1. [A.C. No. 5624.

January 20, 2004]

NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT C.
FLORIDO, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an administrative complaint for the disbarment of respondent Atty. James Benedict C.
Florido and his eventual removal from the Roll of Attorneys for allegedly violating his oath as a
lawyer by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious and bogus Court of Appeals
Resolution/Order.[1]
In her Complaint-Affidavit, Natasha V. Heysuwan-Florido averred that she is the legitimate
spouse of respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido, but that they are estranged and living
separately from each other. They have two children namely, Kamille Nicole H. Florido, five
years old, and James Benedict H. Florido, Jr., three years old both of whom are in complainants
custody. Complainant filed a case for the annulment of her marriage with respondent,
docketed as Civil Case No. 23122, before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 24.
Meanwhile, there is another case related to the complaint for annulment of marriage which is
pending before the Court of Appeals and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54235 entitled, James
Benedict C. Florido v. Hon. Pampio Abarientos, et al.
Sometime in the middle of December 2001, respondent went to complainants residence in
Tanjay City, Negros Oriental and demanded that the custody of their two minor children be
surrendered to him. He showed complainant a photocopy of an alleged Resolution issued by
the Court of Appeals which supposedly granted his motion for temporary child custody.
[2]
Complainant called up her lawyer but the latter informed her that he had not received any
motion for temporary child custody filed by respondent.
Complainant asked respondent for the original copy of the alleged resolution of the Court of
Appeals, but respondent failed to give it to her. Complainant then examined the resolution
closely and noted that it bore two dates: November 12, 2001 and November 29, 2001.
Sensing something amiss, she refused to give custody of their children to respondent.
In the mid-morning of January 15, 2002, while complainant was with her children in the ABC
Learning Center in Tanjay City, respondent, accompanied by armed men, suddenly arrived and
demanded that she surrender to him the custody of their children. He threatened to forcefully
take them away with the help of his companions, whom he claimed to be agents of the
National Bureau of Investigation.
Alarmed, complainant immediately sought the assistance of the Tanjay City Police. The
responding policemen subsequently escorted her to the police station where the matter could
be clarified and settled peacefully. At the police station, respondent caused to be entered in
the Police Blotter a statement that he, assisted by agents of the NBI, formally served on
complainant the appellate courts resolution/order. [3] In order to diffuse the tension,
complainant agreed to allow the children to sleep with respondent for one night on condition
that he would not take them away from Tanjay City. This agreement was entered into in the
presence of Tanjay City Chief of Police Juanito Condes and NBI Investigator Roger Sususco,
among others.
In the early morning of January 16, 2002, complainant received information that a van arrived
at the hotel where respondent and the children were staying to take them to Bacolod City.
Complainant rushed to the hotel and took the children to another room, where they stayed
until later in the morning.
On the same day, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch
31, a verified petition[4] for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus asserting his right to
custody of the children on the basis of the alleged Court of Appeals resolution. In the

meantime, complainant verified the authenticity of the Resolution and obtained a certification
dated January 18, 2002[5] from the Court of Appeals stating that no such resolution ordering
complainant to surrender custody of their children to respondent had been issued.
At the hearing of the petition for habeas corpus on January 23, 2002, respondent did not
appear. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.
Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint alleging that respondent violated his attorneys
oath by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious Court of Appeals Resolution in and
outside a court of law. Furthermore, respondent abused and misused the privileged granted to
him by the Supreme Court to practice law in the country.
After respondent answered the complaint, the matter was referred to the IBP-Commission on
Bar Discipline for investigation, report and recommendation. The IBP-CBD recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three years with a warning
that another offense of this nature will result in his disbarment. [6] On June 23, 2003, the IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and recommendation of the
Commission with the modification that the penalty of suspension be increased to six years.
The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent can be held administratively liable
for his reliance on and attempt to enforce a spurious Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
In his answer to the complaint, respondent claims that he acted in good faith in invoking the
Court of Appeals Resolution which he honestly believed to be authentic. This, however, is
belied by the fact that he used and presented the spurious resolution several times. As
pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, the assailed Resolution was presented by
respondent on at least two occasions: first, in his Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas
Corpus docketed as Special Proc. Case No. 3898,[7] which he filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Dumaguete City; and second, when he sought the assistance of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) of Tanjay City to recover custody of his minor children from complainant. Since it
was respondent who used the spurious Resolution, he is presumed to have participated in its
fabrication.
Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer. The burden cast on the judiciary would be
intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted by counsel. The time that will
have to be devoted just to the task of verification of allegations submitted could easily be
imagined. Even with due recognition then that counsel is expected to display the utmost zeal
in the defense of a clients cause, it must never be at the expense of the truth. [8] Thus, the
Code of professional Responsibility states:
CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor
shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper,
the language or the argument of an opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or
knowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or
assert as a fact that which has not been proved.
Moreover, the records show that respondent used offensive language in his pleadings in
describing complainant and her relatives. A lawyers language should be forceful but dignified,
emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession.[9] The lawyers arguments whether written or oral should be gracious to both court
and opposing counsel and should be of such words as may be properly addressed by one
gentlemen to another.[10] By calling complainant, a sly manipulator of truth as well as a
vindictive congenital prevaricator, hardly measures to the sobriety of speech demanded of a
lawyer.

Respondents actions erode the public perception of the legal profession. They constitute gross
misconduct and the sanctions for such malfeasance is prescribed by Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court which states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore.- A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
Considering the attendant circumstances, we agree with the recommendation of the IBP
Board of Governors that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law. However,
we find that the period of six years is too harsh a penalty. Instead, suspension for the lesser
period of two years, which we deem commensurate to the offense committed, is hereby
imposed on respondent.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Atty. James Benedict C. Florido is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
Let copies of this resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent as a member of
the Bar and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country.
SO ORDERED.

2. [G.R. No. 123698. August 5, 1998]

ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARK CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and SPS. LILIA SEVILLA and JOSE SEELIN, respondents.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, A.M., J.:
This is the second time petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation has come to this
Court assailing the execution of the judgment dated August 24, 1989, rendered by the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City in Civil Case No. C-9297. Apparently, hope springs
eternal for petitioner, considering that the issues raised in this second petition for review are
but mere reiterations of previously settled issues which have already attained finality. We now
write finis to this controversy which has dragged on for seventeen (17) years, for as we ruled
in Gomez vs. Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 15, Ozamis City: [1]
x x x litigations must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, it being essential to the
effective administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the winning party
be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Hence, courts must
guard themselves against any scheme to bring about that result, for constituted as they are to
put an end to controversies, they should frown upon any attempt to prolong it. Public policy
and sound practice demand that at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should
become final and irrevocable at some definite date fixed by law. Interes rei publicae ut finis sit
litium.
The facts:
The case started on May 18, 1981 when private respondent-spouses Jose Seelin and Lilia
Sevilla Seelin filed a complaint against Central Dyeing & Finishing Corporation (Central Dyeing
for brevity) for quieting of title and for declaration of nullity of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT
No. 205942) issued in the name of said corporation, docketed as Civil Case No. C-9297, before
the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City.

On August 24, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment, [2] the dispositive portion of which
reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
Declaring the defendant's Certificate of Title No. 205942 null and void.
Dismissing counterclaim of defendant without pronouncement as to costs."
The aforesaid decision was affirmed[3] by respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
25989 on June 25, 1991 and eventually upheld by this Court in G.R. No. L-101819 on
November 25, 1991. Said dismissal became final on March 5, 1992. [4]
The RTC decision, having become final and executory, private respondents moved for
execution which was granted by the lower court. Accordingly, a writ of execution of the
decision was issued.
Subsequently, private respondents filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion for an Immediate
Writ of Possession/Break Open Order. The motion was opposed by herein petitioner Eternal
Gardens Memorial Park Corporation contending that it is not submitting to the jurisdiction of
the trial court; that it is completely unaware of the suit between private respondents and
Central Dyeing; that it is the true and registered owner of the lot having bought the same
from Central Dyeing; and that it was a buyer in good faith.
On July 1, 1992, the trial court granted private respondents motion. Another Order was issued
on August 18, 1992 by the trial court holding that the judgment was binding on petitioner,
being the successor-in-interest of defendant Central Dyeing pursuant to Rule 39, Section 48(b)
of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari. On September 30, 1992 the
Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing the petition, excerpts of which read:
We reviewed carefully the assailed orders and find no compelling reason to disturb the same.
Indeed, since petitioner admits that it bought the property from Central Dyeing and Finishing
Corporation, defendant in Civil Case No. C-9297, petitioner is bound by the decision rendered
therein by respondent Judge.
Under Section 20, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court, a transferee pendente lite does not have to
be included or impleaded by name in order to be bound by the judgment because the action
or suit may be continued for or against the original party or the transferor and still be binding
on the transferee[5]
The motion for reconsideration was also denied by the Court of Appeals on February 18, 1993.
[6]

On further appeal to this Court, petitioners petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G. R.
No. 109076, was denied in a resolution dated August 2, 1993. [7] Upon finality of said
resolution, this Court issued Entry of Judgment dated October 21, 1993. [8]
Thereafter, private respondents filed another motion for the issuance of a second writ of
execution before the trial court which was granted in the Order of July 20, 1994.
Not willing to give up, petitioner sought a reconsideration. Petitioners motion was initially
granted[9] on August 29, 1994 by the trial court thru Judge Arturo Romero. However, upon
motion of private respondents, the said order was reconsidered on December 19, 1994 [10] by
Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr., who succeeded Judge Romero. Forthwith, alias writs of execution
were issued.
Desperately needing a favorable judgment, petitioner, for the second time, filed a petition for
certiorari[11] with respondent Court of Appeals (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 36591),
arguing inter alia: that the judgment cannot be executed against it because it was not a party

to Civil Case No. C-9297; that the decision of the trial court in said case never
mandatedCentral Dyeing to deliver possession of the property to the private respondents;
that certain facts and circumstances which occurred after the finality of the judgment will
render the execution highly unjust, illegal and inequitable; that the issuance of the assailed
writ of execution violates the lot buyers freedom of religion and worship; and that private
respondents title is being questioned in another case.
On September 29, 1995, the respondent court rendered judgment [12] dismissing the petition
for certiorari on the ground that the lower court's decision in Civil Case No. 9297 had long
become final and executory. It ruled, thus:
"This Court needs (sic) not belabor the fact that the respondent Court's decision in Civil Case
No. 9297 had long become final and executory. The respondent court's writs of execution and
possession could have been implemented a long time ago if not for the series of legal
maneuvers of petitioner Eternal Gardens. x x x x Petitioner Eternal Gardens cannot
anymore stop the execution of a final judgment by raising issues which actually
have been ruled upon by this Court in its earlier case with Us in CA-G.R. SP No.
28797. To Our mind, the instant petition is a mere continuation of petitioner's dilatory tactics
so that plaintiffs, although prevailing party, will not benefit at all from a final judgment in their
favor. Thus, the instant petition is obviously, frivolous and dilatory warranting the assessment
of double costs of this suit against petitioner Sec. 3, Rule 142 of the Revised Rules of Court).
Moreover, as manifested by the plaintiffs, herein private respondents, the instant
petition has already become moot and academic as the property in question was
already turned over by the Deputy Sheriff to the plaintiffs, and the writs of
execution and possession fully satisfied. Thus, hopefully, putting the legal battle of
this case to rest." (Emphasis ours.)
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on January 30, 1996. [13]
Petitioner once again seeks this Court's intervention reiterating in essence the same line of
arguments espoused in their petition before the respondent Court of Appeals.
The petition must fail.
It is a settled rule that once a court renders a final judgment, all the issues between or
among the parties before it are deemed resolved and its judicial functions with respect to any
matter related to the controversy litigated come to an end.
Petitioners argument that the trial court cannot order it and the one hundred (100) memorial
lot owners to surrender and/or deliver possession of the property in dispute on the ground
that they were never parties to the case between private respondents and Central Dyeing,
has long been resolved by respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28797 when it ruled:
Indeed, since petitioner admits that it bought the property from Central Dyeing and Finishing
Corporation, defendant in Civil Case No. C-9297, petitioner is bound by the decision rendered
therein by respondent Judge.
Under Section 20, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court, a transferee pendente lite does not have to
be included or impleaded by name in order to be bound by the judgment because the action
or suit may be continued for or against the original party or the transferor and still be binding
on the transferee.[14]
The aforesaid decision was affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. 109076 and attained finality on
October 21, 1993. There is, therefore, no need for us to belabor the same issue here.
Further, petitioners contention that a determination of the issue of possession should first be
resolved before the issuance of a writ of possession is untenable.
Placing private respondents in possession of the land in question is the necessary and logical
effect or consequence of the decision in Civil Case No. C-9297 declaring them as the rightful

owners of the property. As correctly argued by the private respondents, they do not have to
institute another action for the purpose of taking possession of the subject realty.
Petitioner likewise asserts that certain facts and circumstances transpired after the finality of
judgment in Civil Case No. C-9297 which will render the execution of the said judgment unjust
and illegal. It points to the pendency of Civil Case No. C-11337 before the Regional Trial Court
of Caloocan City filed by the Republic of the Philippines against private respondents for
nullification of 22 titles which include the title to the subject property. Petitioner argues that
the pendency of the said case provides a reasonable justification why execution of the
aforesaid judgment and delivery of possession of the subject property should be permanently
stayed or at least held in abeyance until after the final resolution of the case.
We do not agree.
The pendency of Civil Case No. C-11337 for annulment of titles filed by the Republic against
private respondents will not justify the suspension of the execution of the judgment in Civil
Case No. C-9297. This is so because the petitioners title which originated from Central Dyeing
(TCT No. 205942) was already annulled in the judgment sought to be executed, and which
judgment had long been affirmed by the Court of Appeals and by this Court. Thus, even if, in
the remote possibility, the trial court will nullify the said private respondents title in Civil Case
No. C-11337, as argued by petitioner, the supposed adverse decision cannot validate TCT No.
205942 and make petitioner the rightful owner of the subject land. Clearly, the present
petition was instituted merely to delay the execution of the judgment.
Finally, petitioners fear that the grave lots will be disturbed, desecrated and destroyed once
the execution of the judgment proceeds is more imagined than real. A perusal of the Orders of
the trial court with regard to the execution of the judgment reveals that the interests of said
burial lot owners have been taken into account by the trial court when it took steps and made
suggestions as to how their rights could be amply protected. In its Order dated February 13,
1995, the trial court, through Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr., stated:
"The defendant-petitioner are (sic) however not completely without recourse or remedy
because they can still go after the original party-defendant or transferor of the property in
question which is Central Dyeing and Finishing Corporation pursuant to Section 20, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court. And should it be difficult or nay impossible for plaintiff-respondents to be
placed in possession of the subject property, due to defendant-petitioners' arguments that the
same have already been sold to burial lot buyers, then it should be incumbent for the
defendant-petitioners to negotiate with the plaintiff-respondents for payment in cash of the
property subject of their complaint to avoid demolition or desecration since they benefited
from the sale of the burial lots."[15]
In another order dated May 4, 1995, the following directive was given, to wit:
"The court directs and orders the defendant to give access to the plaintiffs and as proposed
by the plaintiffs, they are given authority to destroy a small portion of the fence so that they
can have access to the property. But as to the demolition of the burial lots, negotiation could
be made by the defendant with the former owner so that cash payment or cash settlement be
made."[16]
Even the former Presiding Judge Arturo A. Romero, in his Order dated July 20, 1994, imposed
the following limitation on the writ of execution, as follows:
"Moreover, considering the manifestation that large areas within the Eternal Gardens have
been sold to so many persons who now have buried their beloved ones in the grave lots
adjoining the lot in question, it is therefore, in the interest of justice and equity, that the
enforcement of the writ of possession and break open order should be applied only to the gate
of Eternal Gardens Memorial Park at the eastern side nearest to the parcel of land in question
where the factory of the defendant is located, in order to avoid disturbing the peace of the

resting souls over the graves spread over the parcels of land within the said memorial
park."[17]
From the above-mentioned orders, it can be seen that the issue as to the status of the burial
lot owners has been properly addressed.
Be that as it may, the petition has been rendered moot and academic in view of the fact that
the questioned Alias Writ of Possession dated December 27, 1994 and the Alias Writ of
Execution dated December 27, 1994 have already been implemented by the Sheriff as shown
by the Sheriffs Return,[18] dated March 31, 1995, with the attached Turn Over
Premises[19]indicating therein that private respondents took possession of the subject property.
A note of caution. This case has again delayed the execution of a final judgment for seventeen
(17) years to the prejudice of the private respondents. In the meantime that petitioner has
thwarted execution, interment on the disputed lot has long been going on, so that by the time
this case is finally terminated, the whole lot shall have already been filled with tombstones,
leaving nothing for private respondents, the real owners of the property. This is a mockery of
justice.
We note that while lawyers owe entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the
defense of their client's right, they should not forget that they are officers of the court, bound
to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. They
should not, therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice or unduly
delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes. [20] In Banogan
et. al. vs. Cerna, et. al.,[21] we ruled:
"As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of
justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to the
workload of the judiciary, especially this Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious
study of the facts and the law should advise them when a case such as this, should not be
permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not
advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of
merit do not deserve the attention of the courts."
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

