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Economic Development Studies

Group E
Meiji Japan: From Feudalism to Industrialization
Group Members:
Sounay Phothisane
Hasan Javid
Elmira Ibraeva
Dalaphone Sengdavong
Thai Seangmean

5.1 Miracle in the late nineteenth Century

During the 12th century to early 17th century, Japan was in the period of frequent wars among
Samurai lords over influence and territory. After winning the decisive Battle of Sekigahara which
brought peace to the country in 1600, Tokugawa Ieyasu and his posterity then ruled the country
as Shogun (supreme military leader) for the following two and a half century. The period of
Tokugawa shogunate (1603-1867) is called Edo period, and the central military government in
Edo (now Tokyo) is called Bakufu.
Japan during Edo period was a feudal class society, in which Samurai ruled the other three
classes, namely, famers, craftsmen and merchants. Tokugawa family was at the top of Samurai
class that ruled almost a quarter of Japanese land, including main cities, and mines, as well as
monopolized foreign trade. Under Bafuku bureaucracy, Japan spent two and a half century of
relative stability, separation from the outside world, and development of unique culture and local
products.
In mid -19th century, American military fleet led by Commodore Matthew C.Perry arrived at the
Bay of Edo, forcing the Bakufu to sign friendship treaties with Western powers, in order for
foreign ships to use Japanese Ports. From this time onward, Japanese national goals had turned to
withstanding pressure from the West, maintaining political independence and accelerating
Westernization and modernization of Japanese Society.
Japan successfully achieved those goals, such that, by importing western system and technology,
it turned itself into a modern society with Western-style constitution, law and government.
Japan achieved industrial revolution around the 1890s, in which mechanized factories became
the leading mode of production. Japan become one of the Big Five nations by the end of World
War I, and was the first non-Western country to modernize, comparing to other high-performing
Asian economies.
The achievement of Japan in the late 19th century was a result of a good combination between
strong private dynamism and industrial policy (discussed in the following sections of the
chapter).
5.2 Japanese history as a continuous merger of domestic and foreign systems
5.2.1 Translative Adaptation
According to Prof.Maegawa, Meiji Japan was the country that succeeded massively in translative
adaptation. He defines translative adaptation as an integration, in which, a latecomer country take
the initiative in deciding the terms of the integration, while ensuring that it can still maintain its
"ownership," social continuity and national identity. In this, changes, occurred, are managed by
its government and people (not by foreign firms or organizations). Foreign ideas and systems are
modified to fit the local needs before being adopted.

However, Natsume Soseki, a famous Japanese Novelist in Meiji period, argued that Japanese
development is superficial, such that it led people to become empty, frustrated and worried.
5.2.2 The Umesao Theory
The theory emphasizes a special geographical position shared by both Japan and Western Europe
as the answer to the question of how Japan could perform translative adaptation early and
successfully.
According to Prof. Umesao, Japan and Western Europe were situated at an appropriate distantnot too far, not too near from the great civilizations of Eurasia (China, India, and the Middle
East). Because of this location, Japan and Western Europe could absorb the achievements of
these civilizations while being protected from the invasion and destruction from nomad people
roaming around the central dry area of Eurasian continent. Japan and Western Europe were given
enough time and control to mix domestic culture with foreign impact, and to develop
independently. Repeated acceptance and digestion of foreign elements, without abandoning the
countrys local natures, allowed Japan to strengthen its capability to respond strongly to external
shocks.
5.3 Preparation for a take-off
*Key terminologies: Bakufu central military government in Edo (now Tokyo); Shogun supreme military leader;
Daimyo - any of the largest and most powerful landholding magnates; Kokugaku research on ancient Japanese
literature and history; Han a territorial domain; Hikyaku - rapid-delivery service on foot or by horse

