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THESIS
K11
OPTIMIZING ECM TECHNIQUES AGAINST
ACQUISITION
MONOPULSE
AND TRACKING RADARS
by
Kvvon, Ki
loon
September 1989
Thesis Advisor
Approved
R.L. Partelow
is
unlimited.
Unclassified
ecunty classification of
this
page
la
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Name
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(if applicable)
is
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93943-5000
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TRACKING RADARS
Personal Author(s)
Kwon. Ki Hoon
Master's Thesis
From
1<1
To
Date of Report
15
September 1989'
Page Count
73
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or poof the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
Supplementary Notation
16
sition
Cosati Codes
18 Subject
Group
Field
Subgroup
Terms
continue on reverse
if
ECM.monopulse.monopulse radar
[19
Abstract
ECM
ECM
ECM
ECM
S
la
unclassified unlimited
Nan?
of
same
DT1C
Unclassified
users
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Responsible Individual
D FORM
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include Area
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MAR
83
APR
edition
may
code
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security classification of this page
Unclassified
T245265
Approved
Optimizing
ECM
is
unlimited.
by
Kwon, Ki Hoon
Major, Korean Air Force
B.S.,
Submitted
in partial fulfillment
of the
MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
(ELECTRONIC WARFARE)
from the
ABSTRACT
ECM
ECM
ECM
The techniques
It
and de-
was found
techniques are involved with several complex parameters and they are
Partic-
ECM
techniques
is
111
C.l
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
I.
A.
B.
C.
II.
BACKGROUND
TWO
DISTINCTIVE CATEGORIES
1.
2.
III.
C.
7
7
7
7
11
15
15
16
2.
Barrage Jamming
17
3.
Blinking
17
B.
DECEPTION JAMMING
20
1.
21
2.
22
3.
Skirt
4.
Delta
5.
Image Jamming
6.
Cross-Polarization
7.
Cross- Eye
PASSIVE
Frequency Jamming
23
Jamming
25
26
Jamming
28
Jamming
30
COUNTERMEASURES
38
1.
Chaff
38
2.
40
3.
Stealth
40
IV
D.
E.
DECOYS
41
1.
Expendable Jammer
41
2.
42
DESTRUCTIVE COUNTERMEASURES
1.
Anti-Radiation Missile
42
2.
43
IV.
A.
DENIAL JAMMING
C.
D.
E.
45
45
46
2.
Barrage Jamming
46
3.
Blinking
47
B.
42
DECEPTION JAMMING
47
1.
48
2.
48
3.
Skirt
4.
Delta
5.
Image Jamming
6.
Cross-Polarization
7.
Cross- Eye
PASSIVE
Frequency Jamming
48
Jamming
49
49
Jamming
Jamming
COUNTERMEASURES
49
49
50
1.
Chaff
50
2.
51
3.
Stealth
51
DECOYS
52
Expendable Jammer
52
2.
52
DESTRUCTIVE COUNTERMEASURES
52
1.
Anti-Radiation Missile
52
2.
53
V.
CONCLUSION
LIST
54
OF REFERENCES
57
59
VI
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure
1.
in
one dimension,
(a)
Polar
Figure
2.
Two
tern in
Figure
3.
two dimension,
(b)
pat-
4.
5.
6.
in
10
phase-comparison
monopulse radar
Figure
7.
er-
Figure
ror signal
Figure
12
in
radar
13
Figure
S.
16
Figure
9.
Barrage jamming
17
Figure
10.
Figure
Figure
12.
Figure
13.
Waveform
Figure
14.
26
Figure 15.
27
Figure
28
Figure 17.
Components of
29
Figure
IS.
Figure
19.
Sum
1.
16.
Blinking
jamming waveforms
18
19
frequency jamming
of skirt frequency
24
jamming
25
polarization
31
(a)
One
source, (b)
Two
sources
Figure 20.
33
Vll
One
source, (b)
Two
Figure 21.
34
sources
sum
channel, (a)
source, (b)
Two
Figure 22.
Warped phase
front
Figure 23.
Figure 24.
One
sources
35
36
37
38
path
Figure 25.
46
Figure 26.
55
Vlll
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AAA
AGC
ALARM
AM
ARM
DECM
Amplitude Modulation
DINA
ECCM
ECM
EJ
Expendable Jammer
EW
Electronic
FM
Frequency Modulation
HARM
IF
Intermediate Frequency
INS
Inertial
IR
Infra
MTI
PRF
P\Y
Pulse
RADAR
RAM
RAS
RCS
RF
Radio Frequency
RGWO
RPV
RWR
SAM
Anti-Aircraft Artillery
Anti-Radiation Missile
Deception (Deceptive)
ECM
Electronic Countermeasures
Warfare
Navigation System
Red
Width
Surface-to-Air Missile
IX
SEAD
SNR
STAR
Suppression of
TWS
TWT
UK
Track-While-Scan
Traveling
US
United States
USSR
USAF
Union of Soviet
VGWO
Signal-to-Noise Ratio
Wave Tube
United Kingdom
Socialist Republics
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I
am
cordially thankful to
sincerely
God and
wish to express
my
appreciation to the
want
to express
my
gratitude to
my
Partelow, for his patient guidance, dedicated lengthy counsel and consecutive
this thesis.
Without
his help
my
effort
would
am
corrects
my
Finally,
script.
I
thank
to
my
wife,
Nam
Kyo,
behalf.
XI
for the
many
sacrifices
made on my
INTRODUCTION
I.
A.
BACKGROUND
(EW) has been
Electronic warfare
seeking out
enemy
targets in either
enemy from
counter countermeasures
tiveness of
ECM. The
interaction between
(ECCM)
its
Electronic
EW
development of these
enemy and
(ECM).
de-
countermeasures which
is
a typical
was
true of the
example of
this
interaction process.
a code
name used by
the phrase
the
US Navy
in 1940,
[Ref.
and
1:
is
an
p.l].
