Issue 62, SPEX

SMU Economics Intelligence Club

SMU POLITICAL ECONOMIC EXCHANGE

A SMU ECONOMICS INTELLIGENCE CLUB PUBLICATION

This issue in brief:

Growth Amidst External Challenges
Global economic slowdowns have not left Singapore unaffected. Faced with the
challenges of a turbulent oil market, depreciating currencies and declining exports,
Jingwei feels that Singapore must explore options closer to home in order to stay
strong in the face of such uncertainties.
Terrorism in Europes Economy: Reviewing its Implications
Kai Huis article discusses the various ways in which European countries grapple with
the complex and nuanced impacts of terrorism upon their economies, legal systems and
societies.
The impact of BREXIT on China-UK trade relations
UKs withdrawal from the European Union has caused much turbulence in financial
markets worldwide. Given Chinas status as an important trading partner and a source
of FDI for the UK, to what extent was it affected by Brexit? Zhiyans article touches
upon this very issue.

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By Ke Jingwei
In January 2016, Singapores Non-Oil Domestic Exports (NODX) fell by 9.9 per cent YoY
(Year over Year). The oil component of Singapores export price index also fell by 11 per
cent MoM in December 2015. Against the current backdrop of global economic weaknesses,
Singapores export is hurt and it is foreseeable for her growth to be driven mainly by
domestic factors this year. While one can argue that the fall in Oil Domestic Export (ODX) is
largely due to the global oil route, and that it decreases the crude oil import in nominal terms,
we have to acknowledge that part of the oil rout is caused by Chinas slowdown and its
contagion on the world economy. This causes weaknesses in demand for refined petroleum,
Singapores top export, and impedes her from driving growth this year.
Also, the general slowdown in global economies weighs down on Singapores NODX.
Malaysia, Singapores closest neighbour and top five export destination, has her currency
trading in a 5-year low band against the SGD. This makes Singapores exports relatively
more expensive to Malaysia. Hong Kong, Singapores top export destination, has its
currency pegged to USD. With the Federal Reserves forecast of 4 interest rate hikes this
year, USD and hence HKD appreciated against SGD. However, the recent Federal Open
Market Committee meetings had the Fed portraying dovish views, suggesting a
postponement of monetary tightening in the US. Hence, it is likely that USD and hence HKD
will depreciate against SGD, making her exports relatively expensive.
All these point Singapores growth solution away from external environment, given the
weakness in exports; we have to look at domestic drivers to boost our GDP growth. Fiscal
stimulus is definitely an option to pump liquidity into domestic economy and boost
aggregate demand through the multiplier effect. Despite a small budget deficit of 0.13 per
cent of GDP in 2014, Singapores overall government budget is still healthy and well able to
increase her fiscal stimulus amidst this period of global turmoil. This can come in the form of
tax rebates to increase disposable wealth of Singaporeans. Consumption smoothing should
not be a big factor in reducing the effectiveness of the tax rebates since Singapores jobless
rate is at a 1.9 per cent low. Coupled with the fact that the government budget has been
healthy, Singaporeans propensity to consume the additional disposable wealth would be
higher since a tax hike is not expected in this case.
Singapores ongoing effort in boosting productivity through different incentivised skills
upgrading schemes puts her in a strong position to continue her GDP growth. This keeps
multinational companies coming to invest in her and employing her highly skilled labour

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force. With growing productivity in her economy, Singapores output increases despite
having limited resources. Moving on to a knowledge-intensive economy, this continuous
skill upgrading becomes more important as it keeps her workers at the edge of the
knowledge frontier and prevents her from becoming obsolete.
Moving forward, volatility in the global market is expected, especially with diverging
monetary policies of the worlds biggest economies. However, we do find some solace in
rebounding oil prices as Saudi Arabia and Russia tentatively agreed to freeze their oil
production levels, putting a cap to oil supply movements. Higher oil prices would improve
oil-producing countries GDP and have positive spillover effect on the global economy.
Spending power should rise, as a whole, alleviating some of the export weakness that
Singapore is facing right now.
In her domestic economy, Singapore should continue her ongoing efforts in boosting
productivity in order to keep her competitive edge as a highly skilled economy. Also, in
times of global weakness, Singapore should step up on her fiscal stimulus to make up for it.
Should the external economies enter into recession, MAS can consider lowering the currency
band in which SGD is trading at. This reduces the impact on Singapores export and at the
same time provides some support to the domestic economy. However, this is not to
encourage a currency war and the focus should still be on employing fiscal stimulus to drive
domestic growth.