5.3.1 The seven conditions prepared by feudalism of the Edo period (1603-1867):
1. Political unity and stability;
2. Agricultural development (both area and productivity);
3. Development of transportation and the emergence of nationally unified markets;
4. The emergence of comer, finance, and the wealthy merchant class;
5. The broad-based rise of pre-modern manufacturing such as agro processing, handicrafts, and
metalworking;
6. Agricultural and industrial promotion by local governments
7. High level of education for both leaders and ordinary people.
These conditions, which existed in Japan during late Edo period, are not satisfied by most
developing countries even today. The Edo society consisted of population with 90% of it being
peasants. The basic unit of production was family. Villages were well organized and autonomous,
as long as they paid rice taxes stipulated by the Bakufu or local governments.
In agricultural sector there was an enormous expansion of farmland Great Age of Opening
Fields. Productivity increased with larger rice outputs. Contributing factors included double

cropping, new species of rice, fertilizer and the introduction of new farming tools. Gradually
subsistence agriculture was replaced by commercial agriculture. With the growing income, rich
farmers enjoyed social and cultural events and travelling in spite of the Bakufus laws to regulate
the farmers lives and keep them frugal and able to pay taxes.
The Edo tax system was based on the transfer, storage and cashing of rice. The development of
cash crops and handicrafts also stimulated domestic commerce. Osaka was the commercial
center with mane wealthy merchant families, money changers, and lenders, while Edo was the
political center with great demand for consumer goods. The government now opened new
highways and sea lanes, and the private sector provided service sector, like inns, restaurants,
shippers, and baggage carriers. During this period rich domestic enterprises emerged with large
capital and extensive business networks. This was a great advantage for Japan since their
expertise and power was in a position to absorb later imported technology and compete with
foreigners. However, the survival rate of such family enterprises was very low (falling to 9% in
1902). The name Mitsui and Sumitomo recognized until now, was an exception.
With the development of agriculture and commerce, pre-modern manufacturing such as
handicrafts and food processing also developed. The local products included tea, tobacco, wax,
indigo, knives, sword, pottery, lacquer ware, silk, cotton, soy sauce, sake, paper, cut stone,
medicine, and dried fish.
Education is often considered as the cause of fast industrialization in the later period. Bakufu
schools mainly taught Confucianism, which emphasized social order, proper rituals, the way of
good political leadership, and respect for the elderly and superiors. By the end of the Edo period,
these public schools started to teach practical skills such as military training and foreign
language. In parallel with public schools private schools of eminent scholars were operating.
These schools taught Confucianism as well as kokugaku (research on ancient Japanese literature
and history), Western languages, medicine, science, technology, etc. These professional school
produced many national leaders in the late Edo period and the early Meiji period. One more type
of schools was Terakoya (private primary schools run by local teachers to teach reading, writing
and arithmetic. These schools contributed a lot to the nations high literacy.
All the above mentioned features even in feudal society made Japan ready for the growth.

5.3.2 Centrifugal politics and centripetal nationalism

There were two specific factors that played key role in getting rid of the Bakufu-Han System at
the time of opening of ports in 1850s. The amazing thing about this revolution was that it was
achieved without splitting the country into pieces, spilling a large amount of blood or being
colonized by the Western powers.
The one factor was centrifugal force unleashed by the decline of legitimacy of the Bakufu as a
result of poor handling of external and internal affairs. The entrance of the mighty West in the
face of American Commodore Perry and his Black Ships in the mid-nineteenth century destroyed
the solid authority of the Bakufu. There were several policy mistakes that damaged this
authority:
- Inability to voice its conditions in conclusion of commercial treaties with the West;
- Schism between the Bakufu and Emperor,
- When the former signed commercial treaties without the latters consent;
- Bakufus despotic policymaking; economic confusion caused by the opening of ports.
The other factor was a spontaneous surge of private nationalism fostered by kokugaku stimulated
by the appearance of foreign rivals. The news that fours Black Ships appeared at the mouth of
the Bay of Edo in 1853 was spread instantaneously across Japan. This communication speed
was an important factor that shaped the political development of this period. The acute sense of
national crisis under foreign pressure supported the national identity of Japanese people,
increased demand for political information and discussion and politicized all intellectuals
regardless of their class. Kokugaku began changing its nature from academic research to political
ideology. This was not state-guided nationalism, but was born spontaneously within the nation.
The social ethos (spirit) derived from kokugaku served as a centripetal force.
5.4. Flexible Structure of Politics
5.4.1 - Politics of Coping with globalization pressure (Meiji Period 1858 - 1912)
From the late Edo period to the early Meiji period (1858-1881), Japanese politics exhibited a
flexible structure which was a unique feature for a latecomer country. This was a critical
period of Japanese transformation, to re-organize its economic, political and social priorities and
implement their new goals.
But if we look back we see that in fact, it was four years after the friendship treaty, (1858) that
transformation started. At this point commercial treaties with Russian, Americans, Dutch, British
and French were made. With that came the introduction of constitution and parliament,
privatization for state-owned enterprises. This was followed by fiscal austerity by the finance

