", arce open and afford little or no cover:: . Church towers and
buildings are .the only viewpoints.

(The "Geographic ivilitaire de la Belgique, Armee .Belge",.

describes the polder country as "gencralement impropre aux operations'
militaires," )

PLTN" (See Diagram 2)

15. Briefly 5 Canadian Infantry Division planned to carry out its

taslkin-four phases:-

Phase 1, A.At first light on D day (6 October), 7 Canadian Infantry

Brigade Group ras to' assault the LEOPOLD C~NAL from
approximately MOERSH-OOPD to the canal junction at
STROOIBURG-, and to establish.a bridgehead and clear the
area MOERSH-OOFD - VALEISIREEK - A~DENBURG - Mi'IDDELBURG
and back to the canal,

S Phase 2, 8 Canadian Infantry Brigade, on orders from the Division,

was to pass through the bridgehead and seize the crossings
at SLUIS, while 7 Canadian Infantry Brigade was to expand
4 and clear the area to the SLUIS - BRUGES Canal.
Phase 3. 9 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group was to assault across
SAVOJuiRDS PLiT on D + 2, establish a bridgehead in the
I-O.OFDPLAT - BIERVLIET area,, and clear up to BPESIKNS
inclusive. A t the, same' tin,. 7 Canadian Infantry Brigade
was to seize OOSTBURG and SCHOONDIJKE, nd' 8 Canadian
Infantry Brigade was to make good the crossings at
RETR 'NCI-JENT. The 7 Canadian Recce.Regiment was to clear
the SE area of the *"islaind"

Phase 4. 8 Canadian Infantry Brigade was to clear the INOCKE area.

ALRTILLER Y

14. CCRA 2 Canadian Corps co-ordinated all fire requirements and

controlled IF and CB tasks. Guns available were two Divisional
Artilleries and two AGRis viz 14 25-prs, 128 mediums, and 55 heavies
and super-heavies, a total of 327, all calibres.

.... /TrE ASSAULT

 -5-

'T:iE ASSAULT ACROSS TI LEOPOLD CNTAL

15, The plan for the establishment of the bridgehead envisaged an

assault by two battalions of 7 Canadian Infantry Brigade - 1 C Scot R on
the RIGH-T, and Regina Rif on the IT - at several points over the canal,
which was about 90 feet wide.

i'The enemy positions on the far side of the canal were known 'to
be dug in on the reverse side of the canal dyke. Owing to the difficulty'
of neutralising such positions with BE and SA fire, an exercise was carried-
out with 'ASPS on an exactly similar piece of ground, to see -whether flame
could be projected into the slit trenches. This trial showed that"if bthe
flame was aimed at the near edge of the dyke, just below the crown,a .
goodly portion of the fuel would riccochet and splash into the trenches.

16. All available WASPS were accordingly assembled to-support the

assault. Eleven were positioned behind the near bank at 60 yards interval
to flame the 1 C SCOT R front. Owing to the difficult apprpaches,.only:
six equipments could be got up to support the Regina Rif on the..LET.

At 0525, WASP firing began, and immeidiately it ceased-the attack-

ing companies clambered over the dyke and launched their assault boats.
The N Shore Regt, under command 7 Canadian Infantry Brigade provided ferry-
men, On the RIGHT, for 10 minutes after K hour, no fire was returned by
the enemy and both companies of I C SCOT R crossed, and Kapok bridges were
established without opposition. A known strong point was set on fire and
rendered innocuous, ahd 'soie hobuses thirty yards beyond. the canal were
ignited.

On the LTFT however, heavy fire was met as .the Regina Rif assault
boats' were launched. 'A' Company on the RIGH-T was unable to launch itself
at all, while 'B' Company on the L 'T managed -to get across, not without
some casualties, but suffered severely when it moved inland. 'WEST of
STROOIBURG-, the LEOPOLD and DERIVATION Canals converge and are separated
by a narrow island. MGi positions on the island enfiladed the crossing
places and caused heavy casualties, while mortaring steadily increased.

17. Nevertheless, the two battalions held on to the far bank and the
remaining companies of the Regina Rif crossed at 'B' Comapny's ferry on the
~F'T. By darkness, 1 C SCOT R held a small bridgehead in the vicinity of
MIORSDO'D and YUILP2 . Regina Rif bridgehead consisted of a single line..
of men along the canal side of the dyke, stretching from opposite G-R~
F JAi
to the main road. Repeated efforts were made to get depth by pushing
groups out to the front, but every movement drew intense, fire.

The enemy was st eadily reinforced and made repeated counter

attacks in spite of suffering heavy casualties. He hung on to his positions
along the canal dyke between the two batoalions, and still held out within
the Regina Rif sector, in two strong points on the canal bank.

18. On 7 October, the R TIG R were put in to close the. gap. They
crossed behind the RIGHT battalion and proceeded to move ,IEST to clear
OOSTHOEK, but this w-Ls no easy matter and the juncture was not made until
9 October. The enemy.showed no signs of slackening, and it was another
four days before it was possible to build-the -required bridges near
STROOIBURG. At the same time, he suffered severe losses, and it turned
out later that he had spent a considerable portion of his best troops in
the costly counter attacks against the bridgehead.

AUSS.ULT
IT: PLOSS SHOJAA DS iUT (For detailedaccount of this
operation see Immediate Report No. 63).

19. Meanwhile, '9 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group was preparing for.
its amphibious assault from TEII EUZEN. After brief training in the G-iENT

... /area, .its

 - -

area, its Assault Group, consisting of two batcaions and 'actical Brigade
Headquarters, moved off in the evening of 7 October, sailing in LVTs up
the GIT-TERZNEU T Canal. The 20-mile journey was uneventful, until
the damaged locks at TEN' UZE" were reached about 2200 hours. Here,
ramps had been constructed to enable the LVTs to make a detour on land to
by-pass the locks, but owing to the difficulty of ascending the ramp, each
LVT had to be towed out singly, and it was found impossible to mount the
assault at the appointed hour viz: a "touch-dov'n" on the island at 0130
hours. It was therefore decided to postpone the assault for 24 hours,
and the troops and LVTs were qickly dispersed to harbour before first
light, and out of observation from the enemy.

20. For the carrie of the Assault Group, the LVTs had been
organised in two flotillas. "A" Flotilla consisted of 46 LVTs carrying
the Nth NS HIGRS who were to land on the more Northerly beach "GREEN."
"B1" flotilla had 51 LVTs, of which 5 were for Tactical Brigade Headquarters,
and 46 for ijLI of C who were to land on "A~ 'ER" beach . Each infantry
battalion s allotment included four LVTs for carriers of the Commandin
Officer ahd three FOOs, three for ,ASPS, four for 6-pr guns and four for
Loyd towers, four for Company Commanders' carriers and four for Jeeps.

21. K hour.for the touch-down was put back to 0200 hours 9 October.
personnel re-embarked on the evening of 8 October, and at 0020 hours the
leading flotilla commenced to move into the outer harbour, and shortly
'afterards the convoy emerged into the SC-IDLDT. "A" Flotilla had a 5-
miles journey to their beach; "B". Flotilla had 4 miles to go to AMR.
The convoy was piloted by an Officer 'RN, and each flotilla was precede
by a motor boat equipped with a compass. A careful study was made of
air photographs and charts, and marker shells were fired on to the land-
ing beaches as a further aid to navigation.

Direction keeping was good and both flotillas touched down at

0210 hours, i.e. about .10 minutes late...

22. Opposition was almost.negligible and surprise was complete.

After daylight, the FLUSKING batteries and guns from BIERVLIET opened
on ,the beaches and the sea approaches, and delayed the vehicles already
ashore in getting up to their units, but by 0830 hours both battalions
had all their o6mpanies in position on their initial objectives.

rBy 0500 hours, most of the LVTs had turned round to return for
the Follow-up Group, and this started to arrive on the beaches'about 0915
hours. During the morning the third, battalion, SD & G Highrs, disem-
barked and completed its arrangements to attack HOOFDPLA T.

Enemy reaction steadily .stiffened during the day, and the

FLUSHINTG guns were a constant nuisance, in spite of a smoke screen in
the SCHI7LD, laid by the Pioneer Smoke Company, from TRNEUZEN to the
RIGHTT flank of the brigade. The bridgehead, however, was firm. By
1630 hours, SD & G Highrs had two companies in HOOFDPLIuT, and the Nth
NS Kighrs in the C\Ti E .made some progress towards DRIE
'DGE. The
I-I of C, on the L;.'T, supported by the fMG Company and- two platoons of
4.2 inch mortars who arived in the Follow-up Group, held their posi-
tions against a number of counter attacks which developed from the
BIERVLIET area.

On 10 October, the village and harbour of IHOODP AT were

captured and Nth NS Highrs were in DRIEtEGEN. In the first twenty-
four hours the Brigade took 265 . ..

As soon as the Follow-up Group had been ferried across, the

LVTs were re-organised into their orwn squadrons, and each squadron
produced 15 craft at the loadiin point every fourihours by day, and
once by night. . - .
... /TERRAPI S for
 -7-

TERRAPITS for the carriage of ammunition and stores, were brought

into use on the evening of 10 October.

23. In view" of the situation -on the LEOPOLD CAINAL, it was decided to
put 8 Canadian Infantry Brigade and the Recce Regiment, through the
SAVOJAARDS PIAT bridgehead. Their task was to push SW, and at the same-
time, to open a route from the SOUTH in the ISABELLA area, in conjunction
with the 4 Canadian Armoured Division. Until a land route was opened,
the progress of 9 Canadian Infantry Brigade' would be limited, as it would
soon be beyond effective support of its artillery, still FAST of
SAVOJA~ DS PLAAT.