Before world war two, radar had been developed independently and simul-
taneously
in several countries.
widespread due
by the
allies
Since the advent of radar, air strikes have not obtained as good results.
came designated
in
jamming
as "chaff* or
foil strips.
"window"
[Ref. 2: p.l 15
in
same
&
devices
technique was
p. 252].
ECM
ertheless, electronic
This kind of
ECM
In
(USAF)
during the
3].
last
and crew
losses
In the
(AAA)
losses
stalled
to air missiles
which were
flexible
Yom
Israeli aircraft
3:
searching for
US
new
of air operations,
it
SAM
systems which
essential
is
in-
countermeasure techniques or
SAM
30%
and
of the prewar
AAA
systems
systems.
modern warfare,
had "PODS"
and
new
reduce the
is
to
nullify
to destroy
its
countermeasures,
apparent.
utilize acquisition
to
fighters
To
pp.2-3].
The now
anti-aircraft artillery
initial stages.
In
(SAM) and
the
them.
and tracking
ra-
SAM
batteries
When we
using
proper
apply countermeasures
and
a variety of different
The main
pioneered
in the
US
in
related to
is
USSR
for the
same
function.
It
is
intrinsically
those
ECM
more
precise
much
less
vulnerable than
countermeasures, specifically
Due
to the several
The
is
to provide
advantages of monopulse
ra-
their anti-
is
to
determine optimum
ECM
techniques which
apply against the monopulse acquisition and tracking radars that are used for
SAM
targeting.
B.
According
categories.
(TWS)
second,
to angle tracking
They
radar.
TWS
The
first
radar,
fall
into
two
distinct
provides
targets.
by
antenna
is
used for
One method
ror
is
is
in
Figure
positions.
This
Switchi ng axis
Beam
Beam
position #1
position
#2
Beam
Beam
position #1
position
#2
# Target
Angle
(a)
Figure
1.
(b)
in
one dimension,
(a)
Polar fonn.(b)
requires a
minimum
This
also true in
azimuth,
it
Figure 2
(a).
is
of four successive
monopulse, but
beam
it is
shown
positions as
not successive
and
in
beams but
simultaneous beams.
Rotation
Azimuth
*,
\
c
o
>
0)
LU
^r
(b)
(a)
Figure
2.
Tmo
two dimension,
Another method
is
conical scanning.
switching technique.
The beam
axis, rather
discrete positions.
It
is
For example,
shown
in
if
is
is
continuous
lobe
in conical scan,
is
pulse re-
and
Figure 2
scan.
in
beams per
beam pattern
in the
(b).
lobe switching
6: p. 5].
methods
is
of the echo signal can degrade the accuracy of the tracking radars which need
many
its
required four
minimum
is
There
it
is
in
developed.
Monopulse has
Monopulse operation
is
several advantages
of a single pulse.
receives
it
is
free of errors
due
to pulse-to-pulse fluc-
tuations in target echo intensity because the fluctuations have no effect on the
ratio of signals received simultaneously
Assuming
Ratio
both
less
(SNRj
in
that the other radar parameters are the same, the Signal-to-Noise
is
higher
in
monopulse
since the
sum beam
is
Monopulse has
unfriendly observer.
which
utilize
It
that information.
during tracking.
to
is
disclosed easily to an
some countermeasures
the
beam
certain limits.
(PRF)
Monopulse
is
cost.
In addition,
matched
one another
C.
to track
monopulse
because
range
in
monopulse.
The
maximum unambiguous
is
is
receivers
in
OVERVIEW
This thesis
is
composed of
five chapters.
differ-
methods.
cially
two
distinctive categories;
monopulse radars
nial
in
ECM
techniques against
They
are: de-
methods.
chapter
techniques.
ECM
techniques conceptually.
Finally,
II.
A.
MONOPULSE CONCEPT
Sequential-lobing techniques, including conical scan used earlier for target
To
by the
effects of
si-
minimum
scan require a
one pulse.
just
tracking accuracy
rather than
if
the angular
many. There
measurement
are several
multaneously
in these
is
made on
used
is
si-
beam on
time-shared basis.
The angle
direction
of the echo signal can be determined in a single pulse system by measuring the
relative
in
each beam.
a single
pulse.
B.
TWO
1.
DISTINCTIVE CATEGORIES
The
basic amplitude-comparison
may
by two adjacent
feeds.
monopulse
to obtain
[Ref.
5:
signals.
The
basic amplitude-comparison
monopulse system
is
shown
in
target
is
Figure
Figure 3
3.
deviated by an angle
(a)
beam
difference pattern.
If the
is
sum
(c)
shows the
as a reference signal, while the difference patterns are used for angle discrimi-
nation.
sum and
separately and combined in a phase detector to produce the error signal characteristic
shown
in
Figure 3
(d).
(b)
Out
of
{
In
phase
""J
(d)
(c)
Figure
3.
sig-
nal.
amplitude-comparison
Figure 4 shows a
monopulse radar
for a
in either
block diagram
single angular
of the
coordinate.
The
circuits
The transmission
channels.
line
The
The angle
For example,
minus sign
the target
error signal
is
is
(up/down).
in the case of
mean
and
right-side
mean up
left-side. In
or
down.
If
of angular error.
The
plus
sum channel
It
sign of the difference pattern points out the detected targets direction
signal
connected to the
"magic T".
field
sum
The magnitude
or reference channel.
of angle error
is
pro-
portional to the targets direction relative to boresight. These angular error signals
control an antenna servo
mechanism
to
in
an-
gular coordinates.
Transmitter
Sum channel
Duplexer
Mixer
IF
Range
Amp
Envelope
signal
detector
magic
Angle-error
TEE
Phase
LO
Mixer
signal
detector
IF
Amp
Antenna
feed horns
Figure
4.
Difference channel
is
phase detector
is
part of amplitude-
intrinsically a
beams
is
offset
is
basically derived
by
The phase
re-
beams.
