WHEN THE LAW DOES NOT DISTINGUISH, THE COURTS SHOULD NOT DISTINGUSH

PHILIPPINE BRITISH ASSURANCE CO., INC., petitioner, vs. HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE

APPELLATE COURT; SYCWIN COATING & WIRES, INC., and DOMINADOR CACPAL,
CHIEF DEPUTY SHERRIF OF MANILA, respondents.
Facts:

Private respondent Sycwin Coating & Wires, Inc., filed a complaint for collection of a sum of
money against Varian Industrial Corporation before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
During the pendency of the suit, private respondent succeeded in attaching some of the properties
of Varian Industrial Corporation upon the posting of a supersede as bond. The latter in turn
posted a counterbond in the sum of P1,400, 000.00 4 thru petitioner Philippine British
Assurance Co., Inc., so the attached properties were released.
RTC ruled in favor of PR (ordering Varian vis--vis Phil British to pay obligations)
Varian appealed decision -> ordered the execution pending appeal as prayed for by Sycwin -> writ
of execution was returned unsatisfied as Varian failed to deliver the previously attached personal
properties upon demand -> PR files petition praying that the surety (herein petitioner) be ordered
to pay the value of its bond. CA affirmed RTC decision, granting petition of PR.
While as a general rule a motion for reconsideration has been considered a condition sine qua non
for the granting of a writ of certiorari, this rule does not apply when special circumstances
warrant immediate or more direct action. It has been held further that a motion for
reconsideration may be dispensed with in cases like this where execution had been ordered and
the need for relief was extremely urgent.
Counterbond of Varian provides that they will pay 1,400,000.00 to Sycwin.

SC Decision:

Sections 5, 12, and 17 of Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court also provide:
o SEC. 5. Manner of attaching property. The officer executing the order shall
without delay attach, to await judgment and execution in the action, all the properties of
the party against whom the order is issued in the province, not exempt from execution, or
so much thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy the applicant's demand, unless the former
makes a deposit with the clerk or judge of the court from which the order issued, or gives
a counter-bond executed to the applicant, in an amount sufficient to satisfy such demand
besides costs, or in an amount equal to the value of the property which is about to be
attached, to secure payment to the applicant of any judgement which he may
recover in the action. The officer shall also forthwith serve a copy of the applicant's
affidavit and bond, and of the order of attachment, on the adverse party, if he be found
within the province.
o SEC. 12. Discharge of attachment upon giving counterbond. At any time after
an order of attachment has been granted, the party whose property has been attached, or
the person appearing on his behalf, may, upon reasonable notice to the applicant, apply
to the judge who granted the order, or to the judge of the court in which the action is
pending, for an order discharging the attachment wholly or in part on the security given.
The judge shall, after hearing, order the discharge of the attachment if a cash deposit is
made, or a counter-bond executed to the attaching creditor is filed, on behalf of the
adverse party, with the clerk or judge of the court where the application is made, in an
amount equal to the value of the property attached as determined by the judge, to
secure the payment of any judgment that the attaching creditor may recover
in the action. Upon the filing of such counter-bond, copy thereof shall forthwith be
served on the attaching creditor or his lawyer. Upon the discharge of an attachment in

accordance with the provisions of this section the property attached, or the proceeds of
any sale thereof, shall be delivered to the party making the deposit or giving the
counterbond aforesaid standing in place of the property so released. Should such
counterbond for any reason be found to be, or become, insufficient, and the party
furnishing the same fail to file an additional counterbond, the attaching creditor may
apply for a new order of attachment.
SEC. 17. When execution returned unsatisfied, recovery had upon bond. If the
execution be returned unsatisfied in whole or in part, the surety or sureties on any
counter-bond given pursuant to the provisions of this rule to secure the
payment of the judgment shall become charged on such counter- bond, and
bound to pay to the judgement creditor upon demand, the amount due under
the judgment, which amount may be recovered from such surety or sureties after notice
and summary hearing in the same action.
Under Sections 5 and 12, Rule 57 above reproduced it is provided that the counterbond is
intended to secure the payment of "any judgment" that the attaching creditor may recover
in the action. Under Section 17 of same rule it provides that when "the execution be
returned unsatisfied in whole or in part" it is only then that "payment of thejudgment
shall become charged on such counterbond."
The counterbond was issued in accordance with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 57 of the
Rules of Court as provided in the second paragraph aforecited which is deemed
reproduced as part of the counterbond. In the third paragraph it is also stipulated that the
counterbond is to be "applied for the payment of the judgment." Neither the rules nor the
provisions of the counterbond limited its application to a final and executory judgment.
Indeed, it is specified that it applies to the payment of any judgment that maybe
recovered by plaintiff. Thus, the only logical conclusion is that an execution of any
judgment including one pending appeal if returned unsatisfied maybe charged against
such a counterbond.
The rule therefore, is that the counterbond to lift attachment that is issued in accordance
with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 57, of the Rules of Court, shall be charged with the
payment of any judgment that is returned unsatisfied. It covers not only a final and
executory judgement but also the execution of a judgment pending appeal

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: It is well recognized rule that where the law does not distinguish,
courts should not distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguish nec nos distinguere debemos. "The rule,
founded on logic, is a corollary of the principle that general words and phrases in a statute should
ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance. 14 The rule requires that a general term or
phrase should not be reduced into parts and one part distinguished from the other so as to justify its
exclusion from the operation of the law. In other words, there should be no distinction in the application
of a statute where none is indicated. For courts are not authorized to distinguish where the law makes no
distinction. They should instead administer the law not as they think it ought to be but as they find it and
without regard to consequences.
Petition dismissed.

BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) vs ZAMORA (EXEC. SECRETARY) (OCTOBER

10,2000)
Facts:

On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a Military Bases
Agreement which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by
United States military personnel. To further strengthen their defense and security relationship,
the Philippines and the United States entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951.
Under the treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their territory,
armed forces, public vessels, and aircraft.
In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the
Philippines and the United States negotiated for a possible extension of the military bases
agreement but was denied by the Senate. Notwithstanding, the defense and security relationship
between the Philippines and the United States of America continued pursuant to the Mutual
Defense Treaty.
On July 18, 1997, the United States panel met with the Philippine panel to exchange notes on the
complementing strategic interests of the United States and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific
region. Both sides discussed, among other things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA). Negotiations by both panels on the VFA led to a consolidated draft text,
which in turn resulted to a final series of conferences and negotiations that culminated in Manila
on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA and
then ratified President Joseph E. Estrada in 1998.
On May 3, 1999, the Committees on National Defense and Security Foreign Relations of the
Senate submitted Proposed Senate Resolution No. 443 recommending the concurrence of the
Senate to the VFA and the creation of a Legislative Oversight Committee to oversee its
implementation. It was then approved.
On June 1, 1999, the VFA officially entered into force. The VFA, which consists of a Preamble and
nine (9) Articles, provides for the mechanism for regulating the circumstances and conditions
under which US Armed Forces and defense personnel may be present in the Philippines.
Petitions for certiorari and prohibition, petitioners - as legislators, nongovernmental
organizations, citizens and taxpayers - assail the constitutionality of the VFA and impute to herein
respondents grave abuse of discretion in ratifying the agreement.

Issue: The determination of which provision of the Constitution applies, with regard to the exercise by
the senate of its constitutional power to concur with the VFA.
Ruling:

Petitioners argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is applicable considering that the VFA has for its
subject the presence of foreign military troops in the Philippines. Respondents, on the contrary,
maintain that Section 21, Article VII should apply inasmuch as the VFA is not a basing
arrangement but an agreement which involves merely the temporary visits of United States
personnel engaged in joint military exercises.
The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the Senate
on treaties or international agreements.

Section 21, Article VII, which herein respondents invoke, reads:

No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by
at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

Section 25, Article XVIII, provides:

After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines
and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the
senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people
in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State.

Section 21, Article VII deals with treatise or international agreements in general, in which
case, the concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the Senate is
required to make the subject treaty, or international agreement, valid and binding on the
part of the Philippines. This provision lays down the general rule on treatise or
international agreements and applies to any form of treaty with a wide variety of subject
matter, such as, but not limited to, extradition or tax treatise or those economic in nature.
All treaties or international agreements entered into by the Philippines, regardless of
subject matter, coverage, or particular designation or appellation, requires the
concurrence of the Senate to be valid and effective.
In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to treaties which
involve the presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines.
Under this provision, the concurrence of the Senate is only one of the requisites to render
compliance with the constitutional requirements and to consider the agreement binding
on the Philippines. Section 25, Article XVIII further requires that foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities may be allowed in the Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly
concurred in by the Senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum held for that purpose if so required by Congress, and recognized as such by
the other contracting state.
It is our considered view that both constitutional provisions, far from contradicting each
other, actually share some common ground. These constitutional provisions both embody
phrases in the negative and thus, are deemed prohibitory in mandate and character. In
particular, Section 21 opens with the clause No treaty x x x, and Section 25 contains the
phrase shall not be allowed. Additionally, in both instances, the concurrence of the Senate
is indispensable to render the treaty or international agreement valid and effective.
The fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under Section 21, Article VII,
and that the Senate extended its concurrence under the same provision, is immaterial.
For in either case, whether under Section 21, Article VII or Section 25, Article XVIII, the
fundamental law is crystalline that the concurrence of the Senate is mandatory
to comply with the strict constitutional requirements.
On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States
troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern
such visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights of the United States and
the Philippine government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and
aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.
Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, should apply in the instant case. To a certain
extent and in a limited sense, however, the provisions of section 21, Article VII will find
applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the number
of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the Senate.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: A special provision or law prevails over a general one. Lex specialis
derogat generali. Thus, where there is in the same statute a particular enactment and also a general one
which, in its most comprehensive sense, would include what is embraced in the former, the particular
enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to affect only such cases within its
general language which are not within the provision of the particular enactment.
In Leveriza vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, we enunciated:
x x x that another basic principle of statutory construction mandates that general legislation must
give way to a special legislation on the same subject, and generally be so interpreted as to embrace
only cases in which the special provisions are not applicable (Sto. Domingo vs. de los Angeles, 96
SCRA 139), that a specific statute prevails over a general statute (De Jesus vs. People, 120 SCRA
760) and that where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one
designed therefor specially should prevail (Wil Wilhensen Inc. vs. Baluyot, 83 SCRA 38).
Moreover, it is erroneous to argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is inapplicable to mere transient
agreements for the reason that there is no permanent placing of structure for the establishment of a
military base. On this score, the Constitution makes no distinction between transient and permanent.
Certainly, we find nothing in Section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be
stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines.
It is a rudiment in legal hermenuetics that when no distinction is made by law, the Court
should not distinguish- Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos .

In like manner, we do not subscribe to the argument that Section 25, Article XVIII is not
controlling since no foreign military bases, but merely foreign troops and facilities, are involved in
the VFA. Notably, a perusal of said constitutional provision reveals that the proscription covers
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities. Stated differently, this prohibition is not limited to
the entry of troops and facilities without any foreign bases being established. The clause does not
refer to foreign military bases, troops, or facilities collectively but treats them as separate and
independent subjects. The use of comma and the disjunctive word or clearly signifies
disassociation and independence of one thing from the others included in the enumeration, such
that, the provision contemplates three different situations - a military treaty the subject of which
could be either (a) foreign bases, (b) foreign troops, or (c) foreign facilities - any of the three
standing alone places it under the coverage of Section 25, Article XVIII.
Applying the foregoing constitutional provisions, a two-thirds vote of all the members of the
Senate is clearly required so that the concurrence contemplated by law may be validly obtained
and deemed present. While it is true that Section 25, Article XVIII requires, among other things,
that the treaty-the VFA, in the instant case-be duly concurred in by the Senate, it is very true
however that said provision must be related and viewed in light of the clear mandate embodied in
Section 21, Article VII, which in more specific terms, requires that the concurrence of a treaty, or
international agreement, be made by a two -thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. Indeed,
Section 25, Article XVIII must not be treated in isolation to section 21, Article, VII.

Petition dismissed.