24. The 7 Canadian Recce Reginent was ferried across on 11 October.

Operating as Infantry, it relieved HLI of C, who then attacked and cap-
tured BIERVLIET. The enemy hung on tenaciously to his positions along
the dykes, and in both bridgeheads our forward troops compared the fighting
with the heaviest of the campaign. In'addition to the fixed defences of
TALCHERIN, BRESITS and CAiDZAD, he had a good supply of .20 mm guns which
he used as Mis, and a profusion of light automatics;' These latter, dug.
in on both sides of the dykes, complotely commanded the open fields and
polders, and it was found that each post had to be dealt with individually
by moving along the top of the dyke. . Much use was made of WASP flame-
throwers, Where the ground made it possible, they moved along the dyke..
berm, and flamed the bank in a "herring bone" pattern, while the .infantry
advanced along the top,

25. With the arrival'of 8 Canadian Infantry Brigade, the area was
extended SOUTH and S'. On the evening of 14 October, this brigade joined
up with a battalion of 4 Canadian Armoured Division, who had come up from
the SOUTH after some fierce fighting among floods, mines and booby-traps.

The land route through ISABELLA was now open.

LEOPOLD CAL BRIDCG rr

ED

26. During this time, 4 Canadian Armoured Division had done more than
merely picquet the canal line, and in addition to opening the. land route at
its Eastern end, had undertaken various diversions along its length. But
it was urgently required elsewhere, and on 17 October, 6 HLI and the Recce
Regiment of 52 (L) Division, took over, enabling the Armoured Division to
leave the area,

27. The remainder of 157 Infantry Brigade now arrived, and on 19

October relieved 7 Canadian Infantry Brigade which was withdrawn from the
bridgehead, preparatory to joining the other two brigades of the division.

RPROGRESS
PURTRL CROSS TE] "ISLND, "t

28~ Continued pressure from the EAST caused the enemy to make a
general withdrawal. IJZM\DIJI was captured on 17 October, and on 19
October, the two bridgeheads linked up when 7 Canadian Recce Regiment made
contact with 157 Infantry Brigade near ST KRUIS.

The enemy retired to the general line BPRESI S a- SCHOONDIJ -

OOSTBJURG - SLUIS, and this enabled 157 Infantry Brigade to occupy
AARDE4NBURG without opposition.

29. On 21 October, 7 Canadian Infantry Brigade returned to the battle,

this time in 9 Canadian Infantry rigade' s area, with the ultimate object
of relieving that formation. On the same day, the SD & G HIG-RS attacked
BRESKH\TS, and completed its capture 24 hours later.

3SCHD0IIJI\ was taken on 23 October, and patrols were in the old

FORT FRDiRICK LElTRIK, but they were forced to withdraw and it was not

... /finally cleared

 - -

finally cleared until 25 'dctober when the1ih NS HIG-GRS made it firm in.
our hands.,

iae .
9 Carnadian Infa ntry Bs; as noas withdrawn, in order to
puzzle the enemiy as to its future employment, and 7 Canadian Infantry
Brigade pushed through to;vards. GROEDE.

30 .BBC,
A bout this tine, the announced that the 'danadians had..
withdrawn from BES1E S, To.our troops Who were sitting there, this
seemed strange though NT iunprecedented, but t he German Commander, who*
also heard it, later admitted that he thought this was another example
of Canadian cunning.

31. On 24 October, 157 InfantryBriade reverted to command of 52

(L) Division for employment elsewhere, and turned over its area of res-
ponsibility to 52 Recc egiment which remained under command 3 Canadian
Infantry Division. The Recce Regiment was in -urn relieved by 3
Canadian Anti'tani Regim.ent,.

32.- The"line now held by 3 Canadian Infantry Division ran from

PORT PRsDiRICr
atERIK - G 0'KE - OOSTBTURG to DRAAIURG, all inclusive,
and it is now inecessary to consider the operations which were develop-
ing for the clearance of SOUTH BL I1EAND.
 -9-

P.A-R. T IV

TrE CLE 2-TG OF SOU~Ti.- BEELD - OPERATIONS VITAILITY Iand VITALITY II

PLANING

33. The intended method of clearing SOUTH BEVEL D was briefly as

follows. While 4 Canadian Armoured Division attacked in the direction of
BERGEN-OP-ZOOM1, with the object of securing the front and RIGiT-'flank of 2
Canadian Infantry Division, the latter formation would clear the peninsula
and secure the causeway leading to WALC:RN island. 4 Canadian Infantry
Brigade was to have the primary task of advancing TVZST along the isthmus to
seize a bridgehead over the BEV ,NDL CAtAL. 5 Canadian Infantry Brigade
was to carry out an amphibious assault from the SOUT:k of the SCHELDT, and
the twvo brigades were to.link up in the area of GRATVn POLDER. Alternatively,
5 Canadian Infantry Brigade was to'be prepared to follow 4 Canadian Infantry
Brigade Westwards along the isthmus.' 6 Canadian Infantry Brigade was to
contain the enemyi NORTH and'EAST' of WOENSD CH T, and was to be prepared to
pass through i4 Canadian Infantry Brigade beyond the line of the BEVELI]D
CANAL.

ASSAULT ALOING TKF IST ,1

US. VITALITY I.

34. It is difficult to:imagine a more unsuitable piece of country in

which to fight a battle. The greater part Of it is reclaimed land, held
in position by dyke. , Movement is restricted to the one main road, and
the minor approach roads along the dykes SOUTH of t'he main road. Large
areas had been flooded, particularly just EAST of the BVEIu ND CNriL, while
the remainder was saturated ground.
The enemy strength on SOUTH BlVELAND was problematical. '
reports stated that reinforcements had recently arrived on the peninsula,
but indications generally-were that about 3000 troops might be encountered.

35. Owing to the. stiff fighting which had taken place around
WOETNSDRECE , and the enemy' s continued threats from BERGEN-OP-ZOOM, 156
Infantry Brigade was given the task Of making the assault from across the
SCHELDT. While 4 Canadian Infantry Brigade was bein concentrated,
preparatory to leading the way across the isthmus, on 23 October 6 Canadian
Infantry Brigade started an advance NORTH towards' KORTEVEN. At the same
time, 5 Canadian Infantry Brigade attacked N!y of W0~CSDRECHT to clear the
area NORTH of the railway line. Both brigades had limited success, but
the hold on the area was strengthened and 4 Canadian Infantry Brigade
was able to s tart its advance at.0430 hours on 24 October.

36. SOUTH of the main road, R Regt of C made good progress in face of
moderate opposition, but on the main road and NORTH of it, the ESSEX
SCOTTISH encountered stiff resistance from heavy gun and anti-tank fire,
and were further delayed, by the wholesale cratering of the road,

37. By the following day, 4 Canadian Infantry Brigade had reached a

line 'running NORTH and SOUTH through RILL[NAD, with elements of the recce
regiment about a mile further Vi ST, and. 6 Canadian Infantry Brigade began
to pass through them. On the 26th, the latter brigade reached
KRIiBBfNIJZ. and was nearing WA 'lDE.
The advance continued against light opposition, but was con-
siderably hanrpered by inundations, mines and craters; one crater on the
main road bein 70 feet in diameter. On the 27 October, 6 Canadian
Infantry Brigade reached the canal, to find the road and railway bridges
blown. During the night, the SSR crossed the canal just SOUTH0 of VLJ ,
and the FUS MR crossed 'TEST of RUI\NGEI. By noon the following day,
a 'Class 9 bridge was open near VLAKE,
The BE.ELTD CANAL was 300 feet wide, and the bridging of it
was a major operation for the Engineers.
S../At the same
 -10 -

At the same time, the 4 Canadian Armoured'Division had secured

B RGT-OP-ZOOM, and 3 Canadian Infantry Brigade was moved Y'WST to join
in the drive beyond the canal.

38. i n the advance along the isthmius, many of the difficult .

positions were captured by successful night attacks following long
advances carried out in darkness, and the main highway was avoided as.
much as possible.

39. 10 Canadian Armoured Regiment naturally .did:not find the

marshy dyke-land of the peninsula g.od tank country and some variatidns.
from normal method of deployment were necessary. On nearly all
occasions, the .inantry were supporte d by. a troop or squadron of tanks,
the most comipmon arrangement beino one troop to a battalion.

On 24 October, an in'antry company' was supported by one troop

of tanks and one troop. of 8 Canadian tecce Regiment, .the tanks and recce
cars being deployed in advance of the infantry.. After one 75 nm gun
had knocked out three recce cars and three tanks, it was decided that
this -type of formation was inadvisable. In later engagements the .
infditry pushed ahead with the tanks behind them, and hen armoured
support was required, the tanks were generally deployed on the flanks,
to greater advantage and with fewer casualties. On occasions, the tanks
were used with considerable effect from "hull-down" positions behind
dykes in which the infantry had previously 'lown holes for them with
grenades. Further support wa.s given by indirect shoots, using bursts
of .delayed action E,, .and directed by a 00.

Thus, in spite, of the unsuitable terrain, these small

"packets' .of taenks were able to give valuable support to the Division,
both on the isthmus and later in SOUILh B7EVELANID.
 - 11 -

ASSUILT ACROSS S3EIL

4DT STURY VITALITY II Diagram 3

_eI NTNflNG

40. This operation entailed the placing of 15:6 Infantry Brigade Group
ashore on SOUTH BrEVEL A . from concentration areas in and near TERZIUZET,
and, subsequent to the initial assault, landing the .necessary build-up and
maintenance until such time as this could be brought by road along-the
SOUTH BEVJEL\1D isthmus.
Combined planning between 5 Canadian infantry Brigade and 1
Assault Brigade RP commenced on 21 October, 156 :Inantry Brigade.also
held a watching brief, and when it was decided on 22 October that they
should make the assault, they were already in the picutre.

&fEEIT ION

41 156 Brigade Group was to establish a bridgehead on the general

line inclusive HOEDENSKERKE - M{OL:E0ERG - dyke junction marked "i'"1 on
diagram 3, on the night 24/25 October, with a view to a further advance NiW
as quickly as possible.
Owing to the delay imposed on the advance of 2 Canadian Infantry
Division along the isthmus, orders were issued on the evening of 24 October
for the operation to be postponed 24 hours.