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References:
1. Singapore's External Trade - January 2016, IE Singapore. (2016, February 17).
Retrieved February 20, 2016, from http://www.iesingapore.gov.sg/~/media/IE
Singapore/Files/Publications/Singapore Trade Statistics/Monthly Trade
Statistics/2016/Monthly_Trade_Report_Jan2016.pdf

2. Import & Export Price Indices, Dec 2015. (2015, December), Statistics Singapore.
Retrieved February 20, 2016, from http://www.singstat.gov.sg/docs/defaultsource/defaultdocumentlibrary/publications/publications_and_papers/prices/ipidec15.pdf

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by Ng Kai Hui
Overview
The scourge of terrorism has emerged as one of the most pressing global challenges in the
21st century, becoming more lethal and pervasive than before. Beyond the loss of life and
property, the potential damage terrorism can inflict permeates into other facets, such as the
economy and political climate of respective states. According to the Institute for Economics
and Peace, the global economic impact of terrorism reached US$89.6 billion in 2015. In
Europe, relatively recent acts of terror such as those committed in Paris and Brussels would
similarly have imposed economic costs extending beyond physical losses. However, the
implications of terrorism on Europes individual economies are likely to be diverse and vary
in degree.

Tourism and Consumer Confidence

One of the most direct impacts of a terrorist incident would be the adverse consequences on
consumer confidence and tourism. In the immediate aftermath of an attack, consumer
confidence and tourism levels are likely to fall, fuelled by increasing safety concerns, as
evidenced during the Paris attacks. The Paris Convention and Visitors Bureau reported that
hotels experienced a sharp fall in visitors, while 40 per cent of hotel bookings in Brussels
were cancelled over the weekend of the security clampdown as a result of the attacks. The
reduction in tourist numbers translates into lost business for the service sector, such as
restaurants, shops and tourist attractions. Such negative effects could pose a drag on the
consumption and GDP figures of affected economies, especially those where tourism is a key
growth sector.
However, these direct economic impacts are likely to be short-lived and less severe than
initially assumed. Historical evidence suggests that in countries where stability and security
are the norm remain mostly resilient, with slides in consumer confidence and tourism levels
usually rebounding within a few months after a terrorist incident. In the United Kingdom,
private consumption actually grew at a pace of 3.5 per cent during the second half of 2005
despite the bombings in July, and the economy expanded 5 per cent. More recently, after the
Brussels bombings in March 2016, the National Bank of Belgiums consumer confidence
indicator dipped for two months before stabilizing, perhaps indicating the transitory nature of
terrorisms impact on consumer confidence and economic growth.
Although European states can take some comfort in the knowledge that the adverse economic
consequences of terrorism are often transitory, it would be unwise to be complacent with

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regard to their internal security. While sporadic attacks arguably do not have a lasting impact
on macroeconomic performance, frequent attacks over the long term could potentially
undermine consumer confidence and business investment. Such risks should not be flippantly
dismissed given the currently lacklustre growth of the Eurozone.

Financial Markets
In the wake of an attack, financial markets may experience some headwinds, as cautious
investors become less optimistic about the stability and profitability of investing in businesses
operating in Europe. After the attacks in Paris, travel and tourism related shares in the region
fell sharply during the next trading session, such as those of airlines Air France-KLM (5 per
cent fall), Lufthansa and French hotels group Accor.
Yet, an examination of the historical performance of stock markets point to the possibility
that they are rather resilient even in the event of a terror attack. The FTSE dipped 4 per cent
after the London bombings in July 2005, but ended the year up by 7.4 per cent. Similarly, the
CAC-40, Frances benchmark stock index, was never down more than 2 per cent and ended
just 0.1 per cent lower for the day when it opened after the Paris attacks. From these
observations, it appears that the adverse effects of terrorism on regional financial markets are
confined to a certain group of stocks, and are likely to be relatively transient.

