BIENVENIDO

BABAO,
ETC.,
vs.
FLORENCIO PEREZ, ETC., ET AL., defendants-appellants.

plaintiff-appellee,

QUESTION:
X was the owner of the parcel of land. Y married X's niece and both entered into a verbal agreement whereby Y
bound himself in clearing, improving and administering the land and in consideration of which, X in turn bound herself
to convey to Y or, his wife of land, together with all the improvements thereon upon her death.
Y started clearing and improving said lands, leaving only 50 hectares unimproved, all of which having been
administered by him incurred expenses thereon.
X sold few days before she died about 127 hectares of the land. When X and Y died, intestate proceedings were
instituted for the settlement of their estate. Ys heirs filed for the recovery of portion of the land and for the
annulment of the sale, and in the alternative, for the reimbursement of useful and necessary expenses. However Xs
heirs denied the claim that a verbal agreement was entered into between X and Y. When the case was tried on the
merits, the court overruled to the introduction of oral testimony to prove the alleged verbal agreement.
Is the oral testimony of the existence of agreement between X and Y should be admitted?
RULING:
No.
Testimony was prohibited by section 26(c) of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court. This rule prohibits parties or assignors of
parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator of a deceased
person upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person from testifying as to any matter of fact
occurring before the death of such deceased person.
The reason for this rule is that "if death has closed the lips of one party, the policy of the law is to close the lips of the
other.' Another reason is that `the temptation to falsehood and concealment in such cases is considered too great to
allow the surviving party to testify in his own behalf.' Accordingly, the incompetency applies whether the deceased
died before or after the commencement of the action against him, if at the time the testimony was given he was dead
and cannot disprove it, since the reason for the prohibition, which is to discourage perjury, exists in both instances.
G.R. No. L-2016

August 23, 1949

Testate estate of RICHARD THOMAS FITZSIMMONS, deceased, MARCIAL P. LICHAUCO, administratorappellee,

vs.
ATLANTIC, GULF and PACIFIC COMPANY OF MANILA, claimant-appellant.
QUESTION:
Company A made a claim against the estate of Mr. B, the president of the former, for the payment of a
current account with the company when it resumed operations after the Japanese invaded the Philippines. Company
A presented the vice-president-treasure and president of the company to testify regarding the current account of Mr.
B with Company A. However, C, administrator of Mr. Bs estate, objected on the ground that they are disqualified
under Section 23, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence.
Are they disqualified?
No. The rule disqualifies only parties or assignors of parties, and officers and/or stockholders of a
corporation are not disqualified from testifying, for or against the corporation which is a party to an action upon a
claim or demand against the estate of a deceased person, as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such
deceased person.

G.R. No. L-29512

January 17, 1929

ONG
CHUA,
vs.
EDWARD CARR, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

plaintiff-appellee,

QUESTION:
X bought properties (land and a building) from spouses Y with a right to repurchase within 4 years.
Z is interested in buying coconut lands. X and Z agreed on contract of sale but on the condition that the rights of the
spouses to repurchase the lots should be respected. According to Zs lawyer testimony, Z was fully aware of those
rights before the execution of the deed. The deed of sale was drafted without including the condition of the right to
repurchase.
Because of a mortgage entered into by X on one of the lots, Z agreed on the proposition that he will pay P13,500 and
promised in writing to pay X the balance of P6.500. But the parties never redrafted the deed. It was just agreed that
Zs lawyer will keep all the necessary documents until the lapse of the period of repurchase.
Z took possession of the deed and immediately presented it for registration. Thereafter, the spouses Y offered to
repurchase the property but Z declined alleging that he is the absolute owner because there is no recording in the
deed of any right of the spouses to repurchase.
X filed a case against Z. During the pendency however, Z died. Is X deposition of facts occurring prior to the death of
Z admissible as evidence?
ANSWER:
NO!!
The first proposition rests on subsection 7 of section 383 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which bars parties to an
action or proceeding against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person upon
a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person from testifying as to any matter of fact
occuring before the death of such deceased person.
Similar provisions are to be found in the statutes of practically all of the states of the Union, and the rule thus laid
down is now unquestioned. But it has generally been given a liberal construction to promote justice, and it is
held that it never was intended to serve as a shield for fraud. As stated in Jones on Evidence, 2d ed., sec. 744:
The evidence of an adverse party is absolutely excluded by an independent, affirmative enactment making him
incompetent as to transactions or communications with a deceased or incompetent person. These statutes,
however, do not render the adverse party incompetent to testify to fraudulent transactions of the deceased,
as the statutes are not designed to shield wrongdoers but the courts compel the adverse party to clearly
establish the alleged fraudulent acts before admitting such testimony.
And in case of Tongco vs. Vianzon (50 Phil. Rep., 698, 702) this court said:
Counsel is eminently correct in emphasizing that the object and purpose of his statute is to guard against the
temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party.
He has, however, neglected the equally important rule that the law was designated to aid in arriving at the truth
and was not designed to suppress the truth.
In this case a number of credible witnesses testified to facts which conclusively showed that Z's conduct was tainted
with fraud. The plaintiff did not take the witness stand until after the existence of fraud on the part of Z and been
established beyond a doubt and not by a mere preponderance of evidence. In these circumstances, we cannot hold
that the trial court erred in not excluding the plaintiff's testimony.