CRIFT AVAILAiBLL

42. 176 LVTs were used for the initial assault and follow up, 80
under command 5 Assault Regiment RE, and 96 under command 11 R Tks. In
addition, 25 LOAs were available and 27 .TEBRRAiiI'TS were used in the build
up and maintenance programme.
One squadron of STAFI0F'S YLO, under conrmiand 1 Assault Brigade RE
was in support of 156 Infantry Brigade.

ALLOCATION
LVT2. LVT 4 LCA
Assault (4/5 Ral Group 19 55 2 Initial load
6 .CirtONIi~N Group 20 .39 2 " "
156 Infantry Brigade
S'R' Group 1 3 - . "

Follow- (7 CiERONTIANS Group 4 33 17 ." "

up (STAi YEO 2 4 " "

43. The initial-assault was to be launched from TEBRTBIZEI as this had

covered approaches and.a clearer channel across the estuary. The build-up
gioup was to concentrate in the IHLST. area, whence it would be called
forward as required to the build-up loading areas. These were in the
OSSE'iISSE peninsula; the LCAs and TiRRAPINS were to use a small, harbour in
the .corner; a passage for the LVTss .vas to be cut through the sea dyke
in the 1 .corner.

44. Craft and assaulting troops began to assemble at T RNEUZBN on

the evening of 23 October. The LCAs came by train from OSTMD to GFIT,
and thence up the canal. io get them through the damaged locks, it was
necessary to dam 'the canal at TERlITEZN. Loadingowas completed. after
dark on 25 October.

INITIAL OBJECTrld:S
I:TD
STAS Or ABSAULT CGOUP
t .. GE
.assault CI beach and
45. RIGHI -4/5.lSIP Group. lotilla
.. capture .A, C, and D.

L" - 6 C.vLRONL2'1 Group. 'B' Fflotilla - To assault iMBER beach

:
.... and capture E, P and G-.

... /If opposition

 -12 -

If opposition was light, ./5 RS were to capture EL0LJ ]Si E ,. and 6

CAMjERONIANS were to push on due PtST.

SOLlOW-UP GROUP

46. This formed '0F lotilla and would land as ordered by the Brigade
Commander. Its probable task would be to concentrate NORTH and W of
dRL'iD, with a view :-
'BT

(i) To seizing certain'localities between HODEKMNSK

S l; and
GRAV ,LPODER.
or

(ii) To advancing iW.,

TEi, ?ASSAG

47. H hour, the time of touch down was.fixed for.0445 hours, 2.

October. At 0245 hours, 'A' and 'B' flotillas set 'ff. Each had with
it two LCAs, one to act, s guide, and one as whipper-in.

The distance to the beaches was between 3 and. miles As an

aid to navigation, two red leading lights, operated by a generating set,
were lit on the SOUTH bank, immediately SOUTH of .AMBERbeach as the lead-.
ing craft passed. BOFORS tracer were fired from the OSSTTISSE peninsula
to just NORTH of GEi l beach to prevent craft going too far NORTH, and
marker shells were fired on to the beaches. at intervals from H - 10
onwards,

The two flotillas touched down at 0450 hours, 5 minutes late.

There vas no resistance on ABR, but GREE beadh was shelled and there
were some casualties to craft.

PROGRESS O TM ASSAULT

40G. 4/5 RSF soon had one company in locality (A) and another in
BAKiDORP, and were approaching BA'iRLt2D, while 6 CiMRONIJANS made good
progress towards (F). At 0635 hours, the two battalions were in
contact.

The follow-up group, 'C' Flotilla, was now landed on iAMBB'

beach and 7 C1AlRONIANS moved inland about 1000 yards. The s quadron
~
ST;PS iYO arrived about the sace time, but was unable to proceed in-
land. Some were bogged down on the mud flats, others were unable to
.cross the dyke. An attempt was made to use a ramp which was being.
constructed at the dyke, but this was stopped by the Brigade Commander
as it became cut up, and priority was given to infantry vehicles. The
Squadron then gave fire support from their positions on the beach.

49, During the day, the bridgehead was expanded, in spite of a

strong counterattack from the NORTH which made a temporary penetration..
OUDEL~tDE was captured by 6 OI'avIONITS. and by the end of the day, the
bridgehead was on the general li of lo4ita A Di, an t'. 7
CAI;ION were in reserye an patrollirg the road from BAmfldi to
OUDEDE.

The enemy indulged in spasmodic rifle and MG fire during the

night and there,was some infiltration, but the bridgehead was firmly in
our hands.

50. On 27 October, t he brigehead was extended by 7 CAVRONINS

who made progress beyond OUDEIEDE. 4/5 RSF pushed forward towards
MOLE RG but were again counterattacked. 5, LI, of 157 Infantry.
Brigade, had been ordered to join 156 infantry Brigade and in the early
hours of 28 October were ferried across, followed later in the day by
1 GLAS H. . '
... /L56 Infantry
 - 13 -

156 Infantry Brigade pushed on towards the line MO~BERG -

ELLENOUTSDIJK and 7 CAERONIATS captured .the latter place. 5 IU-1 attacked
MOL;ERG but opposition was stiff and it was not until late that night.
that it was in their hands,.

51. On 29 October, progress was general on the front of 2 Canadian

Infantry Division and.52 (L) Division. -To. the NORTH 4 and 5 Canadian
Infantry Brigades had passed through 6 Canadian Infantry Brigade and
crossed the BEi'VE I 0I.L. 5 Canadian Infantry Brigade moned and
liberated' GOES, while 4 Canadian Infantry Brigade Worked SOUTH of the
main road and linked up with 156 Infantry Brigade in the GRAVERPOLDER
area..

While 156 Infantry Brigade held a firmibas'e in the bridgehead

and expanded to lin up witti the Canadians, the battalions of 157 Infantry
Brigade advanced on the general line OUDELMNDE - DRIEfEG'N - S'IEEENHOEK.
By midday, 52 (L) Division had taken over: 600 prisoners since-the landing.

Two Field Regiments of t.he division now arrived'ihn SOUTH B.iVEL ND

by the land route, via MTTERP and a third was ,on its way.

52. On 50 October, 2 Canadian Infantry, Division pushed on towards

the causeway, until held up at the EA'ST end by determined oo'positionn and
mines. With 157 Infantry Brigade leading, directed on the causeway, 52
(L) Division expanded ;\. and held the area SOUTH of the general line
HOEDDN SKERE S'LHEER OEK,

The next day, 4 Canadian Infantry Brigade cleared the EAST end
of the causeway, and 5 Canadian Infantry Brigade, who passed through them,
had their leading elements within 100 yards of the' far end where they were
pinned by heavy mortar fire and a profusion of ?MGIsited in the WULCT~iE T
dykes.

COivUIvM 'TND

53. It was decided that GOC 52 (L) Division should command the
impending ALClEREN operations. Accordingly, he directed C 1 52 (L)
Division to assume general direction of the two infantry brigades and the
divisional artillery operating in SOUTE BEELA D. The task of the force -
to be known as "B NORCE" - was to take over from 2 Canadian Infantry
Division and to be prepared, subsequently, to clear the Eastern portion of
i-ALCi~2RN and to advance, firstly on FLUSHING and secondly, or alternatively,
on MIDDELBURT.

CONCLUSION OF VITALITY I ND II

54. Meanwhile, the Northern portion of SOUTH B EL ND had been

cleared by 8 Canadian Recce Regiment, and it was clear that all resistance
on the peninsula had now ceased.

,As they considered the clearance of NORTH BV'LANID .was necessary

for the .safety of the peninsula, a Squadron of 8 Canadian Recce Regiment
crossed over by means of some barges found near KORP GENE. They established
a firm base around their bridgehead, and patrols sent out in all directions
collected some 600 PF on the island.
AI1NTMIMANC OF TH BRIDGEI-D ON SOUT
i B .L D

55. The build-up programme from the OSSETISSE peninsula had been
continued during 26, 27 and the morning of 28 October. A'tno stage were
the operations suspended, although fog on the night 26/27 October reduced
visibility to 50 yards and a number of craft lost their bearings and were
unable to land. Attempts were made to ship a searchlight to be sited on
JAMI beach, but as it weighed 10 tons this was found impossible. Re-
course was then made to the firing of tracer in short bursts during the

.. night to
 - 1 4.-

night to direct craft to iMEiR.

Heavy rain on. 27ctober, ahd: durin the night, made the :: Tand
OUT ramps practically .impassable, short of towing .each LVT separately
through the mud with a bulldozer. It. was therefore decided to transfer
the LVTs to TMERUZ i where conditions were better.

..After the morin g of 30 October, LIT's were no longer required

as the land route into I'OUITH BEDILOD was then opened up..,

On 27 October, the 80 LVTs of 5 Assault Regiment, RE and 17 of

i
11 R Tks were w:ithdrawn to participate in the operations against
IALCO-iRE, but nevertheless, some 700 loads were carried by LVTs to
SOUTH B EL . .I..ND

56. Prom the morning of 26 October, the LCAs and TEiR2PTMS had
successfully carried, out "a stores maintenance programme£from the small
harbour near OSSTEISSE. Conditions of tide prevented more than one
turn round being made each day, and .appreciable .delay was caused by the
difficulty of getting TE APINS and other vehicles-ff the beach and on
to the roads on the far side.

About 20 miles of tracing tape and 300 marking lamps were used
in marking the routes and marshalling areas. . LVTs .and TERAPINS used
27,000 gallons of. petrol during the operation,.
 - 15 -

PAR T V

CO0IVPLETION O PEP TIONISWITOiiBACK"

57. Before considering the assaults on ALCI-iIE , it is necessary to

revert to the operations still continuing for the elimination of the enemy
in "the BRI;ESiS pocket."

On 24 October, 7 and 8 Canadian Infantry Brigades were roughly

on the line GROEDE - OOSTBURG - DP
RIBURG, with 9 Canadian Infantry Brigade
in reserve, aid 3 Canadian Anti-tank Regiment SE of. SLUIS.

58. The next objectives for 7 and 8 Canadian Infantry Brigades,

respectively, were CiDZiAD and ZUIDZANDE. The enemy's resistance was
now breaking and he gradually withdrew to the -DERIVATION CjANAL which
passes close to RETPJITCI-~i T. CADZMaD and ZUIDZ ADE were occupied
without opposition and both brigades were quickly directed on RETRNTC~M TT
where a crossing was to be secured. The intention was then to break into
the INOCi area with 9 Canadian Infantry Brigade who were still in reserve.