Government Policies and Measures

The heightened threat of terrorism in Europe has prompted governments to introduce
measures to boost security, and take military action to address this menace. However, these
additional counter-terrorism measures could come at the expense of fiscal prudence and
investments in more rewarding sectors. In France, President Francois Hollande announced
that the defence budget will increase by an extra 3.8 billion between 2016 and 2019 after the
Charlie Hebdo attacks in January 2015. The increase will be used to fund the mobilisation of
additional personnel to improve Frances internal security, as well as the countrys overseas
military operations against extremism. It should be noted that the costs of this increase in
spending are cuts in the resources of other ministries, which could potentially reduce
expenditures on essential public services such as healthcare and education.
Thus, European governments looking to increase their spending on counterterrorism
measures may divert crucial resources that can be better channelled towards more productive
investments. Countries in Europe may also look to higher taxes and borrowing in order to
materialize the required increases in spending. However, they should be mindful that such
policies would incur the risk of dampening economic growth, fiscal instability and
undermining their political support. Hence, governments in Europe will need to consistently
balance between their countrys need to address terrorism, and economic prospects.

Schengen Zone
The acts of terror in Europe has also raised doubts regarding the Schengen Agreement, which
abolished border controls and allows for unrestricted travel across most of the region. Certain

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countries (e.g. Denmark and Germany) have temporarily reintroduced controls recently in an
attempt to stem the flow of migrants and address the danger of potential extremists moving
freely across their borders. The increasing prevalence and severity of terrorism on the
continent may unnecessarily feed increasing xenophobic sentiment, thus pressuring
governments to embark on more permanent border controls, tougher laws and regulations.
While such moves could contribute to tightening the porous borders of states, it also poses the
risk of reversing the regions economic development. Clamping down on the freedom of
cross-border movement in the Schengen region would impose additional costs on trade and
business operations. A strategy unit of the French government has estimated that a collapse of
Schengen and hence the curtailment of free passage of goods would amount to a 3 per cent
tax on trade within the region. The overall effect of hampering cross-border activity would
reduce output in the area by 0.8 per cent, or 110 billion over the next decade. The tightening
of borders in Schengen countries is likely to impose costs on exports, and weigh down on the
GDP figures of the respective states. However, the exact potential costs to the European
economy and trade will depend on the extent to which states are willing to compromise the
freedom of movement for increased domestic security.

Conclusion
The implications of terrorism on Europes economy are diverse and extend into different
aspects. A brief examination of previous terror attacks in certain parts of the continent seem
to indicate that the economic repercussions are mostly confined to specific sectors, and are
often transitory. It is crucial to note that the apparent resilience of the economies explored
could be attributed to the fact that they are mostly stable, and do not experience long-term,
frequent strife. However, governments in Europe do face complex trade-offs and decisions,
stemming partly from the scourge of terrorism. One of their most salient challenges may be to
manage this delicate balancing act between greater vigilance against terror threats, while not
unnecessarily stifling economic development.

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References:
1. Bremmer, I. (2015, November 19). These 5 Facts Explain the Dire Costs of the Paris
Attacks. TIME. Retrieved December 4, 2016, from: http://time.com/4120187/parisattacks-economic-cost-terror/.
2. Horobin, W. (2015, April 29). France to Increase Military Spending to Counter
Terror Threat. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved December 4, 2016, from:
http://www.wsj.com/articles/france-to-increase-military-spending-to-counter-terrorthreat-1430312805.
3. Institute for Economics and Peace. (2016). Global Terrorism Index 2016. Institute for
Economics and Peace. Retrieved December 4, 2016, from:
http://economicsandpeace.org/reports/.
4. Kennedy, S. (2015, November 16). When Terrorism Strikes, History Shows
Economies Prove Resilient. Bloomberg. Retrieved December 5, 2016, from:
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-16/when-terrorism-strikeshistory-shows-economies-prove-resilient.
5. Laird, L. (2015, November 16). The Paris Attacks and The Economic Impact of
Terrorism. Forbes. Retrieved December 4, 2016, from:
http://www.forbes.com/sites/laurielaird/2015/11/16/the-paris-attacks-and-theeconomic-impact-of-terrorism/#342280386d25.
6. Moreau, M. (2015, December 13). What is the economic cost of terrorism? Global
Risk Insights. Retrieved December 4, 2016, from:
http://globalriskinsights.com/2015/12/what-is-the-economic-cost-of-terrorism/.
7. Putting up barriers. (2016, February 6). The Economist. Retrieved December 5, 2016,
from: http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21690065-permanent-reintroductionborder-controls-would-harm-trade-europe-putting-up-barriers.
8. Schengen: Controversial EU free movement deal explained. (2016, April 24). British
Broadcasting Corporation. Retrieved December 5, 2016, from:
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13194723.
9. Schulze, E. (2016, August 8). Europe Terror Attacks: Why they dont make
consumers stay home. Consumer News and Business Channel. Retrieved December 5,
2016, from: http://www.cnbc.com/2016/08/08/europe-terror-attacks-why-they-arentlikely-to-hurt-the-economy.html.