minister Mr. Matsuka to fight inflation, and a series of monetary and fiscal reforms that
established the Bank of Japan in 1882. These reforms set the stage for industrial revolution.
In 1868 the rule of Bakufu (Tokugawa family) ended, but from history of a latecomer country
point of view, it is more logical to divide this part of Japanese history as:
Pre 1858 as Pre-opening period
1858-1881 as Transformation period
1881-onwards as implementation period/decade
Meiji period was not an authoritarian developmentalism, as some argue, like the ones in other
East and Southeast Asian countries. The only common factor was the crisis as a catalyst to
initiate the regime. In contrast with others, Meiji flexible structure allowed competing priorities
and that the political goals were not sacrificed for promoting economic goals.
5.4.2 Three aspects of the flexible structure
1. Multiplicity and dynamism of national goals
Kogi Yoron (government by public deliberation) and Fukoku Kyohei the economic
and military goals of enriching the country and strengthening the military. Kogi Yoron
started by alliance of 4 or 5 intelligent Han lords then evolved into the idea of a
conference of all Han totaling approximately 300 and even the creation of a Bicameral
parliament system and constitution for a peaceful transition of power. Fukoku Kyohei,
in Edo period some Hans developed the idea of exporting demanded goods and buy
military equipments in exchange. This resulted in victory of those Hans later in Meiji
period. But in Meiji period priority shifted to importing technology and advanced
machinery.
2. Re-formation of alliances:
No one group yielded sufficient political power to carry out desired policies, and could
pursue them only by forming a coalition with one or two other groups which entertained
other policy objectives. This led to constant makeup and breakup of alliances, no one
absolute power emerged during this period.
3. Variability and resilience of leaders and leader groups.
Unlike many other East and Southeast Asian nations, Meiji Japan didnt have a
charismatic leader with developmental dictatorship and hard structure. On the contrary
Meiji leaders proved effective in the simultaneous pursuit of multiple goals and resilience
to internal and external shocks.
5.4.3 The source of political leader
People who led and executed the Meiji revolution and transformation predominantly came from
the Samurai class, who had been the political leaders and the privileged class in the Bakufu-Han
system. Out of total 56 leaders listed in the book, 52 were from the Samurai class, which is 93%.
Another study by 800 historians all over Japan in 1981 enumerated a total of 4,300 VIPs (of
almost all sorts), again this list was dominated by the Samurai class. Why Samurai class forced a