MANDATORY/DIRECTORY/PROHIBITURE

CITY OF DAVAO, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BENJAMIN C. DE GUZMAN,

Respondents. (August 13, 2014)
Facts:

Davao City was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Daliao, Toril, Davao City,
covered by TCT No. T-29856. Claiming that this same parcel of land was earlier donated by
the late Engracia Tagalplace (Tagolplace) and Juan dela Cruz (Dela Cruz), to be used as a public
market but was not used as such, their heirs wrote De Guzman, then Davao City Mayor, seeking
reconveyance of the said land.
Subsequently, the Sangguniang Panlungsod issued Resolution No. 2398-01 granting De
Guzman the authority to sign for, and on behalf of Davao City a deed of reconveyance in
favor of the said heirs.
A few months later, under its new mayor, Mayor Rodrigo R. Duterte, it was discovered that the
subject property was sold, not donated, to Davao City, based on the annotation found at the
back of' TCT No. 1417.
From the documents discovered, it appeared that TCT No. T-29856 was a portion of a bigger
parcel of land covered by TCT No. 141 7; that on December 29, 1936, TCT No. 1417 was cancelled,
caused by the execution of a deed of sale transferring the rights over Lot 134-A-2-B in favor of
then Municipality of Davao (now Davao City); that in lieu of TCT No. 141 7, two (2) titles were
issued by the Register of Deeds:
o TCT No. 1588, issued in the name of the Municipality of Davao
o TCT 1589, issued in the name of Tagalplace and dela Cruz
That on February 2, 1971, TCT No. 1588 (first property) was further cancelled when the
Municipality of Davao purchased it from Tagalplace and dcla Cruz, resulting in the issuance of
TCT No. 29856.
Based on this documented discovery, Davao City, through Mayor Duterte, filed a complaint to
annul the reconveyance, impleading not only the heirs of Tagalplace and dela Cruz (the Heirs) but
also De Guzman. The case was presided by Judge Renato A. Fuentes (Judge Fuentes). Meanwhile,
claiming that he was not a real party-in-interest, De Guzman filed a motion to dismiss. Judge
Fuentes denied the motion. Upon denial of his motion for reconsideration, De Guzman filed a
petition for certiorari before the CA (which was eventually dismissed)
Fuentes rendered a summary judgment voiding the reconveyance and ordering the said parcel or
land restored to Davao City.
The Heirs and De Guzman filed an appeal to the CA. The CA ruled that the application of the
rules on summary procedure was not proper because there were genuine issues which
necessitated the presentation of evidence. For said reason, it set aside the RTC-Br. 17 decision and
ordered the remand of the case to the said court for further proceedings.
When the case was returned to RTC-Br. 17, the Heirs and De Guzman moved for the inhibition of
Judge Fuentes, who granted the motion. The case was thereafter re-raffled to RTC-Branch 11
presided by Judge Virginia Hofilenia-Europa. As the records would show, Davao City
asked for the inhibition of Judge Hofilenia-Europa, as her son was the lawyer of De
Guzman. Eventually, the case was finally re-raffled to RTC-Br. 14 presided by Judge George
Omelio.
During the proceedings, De Guzman reiterated his position that he should not be impleaded
because he merely signed the reconveyance in his official capacity as then mayor of Davao City.

This led to an exchange or oral arguments between the opposing parties. Thereafter, Judge
Omelio ordered in open court that De Guzman be dropped as co-defendant.
This prompted Davao City to move for the inhibition of Judge Omelio, alleging bias and partiality
as there was no motion filed by De Guzman. Judge Omelio, however, denied the motion. It was
then brought up with the CA.
CA found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Omelio because the assailed order was
well within the authority of the Court. The CA stated that De Guzman could neither benefit nor be
injured by the affirmation or annulment of the deed or reconveyance. CA dismissed it for being
patently without merit.
De Guzman filed a motion for partial reconsideration and asked for the payment of treble costs
and attorneys fees. CA granted motion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the August 5, 2011
Resolution directing Davao City and its counsel to pay solidarily De Guzman the amount of P5,000.00 as
treble costs.
Decision:

The pertinent rule in this regard is Section 8 of Rule 65, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC,
which reads:

SEC. 8. Proceedings after comment is filed. - After the comment or other pleadings required by the
court are filed, or the time for the filing thereof has expired, the court may hear the case or require the
parties to submit memoranda. If, after such hearing or filing of memoranda or upon the expiration of
the period for filing, the court finds that the allegations of the petition are true, it shall render
judgment for such relief to which the petitioner is entitled.
However, the court may dismiss the petition if it finds the same patently without merit or prosecuted
manifestly for delay, or if the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration.
In such event, the court may award in favor of the respondent treble costs solidarily against the
petitioner and counsel, in addition to subjecting counsel to administrative sanctions under Rule 139
and 139-B of the Rules of Court.
The Court may impose motu proprio, based on res ipso loquitur, other disciplinary sanctions or
measures on erring lawyers for patently dilatory and unmeritorious petitions for certiorari.

The use of the word "may" in the last sentence of the second paragraph or Section 8, Rule 65,
indicates that the assessment of treble costs is not automatic or mandatory. It merely gives
the court the discretion and latitude to impose further sanctions where a petition is dismissed for
being "patently without merit," "prosecuted manifestly for delay," or upon finding that the
questions raised in the petition for certiorari were "too unsubstantial to require consideration."
Although the court is afforded judicial discretion in imposing treble costs, there remains a need to
show that it is sound and with basis that is "taking all the pertinent circumstances into due
consideration.''
In granting De Guzmans motion for partial reconsideration, the CA merely ruled that:
Indeed, we have ruled that the petition was filed patently without merit. While petitioner claims
that it was not filed '"maliciously'' and "in bad faith," we however ruled that 'it is mind boggling
why petitioner would exert every effort to implead him as co-defendant when records clearly
show that he was merely acting in his official capacity.' Records further show that private
respondent has indeed participated in the case since 2002 and ever since had been insisting that
he was not the real party-in-interest.

CA never gave the foundation of their ruling. Even the Supreme Court has not received
information that the main case has been solved.

The Court cannot see why the petition questioning the dropping of De Guzman as co-defendant
was patently without merit. Davao City was of the firm and sincere belief that he had a hand in the
reconveyance of the subject property to the Heirs. Although this matter is still to be decided by
RTC-Br. 14, Davao City believed that he should be impleaded in the case precisely because from
the annotations on TCT No. 1417 covering the subject property, it clearly appears that the said
parcel of land was not donated to the local government unit, but sold to it. Despite the
annotations, De Guzman still executed the deed of reconveyance.
Judge Omelio ordered that he be dropped as a party defendant. Clearly, the order was made not
after a full blown hearing on the merits. For said reason, Davao City has a valid cause to elevate
the matter to the CA. The case was definitely not "patently without merit."
Treble costs were imposed in cases where the parties and their counsels resort to deplorable
dilatory tactics to frustrate the fruition of justice.
In the case at bench, the imposition of treble costs was not explained at all. The CA imposed the
amount ofP5,000.00 but it did not give any reason for such imposition. As the CA never justified
it, the imposition should be stricken off.

Petition granted.

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR., petitioner, vs. Hon. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE in his capacity as
Executive Secretary, Hon. EMILIA BONCODIN in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management, respondents. ROBERTO PAGDANGANAN, intervenor. (July 19, 2000)
Facts:

On December 27, 1997, the President of the Philippines issued AO 372. Its full text, with emphasis
on the assailed provisions, is as follows:
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 372
ADOPTION OF ECONOMY MEASURES IN GOVERNMENT FOR FY 1998

WHEREAS, the current economic difficulties brought about by the peso depreciation requires continued
prudence in government fiscal management to maintain economic stability and sustain the country's
growth momentum;
WHEREAS, it is imperative that all government agencies adopt cash management measures to match
expenditures with available resources;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order and direct:
SECTION 1. All government departments and agencies, including state universities and
colleges, government-owned and controlled corporations and local governments units will
identify and implement measures in FY 1998 that will reduce total expenditures for the
year by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services items,
along the following suggested areas:
xxxx
SECTION 4. Pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget
Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation, the amount equivalent to 10% of
the internal revenue allotment to local government units shall be withheld.

Subsequently, on December 10, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada issued AO 43, amending
Section 4 of AO 372, by reducing to five percent (5%) the amount of internal revenue allotment
(IRA) to be withheld from the LGUs.
Petitioner contends that the President, in issuing AO 372, was in effect exercising the power of
control over LGUs. The Constitution vests in the President, however, only the power of general
supervision over LGUs, consistent with the principle of local autonomy. Petitioner further argues
that the directive to withhold ten percent (10%) of their IRA is in contravention of Section 286 of
the Local Government Code and of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution, providing for the
automatic release to each of these units its share in the national internal revenue.
The solicitor general, on behalf of the respondents, claims on the other hand that AO 372 was
issued to alleviate the "economic difficulties brought about by the peso devaluation" and
constituted merely an exercise of the President's power of supervision over LGUs. It allegedly
does not violate local fiscal autonomy, because it merely directs local governments to identify
measures that will reduce their total expenditures for non-personal services by at least 25 percent.
Likewise, the withholding of 10 percent of the LGUs IRA does not violate the statutory prohibition
on the imposition of any lien or holdback on their revenue shares, because such withholding is
"temporary in nature pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Coordination
Committee of the emerging fiscal situation."

Issue: Whether (a) Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it "directs" LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25
percent; and (b) Section 4 of the same issuance, which withholds 10 percent of their internal revenue
allotments, are valid exercises of the President's power of general supervision over local governments.
Decision:

Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution confines the President's power over local governments to
one of general supervision. It reads as follows:

"Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. x x
x"
This provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. In Mondano v. Silvosa, the Court
contrasted the President's power of supervision over local government officials with that of his power
of control over executive officials of the national government. It was emphasized that the two terms -supervision and control -- differed in meaning and extent. The Court distinguished them as follows:
"x x x In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see
that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may
take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other
hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer
ha[s] done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the
latter.

Under our present system of government, executive power is vested in the President. The
members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos. As such, they are
subject to the power of control of the President, at whose will and behest they can be removed
from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed. In contrast, the heads
of political subdivisions are elected by the people. Their sovereign powers emanate from the
electorate, to whom they are directly accountable. By constitutional fiat, they are subject to the
Presidents supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of
their legitimate powers. By the same token, the President may not withhold or alter any authority
or power given them by the Constitution and the law.
Hand in hand with the constitutional restraint on the President's power over local governments is
the state policy of ensuring local autonomy. In Ganzon v. Court of Appeals, we said that local
autonomy signified "a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization." The grant of autonomy is intended to "break up the
monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local governments, x x x not x x x to end
the relation of partnership and interdependence between the central administration and local
government units x x x." Paradoxically, local governments are still subject to regulation, however
limited, for the purpose of enhancing self-government
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not completely
relinquished all its powers over local governments, including autonomous regions. Only
administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of the
delegation is to make governance more directly responsive and effective at the local levels. In
turn, economic, political and social development at the smaller political units are expected to
propel social and economic growth and development. But to enable the country to develop as a
whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a
common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President and
Congress.
1. In line with the preambular clauses of AO 372, the Local Government Code provides:
"x x x [I]n the event the national government incurs an unmanaged public sector deficit, the President
of the Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the recommendation of [the] Secretary of Finance,

10

Secretary of the Interior and Local Government and Secretary of Budget and Management, and
subject to consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the presidents of
the liga, to make the necessary adjustments in the internal revenue allotment of local government
units but in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national
internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year x x x."
While the wordings of Section 1 of AO 372 have a rather commanding tone, and while we
agree with petitioner that the requirements of Section 284 of the Local Government Code
have not been satisfied, we are prepared to accept the solicitor general's assurance that the
directive to "identify and implement measures x x x that will reduce total expenditures x x x
by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriation" is merely advisory in character,
and does not constitute a mandatory or binding order that interferes with local
autonomy. The language used, while authoritative, does not amount to a
command that emanates from a boss to a subaltern.