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10. Walker, A. (2015, December 2). Paris Attacks: Assessing the economic impact.
British Broadcasting Corporation. Retrieved December 4, 2016, from:
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-34965000.

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By Jin Zhiyan
On June 23rd 2016, the result of the Brexit referendum threw world financial markets into
disarray with the British Pound dropping to its value against the dollar lowest in 31 years the
next day (Soffen, 2016). What does this then mean for China, whose premier Xi Jin Ping
famously heralded the coming 10 years as a Golden Era for Chinese-UK relations
economically, politically, and strategically (Powell, 2015)? During his October 2015 trip, he
signed more than 40 billion pounds worth of short-term and long-term trade deals (Soffen,
2016). Given the economic and political changes since June 23rd, what are the impacts on each
country? This paper seeks to delve deeper into these questions and present some answers.

Economic links between UK and China

In 2014, China was the UKs 7th-largest export partner and 3rd-largest import partner. While
the UK has a trade deficit of 19.6 billion pounds with China, it actually has a net trade surplus
in services of 2.2 billion pounds, from 3.2 billion exports and 1 billion imports from exporting
3.2 billion pounds and importing 1 billion (House of Commons Library, 2015). The UK is
currently the location of 3 important Chinese functions, Foreign Direct Investment, EU
passporting of financial services, and the offshore clearing of Chinese RMB (Ren Min Bi).
A. Chinese foreign direct investment
Foreign Direct Investment is a significant indicator of a countrys willingness and ability to do
business as well as the vibrancy of its economy. The UK has been very receptive of FDI and
goes to lengths to ensure it is the preferred destination for FDI in Europe. Indeed, in 2014, its
FDI stock (an indicator of long-term commitment of foreign direct investment into a country)
passed the 1 trillion level, making the 3rd largest country in the world by FDI stock (UK Trade
and Industry, 2015). It has scored China as another major source of FDI, with Chinese setting
up regional headquarters in the UK and acquiring UK companies. Similarly, China is one of
the UKs main targets for overseas Investment (UK Trade and Industry, 2015). Recently, China
has been aggressively acquiring firms across Europe as part of its usage of capital, with
significant investments in the UK. According to the Financial Times, Chinese Mergers and
Acquisitions in the UK began booing in mid-2015 and deal volume hit a record high in
November 2016 (refer to figure 1). Investments were in the property sector, consumer sector,
financial services, oil and gas, healthcare, and technology, in decreasing order (Kynge, 2016).

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Figure 1: Volume of Chinese Mergers and Acquisitions. Financial Times. Retrieved from
https://www.ft.com/content/c54fe1e0-a2a2-11e6-aa83-bcb58d1d2193
The UK has traditionally been a stronghold for FDI because of its unique position the English
language being the worlds most widely-spoken and business language, its business-friendly
climate with low corporate tax rates, its not being bound by the Euro and its access to the EU
financial markets (Daly, 2013). With the impending leaving of the European Union, many of
these pros have become uncertain. The access it provides to the European Union is its greatest
advantage with the Brexit talks that throw relations for the next two years and most probably
longer, into confusion and disarray new FDI will find the investment locations economic
viability uncertain and current FDI is at risk of pulling out as well. Britain has spoken of aiming
for a Swiss or New Zealand style of trade with the EU countries and other countries, postBrexit (Atkins, 2016). However, given the current political mood and the UKs past privileges
in the EU, its ability to continue conducting financial services or obtain access is likely to be
severely compromised as the European Commission and the 27 other countries seek to punish
the UK and make an example of it.
The impact of this on China will not be so much as on the UK. Chinas outward investment
flows are diversified across the world outward investment is primarily into Asia (49 per cent),
Europe is the second-largest recipient (19 per cent), followed by North America (13 per cent),
Oceania (7 per cent), Africa (8 per cent) and Latin American Countries (5 per cent) (GarciaHerrero, 2015) Without the UK, China still has significant investment locations. While most
of their investment is in the Big Three (Germany, France and UK), since 2013, they have
sharply increased investment into other European countries as well. Chinese investment in
Southern Europe in 2015 accounted for almost half of ODI into Europe and is a driver of closer