Transmitter
Range
AGC
LO
9a e
'
T
Duplexer
channel
Elevation
difference
channel
Envelope
detector
Phase
IF
Mixer 4*- amp
detector
Video
amp
Range
Elevation angle
error
Azimuth
difference
Mixer
channel
Figure
5.
IF
Phase
amp
detector
Azimuth angle
error
The
makes four
partially overlapping
by
all
four feeds.
The
The
10
is
formed
sum
utilized with
is
obtained by combining
sum
installed,
local oscillator in
Two
phase
detectors extract the angle error information, one for azimuth, the other for elevation.
Range information
is
sum channel
after
envelope detection.
sum
a difference pattern with a large value of slope at the crossover of the offset
SNR
in the
measurement of
angle.
more accuracy
in the
Moreover, the sidelobes of both the sum and difference patterns must be low.
It is
must
is
an important part of
is
accomplished
by
employing
The
AGC
proportional
voltage
The
AGC
results in
all
in a
to
monopulse radar
the
is
sum channel
and
range.
2.
signals received
5:
is
similar in
many ways
to
antennas are
offset
parallel.
11
from the
axis.
The
in
individual boresight
Therefore,
if
the target
is
moves
namely,
exists
phase.
If the target
is
no phase
shift,
in
axis, there
error.
l^ ^^
/**
T^""^^^
Distance
between
Antenna #1
/boresight axis
antennas
Figure
l^^^
\ Antenna
[N.
/boresight axis
6.
in
#2
monopulse radar.
same
same depending on
The
tion, as
tenna
1, is
i.e.,
path length or
illustrated in Figure 7.
line
shown
is
very nearly
in
Figure
7.
*i
to the target
R-4-smd
from antenna 2
12
is:
(2.1)
R,
The
= R + 4-smd
(2.2)
is
AR = R 2 - R =dsmd
(2.3)
A<p
where X
is
is
sin
(2.4)
Target
Antenna #2
Antenna #
Figure
7.
13
in
two antennas
signals in the
is
sin
Atf>*-y-rf0
There
error. It
may
(2.5)
In the
in
two
fixed antennas
is
measured with a
the phase shifter until the difference in phase between the two channels
shift
which has
to be
generated to
make
is
adjusts
a null.
a null signal
is
error.
for
different
The
also. In the
rections because the antenna difference patterns are offset from the antenna
boresight
line.
Any
side.
it
is
amplitude
a result of differences in
is
angle-tracking techniques.
that the
nas.
sum
However,
this
due
is
two anten-
apertures.
14
III.
DENIAL JAMMING
A.
Denial jamming
ceiver so that
used to
its
effective use
denied
is
This terminology
is
also
a noiselike signal
[Ref. 7: p. 55].
illustrate noise
in the victim's
is
power supply
other components,
limitation,
power
etc.
to get the
maximum power
per unit
to the victim
fre-
nial
and
jammer
bandwidth
or receiver, or to
jam
to
se-
Denial jamming
is
to
is
obscure the true target echo by inserting the jammer noise signal into the
jamming
RF
carrier
wave with
noise,
is
generated by
AM
or
FM
modulating an
quency. The radar receiver detects relatively weak return signals from the target,
therefore radar receivers
sensitivity.
jamming because
the
jamming
signal
SNR
SNR
its
target in a
one or
less,
due
in
from the
target.
15
usually
The radar
However, the
noise.
is
will not
If
be able
Denial jamming
is
to the
monopulse acquisition
1.
is
is
quency
In order to
sweep
fre-
cannot jam as
it
fre-
jam radar systems with both high power density and over
jamming tunes
is
agile techniques to
a kind of denial
the high
power jamming
is
Swept spot
nevertheless employed.
if
band with
frequency. Thereby
all
pre-
determined victim radars over the desired frequency band including frequency
agile
in
maximum
Sweep
Figure
8.
"
little
in
The
8.
pp. 273-277].
8:
Agile radar
signal
spot
'
1
i!'r
Figure
.'II.
/'
shown
1LL
Hi
End
End
points
points
16
'
Barrage Jamming
2.
radar can be
jammed
many
many
erated in
broadband
may
be gen-
for the
low-power sources,
like
(DINA)
is
semiconductor
RF
oscillators.
are used.
Di-
ming
circuitry.
Jamming power
density spectrum
Figure
3.
Barrage jamming.
9.
Blinking
Blinking
jamming
utilizes
noise
the
bandpass of the victim radar and the jamming signal alternately turns on and off
at
approximately a
are
shown
in
50%
Figure
10.
17
7:
p.481].
Blinking
jamming waveforms
'
'
CL
=>
On-Off
<D
yyyvyvv
y y vvvvvvv
/vy
yyVyyv
xxxx
/yv
yvy
y vy y y v
QOOO<XXX
Q.
>CxxVxx'x;
w w yv y y
VvVvVvV VvVvV
y
t v v v v v y v
vvyyvvy
cn
c
E
E
-..,
-.'
Off
ratio
= P2 / P 1
Sfe
'
>!* ">.'
VV
On
03
>
Figure
10.
In order to effectively
The jammer
it
jam
a track-on-jam
Good
blinking
jamming maintains
track-on-jam mode.
its
it
For blinking
to be
most
effective,
they can be installed on two individual aircraft. These jammers are located within
the radar antennas
beam but
The jammers
are alter-
nately turned on and off so that the victim radar receives the strong noise signal
will
attempt
to shift
its
mid
point.
The antenna of
is
of sufficient strength.
as
shown
in
Figure
a single target-tracking
18
by
Depending on the
Master
Jamming
ff
RF
'
j/lctifTJ
Jamming
&
T ITH
Iradar)
ass^
Slave
Jamming
Aircr
Aircraft
navigation
gatic
II
1 >
link.
