Tacc Matc II 2017

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
Civil Aviation Regulatory Commission
Air Navigation Services
Manual of Air Traffic Control Part II

MATC II
Terminal Area Control Centre "TACC"
Operational Procedures
Issued in accordance with Jordan Civil Aviation Regulations

On the Authority of the Chief Commissioner of the Civil Aviation
Regulatory Commission.
Eng. Ahmad Azzam

Acting Chief Commissioner
DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION SHEET
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
Manual of Air Traffic Control Part II

Document Identifier
EDITION No. :
EDITION DATE :
MATC II
Sixth Edition
01/02/2017
The main purpose of this document is to provide guidance to cover the Operational needs for
Air Traffic Controllers in Amman TACC.
Keywords
TEL:
DIVISION:
00962 6 4452689
TACC
CONTACT PERSON :
Chief of AMMAN TACC
DOCUMENT STATUS AND TYPE

STATUS
CATEGORY
CLASSIFICATION
Working Draft
Safety Regulatory Requirement
General Public
Draft
Comment/Response Document
Restricted ATS
Proposed Issue
Advisory Material
Restricted ANSP
Released Issue
Policy Document
Restricted CARC
ELECTRONIC BACKUP
INTERNAL REFERENCE NAME :
SOFTWARE(S)
MS Office Word
MS WINDOWS XYZ
MEDIA
Type : Hard disk
Media Identification :
HOST SYSTEM
Printing Date: 01/02/2017
DOCUMENT APPROVAL
The following table identifies all authorities that have successively edited,
accepted, endorsed and approved the present issue of this document.
AUTHORITY
NAME and SIGNATURE
DATE
Signature:
Prepared
By
Chief of AMMAN
TACC
Name:
Signature:
Accepted
Director of ATM
Name:
Signature:
Endorsed
Director of QSMS
Name:
Signature:
Regulatory
Approval
Director of
ANSSD
Name:
ii
AMENDMENTS
Its the responsibility of each controller to keep His / Her copy of MATC II fully
amended and available for inspection by the chief of TACC.
RECORD OF AMENDMENTS
NO
ITEM DESCRIPTION
SECTION
AFFECTED
DATE
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER ONE : Introduction
.
1.1 Forwarded
1.2 Purpose
........ 1
1.3 Authority/responsibility for Changes

1.4 Review
1.6 Change History
.......
1.8 Distribution of the Manual

1.9 Master Copy
1.7 Controlling the Manual
1.11 Layout
... 2
1.5 Interpretation of Words
1.10 Enquiries
....... 3
1.12 General Instruction
.. 4
1.13 Symbols and abbreviations
CHAPTER TWO : Terminal Area Control Center

2.1 General Description
13
2.2 THALES RADAR Center
13
2.2.1 THALES RADAR System Description
... 13
2.2.2 THALES RADAR Control Sectorization
..
13
15
..
16
16
2.2.3 Sector Manning Level

2.2.4 Strip Layout
2.3 INDRA RADAR Center
2.3.1 INDRA RADAR Control Sectorization
16
2.3.2 Merging / Splitting Sectors Procedure in Amman TACC
........ 19
iv
.. 19
2.3.3 Sector Manning Level
... 21
2.3.4 Strip Layout

2.4 Frequencies
..
.. 22
2.4.1 Navigation Aids Frequencies
2.4.2 Voice Communication System " VCS " Frequencies

2.5 Unit Administration
.......... 24
24
.. 25
2.5.1 Responsibilities and Duties
2.5.2 Control Room Administrations

2.5.2.1 Hours of Operation
. 28
2.5.2.2 Duty Restriction in the Influence of Alcoholic and Drugs

2.5.2.3 Confidentially
2.5.2.4 Visitor(s)
22
28
... 29
29
29
2.5.2.5 Private telephone calls
29
. 29
2.5.2.6 Leave
2.5.2.7 Control Room Discipline
.. 30
2.5.2.8 Radio / Telephone Discipline

2.5.2.9 Taking Over Watch
2.5.2.10 Read-Back Procedure
29
.... 30
30
CHAPTER THREE : RADAR Failure Procedure

3.1 RADAR Failure Procedure
.......
35
CHAPTER FOUR : RADAR Control

4.1 General
.......
4.2 Surveillance Identification of aircraft
37
....... 37
4.2.1 Establishment of identification
.. 37
4.2.2 SSR identification procedures
.. 37
v
4.2.3 ADS-B identification procedures
39
4.3 Surveillance Separation Minima
39
4.4 Mode C Verification and Errors
40
4.4.1 Mode C Verification

4.4.2 Mode C Errors
41
..... 41
4.4.3 Phraseology
.......... 42
4.5 SSR Codes
.......... 42
4.5.1 General
42
42
4.5.2 SSR Code Failure
4.5.3 Inbound SSR code assignment
... 42
4.5.4 Over fly SSR code assignment
..
4.5.5 Outbound SSR code assignment

4.5.6 Domestic SSR Codes
42
. 42
. 43
4.5.7 Regional SSR Codes assignment
..
44
CHAPTER FIVE : TMA and Area Procedure

5.1 General
..
5.2 Departure Flights Procedure
45
. 45
5.2.1 Outbound Silent RADAR Handover .. 45

5.2.2 Standard outbound levels
46
5.3 Arrival Flights Procedure
46
5.3.1
Inbound Silent RADAR Handover
5.3.2 Standard Inbound levels
.. 47
5.4 PBN Procedure within AMMAN FIR " RNAV Procedure "
5.5 Holding Areas
... 47
49
5.6 Co-ordination Procedures
.......
General and Flight planning between Approach Unit and
5.6.1 Tower Unit
47
...
51
51
vi
5.6.2 Visual Approach
..
52
5.6.3 Runway Change Procedure ... 52

...
5.6.4 VFR Traffic Procedures

5.6.4.1 Operating Rules
53
. 53
5.6.4.2 Visual Flight Rules
.... 53
5.6.4.3 SVFR at Amman / Marka CTR
53
5.6.5 Diversion Procedure ... 54

5.6.6 Miscellaneous Operations
...
54
CHAPTER SIX : AMMAN MARKA Airport Procedures

6.1 General
....
55
..
55
..
55
55
6.2.1 Departure Flights Release Procedure
6.2.2 Conventional Arrival Flights Release Procedure

6.2.3 RNAV Arrival Procedures
... 56
6.3 Landing Intervals

6.4 Training Flights Procedure
57
57
..
58
6.5.1 Runway 24
58
6.5.2 Runway 06
59
6.5 Approach Procedures
CHAPTER SEVEN : Queen Alia Airport Procedures