59. While REGIUA RI 1 of 7 Canadian Infantry Brigade encountered

stubborn resistance as they moved down the coast above CADZAND, the
DERIVATIOIN was reached on a broad. front.

During the night 30/31 October, tmo battalions of 9 Canadian

Infantry Brigade crossed the canal near :RETRXNCHfIENT 'in the face of light
opposition. By the following evening they were close to KNOCKE. Mean-
while, some four hours after the infantry got across, the Engineers had
started to put up a bridge. Despite fairly heavy mortar fire, this was
completed before first light 1 November.

60. Early in the morning of 1 November, another bridge was completed

near SLUIS and at 0645 hours, N S-HOI~ R (8 Canadian Infantry Brigade),
launched an attac against the town which was quickly taken. Later in
the day, another battalion passed through them and advanced on WESTIhPELIE
using WEASELS across the inundated country.

ESTIPELLE was captured the following day, and the battalion

(QOR of C) accepted the surrender of the garrison as far WEST as the
LEOPOLD CANAL. In the meantime, 9 Canadian Infantry Brigade had occupied
KNOCKG and by nightfall had pushed through i2YST to the canal line.

61. During these operations on i and 2 November, a very creditable

piece of work was carried out by 3 Canadian Anti-tank Regiment who were
given an infantr;.y role. Under command of 8 Canadian Infantry Brigade, and
in conjunction with the advance on SLUIS and.:STI'LT.L, the Regiment was
given the task of crossing the SLUIS - BRU-GES Canal, capturing the village
1
of OOSTIKE , and cleaning up the area between WEST PELIE and the
LEOPOLD Canal.

In spite of their limited acquaintance with the principles of

infantr-y fire and movement, the Regiment set about its task with enthusiasm.
Supported by some of their own M 104, who at times were shooting at-
practically point blank range, they carried out their task, not without
some opposition, and killed a large number of enemy, capturing 350 P .

62. It now only remained to mop-up the strip between ZEEBRUGGE and
the LEOPOLD CIANAL. This was done- by 7 Canadian Recce Regiment, and
operation "SWIT LxB1CK" was concluded at 0930 hours, 3 November, having
yielded 12,500 prisoners.
 - 16 -

PART. VI
1
D ASS5 1j QN
OULl
TIEE ISLAND01-IOAl 1TLCKEIT 01.x lh«-TUU TE I ANID'In

P ;NING .

63 . Planning at HQ First Canadian Army started early in September,

On 21 September, the Cormmander of the Naval Force ("T") arrived, and his
own HQ was set up on 1 October, at BRUGS, :'in contact ith HQ 4 SS Brigade
who were the troops detailed for the main sea-borne assault.

84 Group REi directed the .close support air operations.

Liaison with Bomber Command was made through First Canadian Army and 84
Group.

While the operati6nfwas under the general direction of First

Canadian irmy,.. it Was %o b'e: carried out under .the -orders of 2 Canadian
Corps who came into the detailed planning on the institution 6f the
combined THQ at BRUGES.

64. Two sea-borne assaults were to be male on the island, c :he

same day. ,.

INF TUATE I - An attack on FLUSHIIIG by No. 4 Cormando, proceeding

direct from BRESKEiS in LCA.,

II"f TUTE II - An attack. on the ies tern side of the island, near
STIKPIiELLE , by Noso, 41, 47 and' 48 Commandos of 4
.v SS Brigade., and No. 1 0 ( .A.) Conmmando.

155 Infantry Brigade wa;s to be held in reserve at BRESINS.

If the initial assault at FLUJSHNG proved successful the Brigade would
immediately:follow through. If the initial assault failed, 155 Infantry,
Brigade wsas to move overland to OSTEND, and was then to be landed at
SSTiAI LLE and pass through 4 SS Brigade.

In conjunction with the sea-borne landigs an assault was to

be made from- SOUTH BNUVELATD.

TARGET DA:TE AND H HOUR

65. From the Naval point of view, it was essential to land at

WSTKIPEZ.E as soon after l w water as possible., As: far as the
ground troops were concerned, "about 5 hours daylight was the mininmum.
required to secure the D day objectives, and therefore a landing was
not acceptable later than 1300 hours.

To allow time for a rehearsal, 12 November was. the date

originally selected,; Owing to the urgency of commencing sweeping
operations, the success of the flooding, anticipated heavy bomber pro-
gramme, and the fact that the troops detailed were well acquainted with
the technique of combined operations, a decision was taken on 25 October.
to go without a rehearsal. The assault was to be made on 1 November,
the first occasion on which the tides served.

H hour was accordingly fixed for 094, hours.

PELIMITM.OP i:
IONS. . :.

66. In addition to the operations ,previously described, the follow-

ing were to be carried out before the attach ~tas launched: -,

..(a)/Bombing of
 - .17 -

(a) Bombing of the ESTKPELLE and other dykes, to flood the island.
By flooding the island it was considered that many of the defences
Swould be submerged, and that the .garrison would be driven out or
appreciably restrictedin, its movements. If, at the.same time,
a large enough gap could be made in a sea dyke, it wvould enable
the defences to be taken in the rear by waterborne forces.

(b) Systematic:softening of the remaining defences by bombing and

straffig, and by artillery deployed on the SOUTH bank of the
SCELDT,

(c) Special recces of beaches, etc, by "TARBRUSH" parties.

DESCIMION OF THE DiENC S

67. The defences were sited primarily to prevent a seaborne landing

from the TEST and to cover the entrance to the WEST SCiHEDT. The EST and
SOUTH sides of the island were protected by underwater obstacles, wire and
infantry positions on the' dykes and dunes, with gun batteries in support
behind. FLUSHING had a perimeter defence system, including two anti-tank
ditches. The strong points on the SW coast, as far NORTH as W.STKALLE,
were fairly heavily fortified, though less heavily than those at FLUSHING.
It was reported that the beaches' and dunes, and their exits, were thoroughly
mined. Allowing for the losses in SOUTH BIVLAND, the strength of the.
garrison was estimated at about 6000, mostly from 70 Infantry Division.

BOMBINGOF TI-E D ES ND FLOODING.

68. During the first week.in October, the dykes were breached by
Bomber Command at four points. . . .

NE , .I of VE
SOUTH - Both EAST and TEST of FLUSHING
EST' . - SOUTH end of the dEST1 EL DLIK .,

The breaches were improved by further attacks later in the month.

69. This was a brilliant example of precision. bombing. The width of

breach required by Canadian Army in the 'WSTI~LLE dyke was 300 yards:; in
fact, a breach of .380 yards was made. At its base, this dyke is 330 feet
wide; its average height above high water level was 16 feet, and above
low water level, 29 feet. Considerable doubt was expressed as to whether
such a work could be breached.

70. Complete small scale, photo cover of WALCiSPLI on 21 October,

(Appendix 1), indicates .the extent to which floodwater had invaded the
island. The only dry area of any. size is seen on the EAST side, .On
the NORTH, WEST and SOUTH only the dunes and dykes remain above water -
MIDDELBURG and FLUSING- are surrounded,

On 28 October air photograph interpretation showed that out of

an original total of 25 active batteries, flooding and bombing had accounted
for all but 11 active batteries, and 4 others, probably unserviceable.
i
--. . , . . . ".- \ ' -
SOFTEM\TING-UP PRO ESS

71 Between 11 and 31 October, Bomber Command flew 91 sorties and

dropped 4871 tons of bombs. This was in addition to the effort against
the dykes.

Between 28 and 31 October, 654 Spitfire sorties'and 150 Typhoon

sorties were flown, against pre-selected targets, gun positions, dual-
purpose AA guns and radar sites.

.ART .
.. /i liRUnvSH
 - 18 -

TAR2BRUSI~ PiRTIES'

72. Some nights previous to the LST'KAP LL .assault.special reoce

parties inspected the beach area. It waS confirmed that 'the gap seemed -
negotiable, and it was noticed that the enemy in its vicinity were very
alert and had positioned four searchlights, to cover, it,

73. This was variable, with conditions worst between November and.
and February. Widespread land fog, which forms at night and clears by
day, is common in winter, when the NW beaches are subject to a heavy swell
and strong waves.

Conditions are such that the most optimistic reports estimated

one day in three as being suitable for troops to land at .ESTKi LITLUfrom
LCls. For this reason use of LCAs.was abandoned and it was decided to
split the assault between the LCI(S) and amphibians launched from LCTs
who would touch down shortly after the LCI(S).

FINAL DECISION .

74. It was decided on 26 October that:-.

IdITI iTE I I
JA42- would be mounted on 1 November, weather permitting,
regardless of'flying conditions, and regardless of
whether INATUATE II sras launched that day or not.

1\LPAiJAT~1E II would be mounted on 1 November, weather permitting,

and regardless of whether air support would be available.

PI:N POR T hA' ONN FLUSHIITG- (See Diagrams 4 - 5.),,.

75. The assault was to be made by 4 Commando carried in 20 LCAs,

with a section of DUTCH troops, 10 (.A.) Commando, and one "TR RUSIT"
party under command. Their task was to seize a bridgehead:at TOENCE
beach, and to clear the area of FLUSEING- bounded by PALAiJfTHT - BEXHILL -
DOV!E._

The Follow-up consisted of 4 IOSB, (155 Infantry Brigade),

carried in 20 LCAs. They were to follor 4 Commando, ard 'pass through
to clear the area of FLUSHING, NORTH of BEXHILL and there reorganize.
4 Commando was under command 155 Infantry Brigade.

'In addition to the 40 LCAs, there wre available 20 LVTs ('A'

Squadron"i11 .RTks) and 26 M-290 (VEAsLS.)

TIMIINGS H-hour
i 0545 hours.