revolution which would destroy the feudal system and the class system on which their privileged
position depended? Their intention was to reorganize, but the movement unexpectedly proceeded
to the denial of the old system because the new system required actions far beyond the original
plan. Thus the movement that started as a political reform ended up in a social revolution.
Three concluding notes:
1. The Meiji revolution was not a revolution by low-ranking samurai alone. The lords of the
influential han were equal or even superior to their most capable vassals in knowledge,
leadership and agility.
2. A clear division fo labor between a few top leaders and a much greater number of
supporting elites was not observable.
3. The role of han was vital as a unit that prepared the conditions for the flexible structure of
politics to emerge within the samurai class. Low ranking samurai of the influential han,
trained in both theory and practice, continued to form and re-form groups into the early
Meiji period with the former han as the basic unit. In this way han in the late Edo period
served as an incubator of human resource and network formation that enabled Japan to
cast off the class-based feudal system and face squarely with the Western powers.
5.5 Technology Transfer
According to Uchida (1990), technological acquirement in Meiji period was categorized in four
concrete processes as 1) early attempts in the late Edo period, 2) foreign experts and turnkey
projects, 3) engineering education, and 4) machinery imports and foreign partnership.
5.5.1 Early attempts
For self-defense against possible foreign invasion, the Bakufu made its first effort to import the
foreign technology in 1854. Many han also attempted to replicate the armament production under
the Fukoku kyhei spirit. This was done based on the imported Dutch books which were
outdated by the time they got translated. As a result, this attempt failed.. Seeing the limits, the
Bakufu and powerful han changed their strategies to directly reimport foreign firearms in 1859
when Japan ports were opened.
However, in the same year, an example of the construction of a Western wooden ship by
Japanese carpenters under the instructions of Russian shipwrights was known as the first success
of on-site-technology transfer. The knowledge was transmitted with the presence of foreign
experts and their direct guidance. It was noted that these Japanese carpenters were able to learn
the technology so well that they became the first skilled workers later at Japanese privatelyowned shipyards.
Another example was an establishment of the Nagasaki Naval Training Center in 1855 where
Japanese crews were first trained Western-style battleship. The success came in the form of a
joint venture of the Dutch navy and the Bakufu in establishing the center, under daily
management of Dutch instructors. Courses focused on operational technologies such as
navigation, artillery training, and the engine maintenance. On-the-job training and variety of
imported ships enabled the Bakufu and han to enhance their knowledge of foreign technology in
warship, engines and gunnery. In addition, the Nagasaki Steel Mill and Shipyard in 1857 and the
Yokosuka Steel Mill in 1866, which later became Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipyard and Yokosuka

Naval Arsenal, were built to facilitate the Nagasaki Naval Training Center in replicating Western
mechanized factory productions and transferring technology to Japanese by the employment of
foreign engineers. Kagoshima Spinning Mill built in 1867 also adopted a similar approach.
5.5.2 Foreign experts and turnkey projects
*Keyword: a turnkey project is a type of project which complete product is constructed and sold to buyers. It is
different from build-to-order project, where the constructor builds an item to the buyer's exact specifications, or
when an incomplete product is sold with the assumption that the buyer would complete it.

In the early years of Meiji, the new government employed foreign experts collectively and
individually. Collective employment was to establish Western-style state-owned enterprises in
the fields of railways, telegraphy, and silk reeling. This vast employment of foreigners could be
regarded as the turnkey projects which the foreign directors instructed their own fellow and
Japanese workers. Japanese eventually took the operation after the project completion. Further,
individual experts were also employed to fill in specific technological needs under Japanese
management. The latter proved to require greater Japanese ownership and involvement in
technology transfer than the former.
The Imperial Mint directed by William Thomas Kinder together with other foreign experts was
one example of turnkey projects. Of note, the primary aim of the government in establishing a
mint, a telegraphic service, railways and shipyards was to introduce modern industrial
infrastructures as quick as possible as also desired by Western countries which obtained trading
rights with Japan. Thus, it was not surprising that the turnkey projects did not consciously
contribute to the technology transmission to Japan.
Japan relied heavily on imported machinery, equipment, and materials and that gave good profits
to foreign merchants. For instance, the Oriental Bank won the contract to build and equip the
Imperial Mint. The merchants were also the intermediaries of technology transfer in Japan. They
acted as middlemen for importing management and technology, given Japanese governmentowned businesses with their foreign engineers and skilled workers.
Although the mass employment of foreigners in Japan depicted the strong Japanese demand on
Western engineers but that was not the only reason of the international migration to Japan. It
could also be reflected by the increase from the supply side. As seen, the completion of British
industrial infrastructure by the 1850s slowed down the demand of engineers in their home
country so that those foreigners chose to seek jobs overseas.
As mentioned, the hiring of foreign experts and workers through turnkey contracts was not
intended or required systematic technology transfer, but the method did have the merit of
providing a training basis for Japanese workers in the work practices of advanced countries. It
created skilled workers who later could shift their work from stated-owned enterprises to private
sector or even set up their own, spreading Western technology and management in Japan from
the 1880s onwards.
From around 1875 stated-owned enterprises stopped hiring large foreign teams, and by 1880
foreign engineers and skilled workers had disappeared almost completely from the workplaces.
This shift resulted from a policy change of the Meiji government which could no longer afford to
hire expensive foreigners. But what so amazing was the fact that Japanese engineers were
already able to take over the role of foreign supervisors and to train Japanese technicians to
replace those foreign engineers.