Rather, the provision is merely an advisory to prevail upon local executives to recognize the
need for fiscal restraint in a period of economic difficulty. Indeed, all concerned would do well
to heed the President's call to unity, solidarity and teamwork to help alleviate the crisis. It is
understood, however, that no legal sanction may be imposed upon LGUs and their officials
who do not follow such advice. It is in this light that we sustain the solicitor general's
contention in regard to Section 1.
2. Section 4 of AO 372 cannot, however, be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the
automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by no less
than the Constitution. The Local Government Code specifies further that the release shall be made
directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of the year and "shall not be
subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever
purpose." As a rule, the term "shall" is a word of command that must be given a
compulsory meaning. The provision is, therefore, imperative.
Section 4 of AO 372, however, orders the withholding, effective January 1, 1998, of 10 percent of the
LGUs' IRA "pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating
Committee of the emerging fiscal situation" in the country. Such withholding clearly
contravenes the Constitution and the law. Although temporary, it is equivalent to a holdback,
which means "something held back or withheld, often temporarily. Hence, the "temporary" nature of
the retention by the national government does not matter. Any retention is prohibited.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Respondents and their successors are hereby permanently
PROHIBITED from implementing Administrative Order Nos. 372 and 43, respectively dated
December 27, 1997 and December 10, 1998, insofar as local government units are concerned.

11

BERNARDINO MARCELINO, petitioner, vs. THE HON. FERNANDO CRUZ, JR., as Presiding
Judge of Branch XII of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and
THE PROVINCIAL WARDEN OF THE PROVINCIAL JAIL OF RIZAL respondents. (March 18,
1983)
Facts:

Petitioner was charged with the crime of rape before the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch XII. Trial was conducted and the same was concluded when the accused rested his
case on August 4, 1975.
On the same date, however, the attorneys for both parties moved for time within which to
submit their respective memoranda. The trial court granted the motion as follows: Upon joint
motion, the parties are given thirty [30] days to submit their respective memoranda,
simultaneously, and thereafter the case shall be deemed submitted for decision of the Court.
Counsel for petitioner submitted his memorandum in due time, but no memorandum was
filed by the People.
On the date set for promulgation of the decision, counsel for accused moved for
postponement, raising for the first time the alleged loss of jurisdiction of the trial court for
failure to decide the case within 90 days from submission thereof for decision. Acceding to
counsel's request that he be given time to consider the proper remedial measure to take, the
respondent judge reset the promulgation of the decision to January 19, 1976. On said date,
counsel for petitioner moved anew for the resetting of the promulgation of decision. Granting
the motion, respondent judge rescheduled the promulgation to January 26, 1976.
Meanwhile, on January 12, 1976, counsel for the accused filed before the SC the present
petition. SC issued a TRO restraining respondent judge from promulgating the decision in the
criminal case.

Issue: Whether or not the three-month period prescribed by Section 11 of Article X of the 1973
Constitution, being a constitutional directive, is mandatory in character and that non-observance thereof
results in the loss of jurisdiction of the court over the unresolved case.
Decision:

Section 11 [1], Article X of the New Constitution provides in full, to wit:

SEC. 11. Upon the effectivity of this Constitution, the maximum period within which a case or matter
shall be decided or resolved from the date of its submission, shall be eighteen months for the Supreme
court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all inferior collegiate courts, and
three months for all other inferior courts.

In previous cases, the Court ruled that the rendition of the judgment in trial courts refers to the
filing of the signed decision with the clerk of court. There is no doubt that the
constitutional provision cited by petitioner refers to the rendition of judgment and
not to the promulgation thereof. Thus, it is this date that should be considered in
determining whether or not respondent judge had resolved the case within the allotted period.
Indeed, the date of promulgation of a decision could not serve as the reckoning date because the
same necessarily comes at at a later date, considering that notices have to be sent to the accused
as well as to the other parties involved, an event which is beyond the control of the judge.
SC does not agree with petitioner. In this case, undisputed is the fact that on November 28, 1975,
or eighty- five [851] days from September 4, 1975 the date the case was deemed submitted for
decision, respondent judge filed with the deputy clerk of court the decision in Criminal Case No.
5910. He had thus veritably rendered his decision on said case within the three-month period
prescribed by the Constitution.

12

The established rule is that "constitutional provisions are to be construed as mandatory, unless by
express provision or by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest." 10 "The
difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often determined on grounds of
expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the general public by disregarding than by
enforcing the letter of the law."
The phraseology of the provision in question indicates that it falls within the exception rather
than the general rule. By the phrase "unless reduced by the Supreme Court," it is evident
that the period prescribed therein is subject to modification by this Court in accordance with its
prerogative under Section 5 of Article X of the New Constitution to "promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts ... " And there can be no doubt that said provision,
having been incorporated for reasons of expediency, relates merely to matters of procedure.
In practice, the SC have assumed a liberal stand with respect to this provision. This Court
had at various times, upon proper application and for meritorious reasons, allowed judges of
inferior courts additional time beyond the three-month period within which to decide cases
submitted to them. The reason is that a departure from said provision would result in
less injury to the general public than would its strict application. To hold that noncompliance by the courts with the aforesaid provision would result in loss of jurisdiction, would
make the courts, through which conflicts are resolved, the very instruments to foster unresolved
causes by reason merely of having failed to render a decision within the alloted term. Such an
absurd situation could not have been intended by the framers of our fundamental law.
As foreseen by Mr. Henry Campbell Black in his Construction and Interpretation of the Laws, the
constitutional provision in question should be held merely as directory. "Thus, where the contrary
construction) would lead to absurd, impossible or mischievous consequences, it should not be
followed. "
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed; and the Restraining Order dated January 16, 1976
issued by this Court is lifted. Since respondent Judge Fernando Cruz, Jr. is already deceased, his
successor is hereby ordered to decide Criminal Case No. C-5910 on the basis of the record thereof
within ninety [90] days from the time the case is raffled to him.

13

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF ELIZABETH MIRA, GILBERT R. BREHM and

ESTER MIRA BREHM, petitioners-appellees, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositorappellant (Sept 30, 1953)
Facts:

Gilbert R. Brehm is an American citizen, serving the U.S. Navy with temporary assignment at
Subic Bay. On October 9, 1958, he married Ester Mira, a Filipino citizen, who had a daughter
Elizabeth, by another man, also of the American Navy, who left the country in 1952, and never
heard from since then.
After the marriage, the couple established residence at Intramuros, Manila, and the minor
Elizabeth had always been under their care and support of Brehm.
On January 28, 1959, the spouses filed a Joint Petition with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court for the adoption of the minor Elizabeth, claiming that they have mutually given their
consent to the adoption, not only to promote her best interest and well-being, but also to give her
a legitimate status. They prayed that after the proper proceedings, judgment be entered, freeing
the child Elizabeth Mira from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to
her natural father, and be, for all legal intents and purposes, the child of the petitioners, with all
the rights pertinent thereto.
An opposition to the petition with respect to Gilbert Brehm was registered by the Republic of the
Philippines, it appearing that Brehm testified that his residence in Philippines was merely
temporary, same being effective only for purposes of his tour of duty with the Navy, thus
disqualifying him from making an adoption (Art. 335 [4], New Civil Code; Sec. 2, Rule 100, Rules
of Court), and that being a non-resident alien, the Court has no jurisdiction over him.
Petitioners claim that Art. 335 does not apply in the case, reasoning out that it covers only
adoptions for the purpose establishing a relationship of paternity and filiation, where none
existed, but not where the adopting parents are not total strangers to said child; that there is
already a relation between the child and Brehm, created by affinity that Art. 338 of the New Civil
code, expressly authorizes the adoption of a step-child by a step-father, in which category
petitioner Brehm falls. Petitioners contend that the records show their residence is Manila, for
while Brehm works at Subic, he always goes home to Manila, during week-ends and manifested
that he intends to reside in the Philippines permanently, after his tour of duty with the U.S. Naval
Forces.
The Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners.

Issue: Whether or not the Juvenile & Domestic Court erred in adjudging the minor Elizabeth Mira the
adopted child of petitioner Gilbert R. Brehm.
Decision:

There is no question that petitioner Gilbert R. Brehm is a non-resident alien. Article 335 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines provides that non-resident aliens cannot adopt.
In previous cases, the SC have also denied petitions to adopt by persons similarly situated as
petitioner Brehm. Thus, in the case of Caraballo v. Republic, giving some reason why nonresident
aliens are disqualified to adopt, the SC said

... Looking after the welfare of a minor to be adopted the law has surrounded him with safeguards
to achieve and insure such welfare. It cannot be gain said that an adopted minor may be removed
from the country by the adopter, who is not a resident of the Philippines, and placed beyond the
reach and protection of the country of his birth.

This notwithstanding, petitioners press the argument that Brehm being now the step-father of the
minor, he is qualified to adopt, in view of the provisions of par. 3, Art. 338, Civil Code, which
states

14

The following may be adopted:

(1) The natural child by the natural father
(2) Other legitimate children, by the father or mother
(3) A step-child, by the step-father or step-mother.

SC ruled that Article 338 must be construed in connection with Article 335, which clearly states
that "The following cannot adopt: ... (4). Non-resident aliens". It is therefore, mandatory, because
it contains words of positive prohibition and is couched in the negative terms importing that the
act required shall not be done otherwise than designated (50 Am. Jur. 51).
On the other hand, Art. 338, Provides "the following may be adopted: (3) a step-child, by the stepfather or step-mother", which is merely directory, and which can only be given operation if the
same does not conflict with the mandatory provisions of Art. 335

IN VIEW HEREOF, the decision appealed from, in so far as it affects the petitioner Gilbert R. Brehm, is
hereby reversed, and his Petition to adopt the child EIizabeth Mira, denied.

15

DON TINO REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. JULIAN

FLORENTINO, respondent. (September 10, 1999)
Facts:

The case at bar started on February 6, 1997 when petitioner Don Tino Realty and Development
Corporation (Don Tino) filed against the respondent Julian Florentino an ejectment suit. In its
complaint, Don Tino alleged that it is the owner and in peaceful possession of a parcel of land
covered by TCT No. 32422 situated at Barrio San Juan, Balagtas, Bulacan. By means of force,
strategy and stealth, respondent occupied a portion of the said parcel of land and built his house
thereon.
Falling within the provisions of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, summons were served
upon respondent on February 13, 1997 requiring him to answer within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof.

On February 24, 1997, respondent filed his answer through Roel G. Alvear, president of the
Samahang Magkakapitbahay ng RMB, San Juan, Balagtas, Bulacan. The answer is not verified.
The trial court set the case for preliminary conference but Don Tino filed a motion for rendition of
judgment and motion to cancel the preliminary conference on the ground that the answer of
respondent was defective and filed out of time.
The trial court granted the motions. It declared that respondent failed to comply with Section 3
(b) and Section 5 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. It also noted that Roel G. Alvear
has no authority to represent the respondent as there is no special power of attorney executed in
his favor. Thus, it cancelled the preliminary conference and considered the case submitted for
decision in accordance with Section 6 of the said Rules.
The trial court rendered its decision ordering respondent to vacate the premises and to deliver its
possession to Don Tino and to pay the amount of two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) until he
vacates the same. Respondent was further ordered to remove the improvements he made on the
land.
Respondent filed a Manifestation With Motion to Lift Order Dated March 26, 1997 through his
counsel Antonio R. Roque. He alleged that his answer was filed late and by a non-lawyer because
he is economically destitute. He asked the trial court to consider the same as an honest mistake
and excusable negligence. Though a decision was already rendered, the trial court admitted the
motion and set it for resolution on April 24, 1997.
On April 25, 1997, his motion still unresolved, respondent filed a notice of appeal to the Municipal
Trial Court which was approved. The RTC also affirmed the MTC decision, saying that the
defendant was not denied due process because he was given the opportunity to be heard & MTC
was correct in proceeding with the case in accordance with Sec 6.
On appeal, CA reversed the RTC decision. It held that there would be no substantial prejudice and
damage on the part of Don Tino if the answer will be admitted. On the other hand, Juan
Florentino will suffer injustice and injury if the answer is not considered.
Issue: Whether or not under the facts of the case, the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure may be
liberally interpreted in order to allow the admission of an answer filed one (1) day late.
Decision:

Forcibly entry and unlawful detainer cases are summary proceedings designed to provide for an
expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to possession of the property
involved. It does not admit of a delay in the determination thereof. It is a time procedure designed
to remedy the situation.
The Rule on Summary Procedure was promulgated pursuant to Section 36 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129 which provides:

16

SEC. 36. Summary procedures in special cases.- xxx. The Supreme Court shall adopt special
rules or procedures applicable to such cases in order to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive
determination thereof without regard to technical rules. Such simplified procedure may provide
that affidavits and counter-affidavits may be admitted in lieu of oral testimony and that the
periods of filing pleadings shall be non-extendible.
The provisions of the rule on Summary Procedure which are in point are as follows:
Sec. 5. Answer. -Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant shall file his
answer to the complaint and serve a copy thereof to the plaintiff. xxx.
Sec. 6. Effect of failure to answer. - Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within the
period above provided, the court, motu proprio, or upon motion of the plaintiff, shall render
judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed
for therein: xxx

In the case of Gachon vs. Devera, Jr., the SC ruled that the use of the word shall in the Rule on
Summary Procedure underscores their mandatory character. Giving the provisions a directory
application would subvert the nature of the Rule on Summary Procedure and defeat its objective
of expediting the adjudication of suits.
The view of the Court of Appeals that such provisions should be liberally interpreted is misplaced.
The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and
under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of
technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the
prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.
In the case at bar, no satisfactory explanation was offered by respondent why he was not able to
file his answer on time. His allegation that he is economically destitute fails to convince as he did
not even wait for the Municipal Trial Court to resolve his motion where he alleged such fact. Thus,
the Municipal Trial Court acted correctly when it refused to admit his answer.