76 a) Bombing .of FLUSHING to cease 0530 hrs

b r tillery barrage on FLUSHING water-front 0530 - O540.rs
c TRBRUSH and one LCA 4 Commando, land on UNCLE trs
0545h
d 5 LCAs, 4 Commando land. 0550 - 0555 hlrs
: 4 Cormmando landing' completed .0635 hrs
f 4 KOSB landing completed - 0725 hrs
g) Platoon 241 Field Company :and
PE' two
bulldozers land 0755 hrs
h) Platoon 'A' Company 7 MANCH land 0800 hrs
S452 Mountain Battery RA land 0805 hrs
77. On their return from the.assault, the
,c craft were to be formed
into a Ferry Service Pool, from which LCAs would be provided as, required.
It was estimated that this se rvice would have to maintain the troops
ashore for at least 7 days. '

.... /The LVTs

 - 19 -
The LVTs were to swin across when called o'r,. af q -sui table-.
exits had been made.

INFORME
. SN .(See Diar'ams 5)
NN2I.LL'FORCES -:

78, These consisted of HQ Force "T", controlling:-

(a) Bombardment Squadron 2Vi3VARSPITE 6 x 15" guns:.

IIS EREBUS- 2..x 15" " :.
-1:S ROBERTS 2 x 15" "

(b) Support craft LGCD 6

LCO .' 6
LCGM) 2
LCT.(R) 5
LCS 6

(c) Landing craft LOT(Mk IV) 30

LOT(Mk .II). 5
LCA 40
LCI(S) 6

(d) Miscellaneous craft IQ rigate .. B.HM

KINGSMITIL) 12
LOP(L) -for Soke laying.
4
LCQ 3
(e) Six FOB parties.

(f) Detachments PIN Beach Commindos :and PTT Beach Signals.

(g) Three LCOCU parties.'

79. S The target priorities for the Bombardent .guadron were;-

(a' Retaliatory fire if hostile batteries engage sh1p.

(b Calls from FOBs.
C' Calls from spotting aircraft.
(a Pre-arranged .tasks.

The pre-arranged tasks were:-

WI7SPITE Batteries 17, 19 'and tW5DOMBUR rea ) H - 90

RE~3BUS " 115 NORTH of ESTKAPELIE. Hto.
ROBERTS S W154 and 285 SOUTH of EISTIKapELL) :H - 10

The squadron was to- have spotting aircraft based on UK

80. The close support squadron,\ as divided: into two groups, the
NORTH group to support 41 Commando, the SOUTH group to support 47 and
48 Commandos.

SFire .was NOT to be opened by. gun craft iuntil after .the LCT R)s
had fired, unless the enemy were firing, in. which -case, seen sources of
fire and pre-arranged targets were to be engaged as soon as they were
within effectie range. .

The LT(R)s were to fire when at the right range from their
respective targets, which should be EH- 10 minutes. Leading aves of
landing craft were to.keep station on LOT(R).

The pre-arranged targets were enemy defences on the coast,

within about 1500 yards on::either. side of the landing beach..

... /The L"T I

 -20 -

"The "(R)s-of' the

, OR -i group were to reload with 'smoke
rockets and be prepared. to'lay a smoke screen, if ordered, to mask
the
DO0MBURG defences. The 'LCP(Ls ere to be prepared to screen th
Southernflan if ordered.

AIR SUPPORT

81. Progrande for D day as

Heavy bombers' on batteries .. 7, "1 and.. 11.

H - 40 to H - 20 Fighter bombers on the defences between W1l3

and.il54 (2000 yards) of coast S of Y3ST(T EI)

S-.5 to H + 10 "Cabrank" of four Squadron PP Typhoons for attack

on pre-selected tiagets in beach cdefences, (after
LCT(R )s had fired and before LOTs touched :down).

I +. 10. orward s Continuous fighter patrol.

The remaining f iglh er oniters and fighters of 8 Group R

wer:to be available f'or support or cover, as required.

4 SS ,RI dDE less 4 Comnando

82. The intention was to assault the island with the /object of "
securing:- ,. ..

(a) The dune area from inclusive S'TI J.1 to FLUHNG and
destroying "t e batteries contained therein.

(b) ,The dune area fron STIApLtn. DYI 'to the Northern tip of
the island and destroying all the .batteri s tkherein.

(a) was the primary task.. The second was ,not to be carried
out until it, had been achieved
d.

,"
The landing was' to be E made in the dyke "gap, S of fESTKALL,E
D"TiE m . - : '"TA 'gap
the ....
.-". , * ..- .. .
S
and, called
. ,,S t ;f,-
HITE"'. . ...
GPET" '.SOUTH
. was
*, ..:of. ... .-.
T RED."
' t o the NORTH....

S hour 05945 hour s.

.JOT.Vfl:NT QF TROOPS AND ThSLS

83. (a) Covering parties:-

Three troops 41 Cormmando, with RN Beach Signals andDeach

Parties, to land on foot and seize left shoulder of the gap.

(b) 48 Commando in two waves to pass throughi the gap', seize a footing
th dunes to the SOUTH:iand
Ion Jcapture~l3.
Itv .toas:than ' .:
exploit and clear the- dune area SOUTH to ZOUTEINDE,, or further
if possible. . "

(c) 41
"Command, with two troops 10 (..) cozando, had the
primarytask of cap tu ring VSTKAPELL. It was ,then to
c apture 14 and if active, and coae into reserve.
.22,

Subsequently, its probable task would be to capture w17: ....

(d) 47 Coomando was to pass. through the gap, and' clear the dune
,SOUT from,ZOUTELTDE to, inclusive 1ll. I: found necessary,
it was to destroy 2.. ',': .

..(e)/atical HQ
 - 21 -

S
(e) Tactical HQ ,SS Brigade was to land with.'Comando

(f) Two field coinpanies and a detachment field park company, of 59

GQ Troops', RE, provided, one platoon for each Commond,'for mine-
field clearance and destruction of concrete gun emplacements.
The remainder were to work in the beach area.

84. . Vith the exception of the.covering parties the assault -orce was
to be mounted .in LVTs (BT3UfAiJES) and M29Cs (-WASELS and landed from LCTs.
A total of. 104.LVTs were. providedfrom 11 R Tks and 5 Assault Regiment RE,
and 80. M290s were issued for wich units provided their own drivers.

8. , - Included in the assault force were special detachments from 79

Armourd Division consistin of:-

Ten FLAILS and two BR<N gun tanks of' i' Squadron, 1 LOTHIANS.
E,'' ht E ( for carrying SBGs and fascines) and four bulldozers of
87 Squadron, 6 'Assault Regyiment RE.

These were organised into four 'teams, each transported in a LOT.

Their task-was, in thef irst instance, to assist,:41- Commando in their attack
on TESTKAL] by the breaching of obstacleson,the dyke and by fire support.
Subsequently, they were. to 'be prepare.d to support-.any of the Commandos as
required,

I2TILERY .

86. (a) Each Commnando had a FOB party for the bombardment squadron, and
another -for the up.ort craft.
In addition i had 0.
..-
,one '" -

(b) Support from land-based guns was provided y 96 IMedums, and 58

SHeavies and 'super heavies but only the. 15, and super heavies,
some 26 iuns, could reach the ba tcries NORH of IE S*1 U.

;OGRESS OF THED' FLUSHIING 1 SSIUL

87:, : s. the artillery opened on the water front, the leading troops
left B'bi t3 at 0445 hours. Fires, which were started in the' town
illuminated a'prominent windmill immediately behind.UNCLE beach, andIielpe
.to keep direction. ' The first troop of 4 Commando'made a landing at the
tip of the mole at the-ST-of NCLE, and it was, not until the RNBeach
Group was rounding the mole that the enemy openecd fire. The defences
soon came to life and there was 20 mm and . fire on the main body Of LAS
as. they came in, but none: were stopped. One LC', -carry ng'3-inch mortars
and ;/T sets, ran on to an anti-landidng taread-san , but it was close
enough to the' shore to enable the occupants to salvage "the contents.
They were then clene on the beach and ready again very shortly.

88. he main body landed without many casualties, and the Commando'
T"'
cleared the immediate water front, inocluing: the Arsenal, baracks. W ith
the support of a capt'ured 37
i m un, oite troop eeched TROONt 090 hours.
Meanwhile. another troop pushed):EST and eventually reached BELA PRK,
and liquidated pillbox on the way, but came under hevy fare from the
neighbourhood' of'D RUYTR'S STTU . 4 KOSB were no'wcoming ashore, and
together with 4 Commando hac made good TROON, S 1 0R and TILL by 1000
hours, asualties 1lad been moderate, ut ~the' chief trouble was coming
from the i
flanks ' T'OUT' ,and. OR4'TL.C.' areas

PROGESS 2 F'STKAEL

PS
?I. Aa
T1ROnS" . . . .RO'.L

loaded on D :'2, and-troops embarked on the aftenoon of D - 1. The

.. ,/passage was
 - 22-

passage was uneventful. The course was marked at .variou

~ points by su.
The turning point for the approach course was about 11 miles off shore:
the final approach position wasabout 6 miles further on..

