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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL


Monterey

California

THESIS
K11
OPTIMIZING ECM TECHNIQUES AGAINST
ACQUISITION

MONOPULSE
AND TRACKING RADARS
by

Kvvon, Ki

loon

September 1989

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OPTIMIZING ECM TECHNIQUES AGAINST MONOPULSE ACQUISITION AND

(include security classification)

TRACKING RADARS
Personal Author(s)

Kwon. Ki Hoon

13a Type of Report

13b Time Covered

Master's Thesis

From

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15

September 1989'

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The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or poof the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

Supplementary Notation

16

sition

Cosati Codes

18 Subject

Group

Field

Subgroup

Terms

continue on reverse

if

necessary and identify by block number)

ECM.monopulse.monopulse radar

continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)


techniques against monopulse radars, which are generally employed in the Surface-to-Air Missile targeting system,
ire presented and analyzed.
Particularly, these
techniques classified into five different categories, which are; denial
lamming, deception jamming, passive countermeasures, decoys, and destructive countermeasures. The techniques are fully
techniques are
discussed. It was found difficult to quantize the jamming effectiveness of individual techniques, because
nvolved with several complex parameters and they are usually entangled together. Therefore, the methodological approach
tor optimizing
techniques is based on purely conceptual analysis of the techniques.

[19

Abstract

ECM

ECM

ECM

ECM

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Techniques Against Monopulse

Acquisition and Tracking Radars

by

Kwon, Ki Hoon
Major, Korean Air Force
B.S.,

Korean Air Force Academy, 1980

Submitted

in partial fulfillment

of the

requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE

IN SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
(ELECTRONIC WARFARE)
from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL


September 1989

ABSTRACT

ECM

techniques against monopulse radars, which are generally employed in

the Surface-to-Air Missile targeting system, are presented and analyzed.


ularly, these

ECM

techniques classified into five different categories, which are;

denial jamming, deception jamming, passive countermeasures, decoys,


structive countermeasures.
difficult to

ECM

The techniques

are fully discussed.

It

and de-

was found

quantize the jamming effectiveness of individual techniques, because

techniques are involved with several complex parameters and they are

usually entangled together.


ing

Partic-

ECM

techniques

is

Therefore, the methodological approach for optimiz-

based on purely conceptual analysis of the techniques.

111

C.l
TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

I.

A.
B.

C.

II.

BACKGROUND

COMPARISON OF SEQUENTIAL AND MONOPULSE RADARS


OVERVIEW

MONOPULSE TRACKING RADAR SYSTEMS


A.
MONOPULSE CONCEPT
B.

TWO

DISTINCTIVE CATEGORIES

1.

Amplitude-Comparison Monopulse Radar

2.

Phase-Comparison Monopulse Radar

ECM TECHNIQUES AGAINST MONOPULSE RADARS


DENTAL JAMMING
A.

III.

C.

7
7
7

7
11

15
15

Swept Spot Jamming

16

2.

Barrage Jamming

17

3.

Blinking

17

B.

DECEPTION JAMMING

20

1.

Range Gate Walkoff

21

2.

Velocity Gate Walkoff

22

3.

Skirt

4.

Delta

5.

Image Jamming

6.

Cross-Polarization

7.

Cross- Eye

PASSIVE

Frequency Jamming

23

Jamming

25

26

Jamming

28

Jamming

30

COUNTERMEASURES

38

1.

Chaff

38

2.

Radar Absorbing Material

40

3.

Stealth

40

IV

D.

E.

DECOYS

41

1.

Expendable Jammer

41

2.

Remotely Piloted Vehicle

42

DESTRUCTIVE COUNTERMEASURES
1.

Anti-Radiation Missile

42

2.

Wild Weasel Tactics

43

ANALYSIS OF ECM TECHNIQUES

IV.

A.

DENIAL JAMMING

C.

D.

E.

45
45

Swept Spot Jamming

46

2.

Barrage Jamming

46

3.

Blinking

47

B.

42

DECEPTION JAMMING

47

1.

Range Gate Walkoff

48

2.

Velocity Gate Walkoff

48

3.

Skirt

4.

Delta

5.

Image Jamming

6.

Cross-Polarization

7.

Cross- Eye

PASSIVE

Frequency Jamming

48

Jamming

49
49

Jamming

Jamming

COUNTERMEASURES

49

49
50

1.

Chaff

50

2.

Radar Absorbing Material

51

3.

Stealth

51

DECOYS

52

Expendable Jammer

52

2.

Remotely Piloted Vehicle

52

DESTRUCTIVE COUNTERMEASURES

52

1.

Anti-Radiation Missile

52

2.

Wild Weasel Tactics

53

V.

CONCLUSION

LIST

54

OF REFERENCES

57

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

59

VI

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure

1.

Lobe switching antenna patterns

in

one dimension,

(a)

Polar

form.(b) Rectangular form

Figure

2.

Two

categories of sequential lobing. (a)

tern in

Figure

3.

two dimension,

(b)

Lobe switching beam

pat-

Conical scan with 8 beams per scan.

Monopulse antenna patterns (Polar and Rectangular form) and

4.

5.

Block diagram of two-coordinate (azimuth and elevation)

amplitude-comparison monopulse tracking radar


Figure

6.

Antenna beam radiation patterns

in

10

phase-comparison

monopulse radar
Figure

7.

er-

Block diagram of amplitude-comparison monopulse radar (one


angular coordinate)

Figure

ror signal

Figure

12

Wavefront phase relationships

in

phase comparison monopulse

radar

13

Figure

S.

Swept spot jamming

16

Figure

9.

Barrage jamming

17

Figure

10.

Figure

Figure

12.

Block diagram of the

Figure

13.

Waveform

Figure

14.

Delta jamming block diagram

26

Figure 15.

Image jamming block diagram and waveforms

27

Figure

Block diagram of cross-polarization pulse repeater

28

Figure 17.

Components of

29

Figure

IS.

Cross-eye concept applied to a radar

Figure

19.

Sum

1.

16.

Blinking

jamming waveforms

18

Blinking, synchronized multiaircraft


skirt

19

frequency jamming

of skirt frequency

24

jamming

25

polarization

channels for monopulse receiver,

31
(a)

One

source, (b)

Two

sources

Figure 20.

33

Difference channels for monopulse receiver, (a)

Vll

One

source, (b)

Two
Figure 21.

34

sources

Patterns of the difference channel divided by

sum

channel, (a)

source, (b)

Two

Figure 22.

Warped phase

front

Figure 23.

Block diagram of basic repeater type cross-eye system

Figure 24.

Block diagram of cross-eye system using two separate repeater

One

sources

35

36
37

38

path
Figure 25.

Barrage jamming power vs bandwidth

46

Figure 26.

Block diagram of integrated deception jammer

55

Vlll

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAA
AGC

Automatic Gain Control

ALARM

Air Launched Anti-Radiation Missile

AM
ARM
DECM

Amplitude Modulation

DINA

Direct Noise Amplification

ECCM
ECM

Electronic Counter Countermeasures

EJ

Expendable Jammer

EW

Electronic

FM

Frequency Modulation

HARM

High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile

IF

Intermediate Frequency

INS

Inertial

IR

Infra

MTI

Moving Target Indicator

PRF

Pulse Repetition Frequency

P\Y

Pulse

RADAR

RAdio Detection And Ranging

RAM

Radar Absorbing Material

RAS
RCS

Radar Absorbing Structure

RF

Radio Frequency

RGWO

Range Gate Walkoff

RPV

Remotely Piloted Vehicle

RWR
SAM

Radar Warning Receiver

Anti-Aircraft Artillery

Anti-Radiation Missile

Deception (Deceptive)

ECM

Electronic Countermeasures

Warfare

Navigation System

Red

Width

Radar Cross Section

Surface-to-Air Missile

IX

SEAD
SNR
STAR

Suppression of

TWS
TWT
UK

Track-While-Scan
Traveling

US

United States

USSR
USAF

Union of Soviet

VGWO

Velocity Gate Walkoff

Enemy Air Defense

Signal-to-Noise Ratio

Supersonic Tactical Anti-Radiation

Wave Tube

United Kingdom

Socialist Republics

United States Air Force

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I

am

cordially thankful to

Korean Air Force


I

sincerely

God and

wish to express

my

appreciation to the

for providing the opportunity to study.

want

to express

my

gratitude to

my

thesis advisor, Professor R.L.

Partelow, for his patient guidance, dedicated lengthy counsel and consecutive

support during the preparation of

this thesis.

Without

his help

my

effort

would

never have been successful.


I

am

corrects

also very grateful to Professor E.B.

my

Finally,

Rockower, who carefully reads and

script.
I

thank

to

my

wife,

Nam

Kyo,

behalf.

XI

for the

many

sacrifices

made on my

INTRODUCTION

I.

A.

BACKGROUND
(EW) has been

Electronic warfare

seeking out

enemy

targets in either

principally concerned with techniques for

normal or countermeasure environments using

enemy from

such electronic systems as radio or radar or, for preventing the


tecting

friendly targets, using electronic countermeasures

counter countermeasures
tiveness of

ECM. The

interaction between

(ECCM)

development of radar and

its

Electronic

represent techniques for reducing the effec-

EW

development of these

enemy and

(ECM).

de-

techniques was caused by the

friendly electronic systems. This

countermeasures which

is

a typical

was

true of the

example of

this

interaction process.

The word radar was


acronym derived from

a code

name used by

the phrase

the

US Navy

in 1940,

RAdio Detection And Ranging

[Ref.

and
1:

is

an

p.l].

Before world war two, radar had been developed independently and simul-

taneously

in several countries.

widespread due

During world war two, the use of radar became

to the increase of air attacks

by the

allies

and the Germans.

Since the advent of radar, air strikes have not obtained as good results.

order to thwart the operation of radar systems, both sides employed

which were made of thin aluminum


extremely effective

came designated

in

jamming

as "chaff* or

foil strips.

"window"

of electronic warfare were essentially the

[Ref. 2: p.l 15
in

same

&

devices

technique was

These objects be-

p. 252].

1950. the equipment and tactics


as those of world

war two. Nev-

warfare was indispensable by the end of 1951. According to

the official united states air force

would have been

ECM

the radar systems of that time.

During the Korean war which broke out

ertheless, electronic

This kind of

ECM

In

(USAF)

triple the actual losses

without the use of electronic warfare [Ref.

history, the aircraft

during the
3].

last

and crew

losses

two years of the war,

In the

(AAA)
losses
stalled

Vietnam war, surface

to air missiles

campaign during the

greatly impacted the air

from the enemy ground threat, individual

which were

flexible

threat [Ref. 2: p.253, Ref.


In the

Yom

Israeli aircraft

3:

searching for

US

were shot down by the new Egyptian

new

of air operations,

it

SAM

systems which

essential

is

in-

countermeasure techniques or

SAM

30%
and

of the prewar

AAA

systems

systems.

responses to changing threats,

modern warfare,

had "PODS"

This war showed that old countermeasure tech-

and

familiar development pattern of radar

new

reduce the

to the ever-changing radar

Kippur war of October 1973, approximately

is

to

nullify

to destroy

its

countermeasures,

apparent.

utilize acquisition

dars are major threats for hampering air operations.

to

fighters

To

pp.2-3].

niques were inadequate against the

The now

anti-aircraft artillery

initial stages.

jamming systems, adapted

[Ref. 3: p. 3, Ref. 4: pp. 36-39].