..
61
61
...
61
61
7.1 General
7.2.1 Departure Flights Procedure
7.2.2 Conventional Arrival Flights Release Procedure
vii
7.2.3 RNAV Arrival Procedures
... 62
................. 62
7.2.4 Visual Approach

7.3 Landing Intervals
................ 64
7.4 Training Flights Procedure
............... 64
.........
65
7.5.1 Runway 26L
.......................
65
7.5.2 Runway 26R
.......................
66
7.5.3 Runway 08L
.......................
67
7.5.4 Runway 08R
.......................
67
7.5 Approach Procedures
CHAPTER EIGHT : Failures

8.1 Partial Service Failure
69
8.1.1 INDRA or THALES RADAR Technical Failure

8.1.2 System Data Integrity
... 69
69
8.2 Complete RADAR Technical Failure
.....
8.3 VHF Communication System Failure
... 69
69
8.4 Telephone System Failure 70

8.5 Electrical Failure
.. 70
8.6 AFTN Line Failure .. 71

8.7 Facility Damage
.. 71
CHAPTER NINE: Royal Flights
9.1 Introduction
. 73
9.2 Special Air Traffic Services Procedures for VVIP Flight
... 73
General ATC procedures are as follows for VVIP Flight and
9.3 Distinguished guests and Transient Services
9.4 Take over Watch (TOW) to handle the VIP flight
74
. 75
9.5 ESCORT 75
viii
9.6 Runway in use
75
... 76
9.7 Helicopter Flights
9.8 Aerodrome Control Tower Procedures
. 76
76
9.9 Controlled Airspace
CHAPTER TEN : Reduced Vertical Separation Minima

10.1 The Benefits of RVSM . 77
10.2 RVSM Implementation Needs .. 77
77
10.3 RVSM Flight Levels
10.4 Flight in RVSM Airspace
10.5 RVSM Flight Planning Requirements
77
..... 77
10.6 RVSM Airborne Systems Requirement . 78

10.7 System Support
.. 79
10.8 Contingency Procedures
. 79
10.9 RVSM Transition Procedures

10.10 Vertical Separation Minima
.. 80
.. 81
10.11 RVSM Alarm in INDRA RADAR . 83

CHAPTER ELEVEN : Emergency Procedures
11.1 Fuel Dumping
... 85
11.2 Emergency Descent 86

11.3 Strayed Aircraft
87
11.4 Unidentified Aircraft
. 87
11.5 Interception of Civil Aircraft

11.6 Local Standby
11.7 Full Emergency
.. 88
... 88
89
11.8 Bomb Threat " Aircraft in flight " .. 90

ix
11.9 Hi-Jack
90
11.9.1 Hi-jack in the air within Amman airspace

11.9.2
Hi-jacked aircraft within adjacent FIRs expected to

proceed to Amman FIR
11.10 Aircraft Accident

11.11
90
....... 91
.. 91
Aircraft Emergencies Suspected Communicable Disease,

or Other Public Health Risk
11.12 Other ATC Contingency Procedures

11.12.1 Emergency Separation
.. 92
.. 92
.. 92
11.12.2 Short-term conflict alert (STCA) Procedures
92
CHAPTER TWELVE: ON JOB Training

... 95
12.1 General Procedures
12.2 Phase of Training 95

12.3 Trainees
. 96
12.4 Progress Tests . 96

12.5 Training Report
12.6 Examination
96
.. 96
12.7 General Description of Rating Phases
.. 97
12.7.1 TMA Approach Procedural Non-RADAR
97
12.7.2 TMA Approach RADAR . 98

12.7.3 En-route Procedural Non-RADAR
12.7.4 En-route RADAR
..
98
... 100
12.8 TACC Forms ..
100
APPENDIX 1
RNAV Charts
1. OJAI RNAV Charts
.. 101
x
2. OJAM RNAV Charts
.. 128
3. OJAQ RNAV Charts
143
APPENDIX 2
Conventional SID & STAR
1. Terminal Procedures AMMAN/Marka
.. 154
2. Terminal Procedures Queen Alia ... 159

3. Terminal Procedures AQABA/ King Hussein
169
APPENDIX 3
TACC FORMS
1. ATC Performance Check Form . 172
2. Evaluation Form
... 173
. 174
... 175
3. Rating Validity Report and Practical Assessment Form

4. Practical Training Record Form
. 176
6. OJT Training Assessment Form - Phase one.
... 177
5. ATC Final Practical Assessment Form
7. OJT Training Assessment Form - Phase two
..
178
... 179
.... 180
8. OJT Training Assessment Form - Phase three

9. INDRA Training Form
....
181
..
182
10. Coordination Failures Form

11. Read Back Form
APPENDIX 4
INDRA SYSTEM
1. Definitions
.. 183
2. Abbreviations
.. 183
3. General System Description ..
185
xi
4. Main Components
...
186
5. Controlling Positions
186
6. Auxiliary Equipment
187
7. Simulator Environment
187
8. Plot and Track Symbols
188
189
191
9. Labels and Track Colors

10. Situation Data Display
10.1 General Information Area

10.2 Main Menu Area
11. Flight Data Display
191
201
203
11.1 General Information Area
11.2 Main Menu Area .

12. Controlling and Monitor Display
13. Mouse button relation with our different displays
204
204
206
209
APPENDIX 5
National Contingency Plan
211
APPENDIX 6
AIP Charts
1. The Minimum Vectoring Altitude Chart
2. En_route Chart
235
236
3. Prohibited, Restricted and Danger Areas Chart .
237
.
.
.
238
239
240
4. Radio Facility Index Chart