The support squadron was in c h .lead and was timed to arrive

one mile off sore at - :20 minu~es, the le
ac ng
groupsof land craft
being close astern, U :adi ro
, of li craft
90 i. liri from the shore was first observed 'at' 015, from the
DOMBURG. batteries wiho appeared to be engagion ..the FLUSHING assault.
ARST and OBES .opened fre at 020 hours, but weather had prevented
their spotting aircraft from' t~aking off. The turret of EBUS jammed,
and she was not inaction.unti. 0930 hours, Shortly before 0900 hours,
the support squadron deployed,, and at .0900. hours bata tle was, joined. By
this time the'entire.squadron was being engaged by all the hostile batteries
from "NORTH of ESTKAIEl e"to 11 i .-

91 W..hen the final decision to launch the assault on 1 November had

been made the previous evening ,. it wa appreciated. that the weather would,
most :probably, severely restridt air . operations's. This turned out to be
thie case, and the fighter-bomber. pro ar'me fromH - 40 to H - 20, could
not be. oarried. out,, nor could the final. attack by heavies on the batteries
W 17,.W 13 and W 11 take place,

S Nev: heless, the i -caran': RP Typhoons appeare:don time. As

i:t; :p ^ as tobe eind schedule
it was apparent. the touch-do-vawas bhind schedule, they were held
up for a few minutes until the LCU(Rl)s had discharged their .ockets.
.hen these htad been fired the Croup Captain, Air Controller, on HQship,
gave them the "all clear", and the. Typhoons pressed home a idetermined
attack just.asthe LOTs were about to land. There,is nodoubt;, that the'
deterined actionftheTphoons had a profound effect on the operation
at a tine when-.the support squadron, was not only suffering .severe cas-
ualties from the st;ll active aat cries butb had also reeived. some
discharges
Sinvoluntary from ':'e rock et craf., ... ;

T-ITOUCIO D0N

92. The three LCI carrying the covering parties, discharged their
troops at 0957 hours, and the f -rstwave of five LCTs were successfully
beached .at 1005 hours: The nb wave of five LOTs was beached about
half an hour later, but three of these vwere subsequently lost., The
remaining LOTs (12), carryin:-g roops, ere bac~hed and. :suc:essfully
unloaded between 1;050 and 1230 b.ours

93. :? f the
:four LCTs carryin.g the -oans of LAILS, -AQsand
BU1DOZ S, twp approached P.'D beach at-1005 hours, bu:t wserheavily hit
and forced to retire. The second pair beached at 1020 hours and dis-
charged their loads, and shortly 'afterwarcs, one of t he first two vwas.
able to return and unload. " The "tan:ns in the fourth were badly, damaged,
and as the craft itself. had a damna ged dcoozr, the LOTf returned to OSTEND
without unloading. Of the tanks-which were unloaded,, four AVPERs, three
FPAllS and one BLLDOZER were irretr.ievably boged in the gap, and at.
night when the tide rose the three surviving LAILS. were drowned. '

94. Until the early a, crnoon the support 'cra were heavily en-
gaged with the host'ile bat teries, overing the landins and the advance
to the SOUTI During the first four, hours oses

4 LOGC., 2 L.?, 3 LSC(L), 1 LOT and 1 LOI(S). by gunfire after unloading,

and 3 OTon mines, two after unloading, and one beore beaching.

Slarge number of draft andd LVTs were severelyi ma~ed,. .As

anticipated, the enemy had.p:_suedahi:s usual practice of .co1'icentrating
on the suppoor-t craft insteacd of on the' troop carrying vessel . ad he ,
ai o at tion to the latoub . heter theassault
:
would have succeeded,;
' .
' " '''" *^."' ; '' ; ' : ' ; ; : '"^
' ""'' ' .. . /ACT ION O
S. -
95. 48 Comando landed' in the correct place, and found the dunes
i med.ately to the:SOUT:H of -the gap unoccupied, but heavy gunfire on the
gap caused casualties.: -W 285 was :taken fairly lput
easily, but ' 13 up a -
hard ffight, and it was dark before 48 -Commando had forced their way in, at
a cost of two troop leaders killed. I.n this they.were aided by iaval,
air and iediu: m artillery support. ' On the. left, the t popsof :4 Commando
negotiated the gap intheir LiTs, dismounted 'and reache the near end of
WESTK ELL village without- encountering much opposition. Supported by 1
SIOTIATS, who "brewed up" a tower .n the village which was giving trouble,
and by: AVEs which"petarded"a road block, the Commando cleared STIA IIE
and found 22 and :
14. uhnoccupie nd under water. At 1200hours, a troop
attacked W 15, and quickly captured it, taking 120 P. Progress was made
tto he NORTH end of the village, when Commander 4 SS Brigade ordered them
to stand fas't for the time being..

The 0n'7URG 'atteres shelled the villages, but a call for air
support resulted in the.' being silenced for a time.

96. -47 GCommando.landed between 1200 and 1230 hours. but owing to the
very heavy fire on the SOUTH =side, whiich undoubtedly" iould have re-
sulted in. the LOTs being hit and. the amp hibians lost, three of the-ir L T
were directed to the NORTH side. of the gap. An LVT ferry service ;had
then to be organised Across the gap to the SOUTH side, I n oneb: 'the LOTs
which landed in the :correct place, three LVTs and one EASEL wre burnt out.
The Conmmando. then assembled in the vicinity of 2&5 w8here they remained
for the night.

97. . bout 1500 hours, permission was given for 41 commando to move on

hold .VSTKALL:, 41 advanced with two troops on the road, and two along
the. dunes, but were .,hampered by parties of potentially hostile Germans
who came out to surrender, and .by the f ailing light, DOI IRO~ entered
i:s
at 1815 hours, andc 17 surrendered without much fight. One pocket of
resistance was ehcountered in the sand dunes., causing casualties whi ch
included .a troop leader killed;. The advance was not continued beyond
DO BURG and the nilght was spe.nt in iioppi-ng-up.

98. . .InLUSImC ;the bui ld-up was proceeding.satisfactorily, and the

bridgehead was slowlyJexpanded as a resilt of some hard fighting, particu-
larly at the Western corner of the town. Casualties amnng craft. durin
the day were about 0 LCis and 35- VTs, sunor damaged by gun fire andines

99. ,At the s,L, _r SOUTH B=L!, Causeway, one batalion of' 5
Canadian Infantry igade had made some 400 - 500 yards' progress on to
the island earlier in,-the day, but were later forced..back aftersome--
fierce fighting.

100, RRF'sorties
a; flown during this day were as follows:-

At FLUSHING" -- 37 osquitoes-beforefirst ight

104 Typhoons in: immediate upport : -
4... Spitfires on pre-arrnged targets.

'.STL..S
At -. - 36 Typhoons on pre-aranged targets
" " "- 77 Spitfires on pre arra nged targets
41' Spitfires l n immediate ,support.

. ,
Taregets ere gun positions: strong points, radar stations -etc.

.VNT'TS ON 2 NOVE R - ' - -

l01. :- 157Infantry rigade took over the small bridgehead at the cause-
way from 5 Canai ... Infanty Brigade, with 1 lS , but further prgres s
was limited by the three- eney strong poins
. which faced The .
. ... he task
 -24 -

S The task of 2 Canadian Infantry Division was now completed and

they werewithdrawn into reserve, havin captured some 5200 since 1
October, -- . . . . .

102. At FLUSHING., 155 Infantry Brigade and 4 Cormmando were gradually

mopping-up the town. The. enermy was utting up a stubborn resistance
from stro po ints and concrete pill-boxes. In the dock area, suicide
squads lodged themselves in cranes and gantries, 'and from .these points
of vantage were alble to pin the' at'ackers, In such cases, the.3.7
Mountain Battery proved of great assistance' Some of these guns had
been taken across the SCIELDT in: pieces and put together on the far side;
others had been ferried across on Class 9 rafts. O more than one
occasion, a dismantled gun was taken up to one of :the upper floors of a
house, and re-assembled there. It then engaged suitable targets at
point blank range with surprising effeet.

On the 'ST of the town, 4 Conumando advanced on DOVT area

over roofs and through back gardens, under cover, of a mortar and PIAT
barrage from the top'of a nearbyneaema. .RP Typhoons attacked the
area about midday and when .the Commando were about to storm it, .he
enemy surrendered.

103. On the iST coast, 448 Coman.o captured ZOUTELTNDE about

1106 hours without much difficulty, an-d 47 iComando passed through them
to advance on W 11. it288 was taken without opposition but when 47 had
crossed the anti-tank ditch about 2000 yards short of W 11, they suffered .
heavy casualties in the comparatively open country, and five out of the
six troop leaders. were seriously wounded,. Two commando troops almost
reached the battery, but became isolated and it Was some tme bef ore.
enemy .resistance in the vicinity of the anti-tank ditch is cleared up.

In-the NORTH, the enemy began ;bo withdraw from .the front "of
41 Conimando, who wiere now ordered to hand over to 10 (I .), aid.con-
centrate at : ESTIKiELLE, preparatory to supporting 47 in their advance-
on FLUSHhIG. By nightfall, they reac hed STI ELS.

RONEG OF T -SLOE C-1L (See Diagrap' 3)

104. In order to easp the situation at the causeway, 6 Q02RiL

ONii NS
(156 nfantry Brigade) were ordered to make a silent assault across the.;
SLOOE'channel, about 2 'miles to the SOUTIi, during night 2/3 November.
The-crossing was to start froi a small harbour about 2 miles-XEST of'
NI Et2DORP.

.Theharbour is about 1500 yards from-the nearest point-on

SaLCiHREM. , P.or the first 300 - 400.yards tees
thereis a hnnel. but the
rest of the journey is across a salt marsh.

S - line of advance across the salt 'marsh was selected which

seemed to. off er te best chance'of avoiding the numerous runnels. A
RE party reconnoitred a route, andtaped, it before the assault, to
within 200 yards of the far side, :

At .'0330 hours the first wave started to cross the channel in

assault boats. They disembarked at the marsh, and in about 45 :minutes
two companies were across. There was some small ars opposti ear
the shore dyke, mortaring of- the left comp'any and" later, shelling of the
port. During. .daylight on 3 November, 6 CEIRONIANS met with increasing
opposition and by dark were about 1000 yards inland.- .

The salt marsh was af.ormicable obstacle, and at. times the
troops were well over t.he.r wasts 'in, liquid mud., ' Aittempts to use
Weasels were unavailing; they dug their:prows into the far bank of
the. runnels and slowed :round. : ' .: - . . . : :.
... /5 II
 - 25 -

5 HI were put across by the same method during the night 3/4
November. T.heyou.ld.Ino, go.:alrlicr owiiVI to the need br 'building up"
~i6 ORNITS and the fac' that the crossing was only possible one hhour'
each side. of high tide.

5... Lwere ,,diected c;Ei i ;e to link.up 6 ABRON S. anrl GIAS

H who. were..at the hea: of the a s ay aid had made a little pro ss during
3 November. - .