In

(SAM) and

the

them.

and tracking

ra-

In order to achieve the goal

SAM

batteries

When we

using

proper

apply countermeasures

radar system, we need an understanding of the various types of radar systems

and

Each type makes use of

their principles of operations.

a variety of different

techniques that are vulnerable to varying degrees.

The main
pioneered

topic of this thesis

in the

US

in

related to

is

the late 1940s

monopulse radar. Monopulse radar,

and early 1950s,

tracking of targets for anti-aircraft missile systems,


the

USSR

for the

same

function.

It

is

intrinsically

earlier conical scan type radars to deceptive type

those

ECM

more

precise

being widely deployed by

much

less

vulnerable than

countermeasures, specifically

techniques which generate spurious data on aircraft position in

azimuth, elevation and range.

Due

to the several

dars, the Soviets have been using increasing


aircraft missile systems, both

The

is

to provide

advantages of monopulse

numbers of them with

ra-

their anti-

ground and ship based.

objective of this thesis

is

to

determine optimum

ECM

techniques which

apply against the monopulse acquisition and tracking radars that are used for

SAM

targeting.

COMPARISON OF SEQUENTIAL AND MONOPULSE RADARS

B.

According
categories.

(TWS)
second,

to angle tracking

They

radar.

TWS

method, tracking radars

are the continuous tracking radar

The

first

radar,

fall

into

two

distinct

and the track-while-scan

provides continuous tracking data on a single target, the

provides

near simultaneous tracking data on multiple

targets.

In continuous tracking radar, the

by

antenna

servomechanism actuated by an error

is

pointed at the selected target

signal. Several techniques are

used for

the detection of target angular errors.

One method
ror
is

is

of obtaining the direction and the magnitude of the angular er-

lobe switching, also called sequential switching or sequential lobing, which

done by alternatively changing the antenna beam between two

method generates two overlapping beams which have


in

one coordinate as shown

in

Figure

positions.

This

a small angular separation

[Ref. 5: pp. 153- 154].

Switchi ng axis

Beam

Beam

position #1

position

#2

Beam

Beam

position #1

position

#2

# Target

Angle
(a)

Figure

1.

Lobe switching antenna patterns


Rectangular form.

(b)

in

one dimension,

(a)

Polar fonn.(b)

In order for lobe switching to complete angle tracking in elevation

requires a

minimum

This

also true in

azimuth,

it

Figure 2

(a).

is

of four successive

monopulse, but

beam

it is

shown

positions as

not successive

and
in

beams but

simultaneous beams.

Rotation

Azimuth

*,

\
c

o
>
0)

LU

^r

(b)

(a)

Figure

2.

Tmo

categories of sequential lobing. (a) Lobe switching

two dimension,

Another method

is

(b) Conical scan with 8

conical scanning.

switching technique.

The beam

around the crossover

axis, rather

discrete positions.

It

is

For example,

shown

in

if

is

logical extension of the

is

continuous

lobe

in conical scan,

when each transmitted

the scanning rate

is

pulse re-

forty times per second,

and

320 pulse per second, there are eight beam posi-

Figure 2

and conical scan, are included

scan.

than stepwise motion of the beam between four

Even though the beam motion

the pulse repetition frequency


tions per scan as

in

rotates continuously in a circular path, centered

the receiving target echo will be displayed only

aches the target.

beams per

beam pattern

in the

(b).

The above two methods,

lobe switching

general term, sequential lobing [Ref.

6: p. 5].

methods

principal source of error in these

caused by fluctuating target cross section.

is

the fluctuation of echo signal

Pulse-to-pulsc amplitude fluctuations

of the echo signal can degrade the accuracy of the tracking radars which need

many

pulses to generate the error signal.

Another disadvantage of sequential lobing


with

its

required four

minimum

is

the limitation on the data rate

successive echo pulses for the complete angle

tracking in azimuth and elevation. This can be a serious limitation in target

There

tracking of large angular accelerations.

mechanical vibration makes

it

is

the further disadvantage that

hard to maintain accurate boresight alignment

in

conical scan radars.


In order to eliminate these

developed.

Monopulse has

and conical scan techniques

Monopulse operation

is

and other problems, monopulse techniques were

several advantages

comparing with lobe switching

[Ref. 6: pp. 6-7].

similar in concept to lobe switching, but instead of

comparing the target echoes obtained from sequential beam positions,


several target echoes simultaneously

of a single pulse.

receives

and then makes the comparisons on the basis

Therefore monopulse can provide a higher data rate than the

other techniques because angle information


Theoretically,

it

monopulse radars are

is

available from every received pulse.

free of errors

due

to pulse-to-pulse fluc-

tuations in target echo intensity because the fluctuations have no effect on the
ratio of signals received simultaneously

Assuming
Ratio

both
less

(SNRj

in

from opposing lobes during each pulse.

that the other radar parameters are the same, the Signal-to-Noise
is

higher

in

monopulse

since the

sum beam

is

pointed at the target

transmission and reception. This results in better detection capability and

tracking error due to thermal noise.

Monopulse has

better stability of the boresight axis because this technique

does not use the mechanical vibration of the feed or reflector.


In sequential lobing techniques, scanning information

unfriendly observer.

which

utilize

It

makes the radar vulnerable

that information.

during tracking.

to

is

disclosed easily to an

some countermeasures

However, monopulse transmission has no scan

In conical scan, the scan rate has an effect

the

beam

direction between transmission

certain limits.

(PRF)

Monopulse

is

cost.

In addition,

matched

one another

C.

to track

monopulse

because

pulse repetition frequency

range

in

monopulse.

the other techniques are complexity

Monopulse requires multiple

need only one.

The

maximum unambiguous

The disadvantages of monopulse over


and high

is

and reception must be the same within

free of this restriction.

the only factor limiting the

is

on tracking range. This

receivers, while the other techniques

receivers

must be well designed and

gain and phase.

in

OVERVIEW
This thesis

is

composed of

five chapters.

Chapter one describes the

differ-

ences between sequential lobing and simultaneous lobing or monopulse tracking

methods.
cially

Chapter two describes the basic principles of monopulse radars, espe-

two

distinctive categories;

amplitude-comparison monopulse and phase-

comparison monopulse. Chapter three contains various

monopulse radars
nial

in

accordance with the

ECM

techniques against

five different categories.

They

are: de-

jamming, deception jamming, passive jamming, decoys, and destructive

methods.
chapter

Chapter four analyzes these

five arrives at the

techniques.

ECM

techniques conceptually.

Finally,

conclusions regarding the employment of the various

MONOPULSE TRACKING RADAR SYSTEMS

II.

A.

MONOPULSE CONCEPT
Sequential-lobing techniques, including conical scan used earlier for target

tracking, are found to be degraded in angle tracking accuracy


target scintillation.
precise direction

To

by the

effects of

eliminate this source of error, the technique for finding

by comparing the return echo on two or more antenna lobes

si-

multaneously was developed. Sequential-lobing tracking radar including conical

minimum

scan require a

of four pulses in order to extract the angle error signal.

Monopulse tracking radar, however, needs

one pulse.

just

Pulse-to-pulse amplitude fluctuations of the echo signal have no effect on

tracking accuracy
rather than

if

the angular

many. There

measurement

are several

be obtained with only a single pulse.

multaneously

in these

is

made on

the basis of one pulse

methods by which angle error data might

More than one antenna beam

used

is

si-

methods, compared with the lobe-switching or conical scan

tracker which use one antenna

beam on

time-shared basis.

The angle

direction

of the echo signal can be determined in a single pulse system by measuring the
relative

phase or the relative amplitude of the echo signal received

The names simultaneous lobing and monopulse


ing techniques

in

each beam.

are used to describe those track-

which extract angle error information on the basis of

a single

pulse.

B.

TWO
1.

DISTINCTIVE CATEGORIES

Amplitude-Comparison Monopulse Radar

The

basic amplitude-comparison

two overlapping antenna beams


the target displacement by

These two beams

may

by two adjacent

feeds.

monopulse

to obtain

[Ref.

5:

pp. 160- 164] utilizes

an angle error signal. The radar senses

comparing the amplitude of the received echo

signals.

be generated with a reflector or a lens antenna illuminated

The

basic amplitude-comparison

monopulse system

is

shown

in

target

is

Figure

Figure 3

3.

deviated by an angle

ceived from that side of the

(a)

shows the overlapping antenna patterns.

from the equisignal boresight

beam

difference pattern.

axis the signal re-

pattern has a greater amplitude than that from

Figure 3 (b) shows the

the other side.

If the

The sum pattern

is

sum

pattern and Figure 3

(c)

shows the

used for target amplitude detection and

as a reference signal, while the difference patterns are used for angle discrimi-

Signals received from the

nation.

sum and

the difference patterns are amplified

separately and combined in a phase detector to produce the error signal characteristic

shown

in

Figure 3

(d).

(b)

Out

of

{
In

phase

""J
(d)

(c)

Figure

3.

Monopulse antenna patterns (Polar and Rectangular form) and error

sig-

nal.

Amplitude-comparison monopulse radars may be implemented


one or both angular coordinates.

amplitude-comparison

Figure 4 shows a

monopulse radar

for a

in either

block diagram

single angular

of the

coordinate.

The

two adjacent antenna feeds are usually connected with electromagnetic


comparison

circuits

such as a hybrid junction or

The transmission

channels.

line

phase reference information.


tor.

The

The angle

For example,

minus sign
the target

error signal

is

has a only two

provides range and

generated by phase detec-

is

(up/down).

in the case of

azimuth, plus sign could

mean

and

right-side

mean up

case of the elevation, opposite signs

left-side. In

or

down.

If

located on boresight, the difference pattern produces zero magnitude

of angular error.

The

plus

out-phase, relative to the


is

sum channel

It

sign of the difference pattern points out the detected targets direction

relative to boresight (left/right),

signal

connected to the

"magic T".

field

sum

and minus signs actually mean in-phase and 180

The magnitude

or reference channel.

of angle error

proportional to the angular error and the sign of angular error

is

pro-

portional to the targets direction relative to boresight. These angular error signals
control an antenna servo

mechanism

to

perform automatic target tracking

in

an-

gular coordinates.

Transmitter

Sum channel
Duplexer

Mixer

IF

Range

Amp

Envelope

signal

detector

magic

Angle-error

TEE

Phase

LO

Mixer

signal

detector

IF

Amp

Antenna
feed horns
Figure

4.

Difference channel

Block diagram of amplitude-comparison monopulse radar (one angular


coordinate).

Even though phase comparison

is

comparison monopulse radar, the angular error signal

comparing the echo amplitudes from simultaneous


lationship between the signals in the offset

phase detector

is

part of amplitude-

intrinsically a

beams

is

offset

is

basically derived

by

The phase

re-

beams.

not used. The purpose of the

to conveniently provide the sign of the error signal.

Transmitter
Range

AGC

LO

9a e
'

T
Duplexer

channel

Elevation
difference

channel

Envelope

Mixer -e- amp

detector

Phase

IF
Mixer 4*- amp

detector

Video

amp

Range

Elevation angle
error

Azimuth
difference

Mixer

channel

Figure

5.