Slave
'
lin ks
Viclin
Iradar
Jammlni
Slave
Master
IN
No
Jamming
Victinj
Iradarl
link
Jamming
I3^*W"I
"""
Slave
Him
>>
IV
/<
RF
rime delay
Jamming
Victim
link
Iradar]
Jamming
1 1 1
Master
Jamming
>>
Sy
Synchronized^
digital
A-
clockO^o
-*-
victim
Iradarl
Jammin
Iffllll
*-
Figure 11.
link
19
When
blinking
jamming source
another
to
in
is
more
may
turn. This
lock.
from one
will
difficult
will track
and a
missile guided
miss the target due to the inaccurate target angle position information.
will
the
is
maximum
rate
is
home
in
B.
Hertz [Ref.
it
the blinking
is
If
If
For
Optimum
9: p.3d-21].
DECEPTION JAMMING
Denial jamming can deny range information, but
employed
radar
to a fire control
if
it
may
several denial
Thus
a missile
may
hit a target
little
different
method against
by the
missile.
The
objective of deception
jamming
is
to
kill
fire
proba-
confuse or deceive
the true target echo by inserting properly altered replicas of the true target echo
into the victim radar systems. This technique will
correct information
ception
jamming may be
not only
ming
by providing many
in
in
is
able to degrade
and elevation
it
related to azimuth
make
implemented successfully,
If
angle jam-
in general,
it
The
tion
with
is
basic
to reradiate
time delay.
repeater jamming.
Its
implementa-
The conspicuous
characteristics
frequency
is
memory such
as a
TWT
in the
ECM
combined with
2"
of repeater
set.
This
is
jamming
is
done by using
to
a
The
output
is
range walk.
to
victim
istics
is
ele-
used by the
to the character-
Typically, deception
as;
in three
ways, depending
The
range gate walkoff technique represents range deception, velocity gate walkoff
technique represents doppler deception and several angle deception jamming
techniques are applicable to either the monopulse or sequential lobing acquisition
and tracking radars. Angle deception techniques against monopulse radars can
The
techniques
utilize the
example
cross-eye
ception
1.
is
jammers.
in the
first
etc.
skirt
frequency
weakness basic
to all
jamming techniques
blinking.
The various
de-
(RGWO)
is
ECM
tech-
nique for use against automatic range tracking radars that captures the victim
radar's range gate, walks
it
off in range,
7: p.l 15].
off,
dumping,
selecting or confusion.
This technique
is
fundamental deception
The gate
width of gate
is
is
swiftly controlled
21
split
by
ECM
In tracking
The
mode, the
width of gate
tion.
is
will
be increased
in length to several
is
gate.
is
minimum
is
7:
RGWO
True target
received, amplified,
to the victim
radar receiver.
is
decreased
(b)
By then gradually
This phase
(c)
is
it
As soon
jammer reaches
as the
When
the
The procedure
is
The walk
off rate
is
walk
the
jammer
turns
limit,
off.
to the acquisition or
it
is
turned
This
off.
2.
is
is
called walk.
racy.
circuitry.
Hence,
(d)
AGC
in
in
is
pp. 786-787].
is
jamming
beacon would,
phase
echo signals
RGWO
typically
In acquisition
in the
range of
\i
sec for
up
to 10 seconds.
(VGWO)
is
ECM
technique for use against automatic velocity tracking radars, that captures the
victim radar's velocity gate, walks
velocity gate with
it
no signal" [Ref.
off in velocity,
7: p. 145].
tion,
off,
leaving the
Some
")->
in or-
VGWO
doppler
shift
teristics
of the velocity gate, which tracks the frequency of a strong echo signal.
is
The frequency
shift
operation
of
TWT.
[Ref. 7: pp.937-941].
lows:
(a)
is
and retransmit-
ted to furnish a strong repeated signal, such as a beacon, to the victim radar re-
ceiver.
is
suppressed and the repeater captures the velocity gate of the victim radar
is
RGWO.
sequentially changed,
is
or walked, either in an increasing or decreasing direction. This will cause the vic-
tim radar to track the doppler frequency of the jamming signal rather than that
of the real target.
(c)
Upon
This step
is
mode and
sition
is
may
Above procedures
VGWO must
ECM
it
is
turned
This will
off.
low
level signal.
This
and
The
repeater
step
limit, the
be done
in a
VGWO
cycle.
RGWO
techniques.
3.
Skirt Frequency
The
Jamming
definition of skirt
jamming
is
jamming
refers to
jamming on
effectiveness
these frequencies, where rapid phase shifts are present in each channel.
it
Its
at
Of course,
[Ref.
7: p. 843].
23
Skirt frequency
When
signal
the
ECM
the
which
ECM
is
jamming can
offset
radar signal,
it
will transmit a
set will
offset
jamming.
jamming
frequency by
local oscillator.
The
beat signal will appear on each side of the passband spectrum, or on the passband
skirts. Stable
will
be hard to
er-
by the radar.
\/
Pulser
Detector
Direc tional
cou
Dler
i
rs
TS_
WL/
T\A/
1
Variable
attenuator
Mixer
\s
<
y^
TV n>
i
U^
fc
Figure
12.
skirt
frequency jamming.
frequency,
When
and
is
-f and/ + f where/
is
two
24
de-
jammer.
These
jamming
Figure
signals
13.
contain
very
receiving
little
signal
frequency, as shown
jamming
in
rolls off.
Lower sideband
jamming
Upper sideband
jamming
>
Victim radar
DC
UJ
passband spectrum
-z.
LU
hZ>
Q_
\-
D
o
fr-h
Figure
4.
13.
Waveform
Delta
Jamming
Delta jamming
of skirt frequency
is
radar.
spacing
of/ f2
is
RF
ECM
signals at
in the victim
radar IF amplifier.
There
are
+h
jamming.
a self-screening
f The
fr
>r
made
several
By forming
false
make
false
IF signals
names
delta.
25
for
this
technique:
dual-frequency,
Frequency
offset
t
1_
fi
Set on
circuit
Q.
(/)
Pulsei
Detector
Cv5
Set on
circuit
CO
Frequency
() offset
Figure 14.
