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THE CONTRIBUTION
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383
harshlyforverdictswhich,a decade later,borderon the ridiculous and thenaive.When thebook and thereviewswerewritten,therewasverylittlein thewayofformbywhichto measure
scholarlypublicationsin international
politics.Furthermore,
the
themechosenby ProfessorSpykmanprobablymade more difficultthe taskof graspingthe methodof analysiswhichhe was
using. (As not a fewcriticspointedout, the orientationof the
book was toward the isolation-intervention
debate and was
selectedbeforethe Japaneseaction at Pearl Harbor forcibly
ended thecontroversy.)
However,a carefulre-reading
ofA merica's Strategy,togetherwith all of ProfessorSpykman'sarticles
and The Geographyof thePeace, whichwas publishedafterhis
death in 1944,* plus a knowledge of his undergraduate and
mentoftheirpowerpositiona primaryobjectiveoftheirforeign
policy," he stated in the introductionto America'sStrategy.
both for na"Force is manifestly
an indispensableinstrument
tionalsurvivaland forthe creationof a betterworld,"reads a
did not
sentencein The GeographyofthePeace. Suchstatements
verywell fitthetemperof theirtimes.Fromthedreamworldof
Americanswereslow to awake,even
abdicationofresponsibility
afterthe outbreakof World War II. The precipitationof the
* A chronological bibliography of Spykman's published work includes: The Social
Theory of Georg Simmel, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1925; "The Social
Background of Asiatic Nationalism," American Journal of Sociology, xxxii, No. 3
(November 1926), 396-412; "States' Rights and the League," Yale Review, xxiv, No. 2
(December 1934), 274-93; "Geography and Foreign Policy," American Political Science
Review, xxxii, No. 1 (February 1938), 28-51, and No. 2 (April 1938), 213-37; with
Abbie A. Rollins, "Geographic Objectives in Foreign Policy," American Political
Science Review, xxxiii, No. 3 (June 1939), 391-412,and No. 4 (August 1939), 591-615;
America's Strategy in World Politics, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1942;
"Frontiers,Security,and International Organization," Geographical Review, xxxii, No. 3
(July 1942), 436-38; letter to Life Magazine, January ii, 1943, p. 2; The Geography
of the Peace, ed. by Helen R. Nicholl, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1944.
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WORLD POLITICS
385
America'sStrategy,
widelycriticizedforneglectingall factors
otherthan the geographic,containsthissentence,whosemeaning seemsclear to all who troubleto read it: "But the relative
powerofstatesdependsnot onlyon militaryforcesbut on many
otherfactors-sizeofterritory,
natureoffrontiers,
size of population,absence or presenceof raw materials,economicand technologicaldevelopment,financialstrength,
ethnichomogeneity,
effective
social integration,
politicalstability,and nationalspirit." If the foregoing
sentenceweremissed,the readerwould be
confrontedwith a lengthyanalysisin Part Two of America's
Strategyof the possibilitiesof hemisphericintegration,
which
discusses,in additionto geographicdata,social organization,
political institutions,
ideas and ideology,naturalresources,techand financialstrength.
nologicaldevelopment,
In theundergraduate
coursewhichProfessor
Spykmantaught
at Yale University,
thefactorsconditioning
nationalpowerwere
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WORLD POLITICS
schematically
presentedas follows:geographic,demographic,
racial, ethnic,economic,social,political,ideological,and personal.
ofeachfactor
Withinthetimelimitsofthecourse,theimplications
were exploredand theirinterrelationship
developed.This the
couldnotbe expectedtoknow,forin
criticsofAmerica'sStrategy
thatworkProfessor
Spykmanchoseto use theword"geopolitics"
to describehis methodof approach."Geopolitics"had unfortuin theUnitedStates,whereAmericanswerejust
nateconnotations
learningabout a man called Haushoferwho was somehowinvolved in the megalomaniaof Adolf Hitler and in Germany's
plans forworldconquest."Geopolitics"had a worsecolor than
"powerpolitics";it wasstranger;it wasforeign;itwas Germanic.