SOn 4 Tovember all.hre battali6s made progress and 5 L linked

up with 1 GLIS IH. By ::darlk Ion
Z±pvember the bridgehead was about 2000.
; .'.
d .two miles : ide:,
yards deep and

105.. Good progress cas made in PLUSHIN and by the end'of the day, all
gerious resistance in the town]YEST of the ,IDDEIBURC-. canal had been over-
come. Arrangements were made o move 4 Commando across the gap to the
SESTIKAELIE - DOi'BURG aea but suff icient VTs were' not available.

.47 Commando, ,in the meantime, .hadcaptu ed

l 11, and pushing on
via.- 4, exploited up- to the gap by- nightfall. 41 Commando h ad been
ferried across the VESTIUAPELLE gap in LVTs, -to support 47, -butthey were
halted in ZOUTEL DE when it was seen how quickly 47 had got'on,. and
ordered to return to the DOMBURG area the next day in their LVTs.

CLOSING STOAGES ON WJALCIR TN

106. Enemy resistance'as now beginning to sho-w signs of disorganisation.

Under steady pressure.from 157 Infantry Brigade -he fell bac in the N to
the .line of the E ..'MIDDEEUHG. Canal. In the SE corner, NIEUi D .and
FORT RlvZIKeNS were in our hands on 5 November.

I n the woods nd dunes to the NE of DOVBURG, however, the enemy

still fought back strongly, protected by extensive mine belts and 10 (A.
and 41. Comr~andos made slow though.steady progress,. In spiteof great
difficulties of ground, the two SH I : tanks and two I VRHE, wwhich. now
gR n:
alone survived, succeeded in joining the tvo Commandos. The BESAS of the
iVslRE and guns of the SI MNlTS were fully used, and materially' assisted
the Commandos who captured W, 13 on 7 November. One AVTE, however, was
lost on a minefield.

107.. In the PLUJSHiG, area, the only serious resistance encountered was

his was held by about 40 men of 6 G.ermarn Divi'io who had fought so
stubbornly :against the Canadians SOUTH
Iof the SCOI DT.

It, is wortlyof interest thlt when these troops were finally put
in the "bag" .and used as a working party, theystill surprised some on-
lookers by the precision of their.drilling. .

108. ,It w:.as decided to .capture MIDBEBUERG by a surprise "left flank-

ing" attack from FLUSNiING across the inundations in LVTs, On the after-
noon of 6:Nove.boer: a comp . of 7/ RS in eight BUPFFLQES r eahed the town
without bein fired on. All rodds out of the main squtre were covered,
while a subaltern: w'ent in search of the -German CommlandeO. Lt-Gen DASER
was reluctant to surrender. to sojunior an officer, but \the immediate
assumption of "local and temporary Lieutenant-Colonel" by the infantry
COompany Comander solved the problem, and the garrison was rounded up
with assistance of 5 lI, whoarred later that night.
.the

109. The NO' TH d r: of

.coast
ic :%hethe..pisland
a':". alone remained, Although VEET'
showed. somp. hesitancy at. first, the ajority of the Germans were most
anxious to be resuced from the appallingfloods which they-later declared
'had damped their spirits more than anything else. 4 SS Brigade, (4and
41 Commandos), came along the o oast toVROT;ENI'OLDER, collecting l, .and
when they put in n attack at f irst light on 8 November, an enemy deputa-
tion approached to make arrangements for all resistance to cease Some
8000 P had been taken on the island.
 - 26 -

'P A.R T VII

CONCLUSION

110. In the operations here described, some 22,000 prisoners were

taken. At a conservative estimate, the enemy probably lost 30,000
men altogether.

111. On the evening of 4 November, the first minesweepers got

E,.
through to IANT~ After one of the largest and most intricate
sweeping operations of the :ar, the first three coasters reached the
port on 26 November. On the same day it was reported that 219 berths
had been cleared.

A convoy of 18 ships reached ANTERP safely on 28 November, /

Over 10,000 tons of stores were landed at the port on .1 December.
 - 27-

PART VIII

COMv ENTS AND 'POIN-S OF '

:INT TS-

PLAYiNNIG AND CO-OPEATION

112. Plans for these combinedoperations; were evolve as result of

a series of joint cohferences of which careful minutes of decision" were-..
prepared and distributed tb all concerned., 'Some" changes of plan, of ormmand
and dates, were inevitable as the scope bf our operations on the Continent
increased. 'That such difficulties were' overcome isa measure of the
co-operation that existed.

113 As a result the operations had. flexibility and speed. .For

example, 3 Canadian Infantry Division arrived in their concentration area for
"SWITOHBACK'" only about 48 hours before the start of their assault across
the IEOOID CANA1 , .Canadian
8 -Infantry Brigade were switched at. short
notioe' through th SAVOjA pDS
PAT bridgeheadinst.ad of being directed
across the-LEOPOLD COAAL as originally intended. At 48 hours notice, .156.
Brigade took the place of 5 Canadian Infantry Brigade for the amphibious
assault across the SCHEDT :
: iCo
-peration between.the Royal.Navy and .4 .S Brigade could not
have been'hapieror more complete 'support by Second Tactical Air Force
throughout, the operation was only limited by the weather.

BQOBARDIENT SQUADRON - OPERATION 'IFTUATE

114. The work ofthe bombardment squadron was handicapped by weather

preventing : the .spotting aircraft from taking off during the morning of D day.
These aircraft were all to come from basos in the. UK.l
Air OPs from the 'Continent :had :been arranged as a .secondary
means of observing and were used. Owing .to the difficulties imposed by
the necessity for advancing the date of the assault,'-it vas not possible
in the time available for the Air Os to exercise with the Bombardment Squadron
For this reason, the spotting was, not completely effective.

CLOSE SUPPORT SQUADRON R.N. OPERATION INFATUATE

115. The military plan required close support near the gap during the
'landing, with continued close support along the .lanks during the advance of tho
Commandos along the durles.- "It was abundantly clear to the Support Squadron
that their task, therefore-, .was to draw the fire of, engage and if possible,,
destroy any of the batteries or strong points found to be. active.
S The success of the landing at' ESTKAPELTS was largely due to-
the determintion of the :Support Squadron. to ensure that .the Commandos should
arrive safely on the beah,'. and receive the maximua support. The Squadron"
put up a magnificent 'fight against.formidable defences, iandsuffered severely,
but. they drew to"themselves the fire of .the enemy' batteries and thus enabled
the troop carrying craft to go in with relatively few casualties.

11i6. Complete fiure for sorties flown are not available, but sane
idea of the magnitude of the Royal Air Force's contribution to the operations,
may be obtained from the following" -

perati on SWITCHBACK Fighter .sorties 1733. ,:Flown on 16 days.

" Medium'or heavy
' . . bomber
b: sorties . 508, Flown on 5 days.'

Operation IFATUATE Pre-D . .d

Fighter bomber sortie 427. Flown on 8 days,

Heavy ,bomber sorties 1153. Flown on 9 days
Fighter sorties ,804. Flown on 4 days.

D day'

Fighter sorties. 343

S../ EFFEqT OF
 -28-
EFFECT OF SHELLING AND BOMBING ON FIXED DEFENCES

e ' on WACIHRE and the

117. The following are some 'of the battie
treatment they received-:-

W":1' Attactkgediby 25 :heavy biomberson .- 25.:

'Rec ived. 1i20x..7.2" sheits int-he timed, artillery programme

betweef'- 70 ahdH.:H '.Don IDday.

Engaged by EREBUS (2 x 15") on D + 1, in several shoots

with P O.B. ' ' . .: .. . - .: . . .

This battery inflicted heavy.:losses- on the iSuport, Squadron

on. D day, and was only 6aptared b:.y :47 .Commando after they
had suffered severe casualties. . : .

W 13: :Attacked, by 35 'hhdavy- bombers on D. -, 4.

'Received 80 x. 240 mm and 40 x. 8' shells in the tjned,

:artille ry programme between
:H - 70 and H hr on .D. day.-

Attacked by Typhoons on D Day.

This battery was responsible for many casualties to

the Support Squadron. It put up a..hard.fight ,:and it
was dark on D .day 'before 48 Commando forced, their .way
in, loping two-troop leaders .killed. ,

On examnin.jion it was found .that, one gun in casemate

had been destroyed..by a"naval shell..

W1 Attacked. by. 35 heavy;.bombers on *D - 4.

Received 500 x 155 in shells between H.- 70: and H - 10

on D day. .

Engagea. by ROBIRTS, ..(2 x. 15") and EREBUS .on D day.

The battery wasS active early on D day, but was .quickly.,

captured about noon by 41 Conmando who' to.o 1i20 PW.

PW stated one casemate was destroyed by bombing prior .to

D day, and. that two casemates .-were put out, of action, y.
naval shells, 30 men being killed and, a.t leas. that number
being wounded . . -

Two 75 mm Anti-tank guns in open emplacements about "100yards

to the SOUTH of the main -battery were captured completely.
intact, and each had. fired over 300 rounds.

W17 Attacked .by 25:heavy bo~iber. both on D-. 25 d ;-D 9, and

again by 35 heavy bombers' onD - 4.-; ...... U '

Engaged, by W:AiRSITE, (6. x:1i!) .throughout-D .day,. but-, seemed

to revive at' intervalso . -:::: .

Surrendered to 42 Commnando in the evening of D day, without

much fight.. . : .

iMateial, d-image w as one220 mm gun in open emplacement put

out.of action .by naval bemnbardment. Three guns were destroyed.
: by .their own creV,::after -having fired a considerable number
of rounds. Several small calibre guns in the area were
undestroyedo

No-amount
 -29-

118, No amount of shelling and/or bombing can be relied upon to

destroy completely weapons or personnel,within concrete shelters built by
ermn This requires infantry. The most that can be hoped for is
neutralisation, wvhich pre-supposes a quick, follow-up by infantry.

GROUND FORGES

119. INFANTRY

Conditions of weather and ground made increasing demands onthe

physique: of the -troops. The canalizing of movement dueto dykes and ditches,
and: the consequent difficulties of control, called for added qualities of
self-roliance-and iniiLLtativeamong junior leaders. The responsibilityl of
infantry to deal themselves with mines, booby traps and road blocks, and to
erect and handle assault boats and. kapok bridges, was again emphasised.