3. G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL
ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO,
vs.
VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
RESOLUTION

CASTRO, J.:
Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title,"
filed on September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice

committed against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase,
as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without
reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with
impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust
judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the
same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this
Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is
not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the
people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustice's committed by this
Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never
be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that
... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned
attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in
the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice
of the noblest profession.
He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition. Thus, on
September 26, 1967, the Manila Times published statements attributed to him, as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to expose the
tribunal's "unconstitutional and obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals
without any reason.
Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored, his client was condemned to
pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, "where our Supreme
Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without
reason their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with
impunity.
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his living, the
present members of the Supreme Court "will become responsive to all cases brought to its
attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those unconstitutional and obnoxious
"lack of merit" or "denied resolutions. (Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Almacen's statement that
... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of [sic] justice,
who ignore their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution
with impunity
was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of
September 28, 1967. In connection therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had
"accused the high tribunal of offenses so serious that the Court must clear itself," and that
"his charge is one of the constitutional bases for impeachment."
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs.
Antonio H. Calero,1 in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after
due hearing, rendered judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a
copy of the decision. Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration.
He served on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the
time and place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for
execution of the judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trial court denied both motions.
To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration,

Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration to which he
attached the required registry return card. This second motion for reconsideration, however,
was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty.
Almacen himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the appeal.
Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the
trial court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety & Fidelity
Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the appeal, in the
following words:
Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiff-appellee praying
that the appeal be dismissed, and of the opposition thereto filed by defendant-appellant; the
Court RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses, the appeal, for the reason that the
motion for reconsideration dated July 5, 1966 (pp. 90-113, printed record on appeal) does not
contain a notice of time and place of hearing thereof and is, therefore, a useless piece of
paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June
24, 1965), which did not interrupt the running of the period to appeal, and, consequently, the
appeal was perfected out of time.
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is
not decisive. At the same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme
Court in Support of Motion for Reconsideration," citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio
A. Venturanza, L-20417, decided by this Court on May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again,
the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration, thus:
Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and the supplement thereto
of the same date filed by defendant- appellant, praying for reconsideration of the resolution of
May 8, 1967, dismissing the appeal.
Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between this case and that
of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L- 16636, June 24,
1965, relied upon by this Court in its resolution of May 8, 1967. Appellant further states that in
the latest case, Republic vs. Venturanza, L-20417, May 30, 1966, decided by the Supreme
Court concerning the question raised by appellant's motion, the ruling is contrary to the
doctrine laid down in the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. case.
There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.
In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the motion to dismiss the
appeal, based on grounds similar to those raised herein was issued on November 26, 1962,
which was much earlier than the date of promulgation of the decision in the Manila Surety
Case, which was June 24, 1965. Further, the resolution in the Venturanza case was
interlocutory and the Supreme Court issued it "without prejudice to appellee's restoring the
point in the brief." In the main decision in said case (Rep. vs. Venturanza the Supreme Court
passed upon the issue sub silencio presumably because of its prior decisions contrary to the
resolution of November 26, 1962, one of which is that in the Manila Surety and Fidelity case.
Therefore Republic vs. Venturanza is no authority on the matter in issue.
Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case, and by
minute resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for
reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and
for extension of time. Entry of judgment was made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the second
motion for reconsideration filed by him after the Said date was ordered expunged from the
records.
It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his
"Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to a pleading that is
interspersed from beginning to end with the insolent contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and

derogatory remarks hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as its individual
members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is unprofessional.
Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold action on his
petition until he shall have actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited for him to
make good his proffer. No word came from him. So he was reminded to turn over his
certificate, which he had earlier vociferously offered to surrender, so that this Court could act
on his petition. To said reminder he manifested "that he has no pending petition in connection
with Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said case is now final and executory;" that
this Court's September 28, 1967 resolution did not require him to do either a positive or
negative act; and that since his offer was not accepted, he "chose to pursue the negative
act."
In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and
gross misconduct, this Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show
cause "why no disciplinary action should be taken against him." Denying the charges
contained in the November 17 resolution, he asked for permission "to give reasons and cause
why no disciplinary action should be taken against him ... in an open and public hearing." This
Court resolved (on December 7) "to require Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from
notice hereof, his reasons for such request, otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed waived
and incident submitted for decision." To this resolution he manifested that since this Court is
"the complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to be heard and to answer questions
"in person and in an open and public hearing" so that this Court could observe his sincerity
and candor. He also asked for leave to file a written explanation "in the event this Court has
no time to hear him in person." To give him the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was
allowed to file a written explanation and thereafter was heard in oral argument.
His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no apology. Far
from being contrite Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this
time embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and innuendo. Thus:
At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew:
"Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what judgment you judge, you shall be
judged, and with what measure you measure, it shall be measured to you. But why dost thou
see the speck in thy brother's eye, and yet dost not consider the beam in thy own eye? Or
how can thou say to thy brother, "Let me cast out the speck from thy eye"; and behold, there
is a beam in thy own eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam from thy own eye, and then
thou wilt see clearly to cast out the speck from thy brother's eyes."
"Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you also to them: for this is the Law
and the Prophets."
xxx xxx xxx
Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned in his petition. On
the contrary, he refirms the truth of what he stated, compatible with his lawyer's oath that he
will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. But he vigorously DENY under
oath that the underscored statements contained in the CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous,
grossly disrespectful and derogatory to the individual members of the Court; that they tend to
bring the entire Court, without justification, into disrepute; and constitute conduct
unbecoming of a member of the noble profession of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH and has been asserted
with NO MALICE BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated with the highest interest
of justice that in the particular case of our client, the members have shown callousness to our
various pleas for JUSTICE, our pleadings will bear us on this matter, ...

xxx xxx xxx

To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for charity, generosity,
fairness, understanding, sympathy and above all in the highest interest of JUSTICE, what
did we get from this COURT? One word, DENIED, with all its hardiness and insensibility. That
was the unfeeling of the Court towards our pleas and prayers, in simple word, it is plain
callousness towards our particular case.
xxx xxx xxx
Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that notwithstanding
the violation of the Constitution, you remained unpunished, this Court in the reverse order of
natural things, is now in the attempt to inflict punishment on your respondent for acts he said
in good faith.
Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for JUSTICE, CHARITY,
GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to justify their stubborn denial with any
semblance of reason, NEVER. Now that your respondent is given the opportunity to face you,
he reiterates the same statement with emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is this. the way of life in the
Philippines today, that even our own President, said: "the story is current, though
nebulous ,is to its truth, it is still being circulated that justice in the Philippines today is not
what it is used to be before the war. There are those who have told me frankly and brutally
that justice is a commodity, a marketable commodity in the Philippines."
xxx xxx xxx
We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR. We attack the
decision of this Court, not the members. ... We were provoked. We were compelled by force of
necessity. We were angry but we waited for the finality of the decision. We waited until this
Court has performed its duties. We never interfered nor obstruct in the performance of their
duties. But in the end, after seeing that the Constitution has placed finality on your judgment
against our client and sensing that you have not performed your duties with "circumspection,
carefulness, confidence and wisdom", your Respondent rise to claim his God given right to
speak the truth and his Constitutional right of free speech.
xxx xxx xxx
The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the further violations we sought to
be prevented is impliedly shared by our President. ... .
xxx xxx xxx
What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to us.
Recalling Madam Roland's famous apostrophe during the French revolution, "O Liberty, what
crimes are committed in thy name", we may dare say, "O JUSTICE, what technicalities are
committed in thy name' or more appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what injustices are committed in
thy name."
xxx xxx xxx
We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses, but who would
correct such abuses considering that yours is a court of last resort. A strong public opinion
must be generated so as to curtail these abuses.
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be found in all courts and
government offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb.
Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court has ever heard our cries for charity,
generosity, fairness, understanding sympathy and for justice; dumb in the sense, that inspite
of our beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why our appeal has been

DENIED, not one word was spoken or given ... We refer to no human defect or ailment in the
above statement. We only describe the. impersonal state of things and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this Court and for
which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what
has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended as our self-imposed
sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to when we must end our self-sacrifice. If we have to
choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and confidence in the members of the Court
but disregard our Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the
members of this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter.
But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended as a
studied disrespect to this Court, let us examine the grain of his grievances.
He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite aware of the
criticisms2 expressed against this Court's practice of rejecting petitions by minute resolutions.
We have been asked to do away with it, to state the facts and the law, and to spell out the
reasons for denial. We have given this suggestion very careful thought. For we know the
abject frustration of a lawyer who tediously collates the facts and for many weary hours
meticulously marshalls his arguments, only to have his efforts rebuffed with a terse
unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however, most petitions rejected by this Court are utterly
frivolous and ought never to have been lodged at all. 3 The rest do exhibit a first-impression
cogency, but fail to, withstand critical scrutiny. By and large, this Court has been generous in
giving due course to petitions for certiorari.
Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition we
reject, we would be unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us by the
Constitution. The proper role of the Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S.
Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide "only those cases which present questions whose
resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved."
Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio
Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:
A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same petition different
reasons may read different justices to the same result ... .
Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even confusing reasons for denying
petitions for certiorari, it has been suggested from time to time that the Court indicate its
reasons for denial. Practical considerations preclude. In order that the Court may be enabled
to discharge its indispensable duties, Congress has placed the control of the Court's business,
in effect, within the Court's discretion. During the last three terms the Court disposed of 260,
217, 224 cases, respectively, on their merits. For the same three terms the Court denied,
respectively, 1,260, 1,105,1,189 petitions calling for discretionary review. If the Court is to do
its work it would not be feasible to give reasons, however brief, for refusing to take these
cases. The tune that would be required is prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as already
indicated different reasons not infrequently move different members of the Court in
concluding that a particular case at a particular time makes review undesirable.
Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G.
8099), this Court, through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered
view on this matter. There, the petitioners counsel urged that a "lack of merit" resolution
violates Section 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief Justice Bengzon:
In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been raised before; and
we held that these "resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above constitutional
requirement. They merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained in view
of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and even ordinary lawyers have all this time

so understood it. It should be remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court
of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to
fully explain the court's denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in
the Court of Appeals' opinion.
By the way, this mode of disposal has as intended helped the Court in alleviating its
heavy docket; it was patterned after the practice of the U.S. Supreme Court, wherein petitions
for review are often merely ordered "dismissed".
We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the Court
of Appeals have had the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons
to buttress such petitions if this Court is to be moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic
that the supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the Court of Appeals is not
intended to give every losing party another hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45
of the Rules of Court which recites:
Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.A review is not a matter of right but of
sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important
reasons therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's
discretion, indicate the character of reasons which will be considered:
(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not theretofore
determined by the Supreme Court, nor has decided it in a way probably not in accord with law
or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court;
(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by the lower court, as to call for the
exercise of the power of supervision.
Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing examination of
the pleadings. and records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the
dismissal of his appeal in the light of the law and applicable decisions of this Court. Far from
straying away from the "accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings," it traced the
procedural lines etched by this Court in a number of decisions. There was, therefore, no need
for this Court to exercise its supervisory power.
As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew
or ought to have known that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the
period of appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse
party (which he did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which
admittedly he did not). This rule was unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs.
Batu Construction & Co., supra:
The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in general by Rule 15,
Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which provides that such notice shall state the time, and
place of hearing and shall be served upon all the Parties concerned at least three days in
advance. And according to Section 6 of the same Rule no motion shall be acted upon by the
court without proof of such notice. Indeed it has been held that in such a case the motion is
nothing but a useless piece of paper (Philippine National Bank v. Damasco, I,18638, Feb. 28,
1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of
Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117). The reason is obvious:
Unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing the Court would have no way to
determine whether that party agrees to or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear
him on his objection, since the Rules themselves do not fix any period within which he may
file his reply or opposition.
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment, he
has only himself to blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal,
which, incidentally, is not a matter of right. To shift away from himself the consequences of his

carelessness, he looked for a "whipping boy." But he made sure that he assumed the posture
of a martyr, and, in offering to surrender his professional certificate, he took the liberty of
vilifying this Court and inflicting his exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It would
thus appear that there is no justification for his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.
Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect
consideration. We know that it is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time
he loses what he sanguinely believes to be a meritorious case. That is why lawyers are given
'wide latitude to differ with, and voice their disapproval of, not only the courts' rulings but,
also the manner in which they are handed down.
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public
officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial
authority,4 or that it is articulated by a lawyer. 5 Such right is especially recognized where the
criticism concerns a concluded litigation,6 because then the court's actuations are thrown
open to public consumption.7 "Our decisions and all our official actions," said the Supreme
Court of Nebraska,8 "are public property, and the press and the people have the undoubted
right to comment on them, criticize and censure them as they see fit. Judicial officers, like
other public servants, must answer for their official actions before the chancery of public
opinion."
The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's integrity,
competence and honesty, with "imminent danger to the administration of justice," is the
reason why courts have been loath to inflict punishment on those who assail their
actuations.9 This danger lurks especially in such a case as this where those who Sit as
members of an entire Court are themselves collectively the aggrieved parties.
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their
actuations. 10 For courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability
into the tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer is expected
not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and
indiscretions of courts and judges. 11
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical evaluation of their
performance. 13 For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in
the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is
expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a
citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of
courts and judges. The reason is that
An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place accorded to him in the
administration of justice, his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair
and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has
always been encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487) .
Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of the bar.
In the prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In written for law
journals he dissects with detachment the doctrinal pronouncements of courts and fearlessly
lays bare for -all to see that flaws and inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS
2d 286). As aptly stated by Chief Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:
No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expansion or publication of
opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They
have the best opportunities for observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in
constant attendance on the courts. ... To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this
subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and
livelihood, by the judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a