Petition granted.

17

JOSE ESCRIBANO, petitioner, vs. HON. DAVID P. AVILA, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Cotabato (First Branch) and SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, respondents. (September 12,
1978)
Facts:

On September 25, 1968 Congressman Salipada K. Pendatun, the governor-elect of Cotabato,

filed directly with the Court of First Instance of that province (now North Cotabato) a
complaint for libel against Mayor Jose Escribano of Tacurong, Cotabato (now the province of
Sultan Kudarat).
In that complaint Escribano was charged with having said in a speech, which was broadcasted
on August 26, 1968 by a radio station at Cotabato City, that "Mr. Pendatun is the worst
animal that ever live (fixed) in this province" criminal Case No. 5283).
Escribano questioned Judge Avila's authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the
offense. Judge Avila in his orders of March 5, 20 and 27, 1969 ruled that he had the power to
conduct the preliminary investigation. He received complainant's evidence.
On April 1, 1969 Escribano filed in this Court against Judge Avila and Pendatun the instant
special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition, praying that the said orders of Judge Avila
be set aside.
On April 18 Escribano filed a supplemental petition to annul Judge Avila's order of March 29,
1969. In that order he found that Pendatun's evidence had "established a probable cause to
believe that" libel by radio had been committed and that Escribano "probably committed the
same". Judge Avila ordered the arrest of Escribano, fixed the bail at three thousand pesos,
and referred the case to the city fiscal of Cotabato for the filing of the corresponding
information. A warrant of arrest was issued on March 31. Sometime before April 16 the city
fiscal filed an information for libel against Escribano.
On August 10, 1970 this Court issued a resolution restraining Judge Avila from proceeding
with the arraignment of Escribano.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Cotabato is invested with authority to conduct the
preliminary investigation of the crime of libel committed by means of radio at Cotabato City or whether
that power is lodged exclusively in the city attorney of that city.
Decision:

Petitioner Escribano, in support of his contention that the city fiscal of Cotabato is the only
functionary empowered to conduct the preliminary investigation of the libel charge, invokes the
following provisions of the charter of Cotabato City, Republic Act No. 2364, as amended by
Republic Act No. 3332:

SEC. 23. The city attorney His compensation powers and duties. The provisions of Commonwealth
Act Numbered Four hundred nine to the contrary notwithstanding, the city shall have an attorney who
shall be the chief legal adviser of the city. ... The city attorney shall have the following powers and duties:
xxx xxx xxx
(f) He shall investigate any charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of laws and city ordinances
and prepare the necessary informations or make the necessary complaints against the persons accused.
(g) He shall have charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors and violations of laws and city
ordinances triable in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, and the municipal court of the city, and shall
discharge all the duties in respect to Criminal prosecutions enjoined by law upon provincial fiscals.

On the other hand, complainant Pendatun and respondent Judge rely on section 13, Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court to support their view that the Court of First Instance of Cotabato could conduct
the preliminary investigation:

18

SEC. 13. Preliminary examination and investigation by the judge of the Court of First Instance.
Upon complaint filed directly with the Court of First Instance, without previous preliminary
examination and investigation conducted by the of the judge thereof shall either refer the complaint
to the municipal judge referred to in the second paragraph of section 2 hereof for preliminary
examination and investigation, or himself conduct both preliminary examination and investigation
simultaneously in the manner provided in the preceding sections, and should be find reasonable
ground to believe that the defendant has committed the offense charged, he shall issue a warrant for
his arrest, and thereafter refer the case to the fiscal for the filing of the corresponding information.
The rule is that in construing a statute the mischief intended to be removed or suppressed and the
causes which induced the enactment of a law are important factors to be considered in its
construction (2 Sutherland on Statutory Construction, 885886, cited in Philippine Sugar Centrals
Agency vs. Collector of Customs, 51 Phil. 131, 145). Therefore, it is safe to conclude that the
enumeration in the amendatory law of the public officers and the courts that may conduct the
preliminary investigation of complaints for written defamation was designed to divest the
ordinary municipal court of that power but not to deprive the proper Court of First
Instance of that same power.
(Libel by means of radio is a written defamation under article 355 of the Revised Penal Code)
Before Article 360 of the RPC was amended, the rule was that a criminal action for libel may be
instituted in any jurisdiction where the libelous article was published or circulated, irrespective of
where it was written or printed (People vs. Borja, 43 Phil. 618) and it did not specify the public
officers and the courts that may conduct the preliminary investigation of complaints for libel.
Experience had shown that under that old rule the offended party could harass the accused in a
libel case by laying the venue of the Criminal action in a remote or distant place.
Thus, in connection with an article published in the Daily Mirror and the Philippines Free Press,
Pio Pedrosa, Manuel V. Villareal and Joaquin Roces were charged with libel in the justice of the
peace court of San Fabian, Pangasinan (Amansec vs. De Guzman 93 Phil. 933). To forestall such
harassment, Republic Act No. 4363 laid down the following rules on the venue of the criminal
and civil actions in written defamations:
1. General rule: The action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the
libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at
the time of the commission of the offense.
2. If the offended party is a public officer with office in Manila at the time the offense was committed,
the venue is Manila or the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published.
3. Where an offended party is a public official with office outside of Manila, the venue is the province
or the city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous
article is printed and first published.
4. If an offended party is a private person, the venue is his place of residence at the time of the
commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published.

The common feature of the foregoing rules is that whether the offended party is a public officer or
a private person, he has always the option to file the action in the Court of First Instance of the
province or city where the libelous article is printed or first published.
Its purpose is to minimize the filing in municipal courts of out-of-town libel suit this the
lawmaking body, in order to attain that objective, deprived the ordinary municipal courts of the
power to conduct the preliminary investigation of a criminal action for written defamation. In
other words, the amendment contains not only the rules limiting the venue of the criminal and
civil actions to the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous matter is

19

printed and first published, or where the offended party held office or resided at the time the libel
was committed, but it also specifies that the preliminary investigation should be conducted by the
provincial or city fiscal of the province or city or by the municipal court of the city or capital of the
province where the action may be instituted.
That purpose of the amendment has nothing to do with the power of the Court of First Instance to
conduct preliminary investigations in criminal cases cognizable by it. To retain that power of the
Court of First Instance would in a way be an implementation of the purpose of the amendment,
which is to prevent complainants from harassing and embarrassing the accused with libel suits in
distant municipalities.
Escribano's contention that in chartered cities the city fiscal has the exclusive authority to conduct
preliminary investigations is not correct. While section 23(f) of the Charter of Cotabato City
(Republic Act No. 2364) empowers its city attorney to "investigate all charges of crimes,
misdemeanors and violations of laws and city ordinances and prepare the necessary informations
or make the necessary complaints against the persons accused", that power is not exclusive.
Section 78 of the same charter provides that the municipal or city court of Catabato City "may also
conduct preliminary investigations for any offense, without regard to the limits of punishments",
a provision which is found in section 87 of the Judiciary Law and in section 2, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:
The fact that the Court of First Instance is not mentioned in Article 360 as a tribunal that may conduct the
preliminary investigation of libel cases would seem to suggest that it cannot conduct such preliminary
investigation, following the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius (the inclusion of one thing is the
exclusion of another or the enumeration of particular things excludes the Idea of something else not
mentioner).
Under that canon of legal hermeneutics, where a statute directs the performance of certain acts by a
particular person or class of persons, it implies that it shall not be done otherwise or by a different person
or class of persons (82 C.J.S. 667668).
That maxim is not a rule of law. It is just a tool of statutory construction or a means of ascertaining the
legislative intent. It is not of universal application and is not conclusive. It cannot be used to defeat the
plainly indicated purpose of the lawmaking body (82 C.J.S. 668). The maxim is inapplicable if there is
some special reason for mentioning one thing and none for mentioning another which is otherwise within
the statute, so that the absence of any mention of such other will not exclude it (82 C.J.S. 670). The
maxim does not apply in case a statute appears upon its face to limit the operation of its provisions to
particular persons or things by enumerating them, but no reason exists why other persons or things not so
enumerated should not have been included, and manifest injustice win follow by not so including them
(Springer vs. Philippine Islands, 72 Law. ed. 845, 227 U.S 189; People vs. Manahan, 115 Phil. 657,6681).
The maxim is no more than an auxiliary rule of interpretation to be ignored where other circumstances
indicate the enumeration was not intended to be exclusive" (Manabat vs. De Aquino, 92 Phil. 1026, 1027).
The maxim cannot be applied in this case because, as shown above, the fact that the Court of First
Instance is not mention in the amendment, as being empowered to conduct a preliminary investigation in
cases of written defamation, has nothing to do with the purpose of the amendment. It should be stressed
that in construing a law, the court must look to the object to be accomplished, the evils and mischief
sought to be remedied, or the purpose to be subserved, and it should give the law a reasonable or liberal
construction which win best effect its purpose rather than one which win defeat it (82 C.J.S. 593)

20

EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS (express mention of one thing excludes all
others)

CITY GOVERNMENT OF SAN PABLO, LAGUNA, CITY TREASURER OF SAN PABLO,

LAGUNA, and THE SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNSOD OF SAN PABLO, LAGUNA, petitioners, vs.
HONORABLE BIENVENIDO V. REYES, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 29, San Pablo City and the MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, respondents. (March 25, 1999)
Facts:

Act No. 3648 granted the Escudero Electric Services Company, a legislative franchise to maintain
and operate an electric light and power system in the City of San Pablo and nearby municipalities
Section 10 of Act No. 3648 provides:

x x x In consideration of the franchise and rights hereby granted, the grantee shall pay unto the
municipal treasury of each municipality in which it is supplying electric current to the public under
this franchise, a tax equal to two percentum of the gross earnings from electric current sold or
supplied under this franchise in each said municipality. Said tax shall be due and payable quarterly
and shall be in lieu of any and all taxes of any kind, nature or description levied, established or
collected by any authority whatsoever, municipal, provincial or insular, now or in the future, on its
poles, wires, insulators, switches, transformers, and structures, installations, conductors, and
accessories place in and over and under all public property, including public streets and highways,
provincial roads, bridges and public squares, and on its franchise, rights, privileges, receipts,
revenues and profits from which taxes the grantee is hereby expressly exempted.