5.5.3 Engineering Education

Having understood the fundamentals of Western technologies, Japanese engineers undertook the
role of internalizing and spreading the knowledge out in the country after the foreigners left. The
smooth transfer of Western technologies was because Meiji Japan trained a large number of local
engineers to an exceptionally high quality. Also, turnkey projects supervised by foreigners,
sending students to study overseas and the establishment of the institutions for technical
education and training at home country were all important channels for industrial human
development in Japan.
There were three types of engineers in the early Meiji period. First were the scholars who had
trained themselves using Dutch imported technical books and journals in the late Edo period.
Second were the graduates from schools and centres instructed by foreigners. Third were those
selected and sent to study abroad by the government. Notably, those students were extremely
good despite inadequate stipends offered by the government. That was because they were
carefully selected based on their best achievements among other graduates of Japanese
education. Upon their return to Japan, those students took a job as senior technical experts for the
government.
Besides, there were also other scholars who sought overseas study without official permission,
namely, master engineers Yamao Yozo and Inoue Masaru who became senior bureaucrats in the
Ministry of Industry after the Meiji Restoration. Fields of studies were shipbuilding, mechanical
engineering, civil engineering, mining and metallurgy, arms manufacture, and chemistry. Study
destinations ranged from Britain, the US, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, according to
Uchida (1990).
It was concluded that the first wave of Japanese overseas students were sent to appropriate
institutions aiming for absorbing pragmatic technical knowledge and receiving a good education
equal to the first-ranked engineers in Europe and the US. As a result, on their return, these
engineers were able to assume the responsibilities and positions previously occupied by foreign
advisors and engineers.
In addition, engineering subject was studied vigorously in Japan. The early establishment of
engineering faculties at Japanese universities brought a big contribution to the countrys
technological development. Moreover, Meiji Japan was so quick in selectively bringing the
components of engineering education abroad and combined them for the best result. Examples
could be seen with the founding of Kobu Daigakko (Institute of Technology) and the courses in
applied science and civil and mechanical engineering offered at the University of Science.
The Institute of Technology integrated both theory and practice. The study program included
basic education in English and mathematics in the first two years, classroom instructions in
science and engineering in the next two years, and internship at the Ministry of Industry under
the supervision of foreign engineers in the final two years. Upon the graduation, the engineers
were expected to take positions there. Institute of Technology and the University of Science were
merged later to become the Faculty of Engineering at Tokyo Imperial University in 1885. By the
end of Meiji era, other imperial universities founded in Kyoto, Tohoku, and Kyushu possessed