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relationships between China and the Eastern European nations as well (Hanemann et al, 2016).
Chinese Investment is not likely to suffer significantly, given the wide range of alternative
locations for investment and that it has invested significantly in more stable sectors like
consumer services, oil and gas, and technology. While financial services and property values
may see a drastic change in fate, the UKs value should not plunge so much to make it
impossible for Chinese Investment to remain. Movements to other European or North
American investment locations remain highly viable.

Figure 2: Chinese Outward Direct Investment in 2013. (Garcia-Herrero, 2015). Bruegel.

Retrieved from http://bruegel.org/2015/06/chinas-outward-foreign-direct-investment/

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Figure 3: Distribution of Chinese Outward Direct Investment in Europe for 2000-2015.

(Hanemann et al, 2016). Mercator Institute for China Studies, Rhodium Group. Retrieved from
http://rhg.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/02/A_New_Record_Year_for_Chinese_Outbound_Investment_in_Eur
ope.pdf
B. Passporting of financial services
In 1993, the EEA (European Economic Area) set up passporting rights for the members of the
EU and Lichenstein, Norway and Iceland. Under this scheme, a company can set up a firm in
just one country and is able to do business across all 31 countries without having to set up
subsidiaries and be subject to tough regulations in each country (Investopedia, 2016). This is
heavily utilized by many European companies, especially banks. London has benefitted
significantly, so predictions are rife that Brexit will mean movement of companies from
London to other European financial centres like Paris, Brussels or Frankfurt (Martin, 2016).
There have also been, on the contrary, discussions of whether the EU passporting rules are so
as much benefit as heralded, and of its cons. An Icelandic Bank, Landsbanki collapsed during
the 2008 global financial crisis and due to regulatory problems, the UK and Iceland
governments were embroiled in a protracted legal battle that ended only this year (Gallacher,
2016).
Similar to the previous point, the loss of passporting rights, if it happens, will be of limited
impact to China. Passporting rights are merely a gateway via any country to do business in the
other 30 countries. Without London, there remain many strong financial hubs China can move
to, including for example Paris and Frankfurt, which were respectively 7th and 8th on the Xinhua
Dow Jones International Financial Centres Development Index 2014, a ranking of the
financial centres of the world (Standard and Poors, 2014). Although London was ranked 2nd,

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it is by no means the only centre in Europe. Especially with RMB clearing also available in
Frankfurt and other areas, London is not a must-have.
However, Moodys has indicated that London will be able to deal with the loss of passporting
rights, given that its status as a regional centre will be hit, but its status as a global centre will
be less so (Martin, 2016). In particular, they cited that the country will likely sign a deal with
the EU for continued single-market access, so losses will be manageable. For example, the
UK is likely to join the EUs new scheme Mifid 2, which will give it an equivalent regulatory
regime to the current scheme, providing an alternative gateway into the single market (Martin,
2016). As negotiations begin, these will be subject to a great deal of volatility.
C. Offshore clearing of Chinese renminbi
China has been aggressively internationalizing the Chinese Ren Min Bi, setting up bilateral
currency swaps and offshore clearing centres. The goals are to reduce costs of trade, to create
new sources of financing and borrowing for the Chinese, to increase the use of the RMB across
the world. The Chinese Yuan officially joined the IMFs special drawing rights basket of
currencies in October 2016 (Taplin, 2016).
In 2013, the UK accounted for 62 per cent of global RMB trading outside of China and Hong
Kong (UK Government, 2013). In 2016, it surpassed Singapore to become the worlds secondlargest offshore RMB clearing centre (Lockett, 2016). Evidently, there are other European
centres China could use. Frankfurt, Luxembourg and Paris are all strong in offshore-RMB
activity: Germany is Chinas largest EU trading partner and fifth-largest trading partner in the
world (China Daily, 2014); Luxembourg leads the EU in RMB securities settlements and RMB
denominated bonds (N Luxembourg for finance); in 2013 Paris became the second largest pool
of RMB in Europe after London (Blanchard, 2013).
Again, the impact of Brexit on the UKs access to Europe will definitely reduce the
attractiveness of London for RMB clearing while deals can still be conducted in other
places equally conducive for trade, like Luxembourg, the impact on the UK will be far worse.
Deals in RMB now account for 40 per cent of all transactions in the UK-China corridor, and
the RMB is the eighth most-traded currency in the UK (Lockett, 2016). The UK is likely to
lose a lot of attractiveness not just in RMB clearing deals, but also in the chain effects from
the loss of Chinese business.