Escuderos franchise was transferred to the plaintiff MERALCO under Republic Act No. 2340.
Presidential Decree No. 551 was enacted on September 11, 1974. Section 1 thereof provides the
following:

Section 1. Any provision of law or local ordinance to the contrary notwithstanding, the franchise tax
payable by all grantees of franchise to generate, distribute and sell electric current for light, heat and
power shall be two percent (2%) of their gross receipts received from the sale of electric current and
from transactions incident to the generation, distribution and sale of electric current.
Such franchise tax shall be payable to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or his duly authorized
representative on or before the twentieth day of the month following the end of each calendar quarter or
month as may be provided in the respective franchise or pertinent municipal regulation and shall, any
provision of the Local Tax Code or any other law to the contrary notwithstanding, be in lieu of all taxes
and assessments of whatever nature imposed by any national or local authority on earnings, receipts,
income and privilege of generation, distribution and sale of electric current

Local Government Code of 1991 took effect on January 1, 1992. The said Code authorizes the
province/city to impose a tax on business enjoying a franchise at a rate not exceeding fifty percent
(50%) of one percent (1%) of the gross annual receipts for the preceding calendar year realized
within its jurisdiction.
On October 5, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglunsod of San Pablo City enacted Ordinance No. 56,
otherwise known as the Revenue Code of the City of San Pablo. Sec 2.09 of the Ordinance imposes
the tax provided for in the LGC (1%)
Pursuant to Section 2.09, the petitioner City Treasurer sent to private respondent a letter
demanding payment of the aforesaid franchise tax. From 1994 to 1996, private respondent paid
under protest a total amount of P1,857,711.67
The private respondent subsequently filed this action before the Regional Trial Court to declare
Ordinance No. 56 null and void insofar as it imposes the franchise tax upon private respondent

21

MERALCO and to claim for a refund of the taxes paid. The Court ruled in favor of MERALCO and
upheld its argument that the LGC did not expressly or impliedly repeal the tax
exemption/incentive enjoyed by it under its charter.
A motion for reconsideration was denied. Thus the current petition.

Issue: Whether or not the City of San Pablo may impose a local franchise tax pursuant to the LGC upon
MERALCO which pays a tax equal to two percent of its gross receipts in lieu of all taxes and assessments
of whatever nature imposed by any national or local authority on savings or income.
Decision:

The LGC contains the following provision:

Section 534 (f). Repealing Clause - All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive
orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with
any of the provisions of this code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

This clause partakes of the nature of a general repealing clause. It is certainly not an express
repealing clause because it fails to designate the specific act or acts identified by number or title,
that are intended to be repealed.
Thus, the SC ruled that there an implied repeal by Republic Act No. 7160 of the MERALCO
franchise insofar as the latter impose a 2% tax in lieu of all taxes and assessments of whatever
nature.
Petitioners correctly rely on the provisions of Section 137 and 193 of the LGC to support their
position that MERALCOs tax exemption has been withdrawn. The explicit language of Section 137
which authorizes the province to impose franchise tax notwithstanding any exemption granted by
any law or other special laws" is all encompassing and clear. The franchise tax is imposable
despite any exemption enjoyed under special laws.

Section 137. Franchise Tax - Notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law or other special law,
the province may impose a tax on business enjoying a franchise, at a rate not exceeding fifty percent 50%
of one percent 1% of the gross annual receipts for the preceding calendar year based on the incoming
receipts, or realized, within its territorial jurisdiction. Xxx
Section 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges - Unless otherwise provided in this Code, tax
exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, except local water districts, cooperatives duly
registered under R.A. 6938, non-stock and nonprofit hospitals and educational institutions, are hereby
withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.

Section 193 buttresses the withdrawal of extant tax exemption privileges. By stating that unless
otherwise provided in this Code, tax exemptions or incentives granted to or presently enjoyed by
all persons whether natural or juridical, including government-owned or controlled corporations
except 1) local water districts, 2) cooperatives duly registered under R.A. 6938, (3) non-stock and
non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, are withdrawn upon the effectivity of this code,
the obvious import is to limit the exemptions to the three enumerated entities.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: The express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence
excludes all others as expressed in the familiar maxim expressio unius est exlcusio alterius. In the absence
of any provision of the Code to the contrary, and we find no other provision of the Code to the contrary,
and we find no other provision in point, any existing tax exemption or incentive enjoyed by MERALCO
under existing law was clearly intended to be withdrawn.
Petition granted.

22

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MORO SUMAGUINA

MACARANDANG, defendant-appellant (Dec 23, 1959)
Facts:

Moro Sumaguina Macarandang was accused and, after trial, convicted of the crime of illegal
possesion of fire-arms in the Court of First Instance of Lanao.
o Riot Gun, Winchester, 12 GA. SN-924131 and (8) rounds of ammunitions, without having
obtained in proper license or permit therefore from competent authority
In his present appeal, he invokes as his legal excuse or authority therefor, the appointment issued
him by Governor Dimakuta as secret agent on October 1, 1953, which reads:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

For having shown good faith by previously surrendering to this Office a firearm, Datu Sumaguina
Macarandang of Kamalig, Marantao, Lanao, has been appointed SECRET AGENT of peace and order
campaigns and detention of crimes. Accordingly, he is hereby authorized to hold and carry in his
possession one (1) Riot Winchester Shotgun, 12 GA. Serial No. 942131 with twenty (20) rounds of
ammunitions for the successful execution of his hazardous mission.
Datu Sumaguina Macarandang shall personally report to me from time to time all activities and
whereabouts of lawless and wanted elements roaming in the Municipal District of Marantoa, as well as all
matters affecting tranquility therein existing.
Issue: Whether or not Macarandang is exempt from the requirements relating to the issuance of license
to possess firearms.
Decision:

While the trial court was correct in holding that the Governor has no authority to issue any
firearm license or permit, Section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides, as shown at
lease by the subject matter therefor, that "peace officers" are exempted from the requirements
relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. The appointment of the accused as secret
agent to the assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detention of crimes,
sufficiently put him within the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the
municipal police expressly covered by section 879.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed and accused acquitted, with costs de officio.

23

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG,

defendant-appellant. (April 30, 1967)
Facts:

In an information dated August 14, 1962, Mapulong was charged for violating Section 878 in
connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code; he willfully and unlawfully
have in his possession and under his custody and control one home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal.
22, without serial number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition, without first having secured the
necessary license or permit therefor from the corresponding authorities. Contrary to law.
During the proceeding, counsel for the accused on his part presented four (4) exhibits consisting
of:
o His appointment "as secret agent of the Hon. Feliciano Leviste," then Governor of
Batangas, dated June 2, 1962
o A document likewise issued by Gov. Leviste also addressed to the accused directing him
to proceed to Manila, Pasay and Quezon City on a confidential mission
o The oath of office of the accused as such secret agent,
o A certificate dated March 11, 1963, to the effect that the accused "is a secret agent" of Gov.
Leviste.
Counsel for the accused then stated that with the presentation of the above exhibits he was
"willing to submit the case on the question of whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and
qualified as such of the provincial governor is exempt from the requirement of having a license of
firearm."
Trial court convicted the accused.

Issue: Whether or not the appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial
governor would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of
firearm and ammunition.
Decision:
No. The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any
person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any
instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of
firearms, or ammunition."
The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers,
soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine
Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial
governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors,
and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in
possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties.

The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt.
Accuseds reliance on People v. Macarandang, where a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on
the assumption that the appointment "of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within
the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly
covered by section 879." is misplaced. It is not within the power of this Court to set aside the clear
and explicit mandate of a statutory provision.

Judgment appealed from is affirmed.

24

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JESUS SANTAYANA Y ESCUDERO,

defendant-appellant. (Nov 15, 1976)
Facts:

On February 19, 1962, accused Jesus Santayana, was appointed as "Special Agent" by then
Colonel Jose C. Maristela, Chief of the Criminal Investigation Service.
On March 9, 1962, a Memorandum Receipt 2 for equipment was issued in the name of the
accused regarding one pistol Melior SN-122137 with one (1) mag and stock. Col. Maristela
likewise issued an undated certification to the effect that the accused was an accredited member
of the CIS, that the pistol was given to him by virtue of his appointment as special agent and that
he was authorized to carry and possess the same in the performance of his official duty and for his
personal protection.
On October 29, 1962, the accused was found in Plaza Miranda in possession of the firearm
without a license to possess them. An investigation was conducted and thereupon, a
corresponding complaint was filed against the accused. The case underwent trial after which the
accused was convicted of the crime charged with its corresponding penalty (1 year and 1 day)

Issues: Whether or not the appointment of the appellant as special agent of the CIS which apparently
authorizes him to carry and possess firearms exempts him from securing a license or permit
corresponding thereto.
Decision:

There is no question that appellant was appointed as CIS secret agent with the authority to carry
and possess firearms. Indeed, appellant was issued a firearm in the performance of his official
duties and for his personal protection.
It also appears that appellant was informed by Col. Maristela that it was not necessary for him to
apply for a license or to register the said firearm because it was government property and
therefore could not legally be registered or licensed in appellant's name.
Capt. Adolfo M. Bringas from whom appellant received the firearm also informed the latter that
no permit to carry the pistol was necessary "because you are already appointed as CIS agent.
At the time of appellant's apprehension, the doctrine then prevailing is enunciated in the case of
People vs. Macarandang wherein the SC held that the appointment of a civilian as "secret agent
to assist in the maintenace of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts
him within the category of a 'peace officer' equivalent even to a member of the municipal police
expressly covered by Section 879." The case of People vs. Mapa revoked the doctrine in the
Macarandang case only on August 30, 1967. Under the Macarandang rule therefore obtaining at
the time of appellant's appointment as secret agent, he incurred no criminal liability for
possession of the pistol in question.

The decision appealed from is hereby reversed and appellant Jesus Santayana y Escudero
is hereby acquitted.

25

SARIO MALINIAS, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, TEOFILO CORPUZ,

ANACLETO TANGILAG and VICTOR DOMINGUEZ, respondents. (October 4, 2002)
Facts:

Petitioner Malinias was a candidate for governor whereas Pilando was a candidate for
congressional representative of Mountain Province in the May 11, 1998 elections. The Provincial
Board of Canvassers held the canvassing of election returns from May 11, 1998 to May 15, 1998.
On July 31, 1998, Malinias and Pilando filed a complaint with the COMELECs Law Department
for violation of Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646, and Sections 232 and 261 (i) of B.P. Blg. 881, against
Victor Dominguez, Teofilo Corpuz, Anacleto Tangilag, Thomas Bayugan, Jose Bagwan who was
then Provincial Election Supervisor, and the members of the Provincial Board of Canvassers.
Victor Dominguez was then the incumbent Congressman of Poblacion, Sabangan, Mountain
Province. Teofilo Corpuz was then the Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police in
Mountain Province while Anacleto Tangilag was then the Chief of Police of the Municipality of
Bontoc, Mountain Province.
Malinias and Pilando alleged that on the last day of canvassing, a police checkpoint at Nacagang,
Sabangan, Mountain Province blocked their supporters who were on their way to Bontoc, and
prevented them from proceeding to the Provincial Capitol Building. Malinias and Pilando further
alleged that policemen, upon orders of private respondents, prevented their supporters, who
nevertheless eventually reached the Provincial Capitol Building, from entering the capitol
grounds.
In support of the complaint, several supporters of Malinias and Pilando executed so-called mass
affidavits uniformly asserting that private respondents, among others, (1) prevented them from
attending the provincial canvassing, (2) padlocked the canvassing area, and (3) threatened the
people who wanted to enter the canvassing room. They likewise alleged that the Provincial Board
of Canvassers never allowed the canvassing to be made public and consented to the exclusion of
the public or representatives of other candidates except those of Dominguez.
Corpuz and Tangilag admitted ordering the setting up of a checkpoint at Nacagang, Sabangan,
Mountain Province and securing the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol Building. That the check
points were to enforce the COMELEC gun ban and that policemen were posted within the vicinity
of the capitol grounds in response to earlier information that some groups were out to disrupt the
canvass proceedings which were being conducted in the second floor of the Provincial Capitol
Building.
COMELEC en banc dismissed the petition for lack of sufficient evidence to establish probable
cause.

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing Malinias and Pilandos
complaint for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for alleged violation of Section 25 of
R.A. No. 6646 and Sections 232 and 261 (i) of B.P. 881.
Decision:
1.