5. Bird Concentration Chart
6. Bird Migration Chart
xii
APPENDIX 7
AIR TRAFFIC SERVICES AIRSPACE
REFERENCES
1. Aeronautical Information Publication of Jordan
Third Edition
2. Manual Air Traffic Control PART I
Sixth Edition
3. Manual Air Traffic Control PART II
Fifth Edition
4. Jordan Civil Aviation Regulations (JCAR)
Edition 2004
5. Air Traffic Management (DOC 4444-ATM/501)
Fifteenth Edition
6. Airport Emergency Plan
Version 5 Nov.2012
7. Local ATC Instructions.
xiii
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Intentionally Left Blank
TACC MATC II
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Forwarded:
Civil Aviation Regulatory Commission of Jordan provides air traffic services in
accordance to ICAO Annexes and Documents to the Chicago Convention. These
services are flight information service, alerting service and air traffic control service. In
order to achieve the objectives of air traffic services there is a need to specify
procedures necessary for the safety of air navigation for uniform application
throughout Jordan air space.
Maintaining the acceptable levels of safety calls for standardization and quality
assurance in every sub systems of Air Traffic System at one end and maintain the
ICAO standards and recommended practices at the others. This Manual of Air Traffic
Control " MATC " Part II for AMMAN TACC has been developed by AMMAN
TACC UNIT in corporation with DANS of QAIA as a part of comprehensive
documentation to achieve this objective.
AMMAN TACC MATC Part II is published for the guidance and information for air
traffic control in AMMAN FIR including all local instructions and all information's
concerned the Air Traffic Controllers in AMMAN TACC.
The purpose of AMMAN TACC MATC Part II is to establish procedures, provide
information and instructions which are essential for the provision of safe and efficient
air traffic services in AMMAN airspace and at the Jordanian airports where air traffic
services are provided by AMMAN TACC. It is published for the use and guidance of
its ATS personnel.
DANS of QAIA will ensure the provision of air traffic service under his jurisdiction
comply with the processes, procedures and instructions contained in this manual.
AMMAN TACC MATC Part II will fulfill the requirements for the best practices in
provision of Air Traffic Services according to international & national standards and
recommended practices and in meeting with the ICAO Universal Safety Audit
Oversight Programme requirements.
1.2 Purpose:
The purpose of this document is to establish procedures, provide information and
instructions which are essential for the provision of safe and efficient air traffic
services at AMMAN TACC where air traffic services are provided by ATM\CARC. It
is published for use and guidance of its ATS personnel.
EDITION No. 6
Effective Date: 01/02/2017
Page 1
TACC MATC II
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1
The chief of AMMAN TACC in QAIA will ensure that the provision of air traffic
services under his jurisdiction are provided in compliance with the processes,
procedures and instructions contained in this manual.
1.3 Authority/responsibility for Changes:

DATM, DANS of QAIA or Chief of TACC may ask for incorporating amendments to
the MATC II, when necessary, after endorsement by document approval process.
Each Holder of hard-copy of MATC II is responsible for ensuring that the Manual is
kept up to date. This includes inserting new chapters or chapter amendments in a
timely manner and complying with any instructions on amendment advice.
The user of MATC II will be responsible for verifying the currency of documentation
in the Manual.
1.4 Review:
DANS of QAIA or Chief of TACC will conduct every six month a general review of
this Manual to ensure accuracy and updating of all its contents and reference data. The
results of such review and action taken thereupon will be documented and presented
through DATM for document approval process.
DATM will ensure;
1. Changes being incorporated are properly approved by the competent authority,
2. Relevant pages in the Manual are revised.
3. Amendment/ advice are issued in time to all concerned in respect of new
chapter(s) and the same is inserted in the Manual.
4. Master- copy of the Manual is updated.
1.5 Interpretation of Words:

To avoid any misunderstanding within MATC II, certain words are to be interpreted as
having specific meanings when they are the operative words in an instruction.
Words
Meaning
'shall' 'is to, are to'

and 'must'
The instruction is mandatory
'will
It is only used for informative or descriptive writing,

e.g. 'pilots will file . . . . . ' is not an instruction to the
controller
'may'
It means that the instruction is permissive, optional

or alternative, e.g. 'a controller may seek assistance .
. . . . 'but would not if he did not need it.
EDITION No. 6
Page 2
TACC MATC II
'should'
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1
It means that it is strongly advisable that an

instruction is carried out;
It is recommended or Discretionary. It is
applied where the more positive 'shall' is
unreasonable but nevertheless a controller
Would have to have a good reason for not
doing so.
It always refers to nautical
miles
'miles'
Note: In the interests of simplicity, any reference to the masculine gender can be
taken to mean either male or female.
1.6 Change History:

This is sixth edition of TACC MATC II. Subsequent changes will be indicated on
Record of Amendments page.
1.7 Controlling the Manual:

DANS of QAIA will control this Manual through direct contact with DATM.
1.8 Distribution of the Manual:

DANS of QAIA should produce hard copies and control the distribution of these
copies, as they deem appropriate.
1.9 Master Copy:

An electronic and a hard Master Copy of each chapter contained in the manual will be
held and maintained by the DATM and DANS.
1.10 Enquiries:
Any ATC can report to AMMAN TACC Chief for any enquiries, clarifications or
suggestions.
1.11 Layout:
The manual is laid out in twelve chapters each chapter is divided into several sections
which are applicable to particular aspects of the ATC services.
EDITION No. 6
Page 3
TACC MATC II
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Chapter Number
Title
Chapter One
Introduction
Chapter Two
Terminal Area Control Center
Chapter Three
Deemed Separation
Chapter Four
RADAR Control
Chapter Five
Terminal and Area Procedure
Chapter Six
AMMAN / Marka Airport Procedures
Chapter Seven
Queen Alia Airport Procedures
Chapter Eight
Failures
Chapter Nine
Royal Flights
Chapter Ten
RVSM Procedures
Chapter Eleven
Emergency Procedures
Chapter Twelve
On Job Training
1.12 General Instruction:

1. All ATC instructions in this manual shall be written clearly and concisely in
English in such a way that there is no ambiguity or doubt in the meaning.
2. All instructions that affect other agencies or units will be in accordance with
the agreement with the other unit or agency and where possible the same words
shall be used by either units or agencies.
3. All publications shall be contained in a suitable cover that will facilitate
amendment.
a)
Each page will contain the following information:

i. Document title.
ii. Chapter Number.
iii. Page number.
iv. Effective Date.
b) All publications will contain an index.

