Jarvis

Good effort. Well presented.

Structure
The sub-headings may have been clearer if they indicated "Offences
committed by A". Usually more helpful than offences of a particular
category (eg sexual offences). Not quite why you started with the sexual
offences?
General approach
Problem questions ask "What if any offences have been committed." As
such it invites an abstract analysis. Identify the potential offences. Set out
the elements of the offence, and identify the issues raised by the
question. Deal with straightforward matters concisely and spend more
time on the difficult issues. Try to articulate the relevant statutory tests
accurately.
If facts are limited, don't fill the gaps; simply express conclusions
conditionally.
Remember the sources of law: legislation and case law. The Crown
Prosecution Service is not a source of law. When citing case law, try to
distil the principle or proposition of law.
NR

What offences, if any, have been committed?

Answer:

Sexual Offences:

The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) defines Causing sexual activity

without consent (Section 4 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003) with an
Actus Reus (AR) of a person A intentionally causes B to engage in activity
that is sexual, and that B does not consent to engaging in that activity
and a Mens Rea (MR) element of A does not reasonably believe that B
consents.

Offence 1: Causing sexual activity without consent

Under S4, taking Edmure (E) as the complainant, and Catelyn (C) as the
defendant, we see that Catelyn had intentionally caused Edmure to have
sexual activities (oral sex) with Ned (N). Under the relevant parts of S76,
we see that Catelyn has not deceived Edmure to the nature and purpose
of the act; since the sexual purpose of the act was made known to Edmure
and was still present despite the deception that Ned wanted to
experiment with male sexual partners (relying on Jheeta [2007]). S75 does
not apply. S74 will apply, as we can see that Edmure was not given the
freedom and capacity to choose and consent. Edmure was deceived into
thinking that Ned wanted male sexual partners, which conceivably
affected Edmures right to exercise free choice or consent (relying on
Jheeta [2007], where lies as to the true circumstances surrounding the
sexual activity vitiated consent under s74). As for the MR, Catelyn knew
that Edmure was not consenting as Catelyn herself had lied to Edmure to
secure his role in the oral sex, thus she had no reasonable belief in
Edmures consent.

Offence 2: Causing sexual activity without consent

Under S4, taking Ned as the complainant and Catelyn as the defendant,
we see that the same logic applies as in Offence 1. Catelyn had
intentionally caused Ned to have sexual activities (oral sex) with Edmure.
Under S76, we see that Catelyn has not deceived Ned to the nature and
purpose of the act; since the sexual purpose of the act was made known

to Ned, even though it was Edmure instead of Catelyn at the other end of
the oral sex. This is more analogous to McNally [2013], where the nature
of the act (being penetrated by a girl with an object instead of a boy) was
altered to a large degree, but s76 still did not apply). However, as in
offence 1, under s74, Ned could not have free choice or consent as Ned
was not aware of the true circumstances of the sexual activity (Jheeta
[2007]). Like Offence 1, Catelyn could not have had reasonable belief in
Neds consent, as Catelyn had intentionally deceived Ned.

Offence 3?
Under S3 for sexual assault, taking Ned as the complainant and E as the
defendant. We see that Edmure had intentionally touched (sexually)
Ned, and as established under Offence 2, Ned did not have the freedom
and capacity to consent, thus the absence of consent. However, it is
difficult to say that Edmure did not reasonably belief that Ned was
consenting. If left to a jury, Edmure could be seen as being completely
deceived by Catelyn as when presented with a disrobed Ned who did not
object while the act was ongoing, thus Edmure would have reasonably
believed that Ned was consenting to the oral sex. However, whether
Edmure actually was completely deceived would be a matter of fact, not
law, and could be left to the jury.

Offences against the Persons (Non-fatal):

The CPS defines assault as when a person intentionally or recklessly
causes another to apprehend the immediate infliction of unlawful force.

Offence 4: common assault

For assault under S39 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, taking Petyr (P) as
the victim and Ned as the defendant, we see that the AR of assault has
been met. Ned was screaming and smashed his glass bottle, rushing

towards Petyr. This would directly cause Petyr to consider that Ned might
immediately hit him with the bottle, or that Ned might inflict some
violence upon him in the next few moments. Petyr was not consenting to
this action, and thus this act by Ned would be an unlawful force. As for
the MR, Ned directly intended that assault on P. Thus, Ned would be
charged with assault under S39. This is not a controversial judgment.

Offence 5: unlawful wounding

Bran (B) was very badly cut by the glass. This, per CPS standards as to
what constitutes wounding or Grievous Bodily Harm (GBH), could be
seen as merely just a wound (wounding may encompass injuries that
are relatively minor in nature, for example a small cut or laceration).
There is thus debate on whether this current case was better classified
under Actual Bodily Harm (ABH), depending on the severity of the bad
cut, and how much medical intervention was needed. However, for the
present case, I will assume that the bad cut was sufficiently deep and
serious to qualify as wounding under S20, presumably causing massive
blood loss and injury to Bran.
The CPS defines unlawful wounding as when a person unlawfully and
maliciously wounds another person. In this present case, unlawful
wounding was established, as there was a bad cut and Bran certainly did
not consent. Moving to MR, there was no ulterior intent by Ned to even
wound or inflict any harm on Bran (thus explaining why the charge of
wounding with intent was not applied). Hence, we look towards
maliciously. The doctrine of transferred malice applies where the mens
rea of one offence can be transferred to another. Since Ned had criminal
intent to commit assault or worse on P (as seen in Offence 4), and Ned
knew or could foresee that Petyr could have been harmed by Neds
actions, and Ned wanted this harm to occur, the transferred malice
doctrine could apply (as directed by R v Latimer (1886) and explained by
A-G Ref NO. 3 OF 1994 [ 1997 ]). Thus, we can charge Ned with unlawful
wounding under S20.