Sec. 25. Right to be Present and to Counsel During the Canvass - Any registered political party,
coalition of parties, through their representatives, and any candidate has the right to be present
and to counsel during the canvass of the election returns; Provided, that only one counsel may
argue for each political party or candidate. They shall have the right to examine the returns being
canvassed without touching them, make their observations thereon, and file their challenge in
accordance with the rules and regulations of the Commission. No dilatory action shall be allowed
by the board of canvassers.
In the present case, Malinias miserably failed to substantiate his claim that private
respondents denied him his right to be present during the canvassing. There was even no
showing that Malinias was within the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol Building or that private
respondents prevented him from entering the canvassing room. He failed to show that his

26

rights as a gubernatorial candidate were prejudiced by the alleged failure of his supporters to
attend the canvassing.
Malinias claimed that even though Pilando was present during the canvassing, the latter was
only able to enter the room after eluding the policemen and passing through the rear entrance
of the Provincial Capitol Building. This allegation, however, is not supported by any clear and
convincing evidence. Pilando himself, who was purportedly prevented by policemen from
entering the canvassing room, failed to attest to the veracity of this statement rendering the
same self-serving and baseless.
Surprisingly, the COMELEC and private respondents apparently overlooked that R.A. No.
6646 does not punish a violation of Section 25 of the law as a criminal election
offense. Section 25 merely highlights one of the recognized rights of a political party or
candidate during elections, aimed at providing an effective safeguard against fraud or
irregularities in the canvassing of election returns. Section 27 of R.A. No. 6646, which
specifies the election offenses punishable under this law, does not include
Section 25.
Malinias further claims that, in violation of this right, his supporters were blocked by a
checkpoint set-up at Nacagang, Sabangan, Mountain Province. This allegation is devoid of
any basis to merit a reversal of the COMELECs ruling. Malinias supporters who were
purportedly blocked by the checkpoint did not confirm or corroborate this allegation of
Malinias.
The police established checkpoints in the entire country to implement the firearms ban
during the election period. Clearly, this is in consonance with the constitutionally ordained
power of the COMELEC to deputize government agencies and instrumentalities of the
Government for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections.
2. Sec. 232. Persons not allowed inside the canvassing room - It shall be unlawful for any officer
or member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, including the Philippine Constabulary, or the
Integrated National Police or any peace officer or any armed or unarmed persons belonging to an
extra-legal police agency, special forces, reaction forces, strike forces, home defense forces,
barangay self-defense units, barangay tanod, or of any member of the security or police
organizations or government ministries, commissions, councils, bureaus, offices,
instrumentalities, or government-owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries or of any
member of a privately owned or operated security, investigative, protective or intelligence agency
performing identical or similar functions to enter the room where the canvassing of the election
returns are held by the board of canvassers and within a radius of fifty meters from such room:
Provided, however, That the board of canvassers by a majority vote, if it deems necessary, may
make a call in writing for the detail of policemen or any peace officers for their protection or for
the protection of the election documents and paraphernalia in the possession of the board, or for
the maintenance of peace and order, in which case said policemen or peace officers, who shall be
in proper uniform, shall stay outside the room within a radius of thirty meters near enough to be
easily called by the board of canvassers at any time.
Again, the COMELEC and private respondents overlooked that Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881
is not one of the election offenses explicitly enumerated in Sections 261 and 262 of
B.P. Blg. 881. While Section 232 categorically states that it is unlawful for the persons referred
therein to enter the canvassing room, this act is not one of the election offenses criminally
punishable under Sections 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. 881. Thus, the act involved in Section 232 of
B.P. Blg. 881 is not punishable as a criminal election offense. Section 264 of B.P. Blg. 881
provides that the penalty for an election offense under Sections 261 and 262 is imprisonment of
not less than one year but not more than six years.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:

27

Under the rule of statutory construction of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, there is no ground to
order the COMELEC to prosecute private respondents for alleged violation of Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881
precisely because this is a non-criminal act.
It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence
implies the exclusion of all others. The rule is expressed in the familiar maxim, expressio unius est
exclusio alterius.
The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is formulated in a number of ways. One variation of the
rule is the principle that what is expressed puts an end to that which is implied. Expressium facit cessare
tacitum. Thus, where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by
interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters.
x x x The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius and its variations are canons of restrictive
interpretation. They are based on the rules of logic and the natural workings of the human mind. They are
predicated upon ones own voluntary act and not upon that of others. They proceed from the premise that
the legislature would not have made specified enumeration in a statute had the intention been not to
restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned

However! This is not to say that a violation of Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is without any sanction.
Though not a criminal election offense, a violation of Section 232 certainly warrants, after proper
hearing, the imposition of administrative penalties. Under Section 2, Article IX-C of the
Constitution, the COMELEC may recommend to the President the imposition of disciplinary
action on any officer or employee the COMELEC has deputized for violation of its directive, order
or decision. Also, under the Revised Administrative Code, the COMELEC may recommend to the
proper authority the suspension or removal of any government official or employee found guilty
of violation of election laws or failure to comply with COMELEC orders or rulings.

28

LUNG CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. QUEZON CITY and CONSTANTINO P.
ROSAS, in his capacity as City Assessor of Quezon City, respondents. (June 29, 2004)
Facts:

The petitioner Lung Center of the Philippines is a non-stock and non-profit entity established on
January 16, 1981 by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1823. The petitioner accepts paying and
non-paying patients. It also renders medical services to out-patients, both paying and non-paying.
Aside from its income from paying patients, the petitioner receives annual subsidies from the
government.
It is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Quezon Avenue corner Elliptical Road,
Central District, Quezon City.
On June 7, 1993, both the land and the hospital building of the petitioner were assessed for real
property taxes.
On August 25, 1993, the petitioner filed a Claim for Exemption from real property taxes with the
City Assessor, predicated on its claim that it is a charitable institution. The petitioners request
was denied, and a petition was, thereafter, filed before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals of
Quezon City (QC-LBAA) for the reversal of the resolution of the City Assessor.
o The petitioner alleged that under Section 28, paragraph 3 of the 1987 Constitution, the
property is exempt from real property taxes. It averred that a minimum of 60% of its
hospital beds are exclusively used for charity patients and that the major thrust of its
hospital operation is to serve charity patients. The petitioner contends that it is a
charitable institution and, as such, is exempt from real property taxes.
The QC-LBAA rendered judgment dismissing the petition and holding the petitioner liable for
real property taxes.
Central Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City (CBAA) affirmed this decision; so did the
CA.

Issue: (1) Whether or not the petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of Presidential
Decree No. 1823 and the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and Section 234(b) of Republic Act No. 7160; and
(2) whether the real properties of the petitioner are exempt from real property taxes.
Decision:
1. Yes, petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions.
To determine whether an enterprise is a charitable institution/entity or not, the elements
which should be considered include the statute creating the enterprise, its corporate
purposes, its constitution and by-laws, the methods of administration, the nature of the
actual work performed, the character of the services rendered, the indefiniteness of the
beneficiaries, and the use and occupation of the properties.
In the legal sense, a charity may be fully defined as a gift, to be applied consistently with
existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their
minds and hearts under the influence of education or religion, by assisting them to
establish themselves in life or otherwise lessening the burden of government.
The test whether an enterprise is charitable or not is whether it exists to carry out a
purpose reorganized in law as charitable or whether it is maintained for gain, profit, or
private advantage.
Under P.D. No. 1823, the petitioner is a non-profit and non-stock corporation which,
subject to the provisions of the decree, is to be administered by the Office of the President
of the Philippines with the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Human Settlements. It
was organized for the welfare and benefit of the Filipino people principally to help combat
the high incidence of lung and pulmonary diseases in the Philippines.

29

The medical services of the petitioner are to be rendered to the public in general in any
and all walks of life including those who are poor and the needy without discrimination.
After all, any person, the rich as well as the poor, may fall sick or be injured or wounded
and become a subject of charity.
So long as the money received is devoted or used altogether to the charitable object which
it is intended to achieve; and no money inures to the private benefit of the persons
managing or operating the institution.
Under P.D. No. 1823, the petitioner is entitled to receive donations. The petitioner does
not lose its character as a charitable institution simply because the gift or donation is in
the form of subsidies granted by the government

2. No, it is not entirely exempt from real property taxes.

Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1823, relied upon by the petitioner, specifically provides that
the petitioner shall enjoy the tax exemptions and privileges:
SEC. 2. TAX EXEMPTIONS AND PRIVILEGES. Being a non-profit, non-stock corporation organized
primarily to help combat the high incidence of lung and pulmonary diseases in the Philippines, all
donations, contributions, endowments and equipment and supplies to be imported by authorized entities
or persons and by the Board of Trustees of the Lung Center of the Philippines, Inc., for the actual use and
benefit of the Lung Center, shall be exempt from income and gift taxes, the same further deductible in full
for the purpose of determining the maximum deductible amount under Section 30, paragraph (h), of the
National Internal Revenue Code, as amended.
The Lung Center of the Philippines shall be exempt from the payment of taxes, charges and fees imposed
by the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof with respect to equipment
purchases made by, or for the Lung Center.

It is plain as day that under the decree, the petitioner does not enjoy any property tax exemption
privileges for its real properties as well as the building constructed thereon. If the intentions were
otherwise, the same should have been among the enumeration of tax exempt privileges under
Section 2 (rule of expression unius est exclusion alterius)
Section 28(3), Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides, thus:

(3) Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, nonprofit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly and exclusively used for
religious, charitable or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation

The tax exemption under this constitutional provision covers property taxes only.
Consequently, the constitutional provision is implemented by Section 234(b) of Republic Act No.
7160 (otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991) as follows:

SECTION 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. The following are exempted from payment of the
real property tax: ... (b) Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto,
mosques, non-profit or religious cemeteries and all lands, buildings, and improvements actually, directly,
and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational purposes.

Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and Rep. Act No. 7160 in order to be entitled to the
exemption, the petitioner is burdened to prove, by clear and unequivocal proof, that (a) it is a
charitable institution; and (b) its real properties are ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY and EXCLUSIVELY
used for charitable purposes.
o Exclusive is defined as possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of others; debarred from
participation or enjoyment; and exclusively is defined, in a manner to exclude; as
enjoying a privilege exclusively. If real property is used for one or more commercial

30

purposes, it is not exclusively used for the exempted purposes but is subject to taxation.
The words dominant use or principal use cannot be substituted for the words used
exclusively without doing violence to the Constitutions and the law. Solely is synonymous
with exclusively.
o What is meant by actual, direct and exclusive use of the property for charitable purposes
is the direct and immediate and actual application of the property itself to the purposes
for which the charitable institution is organized. It is not the use of the income from the
real property that is determinative of whether the property is used for tax-exempt
purposes
Petitioner failed to prove that the entirety of its real property is actually, directly and exclusively
used for charitable purposes. While portions of the hospital are used for the treatment of patients
and the dispensation of medical services to them, whether paying or non-paying, other portions
thereof are being leased to private individuals for their clinics and a canteen. Further, a portion of
the land is being leased to a private individual for her business enterprise under the business
name Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center.

Petition is partially granted.

31

DOMINADOR GOMEZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. HONORIO VENTURA, Secretary of the Interior of

the Government of the Philippine Islands, and the BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, defendants-appellees. (March 29, 1930)
Facts:

Plaintiff prays for the annulling and setting aside investigation proceedings, particularly the
decision of the Board of Medical Examiners of the Philippine Islands revoking the plaintiffs
license to practice medicine and surgery.
The defendants answered with a general denial and prayed that the complaint be dismissed.
Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the complaint with costs against the plaintiff.
Counsel for plaintiff contends that the court below erred, among other things, in holding that
Section 9 Act No. 2381, known as the Opium Law, is in force and in not holding that Section 9 Act
No. 2381 has been repealed, even on the supposition that it was valid

Decision:

There is no express repeal of section 9 of Act No. 2381 and it cannot be held that it has been
impliedly repealed, for the reason that the provisions of section 9, Act No. 2381, are neither
contrary to, nor incompatible with, the provisions of section 780 of the Administrative Code, as
amended.
o Act No. 310 provided that the Board of medical Examiners could revoke licenses for
"unprofessional conduct," without defining the term. Act No. 1761 (the Opium Law)
provided that illegally prescribing opium should be cause for revocation of medical
licenses.
o Clearly, the Opium Law did not repeal Act No. 310. Act No. 2381 also an Opium Law
in its section 9, repeated the provision as to doctors and dentists. The repetition did not
repeal Act No. 310.
o Act No. 2493, section 11 (Ad. Code, sec. 780), provided that certificates of physicians are
revocable for "unprofessional conduct," without defining the phrase. In other words, so
far as revocation of licenses is concerned, Act No. 2493 is mere reenactment of Act No.
310. The reenactment of the said portion of Act No. 310 did not repeal section 9 of the
Opium Law. If said section 9 has been repealed, it must be by Act No. 3111, which amends
Act No. 2493 (Ad. Code, sec. 780), by an addition after the words "unprofessional
conduct" of the following:

"The words "unprofessional conduct, immoral, or dishonorable conduct" as used in this chapter shall be
construed to include the following acts: (1) Procuring, aiding or abetting a criminal abortion; (2)
advertising, either in his own name or in the name of any other person, firm, association, or corporation,
in any written or printed paper, or document, of medical business in which untruthful or improbable
promises are made, or being employed by, or in the service of any person, firm, association or corporation
so advertising, or advertising in any obscene manner derogatory to good morals; (3) habitual
intemperance or addition to the use of morphine, opium, cocaine or other drugs having a similar effect;
(4) conviction of a crime or misdemeanor involving dishonorable conduct; and (5) willfully betraying a
professional secret."
o

It cannot be seriously contended that aside from the five examples specified there can be
no other conduct of a physician deemed "unprofessional" conduct theretofore deemed
grounds for revocation licenses. The maxim expressio unius est exclussio alterius
should be applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent and should not be
permitted to defeat the plain indicated purpose of the Legislature. It does not apply when
words are mentioned by way of example, or to remove doubts. (See Cyc., 1122.) If,
therefore, there exists, "unprofessional conduct" not specified in the laws, with more
reason does the criminal use of opium remain a specific cause for revocation of license.