c) All publications will contain an amendment record.
d) All publications will contain a page/date record sheet.
EDITION No. 6
Page 4
TACC MATC II
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1
4. All publications will be distributed to each controller; TACC Chief will make a
record of the documents held by each controller.
5. Each controller will sign the reception for each document and all future
amendments.
6. Amendments will be displayed on control room notice board(s) for one month
after date of publication.
7. Processed Documents, when a document is processed the following procedures
apply:
a) Three copies will be created:
i. Working copy, for actual amendment.
ii. Backup copy, to be made when a document is fully amended
iii. Master (original) copy, to be revised annually.
b) Annually. Copy the backup copy and retain as insurance of damage to both
working and backup.
i.e.: Power failure during transfer of data working to backup.
c) Storage of copies:
i. The master copy will be held by DANS and will only be released for
annual copy or if other copies are damaged.
ii. If other copies are damaged the master will immediately be copied before any
amendment is made.
iii. If the master is copied to replace lost or damaged diskettes the copy will
be upgraded to the last stage by comparison with the paper master (hard
copy).
d) Amendments of TACC manual are the responsibility of AMMAN TACC
Chief.
i. All amendments will be submitted to DATM for his acceptance.
ii. The purpose of approval is to ensure that the procedures at TACC meet
the general standard and policy of the CARC.
1.13
Symbols and abbreviations:
1.13.1
General:
The following symbols and abbreviations should be used for strip marking at AMMAN
TACC.
Aircraft type designators are listed in ICAO Doc. 8643, Company abbreviations in
ICAO Doc. 8585 and indicators in ICAO Doc. 7910.
EDITION No. 6
Page 5
TACC MATC II
1.13.2
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1
Symbols:
Meaning
Symbol
AIRCRAFT INSTRUCTED TO HOLD
AIRCRAFT GIVEN APPROPRIATE ALTIMETER

SETTING
AIRCRAFT GIVEN TIME CHECK
CLEARANCE EXPIRES (time)
CE (time)
ALTERNATIVE INSTRUCTIONS
()
ABOVE FL
BELOW FL
FL OR ABOVE
FL OR BELOW
AFTER (time or level)
BEFORE (time or level)
AIRCAFT REPORTED AT WRONG LEVEL (shown in circle)

CLEARED TO CROSS AIRWAY (arrow indicates direction)
CLIMB
DESCEND
EDITION No. 6
Page 6
TACC MATC II
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1
CLIMB AND MAINTAIN
CLIMB COORDINATED (with another ATC unit)
DESCENT COORDINATED (with another ATCU)
CC
CRUISE CLIMB
MAINTAIN
CLIMB 1000 FT BELOW (aircraft)
(call sign)
1
REPORT LEAVING (level)
RL
REPORT REACHING (level)
RR
REPORT PASSING (level)
RP
REQUEST LEVEL CHNGE ENROUTE

COMMUNICATION FAILURE
RCLE
CF
COORDINATION EFFECED
CROSS
AIRCRAFT GIVEN WEATHER

DELAY NOT DETERMINED
Z
DIV
DIVERTED TO
EDITION No. 6
WX
Page 7
TACC MATC II
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1
ESSENTIAL TRAFFIC IS
TFC
EXPECTED APPROACH TIME
EAT
I
ILS
INFORMATION PASSED AND ACKNOWLEDGED
JOINING FLIGHT
LEAVING CONTROLLED AIRSPACE
MA
>
AISSED APPROACH
NO DELAY EXPECTED
OVERHEAD (beacon of airfield)
QFG
OVER FLIGHT (through )
RELEASE NOT BEFORE

RELEASE SUBJECT TO
RELEASE SUBJECT YOUR DISCRETION (with regard to)
RELEASE SUBJECT TO APPROACH

RADAR IDENTIFICATION
RADAR HAND OVER COMPLETED
RADAR SERVICE TERMINATED
EDITION No. 6
Time
RS /
RS YD
RS APP
R
R
Page 8
TACC MATC II
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1
RADAR VECTOR
RV
RADAR VECTORING ILS APPROACH
R/I
RADAR VECTORING VISUAL APPROACH
R/V
RADIAL (when followed by an ident 3 figures)
1.13.3 Abbreviations:
ACC
ACT
ADEP
ADES
ADOC
AFDO
AFL
AFS
AFTN
AOC
APP
APPP
APPR
ARR
ASC
ASR
ATC
ATCC
ATCO
ATIS
ATM
ATS
BPN
BPX
BRS
CAS
CATC
CD
CFL
CH
CIDIN
CLM
CSCI
CTACC
DAIW
Area Control Center

Activation ( OLDI Message )
Aerodrome Of Departure
Aerodrome of Destination
Air Defense Operation Center
Automatic Flight Data Operator
Actual Flight Level
Airport Fire Service
Aeronautical fixed Telecommunication Network
Accept Of Control ( Function )
Approach
Approach planning controller
Approach radar controller
Arrival
AFTN Switching Center
Air Safety Report
Air Traffic Control
Air Traffic Control Center
Air Traffic Control Officer
Automatic Terminal Information Service
Air Traffic Management
Air Traffic Services
Boundary Point : Entry Point
Boundary Point : Exit Point
Built-In Radio Switch
Controlled Air Space
Chief of Air Traffic Control ( TACC )
Civil Defense
Cleared Flight Level
Channel Check Message ( AFTN )
Common ICAO Data Interchange Network
Claim
Computer Software Configuration Item
Chief Of Terminal Area Control Center
Danger Area Infringement Warning
EDITION No. 6
Page 9
TACC MATC II
DANS
DATM
DCT
DEC
DEP
DLA
EET
EST
ERVCC
ETA
ETB
ETD
ETN
ETO
ETX
FDO
FDP
FIR
FL
FPL
FPPS
FPS
GMC
HMI
HND
ICAO
IFR
KBD
LAM
LAN
LOA
LPL
MFT
MSAW
MSSR
NM
NOTAM
OH
OJT
OJTI
OLDI
OPS
PABX
PAC
PD
PFL
PIRC
PSR
PUSH
QNH
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1
Director Of Air Navigation Services

Duty Air Traffics Management
Direct Route
Digital Equipment Corporation
Departure
Delay
Estimated Elapsed Time
Estimated Flight Plan ( Function )
Emergency Radio Voice Communication Console
Estimated Time Of Arrival
Estimated Time Boundary
Estimated Time Of Departure
Estimated Time Next Point
Estimated Time Of Over flight
Estimated Time Of Exit Point
Flight Data Operator
Flight Data Processor
Flight Information Region
Flight Level In Hundreds Of Feet
Flight Plan
Flight Plan Processing System
Flight Progress Strip
Ground Movement Control
Human Machine Interface
Hand-over (Function )
International Civil Aviation Organization
Instrumental Flight Rules
Keyboard
Logical Acknowledgement Message ( OLDI)
Local Area Network
Letter of agreement
Local Flight Plan
Multi-Function Terminal
Minimum Safe Altitude Warning
Mono pulse Secondary Surveillance Radar
Nautical Mile
Notice To Airmen
Operational Handbook
On The Job Training
On The Job Training Instructor
ON- Line Data Interchange
Operational
Private Automatic Exchange
Preliminary Activate Message (OLDI )
Pointing Device
Planned Flight Level
Processor Of Interface For Radars And Communication
Primary Surveillance Radar
It is a sensitive area drawn on the screen used to perform BUTTON
Barometric Pressure
EDITION No. 6
Page 10
TACC MATC II
RDF
RDP
REP
RFL
RFP
RJAFLO
RPL
RTE
SDR
SFP
SMPO
SPI
SSDD
SSR
SSS
STCA
STP
SUP
SUPP
SVC
TAS
TCP/IP
TL
TMA
TMCS
TOGGLE
TWR
UIR
VCS
VFR
WKS
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1
Radar Data Function