G.R. No. L-27434 September 23, 1986

GENARO GOI, RUFINA P. vda. DE VILLANUEVA, VIOLA P. VILLANUEVA, OSCAR P. VILLANUEVA, MARINA P.
VILLANUEVA, VERNA P. VILLANUEVA, PRAXEDES P. VILLANUEVA, JR., JOSE P. VILLANUEVA, SAMUEL P.
VILLANUEVA, LOURDES P. VILLANUEVA, MILAGROS P. VILLANUEVA DE ARRIETA, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and GASPAR VICENTE, respondents-appellees.

X owned three haciendas, X1, X2 and X3. Y negotiated with X for the purchase of said haciendas guaranted by Z. As
he did not have sufficient funds to pay the price, Y with the consent of Y, offered to sell Hacienda X1. Y further
contracted or promised to sell to the latter fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 of Hacienda X2 for the sum of P13,807.00.
Z, the guarantor thereafter advised TABACALERA to debit from his account the amount of P13,807.00 as payment
for the balance of the purchase price. However, as only the amount of P12,460.24 was actually needed to complete
the purchase price, only the latter amount was debited from Zs account. The difference was supposedly paid by Y,
but as no receipt evidencing such payment was presented.
X executed a formal deed of sale covering the three haciendas in favor of Y. including Fields Nos. 3, 4 and 13 of the
Hacienda X2. Meanwhile, Fields nos. 4 and 13 were delivered to Z.
Y died and intestate proceedings were instituted, among the properties included in the inventory submitted to the
court were fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 of Hacienda X2. Z instituted an action for recovery of property and damages. He
sought to recover field no. 3 of the Hacienda X2, basing his entitlement thereto on the contract/promise to sell
executed by Y in his favor.
May Z testify on matters of fact occurring before the Y, which constitutes a claim or demand upon his estate, in
violation of Rule 130, sec. 20 par. (a) ?
RULING:
YES. The object and purpose of Rule 130, Sec. 20 par. (a) (commonly known as the SURVIVORSHIP
DISQUALIFICATION RULE or DEAD MAN STATUTE) is to guard against the temptation to give false testimony in
regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party and further to put the two parties to a suit upon
terms of equality in regard to the opportunity of giving testimony. It is designed to close the lips of the party plaintiff
when death has closed the lips of the party defendant, in order to remove from the surviving party the temptation to
falsehood and the possibility of fictitious claims against the deceased.
The case at bar, although instituted against the heirs of Y after the estate of the latter had been distributed to them,
remains within the ambit of the protection. The reason is that the defendants-heirs are properly the "representatives"
of the deceased, not only because they succeeded to the decedents right by descent or operation of law, but more
importantly because they are so placed in litigation that they are called on to defend which they have obtained from
the deceased and make the defense which the deceased might have made if living, or to establish a claim which
deceased might have been interested to establish, if living.
Under the great majority of statutes, the adverse party is competent to testify to transactions or communications with
the deceased or incompetent person which were made with an agent of such person in cases in which the agent is
still alive and competent to testify. But the testimony of the adverse party must be confined to those transactions or
communications which were had with the agent.

G.R. No. L-31739

March 11, 1930

LEONOR MENDEZONA, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ENCARNACION C. VIUDA DE GOITIA, administratrix of the estate of Benigno Goitia, defendant-appellant.
----------------------------G.R. No. L-31740

March 11, 1930

VALENTINA IZAGUIRRE Y NAZABAL, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ENCARNACION C. VIUDA DE GOITIA, ETC., defendant-appellant.

X and Y, co-partners in Tren de Aguadas, filed claims against the estate of Z who
was the manager of the said co-partnership and collected the dividends for X and Y.
Z, who was no longer the manager, still received as attorney-in-fact of both plaintiffs
and failed to remit their shares in the partnership.
X and Y submitted a deposition denying that Z rendered an account or liquidation
until his death. When it was read in court, Zs administratrix (widow) objected since
section 383, No. 7, Code of Civil Procedure prohibits a witness who is directly
interested in a claim against the estate of a decedent from testifying upon a matter
of fact which took place before the death of the deceased.
The lower court held that Z was an attorney-in-fact of the plaintiffs in the jointaccount partnership and having failed to remit the dividends upon the shares of X
and Y, the defendant (widow) was then ordered to render a judicial account of the
estate of Z and to pay the plaintiffs.
Are the witnesses directly interested in the claim against the estate (claimants) are
disqualified or prohibited from testifying upon a matter of fact which took place
before the death of the decedent?
RULING: No
The rule is that law prohibits a witness directly interested in a claim against the
estate of a decedent from testifying upon a matter of fact which took place before
the death of the deceased. However, to apply to them the rule that "if death has
sealed the lips of one of the parties, the law seals those of the other," would be to
exclude all possibility of a claim against the testamentary estate.
In this case, there has been no such liquidation between the plaintiffs and the
deceased. They testify, denying any such liquidation. Therefore, it was incumbent
upon the X and Y to prove by proper evidence that the affirmative proposition was
true, either by bringing into court the books which the attorney-in-fact was in duty
bound to keep, or by introducing copies of the drafts kept by the banks which drew
them, as was the decedents usual or by other similar evidence. Therefore, a
witness who is directly interested in a claim against the estate of a decedent is not
absolutely prohibited from testifying upon a matter of fact which took place before
the death of the deceased.