32

EJUSDEM GENERIS (OF THE SAME KIND OR NATURE)

LA RAZON SOCIAL "GO TIAOCO Y HERMANOS," plaintiff-appellant, vs. UNION INSURANCE
SOCIETY OF CANTON, LTD., defendant-appellee (September 1, 1919)
Facts:

This is an action on a policy of marine insurance issued by the Union Insurance Society of Canton,
Ltd., upon a cargo of rice belonging to the plaintiffs, Go Tiaoco Brothers, which was transported
in the early days of May, 1915, on the steamship Hondagua from the port of Saigon to Cebu.
o On discharging the rice from one of the compartments in the after hold, upon arrival at
Cebu, it was discovered that 1,472 sacks had been damaged by sea water.
o The trial court found that the inflow of the sea water during the voyage was due to a
defect in one of the drain pipes of the ship and concluded that the loss was not covered by
the policy of insurance.
o Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of the defendant and the plaintiffs appealed.
The policy of insurance was signed upon a form long in use among companies engaged in
maritime insurance. It purports to insure the cargo from the following among other risks: "Perils .
. . of the seas, men of war, fire, enemies, pirates, rovers, thieves, jettisons, . . . barratry of the
master and mariners, and of all other perils, losses, and misfortunes that have or shall come to the
hurt, detriment, or damage of the said goods and merchandise or any part thereof."
Issue: Whether or not the insurer is liable on this policy for the loss caused in the manner above stated.
Note: The issue presents two phases which are in a manner involved with each other. (1) One has
reference to the meaning of the expression "perils of the seas and all other perils, losses, and misfortunes,"
as used in the policy; (2) the other has reference to the implied warranty, on the part of the insured, as to
the seaworthiness of the ship.
Decision:
1.

In the first place it is determined that the words "all other perils, losses, and misfortunes" are to
be interpreted as covering risks which are of like kind (ejusdem generis) with the
particular risks which are enumerated in the preceding part of the same clause of the contract.
"According to the ordinary rules of construction," said Lord Macnaghten in Thames and
Mersey Marine Insurance Co. vs. Hamilton, Fraser & Co. ([1887]), 12 A. C., 484, 501),
"these words must be interpreted with reference to the words which immediately precede
them. They were no doubt inserted in order to prevent disputes founded on nice
distinctions
for example, if the expression 'perils of the seas' is given its widest sense the general
words have little or no effect as applied to that case. If on the other hand that expression
is to receive a limited construction, as apparently it did in Cullen vs. Butler (5 M. & S.,
461), and loss by perils of the seas is to be confined to loss ex marinae tempestatis
discrimine, the general words become most important. But still, ever since the case of
Cullen vs. Butler, when they first became the subject of judicial construction, they have
always been held or assumed to be restricted to cases 'akin to' or resembling' or 'of the
same kind as' those specially mentioned."
It must be considered to be settled, furthermore, that a loss which, in the ordinary course
of events, results from the natural and inevitable action of the sea, from the ordinary
wear and tear of the ship, or from the negligent failure of the ship's owner to provide the
vessel with proper equipment to convey the cargo under ordinary conditions, is not a
peril of the sea. Such a loss is rather due to what has been aptly called the "peril of the
ship." The insurer undertakes to insure against perils of the sea and similar perils, not
against perils of the ship.

33

In the present case the entrance of the sea water into the ship's hold through the
defective pipe already described was not due to any accident which happened during the
voyage, but to the failure of the ship's owner properly to repair a defect of the existence of
which he was apprised. The loss was therefore more analogous to that which directly
results from simple unseaworthiness of the ship than to that which results from perils of
the sea.

2. The ship was unseaworthy.

It is universally accepted that in every contract of insurance upon anything which is the
subject of marine insurance, a warranty is implied that the ship shall be seaworthy at the time
of the inception of the voyage. This rule is accepted in our own Insurance Law.
It is also well settled that a ship which is seaworthy for the purpose of insurance upon the ship
may yet be unseaworthy for the purpose of insurance upon the cargo.

The trial court committed no error in absolving the defendant from the complaint. The
judgment must therefore be affirmed.

34

IN RE: PETITION FOR EXEMPTION FROM COVERAGE BY THE SOCIAL SECURITY

SYSTEM, ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, petitioner-appellant, vs. SOCIAL
SECURITY COMMISSION, respondent-appellee (January 20, 1961)
Facts:

On September 1, 1958, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, thru counsel, filed with the
Social Security Commission a request that "Catholic Charities, and all religious and charitable
institutions and/or organizations, which are directly or indirectly, wholly or partially, operated by
the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila," be exempted from compulsory coverage of Republic
Act No. 1161, as amended, otherwise known as the Social Security Law of 1954.
o Social Security Law was enacted pursuant to the "policy of the Republic of the Philippines
to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security system which shall be suitable
to the needs of the people throughout the Philippines and shall provide protection to
employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death."
o The request was based on the claim that the said Act is a labor law and does not cover
religious and charitable institutions but is limited to businesses and activities organized
for profit.
SSS denied the request. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, reiterating its arguments and
raising constitutional objections, requested for reconsideration of the resolution. It was denied
also.
Section 9 of the Social Security Law, as amended, provides that coverage "in the System shall be
compulsory upon all members between the age of sixteen and sixty rears inclusive, if they have
been for at least six months in the service of an employer who is a member of the System,
Provided, that the Commission may not compel any employer to become member of the System
unless he shall have been in operation for at least two years and has at the time of admission, if
admitted for membership during the first year of the System's operation at least fifty employees,
and if admitted for membership the following year of operation and thereafter, at least six
employees x x x."
o The term employer" as used in the law is defined as any person, natural or juridical,
domestic or foreign, who carries in the Philippines any trade, business, industry,
undertaking, or activity of any kind and uses the services of another person who is under
his orders as regards the employment, except the Government and any of its political
subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities, including corporations owned or controlled
by the Government"
o An "employee" refers to "any person who performs services for an 'employer' in which
either or both mental and physical efforts are used and who receives compensation for
such services"
o "Employment", according to paragraph [i] of said section 8, covers any service performed
by an employer except those expressly enumerated thereunder, like employment under
the Government, or any of its political subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities
including corporations owned and controlled by the Government, domestic service in a
private home, employment purely casual, etc.

Issues: Whether or not petitioner is covered by the Social Security Law of 1954.
Decision:

Appellant contends that the term "employer" as defined in the law should following the
principle of ejusdem generis be limited to those who carry on "undertakings or activities which
have the element of profit or gain, or which are pursued for profit or gain," because the phrase
activity of any kind" in the definition is preceded by the words "any trade, business, industry,
undertaking." The contention cannot be sustained.

35

The rule ejusdem generis applies only where there is uncertainty. It is not
controlling where the plain purpose and intent of the Legislature would thereby be
hindered and defeated. In the case at bar, the definition of the term "employer" is,
sufficiently comprehensive as to include religious and charitable institutions or entities
not organized for profit, like herein appellant, within its meaning.
o This is made more evident by the fact that it contains an exception in which said
institutions or entities are not included. And, certainly, had the Legislature really
intended to limit the operation of the law to entities organized for profit or gain, it would
not have defined an "employer" in such a way as to include the Government and yet make
an express exception of it.
In support of its contention that the Social Security Law was intended to cover only employment
for profit or gain, appellant also cites the discussions of the Senate, portions of which were quoted
in its brief.
o There is, however, nothing whatsoever in those discussions touching upon the question of
whether the law should be limited to organizations for profit or gain.
There is no merit in the claim that the inclusion of religious organizations under the coverage of
the Social Security Law violates the constitutional prohibition against the application of public
funds for the use, benefit or support of any priest who might be employed by appellant. The funds
contributed to the System created by the law are not public funds, but funds belonging to the
members which are merely held in trust by the Government.
Neither may it be validly argued that the enforcement of the Social Security Law impairs
appellant's right to disseminate religious information. All that is required of appellant is to make
monthly contributions to the System for covered employees in its employ.
o

SSS judgments are affirmed.

36

AMELITO R. MUTUC, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. (November 26,

1970)
Facts:

In this special civil action for prohibition filed on October 29, 1970, petitioner, after setting forth
his being a resident of Arayat, Pampanga, and his candidacy for the position of delegate to the
Constitutional Convention, alleged that respondent Commission on Elections, by a telegram sent
to him five days previously, informed him that his certificate of candidacy was given due course
but prohibited him from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud
speakers, an order which, according to him, is "violative of [his] constitutional right ... to freedom
of speech."
o There being no plain, speedy and adequate remedy, according to petitioner, he would
seek a writ of prohibition, at the same time praying for a preliminary injunction.
o COMELEC justified in its answer that prohibition was premised on a provision of the
Constitutional Convention Act, 2 which made it unlawful for candidates "to purchase,
produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as
pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets,
bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign
origin."
o It was its contention that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the recorded or
taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda material, under the above
statute subject to confiscation. It prayed that the petition be denied for lack of merit.

Issue: Whether or not COMELEC had the right to prohibit petitioner from using jingles in his mobile
units.

Decision:

The SC granted the writ of prohibition, setting forth the absence of statutory authority on
the part of respondent to impose such a ban in the light of the doctrine of ejusdem
generis as well as the principle that the construction placed on the statute by respondent
Commission on Elections would raise serious doubts about its validity, considering the
infringement of the right of free speech of petitioner.
Respondent Commission on Elections was called upon to justify such a prohibition imposed on
petitioner. To repeat, no such authority was granted by the Constitutional Convention Act. It did
contend, however, that one of its provisions referred to above makes unlawful the distribution of
electoral propaganda gadgets, mention being made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic
goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes, and concluding with
the words "and the like." For respondent Commission, the last three words sufficed to justify
such an order.
o SC: What was done cannot merit our approval under the well-known principle of
ejusdem generis, the general words following any enumeration being applicable only
to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to.
o It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets
of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the
candidate responsible for its distribution.