Radar Data Processor
Reporting Point
Requested Flight Level
Radar Front Processor
Royal Jordanian Air force liaison officer
Repetitive Flight Plan
Route Of Flight
Security Data Recording
Stored Flight Plan
System Manger Position
Special Pulse Information
System Software Design Document
Secondary Surveillance Radar
System Segment Specification
Short Term Conflict Alert
Strip Printer
Supervisor
Supplementary
Service Messages (AFTN )
True Air Speed
Transport Control Protocol / Internet Protocol
Transition Level : It is the flight level ( in hundreds of feet) under
which a barometric correction is performed to deal with local pressure
Terminal Maneuvering Area
Technical Management And Control System
Push button that enables a limited set of predefined values
Tower
Upper Information Region
Voice Communication System
Visual Flight Rules
Work Station
EDITION No. 6
Page 11
TACC MATC II
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1
EDITION No. 6
Page 12
CHAPTER TWO
TERMINAL AREA
CONTROL CENTER
TACC MATC II
CHAPTER 2
2. TERMINAL AREA CONTROL CENTER

2.1. General Description:
The TACC Operation Room is an ATS unit providing the following Air Traffic Control
services:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Approach Control Service.

Area Control Service.
Flight Information Service.
Alerting Service.
Note: In the event of complete failure of the ATS surveillance system the
necessary action shall be taken to establish RADAR Failure Procedure.
The number of aircraft simultaneously provided with ATS surveillance services within
AMMAN terminal area, shall not be exceed more than the level which will not be adverse
impact on safety, taking into account:
1. The structural complexity of the control area or sector concerned.
2. The functions to be performed within the control area or sector concerned.
3. Assessments of controller workloads, taking into account different aircraft
capabilities, and sector capacity; and
4. The degree of technical reliability and availability of the primary and backup
communications, navigation and surveillance systems, both in the aircraft and on
the ground.
2.2. THALES RADAR Center:
2.2.1. THALES RADAR System Description:
THALES RADAR is a Secondary Surveillance RADAR MSSR " the MSSR is Monopuls
surveillance RSM 9701 of 256 NM range ".
2.2.2. THALES RADAR Control Sectorization:
THALES TACC consist a number of autonomous Air Traffic control sectors, the following
sectors are the main sectors only:
I. Approach Sector:
Approach Sector is responsible for the provision of ATS within Amman TMA below
FL 255, excluding the Amman Control Zone and QAI Control Zone below 5500 FT,
and the following segments:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
EDITION No. 6
ATS route L513 till BUSRA point.

ATS route R652 till KIPAS point.
ATS route N318 till GENEX point
ATS route R652 till LOSIL point.
ATS route L513 south till MAZAR point.
Page 13
TACC MATC II
CHAPTER 2
6. MOUAB and OSAMA points.

7. ATS route A412 till ASLON point.
Approach sector contains the following Equipments:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
II.
RADAR Controller Position RCP.

Planner Controller Position PCP.
Two VCS Communications, for Controller and for planner.
Navigation aids Monitor.
Emergency Radio SELEX.
Recording system RC 2000.
MET displays.
West Sector:
West Sector will be responsible for all controlled airspace within Amman FIR
which is located West of the Western boundary along the extension between
DAXEN point and the point located 20 NM west of RASLI on the center line of
ATS route R652 to the Western boundary of Jordan political boundary from
altitude 7000 up to and including FL 340 excluding Amman TMA and Aqaba
Approach below FL255.
The West sector contains the following Equipments:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

One VCS Communications for controller.
Recording system RC2000.
III. East Sector:

The East Sector is responsible for all controlled airspace within Amman FIR which
is located East of the Eastern Boundary of the west sector from its intersection with
Amman FIR boundary at OTILA to SOKAN or NAMBO then ZELAF to RASLI
from ALT 13000 up to and including FL 340 and for all controlled airspace within
Amman FIR, within Jordan political boundaries from FL 350 and above.
The East sector contains the following Equipments:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Two VCS Communications, for controller and planner.
Recording system RC2000.
MET displays.
IV. TACC Supervisor:

Operational Supervisor position contains the following equipments and the
following special functions:
1. Control display.
2. Modification QNH, TL & QFU.
EDITION No. 6
Page 14
TACC MATC II
3.
4.
5.
6.
CHAPTER 2
Sectorization.
Information pages.
Alert area selection.
VCS Communications.
2.2.3. Sector Manning Level:

It is the responsibility of the TACC Supervisor or Watch Supervisor to ensure that
sectors are manned to meet traffic demand. The following manning levels are
given for guidance but the minimum manning levels shall not be reduced.
Controllers allocated to a control position or workstation will carry out a full
handover with the controller they are taking over from and remaining at their
position until relieved.
Note: The hand over shall be not less than 10 minutes.
It is required that supervisors publish a list of controllers work positions and relief
breaks for each duty shift.
Console
#
Name
Required
Endorsement
Control Service
Working
Hours
Min.M.L
Max.M.L
APSE
RADAR Control
For IN & OUT
Bound TFC
and over flying
24 HRs
1 ATCo
2 ATCo
ASE
RADAR Control
For IN & OUT
Bound TFC
and over flying
24 HRs
1 ATCo
2 ATCo
24 HRs
2 ATCo
2 ATCo
24 HRs
1 ATCo
1 ATCo
Terminal
APP PSN
West
WEST PSN
En route
EAST PSN
ASE
RADAR Control
For IN & OUT
Bound TFC
and over flying
TACC
All Positions
ADMINSTRATIVE
&
OPERATIONAL
SUPERVISOR
APSE: Approach Surveillance Endorsement.