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faculties of engineering. Those faculties at that time were not research-oriented but dedicated to
pass on the Western engineering knowledge, thus, the textbooks and many lectures as well as
examinations were in English or German.
Additionally, there were also the technical and vocational schools that trained middle-rank
engineers, to wit, the Tokyo Shokko Gakko (Tokyo Workers School) which later became a
technical high school. More like this were created in Nagoya, Kumamoto, Sendai, and Kyoto by
the end of Meiji era. These schools, hence, also contributed greatly to industrialization in Japan
owing to the fact that they helped produce a large number of Japanese engineers with pragmatic
industrial knowledge in the late Meiji period. The increase of engineering graduates helped solve
the problem of scarcity of human resource. The supply of capable domestic engineers rose up, so
that more and more were employed in the private sector as well. This indicates Japans leading
industries in the late 19th and the early 20th centuries.
5.5.4 Import of Machinery and Foreign Partnership
In 1880, most imported machineries from the Western countries were cotton spinning, paper,
sugar, shipbuilding, telephony, electric power generation, and electrical machinery and those
imported goods were to be analyzed and absorbing the technology. In 1900s, Japan employed
technology transfer by technical cooperation agreements with western countries. The contracts
with foreign countries were to provide instructors and know-how with those imported machinery.
With these two successful methods, there were a growing number of Japanese engineers who
could absorb technical information, select technologies, and assimilate them.
Examples:
Ministry of communication set up a telephone network. A group of engineers collected publicly
available information by visiting Britain, the US, and Germany to study telephone system. They
negotiated with telephone equipment makers and selected the kind of system suitable for Japan.
Early Meiji-era, Japanese naval shipbuilding and armaments engineers were trained in Britain to
observe and learn the state-of-the-art battleships being built to be shipped to Japan. This provided
them with opportunities to learn about ship design and construction from the British Navy and
shipyards. Since then, Japan became able to build their own ships. Ships gradually improved to
steel-hulled ships.
Textile Industry, government imported ten large scale sets of spinning machinery from Britain
and it was tested in state-owned mills in Aichi. The government then assisted commercialization
of the factories. Many new mill factories were established by university-educated engineers such
as Owari, Miebo, Osakbo, Amagasakibo, and Kanebo. Due to the great demand, they traveled to
Britain to purchase spinning machinery and acquire the necessary practical skills and technology.
Technology transfer from the middle of the Meiji period onwards occurred mainly through
importing machinery or the transfer of know-how that accompanied imported products.

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During the Meiji period, imported machinery for communications, transport, and automotive
industries increased significantly. This was due to the low tariff of 5 percent which was imposed
by the unequal commercial treaties with the west.
Table: 5.4 Machinery imports in the Meiji period (unit: 1,000 yen)
18781882
11.8

Telegraphic
& Telephone
equipment
Railway
carriages
Locomotive
s
Steamships
81.9
Steam
engines
Internal
Combustion
engines
Dynamos &
electric
motors
Machine
tools
Spinning
machines
Looms
TOTAL
1219.2

18831887
19.3

18881892
35.8

18931897
43.1

18981902
65.1

19031907
113.5

19081912
78.0

29.0

355.8

518.5

1,045.6

1,771.7

2,336.0

72.2

408.2

1,505.4

1,963.5

1,705.8

1,156.8

718.5
81.7

841.7
329.1

4,744.5
586.2

3,562
759.8

4,692.1
1,208.8

2,215.6
797.2

102.5

262.2

873.9

322.6

1,546.0

2,275.4

3.0

4.5

106.1

649.1

2,404.2

2,687.9

71.9

784.5

3,012.1

1,330.3

1,840.8

3,608.0

25.6
12,066.4

99.0
5,755

206.1
16,427.7

199.8
19,145.1

391.5
30,354.8

1,060.8
37,381.6

Along with machinery imports, domestic production of machinery had also emerged. Not
surprisingly, the design and quality of Japanese machinery in the Meiji period were less
sophisticated than those of the West. Most of the machinery manufactured in Japan was copied
from imports. Such copy production from imported machineries was the means by which
Japanese producers acquired technology through trial-and-error that finally served as the basis
for commercially viable domestic production.
Examples:
Tokyo Light Company, a buyer of imported electrical machinery, tried to support domestic
production and light bulb. They purchased dynamos from Ishikawajima Shipyard that were