Two
dars frequency.
Frequency
jammer frequency
quency.
5.
fre-
In order to allow
TWT
to be displaced
power
RF
is
used.
Each set-on
7:
oscillator
has
its
own
high
pp. 602-605].
Image Jamming
Image jamming
is
a self-screenig
ECM
definition of
image jamming
is
in
phase-comparison
as follows:
"Image jamming
occurs at the image frequency of the radar, depending on the fact that the phase
angle at IF, between two signals (image frequency and local oscillator)
verse of that which
would appear
at the IF
if
the
is
at the
the re-
normal
the direction of the error by the direction of the phase difference between
26
two
signals,
the
the signal
to be driven
power"
[Ref.
away from
the target
if
7: p. 703].
LO
2 IF
Band Stop
Mixer
for
Filter
f.
Pulser
Detector
(a)
Upperside
jamming signal
Lowerside
jamming signal
en
"e
E
fr
-2
if
tLO
f,
/L0
fr +2
IF
(b)
Figure 15.
spectrum.
is
jammer
is
RF
TWT
The
RF
frequency
amplifier,
tector provides
TWT
and an
its
radar pulse.
It is
necessary to
best operation.
27
know
signal de-
final
pulsed
In the case
shown
in
Figure 15
(a),
the
band stop
filter
/ +
21 F,
21
F and
the
signals.
Figure 15 (b) shows the frequency spectrum which has the two image
jamming
signals
andfLO
represents the victim radar frequency and local oscillator frequency respectively
As an
is
when
Some monopulse
receivi ng signal
is
t\ /
7
180 phase
TWT
shifter
chain
Variable/
a ttenuator
1/
4
Vertically polarized
transmitting signal
\/
71
TWT
chain
16.
simple
error in
Horizontally polarized
transmitting signal
Verticall y polarized
Figure
utilizing a
Jamming
a self-screening
angular information
can be generated by
Filter.
Cross-Polarization
This
signal,
V
A
2S
Cross-polarization
polarization
jamming
[Ref.
7:
The
is
signal.
Received
>
Transmitted
jamming signal
component
/
/
vertical
Received
victim radar signal
\
\
>
Effective transmitted
jamming signal
^\
\j
^\
Received
Transmitted \.
jamming signal
horizontal component
270-
>
90
Transmitted
18
jamming signal
horizontal component
(Before reversal)
Figure
17.
Components
of polarization.
The
jamming
platform are dark arrows. The horizontal polarization component of the received
victim radar signal
the
jammer which
is
is
29
TWT
polarization
which
The
Figure 20
is
due
tortion
nulls
ECM
is
after
TWT
equivalent to a 180
is
sum
on boresight, and
null
in
Figure 19
ECM
and
(b)
in
monopulse
ra-
two
to the interference
shown
ECM
in
beam
the two
The
ECM
cross eye
to use
is
two
7:
pp. 555-576].
is
sources which have equal amplitudes and are 180 out of phase,
Figure
victim radars
The concept of
One method
IS.
direction.
received signal
is
is
a re-
to the
two
jamming
make
by 180
out-of-phase
ECM
shifted
is
(b). respectively.
mounted on an
as
When
This
to use
Cross-Eye Jamming
7.
dars
is
of difference
pair
signal
The function of
amplifier chain.
it is
impose as
On
30
antenna aperture.
d/ 2
Transmit antenna
Transmit antenna
P z/180
jZ ol
e
\
|\
Receive
4r^:
c/sinGi
\:
antenna
Line of
->^9V<.:
\
maximum
ijamming effectiveness
A
Radar
Figure
site
18.
Thus
are installed
left
wing antenna
dsin 6 more than that by the right wing antenna, making the
point on line
AB. Line
AB
will travel
first
one
jammer
The
31
n).
where n
is
'/.
is
the
radar wavelength. For finding the null positions, two equations can be derived
as follows:
n/.
For the
6
first null,
= d sin 6
(3.1)
= rtan0
(3.2)
n should be one.
s,
(sin
6^
tan 6
when
small):
is
(33)
"-"""(-jM
iwfl
where
The
As
(3.4).
two
the
is
first null
r is
moves
is
any other
is
cross-eye
jamming
steep spatial
jamming
s. r,
effectiveness,
When
(3.4)
relationship between
sets
= r4
s is
the aircraft
ECM
jamming
or
B rad
null.
is
related to the
decreased.
jamming
is
is
stronger than the skin return and result in angular tracking errors (usually
azimuth) of
few degrees
The following
is
at
figures
most.
show
32
c/)
O
>
-10
-20-
LLI
(a)
zz
-30"
LU
DC
-40
50
5
-10
-5
^p
Ar
10
15
10
15
SCAN ANGLE
if)
-10-
tj
O
>
(b)
-20-
LU
>
<
_l
LLI
DC
-30-
-40"
4-5
-505
-10
9 e
A
5
SCAN ANGLE
Figure 19.
Sum
33
One
source, (b)
Two
sources.
LLI
(3
-10
<
H
-J
o -20
>
LLI
(a)
> -30
H
<
_J
LU
DC
-40
50
5
-10
-5
10
15
10
15
SCAN ANGLE
LU
-10
o
>
(b)
-20
LU
> -30
ZZ
<
_i
LU
DC
SCAN ANGLE
Figure 20.
34
One
source, (b)
Tno
3
CO
o
>
>
<
_l
r
-
LLI
(a)
LLI
Boresnght
-1
CO
-2
5
-10
-5
10
10
SCAN ANGLE
Boresight
3-i
>,
CO
/I
o
>
LLI
(b)
>
<
LLI
-1
-2
5
-10
-5
SCAN ANGLE
Figure 21.
Two
sources.
35
sum
channel, (a)
One
sum
(a),
channel.
There
is
no
null
point on the
is
a null point
on the boresight axis for one source. But two sources have two null points, each
at the cross-eye angle (6 CE )
Figure 3
to
(d).
