[FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (SPEECH, PRESS,

ASSEMBLY & PETITION)]

Sanidad v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 90878 January 29, 1990
FACTS:
RA 6766, "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA
AUTONOMOUS REGION" was enacted into law in which its plebiscite was scheduled on January 30,
1990 by virtue of Comelec Resolution No. 2226.
By virtue of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution, the COMELEC, the Omnibus Election
Code (BP 881), R.A. 6766 and other election laws, promulgated Resolution No. 2167 shall govern the
conduct of the said plebiscite.
Pablito Sanidad (pet), a newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND
COURIER, questioned the constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 which prohibits
columnists, commentators or announcers to used their column or radio or television time to campaign for
or against the plebiscite issues during the plebiscite campaign period. He alleged that the provision is void
and unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of
the press embodied in the Constitution and it constitutes a prior restraint on constitutionally-guaranteed
freedom of the press and further imposes subsequent punishment for those who may violate it because it
contains a penal provision. Moreover, he also believes that the expression of views, beliefs and opinions
of the media practitioners shall also help the government for information dissemination and to examine all
side of the issue.
A temporary restraining order was issued enjoining COMELEC from enforcing and implementing
Section 19 of Resolution No. 2167 and required the COMELEC to comment on the petition.
COMELEC commented that the provision of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is not violative of the
constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press. Rather it is a valid
implementation of the power of the Comelec to supervise and regulate media during election or plebiscite
periods as stated in Article IX-C, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.
Moreover, COMELEC also said that it does not absolutely bar petitioner-columnist from expressing his
views and/or from campaigning for or against the organic act because he may do so through the Comelec
space and/or Comelec radio/television time, as provided under Sections 90 and 92 of BP 881.
ISSUE:
WON Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is unconstitutional on the ground that it violates
the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press.

[FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (SPEECH, PRESS,

ASSEMBLY & PETITION)]

RULING:
Yes. Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is unconstitutional.
It is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was the
power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for
the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of communication or information to the end
that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor,
for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured. The evil sought to be
prevented by this provision is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give any undue
advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising space or radio or television time. This is also the reason
why a "columnist, commentator, announcer or personality, who is a candidate for any elective office is
required to take a leave of absence from his work during the campaign period (2nd par. Section 11(b)
R.A. 6646). It cannot be gainsaid that a columnist or commentator who is also a candidate would be more
exposed to the voters to the prejudice of other candidates unless required to take a leave of absence.
However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can be
construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the
exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods. Media
practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise
holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19
of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis.
Comelec's argument that Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167 does not absolutely bar
petitioner-columnist from expressing his views and/or from campaigning for or against the organic act
because he may do so through the Comelec space and/or Comelec radio/television time, the same is not
meritorious.
While the limitation does not absolutely bar petitioner's freedom of expression, it is still a
restriction on his choice of the forum where he may express his view. No reason was advanced by
respondent to justify such abridgement. This form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioner's
freedom of expression for no justifiable reason.
Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a forum for expression but they do not
guarantee full dissemination of information to the public concerned because they are limited to either
specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio or television times.
The instant petition is GRANTED. Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is declared null
and void and unconstitutional. The restraining order issued is hereby made permanent.

[FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (SPEECH, PRESS,

ASSEMBLY & PETITION)]
Ayer Productions vs. Capulong
G.R. No. 82380 April 29, 1988
FACTS:
Hal McElroy (pet) informed Juan Ponce Enrile (pr) about the projected motion picture, "The Four
Day Revolution", enclosing a synopsis of it. The proposed motion picture is a reenactment of the EDSA
revolution. Enrile replied and demanded that they should not used his name or any of his family members
in their production film. Enriles demand was followed by the petitioners and deleted Enriles name from
the movie script. Petitioners proceeded to film the projected motion picture.
Enrile files a civil case against the petitioners on the ground that it violates his right of privacy. The
trial court issued a Temporary Restraining Order and set for hearing the application for preliminary
injunction.
Hal McElroy (pet) flied a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the Petition for Preliminary
Injunction contending that the mini-series film did not involve the private life of Juan Ponce Enrile nor any
of his family and that a preliminary injunction would amount to a prior restraint on their right of free
expression. Petitioner Ayer Productions also filed its own Motion to Dismiss alleging the lack of cause of
action as the mini-series had not yet been completed.
The respondent court issued a writ of Preliminary Injunction against the petitioners.
Ayer Productions and Hal McElroy (pet) both files a separate petition for certiorari with an urgent
prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Restraining Order.
The Court granted a Temporary Restraining Order partially enjoining the implementation of the
respondent Judge's Order of 16 March 1988 and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued therein, and
allowing the petitioners to resume producing and filming those portions of the projected mini-series which
do not make any reference to private respondent or his family or to any fictitious character based on or
respondent.
In private respondents answer, he invoked his right of privacy.
ISSUE:
WON the production and filming of the projected mini-series constitutes an unlawful
intrusion upon private respondent's right of privacy.

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ASSEMBLY & PETITION)]

RULING:

No. The production and filming by petitioners of the projected motion picture "The Four Day
Revolution" does not, in the circumstances of this case, constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private
respondent's "right of privacy.
Freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom to film and produce motion pictures
and to exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through television.
The right of privacy or "the right to be let alone," 6 like the right of free expression, is not an
absolute right. A limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long been regarded as permissible where
that person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be published about
him constitute of a public character.

The right of privacy cannot be invoked resist publication and

dissemination of matters of public interest. 8 The interest sought to be protected by the right of privacy is
the right to be free from unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful publicizing of the private affairs and
activities of an individual which are outside the realm of legitimate public concern.
The subject matter of the projected fil is one of public interest and concern. The subject matter
does not relate to the individual life and certainly not to the private life of private respondent Ponce Enrile.
The extent of the intrusion is to keep that film a truthful historical account. Private respondent
does not claim that petitioners threatened to depict in "The Four Day Revolution" any part of the private
life of private respondent or that of any member of his family.
Private respondent is a "public figure" because of his participation on the historical event. The
right of privacy of a "public figure" is necessarily narrower than that of an ordinary citizen. Private
respondent has not retired into the seclusion of simple private citizenship. he continues to be a "public
figure."
The film limits itself in portraying the participation of private respondent in the EDSA Revolution to
those events which are directly and reasonably related to the public facts of the EDSA Revolution, the
intrusion into private respondent's privacy cannot be regarded as unreasonable and actionable.