IF

Phase

amp

detector

Azimuth angle
error

Block diagram of two-coordinate (azimuth and elevation) amplitude-

comparison monopulse tracking radar.

Figure 5 shows a block diagram of an amplitude-comparison monopulse

The

radar with both elevation and azimuth error signals.

makes four

partially overlapping

antenna beams. The feeds might be

a parabolic reflector, Cassegrain antenna, or a lens.

by

all

four feeds.

The

difference pattern in one plane

of two adjacent feeds and subtracting this from the


feeds.

The

cluster of four feeds

The sum pattern


is

10

is

formed

formed by taking the sum

sum

difference pattern in the orthogonal plane

the differences q[ the orthogonal adjacent pairs.

utilized with

of the other two adjacent

is

obtained by combining

Four hybrid junctions generate

three channels which are the

sum

channel, elevation difference channel and

azimuth difference channel. Three separate mixers and IF amplifiers are


one for each channel. All three mixers operate from a single

installed,

local oscillator in

order to maintain the phase relationships between the three channels.

Two

phase

detectors extract the angle error information, one for azimuth, the other for elevation.

Range information

is

extracted from the output of the

sum channel

after

envelope detection.

The monopulse antenna must generate


and

sum

pattern with high efficiency

a difference pattern with a large value of slope at the crossover of the offset

beams. The greater the

SNR

and the steeper the slope of the error signal

in the

measurement of

angle.

vicinity of zero angular error, the

more accuracy

in the

Moreover, the sidelobes of both the sum and difference patterns must be low.

The antenna must be capable of

the desired bandwidth, and the patterns

have the desired polarization characteristics.


these properties simultaneously.

It is

must

difficult to fully achieve of all

Thus antenna design

is

an important part of

good monopulse radar operation.

Automatic gain control (AGC)

required in order to keep a stable

is

closed-loop servo system for angle tracking.

accomplished

by

employing

The

AGC

proportional

voltage

IF-amplifiers output in order to control the gain of

The

AGC

results in

all

in a

to

monopulse radar
the

is

sum channel

three receiver channels.

a constant angle sensitivity regardless of target size

and

range.
2.

Phase-Comparison Monopulse Radar


In this technique target angle

signals received
5:

pp. 165- 167]

is

sensed by comparing the phase of the

by two separate antennas.


is

similar in

many ways

to

Phase-comparison monopulse [Ref.


amplitude-comparison monopulse.

However, unlike the antennas of amplitude-comparison trackers, those used


phase-comparison systems are not
axis of the

antennas are

offset

parallel.

11

from the

axis.

The

in

individual boresight

Therefore,

if

the target

is

on the antenna boresight

moves

namely,

exists

phase difference which points out the angular

phase.

If the target

is

no phase

off the antenna boresight axis, there

shift,

in

axis, there

error.

l^ ^^
/**

T^""^^^

Distance

between

Antenna #1

/boresight axis

antennas

Figure

l^^^

\ Antenna

[N.

/boresight axis

Antenna beam radiation patterns

6.

in

#2

phase-comparison monopulse radar.

Figure 6 shows the antenna radiation pattern for a phase-comparison

monopulse radar.

Because the antennas radiate separate parallel beams, the

amplitude of the target echo signals coming from far


the

same

value, but the phases are not the

field targets are

same depending on

tances from the target to each of the respective antennas,

phase length differences. This situation

The
tion, as

tenna

1, is

the relative dis-

i.e.,

path length or

illustrated in Figure 7.

of sight to the target makes an angle 6 to the equisignal direc-

line

shown

is

very nearly

in

Figure

7.

representing the distance to the target from an-

*i

and the distance

to the target

R-4-smd

from antenna 2

12

is:

(2.1)

R,

The

= R + 4-smd

difference between these offsets

(2.2)

is

AR = R 2 - R =dsmd

(2.3)

This can be used to determine the phase difference

A<p

where X

is

the wavelength, and

is

sin

(2.4)

distance between two antenna feed horns.

Target

Antenna #2
Antenna #

Figure

7.

Wavefront phase relationships

13

in

phase comparison monopulse radar.

For small angles where

two antennas

signals in the

is

sin

6^0, the phase difference between the echo

Atf>*-y-rf0

There
error. It

between phase difference and angular

exists a linear relationship

may

(2.5)

be used to position the antennas via a servo-control loop.

phase-comparison principle, as applied

In the

phase difference between the signals

in

two

to missile guidance, the

fixed antennas

is

measured with a

The servo loop

servo-controlled phase shifter located in one of the arms.

the phase shifter until the difference in phase between the two channels

The amount of phase

shift

measure of the angular

which has

to be

generated to

make

is

adjusts
a null.

a null signal

is

error.

Both the amplitude-comparison monopulse and the phase-comparison

monopulse trackers use two antenna beams

for

one coordinate tracking.

measurements carried out by the two systems are

different

from each other.

Therefore the characteristics of the antenna beams will be different,

amplitude-comparison monopulse the two beams point

The

also. In the

in slightly different di-

rections because the antenna difference patterns are offset from the antenna

boresight

line.

This type of pattern can be generated by using one reflector with

two feed horns side by


four feed horns.

Any

side.

For two coordinate tracking,

will require at least

difference in the amplitudes between the two antenna out-

puts in the amplitude-comparison system

and not phase.

it

is

amplitude

a result of differences in

phase-comparison monopulse measures

In contrast with this the

phase differences only and

is

not concerned with amplitude difference.

Even though tracking radars based on the phase-comparison monopulse


principle have been employed, this has not been widely used

angle-tracking techniques.
that the
nas.

sum

The disadvantage of phase-comparison monopulse

signal has higher sidelobes

However,

this

compared with other

due

to the separation of the

is

two anten-

problem can be reduced by overlapping the antenna

apertures.

14

III.

ECM TECHNIQUES AGAINST MONOPULSE RADARS

DENIAL JAMMING

A.

Denial jamming
ceiver so that

used to

its

effective use

denied

is

This terminology

is

also

a noiselike signal

radar receiver bandwidth.

Maximum jamming power


vices,

[Ref. 7: p. 55].

jamming, which consists of transmitting

illustrate noise

in the victim's

defined as the technique that effects a victim radar re-

is

power supply

other components,

limitation,

output depends on the ratings of available de-

power

limitations of waveguides, antenna,

For the jammer

etc.

to get the

maximum power

per unit

bandwidth, the bandwidth should be made as narrow as possible and the

quency spectrum matched

to the victim

fre-

radar receiver. In the most cases, the de-

jamming bandwidth should be greater than

nial

and

allow for frequency set-on tolerances, drift of

the victim receiver

jammer

bandwidth

or receiver, or to

jam

to
se-

veral radar receivers simultaneously.

Denial jamming
is

to

also called noise

is

jamming. The objective of noise jamming

obscure the true target echo by inserting the jammer noise signal into the

victim radar receiver. Noise

jamming

RF

and transmitting the

carrier

wave with

noise,

is

generated by

AM

or

FM

modulating an

result at the victim radar's fre-

quency. The radar receiver detects relatively weak return signals from the target,
therefore radar receivers

must have very high

the radar to be vulnerable to noise

sensitivity.

jamming because

the

This sensitivity causes

jamming

signal

of far greater amplitude than a returning echo signal from a target.

system can detect

SNR
SNR

its

target in a

back ground of ambient

must be much greater than one


is

one or

less,

due

in

from the

target.

15

usually

The radar

However, the

order to reliably detect the target.

to the effects of noise

to evaluate the skin return

noise.

is

jamming, the radar

will not

If

be able

Denial jamming

is

often classified according to the emission bandwidth of the

jammer. The following techniques can be applied

to the

monopulse acquisition

and tracking radar jamming.


Swept Spot Jamming

1.

Swept spot jamming


quency

is

is

swept across the band. Spot jamming

ming power against one particular


efficiently

quency

In order to

sweep

fre-

capable of concentrating jam-

cannot jam as

it

Nowadays, many radars use

fre-

counter against spot noise jamming.

jam radar systems with both high power density and over

wide frequency band, swept spot jamming

jamming tunes

is

fixed radar frequency, but

an entire radar frequency band.

agile techniques to

jamming where jamming

a kind of denial

the high

power jamming

is

Swept spot

nevertheless employed.

signal across a wide frequency

rates corresponding to the victim radars

if

band with

frequency. Thereby

all

pre-

determined victim radars over the desired frequency band including frequency
agile

radars are affected by the jamming signal, as

bandwidth of swept spot jamming thus


bandwidth. This results

in

maximum

Sweep

Figure

8.

"

little

in

The

8.

pp. 273-277].

8:

Agile radar
signal

spot

'
1

i!'r

Figure

bigger than the victim radar

noise quality [Ref.

.'II.
/'

shown

1LL

Hi

End

End

points

points

Swept spot jamming.

16

'

Barrage Jamming

2.

Barrage jamming comprises the spreading of noiselike jamming energy


over a wide frequency band, such that

radar can be

jammed

many

victim radars or a single

over a whole radar band simultaneously.

Barrage jamming with wide band noiselike jamming power

many

erated in

broadband

may

be gen-

ways. For example, various types of modulated electromagnetic

waves can be used

for the

low-power sources,

For high-power source devices


rect noise amplification

like

like the traveling

(DINA)

is

semiconductor

wave tube (TWT)

RF

oscillators.

are used.

Di-

produced by passing band-limited Gaussian

noise from a low-power source through a high-power amplifier.

There are several variations of barrage jamming depending on the jam-

ming

circuitry.

Figure 9 shows basic barrage jamming.

Jamming power
density spectrum

Victim radar signals

Figure

3.

Barrage jamming.

9.

Blinking
Blinking

jamming

utilizes

noise

jamming whose spectrum covers

the

bandpass of the victim radar and the jamming signal alternately turns on and off
at

approximately a

are

shown

in

50%

Figure

duty cycle [Ref.

10.

17

7:

p.481].

Blinking

jamming waveforms

'

'

CL
=>

Spot or barrage noise

On-Off

<D

yyyvyvv

y y vvvvvvv
/vy
yyVyyv
xxxx
/yv
yvy
y vy y y v

QOOO<XXX

Q.

>CxxVxx'x;
w w yv y y
VvVvVvV VvVvV
y
t v v v v v y v
vvyyvvy

cn

c
E
E

-..,

-.'

Off

ratio

= P2 / P 1

Sfe

'

>!* ">.'

VV

On

03

>

Figure

10.

Blinking jamming waveforms.

In order to effectively

should just exceed the time

The jammer

it

jam

a track-on-jam

radar receiver, jammer on time

takes the radar to go into

off time should be just less than the time that

reacquire the target.

Good

blinking

jamming maintains

track-on-jam mode.

its

it

takes the radar to

the radar either searching

for the target or in the process of going into track-on-jam

mode. Typical blink

rates are in the low audio frequency range.

For blinking

to be

most

effective,

two or more synchronized blinking

jammers, which are angularly separated, are required.

In the case of aircraft,

they can be installed on two individual aircraft. These jammers are located within
the radar antennas

beam but

The jammers

at slightly different angles.

are alter-

nately turned on and off so that the victim radar receives the strong noise signal

from alternate angles around


radar
off,

will

attempt

to shift

its

mid

point.