The decade since 1942 has enabled the studyof international
of analypoliticsto developothertermsto describeframeworks
were
when
Few
of
them
available
America's
sis.
Strategyappeared.Professor
Spykmanthuswas askinghis readersto accept
as he used it, not to read mysticalmeanderingsof
terminology
Haushoferiandialectic (derived and refinedfrom Friedrich
Ratzel, Rudolph Kjellen, HalfordMackinder,et al.). "As the
word[Geopolitik]indicates,theadherentsare not onlyengaged
in a studyofthegeographicconditioning
ofpoliticalphenomena;
theyare also engaged in advocatingpolicy,which is hardlya
scientificendeavor,"ProfessorSpykmanstated.Too few cared
to makethedistinction.
His choiceof theword"geopolitics"was clear indicationthat
as themostbasic factorconditionSpykmanregardedgeography
a
ing state'sforeignpolicy.He wrotein "Geographyand Foreign
Policy":
War was an instrumentof national policy in his [Napoleon's] time and
still is today,and in a worldwheregroupsstruggleforpower by means
of war,policybecomesa high strategy.In such a world,the geographic
area of the state is the territorialbase fromwhich it operates in time
of war and the strategicposition which it occupies during the temporaryarmisticecalled peace. [This repeated insistencethat it was conflictwhichwas normal,peace whichwas abnormal,horrifiedAmerican
critics.]It is the most fundamentallyconditioningfactorin the formulation of national policy,because it is the mostpermanent.Because
the geographiccharacteristics
of states are relativelyunchangingand
unchangeable,the geographicdemands of those stateswill remain the
387
same for centuriesand because the world has not yet reached that
happy statewherethe wantsof no man conflictwith those of another,
thosedemands will cause friction.Thus at the door of geographymay
be laid the blame for many of the age-longstruggleswhich run persistentlythrough historywhile governmentsand dynastiesrise and
fall.
Spykman,it now becomes clear, had selected the term "geopolitics" to indicate the close relationshipbetween the geographic,economic,and politicalfactorsas conditioningelements
environment.
of statebehaviorin the international
Beforeproceedingto examinesome of the ideas and proposiled him,however,it would
tionsto whichSpykman'sframework
be well to completean expositionof his conceptof the studyof
internationalpolitics. In addition to factorsconditioningnationalpower,Spykmanadded theobjectiveswhichstatespursue,
The objectives,he beand thetoolsand techniquesofstatecraft.
divided into categoriesparallellieved,could be schematically
ing the conditioning factors: geographic, racial, ethnic, economic, social, political, and ideological. The tools and techniques, the methods, of statecraft followed "the three basic
processes of cooperation, accommodation, and opposition" and
includedpersuasion,barter,coercion,and subversion.
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WORLD POLITICS
In partsof the studydealing with factorsother than those conditioning national power, Spykman's choice of concentration
was again geographic. With his researchassistantAbbie A. Rollins, he wrote two articles for the American Political Science
Review in 1939 entitled "Geographic Objectives in Foreign
Policy." Therein the authorsdiscussed the importanceof various
typesof frontiers,ranging fromthe mountain area to the buffer
state, the various types of geographic expansionism in which
national stateshad historicallyindulged-toward a riveror ocean,
up and down stream,circumferential,and so forth-and, finally,
the resultant conflict patterns between states which emerged
fromtheiropposition on the geographic level. The authors concluded:
of theseexpansionforms
to theconstantreappearance
Historytestifies
conflict
and theever-recurring
patterns
thatresult,and thereseemsto
be no reasonto assumeor expectthatthesebehaviorpatterns
of states
willsuddenlychangeor disappearin thenearfuture.An awareness
of
and inevitability
shouldtherefore
theiruniversality
providea useful
and validbasisforanalysisofanyand all conflict
situations,
actualand
wherestatesfaceeach otheracrossriversand seas.Countless
potential,
will complicateand varyeach specificcase,but thebasic
otherfactors
patternagainstwhichthesefactorsmustbe viewedgivespromiseof
remaining
constant.