Murder or Manslaughter
Offence 6: Causing death by careless or inconsiderate driving
The CPS states that Driving carelessly or driving dangerously do not, on
their own, amount to unlawful acts for the purpose of unlawful act
manslaughter. Thus, we rely on Causing death by careless or
inconsiderate driving, under Section 1 of the Road Traffic Act (RTA)1988.
The standard of care of Sansa (S) merely fell below that of a reasonable
driver (just above the legal speed limit), and not far below.
Sansa had the AR of causing death, as Sansa could not stop her car in
time and hit Petyr, resulting in death. It is debateable on the facts if Sansa
being over the speed limit barred Sansa from stopping the car in time. If
being over the speed limit was not a material cause of the collision with
Petyr, apply Taylor [2016] UKSC 5, and say that Sansa did not cause
Petyrs death. However, assuming that speeding caused the death, we
find that Sansa had the MR of driving over the speed limit, falling below
the standards of a reasonable driver, who would drive below the speed
limit.
It is to be noted that in R v Hennigan [1971] and R v Barnes [2008],
driving does not have to be the sole cause of death, it does have to be a
cause. Thus, Sansa can be charged with causing death by careless driving,
despite the earlier events with Ned scaring Petyr and with Petyr running
onto the road.

Offence 7: murder, manslaughter

Taking Petyr as the victim and Ned as the defendant. The CPS defines
murder as the unlawful killing of a person, in being, under the Queens
Peace with intent to kill or cause GBH, with malice aforethought. For
the AR, specifically factual causation; but for Neds actions scaring Petyr,
Petyr would not have run into the streets. As for legal causation, the

concept of whether there might be novus actus interveniens (NAI) when

Petyr ran into the street. However, relying on the test for NAI in R v
William & Davis [1992], we see that Petyrs conduct was definitely
proportionate to the threat of violence by Ned, and that running away
from Ned and into the streets was reasonable. Although it could be said
that P should reasonably have checked the safety of the street before
crossing the road, I argue that Ps actions, although wrong, was justified in
the agony of the moment, since Petyr probably fear serious harm from
Ned. As such, it could not be said that NAI broke the chain of causation.
Noting that Ned might argue that Petyr was in essence killed by Ss
actions in the road accident, I contend that according to R v Benge [1865],
the negligence of 3rd parties did not vitiate the causal chain from Neds
actions; the defendant's action need not be the sole cause of the resulting
harm, but it must be more than minimal.
As for the MR, malice aforethought has been defined by the case law as
intention to kill or intention to cause GBH (Cunningham [1982]). Note
that intention for murder is defined as specific intent. It is difficult from the
given facts to establish what Ned intended from his actions towards P, and
whether this intention was to cause GBH or just merely ABH (which would
result in a constructive manslaughter charge). It has to be left to a jury to
decide. Assuming that Ned intended GBH, we look towards the loss of
control (LoC) defence or the diminished responsibility (DR) defence.
For DR, Ned suffered from clinical depression which was a recognised
medical condition. However, it is argued that depression did not
substantially (has to be big or large, not just merely trivial as explained
in R v Golds [2015]) impair Neds ability to understand the nature of Neds
conduct. Depression did not affect Ned to such a serious extent. Ned was
still in control of his own actions and could still form rational judgments.
There for DR defence fails.
For LoC, first we look at whether Ned in rushing towards Petyr, acted with
deliberation or planning. It is to be noted that the reason for the loss of
control could originate from a 3rd party, i.e. from Jaime and not P. Despite

the few minutes where Jaime (J) made the incendiary remarks and when P
returned from the toilet, Ned arguably did not have much time to
deliberate or consider revenge. The sight of P returning could have
triggered the angry reaction from Ned.
Next, we look at whether Jaimes remarks and taunting could be
considered as a qualifying trigger. Under the ambit of qualifying trigger,
sexual infidelity is supposed to be disregarded as a trigger, but in the
wider context of a taunt, especially from a 3rd party (J) about the loyalty of
Neds girlfriend, and about Neds child calling P daddy, we cannot
disregard Petyrs taunts as a qualifying trigger. Jaimes remarks about
Catelyns infidelity could still be a trigger. However, to say that Jaimes
remarks were of a sufficiently extremely grave character would be a
stretch. Mere taunts by a 3rd party, without any evidence for said taunts,
could not be reasonably justified to be severe enough to be a qualifying
trigger.
As such, assuming that N intended to inflict GBH on P, Ned would be guilty
of murder, with no partial defences operating to render it voluntary
manslaughter.
--end
(1892 words)