position too monstrous to be

entertained. ... .
Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the
right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor
is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which
would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657,
665).
Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat Opportunity to become conversant
with the character and efficiency of our judges. No class is less likely to abuse the privilege, as
no other class has as great an interest in the preservation of an able and upright bench.
(State Board of Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216)
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal the
lips of those in the best position to give advice and who might consider it their duty to speak
disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting
judge may be rehearsed, but as to his demerits there must be profound silence." (State v.
Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill
over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the
One hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate
and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is Such a misconduct
that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere
flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden
more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the
courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity ... to the courts; 14 and the
Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of
justice and judicial officers." 15 The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards
the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial
office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express declaration take
upon themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the
Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and
judicial officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous
demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and
offensive conduct toward judges personally for their judicial acts. (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law.
4d. 647, 652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly
administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers even
those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the judge,
and it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but
discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are
to the effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the
tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering
respectful submission. (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment That is his privilege.
And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his misfortune.
Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may
attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts

are the temples of right. (Per Justice Sanchez in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979.
June 26, 1967)
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney
at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private
conversations or communications 16 or in the course of a political, campaign, 17 if couched in
insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may
subject the attorney to disciplinary action.
Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel precedents.
1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public
criticism of his conduct in office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d
604, 608, nevertheless declared that "any conduct of a lawyer which brings into scorn and
disrepute the administration of justice demands condemnation and the application of
appropriate penalties," adding that:
It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a judge or a court is beyond
bona fide comments and criticisms which do not exceed the bounds of decency and truth or
which are not aimed at. the destruction of public confidence in the judicial system as such.
However, when the likely impairment of the administration of justice the direct product of
false and scandalous accusations then the rule is otherwise.
2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and circulating
a leaflet entitled "JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a municipal judge of having
committed judicial error, of being so prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial on appeal and
of being subject to the control of a group of city officials. As a prefatory statement he wrote:
"They say that Justice is BLIND, but it took Municipal Judge Willard to prove that it is also DEAF
and DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to find that the leaflet went much further than the
accused, as a lawyer, had a right to do.
The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the accused to belittle and besmirch
the court and to bring it into disrepute with the general public.
3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the two-year
suspension of an attorney who published a circular assailing a judge who at that time was a
candidate for re-election to a judicial office. The circular which referred to two decisions of the
judge concluded with a statement that the judge "used his judicial office to enable -said bank
to keep that money." Said the court:
We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to the criticism members
of the bar may make regarding the capacity, impartiality, or integrity of the courts, even
though it extends to the deliberate publication by the attorney capable of correct reasoning of
baseless insinuations against the intelligence and integrity of the highest courts. See State
Board, etc. v. Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex parte
Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In the first case mentioned it was observed, for
instance:
"It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous publication by an attorney, directed
against a judicial officer, could be so vile and of such a nature as to justify the disbarment of
its author."
Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver character than those
made by the respondent here. But, in our view, the better rule is that which requires of those
who are permitted to enjoy the privilege of practicing law the strictest observance at all times
of the principles of truth, honesty and fairness, especially in their criticism of the courts, to the
end that the public confidence in the due administration of justice be upheld, and the dignity
and usefulness of the courts be maintained. In re Collins, 81 Pac. 220.

4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney, representing a
woman who had been granted a divorce, attacked the judge who set aside the decree on bill
of review. He wrote the judge a threatening letter and gave the press the story of a proposed
libel suit against the judge and others. The letter began:
Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that my name is protected
from the libel, lies, and perjury committed in the cases involved, I shall be compelled to resort
to such drastic action as the law allows and the case warrants.
Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly work to
go unchallenged," and said that he was engaged in dealing with men and not irresponsible
political manikins or appearances of men. Ordering the attorney's disbarment, the Supreme
Court of Illinois declared:
... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is proper ground for serious
complaint against a judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer to submit his grievances to the
proper authorities, but the public interest and the administration of the law demand that the
courts should have the confidence and respect of the people. Unjust criticism, insulting
language, and offensive conduct toward the judges personally by attorneys, who are officers
of the court, which tend to bring the courts and the law into disrepute and to destroy public
confidence in their integrity, cannot be permitted. The letter written to the judge was plainly
an attempt to intimidate and influence him in the discharge of judicial functions, and the
bringing of the unauthorized suit, together with the write-up in the Sunday papers, was
intended and calculated to bring the court into disrepute with the public.
5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being
influenced by corruption and greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were
bartered. It does not appear that the attorney had criticized any of the opinions or decisions of
the Court. The lawyer was charged with unprofessional conduct, and was ordered suspended
for a period of two years. The Court said:
A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the authority of the court
against whose members it was made, bring its judgments into contempt, undermine its
influence as an unbiased arbiter of the people's right, and interfere with the administration of
justice. ...
Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the guise of disciplinary
proceedings, deprive him of any part of that freedom of speech which he possesses as a
citizen. The acts and decisions of the courts of this state, in cases that have reached final
determination, are not exempt from fair and honest comment and criticism. It is only when an
attorney transcends the limits of legitimate criticism that he will be held responsible for an
abuse of his liberty of speech. We well understand that an independent bar, as well as
independent court, is always a vigilant defender of civil rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723. 725.
6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for submitting
to an appellate court an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the court from which
the appeal was taken. Such action, the Court said, constitutes unprofessional conduct
justifying suspension from practice, notwithstanding that he fully retracted and withdrew the
statements, and asserted that the affidavit was the result of an impulse caused by what he
considered grave injustice. The Court said:
We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in the profession of
criticising the motives and integrity of judicial officers in the discharge of their duties, and
thereby reflecting on the administration of justice and creating the impression that judicial
action is influenced by corrupt or improper motives. Every attorney of this court, as well as
every other citizen, has the right and it is his duty, to submit charges to the authorities in
whom is vested the power to remove judicial officers for any conduct or act of a judicial officer
that tends to show a violation of his duties, or would justify an inference that he is false to his
trust, or has improperly administered the duties devolved upon him; and such charges to the

tribunal, if based upon reasonable inferences, will be encouraged, and the person making
them
protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a case decided against
him, or the right of the Public generally, to criticise the decisions of the courts, or the reasons
announced for them, the habit of criticising the motives of judicial officers in the performance
of their official duties, when the proceeding is not against the officers whose acts or motives
are criticised, tends to subvert the confidence of the community in the courts of justice and in
the administration of justice; and when such charges are made by officers of the courts, who
are bound by their duty to protect the administration of justice, the attorney making such
charges is guilty of professional misconduct.
7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:
I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring possible temporary
observations more or less vituperative and finally concluded, that, as my clients were
foreigners, it might have been expecting too much to look for a decision in their favor against
a widow residing here.
The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:
... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of propriety and privileged
criticism, but are an unwarranted attack, direct, or by insinuation and innuendo, upon the
motives and integrity of this court, and make out a prima facie case of improper conduct upon
the part of a lawyer who holds a license from this court and who is under oath to demean
himself with all good fidelity to the court as well as to his client.
The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court.
8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a
newspaper an article in which he impugned the motives of the court and its members to try a
case, charging the court of having arbitrarily and for a sinister purpose undertaken to suspend
the writ of habeas corpus. The Court suspended the respondent for 30 days, saying that:
The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most subversive of the public
good, if the conduct of such members does not measure up to the requirements of the law
itself, as well as to the ethics of the profession. ...
The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination is of prime
importance under our system and ideals of government. No right thinking man would concede
for a moment that the best interest to private citizens, as well as to public officials, whether
he labors in a judicial capacity or otherwise, would be served by denying this right of free
speech to any individual. But such right does not have as its corollary that members of the
bar who are sworn to act honestly and honorably both with their client and with the courts
where justice is administered, if administered at all, could ever properly serve their client or
the public good by designedly misstating facts or carelessly asserting the law. Truth and
honesty of purpose by members of the bar in such discussion is necessary. The health of a
municipality is none the less impaired by a polluted water supply than is the health of the
thought of a community toward the judiciary by the filthy wanton, and malignant misuse of
members of the bar of the confidence the public, through its duly established courts, has
reposed in them to deal with the affairs of the private individual, the protection of whose
rights he lends his strength and money to maintain the judiciary. For such conduct on the part
of the members of the bar the law itself demands retribution not the court.
9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by an
attorney in a pending action using in respect to the several judges the terms criminal corrupt,
and wicked conspiracies,," "criminal confederates," "colossal and confident insolence,"
"criminal prosecution," "calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar phrases, was
considered conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar, and the name of the erring lawyer
was ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys.

10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed that
greater latitude should be allowed in case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in
those pending. This lawyer wrote a personal letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
Minnesota impugning both the intelligence and the integrity of the said Chief Justice and his
associates in the decisions of certain appeals in which he had been attorney for the defeated
litigants. The letters were published in a newspaper. One of the letters contained this
paragraph:
You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to it than the burglar to
his plunder. It seems like robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with the court acting as a fence,
or umpire, watchful and vigilant that the widow got no undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions discoverable, short of
assigning to the court emasculated intelligence, or a constipation of morals and faithlessness
to duty? If the state bar association, or a committee chosen from its rank, or the faculty of the
University Law School, aided by the researches of its hundreds of bright, active students, or if
any member of the court, or any other person, can formulate a statement of a correct motive
for the decision, which shall not require fumigation before it is stated, and quarantine after it
is made, it will gratify every right-minded citizen of the state to read it.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six months,
delivered its opinion as follows:
The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional misconduct in sending
to the Chief Justice the letter addressed to him. This was done, as we have found, for the very
purpose of insulting him and the other justices of this court; and the insult was so directed to
the Chief Justice personally because of acts done by him and his associates in their official
capacity. Such a communication, so made, could never subserve any good purpose. Its only
effect in any case would be to gratify the spite of an angry attorney and humiliate the officers
so assailed. It would not and could not ever enlighten the public in regard to their judicial
capacity or integrity. Nor was it an exercise by the accused of any constitutional right, or of
any privilege which any reputable attorney, uninfluenced by passion, could ever have any
occasion or desire to assert. No judicial officer, with due regard to his position, can resent
such an insult otherwise than by methods sanctioned by law; and for any words, oral or
written, however abusive, vile, or indecent, addressed secretly to the judge alone, he can
have no redress in any action triable by a jury. "The sending of a libelous communication or
libelous matter to the person defamed does not constitute an actionable publication." 18 Am.
& Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these respects the sending by the accused of this letter
to the Chief Justice was wholly different from his other acts charged in the accusation, and, as
we have said, wholly different principles are applicable thereto.
The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so far as he exercised the
rights of a citizen, guaranteed by the Constitution and sanctioned by considerations of public
policy, to which reference has been made, he was immune, as we hold, from the penalty here
sought to be enforced. To that extent his rights as a citizen were paramount to the obligation
which he had assumed as an officer of this court. When, however he proceeded and thus
assailed the Chief Justice personally, he exercised no right which the court can recognize, but,
on the contrary, willfully violated his obligation to maintain the respect due to courts and
judicial officers. "This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous
demeanor in open court, but it includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and
offensive conduct toward the judges personally for their official acts." Bradley v. Fisher, 13
Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And there appears to be no distinction, as regards the principle
involved, between the indignity of an assault by an attorney upon a judge, induced by his
official act, and a personal insult for like cause by written or spoken words addressed to the
judge in his chambers or at his home or elsewhere. Either act constitutes misconduct wholly
different from criticism of judicial acts addressed or spoken to others. The distinction made is,
we think entirely logical and well sustained by authority. It was recognized in Ex
parte McLeod supra. While the court in that case, as has been shown, fully sustained the right

of a citizen to criticise rulings of the court in actions which are ended, it held that one might
be summarily punished for assaulting a judicial officer, in that case a commissioner of the
court, for his rulings in a cause wholly concluded. "Is it in the power of any person," said the
court, "by insulting or assaulting the judge because of official acts, if only the assailant
restrains his passion until the judge leaves the building, to compel the judge to forfeit either
his own self-respect to the regard of the people by tame submission to the indignity, or else
set in his own person the evil example of punishing the insult by taking the law in his own
hands? ... No high-minded, manly man would hold judicial office under such conditions."
That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge personally, constitutes
professional delinquency for which a professional punishment may be imposed, has been
directly decided. "An attorney who, after being defeated in a case, wrote a personal letter to
the trial justice, complaining of his conduct and reflecting upon his integrity as a justice, is
guilty of misconduct and will be disciplined by the court." Matter of Manheim 133 App. Div.
136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 The same is held in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City
Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter case it appeared that the accused attorney had addressed a sealed
letter to a justice of the City Court of New York, in which it was stated, in reference to his
decision: "It is not law; neither is it common sense. The result is I have been robbed of 80."
And it was decided that, while such conduct was not a contempt under the state, the matter
should be "called to the attention of the Supreme Court, which has power to discipline the
attorney." "If," says the court, "counsel learned in the law are permitted by writings leveled at
the heads of judges, to charge them with ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with robbery,
either as principals or accessories, it will not be long before the general public may feel that
they may redress their fancied grievances in like manner, and thus the lot of a judge will be
anything but a happy one, and the administration of justice will fall into bad repute."
The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this respect much the same as
the case at bar. The accused, an attorney at law, wrote and mailed a letter to the circuit
judge, which the latter received by due course of mail, at his home, while not holding court,
and which referred in insulting terms to the conduct of the judge in a cause wherein the
accused had been one of the attorneys. For this it was held that the attorney was rightly
disbarred in having "willfully failed to maintain respect due to him [the judge] as a judicial
officer, and thereby breached his oath as an attorney." As recognizing the same principle, and
in support of its application to the facts of this case, we cite the following: Ex parte Bradley, 7
Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark. 149; Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va.
Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7 Colo 237, 244, 3 Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 351; Smith's Appeal,
179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134; Scouten's Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.
Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so far sustained as to make
it our duty to impose such a penalty as may be sufficient lesson to him and a suitable warning
to others. ...
11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18
months for publishing a letter in a newspaper in which he accused a judge of being under the
sinister influence of a gang that had paralyzed him for two years.
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack against
the official acts and decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the attorney
was disbarred for criticising not only the judge, but his decisions in general claiming that the
judge was dishonest in reaching his decisions and unfair in his general conduct of a case.
13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper articles after the trial of
cases, criticising the court in intemperate language. The invariable effect of this sort of
propaganda, said the court, is to breed disrespect for courts and bring the legal profession
into disrepute with the public, for which reason the lawyer was disbarred.
14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a case,
prepared over a period of years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Court

declared that his acts involved such gross moral turpitude as to make him unfit as a member
of the bar. His disbarment was ordered, even though he expressed an intention to resign from
the bar.
The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial
pronouncements is indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers,
critical of the courts and their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which
transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend
to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their integrity and in the
orderly administration of justice, constitute grave professional misconduct which may be
visited with disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme
Court in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of the
morals and ethics of the legal fraternity.
Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted
outbursts of counsel such as those catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases of
comparable nature have generally been disposed of under the power of courts to punish for
contempt which, although resting on different bases and calculated to attain a different end,
nevertheless illustrates that universal abhorrence of such condemnable practices.
A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment.
1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his motion for
reconsideration as "absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to the rigths of the
petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls," this Court,
although conceding that
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client, should
do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so
for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety
and respect which the dignity of the courts requires. The reason for this is that respect for the
courts guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such guaranty, said institution
would be resting on a very shaky foundation,
found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made disclosed
... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional contempt of its
dignity, because the court is thereby charged with no less than having proceeded in utter
disregard of the laws, the rights to the parties, and 'of the untoward consequences, or with
having abused its power and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's
client ... .
2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press Freedom Law,
reaching to, the imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who, invoking said law,
refused to divulge the source of a news item carried in his paper, caused to be published in i
local newspaper a statement expressing his regret "that our High Tribunal has not only
erroneously interpreted said law, but it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency or
narrow mindedness of the majority of its members," and his belief that "In the wake of so
many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last years, ... the only
remedy to put an end to go much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court,"
which tribunal he denounced as "a constant peril to liberty and democracy" and "a far cry
from the impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano,
Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the
Philippine Judiciary." He there also announced that one of the first measures he would
introduce in then forthcoming session of Congress would have for its object the complete
reorganization of the Supreme Court. Finding him in contempt, despite his avowals of good
faith and his invocation of the guarantee of free speech, this Court declared:

But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the press, the
respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which
was then and still is pending consideration by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not
only intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next
Congress, of which he is one of the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing
the number of Justices from eleven, so as to change the members of this Court which decided
the Parazo case, who according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in
order to influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct
the administration of justice. But the respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this
Court for the apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and
degrading the administration. of justice ... .
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately so
many blunders and injustices, that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of Que party
knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in
whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would
tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this Court, and consequently to lower ,or degrade the administration of justice by
this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to
which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their
rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty
and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice
therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and
perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts, Atty.
Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this
Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not
to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the
stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky
foundation.
Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that
... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his
conduct and communication to the courts; he may be removed from office or stricken from
the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A. [N.S.], 586, 594.)
3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al.,
supra, where counsel charged this Court with having "repeatedly fallen" into ,the pitfall of
blindly adhering to its previous "erroneous" pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on
jurisdiction" of the Court of Industrial Relations, our condemnation of counsel's misconduct
was unequivocal. Articulating the sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed:
As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for
reconsideration, implications there are which inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of one
pitfall into which this Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the Court of
Industrial Relations comes into question. That pitfall is the tendency of this Court to rely on its
own pronouncements in disregard of the law on jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge that
the decisions of this Court, blindly adhere to earlier rulings without as much as making any
reference to and analysis of the pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction of the industrial
court. The plain import of all these is that this Court is so patently inept that in determining
the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it has committed error and continuously repeated that
error to the point of perpetuation. It pictures this Court as one which refuses to hew to the line
drawn by the law on jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is that the
pronouncements of this Court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are not entitled to
respect. Those statements detract much from the dignity of and respect due this Court. They
bring into question the capability of the members and some former members of this Court

to render justice. The second paragraph quoted yields a tone of sarcasm which counsel
labelled as "so called" the "rule against splitting of jurisdiction."
Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases
of brevity, need not now be reviewed in detail.

18

which, in the interest

Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases all of them involved
contumacious statements made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So that, in line with the
doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked only against
scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending case and not
after the conclusion thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would now seek to sidestep the thrust of a
contempt charge by his studied emphasis that the remarks for which he is now called upon to
account were made only after this Court had written finis to his appeal. This is of no moment.
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has lost much of its
vitality. For sometime, this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a
modification thereof, however, came when, in People vs. Alarcon, 20 the then Chief Justice
Manuel V. Moran dissented with the holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P.
Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted to. A complete disengagement from the settled
rule was later to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a contempt proceeding, where the editor of the
Manila Guardian was adjudged in contempt for publishing an editorial which asserted that the
1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a farcical manner after the question of the validity
of the said examinations had been resolved and the case closed. Virtually, this was an
adoption of the view expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent in Alarcon to the effect
that them may still be contempt by publication even after a case has been terminated. Said
Chief Justice Moran in Alarcon:
A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in
administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt which is
'summarily punishable by courts. A publication which tends to degrade the courts and to
destroy public confidence in them or that which tends to bring them in any way into disrepute,
constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is equally punishable by courts. What is sought, in
the first kind of contempt, to be shielded against the influence of newspaper comments, is the
all-important duty of the courts to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the
second kind of contempt, the punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate the courts from
any act or conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy public confidence in
them. In the first there is no contempt where there is no action pending, as there is no
decision which might in any way be influenced by the newspaper publication. In the second,
the contempt exists, with or without a pending case, as what is sought to be protected is the
court itself and its dignity. Courts would lose their utility if public confidence in them is
destroyed.
Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his statements
and actuations now under consideration were made only after the judgment in his client's
appeal had attained finality. He could as much be liable for contempt therefor as if it had been
perpetrated during the pendency of the said appeal.
More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for contempt
for such post litigation utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the tenor of our
Resolution of November 17, 1967, we have confronted the situation here presented solely in
so far as it concerns Atty. Almacen's professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his
fitness as an officer of this Court, in the exercise of the disciplinary power the morals inherent
in our authority and duty to safeguard and ethics of the legal profession and to preserve its
ranks from the intrusions of unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In
this inquiry, the pendency or non-pendency of a case in court is altogether of no
consequence. The sole objective of this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal
profession, by removing or suspending a member whose misconduct has proved himself unfit

to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an
attorney.
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, 22 our is the
solemn duty, amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of law.
Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from the
practice of law those who have proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in the
Bar. Thus
The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent and incidental
power in courts of record, and one which is essential to an orderly discharge of judicial
functions. To deny its existence is equivalent to a declaration that the conduct of attorneys
towards courts and clients is not subject to restraint. Such a view is without support in any
respectable authority, and cannot be tolerated. Any court having the right to admit attorneys
to practice and in this state that power is vested in this court-has the inherent right, in the
exercise of a sound judicial discretion to exclude them from practice. 23
This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all that he
is worthy of their confidence and respect. So much so that
... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust
and confidence of the public and of the courts, it becomes, not only the right, but the duty, of
the court which made him one of its officers, and gave him the privilege of ministering within
its bar, to withdraw the privilege. Therefore it is almost universally held that both the
admission and disbarment of attorneys are judicial acts, and that one is admitted to the bar
and exercises his functions as an attorney, not as a matter of right, but as a privilege
conditioned on his own behavior and the exercise of a just and sound judicial discretion. 24
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a mere
inherent or incidental power. It has been elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of
Court. 25
Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make an
assessment of whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question
are properly the object of disciplinary sanctions.
The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on Atty.
Almacen's part. Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond
making the mere offer, however, he went farther. In haughty and coarse language, he actually
availed of the said move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade against this Court. The integrated
entirety of his petition bristles with vile insults all calculated to drive home his contempt for
and disrespect to the Court and its members. Picturing his client as "a sacrificial victim at the
altar of hypocrisy," he categorically denounces the justice administered by this Court to be
not only blind "but also deaf and dumb." With unmitigated acerbity, he virtually makes this
Court and its members with verbal talons, imputing to the Court the perpetration of "silent
injustices" and "short-cut justice" while at the same time branding its members as "calloused
to pleas of justice." And, true to his announced threat to argue the cause of his client "in the
people's forum," he caused the publication in the papers of an account of his actuations, in a
calculated effort ;to startle the public, stir up public indignation and disrespect toward the
Court. Called upon to make an explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no apology.
Instead, with characteristic arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks
and, alluding to the Scriptures, virtually tarred and feathered the Court and its members as
inveterate hypocrites incapable of administering justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary
sanctions upon him.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation
speaks for itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far
transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate criticism. They could never serve any purpose
but to gratify the spite of an irate attorney, attract public attention to himself and, more

important of all, bring ;this Court and its members into disrepute and destroy public
confidence in them to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Odium of this
character and texture presents no redeeming feature, and completely negates any pretense
of passionate commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less than a classic example of gross
misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the Canons of
Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our
disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.
We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any other
Government entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not be, above criticism.
But a critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high function as
the court of last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means
synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities
approached only through constant striving to attain them. Any criticism of the Court must,
possess the quality of judiciousness and must be informed -by perspective and infused by
philosophy. 26
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in ;the premises,
that, as Atty. Almacen would have appear, the members of the Court are the "complainants,
prosecutors and judges" all rolled up into one in this instance. This is an utter
misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but
also of our role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis.
Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not and does not involve a trial
of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its
officers. 27 Not being intended to. inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein It may be initiated by the
Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as
such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member
of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of
justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to
the office of an attorney. 29 In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a
complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade
against the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual
members thereof. But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity
separate and distinct from the individual personalities of its members. Consistently with the
intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual members act not as such individuals but.
only as a duly constituted court. Their distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of their
office. 30 So that, in a very real sense, if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it can
only be the Court itself, not the individual members thereof as well as the people
themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at grave
hazard should the administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men
unfit to discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of
the power to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested
exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally
renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. 31 So that even if it be conceded that the
members collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and
cannot disqualify them from the exercise of that power because public policy demands that
they., acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which call for disciplinary action. The

present is such a case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of the
personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.
Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be visited
upon Atty. Almacen for his transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court, these may
range from mere suspension to total removal or disbarment. 32 The discretion to assess under
the circumstances the imposable sanction is, of course, primarily addressed to the sound
discretion of the Court which, being neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal
animosity or prejudice, should ever be controlled by the imperative need that the purity and
independence of the Bar be scrupulously guarded and the dignity of and respect due to the
Court be zealously maintained.
That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be
overemphasized. However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be
decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may
not perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will
realize that abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an advocate and that in every
effervescence of candor there is ample room for the added glow of respect, it is our view that
suspension will suffice under the circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in his
misconduct by neither manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefor leave us no way
of determining how long that suspension should last and, accordingly, we are impelled to
decree that the same should be indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone because
jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter 33 but also because, even without the
comforting support of precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude
a person from the practice of law, there is no reason why indefinite suspension, which is lesser
in degree and effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the compass of that authority. The
merit of this choice is best shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to
determine for himself how long or how short that suspension shall last. For, at any time after
the suspension becomes effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to
resume the practice of law.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is
hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect
immediately.
Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and
the Court of Appeals for their information and guidance.

4. [G.R. No. 112869. January 29, 1996]

KELLY R. WICKER and ATTY. ORLANDO A. RAYOS, petitioners, vs. HON. PAUL T.
ARCANGEL, as Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 134, respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari, assailing the orders dated December 3, 1993 and December
17, 1993 of respondent Judge Paul T. Arcangel of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 134 of
Makati, finding petitioners guilty of direct contempt and sentencing each of them to suffer
imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of P100.00.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Kelly Wicker, with his wife Wynee Dieppe and the Tectonics Asia Architects and Engineering
Co., brought suit in the Regional Trial Court of Makati against the LFS Enterprises, Inc. and
others, for the annulment of certain deeds by which a house and lot at Forbes Park, which the
plaintiffs claimed they had purchased, was allegedly fraudulently titled in the name of the

defendant LFS Enterprises and later sold by the latter to codefendant Jose Poe. The case,
docketed as Civil Case No. 14048, was assigned to Branch 134 formerly presided over by
Judge Ignacio Capulong who later was replaced by respondent Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
It appears that on November 18, 1993, Wickers counsel, Atty. Orlando A. Rayos, filed a motion
seeking the inhibition of respondent judge from the consideration of the case. [1] The motion
alleged in pertinent part:
1. That before the Acting Presiding Judge took over, defendant LFS Enterprises, Inc. was able
to maneuver the three (3) successive postponements for the presentation for crossexamination of Mrs. Remedios Porcuna on her 10 August 1992 Affidavit, but eventually, she
was not presented;
2. Meantime, Judge [Ignacio] Capulong who had full grasp of this case was eased out of his
station. In one hearing, the Acting Presiding Judge had not yet reported to his station and in
that set hearing, counsel for defendant LFS Enterprises, Inc. who must have known that His
Honor was not reporting did not likewise appear while other counsels were present;
3. Plaintiffs have information that the Acting Presiding Judge was personally recruited from the
south by Atty. Benjamin Santos and/or his wife, Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos, one time member
of the Judicial and Bar Council, against whom plaintiff Kelly R. Wicker filed Administrative Case
No. 3796, and although said case was dismissed, nevertheless, plaintiffs feel that it was the
reason for Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos relief;
4. Plaintiffs have reason to doubt the partiality and integrity of His Honor and to give a
fighting chance for plaintiffs to prove their case, since this will be the last case to recover the
partnership property, plaintiffs feel that His Honor inhibit himself and set this case for reraffle;
5. This move finds support in the Rules of Court and jurisprudence that in the first instance
that a litigant doubts the partiality and integrity of the Presiding Judge, he should immediately
move for his inhibition.
The motion was verified by Kelly Wicker.
Considering the allegations to be malicious, derogatory and contemptuous, respondent judge
ordered both counsel and client to appear before him on November 26, 1993 and to show
cause why they should not be cited for contempt of court. [2]
In a pleading entitled Opposition to and/or Comment to Motion to Cite for Direct Contempt
Directed Against Plaintiff Kelly R. Wicker and his Counsel, Atty. Rayos claimed that the
allegations in the motion did not necessarily express his views because he merely signed the
motion in a representative capacity, in other words, just lawyering, for Kelly Wicker, who said
in a note to him that a young man possibly employed by the Court had advised him to have
the case reraffled, when the opposing counsel Atty. Benjamin Santos and the new judge both
failed to come for a hearing, because their absence was an indication that Atty. Santos knew
who the judge may be and when he would appear. Wickers sense of disquiet increased when
at the next two hearings, the new judge as well as Atty. Santos and the latters witness, Mrs.
Remedios Porcuna, were all absent, while the other counsels were present. [3]
Finding petitioners explanation unsatisfactory, respondent judge, in an order dated December
3, 1993, held them guilty of direct contempt and sentenced each to suffer imprisonment for
five (5) days and to pay a fine of P100.00.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which respondent judge denied for lack of merit
in his order of December 17, 1993. In the same order respondent judge directed petitioners to
appear before him on January 7, 1994 at 8:30 a.m. for the execution of their sentence.
In their petition[4] before this Court, Kelly Wicker and Atty. Orlando A. Rayos contend that
respondent judge committed a grave abuse of his discretion in citing them for contempt. They

argue that when a person, impelled by justifiable apprehension and acting in a respectful
manner, asks a judge to inhibit himself from hearing his case, he does not thereby become
guilty of contempt.
In his comment,[5] respondent judge alleges that he took over as Acting Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134 by virtue of Administrative Order No. 154-93 dated
September 2, 1993 of this Court and not because, as petitioners alleged, he was personally
recruited from the South by Atty. Santos and/or his wife, Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos; that he
assumed his new office on October 11, 1993 and started holding sessions on October 18,
1993; that when all male personnel of his court were presented to petitioner Kelly Wicker he
failed to pick out the young man who was the alleged source of the remarks prompting the
filing of the motion for inhibition; that he was not vindictive and that he in fact refrained from
implementing the execution of his order dated December 3, 1993 to enable petitioners to
avail themselves of all possible remedies; that after holding petitioners in contempt, he issued
an order dated December 8, 1993 inhibiting himself from trying Civil Case No. 14048; that
Atty. Rayos claim that he was just lawyering and acting as the vehicle or mouthpiece of his
client is untenable because his (Atty. Rayos) duties to the court are more important than those
which he owes to his client; and that by tendering their profuse apologies in their motion for
reconsideration of the December 3, 1993 order, petitioners acknowledged the falsity of their
accusations against him; and that the petitioners have taken inconsistent positions as to who
should try Civil Case No. 14048 because in their Motion for Inhibition dated November 18,
1993 they asked that the case be reraffled to another sala of the RTC of Makati, while in their
petition dated November 29, 1993, which they filed with the Office of Court Administrator,
petitioners asked that Judge Capulong be allowed to continue hearing the case on the ground
that he had a full grasp of the case.
In reply to the last allegation of respondent judge, petitioners claim that although they wanted
a reraffle of the case, it was upon the suggestion of respondent judge himself that they filed
the petition with the Court Administrator for the retention of Judge Capulong in the case.
What is involved in this case is an instance of direct contempt, since it involves a pleading
allegedly containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements submitted to the court or
judge in which the proceedings are pending, as distinguished from a pleading filed in another
case. The former has been held to be equivalent to misbehavior committed in the presence of
or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the proceedings before the same within the
meaning of Rule 71, 1 of the Rules of Court and, therefore, direct contempt. [6]
It is important to point out this distinction because in case of indirect or constructive
contempt, the contemnor may be punished only [a]fter charge in writing has been filed, and
an opportunity given to the accused to be heard by himself or counsel, whereas in case of
direct contempt, the respondent may be summarily adjudged in contempt. Moreover, the
judgment in cases of indirect contempt is appealable, whereas in cases of direct contempt
only judgments of contempt by MTCs, MCTCs and MeTCs are appealable. [7]
Consequently, it was unnecessary in this case for respondent judge to hold a hearing. Hence
even if petitioners are right about the nature of the case against them by contending that it
involves indirect contempt, they have no ground for complaint since they were afforded a
hearing before they were held guilty of contempt. What is important to determine now is
whether respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in holding petitioners liable
for direct contempt.
We begin with the words of Justice Malcolm that the power to punish for contempt is to be
exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should it
be invoked to preserve that respect without which the administration of justice will fail. [8] The
contempt power ought not to be utilized for the purpose of merely satisfying an inclination to
strike back at a party for showing less than full respect for the dignity of the court. [9]