The antenna of

tracking direction as the jammers are turned on and

provided that the noise jamming

is

of sufficient strength.

interaircraft control link, this technique can be classified

as

shown

in

Figure

a single target-tracking

18

by

Depending on the

five different classes,

Master

Jamming
ff

RF

'

j/lctifTJ

Jamming

&

T ITH

Iradar)

ass^

Slave

Jamming

Aircr
Aircraft

navigation
gatic

II

1 >

link.

Slave

'

lin ks

Viclin
Iradar

Jammlni

Slave

Master

IN

No

Jamming

Victinj
Iradarl

link

Jamming
I3^*W"I

"""
Slave

Him

>>
IV

/<

RF

rime delay

Jamming

Victim

link

Iradar]

Jamming
1 1 1

Master

Jamming

>>
Sy
Synchronized^

digital

A-

clockO^o

-*-

victim
Iradarl

Jammin
Iffllll

*-

Figure 11.

link

Blinking, synchronized multiaircraft.

19

When

blinking

jamming source

another

to

in

the control of a missile

is

more

may

turn. This

Otherwise the radar tracker

lock.

from one

cause the radar tracker to break-

have erroneous target information. Thus

will

difficult

will track

and a

missile guided

by the tracking radar

miss the target due to the inaccurate target angle position information.

will

the

working properly, the victim radar

is

maximum

rate

miss distance, the blinking rate must be considered.

too high, the tracker will attenuate the jam signal.

is

missile will be able to

home

in

B.

Hertz [Ref.

it

the blinking

too low, the

is

on one jammer by determining precisely the an-

gular position of individual aircraft.


to ten

If

If

For

Optimum

blinking rates are from one half

9: p.3d-21].

DECEPTION JAMMING
Denial jamming can deny range information, but

and elevation information

employed

radar

to a fire control

at different locations simultaneously.

if

it

may

not deny azimuth

jammers are not

several denial

Thus

a missile

may

hit a target

which has a denial jammer for own self-protection.

However, deception jamming provides a

little

different

method against

control and missile guidance radars in order to decrease the aircraft


bility

by the

missile.

The

objective of deception

jamming

is

to

kill

fire

proba-

confuse or deceive

the true target echo by inserting properly altered replicas of the true target echo
into the victim radar systems. This technique will

correct information

ception

jamming may be

not only

ming

by providing many

in

impossible to get the

in

is

on the display. De-

the accuracy of tracking information

able to degrade

and elevation

it

realistic false targets

range and velocity, but also

related to azimuth

make

azimuth and elevation.

implemented successfully,

If

angle jam-

in general,

it

can cause the victim tracking radar to break lock.

The
tion

with

is

basic

form of deception jamming

to reradiate

time delay.

repeater jamming.

Its

implementa-

modified replicas of the received victim radar signal correlating

The conspicuous

characteristics

coherently store the victim radar signal

frequency

is

memory such

as a

TWT

in the

ECM

combined with

2"

of repeater
set.

This

is

jamming

is

done by using

a delay line in a loop.

to
a

The

output

is

gated out of the loop at successively earlier or later time, simulating

range walk.

The technique employed

to

degrade the accuracy of the azimuth and

vation tracking circuits depends on the tracking technique that


radar. Therefore deceptive

victim
istics

jamming must be matched

is

ele-

used by the

to the character-

of the victim radar.

jamming can be categorized

Typically, deception

on the radar parameter to be "deceived" such

as;

in three

ways, depending

The

range, velocity and angle.

range gate walkoff technique represents range deception, velocity gate walkoff
technique represents doppler deception and several angle deception jamming
techniques are applicable to either the monopulse or sequential lobing acquisition

and tracking radars. Angle deception techniques against monopulse radars can

The

conveniently be divided into two kinds.

advantage of the weaknesses


single source

jamming, image jamming,

techniques

utilize the

example

cross-eye

ception
1.

is

category of angle jamming takes

design of certain monopulse radar systems to

Such techniques are cross-polarization,

jammers.

tort the electromagnetic

in the

first

etc.

The second one

skirt

frequency

uses multiple sources which dis-

wave's angle- of- arrival at the monopulse antenna. These

weakness basic

to all

monopulse tracking systems. Typical

jamming and cooperative repeater

jamming techniques

blinking.

The various

de-

are introduced in the following sections.

Range Gate Walkoff

(RGWO)

Range gate walkoff

is

defined as "a self screening

ECM

tech-

nique for use against automatic range tracking radars that captures the victim
radar's range gate, walks

with no signal" [Ref.

it

off in range,

7: p.l 15].

and then turns

off,

leaving the range gate

There are several other names

for this technique:

range gate capture, pulloff. grabber, grabbing, stealer, deception, dropping,

dumping,

selecting or confusion.

This technique

is

fundamental deception

tomatic tracking radars which employ the


target range.

The gate

width of gate

is

is

swiftly controlled

range servo mechanism.

varied according to the antenna modes.

21

technique against au-

gate to measure and track the

split

by

ECM

In tracking

The

mode, the

width of gate

mode, the gate

tion.

similar in size to the victim radar pulse width.

is

will

be increased

in length to several

corollary function of the gate

which are not within the

is

times the radar pulse dura-

to reject spurious return

The range gate

gate.

is

technique exploits the

characteristics of the range gate to produce range errors.

implemented as follows: [Ref.


(a)

minimum

The victim radar pulse

is

7:

RGWO

True target

received, amplified,

and retransmitted with

to the victim

radar receiver.

strong "return'" causes the victim

signal, the "skin return",

is

decreased

(b)

By then gradually

strong repeater signal.

This phase
(c)

is

called the dwell.

gradually walks off from the true target range.

it

As soon

jammer reaches

as the

When

the

and must return

The procedure

is

The walk

off rate

is

walk

the

jammer

turns

limit,
off.

to the acquisition or

it

is

turned

This

off.

the radar has no target

range search routine.

repeated continuously by the jammer thereby con-

tinually interrupting range tracking

2.

is

is

called walk.

the range gate

racy.

circuitry.

increasing the time delay, the range gate tracks the

Hence,

called off or drop.

(d)

AGC

gain and the range gate

in

captured by the strong jamming (beacon) signal. This phase

in

is

pp. 786-787].

radar to decrease the overall receiver gain by the operation of

is

jamming

time delay by the jammer. This provides a strong "return" signal, as a

beacon would,

phase

echo signals

accurately centered at the target

RGWO

return echo during normal radar operation.

typically

In acquisition

in the

and seriously degrading range tracking accu-

range of

\i

sec for

up

to 10 seconds.

Velocity Gate \\ alkoff

Velocity gate walkoff

(VGWO)

is

defined as "a self screening

ECM

technique for use against automatic velocity tracking radars, that captures the
victim radar's velocity gate, walks
velocity gate with

it

no signal" [Ref.

off in velocity,
7: p. 145].

this technique: velocity gate capture, pulloff,

tion,

and then turns

off,

leaving the

There are several other names for


grabber, grabbing, stealer, decep-

dropping, dumping, selecting or confusion.

Some

radars depend on the doppler shift of the target return echo

der to get the target velocity information.

")->

in or-

The measurement and tracking q[

accomplished by the velocity gate.

VGWO

exploits the charac-

doppler

shift

teristics

of the velocity gate, which tracks the frequency of a strong echo signal.

is

The frequency

shift

operation

serrodyne technique using a

of

TWT.

VGWO jammer can be achieved by the


VGWO jamming can be implemented as fol-

[Ref. 7: pp.937-941].

lows:

(a)

Victim radar signal

is

received, amplified coherently,

and retransmit-

ted to furnish a strong repeated signal, such as a beacon, to the victim radar re-

The strong repeated

ceiver.

signal causes the radar receiver gain to decrease

because of the activation of AGC. As a result of


signal

is

AGC action, the real target echo

suppressed and the repeater captures the velocity gate of the victim radar

receiver. This step


(b)

is

also called dwell period, as in

The doppler frequency of

RGWO.

the repeated signal

sequentially changed,

is

or walked, either in an increasing or decreasing direction. This will cause the vic-

tim radar to track the doppler frequency of the jamming signal rather than that
of the real target.
(c)

Upon

This step

is

the walk phase.

reaching the walk

cause the victim radar to breaklock.

mode and

sition

is

may

Above procedures

VGWO must

ECM

it

is

turned

This will

off.

victim radar then returns to the acquiIf

falsely lock to a spurious

the victim radar fails

low

level signal.

This

the off period.


(d)

and

The

repeater

searches for the targets frequency again.

to reacquire the real target,

step

limit, the

be done

in a

are repeated through such

VGWO

cycle.

RGWO

coordinated manner for most efficient use of these

techniques.

3.

Skirt Frequency

The

Jamming

definition of skirt

jamming

is

that "skirt frequency

jamming

refers to

jamming on

the skirts of the frequency response curve of the radar receiver.

effectiveness

depends on unbalance between the sum and difference channels,

these frequencies, where rapid phase shifts are present in each channel.
it

Its

at

Of course,

can be effectively countered by careful design and construction of the radar"

[Ref.

7: p. 843].

23

Skirt frequency

When
signal

the

ECM

the

which

ECM

is

jamming can

also be used with pulse repeater

set detects the victim

offset

radar signal,

it

will transmit a

from the victim radars frequency. This

produce a beat signal with the victim radar

set will

offset

jamming.

jamming

frequency by

local oscillator.

The

beat signal will appear on each side of the passband spectrum, or on the passband

phase control of the victim radars phase detector

skirts. Stable

attain because of the necessary bandpass.


rors translate into angle-tracking errors

will

be hard to

Consequently, the phase-tracking

er-

by the radar.

\/

Pulser

Detector

Direc tional

cou

Dler
i

rs
TS_
WL/

T\A/
1

Variable
attenuator

Mixer

\s

<

y^

TV n>
i

U^

fc

Figure

Block diagram of the

12.

skirt

frequency jamming.

Figure 12 shows the block diagram of skirt frequency jamming.


tector provides the input signal to the pulser.

frequency,

When

the received victim radar

fed into the balanced mixer, the balanced mixer generates

sideband jamming signals alf


t

the victim radar

and

is

-f and/ + f where/

is

two

the center frequency of

the local oscillator frequency of the

24

de-

jammer.

These

jamming
Figure

signals

13.

contain

very

The victim radar

receiving

little

signal

receiver will detect

frequency where the receiver gain

frequency, as shown

jamming

in

signals at the skirt

rolls off.

Lower sideband
jamming

Upper sideband
jamming

>

Victim radar
DC
UJ

passband spectrum

-z.

LU
hZ>
Q_
\-

D
o

fr-h

Figure

4.

13.

Waveform

Delta

Jamming

Delta jamming

of skirt frequency

is

radar.

spacing

of/ f2

is

RF

ECM

signals at

technique that causes erroneous

two different frequencies, f and


x

usually equal to the IF center frequency of the victim

This frequency separation can be controlled so as to

in the victim

radar IF amplifier.

control circuits can be

There

are

+h

jamming.

a self-screening

angle tracking by transmitting two

f The

fr

>r

made

several

By forming

false

make

false

IF signals

IF signals, the victim radar

unstable or will have incorrect bias.


other

names

IF-jamming, two-line delta, or RF/IF

delta.

25

for

this

technique:

dual-frequency,

Frequency
offset

t
1_

fi

Set on
circuit

Q.