ASE: Area Surveillance Endorsement.
Min.M.L: Minimum Manning Level.
Max.M.L: Maximum Manning Level.
Notes:
1. One FDO shall be available in the TACC for 24 HRS, WHEN AVAILABLE.
2. When the Sup. Or his Dep. is on leave; the most Senior ATC will take
over on the Sup. CONSOLE.
EDITION No. 6
Page 15
TACC MATC II
CHAPTER 2
2.2.4 Strip Layout:
1. Call sign category.
10. Route in the F/P.
2. Registration.
11. Destination.
3. Type of the ACFT.
12. ATC Estimate.
4. RVSM status.
13.
5. Flight plan speed.
14. Pilot Estimate.
6. Flight plan ETD.
15. Actual time over head the

reporting position.
7. SSR code.
16. Corrected FL.
8. Point of Departure.
17. Date of Flight.
Position Report.
9. Flight plan FL.

2.3.
INDRA RADAR Center:

INDRA RADAR is an AIRCON 2100 system developed by INDRA " Spain ", a
Secondary Surveillance RADAR with Mode S using RED HAT ENTERPRISE
LINUX 5 with 256 NM range.
2.3.1. INDRA RADAR Control Sectorization:

Every sector in INDRA RADAR center contains the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Two SDD.
Two FDD.
Two VCS GAREKS System units.
VAIZLA Weather Display for Queen Alia Airport.
VAIZLA Weather Display for Amman Airport for TMAA Sector only.
Strip Printer.
DRC SELEX Communication (Aqaba sector not equipped).
I. Approach Sector "TMAA":

Approach control is responsible for the provision of ATS within Amman TMA
below FL 255, excluding the Amman Control Zone and QAI Control Zone below
5500 FT, and the following segments:
EDITION No. 6
Page 16
TACC MATC II
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
CHAPTER 2
ATS route L513 till BUSRA point.

ATS route R652 till KIPAS point.
ATS route N318 till GENEX point
ATS route R652 till LOSIL point.
ATS route L513 south till MAZAR point.
MOUAB and OSAMA points.
ATS route A412 till ASLON point.
Note: For TMA Shape and MVA chart, check Appendix 6.
II. Lower West Sector "ACCW":

Lower West Sector will be responsible for all controlled airspace within Amman FIR
which is located West of the Western boundary along the extension between
DAXEN point and the point located 20 NM west of RASLI on the center line of
ATS route R652 to the Western boundary of Jordan political boundary from altitude
7000 up to and including FL 340 excluding Amman TMA and Aqaba Approach
below FL255.
III.
Aqaba Sector "AQAP":

The Aqaba approach control Sector is responsible for the provision of ATS in the
Aqaba control area (CTA) SEMI-CIRCUIT, lateral limits is 45 NM from AQB/VOR
and the upper ceiling is FL255 and lower limit is ALT 7000 WHEN APPROVED.
Note: Item III above will be applicable when Aqaba Sector is transferred to TACC
operation Room.
IV. Lower East Sector "ACCE":

The East Lower Sector is responsible for all controlled airspace within Amman FIR
which is located east of the eastern boundary of the lower west sector from its
intersection with Amman FIR boundary at OTILA to SOKAN or NAMBO then
ZELAF to RASLI from ALT 13000 up to and including FL 340.
V. Upper East Sector "ACCU ":
East Upper Sector is responsible for all controlled airspace within Amman FIR,
within Jordan political boundaries from FL 350 and above.
EDITION No. 6
Page 17
TACC MATC II
CHAPTER 2
Westbound / Northbound and southbound / eastbound, table of cruising levels:
Sector
West/North Bound Table

of Cruising Level
South/Eastbound Table
of Cruising Levels
Aqaba
App
( AQAP )
A8000, A10000, A12000,

FL160, FL180, FL200,
FL220, FL240 ONLY
WITHIN (AoR).
A7000, A9000, A11000,

A13000, FL150, FL170,
FL190, FL210, FL230,
FL250. ONLY WITHIN
(AoR)
TMA App
( TMAA )
A6000, A8000, A10000,

A12000, FL160, FL180,
FL200, FL220, FL240.
ONLY WITHIN (AoR)
A7000, A9000, A11000,

A13000, FL150, FL170,
FL190, FL210, FL230,
FL250ONLY WITHIN
(AoR).
Lower
West
( ACCW )
FL260, FL280, FL300,

FL320, FL340 Within area
of responsibility all levels
below FL250, can be
assigned, provided that
prior coordination with
TMA approach controller
or Aqaba approach control
FL270, FL290, FL310,

FL330. Within area of
responsibility all levels
below FL250, can be
assigned, provided that
prior coordination with
TMA approach controller
or Aqaba approach control
4.
Lower
East
( ACCE )
FL240, FL260, FL280,

FL300, FL320, FL340.
Fl240 only for overflying
traffic.
Between OTILA-SOKAN
FL250, FL270, FL290,

FL310, FL330FL250 only
for overflying traffic.
Between ZELAF-TRF
5.
Upper
Control
( ACCU )
FL360, FL380, FL400,

FL430
FL350, FL370, FL390,

FL410, FL450
1.
2.
3.
VI. TACC Supervisor:

Operational Supervisor position contains the following equipments:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
CMD.
DBM.
Main SDD with special features and FDD.
Two HP printers.
Two separate telephones.
Door monitor camera.
EDITION No. 6
Page 18
TACC MATC II
VII.
CHAPTER 2
Additional sectors:
1. Flight Data Position: this sector for FDO in Amman TACC, no Sectorization in
this sector.
2. Military Data Position: this sector for military officer in Amman TACC, no
Sectorization or VCS in this sector.
2.3.2. Merging / Splitting Sectors Procedure in Amman TACC:

Due to low volume of traffic, the TMAA sector will merge in one sector and
ACCE, ACCW and ACCU sectors will be merged together which is covered
by local instructions.
When Amman TACC Supervisor is considering merge / split sectors, the following
items should be taken into consideration:
1. Complexity of anticipated traffic.
2. Number of aircraft anticipated (e.g. indicated by number of Flight Progress
Strips, pending departures flight plan in the system).
3. Weather conditions.
4. Non Standard Flights or any other unusual activity within sector jurisdiction,
(e.g. Danger Areas).
5. Equipment redundancies (e.g. RADAR, frequencies), Controllers should
confirm with TACC Supervisor before Merging/Splitting the sector.
6. TACC Supervisor should inform the adjacent ATC unites of the merging /
splitting of a sector if necessary.
When the merging or splitting of a sector has been performed, the following
actions should be taken:
1. Ensure correct frequency/frequencies are selected.
2. Deselect / select telephone lines as appropriate.
3. Advise FDO positions (when available) / assistant as appropriate.
2.3.3. Sector Manning Level:
It is the responsibility of the TACC Supervisor to ensure that sectors are manned to
meet traffic demand. The following manning levels are given for guidance but the
minimum manning levels shall not be reduced.
Controllers allocated to a control position or workstation will carry out a full
handover with the controller they are taking over from and remaining at their
position until relieved.
It is required that supervisors publish a list of controllers work positions and relief
breaks for each duty shift.
EDITION No. 6
Page 19
TACC MATC II
CHAPTER 2
The manning level in case of two sectors (merging):