It would appear that the concentrationon geographic objectives
of stateswas more closelyrelated to the field of militarystrategy
than to an understandingof general conflictsin the international
field. However, as will be pointed out later, conclusions could
be drawn from such a systemof analysis which are applicable
to the bipolar conflictwhich Professor Spykman did not live
to see.
II
Spykman's systemof analysis led him to three broad, related
conclusions. They were: that American isolation was no longer
a practical means of attaining security; that continued political participation in world affairsacross the Atlantic and the
Pacific Oceans should have as its primary objective the creation and maintenance of a balance of power; and that international governmentcould be no acceptable substitute for such a
389
It followedthat,whethertheUnitedStatesrealizedit or not,this
countrywas involvedin worldaffairstakingplace thousandsof
miles fromits own shores.A conditionof potentialdouble-encirclementhad been created,Spykmanwrotein America'sStratof the Old World by the New or of the New
egy-encirclement
by the Old.
If the New World can be united or organized in such a manner that
large masses of unbalanced force are available for action across the
ocean, it can influencethe politicsof Europe and Asia. And if the Old
World remains divided and balanced, that external force can play a
determiningrole in its political life. If, on the other hand, the Old
World can be united and organizedin such a mannerthat large masses
of unbalanced power become available for action across the oceans,
the New World will be encircledand, depending on its powers of resistance,may have to submitto the dictatesof the Old.
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391
ca's Strategy:
An equilibriumof forcesinherently
always
unstable,alwaysshifting,
is certainly
not an ideal powerpatternforan international
changing,
we shalldo well to
society.But whilewe can deploreitsshortcomings,
remember
elementforan international
order
thatit is an indispensable
based on independent
states.It encouragescooperation,
conciliation,
peaceand maintain
and thegrowth
oflaw and is morelikelytopreserve
justicethananyothertypeofpowerdistribution.
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". .
393
If
an unblushingUnited StatesImperialism,"wroteone. ".
thisbrandof geopolitical'realism'wins,the United Statesis in
for a militaristicfutureunder which democracywill become
in contentfromthe political systemsof the
indistinguishable
totalitarianpowers,"predicteda second."Thus, whatProfessor
Spykman'sdescriptionfor America amountsto is permanent
war,"complaineda third,somewhatawkwardly.
Did the criticshave somethingbetterto offerthanan admittedlydangerous,oneroussearchfora balance of power?Many
thoughttheyhad in a systemrejected by Spykman-interna"At the end of the war the only choice we
tionalgovernment.
mayfaceis thatbetweena morestableorganizationand the end
of all organization,betweensome sort of order and complete
anarchy.""If Americaninterestsinclude democracy,political
stability,and welfareeconomics,then our wiseststrategyin
world politicsis to promote,preferablyby consent[otherwise
thistime
by force?],theage-oldprocessof politicalintegration,
Spykman'sbook
on a worldscale." "The wholelogicofProfessor
leads to internationalgovernment;but he ends with a nonsequitur.So faras his conclusionsgo, thereis not realism,but
onlydefeatism."The attitudeof these"learnedgentlemen,"to
borrowa phrasefromone ofthem,wasa previewofthatadopted
enthusiastsimmediatelyafterthe end of
by worldgovernment
simplyhad to comeabout in a hurry
thewar.Worldgovernment
was
rapidlygoingto hell in a basket.From
because the world
contemplatingthe horriblealternative,theywere reachinga
conclusionforscholarlyauthoritiesin the fieldof insurprising
ternationalpolitics."Wishingwill makeit so," theyweresaying
in effect.