120. ARTILLERY

In spite of the limited routes and deployment areas available,

the forward troops were. never short. of effective support from the guns. The
moral effect ofthis was very considerable; conversely, there is ample
evidence it greatly depressed the Boche.
Co-operation with the infantry was of a high standard. In
partic lar, the production of quick stonks and .concentrations based on a
code word system, employed by 3 Canadian Infantry 'Division, worked extremely
well (See Appendix 2. for details).
In the polder country, where the ground was extremely .soft, the.
destructive or killing effect of the 25 pounder was materially red.ued.

121. ARMOUR

It was impossible to make much use of tanks in the dyke and

polder country. In the dunes of .WALCHMREN, the few surviving .FV "were
worththeir weight in gold"!, to quote Commander 4 SS Brigade. -The two SH viNS
expended 1400 rounds of 75. mm and 30 boxes of Browning. The two AVsRE sed
up 46 boxes of Besa, Targets included I positions in concrete, acoastal
battery, pill-boxes and emplacements.

122. AMPHIBIANS

SThe operations would not have been possible without them.

(a) LVTs (BUFFALOES) over flooded and waterlogged country performed

better than any other vehicle available, except M290s. They can
master a mud-covered beach, provided the mud is NOT. too deepQ or
a layer of sand surface exists. Thick'belts of wire and
quantities of fallen telegraph wire proved an obstacle. They are
mechanically reliable and will perform well,. provided they are
properly maintained, regularly overhauled and the crews are NOT
worked to exhaustion.
They present a small, though noisy, target when swimming, but are
conspicuous and vulnerable on land.

(b) . M29Cs (-EA.SELS) . Low free board and lack of steerage way when
swimring make thir employment in anything but calm-still water'
extremely hazardous. 500 of casualties were due to vehicles-
drowning. Their performance in mud, swamp and sand was good.
Steep banks, ditches or runnels of 6 ft width or mbre, are
impassable as the bow of model M29C protrudes in front of the tracks
and digs itself into the far bank of the obstacle. They are halted
by wire obstacles.

... /In order

 -30-

In order to get full value from their capabilities, new

drivers were put through a .course of 3 days training. On..
other occasions as much as days training has,.been given.'
Q10
On the whole, the VVAELS were'.of ..
great value foroarrying
light load.sof 'supplies and ammunition, wireless sets and
the evacuation of wounded.

(c) TERRAPINS performed well for maintenance tasks. Owing

to their height proper arrangements must be made for loading.

SMOKE

123. During SWITCHBACK and.:VITALITY large scale screening of

the '!regatta" operations was effectively.carried put by an. "ad hoc"
organisation based on 806 Pioneer Smoke Company.' The screens involved
jpoints of emission in the SC HELDT, and such. LCAs, LVTs, DUKWs, Storm-
boats and rafts as could be obtained, were. used -.
for this purpose,
- Screening during SWITCHBACK was carried out on:15 days,
(although the original contract was for 12 hours), and consumed 386
tons of stores. For VITAIITY it lasted 6 days, and 'burned .134 tons .
of stores. For the FLUSHEING assault, less screening than anticipated.
was required, and only 14 tos of stores were burned on the two days.
Conclusions drawn are that early planning, of the "smoke
operation is essential, and a Technical Officer CW should be inoluded:."
in the planning stage, 'and follow the operation throughout,
Communications between HQ of the formation being supported and Smoke HQ
must.. be. gbod. ;'- Equially, there must. be adequate communications. between
Smoke HQ and each 'point of emission. Smoke is a fickle weapon and
instant control must be possibleo It was repeatedly apparent:.that the
enemy artillery did NOT fire when 'it was unable to see where. its -shells
were falling.,

POSTS PRIPT

It was in tihe summer of 1809 that the British were.last

(onccrno-dawith oporations of war on VlICHEELN when ANTWERP as again
the objedtive That ill-starred but immense expedition failed in
its object, and its survivors wore oreventually withdrawn.

The element of surprise was somewhat lacking as the com-

position and destination of the force were discussed in the press
before it started, and the dynamic merits of the Naval Commander-in-
Chief, Admiral Sir Richard Strachan, could not effectively combine
with the static virtues of his military colleague, Lieutenant-
General the Earl of Chatham., The affair.is chiefly remembered from
the variously qaot ed verses. of which the genuine original is be-
-lieved to be:-

"Lord Chatham, with his sword undrawn

Kept waitihg for Sir Richard Strachan.
Sir Richard, longing to be at em,
Kept waiting too; for whom.. Lord Chatham"

It is reasonable to assume that on the present occasion,

our tactics were not entirely devoid of surprise for the enemy. At
least, there was something novel in sinking an island by bombing it
from the air, and in putting a .Mountain Division in below sea level.
Co-operation was well-nigh perfect.
 "71
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 51.1I III S

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 ApE NDI 2

MRTILLRY IN Oi "Cil I
.RATION ~tK

Extracts from a report by Brigadier P,i.S. TODD,

DSO, O D , .D, Cl' 2 C.A'DIj N CORPS (formerly
CRA 3 CADIA TShBF TSY DIVISION)
-- -- r-rl*rt lm ""r"
--------------

i, A comment on the effectiveness of artillery support was supplied

by the enemy cormmanderi,iajor-General Eberdiig, when he explained that
shelling had made it impossible for his men to blow prepared demolitions
in BRES~iNS, A distinct disadvantage nonetheless attached to the use of
25-pounders; their fragientation effect vwas materially reduced by the wet
mud of the polders. The first burst was therefore all important, for
subsequent rounds would find the enemy under cover and hence practically
immune from injury.

2, Grouped Ston-jks and Concentrations on Call. In addition to the

numerous DP( dfensive fire) and EV (harassing fire) tasks in readiness,
support was given.-to each infantry attack by fire plans, consisting of
stonks and concentrations on call (linear and pin-point concentrations).
This system has been used so successfully by 3 Canadian Infantry Division,
that it deserves some description. It is essentially a method of siege
warfare, and thus found full development at DOULOCG-E and. CuL'IS, and in
the SCIDE pocket.

.3. Its preparation Inst be :worked out after close study of Intelli-
gence maps showing all knowm or suspected enemy-positions. With this de-
tailed knowledge, and taking into account both artillery resources and the
infantry plan, it is possible to assign to every potential source of oppo-
sition an appropriate weight of shells, the amount varying according to
the nature and importance of the target. "This treatment has normally
resulted in a combination of..numbered medium concentrations and field
stonks, grouped under a code-name,

4. The original task-table issued in support of 7 Canadian Infantry

Brigade's assault over the LEOPOLD Q.
OTAL contained 46 such groups, most of
then, a.ppropriately, bearing the name of rivers. One of the largest
("Colorado") was scheduled to be of eight minutes' duration, and comprised
eight field stonks and three medium concentrations, to be fired, respectively,
by 12 and 13 Canadian Field Regiments at rate slow, and by three medium
regiments of 2 Canadian ACRA at rate normal. The target in this case was
a series of enemy positions around the village of DEN HOiTOPJ\
9604L. smaller
one, on the other hand, might consist of only one stolk and one concentration,
as was the case with "Richelieu".

5. It does not follow that each of these groups must be fired

accordingi to a pre-arranged, and hence inflexible, timed.,programme, or
even fired eat all, should it become unnecessary for any reason. The
firing of each one rests with the infantry for whom they are available on
call. The infantry are thus given.neutralising fire when they want it,
and for as long as they want it. It is quite in order, for example, to
order, "Colorado twice", which would result in the enemy positions being
fired on for sixteen minutes. Once on an objective the infantry can halt
if it is deemed desirable, and the area can be marked off by DF tasks.
This flexibility means that the fire plan ensures covering fire to meet
the infantry' s local rate of advance, a factor not found in the timed
programme wit., its rigid stop lines, which may be utterly ,asted should
the infantry be held up.

6. The chief advantages of the system are that it will produce

quick and effective fire, and that if not abused. it is more economical
than the too-liberal barrage, since it is confinecd to those areas alone
which can affect the battle. It givbs, moreove^, Rmuch more exact results

. .,/than the
 -2-

than the map reference target hastily called for in the heat of battle,
for it is based on deliberate calculation, with all that that implies of
predicted laying (including angle of sight) and allowance for meteorological
conditions. Its preparation also permits adequate time for the proper
allotment of weight and natu~rs to each' targett lot least important is
its simplicity, for the s ystem is readily comprehended by infantry. The
distribution of traces (16 per brigade) is sufficiently wide that commanders-
of sub-units can themselves adjust fire, Even section leaders are able-
to appreciate fully this method of obtaining artillery support.

7. The possibility of misuse lies in the fact that there is nothing

to prevent targets being called for indiscriminately, with resultant
waste of ammunition, rouped concentrations must not be used in the
hope of neutralizing hostile batteries suspected to be in an area
covered by them. Such speculation is of no value; the'system is only
valid when employed on the immediate front of the unit concerned. The
neutralization of hostile batteries is. much better left to, counter-,
battery and Air OP resources which are equipped to deal with them.

/O

*/,-,
TABLE
X / J
/
,, y , 'B / 0 *
.,-."-"-*.
- ""'......
"''"',.',

. OHAIR.

SA

fired on by enemy guns at , a quick reading of his compass may show

that their bearing (C) passes through Targets Chaire and Table, ie
therefore calls for "Chair" but finds that the enemy fire does not cease.
;A second try, this time with "Table" is no more successful. Not only
is the hostile battery still not silenced, but two targets have been
fired needlessly. Time and ammunition would have been saved by sub-
mitting a shell report and relying on the -exercise of Counter-;attery
methods.

9. . Finally,' it is clear that grouped stonks and concentrations

are not to be looked.for invariably as standard praCtice, They are,
after all, a device to be used when the enemy is contained, and when
there are only so many points (no matter how nudierous) which he can
occupy. They cannot be employed over ope or-un familiar country, and
naturally they found no place in the approach-to-contact battle across
F:iJCs during late. August and Early September.