G.R. No. 180843

April 17, 2013

APOLONIO GARCIA, in substitution of his deceased mother, Modesta Garcia, and CRISTINA SALAMAT,
Petitioners,
vs.
DOMINGA ROBLES VDA. DE CAPARAS, Respondent

X is the owner of a 2.5-hectare farm and being tilled by Y as agricultural lessee

under a leasehold agreement. When X passed away, she was succeeded by A, B
and C. On the other hand, Ys children D, E and F succeeded him.

Before she passed away, X appointed A as her attorney-in-fact. After Y died, A and
F entered into an agreement entitled "Kasunduan sa Buwisan", followed by an
Agricultural Leasehold Contract, covering the land. In said agreements, F was
installed and recognized as the lone agricultural lessee and cultivator of the land. F
passed away and his wife, took over as agricultural lessee.
The landowners A,B and C, on the one hand, and Fs sisters D and E on the other,
entered into a "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" whereby D and E were
acknowledged as Fs co-lessees. D and E filed a Complaint for nullification of
leasehold and restoration of rights as agricultural lessees against Fs heirs,
represented by his surviving.
Is the alleged admission of F that he entered into a sharing of leasehold rights with
the petitioners cannot be used as evidence against the herein respondent as the
latter would be unable to contradict or disprove the same?
Ruling
The Petition is denied.
The Affidavit covering Fs alleged admission and recognition of the alternate farming
scheme is inadmissible for being a violation of the Dead Mans Statute, 29 which
provides that "[i]f one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying
by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the
undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the
transaction." Thus, since F is deceased, and As declaration which pertains to the
leasehold agreement affects the "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" which she as
assignor entered into with petitioners, and which is now the subject matter of the
present case and claim against Pedros surviving spouse such declaration cannot be
admitted and used against the latter, who is placed in an unfair situation by reason
of her being unable to contradict or disprove such declaration as a result of her
husband-declarant Pedros prior death.
Under Section 732 of RA 3844, Fs surviving spouse is entitled to security of tenure;
and under Section 16,33 any modification of the lease agreement must be done with
the consent of both parties and without prejudicing Fs surviving spouse's security
of tenure.

QUESTION:
X, had been previously arrested on charges of robbery. X requested permission from the chief of police to see his
wife who was at the time in a room of their house. After a few moments, the escort police heard the scream of a
woman. Running upstairs, he met defendant's wife running out of the room and holding her right breast which was
bleeding. X was lying down with his little son Romeo, aged one year and a half, on his breast and was dead.

The prosecution, in recommending the imposition of the capital penalty upon the accused, relies mainly on the
affidavit, Exhibit C, Exhibit C is an affidavit signed and sworn to by X declares that unconsciously his wife and son
causing the death of the latter. However, when X testified in his own defense in the Court of First Instance, he
repudiated his confession, and alleged torture and violence to have been exerted upon his person and his mind in
order. Furthermore, the statements of appellant in said Exhibit C were corroborated by the testimony of his wife on
rebuttal. This leads us to the consideration of the admissibility of the wife's testimony.
Is the testimony of wife admissible as evidence?
ANSWER:
YES.
Generally, the rule states that neither a husband nor wife shall in any case be a witness against the other except in a
criminal prosecution for a crime committed by one against the other have been stated thus: First, identity of interests;
second, the consequent danger of perjury; third, the policy of the law which deems it necessary to guard the security
and confidences of private life even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and which rejects such evidence
because its admission would lead to domestic disunion and unhappiness; and fourth, because, where a want of
domestic tranquility exists, there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other.
However, as all other general rules, this one has its own exceptions, both in civil actions between the spouses and in
criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed by
sound reasons which, in the excepted cases, outweigh those in support of the general rule. For instance, where the
marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and
tranquility of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent.
Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of private life which the law aims at protecting will be
nothing but ideals which, through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.
At any rate, in the instant case the wife did not testify in the direct evidence for the prosecution but under
circumstances presently to be stated. It will be noted that the wife only testified against her husband after the latter,
testifying in his own defense, imputed upon her the killing of their son. By all rules of justice and reason this gave the
prosecution, which had theretofore refrained from presenting the wife as a witness against her husband, the right to
do so, as it did in rebuttal; and the the wife herself the right to so testify, at least, in self-defense, not of course,
against being subjected to punishment in that case in which she was not a defendant but against any or all of various
possible consequences which might flow from her silence.