Figure 21 (b)
is
sum
channel.
Figure 21 shows
axis.
Figure 21
(a)
each side of boresight. Thus the radar can track either null
and Figure 21
(b).
The angle
corresponds to
is
in
move, one
Figure 20 (b)
never large.
Phase-front
ECM souyteXT
Pj
^8c
No n-jam
Track direction
Jam
track
direction
Figure 22.
Warped phase
Another way
Under
front.
concept
Figure 22.
This concept
is
is
produced as shown
in
36
which
is
The
wave
is
tenna
shown
of n
The
The peaks
in
Therefore cross-eye
is
known
also
as
re-
phase
-f-
front distortion.
front
in the
wave
in
plan-view
in
Figure 22.
180 phase
power
shifter
splitter
Transmit
antenna #1
Transmit
antenna #2^
A
Receive
antenna
Figure 23.
A
shown
in
Figure 23.
The
previous explanation.
is
split so as to drive
in
effects.
TWT
in
Any maneuver
incurring
antenna
37
as the
amplifier
must continuously
same
lem
the
is
is
yaw
ECM
antennas
degrade
the
jamming
effectiveness.
in
Figure 24.
Thus
compensations.
the
result
in
The
relative
placements
will
remain 180
out of phase at the victim radar regardless of the angle of arrival of the victim
no yaw dependency.
i.e.,
180 phase
shifter
>
>
Traansmit
Transmit
antenna
.antenna
#2
Figure 24.
C.
Block,
PASSIVE COUNTERMEASURES
1.
Chaff
Chaff
"window"
in
the
is
one
UK.
It
of
the
is
still
earliest
a
radar
ECM
devices,
also
known
as
all
and
false targets
to reradiate
RF
energy, to gen-
According
3S
to
whose
when
reradiation occurs
the
RF
incident
In
energy [Ref.
RF
wavelength of a specified
9:
the case of a
the greatest
is
Therefore by cutting to a
p.3L-3].
frequency,
dipolc,
maximum
effect
by the chaff
half
be
will
attained.
aluminum
like
aluminum or
foil,
foil
zinc.
and
are ribbons
Chaff length
or wavelength
wavelength
is
falling rate.
is
is
Chaff
is
is
not used
If
If
the frequency
the frequency
is
is
high
low or
increases
its
cover B,
to
To
in
upgrade the effectiveness of jamming. Various chaff missions are also possible.
Representatively, these involve chaff corridor screening, chaff confusion and saturation, chaff deception, signal attenuation,
load the victim radar scope with false echoes returned by the chaff.
Thus
the
victim radar operator cannot discern the true targets on his radar display. Chaff
like
true targets on
To
achieve this mission, chaff cloud size should be greater than the radar cross section
(RCS) of individual
targets
by an amount equal
MTI
In this
way
to the expected
effective returns
MTI
im-
air-
craft targets. Signal attenuation missions reduce target detection ranges of the
victim radars.
To
achieve this purpose, chaff clouds must have large chaff density
39
The
result
is
the effect of a
own
when accompanied by
be increased
The
aircraft.
in
a simultaneous evasive
maneuver
[Ref.
10].
2.
is
RCS
by absorb-
ing impinging electromagnetic energy. Thus, the reduced target size will appar-
One
type of
RAM
is
The
made by
reflected
good only
in
up
20dB RCS
to
reduction.
(approximately
This
is
semitransparent
-H
4
Another type of
wave
electromagnetic
another type of
particles of an iron
RCS
[Ref.
7:
RAM
compound
3.
a dissipator,
p. 405].
to
is
It is
is still
a weight
pp.49-50],
12:
Stealth
Stealth has been a highly classified technology untill now.
RAM
re-
usually thicker.
reductions of up to 20 dB.
penalty [Ref.
is
flection over a
Still
RAM
It
combines
techniques with others and can be applied to any kind of weapon system
RCS
is
aircraft.
in stealth
technology.
of the stealth aircraft also includes avoidance of detection by infra red (IR)
stealth aircraft
is
smoke and
radar
ECM.
40
RCS
aircraft to reduce
RAM,
RCS,
RAM
and counter
reflective
RCS
structures,
"One
is
to
make
it,
wave with
a carefully designed
flection." [Ref.
by the USAF.
Two
14: p. 22].
a stealth
The other
to
is
recently
are
its
own
F-117A, a
stealth fighter,
based on the
is
first
method,
DECOYS
Decoys are
support
ECM
techniques that
utilize
of techniques
ol^
vehicles.
variety of
expendable jammers
to
any radar.
Expendable Jammer
its
delivery package,
such as parachute, rocket, expendable drone and remotely piloted vehicle (RPV).
Most EJ
may
to achieve satisfactory
is
quite different
To be
compared with
a recoverable
factor, therefore, in EJ
life
may
is
be required
not recovered
RPV.
employment
is
cost effec-
41
the platform
and alternate
ECM,
When
delivering EJs,
if
in several
fall,
ways.
tactics of
of delivery
Aircraft de-
parachute retarded or by
2.
This tactic
and
The
confuse
to
utilizes a
enemy
drone
radar.
RPV
RPVs
ECM
as
RPV
conflict
EW
effectiveness as a tool of
between
Israel
and Syria
in the
use of
RPV
is
RPVs
and
The
loss
the
RPV
is
manned
are small.
aircraft
RCS enhancement
due
14:
aircraft.
RPVs
for
p. 112]
the 1982
RPVs
arc
more
difficult to detect
Even though
can be used
to
confuse or deceive
enemy
radar.
E.
DESTRUCTIVE COUNTERMEASURES
I.
Anti-Radiation Missile
The
effectiveness of
SAM
For
systems
this reason,
is
most
SAM
Meanwhile.