(/)

Pulsei

Detector

Cv5

Set on
circuit

CO

Frequency
() offset

Figure 14.

Delta jamming block diagram.

Figure 14 shows a delta jamming block diagram for generating two


frequencies.

Two

dars frequency.

set-on oscillators are used to lock on to the received victim ra-

Frequency

jammer frequency
quency.

offset controls of both oscillators allow the locked

5.

fre-

synchronized operation of both power amplifiers, the

In order to allow

TWT

by exact amounts from the victim radars

to be displaced

victim radar pulse detector circuit

power

RF

is

used.

Each set-on

amplifier and radiating antenna [Ref.

7:

oscillator

has

its

own

high

pp. 602-605].

Image Jamming
Image jamming

is

a self-screenig

ECM

technique for use against tracking

radars dependent on phase-sensing for angle tracking, as

monopulse radar. The

definition of

image jamming

is

in

phase-comparison

as follows:

"Image jamming

occurs at the image frequency of the radar, depending on the fact that the phase
angle at IF, between two signals (image frequency and local oscillator)
verse of that which

would appear

frequencies of the receiver.

at the IF

if

the

two signals were

is

at the

the re-

normal

Since the phase-comparison monopulse determines

the direction of the error by the direction of the phase difference between

26

two

signals,

the

image jamming causes the antenna

jamming power exceeds

the signal

to be driven

power"

[Ref.

away from

the target

if

7: p. 703].

LO
2 IF

Band Stop

Mixer

for

Filter

f.

Pulser

Detector
(a)

Upperside
jamming signal

Lowerside
jamming signal

en

"e

E
fr

-2

if

tLO

f,

/L0

fr +2

IF

(b)

Image jamming block diagram and waveforms.

Figure 15.

Figure 15 shows an image jamming block diagram and

spectrum.
is

The amplified victim radar

fed into a mixer

jammer

is

RF

TWT

The

RF

an input signal for the pulser, which turns on the

for every input

frequency
amplifier,

signal detector. Local oscillator frequency of the

equal to two times the victim radars IF frequency.

tector provides

TWT

and an

signal through the input

its

radar pulse.

It is

necessary to

best operation.

27

know

signal de-

final

pulsed

the victim radars IF for

In the case

shown

in

Figure 15

(a),

the

band stop

filter

radar frequency,/, and then passes the lower sideband frequency,/


higher sideband frequency,

/ +

21 F,

takes out the


-

21

F and

the

which are used as the image jamming

signals.

Figure 15 (b) shows the frequency spectrum which has the two image

jamming

signals

andfLO

which represent the lower and upper sidebands, where/

represents the victim radar frequency and local oscillator frequency respectively

As an

[Ref. 7: pp. 702-704].

alternative, just one sideband, either the lower or the

upper side of the image jamming


high pass or low pass
6.

is

jamming technique which causes angular

tracking radars, including monopulse.

when

Some monopulse

the received signal

receivi ng signal

is

radars provide erroneous

polarized at right angles to the

t\ /

7
180 phase

TWT

shifter

chain

Horizota lly polarized


recei ving signal

Variable/
a ttenuator

1/

4
Vertically polarized
transmitting signal

\/

71
TWT
chain

16.

simple

error in

Horizontally polarized
transmitting signal

Verticall y polarized

Figure

utilizing a

Jamming

a self-screening

angular information

can be generated by

Filter.

Cross-Polarization

This

signal,

V
A

Block diagram of cross-polarization pulse repeater.

2S

Cross-polarization

of the radar transmitter.

polarization

jamming

[Ref.

7:

pp. 579-585] takes advantage of this characteristics of those radar systems.

Figure 16 shows the repeater system employing two separated cross-

The

polarized receiving and transmitting antennas.


is

horizontally polarized signal

radiated as a vertically polarized signal, and the vertically received signal

phase shifted 180 and radiated as a horizontally polarized

is

signal.

Received

victim radar signal


vertical component

>

Transmitted

jamming signal
component

/
/

vertical

Received
victim radar signal

\
\
>

Effective transmitted
jamming signal

^\

\j

^\

Received

victim radar signal


horizontal component

Transmitted \.
jamming signal
horizontal component

270-

>

90

Transmitted
18

jamming signal
horizontal component
(Before reversal)

Figure

17.

Components

of polarization.

Figure 17 shows the polarization components of the signals.


polarization

components of the victim radar

signal appearing at the

The

jamming

platform are dark arrows. The horizontal polarization component of the received
victim radar signal
the

jammer which

is

is

used for producing the vertical polarization component of


then retransmitted to the victim radar antenna through the

29

TWT

amplifier chain without 180 phase shift.

component of the received victim radar

polarization

the horizontal polarization

which

the 180 phase shifter

direction change of the electric field vector.

components are transmitted back


a target

The

Figure 20

is

due

tortion

nulls

ECM

is

after

TWT

equivalent to a 180

is

these modified polarization

cross polarized to the skin echo.

sum

each side of boresight as

on boresight, and

null

in

Figure 19

technique that generates angular errors

aircraft or other platform.

ECM

and

(b)

in

monopulse

ra-

two

to the interference

shown

ECM

in

beam

ceive only antenna


sets.

the two

The

ECM

cross eye

to use

is

two

between two jamming sources.

of describing the cross-eye concept [Ref.

7:

pp. 555-576].

is

sources which have equal amplitudes and are 180 out of phase,

Figure

victim radars

The concept of

sources producing either nulls or phase front angular dis-

One method

IS.

This figure shows the aircraft approaching normal to the

direction.

The antenna mounted on

the nose section

which provides the victim radar signal information

received signal

is

is

a re-

to the

two

divided, amplified, and phase controlled so that

sets reradiate repeater

jamming

signals that have the

tude but are 180 out of phase with each other.

make

by 180

by radiating phase-controlled repeated pulses using separate antennas

out-of-phase

ECM

shifted

is

(b). respectively.

mounted on an

as

When

effects are very similar to cross-eye with a

This

to use

used for producing

Cross-Eye Jamming

7.

dars

is

to the victim radar antenna, they will super-

echo signal which

of difference

pair

signal

component of the jammer and

The function of

amplifier chain.

the other hand, the vertical

then retransmitted to the victim radar antenna through a second

it is

impose as

On

a null at the center of the victim radars

30

The two jamming

antenna aperture.

same amplisignals will

d/ 2

Transmit antenna

Transmit antenna

P z/180

jZ ol

e
\

|\

Receive

4r^:

c/sinGi

\:

antenna

Line of

->^9V<.:
\

maximum

ijamming effectiveness

A
Radar

Figure

site

Cross-eye concept applied to a radar.

18.

The two transmitting antennas


on each wing.

Thus

are installed

the signal transmitted by the

left

feet apart, typically

wing antenna

dsin 6 more than that by the right wing antenna, making the
point on line

AB. Line

AB

will travel

right side null

represents the fact that the radar doesn't have to be

looking perpendicular to the


nulls will occur

first

one

jammer

The

baseline for cross-eye to be effective.

whenever dsin 8 equals

31

n).

where n

is

any integer and

'/.

is

the

radar wavelength. For finding the null positions, two equations can be derived
as follows:

n/.

For the
6

first null,

= d sin 6

(3.1)

= rtan0

(3.2)

Solving for 6 and

n should be one.

s,

(sin

6^

tan 6

when

small):

is

(33)

"-"""(-jM
iwfl

where

The

As

(3.4).

two

the

is

first null

the null distance from the centerline

r is

the distance from

moves

is

any other

is

cross-eye

jamming

steep spatial

jamming

s. r,

aircraft to victim radar.

and d can be explained from the equation

closer to the radar site

and or the distance between

increased the spacing between nulls, which

effectiveness,

When

(3.4)

angle at the aircraft

relationship between

sets

= r4

s is

the aircraft

ECM

jamming

or

B rad

null.

is

related to the

decreased.

jamming

is

operating, the victim radar receiver detects

lobes of opposite polarity on either side of the centerline,

These lobes are detectable because the jammer signal

is

stronger than the skin return and result in angular tracking errors (usually

azimuth) of

few degrees

The following
is

at

figures

most.

show

the relative signal voltage vs scan angle, which

useful for the understanding of cross-eye jamming.

32

c/)

O
>

-10
-20-

LLI

(a)

zz

-30"

LU
DC

-40

50
5

-10

-5

^p

Ar

10

15

10

15

SCAN ANGLE

if)

-10-

tj

O
>
(b)

-20-

LU

>
<
_l
LLI

DC

-30-

-40"

4-5

-505

-10

9 e

A
5

SCAN ANGLE
Figure 19.

Sum

channels for monopulse receiver, (a)

33

One

source, (b)

Two

sources.

LLI

(3

-10

<
H
-J
o -20
>
LLI

(a)

> -30
H
<
_J
LU
DC

-40

50
5

-10

-5

10

15

10

15

SCAN ANGLE

LU

-10

o
>
(b)

-20

LU

> -30
ZZ
<
_i
LU
DC

SCAN ANGLE

Figure 20.

Difference channels for monopulse receiver, (a)


sources.

34

One

source, (b)

Tno

3
CO

o
>
>
<
_l

r
-

LLI

(a)

LLI

Boresnght

-1

CO

-2
5

-10

-5

10

10

SCAN ANGLE
Boresight

3-i

>,
CO

/I

o
>

LLI

(b)

>
<

LLI

-1

-2
5

-10

-5

SCAN ANGLE
Figure 21.

Patterns of the difference channel divided by


source, (b)

Two

sources.

35

sum

channel, (a)

One

Figure 19 shows the


boresight axis for one source
boresight axis (b).

sum

(a),

channel.

There

is

no

null

point on the

but two sources (cross eye) produce a null on the

Figure 20 shows the difference channel. There

is

a null point

on the boresight axis for one source. But two sources have two null points, each
at the cross-eye angle (6 CE )

on both sides of the boresight

the difference channel divided by the

Figure 3
to

(d).

Figure 21 (b)

is

sum

channel.

Figure 21 shows

axis.

Figure 21

(a)

the result of cross-eye so that the nulls

each side of boresight. Thus the radar can track either null

and Figure 21

(b).

The angle

corresponds to

error (0 CE ) caused by cross-eye

is

in

move, one

Figure 20 (b)

never large.

Phase-front

ECM souyteXT
Pj

^8c

No n-jam
Track direction

Jam

track

direction

Figure 22.

Warped phase

Another way

Under

front.

to describe the cross-eye

concept

cross-eye conditions an interferometry pattern

Figure 22.

This concept

utilizes the the

is

phase front distortion.

is

produced as shown

in

property of any radar tracking antenna

36

which

is

to be aligned with the face parallel (actually tangent) to the

The

of the signal being tracked.

wave

is

tenna

will align itself

shown

of n

The

The peaks

in

Therefore cross-eye

is

known

also

as

re-

phase

Figure 18 correspond to path length differences

and represent the phase front distortion shown

-f-

victim radar an-

with the boresight normal to the distorted phase front,

sulting in angular tracking error.

front distortion.

front

distorted phase front of the electromagnetic

interferometry pattern Figure 22.

in the

wave

in

plan-view

in

Figure 22.

180 phase

power

shifter

splitter

Transmit
antenna #1

Transmit
antenna #2^

A
Receive
antenna

Figure 23.