37

PNOC SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS and MARIA EFIGENIA FISHING CORPORATION, respondents. (October 8, 1998)
Facts:

In the early morning of September 21, 1977, the M/V Maria Efigenia XV, owned by private
respondent Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation, was navigating the waters near Fortune Island in
Nasugbu, Batangas on its way to Navotas, Metro Manila when it collided with the vessel
Petroparcel which at the time was owned by the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC).
After investigation was conducted by the Board of Marine Inquiry, Philippine Coast Guard
Commandant Simeon N. Alejandro rendered a decision finding the Petroparcel at fault.
o Based on this finding by the Board and after unsuccessful demands on petitioner, private
respondent sued the LSC and the Petroparcel captain, Edgardo Doruelo, before the then
Court of First Instance of Caloocan City.
o Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case, petitioner PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation sought to be substituted in place of LSC as it had already acquired ownership
of the Petroparcel.
For its part, private respondent later sought the amendment of its complaint on the ground that
the original complaint failed to plead for the recovery of the lost value of the hull of M/V Maria
Efigenia XV. The amended complaint also alleged that inflation resulting from the devaluation of
the Philippine peso had affected the replacement value of the hull of the vessel, its equipment and
its lost cargoes, such that there should be a reasonable determination thereof. Furthermore, on
account of the sinking of the vessel, private respondent supposedly incurred unrealized profits
and lost business opportunities that would thereafter be proven.
Court of First Instance rendered judgment in favor of private respondent and that petitioner pay
P6,438,048.00.
o They cited the evidence presented by private respondent consisting of the testimony of
its general manager and sole witness, Edilberto del Rosario. On the other hand, the lower
court noted that petitioner only presented Lorenzo Lazaro, senior estimator at PNOC
Dockyard & Engineering Corporation, as sole witness and it did not bother at all to offer
any documentary evidence to support its position.
Petitioner went to the CA who affirmed the lower courts decision. On petitioners assertion that
the award of P6,438,048.00 was not convincingly proved by competent and admissible evidence,
the CA ruled that it was not necessary to qualify Del Rosario as an expert witness because as the
owner of the lost vessel, it was well within his knowledge and competency to identify and
determine the equipment installed and the cargoes loaded on the vessel. The documentary
evidence presented as in the nature of market reports or quotations, trade journals, trade
circulars and price lists was enough basis.
Supreme Court:
To enable an injured party to recover actual or compensatory damages, he is required to prove the
actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof and on
the best evidence available. The burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no
evidence would be presented on either side. He must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence which means that the evidence, as a whole, adduced by one side is superior to that of the
other. In other words, damages cannot be presumed and courts, in making an award must point
out specific facts that could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual
damages are borne.
In this case, actual damages were proven through the sole testimony of private respondents
general manager and certain pieces of documentary evidence. In objecting to the same pieces of
evidence, petitioner commented that these were not duly authenticated and that the witness (Del
Rosario) did not have personal knowledge on the contents of the writings and neither was he an

38

expert on the subjects thereof. Clearly ignoring petitioners objections to the exhibits, the lower
court admitted these pieces of evidence and gave them due weight to arrive at the award of
P6,438,048.00 as actual damages.
o Del Rosario could not have testified on the veracity of the contents of the writings even
though he was the seasoned owner of a fishing fleet because he was not the one who
issued the price quotations. Section 36, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides
that a witness can testify only to those facts that he knows of his personal knowledge.
o Del Rosario could not have testified on the veracity of the contents of the writings even
though he was the seasoned owner of a fishing fleet because he was not the one who
issued the price quotations. Section 36, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides
that a witness can testify only to those facts that he knows of his personal knowledge.
o SC agrees with CA that his testimony as to the equipment installed and the cargoes loaded
on the vessel should be given credence considering his familiarity thereto. However, the
conclusion that his valuation of such equipment, cargo and the vessel itself should not be
accepted as gospel truth.
The price quotations presented as exhibits partake of the nature of hearsay evidence considering
that the persons who issued them were not presented as witnesses. Any evidence, whether oral or
documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the
witness but on the knowledge of another person who is not on the witness stand.
One of the exceptions to the hearsay rule pertains to commercial lists and the like under Section
45, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence which states:

Commercial lists and the like. Evidence of statements of matters of interest to persons engaged in an
occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published compilation is admissible as tending
to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is published for use by persons
engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them there.

Based on the above requisites, some of the evidence are not commercial lists for these do not
belong to the category of other published compilations under Section 45.
Under the principle of ejusdem generis, (w)here general words follow an enumeration of
persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be
construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the
same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.
o The exhibits mentioned are mere price quotations issued personally to Del Rosario who
requested for them from dealers of equipment similar to the ones lost at the collision of
the two vessels. These are not published in any list, register, periodical or other
compilation on the relevant subject matter. Neither are these market reports or
quotations within the purview of commercial lists as these are not standard handbooks or
periodicals, containing data of everyday professional need and relied upon in the work of
the occupation. These are simply letters responding to the queries of Del Rosario.

39

STATEMENT OF INDIVIDUAL LEGISLATOR

CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., INC., petitioner, vs. HON. PEDRO GIMENEZ, in his
capacity as Auditor General of the Philippines, and HON. ISMAEL MATHAY, in his capacity as Auditor
of the Central Bank, respondents. (Feb 28, 1963)
Facts:

Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise known as the Foreign Exchange
Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95.
fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions.
o To supplement the circular, the Bank later promulgated a memorandum establishing the
procedure for applications for exemption from the payment of said fee, as provided in
said Republic Act No. 2609.
o Several times in November and December 1959, petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical
Co., Inc. which is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues, used in bonding
lumber and veneer by plywood and hardwood producers bought foreign exchange for
the importation of urea and formaldehyde which are the main raw materials in the
production of said glues and paid therefor the aforementioned margin fee aggregating
P33,765.42. In May, 1960, petitioner made another purchase of foreign exchange and
paid the sum of P6,345.72 as margin fee therefor.
Prior thereto, petitioner had sought the refund of the first sum of P33,765.42, relying upon
Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of said Bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring that
the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee.
Soon after the last importation of these products, petitioner made a similar request for refund of
the sum of P6,345.72 paid as margin fee therefor.
Although the Central Bank issued the corresponding margin fee vouchers for the refund of said
amounts, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and approve said vouchers, upon the
ground that the exemption granted by the Monetary Board for petitioner's separate importations
of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of section 2, paragraph XVIII of
Republic Act No. 2609.

Issue: Whether or not "urea" and "formaldehyde" are exempt by law from the payment of the aforesaid
margin fee.
Decision:

Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2609 reads:

The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall not
be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following:
xxx xxx xxx
XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the
exclusive use of end-users.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved
by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not
covered by this stipulation of facts.

Petitioner maintains that the term "urea formaldehyde" appearing in this provision should be
construed as "ureaand formaldehyde" (emphasis supplied) and that respondents herein, the
Auditor General and the Auditor of the Central Bank, have erred in holding otherwise.

40

National Institute of Science and Technology has expressed, through its Commissioner, the view
that Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is clearly a finished product, which is
patently distinct and different from urea" and "formaldehyde", as separate articles used in the
manufacture of the synthetic resin known as "urea formaldehyde".
Petitioner contends, however, that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative
conjunction "and" between the terms "urea" and "formaldehyde", and that the members of
Congress intended to exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the
manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called "urea" formaldehyde", not the latter as a finished
product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the
consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof.
o Said individual statements do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do
they indicate the intent of the House of Representative. If there has been any mistake in
the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by
the Executive on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of
separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system
the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

41

MANILA JOCKEY CLUB, INC., petitioner-appellant, vs. GAMES AND AMUSEMENTS BOARD,
ET AL., respondents-appellees. PHILIPPINE RACING CLUB, INC., petitioner-intervenor-appellant.
(Feb 29, 1960)
Facts:

Petitioner prays that judgment be rendered against respondents Games and Amusements Board
(GAB), Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), and Executive Secretary Fortunato de Leon
for:
o (a) Interpreting Republic Acts Nos. 309 and 1502 in such a manner that the 30 Sundays
unreserved for charitable institutions and therefore belonging to the private racing clubs
under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 309 continue to pertain to said private entities, and
that the 6 additional sweepstakes races authorized under Republic Act No. 1502 should
be held on 6 of the 12 Saturdays not reserved for any private entity or particular
charitable institution under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 309, or on any other day of the
week besides Sunday, Saturday and legal holiday;
o (b) Holding that respondent PCSO does not have the right or power to appropriate or use
the race tracks and equipment of petitioner without its consent, nor can respondents
compel petitioner to so allow such use of its race tracks and equipment under pain of
having its license revoked.
Court of First Instance ruled in favor or respondents, saying that once a month on a Sunday not
reserved for the Anti-Tuberculosis Society, the White Cross and other charitable institutions by
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 309, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office is authorized to hold
one regular sweepstakes draw and races, pursuant to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1502, thus
reducing the number of Sundays which may be allotted to private entities by the Games and
Amusements Board. . . .
Republic Act No. 1502 increased the sweepstakes draw and races of the PCSO to twelve, but
without specifying the days on which they are to be run. To accommodate these additional races,
the GAB resolved to reduce the number of Sundays assigned to private individuals and entities by
six. Appellants protested, contending that the said increased should be taken from the 12
Saturdays reserved to the President, for charitable, relief, or civic purposes, or should be assigned
to any other day of the week besides Sunday, Saturday, and legal holiday.

Issue: The proper placement of the six (6) additional racing days given to the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office, in virtue of Republic Act No. 1502, approved on June 16, 1956.
Decision:

Appellants' contention cannot be sustained. Section 4 Republic Act No. 309, as amended by
Republic Act No. 983, by express terms, specifically reserved 23 Sundays and 16 Saturdays for
the Philippine Anti-Tuberculosis Society, the White Cross, Inc. and the PCSO, and 12
Saturdays to the President for other charitable, relief, or civic purposes. These days cannot be
disposed of by the GAB without authority of law. As to the remaining racing days, the law
provides:

SEC. 4. Racing days. Private individuals and entities duly licensed by the Commission on Races (now
GAB) may hold horse races on Sundays not reserved under this Act, on twenty four Saturdays as may be
determined by the said Commission (GAB), and on legal holidays, except Thursday and Friday of Holy
Week, July fourth, commonly known as Independence Day, and December thirtieth, commonly known as
Rizal Day.

It is clear from the above-quoted provision that appellants have no vested right to the
unreserved Sundays, or even to the 24 Saturdays (except, perhaps, on the holidays), because

42

their holding of races on these days is merely permissive, subject to the licensing and
determination by the GAB.
Appellants contend that even granting that the six (6) additional sweepstakes races should be
run on Sundays, yet if they are held on a club race day, the GAB should only insert them in the
club races and not given the whole day to the PCSO, to the exclusion of appellants. In support
of this contention, the following quotation from the debate in the House of Representatives
before voting on House Bill No. 5732, which became Republic Act No. 1502, is cited:

Mr. ABELEDA. If there are no more amendments, I move that we vote on the measure.
Mr. MARCOS. Mr. Speaker, before we proceed to vote on this bill, I want to make it of record that it is the
clear intention of the House to increase by two the ten regular and special Sweepstakes races making it
all in all, twelve, and that in cases where a sweepstakes race falls in a club race days the Sweepstakes
races should be inserted in the club race.
Mr. ABELEDA. The gentleman from Ilocos Norte is correct. . . . (t.s.n., Proceedings in House of
Representatives, Congress, May 17, 1956; emphasis supplied.)

Appellants cite in their briefs a number of authorities sustaining the view that in the
interpretation of statutes susceptible of widely differing constructions, legislative debates and
explanatory statements by members of the legislature may be resorted to, to throw light on the
meaning of the words used in the statutes.
o Upon the other hand, the appellees, likewise, quote in their briefs other authorities to the
effect that statements made by the individual members of the legislature as to the
meaning of provisions in the bill subsequently enacted into law, made during the general
debate on the bill on the floor of each legislative house, following its presentation by a
standing committee, are generally held to be in admissable as an aid in construing the
statute.
Legislative debates are expressive of the views and motives of individual members and are not
safe guides and, hence, may not be resorted to in ascertaining the meaning and purpose of the
lawmaking body. It is impossible to determine with certainty what construction was put upon an
act by the members of the legislative body that passed the bill, by resorting to the speeches of the
members thereof. Those who did not speak, may not have agreed with those who did; and those
who spoke, might differ from each other.
In view of these conflicting authorities, no appreciable reliance can safely be placed on any of
them. It is to be noted in the specific case before us, that while Congressmen Marcos and Abeleda
were, admittedly, of the view that the additional sweepstakes races may be inserted in the club
races, still there is nothing in Republic Act No. 1502, as it was finally enacted, which would
indicate that such an understanding on the part of these two members of the Lower House of
Congress were received the sanction or conformity of their colleagues, for the law is absolutely
devoid of any such indication.
o In the interpretation of a legal document, especially a statute, unlike in the interpretation
of an ordinary written document, it is not enough to obtain information to the intention
or meaning of the author or authors, but also to see whether the intention or meaning has
been expressed in such a way as to give it legal effect and validity.

43