(ARM)
SAM
tar-
SAM.
cently developed
ARM
in the
US. operation
is
(HARM),
Onboard
RWR
or the
guidance section can detect the enemy radar signal, then the missile
4:
is
ra-
missile
locked on
HARM
bands from
2 to
40
HARM
In stand-off
HARM
is
flexibility
of
HARM
mode,
radar
all
even
inertial
selected
and the
if
is
maximum
is
launch of missile.
In target-of-opportunity
can
select the
detects, sorts,
to the aircraft.
SAM
(RWR)
In self-protection
HARM
is
many
radar threats.
2.
nickname
is
for
is
of mission,
it
air
defense systems.
weapon systems.
integrated
enemy
Wild Weasel
launch com-
ARM
or other
destructive weapons.
Wild Weasel
aircraft
US Wild Weasel
aircraft
aircraft
were equipped
They had
cated the
in
signal.
to directly
site,
an effort
to
then
It
home
in
in
on the
SAM
radar
site until
destrov the
home
SAM
the area
43
However, low
effective in devastating
with shrike
ARM
enemy
SAM
sites.
sites
Wild Weasel
In
in those
1966, Two-seat
15:
F-105G
aircraft
aircraft
gun
in the
F-4E. This
is
RWR
from outside
craft as future
Wild Weasels.
or
AAA
lethal range.
44
a modified version of
was
sites.
is
enemy radar
aircraft.
20mm
nose
emitters,
and
installed instead of
locate the
USAF
F-4E
IV.
DENIAL JAMMING
A.
is
against tracking radars because most tracking radars are able to maintain angle
may
The
jamming
act like a
effect a kill
In
16:
p. 138].
is
to
if
jamming
jamming
is
to
ifications or missile
ground
launch range.
even though modern missile guidance systems can operate with angle data only.
is
noise
jamming
not required.
nial
jamming
is
less efficient
Thus
deception jamming.
The
to
The simpler
may
in
to
know
effectiveness of noise
fectiveness
One needs
is
jamming
is
jammer and
chapter three,
is
hard
to quantify.
The jamming
ef-
available information
jamming
45
However,
1.
that
is
it
is
that the
jamming
is
wide frequency
jamming with
Swept spot
fast
effects.
from measurements of
Barrage Jamming
2.
The use of
dars can be
this
type of
jammed without
jammer
is
readjusting the
jamming frequency,
jammed
at the
as
same
w ell
r
as be-
time.
Equal areas
\
^^
^ c
<!>
u'tf
.''.
*f
^o
".'
.-.
3-T3
:<">:
mi mil
i riiiiTii
figft^B^^^I
Bandwidth
domain
Bandwidth
domain
Figure 25.
bandwidth product
As shown
in
Figure 25
Jammer power
is
jamming
is
that the
46
is
inversely proportional to
its
jamming power
power density
is
If
Blinking
3.
This
is
ECM
ECM
it
optimum
is
is
Hz
16: p. 156].
DECEPTION JAMMING
Deception jamming
ECM
is
mission in order to jam against missile guidance which utilizes tracking ra-
to
p. 138].
Self-screening or self-protection
limitations on the
noise jamming.
This
is
the
more
applica-
physical size
less
power
to
jam
radar compared
matched
mament
small
is
jammer.
jamming
Small
power
more room
for ar-
jammer
to be
size.
jamming
characteristics.
tively efficient
way
to
RGWO
in
is
use a conventional range gate for measuring the distance from radar to target.
VGWO
frequency
shift.
As
is
is
a useful
way
to
monopulse tracking
ra-
dars compared with sequential lobing radars. Monopulse techniques are inherently strong
beams
to
determine
the
target
position.
47
In
order
to
enhance
jamming
effectiveness,
deception
is
it
imperative
ECM (DECM)
to
closely
match the
system
ters
jammed.
demand more
will
expenditure.
To
circuits
Complexity of
between the jammer and the victim radar systems, these techniques
may
it
to
If
will re-
such information
is
not
1.
False target range information in the missile guidance and tracking radar, such as
ror.
SAM
targeting
good enough
is still
er-
RGWO,
is
If
angular de-
not simultaneously used, the victim radar will reacquire the skin echo
too fast.
2.
VGWO
itself
may
technique
is
RGWO
very similar to
and comparing
to
technique.
fects of
3.
VGWO
filtering.
If the
VGWO
very
by
jamming
RGWO
signal by
way
of
little.
Skirt Frequency
Jamming
in skirt
jamming
is
little
by
target doppler
is
jamming because
RGWO
doppler
But
technique.
(}o
4v
ra-
in
degraded
signal
the receiver
if
lies in
Delta
4.
is
filter.
Jamming
tennas
each channel
in
bandpass
filters
in
TWT
amplifiers
For
effective
jamming, the
Image Jamming
5.
This jamming
fective
the
if
6.
is
monopulse radar
is
Cross-Polarization
Jamming
One advantage
is
ECM
filter
it is
inef-
or mixer.
need special knowledge about the victim radar. This provides design freedom
which
important
is
in the
enemy
technology.
The
critical
huge jamming
drawback of
to signal ratios
the cross-polarization
approaching 20
to
40dB
jamming
is
need for
This
is
because the wave guide components of the victim radar highly attenuate a cross
polarized signal.
sults in a
ponent
is
jamming
any deviation
in the polarization
of the
polarization. If the
In addition,
signal re-
jamming
Cross-Eye Jamming
shift,
and amplitude
ratio of
when
error
two
the
is
ECM
jamming
49
sources.
Maximum jamming
signals of the
two
ECM
ef-
sources
and
at
equal amplitudes.
much
span.
effect
it
is
difficult to
implement
aircraft
wing
Separation has an extremely small value compared with the victim radar
range.
The disadvantage of
aircraft.
is
phase front occurs near the interferometer peaks. Aircraft movement by yawing
will shift the interferometer null pattern, therefore
Although
greatly degraded.
this fault
jamming
effectiveness can be
system which employs two separate repeaters with equal path lengths,
nique
is
as
much
20dB
as at least
antenna aperture
relatively small
is
C.
this tech-
is
required,
is
null spacing.