A
shown

in

Block diagram of basic repeater type cross-eye system.

block diagram of a cross-eye system, which employs a repeater,

Figure 23.

The

previous explanation.

whose output power

is

basic concept of the system operation

center receive-only antenna feeds a

split so as to drive

in

effects.

TWT

in

intersect the radar site so as to

Any maneuver

incurring

antenna

37

as the

amplifier

Figure 23 has a basic prob-

that the perpendicular bisector of the line joining the two

must continuously

same

two transmitting antennas with 180

out of phase signals. However, the system shown

lem

the

is

is

yaw

ECM

antennas

maximize cross-eve jamming


will

degrade

the

jamming

effectiveness.

In order to eliminate this problem,

compensating repeater paths are used as


of the

in

Figure 24.

two transmit and receive antennas

Thus

compensations.

the

two separate, automatically

result

in

The

relative

placements

automatic path length

two signals radiated by the jammers

will

remain 180

out of phase at the victim radar regardless of the angle of arrival of the victim

radar signal at the jammers

no yaw dependency.

i.e.,

180 phase
shifter

>

>
Traansmit

Transmit

antenna

.antenna

#2

Figure 24.

C.

Block,

diagram of cross-eye system using two separate repeater path.

PASSIVE COUNTERMEASURES
1.

Chaff

Chaff

"window"

in

the

is

one

UK.

It

of

the

is

still

earliest
a

radar

ECM

devices,

also

known

very useful technique, applicable to nearly

as
all

radars except some moving target indicator (MTI) radars.

Chaff consists of resonant dipoles. used


erate multiple echo effects

and

false targets

to reradiate

RF

on the radar display.

energy, to gen-

According

the electromagnetic theory of chaff, a piece of chaff acts like a dipole

3S

to

whose

output terminals are short circuited.

when

reradiation occurs

the

RF

incident

In

the dipole length

energy [Ref.

RF

wavelength of a specified

9:

the case of a

the greatest

approximately a half wavelength of

is

Therefore by cutting to a

p.3L-3].

frequency,

dipolc,

maximum

effect

by the chaff

half

be

will

attained.

Materials used for chaff are conducting or nonconducting fibers coated

with a conducting material


of

aluminum

like

aluminum or

silver-coated nylon thread,

foil,

ducting material. The thickness of a

foil

The general forms

zinc.

and

are ribbons

glass fiber coated with a con-

should be as thin as possible, because the

falling rate decreases the thinner the foil.

Chaff length
or wavelength

wavelength

is

falling rate.

is

is

proportional to the wavelength.

short, chaff length should be short.

long, chaff length should be long.

Chaff

band radars, rope

is

is

not used

If

If

the frequency

the frequency

Long chaff length

is

is

high

low or

increases

its

cover B,

combination with other jamming techniques

to

much below 1GHz

for this reason.

To

often used instead of chaff [Ref. 9: p.3L-7].

Chaff can be applied

in

upgrade the effectiveness of jamming. Various chaff missions are also possible.
Representatively, these involve chaff corridor screening, chaff confusion and saturation, chaff deception, signal attenuation,

and self-protection missions.

Chaff corridor screening missions deny

strike aircraft information inside

the corridor to the victim radars. Chaff confusion

and saturation missions over-

load the victim radar scope with false echoes returned by the chaff.

Thus

the

victim radar operator cannot discern the true targets on his radar display. Chaff

deception missions create signals

like

true targets on

the radar displays.

To

achieve this mission, chaff cloud size should be greater than the radar cross section

(RCS) of individual

targets

by an amount equal

provement factor of the victim radars.


after

MTI

In this

way

to the expected

effective returns

MTI

im-

from the chaff

processing should be similar to the returning echo signal from the

air-

craft targets. Signal attenuation missions reduce target detection ranges of the

victim radars.

To

achieve this purpose, chaff clouds must have large chaff density

per unit volume at the victim radar frequencies.

39

The

result

is

the effect of a

greatly increased propagation lose because of the intense

back scattering of the

radar forward energy. Self protection missions deploys chaff


victim radars to break lock on
will

own

when accompanied by

be increased

The

aircraft.

in

order to cause the

effectiveness of this technique

a simultaneous evasive

maneuver

[Ref.

10].
2.

Radar Absorbing Material

Radar absorbing material (RAM)

is

used to reduce the

RCS

by absorb-

ing impinging electromagnetic energy. Thus, the reduced target size will appar-

ently be decreased, along with the target detection range.

One

type of

RAM

surface of the vehicle.

is

The

made by

using a radar semitransparent layer on the

and transmitted energy (50% each) recom-

reflected

bine destructively at the surface, resulting in

good only

narrow band due

in

layer [Ref. 11: p. 101].

up

20dB RCS

to

reduction.

to the fixed thickness of the

(approximately

This

is

semitransparent

-H
4

Another type of

wave

electromagnetic

another type of

particles of an iron

RCS

[Ref.

7:

RAM

compound

Such paint can be applied

3.

a dissipator,

p. 405].

to

is

which attenuates the incident

This absorber can reduce the energy


is

It is

an absorbent paint, containing microscopic

Absorbent paint can give

used for absorption mostly above 10 GHz.

almost any aircraft surface but there

is still

a weight

pp.49-50],

12:

Stealth
Stealth has been a highly classified technology untill now.

RAM

re-

usually thicker.

in the ferrite family.

reductions of up to 20 dB.

penalty [Ref.

is

wider frequency band, but

flection over a
Still

RAM

It

combines

techniques with others and can be applied to any kind of weapon system

which can be detected by radar, including

RCS

is

not the only concern

aircraft.

in stealth

technology.

The design concept

of the stealth aircraft also includes avoidance of detection by infra red (IR)

scanner, optical, acoustic,


In reference to

stealth aircraft

is

smoke and

radar

ECM.

contrails [Ref. 13: p. 28].

however, the only interesting point of the

related to detection evasion

40

bv enemy radar. For that reason,

RCS

reduction plays an important role in stealth aircraft. In order for stealth

aircraft to reduce

RAM,

RCS,

RAM

and counter

as discussed above, contributes to

reflective

RCS

geometry can be employed.

reduction by absorbing or atten-

uating incident electromagnetic energy. In addition, radar absorbing structures

(RAS) and radar transparent

structures,

which are constructed of composite

materials, are used to reduce weight as well as

RCS. Two geometric methods

used to scatter the radar beam, rather than reflect


stealth aircraft.
reflection

"One

is

to

make

from the surface of the

it,

the shape flat or rectilinear, concentrating the

on one bearing, and reducing the tendency for concave surfaces

function as retro reflectors over large ranges of angles of incidence.


to scatter the

wave with

a carefully designed

flection." [Ref.

by the USAF.

and the B-2.


D.

Two

14: p. 22].

a stealth

The other

to
is

concave curve of constantly chang-

ing radius, so that each tiny part of the surface has

recently

are

its

own

tiny main-lobe re-

kinds of stealth aircraft have been introduced

F-117A, a

stealth fighter,

based on the

is

first

method,

bomber, combines both methods.

DECOYS
Decoys are

support

ECM

techniques that

utilize

low cost vehicles equipped

with different jamming augmentation systems. Decoys can be employed by a variety

of techniques

using different delivery vehicles employing

jammers. Typical examples

and remotely piloted

ol^

vehicles.

this tactics application are

variety of

expendable jammers

These jamming techniques are not peculiar against

monopulse radar systems, but are commonly applied


1.

to

any radar.

Expendable Jammer

Expendable jammer (EJ) consists of the jammer and

its

delivery package,

such as parachute, rocket, expendable drone and remotely piloted vehicle (RPV).

Most EJ

may

and cheap. Output jamming power of one unit

are small, light weight,

not be adequate to jam a given radar, therefore, several EJs

to achieve satisfactory

for reuse. This

is

radar capture by decay. By definition, EJ

quite different

The most important


tiveness.

To be

compared with

a recoverable

factor, therefore, in EJ

cost effective, the

life

may
is

be required

not recovered

RPV.

employment

is

cost effec-

cvcle cost of EJs should be less than that of

41

the platform

and alternate

EJ employment are very

ECM,

which the EJs are protecting.

flexible, lending to a variety of scenarios

package and attached jammer.

EJs are dispensed

ploy them by using forward fired rockets, free


towing.
bility,

When

delivering EJs,

if

in several

fall,

ways.

tactics of

of delivery
Aircraft de-

parachute retarded or by

the delivery package does not have flying capa-

parachutes can be used to lengthen jamming time.

Remotely Piloted Vehicle

2.

This tactic

and

The

confuse

to

utilizes a

enemy

drone

radar.

RPV

RPVs

ECM

as

support, to assist strike aircraft

can perform various missions such as jam-

ming, chaff dispensing and EJ delivery.

RPV
conflict

EW

effectiveness as a tool of

between

Israel

and Syria

in the

was demonstrated during

Bekaa Valley, even though not used

use of

RPV

is

RPVs

and

as decoys utilize small radio controlled drones.

The

very cheap compared with using

The primary advantage of


without

loss

the

RPV

is

manned

are small.

aircraft

RCS enhancement

due

14:

aircraft.

use in a high threat environment

of personnel and expensive aircraft.

and shoot down than manned

RPVs

for

p. 112]

decoy delivery but for remotely controlled reconnaissance [Ref.


aircraft simulation.

the 1982

RPVs

arc

more

difficult to detect

Even though

to the their small size.

can be used

to

confuse or deceive

enemy

radar.
E.

DESTRUCTIVE COUNTERMEASURES
I.

Anti-Radiation Missile

The

effectiveness of

get position informations.

SAM

For

systems

this reason,

is

mainly governed by the precise

most

SAM

systems are required to

have targeting radars. These radars greatly enhance the capability of

Meanwhile.

(ARM)

SAM

tar-

SAM.

systems become vulnerable targets of the anti-radiation missile

by working as active emitter.


In the case of high-speed anti-radiation missile

cently developed

ARM

in the

US. operation

is

diation signal either before or after launch.

(HARM),

by locking onto enemy radar

Onboard

RWR

or the

guidance section can detect the enemy radar signal, then the missile

4:

the most re-

is

ra-

missile

locked on

HARM

and homes on the radar.

bands from

2 to

has a wideband seeker which covers

GHz. and has an

40

HARM

width (PW), PRF).

In stand-off

can be fired on a trajectory for

range from high altitude. The highest-priority threat signal


location

HARM

memorized. Then accurate

is

flexibility

of

tactical situation [Ref. 14: p.930].

HARM

mode,

radar

extensive parameter threat library (pulse

has three launch modes which provide

employment, depending on the

all

to continue the attack

even

inertial

selected

and the

navigation system (INS) allow

the radar system

if

is

maximum

is

turned off after the

launch of missile.
In target-of-opportunity

can

in the cockpit. Pilot

select the

mode, the received threat


radar target.

and indicates immediate threats

detects, sorts,

to the aircraft.

Because of these characteristics,

SAM

(RWR)

mode, the radar warning receiver

In self-protection

signals are displayed

HARM

is

capable of coping with

many

radar threats.

2.

Wild Weasel Tactics


"Wild Weasel"

nickname

is

for

an aircraft which performs special

missions relating to destruction or suppression of

Their primary mission

is

of mission,

it

air

defense systems.

to provide a safe corridor for the air strike forces using

weapon systems.

integrated

enemy

In order for the

Wild Weasel

to carry out this kind

needs a sophisticated electronic equipment such as

puter system, specialized radar warning and location system and

launch com-

ARM

or other

destructive weapons.