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Figure 4: A list of the biggest Chinese RMB offshore clearing centres. (Lockett, 2016).
Financial Times. Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/content/d552173a-6030-3c83-b4f79efc1819bb30

Overall impacts
Although overall factors seem to show that China will be less impacted by Brexit than
expected, it remains too early to settle definitively on an answer. The political climate in the
UK has become brash and deviates from reality. The new Prime Minister Theresa May has
been sticking since June to her statement to not give a running commentary on the UKs
position and negotiating direction, to not give the other countries any basis to begin attacking
the UK (The Week, 2016). However, once negotiations begin, information will flood out and
the other countries will not let up. In addition, her secretaries and ministries have been most
indiscreet, with leaked meeting memos and Prime Ministers memos making it all over the
news (Asthana, 2016); and Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union David Davis,
Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson and the Chancellor of the Exchequer Philip Hammond making
contradictory statements, seemingly revealing that Cabinet has not yet reached any consensus
amid infighting (Walters, 2016). Additionally, the government is fighting legal battles on when,
and how, to trigger Brexit, calling into question whether the referendum results may even be
honoured.
Additionally, it is likely that conditions will change significantly once the negotiations formally
begin, with the EU wishing to make an example of the UK for the rest. It is likely that most of
the plans put forward right now by the government are overly optimistic which wishes to have
their cake and eat it (Elgot et al, 2016). All these factors continue to throw into confusion the
economic climate post-referendum, pre-Brexit.

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Conclusion
Based on current and historical information, Brexit is likely to cause limited harm Chinas
economic position, with there being attractive existing alternative locations for Outbound
Direct Investment and offshore RMB clearing as well as EU passporting rules which are will
likely remain possible under alternative schemes. These remain subject heavily to the
negotiating outcomes between the EU and Europe. For the UK, outcomes are more severe
with its significant efforts to make itself the most-attractive location for foreign companies all
at stake. The UK needs to unite and set its stance in negotiations and end the boundless
speculation regarding its goals in the negotiations and dispel the idea that it wishes to have the
cake and eat it.

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References:
1. Asthana, A. (2016, December 4). Government memo demanding end to Brexit leaks
is leaked. The Guardian. Retrieved from
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/dec/04/government-memo-brexit-leaksleaked-cabinet-secretary
2. Atkins, R. (2016, July 6). Swiss route poses a challenge for Brexit UK. Financial
Times. Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/content/e4c7f5a0-4288-11e6-b22f79eb4891c97d
3. Blanchard, B., Chiang, L. (2013, April 12). France plans currency swap line with
China: paper. Reuters. Retrived from http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-francecurrency-idUSBRE93C01S20130413
4. China Daily. (2014, February 19). China Daily. Retrieved from
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2014-02/19/content_17290565.htm
5. Daly, K. (2013, July 3). Britain must continue to play to its strengths in competing for
FDI. The Times. Retrieved from http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/public/ceosummit/article3806191.ece
6. Elgot, J., Rankin. J, (2016, November 29). Minister dismisses have cake and eat it
Brexit notes. The Guardian. Retrieved from
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/nov/29/greg-clark-minister-dismisseshaving-cake-and-eating-it-brexit-notes
7. Gallacher, J. (2016, September 7). Brexit: Is the financial services passport actually
worth fighting for? Left Foot Forward. Retrieved from
https://leftfootforward.org/2016/09/brexit-is-the-financial-services-passport-actuallyworth-fighting-for/
8. Garcia-Herrero, A. Bruegel. (2015, June 28). Chinas outward foreign direct
investment. Retrieved from http://bruegel.org/2015/06/chinas-outward-foreign-directinvestment/
9. Hanemann, T., Huotari, M. Mercator Institute for China Studies. Rhodium Group.
(2016, February). A New Record Year for Chinese Outbound Investment in Europe.
Retrieved from http://rhg.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/02/A_New_Record_Year_for_Chinese_Outbound_Investment_
in_Europe.pdf