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designed and copy produced from certain professors but the heat generated distorted their shape.
Similarly, Miyoshi Electric Machine supplied dynamos to Kobe Light Company and tram motors
to the Municipality of Kyoto. Both instances the products returned as defective. Japanese
industries learned that they could not rely on copy production of machine manufacturers. Thus,
imports of machinery with latest technology continued to increase and the technology they
contained had to be learned more systematically and analytically through repeated copy
production before Japan could finally absorb and internalize it.
There were two kinds of importer during the Meiji period:
- Foreign traders acted as agents for foreign machinery manufacturers.
- Domestic general trading companies such as Mitsui, Takada and Okura (not only middlemen
but also providers of information and technical services to domestic producers)
In 1890s, Mitsui as the Japanese agent for Britains Platt Bros & Co., provided most of the
equipment for spinning mills industries. Bagnal Hills, an American trading company, was the
agent in Japan for General Electric and Britains Healing and Co. Okura was the agent for
Allgemeine Elektricitats-Gesellschaft (AEG) and Takada was the agent for Westinghouse.
Japanese trading companies also facilitated the building of new hydroelectric power plants all
over the country and actively provided domestic entrepreneurs with basic knowledge to run
business.
During 1870s and 1880s, steelmaking is an area where Japan had difficulties in transferring
technology. State-owned steelmaking at Kamaishi Iron Mines assisted by hired foreign engineers
produce by iron and steel but the quality was not up to the standards in shipbuilding, arms
manufacture, railways, and civil engineering projects. Thus, the Japanese military put pressure
on the government to import a complete set of integrated steel mill. So, Yawata Ironworks, a
state-owned enterprise employed technology from Germany opened for business. This transfer of
technology was a turnkey contract which consisted of confidential mill design, imprted
machinery and equipment, and the provision of German engineers and skilled workers.
The establishment of joint ventures with American firms had permitted foreign investment in
Japan. The modified Japanese law favored the patent rights of foreigners, therefore, Japanese
manufacturers were no longer allowed to copy and produce for free.
In 1896 the Japanese government decided to adopt the American Telephone & Telegraph
(AT&T) system to expand telephony. The government had to produce telephony equipment
domestically so Western Electric (manufacturer dept. of AT&T) tried to form a joint venture by
acquiring stock of Oki Electric Industry. However, the negotiation failed and prompted Western
Electric to establish Nippon Electric Company (NEC) in 1899 by holding 54 percent of the
shares. NEC initially sold imported telephones, then built a manufacturing plant with imported
designs and equipment from Western Electric and produced telephones for domestic demand.
In the same case as NEC, in 1905 General Electric acquired Tokyo Electric of 51 percent shares.
As the company was unable to establish a viable production technology or compete with
imported light bulbs from Germany in terms of quality and price, it finds management assistance

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from GE. GEs policy to allow its subsidiaries to produce light bulbs under their own patents
which is a reason why Tokyo Electric selected GE as a business partner.

Examples mentioned above show how the latest Western technology was introduced to Japan in
the late Meiji period. Some transfer of technology were selective and partial while others were
guided by foreigners in every aspect of the project. At the end of Meiji period, Japan imported
frontline technologies which were simultaneously developed and adopted in the West rather
doing copy production in the early Meiji period. Domestic engineers can take significant lead in
selecting, adjusting, and internalizing imported technologies.
5.6 Concluding Remarks
Meiji Japan digested Western industrial technology from the mid-nineteenth century to the early
twentieth century which was a phenomenal change to Japanese industry and economy. The
historical and political perspective were the necessary background for understanding why
Japanese engineers, workers, and policymakers were so able, devoted, and unified in learning
and improving from foreign technology and systems.
Private sector in Japan was assisted by mostly appropriate policies of the government to produce
a miraculous transformation of an agriculture-based feudal society into a modern industrialized
economy within a space of half century.
The use of foreign experts, turnkey projects, engineering education, machinery import, and
foreign partnership were highlighted as principal methods for the concrete examples. These
methods were adopted by latecomer countries. Meiji Japan was miraculous and phenomenal that
utilize their human capital to mobilize these methods effectively to a successful completion.
The author has left us to a deeper question: can a developing country that lacks the historical and
political conditions of Meiji Japan accomplish similar successful industrialization and
modernization? The author suggested that there should be more than one path to development in
response to different initial conditions of each society as well as shifting global situations.