Consistent with the foregoing principles and based on the abovementioned facts, the Court
sustains Judge Arcangels finding that petitioners are guilty of contempt. A reading of the
allegations in petitioners motion for inhibition, particularly the following paragraphs thereof:
2. Meantime, Judge Capulong who had full grasp of this case was eased out of his station. In
one hearing, the Acting Presiding Judge had not yet reported to his station and in that set
hearing, counsel for defendant LFS Enterprises, Inc. who must have known that His Honor was
not reporting did not likewise appear while other counsels were present;
3. Plaintiffs have information that the Acting Presiding Judge was personally recruited from the
south by Atty. Benjamin Santos and/or his wife, Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos, one time member
of the Judicial and Bar Council, against whom plaintiff Kelly R. Wicker filed Administrative Case
No. 3796, and although said case was dismissed, nevertheless, plaintiffs feel that it was the
reason for Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos relief;
leads to no other conclusion than that respondent judge was beholden to the opposing
counsel in the case, Atty. Benjamin Santos, to whom or to whose wife, the judge owed his
transfer to the RTC of Makati, which necessitated easing out the former judge to make room
for such transfer.
These allegations are derogatory to the integrity and honor of respondent judge and
constitute an unwarranted criticism of the administration of justice in this country. They
suggest that lawyers, if they are well connected, can manipulate the assignment of judges to
their advantage. The truth is that the assignments of Judges Arcangel and Capulong were
made by this Court, by virtue of Administrative Order No. 154-93, precisely in the interest of
an efficient administration of justice and pursuant to Sec. 5 (3), Art. VIII of the Constitution.
[10]
This is a matter of record which could have easily been verified by Atty. Rayos. After all, as
he claims, he deliberated for two months whether or not to file the offending motion for
inhibition as his client allegedly asked him to do.
In extenuation of his own liability, Atty. Rayos claims he merely did what he had been bidden
to do by his client of whom he was merely a mouthpiece. He was just lawyering and he cannot
be gagged, even if the allegations in the motion for the inhibition which he prepared and filed
were false since it was his client who verified the same.
To be sure, what Wicker said in his note to Atty. Rayos was that he had been told by an
unidentified young man, whom he thought to be employed in the court, that it seemed the
opposing counsel, Atty. Santos, knew who the replacement judge was, because Atty. Santos
did not show up in court on the same days the new judge failed to come. It would, therefore,
appear that the other allegations in the motion that respondent judge had been personally
recruited by the opposing counsel to replace Judge Capulong who had been eased out were
Atty. Rayos and not Wickers. Atty. Rayos is thus understating his part in the preparation of the
motion for inhibition.
Atty. Rayos, however, cannot evade responsibility for the allegations in question. As a lawyer,
he is not just an instrument of his client. His client came to him for professional assistance in
the representation of a cause, and while he owed him whole-souled devotion, there were
bounds set by his responsibility as a lawyer which he could not overstep.[11] Even a hired gun
cannot be excused for what Atty. Rayos stated in the motion. Based on Canon 11 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Rayos bears as much responsibility for the contemptuous
allegations in the motion for inhibition as his client.
Atty. Rayos duty to the courts is not secondary to that of his client. The Code of Professional
Responsibility enjoins him to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and [to] insist on similar conduct by others[12] and not [to] attribute to a Judge
motives not supported by the record or have materiality to the case. [13]
After the respondent judge had favorably responded to petitioners profuse apologies and
indicated that he would let them off with a fine, without any jail sentence, petitioners served

on respondent judge a copy of their instant petition which prayed in part that Respondent
Judge Paul T. Arcangel be REVERTED to his former station. He simply cannot do in the RTC of
Makati where more complex cases are heared (sic) unlike in Davao City. If nothing else, this
personal attack on the judge only serves to confirm the contumacious attitude, a flouting or
arrogant belligerence first evident in petitioners motion for inhibition belying their
protestations of good faith.
Petitioners cite the following statement in Austria v. Masaquel:[14]
Numerous cages there have been where judges, and even members of the Supreme Court,
were asked to inhibit themselves from trying, or from participating in the consideration of a
case, but scarcely were the movants punished for contempt, even if the grounds upon which
they based their motions for disqualification are not among those provided in the rules. It is
only when there was direct imputation of bias or prejudice, or a stubborn insistence to
disqualify the judge, done in a malicious, arrogant, belligerent and disrespectful manner, that
movants were held in contempt of court.
It is the second sentence rather than the first that applies to this case.
Be that as it may, the Court believes that consistent with the rule that the power to cite for
contempt must be exercised for preservative rather than vindictive principle we think that the
jail sentence on petitioners may be dispensed with while vindicating the dignity of the
court. In the case of petitioner Kelly Wicker there is greater reason for doing so considering
that the particularly offending allegations in the motion for inhibition do not appear to have
come from him but were additions made by Atty. Rayos. In addition, Wicker is advanced in
years (80) and in failing health (suffering from angina), a fact Judge Arcangel does not
dispute. Wicker may have indeed been the recipient of such a remark although he could not
point a court employee who was the source of the same. At least he had the grace to admit
his mistake both as to the source and truth of said information. It is noteworthy Judge
Arcangel was also willing to waive the imposition of the jail sentence on petitioners until he
came upon petitioners description of him in the instant petition as a judge who cannot make
the grade in the RTC of Makati, where complex cases are being filed. In response to this, he
cited the fact that the Integrated Bar of the Philippines chose him as one of the most
outstanding City Judges and Regional Trial Court Judges in 1979 and 1988 respectively and
that he is a 1963 graduate of the U.P. College of Law.
In Ceniza v. Sebastian,[15] which likewise involved a motion for inhibition which described the
judge corrupt, the Court, while finding counsel guilty of direct contempt, removed the jail
sentence of 10 days imposed by the trial court for the reason that
Here, while the words were contumacious, it is hard to resist the conclusion, considering the
background of this occurrence that respondent Judge in imposing the ten-day sentence was
not duly mindful of the exacting standard [of] preservation of the dignity of his office not
indulging his sense of grievance sets the limits of the authority he is entitled to exercise. It is
the view of the Court that under the circumstances the fine imposed should be increased to
P500.00.
The same justification also holds true in this case.
WHEREFORE, the order of December 3, 1993 is MODIFIED by DELETING the sentence of
imprisonment for five (5) days and INCREASING the fine from P 100.00 to P200.00 for each of
the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

5. Re: Letter of the UP Law

Faculty entitled Restoring
Integrity: A Statement by
the Faculty of the
University of the
Philippines College of Law
on the Allegations of
Plagiarism and
Misrepresentation in the
Supreme Court

A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC

June 7, 2011

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

For disposition of the Court are the following:
(a)
the Motion for Reconsideration[1] dated April 1, 2011 filed by respondent University of
the Philippines (UP) law professors Tristan A. Catindig and Carina C. Laforteza; and
(b)
the Manifestation[2] dated April 1, 2011 filed by respondents Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
and Prof. Theodore O. Te.
In support of their Motion for Reconsideration, Professors Catindig and Laforteza relied on the
following grounds:

GROUNDS
A.
THIS PROCEEDING, WHILE OSTENSIBLY DOCKETED AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MATTER, IS PREMISED ON A FINDING OF INDIRECT CONTEMPT. ACCORDINGLY, WITH ALL DUE
RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENTS BREACHED
THEIR ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS WITHOUT OBSERVANCE OF THE DUE PROCESS SAFEGUARDS
GUARANTEED IN AN INDIRECT CONTEMPT PROCEEDING.
B.
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT (1) THE
PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION ISSUES IN THE VINUYA CASE AND IN A.M. NO. 10-7-17SC HAVE NO RELATION TO THE RESTORING INTEGRITY STATEMENT AND THE SHOW CAUSE
RESOLUTION, AND THEREFORE (2) THE RESPONDENTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ACCESS AND
ADDRESS THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN A.M. NO. 10-7-17-SC, TO PRESENT THEIR OWN
EVIDENCE IN RESPECT OF THE PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION ISSUES, AND TO
SUPPORT THEIR RESPONSE TO THE SHOW CAUSE RESOLUTION WITH SUCH EVIDENCE.
C.
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
RESPONDENTS ARE IN BREACH OF THEIR ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS FOR HAVING ISSUED
THE RESTORING INTEGRITY STATEMENT.[3]

In their Motion for Reconsideration, respondents pray that (a) the Courts Decision dated March
8, 2011 be reconsidered and set aside and the respondents Compliance dated November 18,
2010 be deemed satisfactory, and (b) the Court expunge the reference in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC

to the respondents (i.e., joined by some faculty members of the University of the Philippines
school of law) effectively finding them guilty of making false charges against Associate Justice
Mariano C. del Castillo (Justice Del Castillo). In the alternative, they pray that they be afforded
their full rights to due process and provided the full opportunity to present evidence on the
matters subject of the Show Cause Resolution dated October 19, 2010. [4]
Anent the first ground, Professors Catindig and Laforteza insist that, notwithstanding the
docketing of this matter as an administrative case, there was purportedly a findingthat
respondents were guilty of indirect contempt in view of (1) the mention made in the Show
Cause Resolution dated October 19, 2010 of In re Kelly,[5] a case involving a contempt charge;
and (2) the references to respondents contumacious language or contumacious speech and
conduct and to several authorities which dealt with contempt proceedings in the Decision
dated March 8, 2011.
The shallowness of such argument is all too easily revealed. It is true that contumacious
speech and conduct directed against the courts done by any person, whether or not a
member of the Bar, may be considered as indirect contempt under Rule 71, Section 3 of the
Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a charge in writing
has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such
period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of
any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
xxxx
(d)
Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice.
A charge of indirect contempt, if proven in due proceedings, carry with it penal sanctions such
as imprisonment or a fine or both.[6]
The very same contumacious speech or conduct directed against a court or judicial officer, if
committed by a member of the Bar, may likewise subject the offender to disciplinary
proceedings under the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prescribes that lawyers
observe and promote due respect for the courts. [7] In such disciplinary cases, the sanctions are
not penal but administrative such as, disbarment, suspension, reprimand or admonition.
Contrary to Professors Catindig and Lafortezas theory, what established jurisprudence tells us
is that the same incident of contumacious speech and/or behavior directed against the Court
on the part of a lawyer may be punishable either as contempt or an ethical violation, or
both in the discretion of the Court.
In Salcedo v. Hernandez,[8] for the same act of filing in court a pleading with intemperate and
offensive statements, the concerned lawyer was found guilty of contempt andliable
administratively. For this reason, two separate penalties were imposed upon him, a fine (for
the contempt charge) and reprimand (for his failure to observe his lawyerly duty to give due
respect to the Court).
The full case title[9] of In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen[10] and the sanction imposed
indubitably show that the proceeding involved therein was disciplinary. Notwithstanding the
fact that the Court in Almacen adverted to a few principles and authorities involving contempt
proceedings aside from jurisprudence on ethical responsibilities of lawyers, Atty. Almacen was
only meted out an administrative sanction (indefinite suspension from the practice of law) and
no penal sanction was imposed upon him. Indeed, in Almacen,the Court explicitly stated that
whether or not respondent lawyer could be held liable for contempt for his utterances and
actuations was immaterial as the sole issue in his disciplinary case concerns his professional
identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of the Court. [11]

Conversely, In re Vicente Sotto[12] was purely a contempt proceeding. Nonetheless, the Court
in that case saw fit to remind Atty. Sotto that:
As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in
duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity
according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions,
which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation. [13]
Atty. Sotto was expressly found liable only for contempt and accordingly fined the amount
of P1,000.00 payable within 15 days from promulgation of judgment. The unmistakable
reference to Atty. Sottos failure to observe his ethical duties as a lawyer did not convert the
action against him into a disciplinary proceeding. In fact, part of the disposition of the case
was to require Atty. Sotto to show cause, within the same period given for the payment of the
fine, why he should not be disbarred for his contemptuous statements against the Court
published in a newspaper.
Similar to Salcedo, Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan[14] involved both contempt and disciplinary
proceedings for the lawyers act of making public statements to the media that were offensive
and disrespectful of the Court and its members relating to matters that were sub judice. This
was evident in the May 2, 1988 Resolution of the Court which required respondent lawyer to
explain in writing within ten (10) days from notice hereof, why he should not be punished for
contempt of court and/or subjected to administrative sanctions. [15] In Zaldivar, however,
although the Court found that respondents act constituted both contempt and gross
misconduct as a member of the Bar, he was only administratively sanctioned with an
indefinite suspension from the practice of law.
The lesson imparted by the foregoing authorities is that, when the Court initiates contempt
proceedings and/or disciplinary proceedings against lawyers for intemperate and discourteous
language and behavior directed at the courts, the evil sought to be prevented is the same the
degradation of the courts and the loss of trust in the administration of justice. For this reason,
it is not unusual for the Court to cite authorities on bar discipline (involving the duty to give
due respect to the courts) in contempt cases against lawyers and vice versa.
Thus, when the Court chooses to institute an administrative case against a respondent lawyer,
the mere citation or discussion in the orders or decision in the administrative case of
jurisprudence involving contempt proceedings does not transform the action from a
disciplinary proceeding to one for contempt. Respondents contrary position in their motion for
reconsideration is bereft of any rational merit. Had this Court opted to cite respondents for
contempt of court, which is punishable by imprisonment or fine, this Court would have
initiated contempt proceedings in accordance with the Rules of Court. Clearly, the Court did
not opt to do so. We cannot see why respondents would stubbornly cling to the notion that
they were being cited for indirect contempt under the Show Cause Resolution when there is
no basis for such belief other than their own apparent misreading of the same.
With respect to the second ground offered for reconsideration of the Decision dated March 8,
2011, respondents continue to insist on their theory, previously expounded in their
Compliance, that the evidence and proceedings in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC was relevant to their
own administrative case and thus, it was necessary for them to be granted access to the
evidence and records of that case in order to prove their own defenses in the present
case. The Decision already debunked at length the theory that if respondents are able to
prove the bases for their well founded concerns regarding the plagiarism charge against
Justice Del Castillo, then they would be exonerated of the administrative charges against
them. It bears repeating here that what respondents have been required to explain was their
contumacious, intemperate and irresponsible language and/or conduct in the issuance of
the Restoring Integrity Statement, which most certainly cannot be justified by a belief, wellfounded or not, that Justice Del Castillo and/or his legal researcher committed plagiarism.