Wild Weasel

aircraft

ment of technology. The


In the beginning of

have been continuously updated by the improve-

US Wild Weasel

aircraft

were F-lOOFs and F-105Gs.

Vietnam war, F-lOOFs Wild Weasel

aircraft

were equipped

with an unsophisticated radar warning system designed to intercept and

on the SA-2 radar

They had
cated the
in

signal.

to directly
site,

an effort

to

then

It

home

in

could only detect one target signal at any one time.

in

on the

SAM

radar

site until

the crew visually lo-

come back again and drop conventional bombs on

destrov the

home

SAM

the area

svstems. This tactic was extremelv dangerous

43

because the crew couldn't detect any other


pp. 20-26].

However, low

effective in devastating

with shrike

ARM

level attack of the

enemy

SAM

sites.

sites

near that the area [Ref.

Wild Weasel
In

day was very

in those

1966, Two-seat

15:

F-105G

aircraft

replaced the old Wild Weasel.

After Vietnam, F-4Gs, following F-4Cs, became the primary Weasel


aircraft.

The F-4G Wild Weasel

aircraft

For F-4G Wild Weasels, an airborne

gun

in the

F-4E. This

is

RWR

RWR can detect and


SAM

identify each threat such as


selected target

from outside

craft as future

Wild Weasels.

or

AAA

lethal range.

44

a modified version of

was

sites.
is

enemy radar

aircraft.

20mm

nose

emitters,

and

installed instead of

locate the

USAF

F-4E

Wild Weasel then attacks the


considering F-15 or F-16 air-

ANALYSIS OF ECM TECHNIQUES

IV.

DENIAL JAMMING

A.

Denial jamming or noise jamming

is

not the most efficient method to use

against tracking radars because most tracking radars are able to maintain angle

tracking by locking on to the noise


to tracking radars

may

jamming source may

The

jamming

increase the vulnerability of the

act like a

beacon signal [Ref.

principal effect of the noise type

deny the target range information.


will

deny range information

missile system utilizing

effect a kill

In

16:

aircraft since the

p. 138].

jamming against monopulse radar

is

to

monopulse radar systems, denial jamming

the jam-to-signal ratio

if

jamming

jamming

is

equal or greater than one.

monopulse radar guidance may or may not be able

to

without range information, depending on system performance spec-

ifications or missile

ground

source. Applying noise type

However, the operating effectiveness of the

launch range.

degraded without providing accurate range data,

missile system will be

even though modern missile guidance systems can operate with angle data only.

The main advantage of


victim radar system

is

noise

jamming

not required.

and bandwidth of the victim radar


ing, noise

nial

jamming

is

less efficient

Thus

deception jamming.

The

to

The simpler

and blinking, described

may

in

to

know

only the center frequency

perform denial jamming. Generally speak-

than deceptive jamming methods because dethe parameters between the

the circuitry for denial

effectiveness of noise

fectiveness

that precise information about the

One needs

jamming does not accurately match

the victim radar.

is

jamming

is

jammer and

simpler than that for

circuitry generally implies lower cost.

jamming techniques such

chapter three,

is

hard

as swept spot, barrage

to quantify.

The jamming

ef-

be differently evaluated depending on the tactical situation and

available information

these kinds of noise

about enemy weapon systems performance.

jamming

will at least effectively

any radar against which they are employed.

45

However,

degrade the performance of

Swept Spot Jamming

1.

The advantage of swept spot jamming

that

is

it

can concentrate the high

jamming power on each victim radar while sweeping across


band. The disadvantage
time. This

is

that the

jamming

is

wide frequency

intermittent due to the sweeping

drawback can be reduced by increasing

jamming with

Swept spot

the sweeping rate.

sweeping rates produces approximately continuous jamming

fast

Again, the optimum rate corresponds to the victims bandwidth, inferred

effects.

from measurements of

his pulse width.

Barrage Jamming

2.

The use of
dars can be

this

type of

jammed without

jammer

is

attractive because frequency agile ra-

readjusting the

jamming frequency,

cause a number of victim radar receivers can be

jammed

at the

as

same

w ell
r

as be-

time.

Equal areas
\

^^

^ c

<!>

u'tf

.''.

*f
^o

".'

.-.

3-T3

:<">:

mi mil

i riiiiTii

figft^B^^^I

Bandwidth
domain

Bandwidth
domain

:Radar power bandwidth product


[]x.x>|

Figure 25.

bandwidth product

Barrage jamming power vs bandwidth.

As shown

in

Figure 25

jamming power density


width.

Jammer power

is

the disadvantage of barrage

jamming

is

that the

diluted by being spread over a wide frequency band-

The power density of barrage jamming

46

is

inversely proportional to

its

bandwidth. The jamming effectiveness depends on jammer power density.

jamming power
power density

is

If

constant, the wider the jammer's bandwidth the lower the

[Ref. 17: pp. 52-54].

Blinking

3.

This

is

ECM

one of the most effective

ECM

techniques available to the

designer for protecting a formation of aircraft, because

it

works against any type

of tracker including the monopulse tracker.

The disadvantage of blinking jamming

optimum

is

blinking rate, even though the best rate

the tracking servo bandwidth, or in the 0.1 to 10


B.

is

Hz

undoubtedly on the order of


range [Ref.

16: p. 156].

DECEPTION JAMMING
Deception jamming

ECM

generally implemented in the form of the self-screening

is

mission in order to jam against missile guidance which utilizes tracking ra-

dars [Ref. 16:


ble

the difficulty in determining the

to

p. 138].

Self-screening or self-protection

jamming power and

the attack aircraft due to the

limitations on the

noise jamming.

This

is

the

more

applica-

physical size

less

power

to

jam

radar compared

because deception jamming uses a waveform

matched

to the victim radar.

mament

loading. In addition, lower

small

is

jammer.

Deception jamming requires significantly


with

jamming

Small

size is desirable to afford

power

more room

availability requires the

for ar-

jammer

to be

size.

Deception jamming techniques discussed

jamming

characteristics.

tively efficient

way

to

RGWO

in

chapter three have different

as range deception technique

is

easy and rela-

jam against monopulse radar because monopulse radars

use a conventional range gate for measuring the distance from radar to target.

VGWO

as velocity deception technique

frequency

shift.

As

a result, the victim

In general, angle deception

is

is

a useful

way

to

induce false doppler

radar can get false range rate information.

difficult to achieve against

monopulse tracking

ra-

dars compared with sequential lobing radars. Monopulse techniques are inherently strong

beams

to

against angle deception

determine

the

target

jamming because they use simultaneous

position.

47

In

order

to

enhance

jamming

effectiveness,

deception

is

it

imperative

ECM (DECM)

to

combine these three categories of

closely

techniques with one another.

Meanwhile, deception jamming systems employ complicated

match the
system
ters

jammed.

characteristics of each type of system to be

demand more

will

expenditure.

To

circuits

Complexity of

properly match the jamming parame-

between the jammer and the victim radar systems, these techniques

quire specific information about the victim radars.


available,

may

it

to

If

will re-

such information

is

not

greatly impact on the use of deception jammers.

Range Gate Walkoff

1.

False target range information in the missile guidance and tracking radar, such as
ror.

SAM

targeting

monopulse radar, can produce aiming-guidance

However, target angle information

good enough

is still

The radar can guide

target angular position.

er-

to direct against the

the semi-active missile with target

angle information only.


In

RGWO,

monopulse radar application of

followed by dropping of the

deceptive signal, the result can be a partial loss of information.


ception

is

If

angular de-

not simultaneously used, the victim radar will reacquire the skin echo

too fast.
2.

Velocity Gate Walkoff

VGWO
itself

may

technique

is

RGWO

very similar to

not be effective against

some radars which employ

measurements because those radars constantly check the


differentiating range data

and comparing

to

technique.
fects of
3.

VGWO

filtering.
If the

VGWO

very

should be combined with

target velocity data

by

jamming

RGWO

signal by

way

of

and angle deception


ef-

little.

Skirt Frequency

Jamming

The jammer used

in skirt

jamming

is

little

dars frequency. Well designed monopulse radars


this

by

target doppler

victim radar doesn't exploit the doppler characteristics, the

is

jamming because

RGWO

measured target doppler data.

In order for the victim radar not to reject the

doppler

But

technique.

(}o

detuned from the victim

not ha\e vulnerability to this

technique basically uses the weakness

4v

ra-

in

the design of the

monopulse tracking systems. The tracking accuracy of some monopulse systems


is

degraded

signal

the receiver

if

lies in

not properly tuned to the echo signal so that the echo

the skirts of the IF

Delta

4.

is

filter.

Jamming

Delta jamming technique needs high powered

tennas

each channel

in

bandpass

filters

in

TWT

amplifiers

and high gain an-

order to overcome the high losses by the mixers and

of the monopulse victim radars.

For

effective

jamming, the

information on the victim radars IF bandwidth and IF control frequency are


required.

Image Jamming

5.

This jamming
fective

the

if

6.

is

not a dependable jamming technique because

monopulse radar

is

equipped with an image rejection

Cross-Polarization

Jamming

One advantage

that the cross-polarization

is

ECM

filter

it is

inef-

or mixer.

technique does not

need special knowledge about the victim radar. This provides design freedom

which

important

is

in the

rapidly changing field of

enemy

missile radar control

technology.

The

critical

huge jamming

drawback of

to signal ratios

the cross-polarization

approaching 20

to

40dB

jamming

is

need for

This

[Ref. 16: p. 123].

is

because the wave guide components of the victim radar highly attenuate a cross
polarized signal.

sults in a

ponent

is

jamming

any deviation

in the polarization

of the

component with normal

polarization. If the

normal polarization com-

In addition,

greater than the cross-polarization due to the attenuation, the

signal will act as a


It

signal re-

jamming

good target beacon.

has thus far been impractical to employ cross-polarization as the angle

deception jamming technique against monopulse tracking radars.


7.

Cross-Eye Jamming

The magnitude of angular


phase

shift,

and amplitude

fectiveness can be obtained

ratio of

when

error

two

the

is

determined by separation distance,

ECM

jamming

49

sources.

Maximum jamming

signals of the

two

ECM

ef-

sources

are transmitted with 180 phase shift

and

at

equal amplitudes.

separation distances cause proportional angular error,


to

much

span.

effect

it

is

Even though the

difficult to

on the jamming effectiveness because of the limited

implement

aircraft

wing

Separation has an extremely small value compared with the victim radar

range.

The disadvantage of

cross-eye jamming, using one receiving antenna,

dependency on the motion of the jamming

aircraft.

is

The phenomena of warped

phase front occurs near the interferometer peaks. Aircraft movement by yawing
will shift the interferometer null pattern, therefore

Although

greatly degraded.

this fault

jamming

effectiveness can be

can be eliminated by using a cross-eye

system which employs two separate repeaters with equal path lengths,
nique

is

impractical due to cost, weight and complexity constraints.


In order for cross-eye to be effective, high jamming-to-signal

as

much

20dB

as at least

antenna aperture

[Ref. 16: p. 123]. This

relatively small

is

Another major drawback


is

C.

this tech-

is

required,

partly because the victim radar

compared with the


is

is

null spacing.

that the angle error produced by cross-eye

generally very small.