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10. HM Treasury and the RT Hon George Osborne MP. (2013, October 15).
Groundbreaking deal set to make London global currency centre for investment in
China. UK Government. Retrieved from
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/groundbreaking-deal-set-to-make-londonglobal-currency-centre-for-investment-in-china
11. House of Commons Library. (2016, November 12). Statistics on UK trade with China.
Retrieved from
http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7379
12. Investopedia. (2016). European Economic Area Agreement. Retrieved from
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/european-economic-area-eea-agreement.asp
13. Kynge, J. (2016, November 7). Chinas M&A deals in the UK hit record in mid-2016.
Financial Times. Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/content/c54fe1e0-a2a2-11e6aa83-bcb58d1d2193
14. Lockett, H. (2016, April 28). UK becomes second-largest offshore RMB clearing
centre. Financial Times. Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/content/d552173a-60303c83-b4f7-9efc1819bb30
15. Luxembourg for Finance - Agency for the Development of the Financial Centre.
(2016). RENMINBI BUSINESS. Retrieved from
http://www.luxembourgforfinance.com/en/products-services/renminbi-business
16. Martin, B. (2016, September 19). Banks can cope with loss of EU passport after
Brexit, says Moodys. The Telegraph. Retrieved from
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/09/19/banks-can-cope-with-loss-of-eupassports-after-brexit-says-moody/
17. National Financial Information Center Index Research Institute
18. Standard & Poors Dow Jones Index Co. (2014, November). Xinhua Dow Jones
International Financial Centers Development Index (2014). Retrieved from
http://www.sh.xinhuanet.com/shstatics/zhuanti2014/zsbg/en.pdf
19. Powell, N. (2015, October 22). Xi hails golden era for China, Uk ties. Channel
NewsAsia. Retrieved from http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/xihails-golden-era-for/2210056.html
20. Soffen, K. (2016, June 24). The stunning collapse of the British pound, in charts. The
Washington Post. Retrieved from

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SMU Economics Intelligence Club

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/06/24/the-british-pound-hassuffered-a-stunning-collapse/?utm_term=.abadc114635f
21. Taplin, N. (2016, October 3). Chinas yuan joins elite club of IMF reserve currencies.
Reuters. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-currency-imfidUSKCN1212WC
22. The Week. (2016, December 8). Brexit: Article 50 deadline sals through parliament.
The Week. Retrieved from http://www.theweek.co.uk/brexit/65461/brexit-timetablevote-has-theresa-may-really-caved-in
23. UK Trade and Investment. (2015, June 17). Corporate Report: UKTI Inward
Investment Review Report 2014 to 2015 (Online viewing)
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ukti-inward-investment-report-2014-to2015/ukti-inward-investment-report-2014-to-2015-online-viewing
24. Walters, S. (2016, October 8). Chancellor Hammond fears the bull in a China shop
behavior of the 3 Brexiteers Davis, Boris and Fox will wreck the UKs exit from the
EU. Daily Mail. Retrieved from http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article3828878/Chancellor-Hammond-fears-bull-China-shop-behaviour-3-Brexiteers-DavisBoris-Fox-wreck-UK-s-exit-EU.html

Issue 62, SPEX

SMU Economics Intelligence Club

Sreya Sanyal (Director, SPEX)

Ke Jingwei (Writer)

Undergraduate

Undergraduate

School of Business

School of Economics

Singapore Management University

Singapore Management University

ssanyal.2013@business.smu.edu.sg

jingwei.ke.2013@economics.smu.edu.sg

Nguyen Duong Thuy Uyen (Creative

Ng Kai Hui (Writer)

Director)

Undergraduate

Undergraduate

School of Social Sciences

School of Business
Singapore Management University
dtunguyen.2014@business.smu.edu.sg

Singapore Management University

kaihui.ng.2016@socsc.smu.edu.sg
Jin Zhiyan (Writer)
Undergraduate
School of Business
Singapore Management University
zhiyan.jin.2015@business.smu.edu.sg