To dispel respondents misconception once and for all, it should be stressed that this Court did
not call the attention of respondents for having an opinion contrary to that of the Court in the
plagiarism case against Justice Del Castillo. Notably, even their co-respondent Prof. Raul T.
Vasquez stood fast on his opinion regarding the plagiarism issue. Still, he was able to simply
relate to this Court how he came to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement and candidly
conceded that he may have failed to assess the effect of the language of the Statement. This
straightforward and honest explanation was found satisfactory despite the lack of reference to
the evidence in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC or the holding of any formal trial-type evidentiary
hearing, which respondents know fully well was not mandatory in administrative
proceedings. This circumstance belied respondents justification for seeking access to the
evidence and records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC and their assertion that they have in any way
been denied their due process rights. For the same reason that A.M. 10-7-17-SC and the
present case are independent of each other, a passing mention of respondent law professors
in the Resolution dated February 8, 2011 in A.M. 10-7-17-SC is not proof that this Court has
found respondents guilty of falsely accusing Justice Del Castillo of plagiarism nor is it any
prejudgment of the present case. For if so, no one would be exonerated or none of the
compliances would be found satisfactory in this administrative case. Again, the case of Prof.
Vasquez confirms that this Court duly considered respondents submissions in this case before
coming to a decision.
To buttress their third ground for reconsideration, respondents mainly contend that the Court
erred in taking the emphatic language in the Statement in isolation from the other statements
evidencing the good intentions of respondents and calling for constructive action. Again,
these arguments have been substantially addressed in the Decision dated March 8, 2011 and
there is no need to belabor these points here. Suffice it to say that respondents avowed noble
motives have been given due weight and factored in the determination of the action taken
with respect to submissions of respondents.
In all, the Court finds that respondent Professors Catindig and Laforteza have offered no
substantial arguments to warrant a reconsideration of the Decision dated March 8, 2011 nor
to justify the grant of the reliefs prayed for in their motion.
As for the Manifestation dated April 1, 2011, Dean Leonen and Professor Te alleged that they
support the Motion for Reconsideration which was filed by Respondents Professors Tristan
Catindig and Caren Laforteza on April 1, 2011. The rest of the assertions therein are mere
restatements of arguments previously proffered in respondents compliances and have been
extensively taken up in the Decision dated March 8, 2011.
Since the Manifestation, apart from being an expression of support for Professors Catindig and
Lafortezas motion for reconsideration, did not raise any new matter nor pray for any
affirmative relief, the Court resolves to merely note the same.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby RESOLVES to (a) DENY the Motion for
Reconsideration dated April 1, 2011 filed by respondent Professors Tristan A. Catindig and
Carina C. Laforteza; and (b) NOTE the Manifestation dated April 1, 2011 filed by Dean Marvic
M.V.F. Leonen and Professor Theodore O. Te.
SO ORDERED.

6. [A.C. No. 5054. May 29, 2002]

SOLEDAD NUEZ, Represented by ANANIAS B. CO, Attorney-in-Fact for
Complainant, petitioner, vs. ATTY. ROMULO RICAFORT, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:

This is an administrative complaint filed on 21 April 1999 by Soledad Nuez, a septuagenarian

represented by her attorney-in-fact Ananias B. Co, Jr., seeking the disbarment of respondent
Atty. Romulo Ricafort on the ground of grave misconduct.
From the documents submitted by the complainant, it appears that sometime in October 1982
she authorized respondent to sell her two parcels of land located in Legazpi City for P40,000.
She agreed to give respondent 10 percent of the price as commission. Respondent succeeded
in selling the lots, but despite complainants repeated demands, he did not turn over to her
the proceeds of the sale. This forced complainant to file against respondent and his wife an
action for a sum of money before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-93-15052.
For his failure to file an answer, respondent was declared in default and complainant was
required to present ex-parte her evidence. On 29 September 1993, the court rendered its
decision (Annex C of the Complaint) ordering respondent herein to pay complainant the sum
of P16,000 as principal obligation, with interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of the
commencement of the action, i.e., 8 March 1993, until it is fully paid, and to pay the costs of
suit.
Respondent and his wife appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals. However, the
appeal was dismissed for failure to pay the required docket fee within the reglementary period
despite notice.
On 23 October 1995 complainant filed in Civil Case No. Q-93-15052 a motion for the issuance
of an alias writ of execution, which the court granted on 30 October 1995. The next day, the
alias writ of execution was issued (Annex B of Complaint). It appears that only a partial
satisfaction of the P16,000 judgment was made, leaving P13,800 thereof unsatisfied. In
payment for the latter, respondent issued four postdated checks drawn against his account in
China Banking Corporation, Legazpi City.
Upon presentment, however, the checks were dishonored because the account against which
they were drawn was closed (Annexes D and E of Complaint). Demands for respondent to
make good the checks fell on deaf ears, thus forcing complainant to file four criminal
complaints for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City
(Annexes F, G, H and I of the Complaint).
In the Joint Affidavit of respondent and his wife filed with the Office of the Prosecutor, Quezon
City, respondent admitted having drawn and issued said four postdated checks in favor of
complainant. Allegedly believing in good faith that said checks had already been encashed by
complainant, he subsequently closed his checking account in China Banking Corporation,
Legazpi City, from which said four checks were drawn. He was not notified that the checks
were dishonored. Had he been notified, he would have made the necessary arrangements
with the bank.
We required respondent to comment on the complaint. But he never did despite our favorable
action on his three motions for extension of time to file the comment. His failure to do so
compelled complainant to file on 10 March 2000 a motion to cite respondent in contempt on
the ground that his strategy to file piecemeal motions for extension of time to submit the
comment smacks of a delaying tactic scheme that is unworthy of a member of the bar and a
law dean.
In our resolution of 14 June 2000, we noted the motion for contempt; considered respondent
to have waived the filing of a comment; and referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippine (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation or decision within ninety days
from notice of the resolution.
In her Report and Recommendation dated 12 September 2000, Investigating Commissioner
Atty. Milagros V. San Juan concluded that respondent had no intention to honor the money
judgment against him in Civil Case No. Q-93-15052 as can be gleaned from his (1) issuance of

postdated checks; (2) closing of the account against which said checks were drawn; and (3)
continued failure to make good the amounts of the checks. She then recommends that
respondent be declared guilty of misconduct in his dealings with complainant and be
suspended from the practice of law for at least one year and pay the amount of the checks
issued to the complainant.
In its Resolution No. XV-2001-244 of 27 October 2001, the Board of Governors of the IBP
approved and adopted Atty. San Juans Report and Recommendation.
We concur with the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as adopted and approved by
the Board of Governors of the IBP, that respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort is guilty of grave
misconduct in his dealings with complainant. Indeed, the record shows respondents grave
misconduct and notorious dishonesty.
There is no need to stretch ones imagination to arrive at an inevitable conclusion that
respondent gravely abused the confidence that complainant reposed in him and committed
dishonesty when he did not turn over the proceeds of the sale of her property. Worse, with
palpable bad faith, he compelled the complainant to go to court for the recovery of the
proceeds of the sale and, in the process, to spend money, time and energy therefor. Then,
despite his deliberate failure to answer the complaint resulting in his having been declared in
default, he appealed from the judgment to the Court of Appeals. Again, bad faith attended
such a step because he did not pay the docket fee despite notice. Needless to state,
respondent wanted to prolong the travails and agony of the complainant and to enjoy the
fruits of what rightfully belongs to the latter. Unsatisfied with what he had already unjustly
and unlawfully done to complainant, respondent issued checks to satisfy the alias writ of
execution. But, remaining unrepentant of what he had done and in continued pursuit of a
clearly malicious plan not to pay complainant of what had been validly and lawfully adjudged
by the court against him, respondent closed the account against which the checks were
drawn. There was deceit in this. Respondent never had the intention of paying his obligation
as proved by the fact that despite the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, he did not
pay the obligation.
All the foregoing constituted grave and gross misconduct in blatant violation of Rule 1:01 of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.
Respondents claim of good faith in closing his account because he thought complainant has
already encashed all checks is preposterous. The account was closed on or before 26 February
1996. He knew that there were still other checks due on 29 February 1996 and 15 March 1996
which could not be encashed before their maturity dates.
By violating Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent
diminished public confidence in the law and the lawyers (Busios v. Ricafort, 283 SCRA 407
[1997]; Ducat v. Villalon, 337 SCRA 622 [2000]). Instead of promoting such confidence and
respect, he miserably failed to live up to the standards of the legal profession (Gonato v.
Adaza, 328 SCRA 694 [2000]; Ducat v. Villalon, supra).
Respondents act of issuing bad checks in satisfaction of the alias writ of execution for money
judgment rendered by the trial court was a clear attempt to defeat the ends of justice. His
failure to make good the checks despite demands and the criminal cases for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 showed his continued defiance of judicial processes, which he, as an officer of the
court, was under continuing duty to uphold.
To further demonstrate his very low regard for the courts and judicial processes, respondent
even had the temerity of making a mockery of our generosity to him. We granted his three
motions for extension of time to file his comment on the complaint in this case. Yet, not only
did he fail to file the comment, he as well did not even bother to explain such failure
notwithstanding our resolution declaring him as having waived the filing of the comment. To

the Highest Court of the land, respondent openly showed a high degree of irresponsibility
amounting to willful disobedience to its lawful orders (Thermochem Incorporated v. Naval, 344
SCRA 76, 82 [2000]; Sipin-Nabor v. Atty. Baterina, Adm. Case No. 4073, 28 June 2001).
Respondent then knowingly and willfully violated Rules 12.04 and 12:03 of Canon 12 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide that lawyers should avoid any
action that would unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court
processes; and that lawyers, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda
or briefs, should not let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an
explanation for their failure to do so.
The penalty of suspension for at least one (1) year imposed by the Board of Governors of the
IBP is both vague and inadequate. A suspension may either be indefinite or for a specific
duration. Besides, under the circumstances of this case a suspension for a year is plainly very
light and inadequate. For his deliberate violation or defiance of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and
Rules 12:03 and 12:04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, coupled with his
palpable bad faith and dishonesty in his dealings with the complainant, respondent deserves
a graver penalty. That graver penalty is indefinite suspension from the practice of law.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort is hereby INDEFINITELY
SUSPENDED from the practice of law, and is directed to pay complainant Soledad Nuez the
amount of P13,800 within ten (10) days from notice of this resolution.
This resolution shall take effect immediately. Copies thereof shall be furnished the Office of
the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents personal record; the Office of the President;
the Department of Justice; the Court of Appeals; the Sandiganbayan; and the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines. The Court Administrator shall also furnish all lower courts with copies of this
Resolution.
SO ORDERED.

7. A.C. No. 6252

JONAR SANTIAGO, Complainant,
Atty. EDISON V. RAFANAN,Respondent. October 5, 2004

PANGANIBAN, J.:
Notaries public are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties, which
are impressed with public interest. They are enjoined to comply faithfully with the solemnities
and requirements of the Notarial Law. This Court will not hesitate to mete out appropriate
sanctions to those who violate it or neglect observance thereof.
The Case and the Facts
Before us is a verified Complaint[1] filed by Jonar Santiago, an employee of the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology (BJMP), for the disbarment of Atty. Edison V. Rafanan. The
Complaint was filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) on January 16, 2001. It charged Atty. Rafanan with deceit; malpractice or
other gross misconduct in office under Section 27 of Rule 138 [2] of the Rules of Court; and
violation of Canons 1.01, 1.02 and 1.03[3], Canon 5[4], and Canons 12.07[5] and 12.08
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
In his Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid Jr. summarized the
allegations of the complainant in this wise:

x x x. In his Letter-Complaint, Complainant alleged, among others, that Respondent in

notarizing several documents on different dates failed and/or refused to: a)make the proper
notation regarding the cedula or community tax certificate of the affiants; b) enter the details
of the notarized documents in the notarial register; and c) make and execute the certification
and enter his PTR and IBP numbers in the documents he had notarized, all in violation of the
notarial provisions of the Revised Administrative Code.
Complainant likewise alleged that Respondent executed an Affidavit in favor of his client and
offered the same as evidence in the case wherein he was actively representing his
client. Finally, Complainant alleges that on a certain date, Respondent accompanied by
several persons waited for Complainant after the hearing and after confronting the latter
disarmed him of his sidearm and thereafter uttered insulting words and veiled threats. [6]
On March 23, 2001, pursuant to the January 19, 2001 Order of the CBD,Atty. Rafanan filed his
verified Answer.[8] He admitted having administered the oath to the affiants whose Affidavits
were attached to the verified Complaint. He believed, however, that the non-notation of their
Residence Certificates in the Affidavits and the Counter-affidavits was allowed.
He opined that the notation of residence certificates applied only to documents acknowledged
by a notary public and was not mandatory for affidavits related to cases pending before
courts and other government offices. He pointed out that in the latter, the affidavits, which
were sworn to before government prosecutors, did not have to indicate the residence
certificates of the affiants. Neither did other notaries public in Nueva Ecija -- some of whom
were older practitioners -- indicate the affiants residence certificates on the documents they
notarized, or have entries in their notarial register for these documents.
As to his alleged failure to comply with the certification required by Section 3 of Rule 112 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure, respondent explained that as counsel of the affiants, he had
the option to comply or not with the certification. To nullify the Affidavits, it was complainant
who was duty-bound to bring the said noncompliance to the attention of the prosecutor
conducting the preliminary investigation.
As to his alleged violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR, respondent argued that lawyers could
testify on behalf of their clients on substantial matters, in cases where [their] testimony is
essential to the ends of justice. Complainant charged respondents clients with attempted
murder. Respondent averred that since they were in his house when the alleged crime
occurred, his testimony is very essential to the ends of justice.
Respondent alleged that it was complainant who had threatened and harassed his clients
after the hearing of their case by the provincial prosecutor on January 4, 2001. Respondent
requested the assistance of the Cabanatuan City Police the following day, January 5, 2001,
which was the next scheduled hearing, to avoid a repetition of the incident and to allay the
fears of his clients. In support of his allegations, he submitted Certifications from the
Cabanatuan City Police and the Joint Affidavit of the two police officers who had assisted
them.
Lastly, he contended that the case had been initiated for no other purpose than to harass him,
because he was the counsel of Barangay Captain Ernesto Ramos in the cases filed by the
latter before the ombudsman and the BJMP against complainant.
After receipt of respondents Answer, the CBD, through Commissioner Tyrone R. Cimafranca,
set the case for hearing on June 5, 2001, at two oclock in the afternoon. Notices[12] of the
hearing were sent to the parties by registered mail. On the scheduled date and time of the
hearing, only complainant appeared.Respondent was unable to do so, apparently because he
had received the Notice only on June 8, 2001.[13] The hearing was reset to July 3, 2001 at two
oclock in the afternoon.