PASSIVE COUNTERMEASURES
1.

Chaff

Even though
against chaff, chaff

is

MTI
still

radar systems can provide some countermeasures

widely used

jam wide bandwidth radars by using


dispenser.

Some

proper length

in

in

military

different

jamming systems.

Chaff can

lengths of chaff in the

same

chaff dispenser systems mounted on aircraft can cut chaff to the

order to match detected victim radars frequency accomplished

through use of RYVR.

Another advantage of chaff


entail high cost to

DECM

provides a very cost effective

utilizing

to angle

monopulse

cost effectiveness.

employ compared with other

paring chaff with the

more susceptible

is

is

techniques.

When com-

techniques against monopulse tracking radar, chaff

ECM.

DECM.

more

ECM

Chaff doesn't usually

Sequential lobing tracking techniques are

However, the angle jamming of tracking radar

difficult

due

5d

to the characteristics of the

monopulse

beam

pattern.

AM

no

The

DECM

modulation

in the

beam

transmitting

Therefore the

DECM

receiver provides

jammer when

to turn

on and

jamming

18:

no information

monopulse

is

when

there

is

tracking.

for directing the

DECM

DECM may accentuate the


DECM angle deception, from a

Sometimes the

not as effective as two source jamming [Ref.

pp.398-399].

On

and the

the other hand, chaff creates a wide spread echo signal

monopulse tracking radar

action of

Monopulse trackers
by

off.

of monopulse radars

aircraft position to the victim radars.

single source, against

beam and

receiver can sense only one steady

is

similar to

will track the strongest

re-

any other tracking radars.

echo signal, which

may

be produced

Chaff can eventually defeat a monopulse tracking radar with proper

chaff.

deployments.

Radar Absorbing Material

2.

In order to use

be considered.

The

RAM

on the

thickness of

aircraft, the

RAM

weight and cost factors must

depends on the frequency. The

effect of

attenuation per unit depth in absorbing material will be increased, as frequency


is

increased. Therefore the thickness of absorber can be decreased as frequency

is

increased.

RAM

coatings are not very practical at low frequencies.

recent trends for the radar systems shows that the frequency
creases

up

to the millimeter region.

Therefore the use of

However,

band gradually

in-

RAM may become more

prominent.
It

will

probably be attended by high cost because of the newness and

complexity of the technique.


3.

Stealth
In fact, even

though sophisticated stealth techniques are employed, one

cannot completely eradicate reflections

SAM

to

receiving antenna.

acquisition and tracking radar can detect skin echoes to

pending on the target range and the remaining RCS.


stealth fighter against the

SAM

is

The

based on the fact that

Accordingly,

some

effectiveness of the

SAM

radars have to

acquire normal-sized targets just before the target aircraft reaches


range, and

SAM

has a

minimum range because

51

extent, de-

SAM's

lethal

the missile has a required launch

and acceleration time


fighter.

RCS

SAM

D.

In the case of the stealth

radar picks up the target at considerably shorter range due to

reduction.

range [Ref.

to properly track the target.

The attacker may

therefore be located inside the

minimum

its

firing

12: p. 66].

DECOYS
Expendable Jammer

1.

The

use of EJs against a radar missile system can confuse

operators. Frequently EJs are mistaken for airborne targets.

tempt

to shoot

down

Thus, they

may

at-

EJs with expensive missiles.

Remotely Piloted Vehicle

2.

The primary advantage of


without

loss of

the

RPV

is

personnel and expensive aircraft.

and shoot down than manned

RPVs

enemy radar

are small,

due

aircraft

RCS enhancement

use in a high threat environment

RPVs

are

more

difficult to detect

Even though

to the their small size.

to confuse or deceive

enemy

by homing on the radar radiation.

ARM

can be used

radar.

E.

DESTRUCTIVE COUNTERMEASURES
1.

Anti-Radiation Missile

ARM

directly attacks radars

missiles can be installed

against

SAM

on any type of

A trade off

radars.

aircraft for the

necessary since

is

purpose of

ARMs

utilize

self protection

weapon

stations

on the aircraft thereby reducing the loadout of other primary weapons.


Therefore

ARM

suppression of

enemy

effectiveness of

ARM

air

is

usually delivered by specific aircraft which carry out

defense

against

war and Iran Iraq war.

(SEAD)

SAM

as, for

example the Wild Weasel. The

radars was fully proved during the Vietnam

Several countries have developed and produced

For example. Shrike, high-speed anti-radiation missile


the US;
air

Armat. supersonic

tactical anti-radiation

launched anti-radiation missile

The

use o^

ARM

(ALARM)

for destroying

(HARM)

(STAR)

and sidearm by

missile

by France and

by England.

SAM

systems

will

probably increase

because oi their standoff capability and reduced threat against own

52

ARM.

aircraft.

2.

Wild Weasel Tactics


For the performance of

navigation tactics.

SAM

threat

is

Low

a successful mission,

level flight will

not only

make

Wild Weasel uses low

level

detection hard, but also the

decreased due to the higher ground clutter. This allows Wild

Weasel an increased element of surprise against


recently developed

ARM,

which provides

capability,

and Wild Weasel

pression of

enemy

SAM

tactics

SAM

a longer

sites.

The combination of

range and more flexible launch

can contribute to greatly improved sup-

activities.

53

CONCLUSION

V.

It is

jam radars with one technique

difficult to effectively

Individual

only.

techniques cannot successfully achieve monopulse radar jamming.

It

may

be

impossible to jam the radar completely even under the multiple techniques con-

Each

dition.

ECM

to provide a partial

technique

jamming

be integrated with each other


It is

is

tailored for only a specific portion of the radar

Therefore, several

effect.

ECM

thus desirable to employ the various

As

techniques should

order to completely jam the entire radar systems.

in

possible to enhance the overall

ECM

jamming

illustrated in chapter four,

techniques as simultaneously as

effect.

ECM

some

techniques against monopulse ra-

dars are very impractical. Cross-polarization jamming and cross-eye jamming are
also not

good techniques

for application to

monopulse radars due

ments of very high SNR. Image jamming

is

also not a

to the require-

dependable jamming

technique without special knowledge of the victim radar. However, the other
techniques

that

have

been

have

covered

good

effect

on degradation of

monopulse radar performance when combined with one another.


Five different categories of

ECM

techniques against monopulse radar; denial

jamming, deception jamming, passive countermeasures, decoys, and destructive


countermeasures: should be well integrated to give the best result
fectiveness.

Denial jamming techniques have excellent jamming

jamming can be employed by attacking


standoff jamming aircraft.

which

are; range, velocity,

repeater system,

as

very cost effective.

pensing capability.

In deception

in

effects.

In addition.

jamming

RPV

Denial

usually achieved through

and

field.

in

the one

With passive countermeasures, chaff is

Fighter aircraft

RAM

ef-

jamming, the three jamming techniques

Figure 26.

Most attack

expendable drones or

it is

jamming

and angle deception: should be integrated

shown

pact on the future radar

aircraft, but

in

have

self protection

chaff dis-

stealth techniques will certainly imIn

decoy methods, the use of cheap

will greatly increase the survivability of the future

54

When

strike aircraft.
is

considering probability of

theoretically proportional to the

ated by decoys.

number of

the survivability of aircraft

kill,

targets including false targets cre-

Destructive countermeasures can usually be performed by spe-

cially dedicated aircraft

equipped with special weapons,

and attack the position of radar radiation sources.


or Wild Weasel aircraft

a top

is

ARMs,

which can detect

The employment

of

ARMs

growth area, projected well into the next century.

Received victim

Transmitted

radar signal

jamming signal

V
TWT

Delay

line

Angle

Velocity

Range

deception

deception

deception
i

AM

Amplitude Frequency
modulator modulator

detector

Audio-scan

rate

amplitude
modulator

i_

Figure 26.

Time delay
modulator

Swept
oscillator

________

______

Block diagram of integrated deception jammer.

In conclusion, these techniques should be properly integrated to optimize

ECM

techniques while conserving resources against monopulse radars.

The

fol-

lowing combinations are recommended as a best approach for a strike force


package.

55

Attacking aircraft need to be equipped with both passive countermeasures

and integrated deception jammer.

Denial jamming

jamming

relatively

aircraft,

jammers such
confuse the

which require

as decoys can be carried

enemy radar operators

Finally,

performed by the standoff

on any of these

or system.

Wild Weasel type

aircraft to additionally

In relation with these

ECM

tech-

complement the jamming

aircraft

destroying forward or high threat radar systems.

56

Expendable

high output power.

niques, evasive maneuvers have to be included to


fectiveness.

is

with

ARM

take

part

ef-

by

LIST OF
1.

REFERENCES

Eaves, J.L., and Reedy, E.K., Principles of Modern Radar,

Van Nostrand

Reinhold Company,

New

2.

Price, A., Instrument

of Darkness, Peninsula Publishing, Los Altos, 1987.

3.

August, G.

Jr.,

York, 1987.

Radar Electronic Warfare, American

and Astronautics,

Institute of

Aeronautics

Inc., 1987.

Call from Wilderness, Air University Review, 1976.

4.

Alberts, D.J.,

5.

Skolnik, M.I., Introduction to

Radar Systems, McGraw-Hill Book Company,

1980.

6.

Sherman, S.M., Monopulse Principles and Techniques, Artech House, 1984.

7.

Van Brunt,

8.

Knorr.

L.B.. Applied

J.B.,

ECM

Vol

1,

EW

Engineering, Inc., 1987.

and Karantanas, D.T., Simulation Optimizes Noise Jammer

Design, Microwave Journal,

May,

1985.

9.

Hoisington, D.B., Electronic Warfare, Naval Postgraduate School.

10.

Wilson, L.A., Electronic Countermeasures Handout Chaff Section, Naval

Postgraduate School.

11.

Fitts, R.E.,

The Strategy of Electromagnetic Conflict, Peninsula Publishing,

Los Altos, 1980.

57

12.

Sweetman,

B.,

Wholesalers,

Stealth Aircraft,

Motorbooks International Publishers

Inc., 1986.

B-2 Bomber for the 2 1st Century, Interavia, January 1989.

13.

Sweetman,

14.

Wanstall, B.,

15.

Allsup. D., Those Wild Wild Weasel, Airman, September 1984.

16.

Schleher, D.C., Introduction to Electronic Warfare, Artech

17.

Electronic

B.,

Arms

to stop

Combat

Force, Headquarters

18.

&

SAMs,

Principle,

US

AE

Interavia,

September 1987.

Inc., 1986.

Pamphlet 51-3, Department of the Air

Air Force, Washington

Short. R.H., Chaff Conception

House

DC,

18 June 1985.

and Misconception, International Counter-

measure Handbook. 1985.

58

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LTJG. Chia, Hua Kai


#9, Lane

6.

Apartment, Karak-Dong, Kangdong-Gu.

Korea

Shy Jain

ROCN

Li,

Chy Jin District, Kaohsiung, 80504


Taiwan, Republic of China
12.

Almetlaq, Issam
P.O. Box 345
Suit, Jordan

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60

KAY 93

3 9 2

28

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1

K97
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INTCOinu

Kwon
Optimizing ECM techniques against monopulse
acquisition and tracking
radars.

41