Spykmanemphaticallydid not believe that wishingwould
makeit so. This did notmeanhe was againstworldgovernment,
or cooperationbetweenstates.In an
international
organization,
articlewrittenin 1934 for the Yale Review, entitled"States'
Rightsand the League," he was hopefulforthe futureof that
organizationbecause statesmenwere finallyrecognizingits imof nationalpowerand therebywere
portanceas an instrument
into the
theLeague fromtherealmofmake-believe
transferring
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WORLD POLITICS
realmofrealityin international
politics.Spykmanwas quick to
warn,as he did in laterwritings,
thatan international
organizationwasnota substitute
forpowerpolitics,but rathera different
and moredesirableformthereof."The creationof international
orderis not a matterof the abolitionof force,"he wrotein the
Yale Review,"but a changefromthe use of forceas an instrumentof nationalpolicyto the organizationof the use of force
bythecommunity."
the League had been unable to effectthis
Unfortunately,
transference
of force,and had ultimatelygone down beforenationallyemployedmilitarypower in internationalaggression.
There was no reasonto be optimisticthatanypostwarorganization could suddenlysucceed where the League had failed.
Dreamersof a new orderspringingsuddenly,full-blown,
from
the wreckageof war were preciselythat-dreamers."Plans for
far-reaching
changesin the characterof internationalsociety
are an intellectualby-product
of all greatwars,but,whenfighta return
ing ceases,theactualpeace structure
usuallyrepresents
to balanced power," Spykmanassertedin America'sStrategy.
Moreover,thedreamersmightnotwelcomehavingtheirvisions
transformed
precipitously
intoreality.
is stillfaroff.This is perhapsjustas wellbecausethe
Worldfederation
wouldprobablybe a greatdisappointment
world-state
to itsadvocates
fromwhat theyhad anticipated.Brotherly
and verydifferent
love
would not automatically
and the struggleforpower
replaceconflict,
would continue.Diplomacywould becomelobbyingand log-rolling,
warswouldbecomecivilwarsand insurrections,
and international
but
man would continueto fightforwhat he thoughtworthwhile,
and
violencewouldnot disappearfromtheearth.
orSpykmanfeltthatthebestassuranceof bothinternational
ganizationand thedevelopmentofa worldcommunity
was their
foundationon a European and Asiaticbalance of power,which
could onlybe establishedby Americanparticipation.In a letter
to Life on January11, 1943, Spykmanmildlyobjected to that
ofhimselfas an exponentof"cold-blooded
magazine'sdescription
powerpolitics."
in a balanceof power[Spykman
My interest
wrote]is not merelyinspiredby a concernforour powerposition,but also by myconviction
thatonlyin a systemof approximately
balancedpoweris collective
395
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WORLD POLITICS
397
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WORLD POLITICS
Western Powers in the Asiatic Mediterranean.China will be a continentalpower of huge dimensionsin controlof a large section of the
littoralof that middle sea. Her geographicposition will be similar to
that of the United States in regard to the American Mediterranean.
When China becomesstrong,her presenteconomicpenetrationin that
regionwill undoubtedlytake on political overtones.
399
conclusionsregardingUnitedStatesrelationswithintheWestern
Hemisphere,a subjectto whicha largepartof America'sStratsceptiegywas devoted.Spykmanwas generallyand specifically
cal concerningNorth American-LatinAmericancooperation,
friendship,and understanding.". . . The factremains,that,not-
ofunityand solidarity,
theconstantreiteration
the
withstanding
New World has preservedas much internationalanarchyand
achievedno more politicalintegrationthan despisedEurope,"
he wrote.And,also,
throughthe Union of AmericanRepublics, the New World has made
some halting steps toward political integration,but it has not moved
much beyond platonic resolutionson the beauty of solidarity.It has
also failed to create the political frameworkfor a systemof common
defenseagainst threatsfromacrossthe ocean.
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401