On the same day, June 5, 2001, complainant filed his Reply[14] to the verified Answer of
respondent. The latters Rejoinder was received by the CBD on July 13, 2001.[15] It also
received complainants Letter-Request[16] to dispense with the hearings. Accordingly, it
granted that request in its Order[17] dated July 24, 2001, issued through Commissioner
Cimafranca. It thereby directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within
fifteen days from receipt of the Order, after which the case was to be deemed submitted for
resolution.
The CBD received complainants Memorandum[18] on September 26, 2001. Respondent did
not file any.
The IBPs Recommendation
On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2003172[19] approving and adopting the Investigating Commissioners Report that respondent had
violated specific requirements of the Notarial Law on the execution of a certification, the entry
of such certification in the notarial register, and the indication of the affiants residence
certificate. The IBP Board of Governors found his excuse for the violations unacceptable. It
modified, however, the recommendation[20] of the investigating commissioner by increasing
the fine to P3,000 with a warning that any repetition of the violation will be dealt with a
heavier penalty.
The other charges -- violation of Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; and Canons 1.01
to 1.03, 12.07 and 12.08 of the CPR -- were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.
Respondents Administrative Liability
Violation of the Notarial Law
The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are required
to certify that the party to every document acknowledged before them has presented the
proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and to enter its number,
place of issue and date as part of such certification. [21] They are also required to maintain and
keep a notarial register; to enter therein all instruments notarized by them; and to give to
each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before [them] a number corresponding
to the one in [their] register [and to state therein] the page or pages of [their] register, on
which the same is recorded.[22] Failure to perform these duties would result in the revocation of
their commission as notaries public.[23]
These formalities are mandatory and cannot be simply neglected, considering the degree of
importance and evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents. Notaries public entering
into their commissions are presumed to be aware of these elementary requirements.
In Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,[24] the Court explained the value and meaning of notarization as
follows:
The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. Notarization is
not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such
that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization
converts a private document into a public document thus making that document admissible in
evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full
faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be
able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private
instrument.

For this reason, notaries public should not take for granted the solemn duties pertaining to
their office. Slipshod methods in their performance of the notarial act are never to be
countenanced. They are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties,
[25]
which are dictated by public policy and are impressed with public interest.
It is clear from the pleadings before us -- and respondent has readily admitted -- that he
violated the Notarial Law by failing to enter in the documents notations of the residence
certificate, as well as the entry number and the pages of the notarial registry.
Respondent believes, however, that noncompliance with those requirements is not
mandatory for affidavits relative to cases pending before the courts and government
agencies. He points to similar practices of older notaries in Nueva Ecija.
We cannot give credence to, much less honor, his claim. His belief that the requirements do
not apply to affidavits is patently irrelevant. No law dispenses with these formalities. Au
contraire, the Notarial Law makes no qualification or exception. It is appalling and inexcusable
that he did away with the basics of notarial procedure allegedly because others were doing
so. Being swayed by the bad example of others is not an acceptable justification for breaking
the law.
We note further that the documents attached to the verified Complaint are the Joint CounterAffidavit of respondents clients Ernesto Ramos and Rey Geronimo, as well as their witnesses
Affidavits relative to Criminal Case No. 69-2000 for attempted murder, filed by complainants
brother against the aforementioned clients. These documents became the basis of the
present Complaint.
As correctly pointed out by the investigating commissioner, Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure expressly requires respondent as notary -- in the absence of any fiscal,
state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer the oath -- to certify that he
has personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed
and understood their affidavits. Respondent failed to do so with respect to the subject
Affidavits and Counter-Affidavits in the belief that -- as counsel for the affiants -- he was not
required to comply with the certification requirement.
It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for the law and legal processes. [26] They are expected to be in the forefront in
the observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it the obligation to
be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent
enactments and jurisprudence. [27] It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal
principles.Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge
competently and diligently their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may become
susceptible to committing mistakes.
Where notaries public are lawyers, a graver responsibility is placed upon them by reason of
their solemn oath to obey the laws. [28] No custom or age-old practice provides sufficient
excuse or justification for their failure to adhere to the provisions of the law. In this case, the
excuse given by respondent exhibited his clear ignorance of the Notarial Law, the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, and the importance of his office as a notary public.
Nonetheless, we do not agree with complainants plea to disbar respondent from the practice
of law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. [29] Disbarment will be
imposed as a penalty only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing
and the character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Where any
lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be decreed.
[30]
Considering the nature of the infraction and the absence of deceit on the part of
respondent, we believe that the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors is a
sufficient disciplinary measure in this case.

Lawyer as Witness for Client

Complainant further faults respondent for executing before Prosecutor Leonardo Padolina an
affidavit corroborating the defense of alibi proffered by respondents clients, allegedly in
violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR: A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client.
Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the CPR states:
Rule 12.08 A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client, except:
a)
on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an
instrument and the like;
b)
on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of
justice, in which event he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to another
counsel.

Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer is not disqualified from being a witness, [31] except only
in certain cases pertaining to privileged communication arising from an attorney-client
relationship.[32]
The reason behind such rule is the difficulty posed upon lawyers by the task of dissociating
their relation to their clients as witnesses from that as advocates. Witnesses are expected to
tell the facts as they recall them. In contradistinction, advocates are partisans -- those who
actively plead and defend the cause of others. It is difficult to distinguish the fairness and
impartiality of a disinterested witness from the zeal of an advocate. The question is one of
propriety rather than of competency of the lawyers who testify for their clients.
Acting or appearing to act in the double capacity of lawyer and witness for the client will
provoke unkind criticism and leave many people to suspect the truthfulness of the lawyer
because they cannot believe the lawyer as disinterested. The people will have a plausible
reason for thinking, and if their sympathies are against the lawyers client, they will have an
opportunity, not likely to be neglected, for charging, that as a witness he fortified it with his
own testimony. The testimony of the lawyer becomes doubted and is looked upon as partial
and untruthful.[33]
Thus, although the law does not forbid lawyers from being witnesses and at the same time
counsels for a cause, the preference is for them to refrain from testifying as witnesses, unless
they absolutely have to; and should they do so, to withdraw from active management of the
case.
Notwithstanding this guideline and the existence of the Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan in
favor of his clients, we cannot hastily make him administratively liable for the following
reasons:
First, we consider it the duty of a lawyer to assert every remedy and defense that is
authorized by law for the benefit of the client, especially in a criminal action in which the
latters life and liberty are at stake.[35] It is the fundamental right of the accused to be afforded
full opportunity to rebut the charges against them. They are entitled to suggest all those
reasonable doubts that may arise from the evidence as to their guilt; and to ensure that if
they are convicted, such conviction is according to law.
Having undertaken the defense of the accused, respondent, as defense counsel, was thus
expected to spare no effort to save his clients from a wrong conviction. He had the duty to
present -- by all fair and honorable means -- every defense and mitigating circumstance that
the law permitted, to the end that his clients would not be deprived of life, liberty or property,
except by due process of law.[36]

The Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan was clearly necessary for the defense of his clients,
since it pointed out the fact that on the alleged date and time of the incident, his clients were
at his residence and could not have possibly committed the crime charged against
them. Notably, in his Affidavit, complainant does not dispute the statements of respondent or
suggest the falsity of its contents.
Second, paragraph (b) of Rule 12.08 contemplates a situation in which lawyers give their
testimonies during the trial. In this instance, the Affidavit was submitted during the
preliminary investigation which, as such, was merely inquisitorial. [37] Not being a trial of the
case on the merits, a preliminary investigation has the oft-repeated purposes of securing
innocent persons against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions; protecting them from
open and public accusations of crime and from the trouble as well as expense and anxiety of a
public trial; and protecting the State from useless and expensive prosecutions. [38]The
investigation is advisedly called preliminary, as it is yet to be followed by the trial proper.
Nonetheless, we deem it important to stress and remind respondent to refrain from accepting
employment in any matter in which he knows or has reason to believe that he may be an
essential witness for the prospective client. Furthermore, in future cases in which his
testimony may become essential to serve the ends of justice, the canons of the profession
require him to withdraw from the active prosecution of these cases.

No Proof of Harassment
The charge that respondent harassed complainant and uttered insulting words and veiled
threats is not supported by evidence. Allegation is never equivalent to proof, and a bare
charge cannot be equated with liability. [39] It is not the self-serving claim of complainant but
the version of respondent that is more credible, considering that the latters allegations are
corroborated by the Affidavits of the police officers and the Certifications of the Cabanatuan
City Police.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edison V. Rafanan is found guilty of violating the Notarial Law and Canon 5
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby FINED P3,000 with a warning that
similar infractions in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

8. A.M. No. 1769 June 8, 1992

CESAR L. LANTORIA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. IRINEO L. BUNYI, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Cesar L. Lantoria, seeking disciplinary action
against respondent Irineo L. Bunyi, member of the Philippine Bar, on the ground that
respondent Bunyi allegedly committed acts of "graft and corruption, dishonesty and conduct
unbecoming of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and corruption of the judge
and bribery", in connection with respondent's handling of Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 then
pending before the Municipal Court of Experanza, Agusan del Sur, presided over by Municipal
Judge Vicente Galicia 1 in which respondent Bunyi was the counsel of one of the parties,
namely, Mrs. Constancia Mascarinas.
Respondent Bunyi alleged that Mrs. Constancia M. Mascarinas of Manila was the owner of d
farm located in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, and that herein complainant Lantoria was the

manager and supervisor of said farm, receiving as such a monthly allowance. 2 It appears that
the complaint in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 sought to eject the squatters from the
aforementioned farm. 3 These cases were assigned to the Municipal Court of Esperanza,
Agusan del Bur, the acting municipal judge of which was the Honorable Vicente Galicia (who
was at the same time the regular judge of the municipal court of Bayugan, Agusan del
Sur). 4 The defendants in the mentioned civil cases were, in due course, declared in default.
In relation to the same three (3) civil cases, the records of the present case show that
complainant Lantoria wrote a letter to respondent Bunyi, dated 23 April 1974, which reads as
follows:
Butuan City
23 April 1974
Atty. Ireneo Bunye
928 Rizal Avenue
Santa Cruz, Manila
Dear Atty. Bunye:
xxx xxx xxx
Upon informing him of your willingness to prepare the corresponding judgements (sic) on the
3 defaulted cases he said he has no objection in fact he is happy and recommended that you
mail the said decisions in due time thru me to be delivered to him.
xxx xxx xxx
I will communicate with you from time to time for any future development.
My best regards to you and family and to Mrs. Constancia Mascarinas and all.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) CESAR L LANTORIA
Major Inf PC (ret)
Executive Director 5
On 01 June 1974, respondent Bunyi wrote to the complainant regarding the said three (3)
cases, in this wise:
June 1, 1974
Dear Major Lantoria,
At last, I may say that I have tried my best to respond to the call in your several letters
received, which is about the preparation of the three (3) Decisions awaited by Judge Galicia.
The delay is that I have been too much occupied with my cases and other professional
commitments here in Manila and nearby provinces. Not only to Mrs. Mascarinas I would say
that I am so sorry but also to you. Mrs. Mascarinas has been reminding me but I always find
myself at a loss to prepare these Decisions at an early date sa (sic) possible. So also with my
calendar as to the dates for the next hearing of the remaining cases over there.
Herewith now, you will find enclosed the three (3) Decisions against the (3) defaulted
defendants. I am not sure if they will suit to satisfy Judge Galicia to sign them at once.
However, it is my request to Judge Galicia, thru your kind mediation, that if the preparation of
these Decisions do not suit his consideration, then I am ready and willing to accept his
suggestions or correction to charge or modify them for the better. And to this effect, kindly
relay at once what he is going to say or thinks if he signs them readily and please request for
each copy for our hold.
xxx xxx xxx

Please excuse this delay, and thanks for your kind assistance in attending to our cases there.
Regards to you and family and prayer for your more vigor and success.
Brotherly yours,
(SGD.) IRINEO L. BUNYI
Counsel

It also appears that respondent Bunyi wrote an earlier letter to complainant Lantoria, dated 04
March 1974, the contents of which read as follows:
928 Rizal Ave., Sta. Cruz, Manila
March 4, 1974
Dear Major Lantoria,
This is an additional request, strictly personal and confidential. Inside the envelope addressed
to Judge Vicente C. Galicia, are the Decisions and Orders, which he told me to prepare and he
is going to sign them. If you please, deliver the envelope to him as if you have no knowledge
and information and that you have not opened it. Unless, of course, if the information comes
from him. But, you can inquire from him if there is a need to wait from his words about them,
or copies to be furnished me, after he signs them, it could be made thru you personally, to
expedite receiving those copies for our hold. According to him, this envelope could be
delivered to him at his residence at No. 345 M. Calo St., Butuan City, during week end. or, at
Bayugan if you happen to go there, if he is not in Butuan City.
Thanking You for your kind attention and favor.
Truly yours,
(SGD.) L. BUNYI

Three years after, that is, on 11 April 1977, complainant filed with this Court the present
administrative case against respondent Bunyi, predicated mainly on the above-quoted three
(3) letters dated 04 March, 23 April and 01 June, 1974. Complainant contends that respondent
won the said three (3) cases because to (respondent) was the one who unethically prepared
the decisions rendered therein, and that the preparation by respondent of said decisions
warranted disciplinary action against him.
By way of answer to the complaint, respondent, in a motion to dismiss 8 the administrative
complaint, admitted the existence of the letter of 01 June 1974, but explained the contents
thereof as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
b) In the second place, the said letter of June 1, 1974, is self-explanatory and speaks for itself,
that if ever the same was written by the Respondent, it was due to the insistence of the
Complainant thru his several letters received, that the decisions in question be drafted or
prepared for Judge Galicia, who considered such preparation as a big help to him, because he
was at that time holding two (2) salas one as being the regular Municipal Judge of Bayugan
and the other, as the acting Judge of Esperanza, both of Agusan del Sur, with many pending
cases and it was to the benefit of the Complainant that the early disposition of the cases
involved would not suffer inconsiderable delay. But, the intention to draft or prepare the
decisions in question was never spawned by the Respondent. Instead, it came from the understanding between the Judge and the complainant who, from his several letters, had
demonstrated so much interest to eject at once the squatters from the farm he was entrusted
to manage. Furthermore, the Complainant's conclusion that the said decisions were lutong
macao is purely non-sense as it is without any factual or legal basis. He himself knew that
Judge Galicia asked for help in the drafting of said decisions as at any rate they were
judgments by default, the defendants lost their standing in court when they were declared in

default for failure to file their answers and to appear at the place and time set for hearing
thereof (See first paragraph, letter of June 1, 1974)
c) Thirdly, in the same letter, the decisions as prepared were in the form of drafts, as in fact,
the letter mentioned subject to suggestion or correction to change or modify for the better by
Judge Galicia (Second paragraph, Ibid);
d) Fourthly, in the some letter, Responding (sic) even apologized for the delay in sending the
same to the Complainant and expressed his gratitude for his assistance in attending to the
cases involved (Last paragraph, Ibid.)
In its resolution dated 28 November 1977, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor General
for investigation, report and recommendation. 9 On 21 July 1980, the Solicitor General
submitted his report to the Court, with the following averments, to wit: 1) that the case was
set for hearing on April 12, September 29, and December 18, 1978, but in all said scheduled
hearings only respondent Bunyi appeared; 2) that in the hearing of 16 January 1979, both
respondent and complainant appeared; 3) that at the same hearing, the Solicitor General
reported the following development
Atty. Mercado submitted a letter of complainant dated January 16, 1979 sworn to before the
investigating Solicitor, praying that the complaint be considered withdrawn, dropped or
dismissed on the ground that complainant "could hardly substantiate" his charges and that he
is "no longer interested to prosecute" the same. For his part, respondent manifested that he
has no objection to the withdrawal of the complaint against him. At the same time, he
presented complainant Lantoria as a witness are elicited testimony to the effect that
complainant no longer has in his possession the original of the letters attached to his basic
complaint, and hence, he was not prepared to prove his charges. 10 (emphasis supplied)
In his aforesaid report, the Solicitor General found as follows: a) that the letters of respondent
Bunyi (dated 4, March and 1 June 1974), addressed to complainant, showed that respondent
had indeed prepared the draft of the decisions in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 of the
Municipal Court of Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, which he submitted to Judge Vicente Galicia
thru the complainant; b) that those letters indicated that respondent had previous
communications with Judge Galicia regarding the preparation of the decisions; c) that the
testimony of complainant to the effect that he had lost the original of said letters, and
complainant's withdrawal of the complaint in the case at bar are of no moment, as respondent
Bunyi, and his motion to dismiss filed with the Supreme Court, admitted that he prepared the
draft of the decisions in the said civil cases, and be affirmed the existence of the letters.
Hence, in his report, the Solicitor General found that respondent is guilty of highly unethical
and unprofessional conduct for failure to perform his duty, as an officer of the court, to help
promote the independence of the judiciary and to refrain from engaging in acts which would
influence judicial determination of a litigation in which he is counsel. 11 The Solicitor General
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year. He filed with the Court the corresponding complaint against respondent.
In his answer 12 to the complaint filed by the Solicitor General, respondent manifested that in
the future he would be more careful in observing his duties as a lawyer, and in upholding the
provisions of the canons of professional ethics.
On 10 December 1980, the date set by this Court for the hearing of this case, the hearing was
postponed until further notice. On 9 March 1981, respondent filed a manifestation 13 alleging
that no hearing was as yet set in the case since the last setting on 10 December 1980, and he
requested that the next hearing be not set until after six (6) months when be expected to
return from the United States of America where he would visit his children and at the same
time have a medical check-up.
On 28 October 1981, the date set by this Court for bearing in this case, respondent Bunyi and
the Solicitor General appeared, and respondent was directed to submit his memorandum.