PASSIVE COUNTERMEASURES
1.
Chaff
Even though
against chaff, chaff
is
MTI
still
widely used
Some
proper length
in
in
military
different
jamming systems.
Chaff can
same
DECM
utilizing
to angle
monopulse
cost effectiveness.
more susceptible
is
is
techniques.
When com-
ECM.
DECM.
more
ECM
difficult
due
5d
monopulse
beam
pattern.
AM
no
The
DECM
modulation
in the
beam
transmitting
Therefore the
DECM
receiver provides
jammer when
to turn
on and
jamming
18:
no information
monopulse
is
when
there
is
tracking.
DECM
Sometimes the
pp.398-399].
On
and the
action of
Monopulse trackers
by
off.
of monopulse radars
beam and
is
similar to
re-
may
be produced
chaff.
deployments.
2.
In order to use
be considered.
The
RAM
on the
thickness of
aircraft, the
RAM
effect of
is
increased.
RAM
recent trends for the radar systems shows that the frequency
creases
up
However,
band gradually
in-
prominent.
It
will
Stealth
In fact, even
SAM
to
receiving antenna.
SAM
is
The
Accordingly,
some
effectiveness of the
SAM
radars have to
SAM
has a
51
extent, de-
SAM's
lethal
RCS
SAM
D.
reduction.
range [Ref.
minimum
its
firing
12: p. 66].
DECOYS
Expendable Jammer
1.
The
tempt
to shoot
down
Thus, they
may
at-
2.
loss of
the
RPV
is
RPVs
enemy radar
are small,
due
aircraft
RCS enhancement
RPVs
are
more
difficult to detect
Even though
to confuse or deceive
enemy
ARM
can be used
radar.
E.
DESTRUCTIVE COUNTERMEASURES
1.
Anti-Radiation Missile
ARM
against
SAM
on any type of
A trade off
radars.
necessary since
is
purpose of
ARMs
utilize
self protection
weapon
stations
ARM
suppression of
enemy
effectiveness of
ARM
air
is
defense
against
(SEAD)
SAM
as, for
Armat. supersonic
tactical anti-radiation
The
use o^
ARM
(ALARM)
for destroying
(HARM)
(STAR)
and sidearm by
missile
by France and
by England.
SAM
systems
will
probably increase
52
ARM.
aircraft.
2.
navigation tactics.
SAM
threat
is
Low
a successful mission,
not only
make
level
ARM,
which provides
capability,
pression of
enemy
SAM
tactics
SAM
a longer
sites.
The combination of
activities.
53
CONCLUSION
V.
It is
difficult to effectively
Individual
only.
It
may
be
impossible to jam the radar completely even under the multiple techniques con-
Each
dition.
ECM
to provide a partial
technique
jamming
is
Therefore, several
effect.
ECM
As
techniques should
in
ECM
jamming
techniques as simultaneously as
effect.
ECM
some
dars are very impractical. Cross-polarization jamming and cross-eye jamming are
also not
good techniques
for application to
is
also not a
to the require-
dependable jamming
technique without special knowledge of the victim radar. However, the other
techniques
that
have
been
have
covered
good
effect
on degradation of
ECM
which
repeater system,
as
pensing capability.
In deception
in
effects.
In addition.
jamming
RPV
Denial
and
field.
in
the one
Fighter aircraft
RAM
ef-
Figure 26.
Most attack
expendable drones or
it is
jamming
shown
aircraft, but
in
have
self protection
chaff dis-
54
When
strike aircraft.
is
considering probability of
ated by decoys.
number of
kill,
a top
is
ARMs,
The employment
of
ARMs
Received victim
Transmitted
radar signal
jamming signal
V
TWT
Delay
line
Angle
Velocity
Range
deception
deception
deception
i
AM
Amplitude Frequency
modulator modulator
detector
Audio-scan
rate
amplitude
modulator
i_
Figure 26.
Time delay
modulator
Swept
oscillator
________
______
ECM
The
fol-
55
Denial jamming
jamming
relatively
aircraft,
jammers such
confuse the
which require
Finally,
on any of these
or system.
aircraft to additionally
ECM
tech-
aircraft
56
Expendable
is
with
ARM
take
part
ef-
by
LIST OF
1.
REFERENCES
Van Nostrand
Reinhold Company,
New
2.
3.
August, G.
Jr.,
York, 1987.
and Astronautics,
Institute of
Aeronautics
Inc., 1987.
4.
Alberts, D.J.,
5.
1980.
6.
7.
Van Brunt,
8.
Knorr.
L.B.. Applied
J.B.,
ECM
Vol
1,
EW
May,
1985.
9.
10.
Postgraduate School.
11.
Fitts, R.E.,
57
12.
Sweetman,
B.,
Wholesalers,
Stealth Aircraft,
Inc., 1986.
13.
Sweetman,
14.
Wanstall, B.,
15.
16.
17.
Electronic
B.,
Arms
to stop
Combat
Force, Headquarters
18.
&
SAMs,
Principle,
US
AE
Interavia,
September 1987.
Inc., 1986.
House
DC,
18 June 1985.
58
Cameron
Alexandria,
VA
22304-6145
2.
3.
Chairman, Code 73
Department of Electronic Warfare
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5000
4.
Station
Nonsan-Gun, Chungnam-Do,
Republic of Korea
7.
Chongwon-Gun. Chungbook-Do
Republic of Korea
8.
Chongwon-Gun, Chungbook-Do
Republic of Korea
9.
Academy
Chongwon-Gun. Chungbook-Do
Republic of Korea
59
10.
Kwon, Ki Hoon
10
6.
Korea
Shy Jain
ROCN
Li,
Almetlaq, Issam
P.O. Box 345
Suit, Jordan
/*?
60
KAY 93
3 9 2
28
T no
1
K97
c.l
r^
INTCOinu
Kwon
Optimizing ECM techniques against monopulse
acquisition and tracking
radars.
41