Respondent Bunyi filed his memorandum on 16 November 1981. In said

memorandum, 14 respondent submitted that although he prepared the draft of the decisions in
the civil cases, he did not offer Judge Galicia any gift or consideration to influence the Judge in
allowing him to prepare the draft decisions. 15 He also offered his apology to the Court for all
the improprieties which may have resulted from his preparation of the draft decisions.
We agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the determination of the merits of
the instant case should proceed notwithstanding complainant's withdrawal of his complaint in
the case, the respondent himself having admitted that the letters in question truly exist, and
that he even asked for an apology from the Court, for whatever effects such letters may have
had on his duty as a lawyer.
With the admission by respondent of the existence of the letters upon which the present
administrative complaint is based, the remaining issue to be resolved is the effect of the acts
complained of on respondent's duty both as a lawyer and an officer of the Court.
We find merit in the recommendation of the Solicitor General that respondent, by way of
disciplinary action, deserves suspension from the practice of law.
The subject letters indeed indicate that respondent had previous communication with Judge
Galicia regarding the preparation of the draft decisions in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83, and 88, and
which he in fact prepared. Although nothing in the records would show that respondent got
the trial court judge's consent to the said preparation for a favor or consideration, the acts of
respondent nevertheless amount to conduct unbecoming of a lawyer and an officer of the
Court.
Clearly, respondent violated Canon No. 3 of the Canons of Professional Ethics (which were
enforced at the time respondent committed the acts admitted by him), which provides as
follows:
3. Attempts to exert personal influence on the court
Marked attention and unusual hospitality on the part of a lawyer to a judge, uncalled for by
the personal relations of the parties, subject both the judge and the lawyer to
misconstructions of motive and should be avoided. A lawyer should not communicate or argue
privately with the judge as to the merits of a pending cause and deserves rebuke and
denunciation for any device or attempt to gain from a judge special personal consideration or
favor. A self-respecting independence in the discharge of professional duty, without denial or
diminution of the courtesy and respect due the judge's station, is the only proper foundation
for cordial personal and official relations between bench and bar.
In the new Code of Professional Responsibility 16 a lawyer's attempt to influence the court is
rebuked, as shown in Canon No. 13 and Rule 13.01, which read:
CANON 13 A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety
which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.
Rule 13.01 A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek
opportunity for, cultivating familiarity with judges.
Therefore, this Court finds respondent guilty of unethical practice in attempting to influence
the court where he had pending civil case. 17
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Irineo L. Bunyi is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of one (1) year from the date of notice hereof. Let this decision be entered in the
bar records of the respondent and the Court Administrator is directed to inform the different
courts of this suspension.
SO ORDERED.

9. [G.R. No. 159486-88. November 25, 2003]

PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN [SPECIAL DIVISION], HON. MINITA CHICO-NAZARIO, HON.
EDILBERTO SANDOVAL, HON. TERESITA LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On 23 September 2003, this Court issued its resolution in the above-numbered case; it read:
The case for consideration has been brought to this Court via a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by Joseph Ejercito Estrada, acting through his counsel
Attorney Alan F. Paguia, against the Sandiganbayan, et al. The Petition prays
1. That Chief Justice Davide and the rest of the members of the Honorable Court disqualify
themselves from hearing and deciding this petition;
2. That the assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan be vacated and set aside; and
3. That Criminal Cases No. 26558, No. 26565 and No. 26905 pending before the
Sandiganbayan be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Attorney Alan F. Paguia, speaking for petitioner, asserts that the inhibition of the members of
the Supreme Court from hearing the petition is called for under Rule 5.10 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct prohibiting justices or judges from participating in any partisan political
activity which proscription, according to him, the justices have violated by attending the EDSA
2 Rally and by authorizing the assumption of Vice-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to the
Presidency in violation of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that the justices have
thereby prejudged a case that would assail the legality of the act taken by President Arroyo.
The subsequent decision of the Court in Estrada v. Arroyo (353 SCRA 452 and 356 SCRA 108)
is, petitioner states, a patent mockery of justice and due process.
Attorney Paguia first made his appearance for petitioner when he filed an Omnibus Motion on
19 May 2003, before the Sandiganbayan, asking that the appointment of counsels de
officio (sic) be declared functus officio and that, being the now counsel de parte, he be
notified of all subsequent proceedings in Criminal Cases No. 26558, No. 26565 and No. 26905
pending therein. Finally, Attorney Paguia asked that all the foregoing criminal cases against
his client be dismissed.
During the hearing of the Omnibus Motion on 30 May 2003, petitioner presented to the court
several portions of the book, entitled Reforming the Judiciary, written by Justice Artemio
Panganiban, to be part of the evidence for the defense. On 9 June 2003, petitioner filed a
motion pleading, among other things, that
a) x x x President Estrada be granted the opportunity to prove the truth of the statements
contained in Justice Artemio Panganibans book, REFORMING THE JUDICIARY, in relation to the
prejudgment committed by the Supreme Court justices against President Estrada in the
subject case/s of Estrada v. Arroyo, 353 SCRA 452 and 356 SCRA 108; and,
b) A subpoena ad testificandum and duces tecum be issued to Justice Artemio Panganiban,
Justice Antonio Carpio, Justice Renato Corona, Secretary Angelo Reyes of the Department of
National Defense, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., and
Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. for them to testify and bring whatever supporting documents
they may have in relation to their direct and indirect participation in the proclamation of Vice
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on January 20, 2001, as cited in the book of Justice
Panganiban, including the material events that led to that proclamation and the ruling/s in
the Estrada vs. Arroyo, supra. (Rollo, pp. 6-7.)

The truth referred to in paragraph a) of the relief sought in the motion of petitioner pertains to
what he claims should have been included in the resolution of the Sandiganbayan; viz:
The request of the movant is simply for the Court to include in its Joint Resolution the TRUTH
of the acts of Chief Justice Davide, et al., last January 20, 2001 in:
a) going to EDSA 2;
b) authorizing the proclamation of Vice-President Arroyo as President on the ground of
permanent disability even without proof of compliance with the corresponding constitutional
conditions, e.g., written declaration by either the President or majority of his cabinet; and
c) actually proclaiming Vice-President Arroyo on that same ground of permanent disability.
It is patently unreasonable for the Court to refuse to include these material facts which are
obviously undeniable. Besides, it is the only defense of President Estrada. (Petition, Rollo, pp.
13-14.)
On 2 July 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued an order denying the foregoing motion, as well as
the motion to dismiss, filed by petitioner. Forthwith, petitioner filed a Mosyong
Pangrekonsiderasyon of the foregoing order. According to Attorney Paguia, during the hearing
of his Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon on 11 June 2003, the three justices of the Special
Division of the Sandiganbayan made manifest their bias and partiality against his client. Thus,
he averred, Presiding Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario supposedly employed foul and
disrespectful language when she blurted out, Magmumukha naman kaming gago, (Rollo, p.
13.) and Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro characterized the motion as insignificant even
before the prosecution could file its comments or opposition thereto, (Rollo, p. 12.) remarking
in open court that to grant Estradas motion would result in chaos and
disorder. (Ibid.) Prompted by the alleged bias and partial attitude of the Sandiganbayan
justices, Attorney Paguia filed, on 14 July 2003, a motion for their disqualification. On 31 July
2003, petitioner received the two assailed resolutions, i.e., the resolution (Promulgated on 30
July 2003.) of 28 July 2003, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration of 6 July 2003; viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused-movant Joseph Ejercito Estradas Mosyong
Pangrekonsiderasyon (Na tumutukoy sa Joint Resolution ng Hulyo 2, 2003) dated July 6,
2003 is DENIED for lack of merit. (Rollo, p. 37.)
and the resolution (Promulgated on 30 July 2003.) of 25 July 2003, denying petitioners motion
for disqualification of 14 July 2003; viz:
WHEREFORE, prescinding from all the foregoing, the Court, for want of merit, hereby DENIES
the Motion for Disqualification. (Rollo, p. 48.)
The instant petition assailing the foregoing orders must be DISMISSED for gross insufficiency
in substance and for utter lack of merit. The Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of
discretion, an indispensable requirement to warrant a recourse to the extraordinary relief of
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. On the one hand,
petitioner would disclaim the authority and jurisdiction of the members of this tribunal and, on
the other hand, he would elevate the petition now before it to challenge the two resolutions of
the Sandiganbayan. He denounces the decision as being a patent mockery of justice and due
process. Attorney Pagula went on to state thatThe act of the public officer, if LAWFUL, is the act of the public office. But the act of the public
officer, if UNLAWFUL, is not the act of the public office. Consequently, the act of the justices, if
LAWFUL, is the act of the Supreme Court. But the act of the justices, if UNLAWFUL, is not the
act of the Supreme Court. It is submitted that the Decision in ESTRADA vs. ARROYO being
patently unlawful in view of Rule 5.10 of the CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, is not the act of the
Supreme Court but is merely the wrong or trespass of those individual Justices who falsely
spoke and acted in the name of the Supreme Court. (Urbano vs. Chavez, 183 SCRA [347]).

Furthermore, it would seem absurd to allow the Justices to use the name of the Supreme Court
as a shield for their UNLAWFUL act. (Petition, Rollo, p. 11.)
Criticism or comment made in good faith on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or
unsoundness, of a decision of the Court would be welcome for, if well-founded, such reaction
can enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed. (In Re Sotto,
82 Phil 595.)
The ruling in Estrada v. Arroyo, being a final judgment, has long put to end any question
pertaining to the legality of the ascension of Arroyo into the presidency. By reviving the issue
on the validity of the assumption of Mme. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to the presidency, Attorney
Paguia is vainly seeking to breathe life into the carcass of a long dead issue.
Attorney Paguia has not limited his discussions to the merits of his clients case within the
judicial forum; indeed, he has repeated his assault on the Court in both broadcast and print
media. Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a member of the bar
from making such public statements on any pending case tending to arouse public opinion for
or against a party. By his acts, Attorney Paguia may have stoked the fires of public dissension
and posed a potentially dangerous threat to the administration of justice.
It is not the first time that Attorney Paguia has exhibited similar conduct towards the Supreme
Court. In a letter, dated 30 June 2003, addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., and
Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, he has demanded, in a clearly disguised form of
forum shopping, for several advisory opinions on matters pending before the Sandiganbayan.
In a resolution, dated 08 July 2003, this Court has strongly warned Attorney Alan Paguia, on
pain of disciplinary sanction, to desist from further making, directly or indirectly, similar
submissions to this Court or to its Members. But, unmindful of the well-meant admonition to
him by the Court, Attorney Paguia appears to persist on end.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED, and the Court hereby orders
Attorney Alan Paguia, counsel for petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, to SHOW CAUSE, within
ten days from notice hereof, why he should not be sanctioned for conduct unbecoming a
lawyer and an officer of the Court.
On 10 October 2003, Atty. Paguia submitted his compliance with the show-cause order. In a
three-page pleading, Atty. Paguia, in an obstinate display of defiance, repeated his earlier
claim of political partisanship against the members of the Court.
Canon 5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which Atty. Paguia has tirelessly quoted to give
some semblance of validity for his groundless attack on the Court and its members, provides Rule 5.10. A judge is entitled to entertain personal views on political questions. But to avoid
suspicion of political partisanship, a judge shall not make political speeches, contribute to
party funds, publicly endorse candidates for political office or participate in other partisan
political activities.
Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code defines the term partisan political activities; the
law states:
The term election campaign or partisan political activity refers to an act designed to
promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office which
shall include:
(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons for the
purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate;
(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar
assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against a candidate.

(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or against

the election of any candidate for public office;
(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or oppose
the election of any candidate; or
(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.
It should be clear that the phrase partisan political activities, in its statutory context, relates
to acts designed to cause the success or the defeat of a particular candidate or candidates
who have filed certificates of candidacy to a public office in an election. The taking of an oath
of office by any incoming President of the Republic before the Chief Justice of the Philippines is
a traditional official function of the Highest Magistrate. The assailed presence of other justices
of the Court at such an event could be no different from their appearance in such other official
functions as attending the Annual State of the Nation Address by the President of
the Philippines before the Legislative Department.
The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; it will not denounce criticism made by anyone
against the Court for, if well-founded, can truly have constructive effects in the task of the
Court, but it will not countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the erosion of our peoples faith in
the judicial system, let alone, by those who have been privileged by it to practice law in the
Philippines.
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that the lawyer should observe
and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers and, indeed, should insist on
similar conduct by others. In liberally imputing sinister and devious motives and questioning
the impartiality, integrity, and authority of the members of the Court, Atty. Paguia has only
succeeded in seeking to impede, obstruct and pervert the dispensation of justice.
The attention of Atty. Paguia has also been called to the mandate of Rule 13.02 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibiting a member of the bar from
making such public statements on a case that may tend to arouse public opinion
for or against a party. Regrettably, Atty. Paguia has persisted in ignoring the
Courts well-meant admonition.
On the 7th September 2003 issue of the Daily Tribune, Atty. Paguia wrote to say What is the legal effect of that violation of President Estradas right to due process
of law? It renders the decision in Estrada vs. Arroyo unconstitutional and void. The
rudiments of fair play were not observed. There was no fair play since it appears
that when President Estrada filed his petition, Chief Justice Davide and his fellow
justices had already committed to the other party - GMA - with a judgment already
made and waiting to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the
charade of a formal hearing. After the justices had authorized the proclamation of
GMA as president, can they be expected to voluntarily admit the
unconstitutionality of their own act?
Unrelentingly, Atty. Paguia has continued to make public statements of like nature.
The Court has already warned Atty. Paguia, on pain of disciplinary sanction, to become mindful
of his grave responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court. Apparently, he has
chosen not to at all take heed.
WHEREFORE, Attorney Alan Paguia is hereby indefinitely suspended from the practice of law,
effective upon his receipt hereof, for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the Court.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and all courts of the land through the Office of the Court Administrator.
SO ORDERED.