Console
Required
Endorsement
Control Service
Working
Hours
Min.M.L
Max.M.L
Name
TMAA
APSE
RADAR Control For IN

& OUT Bound TFC
and over flying
24 HRs
1 ATCo
2 ATCo
ACCE
ACCW
ACCU
ASE

& OUT Bound TFC
and over flying
24 HRs
1 ATCo
2 ATCo
TACC
All Positions
ADMINSTRATIVE
&
OPERATIONAL
24 HRs
1 ATCo
1 ATCo
SUP
The manning level in case of five sector (splitting):

Console
Required
Endorsement
Control Service
Working
Hours
Min.M.L
Max.M.L
Name
TMAA
APSE

& OUT Bound TFC
and over flying
24 HRs
1 ATCo
2 ATCo
ACCE
ASE

& OUT Bound TFC
and over flying
24 HRs
1 ATCo
1 ATCo
AQAP
24 HRs
1 ATCo
1 ATCo
ACCW
ASE

& OUT Bound TFC
and over flying
24 HRs
1 ATCo
2 ATCo
ACCU
ASE

& OUT Bound TFC
and over flying
24 HRs
2 ATCo
2 ATCo
TACC
All Positions
ADMINSTRATIVE
&
OPERATIONAL
24 HRs
1 ATCo
1 ATCo
SUP
WHEN AVAILABLE will be running

from Amman TACC
APSE: Approach Surveillance Endorsement.

ASE: Area Surveillance Endorsement.
Min.M.L: Minimum Manning Level.
Max.M.L: Maximum Manning Level.
EDITION No. 6
Page 20
TACC MATC II
CHAPTER 2
Notes:
1. One FDO will be available in the TACC for 24 HRS, WHEN AVAILABLE.
2. When the Sup. Or his Dep. is on leave; the most Senior ATC will take
over on the Sup. CONSOLE.
3. The hand over shall be not less than 10 minutes.
2.3.4 Strip Layout:
I. Departure Strip:
1.
Call sign category.
9.
Flight plan FL.
2.
Type of the ACFT and Weight Category.
10.
Route in the F/P.
3.
Flight plan speed.
11.
Destination Aerodrome.
4.
Surveillance Equipment plus SSR Code.
12.
Position Report.
5.
Flight Rules.
13.
ATC Estimate.
6.
Flight Type.
14.
Airborne Time.
7.
Departure Aerodrome.
15.
Actual Level.
8.
RVSM Status.
16.
Date of Flight.
II. Arrival Strip:
1.
Call sign category.
9.
RVSM Status.
2.
Type of the ACFT and Weight Category.
10.
Flight plan FL.
3.
Flight plan speed.
11.
Route in the F/P.
4.
Registration.
12.
Destination Aerodrome.
5.
Surveillance Equipment plus SSR Code.
13.
Position Report.
6.
Flight Rules.
14.
Estimate Time.
7.
Flight Type.
15.
Actual Level.
8.
Departure Aerodrome.
16.
Date of Flight.
EDITION No. 6
Page 21
TACC MATC II
CHAPTER 2
2.4. Frequencies:
2.4.1. Navigation Aids Frequencies:
Nav.Aids / RWY
Frequency
ID
LLZ CAT II
110.9 MHZ
IQA
G.P
330.8 MHZ
DME
100.7 MHZ
IQA
LLZ CAT II
109.3 MHZ
IQAN
G.P
332.0 MHZ
DME
991 MHZ
IQAN
LLZ CAT II
111.1 MHZ
IQAR
G.P
331.7 MHZ
DME
100.9 MHZ
QA
NDB
410 KHZ
MDB
NDB
399 KHZ
VOR
115.2 MHZ
DME
118.6 MHZ
VOR
112.9 MHZ
76 X
DME
116.3 MHZ
76 X
RWY 26 L
RWY 08 L
RWY 26 R
QAA
CH
46 X
30 X
IQAR
48 X
QAA
99 X
QTR
EDITION No. 6
Page 22
TACC MATC II
CHAPTER 2
Nav.Aids / RWY
Frequency
ID
LLZ CAT I
109.5 MHZ
IAM
G.P
332.6 MHZ
DME
993 MHZ
IAM
32X
DVOR/DME
116.3 MHZ
AMN
110X
LLZ CAT I
110.1 MHZ
IAQA
G.P
334.4 MHZ
DME
999 MHZ
IAQA
LLZ CAT I
110.9 MHZ
IKHA
G.P
330.8 MHZ
DME
100.7 MHZ
AQC
NDB
326 KHZ
AQB
DVOR/DME
113.1 KHZ
RWY 24
AMN
RWY 01
RWY 19
EDITION No. 6
IKHA
CH
38 X
46 X
78 X
Page 23
TACC MATC II
CHAPTER 2
2.4.2. Voice Communication System " VCS " Frequencies:
2.5. Unit Administration:

Amman TACC provides air traffic control service, flight information service and
alerting service, with the aim of achieving air traffic services objectives such as
separating aircraft to prevent collisions, to organize and expedite and maintain an
orderly flow of traffic, and to provide information and other support for pilots such as:
a) Information on the status of navigation aids and other supporting services.
b) MET information as provided by the MET office.
c) Search and rescue when necessary. (Coordination& notification only).
EDITION No. 6
Effective Date:01/02/2017
Page 24
TACC MATC II
CHAPTER 2
2.5.1. Responsibilities and Duties:

I.
TACC Chief Responsibilities "C/ TACC":

TACC Chief is responsible to DANS of QAIA for operation and administration of the
Air Traffic Service, technical standard and management of Amman TACC.
TACC Chief shall:
1. Issue and amend TACC MATC II with DANS and DATM approval.
2. Inspect ATC log book daily.
3. Manage the TACC and ensure ATS services are provided in accordance of national
and international standard regulations.
4. Prepare and issue the ATCo Rosters one week before the effective date.
5. Ensure the serviceability and efficiency of the ATC facilities.
6. Provide guidance to subordinate personnel.
7. Evaluate personnel performance.
8. Ensure that the NOTAM file is kept up-to-date.
9. Ensure that ASRs are copied to DANS and local investigation is commenced.
10. Maintain personal records (Sickness, leave, training, etc.).
11. Maintain Unit Endorsements and medical certificates.
12. Submit to DANS a monthly report covering all aspects of TACC operations.
13. Ensure that all annual leaves or any leave are signed by the watch supervisor and to
report it to DANS.
14. Make annual staff administration reports to DANS.
15. Hold routine meetings with ATC Supervisors.
16. Mange and activate the Search and Rescue Center.
II. TACC Shift Supervisor Responsibilities:

TACC Supervisor is responsible to the Chief of TACC for the safe and efficient
operation of the ATC facility by the duty controllers.
III. TACC Shift Supervisor Duties:
TACC Shift Supervisor shall:
1. Shift Supervise ensure that ATC services are provided in accordance of MATC I
and MATC II.
2. Manage ATC staff to meet the traffic demand.
3. Ensure that all operational equipment & NAV. Aids are serviceable or under
maintenance and the status is recorded in the ATC Logbook and brought to the
attention of controllers.
4. Ensure all shift members holding a valid ATC License and valid medical
certificate.
5. Provide guidance to subordinate personnel.
6. Evaluate personnel performance and make recommendations concerning their
suitability, efficiency and potential.
EDITION No. 6
Page 25
TACC MATC II
CHAPTER 2
7. Maintain discipline during the watch.

8. Ensure that the NOTAM file is kept up-to-date.
9. Handle all incoming phone calls to Amman TACC to ensure that no information is
given about any unusual situations within AMMAN FIR.
10. Ensure ASRs are filed on all violations incidents, etc. during the period of watch.
11. Ensure that all Emergency and VIP flights are closely supervised under his control
or under the control of the most competent controller available.
12. Take over watch from other Supervisors and ensure that all staff is briefed between
watches.
13. Record absence or sick leave in the ATC Logbook.
14. Coordinate and implement flow control.
15. Ensure that all staff is briefed and a full complete handover is carried out between
watches.
Note: The hand over shall be not less than 10 minutes.
16. During weekend holidays, public holidays and out of the daily official duty hours
the TACC supervisors are responsible to manage and activate the RCC
(For more information regarding RCC please refer to SAR Manual).
17. Sign and approve all the annual and official leaves of ATC staff in his shift.
18. Select Sectorization.
19. Grant over flight and /or landing permissions for the following:
a)
b)
c)
d)
IV.
Emergency.
Humanitarian.
Technical.
Re fuelling.
Deputy Shift Supervisor Duties:
Deputy Supervisor shall perform the same responsibilities and duties of TACC supervisor.
V.
Supervisor of OJT Duties:
OJT supervisor is responsible to TACC chief for training of the OJT at QAIA TACC.
OJT supervisor shall:
1. Ensure that OJT is carried out in accordance with MATC I, MATC II and Training
Manual.
2. Record all reports concerning staff training.
3. Record all training hours for all OJT.
4. Submit to TACC chief monthly report covering all aspects of OJT operations,
coaches, and trainees.
5. Prepare all annual checks and or refresher courses.
6. Take part in any panel for ATC ratings, Endorsements and Examinations.
7. Ensure that rating validity for controllers is updated as necessary.
EDITION No. 6
Page 26
TACC MATC II
VI.
CHAPTER 2
SMS officer Duties:
The SMS Officer is responsible to the SMSU Director in close coordination with
DANS of QAIA and Amman TACC Chief for:
1. Work in close consultation and cooperation with DANS of QAIA, TACC Chief and
TACC supervisors.
2. Follow up the compliance of TACC staff, with all SMS responsibilities and
obligations.
3. Assist in personnel training in safety management.
4. Participate in the Implementation of procedures for hazard reporting, analysis,
monitoring of safety performance and assessment.
5. Follow up ICAO recommendations of amendments regarding Annexes and safety
issues.
VII.
RADAR Controller Duties:
RADAR controller is responsible for the executive control of traffic within the sector.
The RADAR controller duties are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Identifying and tracking traffic under his control.

Applying RADAR Failure Procedure when RADAR is not efficient or failed.
Maintaining an up-to-date flight progress display.
Accepting and transferring aircraft to other sectors.
Where coordination is required, ensuring that coordination has been carried out
before aircraft is transferred.
6. Adjusting RADAR display by Carrying out adequate checks on accuracy (Refer to
Alternative Facility Contingency Plan Appendix Para 5.1.1.2).
7. Other duties, which may be assigned by the TACC Shift SUP.
VIII.
Planner Controller Duties:
The main task is to assist the RADAR controller to the maximum extent possible.
The planner controller is responsible for the receipt and dissemination of all data relating to
aircraft movements within the sector. The planner controller duties are:
1. Receiving and processing estimates and revisions and manual preparation of FPLSs
in the event of any degradation in the system or failure.
2. Monitoring the frequency and assisting the RADAR controller in maintaining an
up-to-date flight progress display.
3. Passing estimates, revisions and EATs to the relevant sectors.
4. Alerting the RADAR controller of any apparent conflict evident from the traffic
display, which requires solution.
5. Coordination with the relevant Sectors.
6. In the event of full RADAR failure, assist the RADAR controller in re-establishing
RADAR Failure Procedure.
EDITION No. 6
Page 27
TACC MATC II
IX.
CHAPTER 2
Flight Data Operator Duties " FDO ":
The Flight Data operator " FDO " responsibilities are:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Receive and print estimates from adjacent.

Create, modify and amend flight plan items.
Insert the registration mark in Plan Window for each flight plan when so available.
He is fully responsible for the AFTN receptions.
Validate the ATIS messages.
Amend and update the meteorological information using area forecast reception
bulletins.
7. Archive the over flying permissions, when needed.
8. Archive the overflying FPSs at the end of the day (2359) UTC for TRF, OTILA,
ULINA and GRY positions strip.
Note: When the FDO position not manned, the FDO duties will be assigned to the
Planner Controller.
X.
TACC Examiner:
The TACC examiner is responsible for the conduct of an examination board for a unit
endorsement examination, must ensure:
1. The candidate is fully briefed on:
a) The schedule for the examination board and its constituent parts.
b) The persons involved and their roles in the examination.
2. The candidate and those involved in the examination are appropriately licensed.
3. The unit ATC examiners meet all the licensing requirements to act as a member of
the board.
4. During the oral element of the examination the questions asked conform to
designated approved document.
5. The candidate is fully debriefed following the examination with, if appropriate, the
reasons for failure.
6. The necessary licensing documentation is completed.
7. CARC will issue an official letter of authorization to confirm that a controller is
authorized to act as the TACC Examiner responsible for the conduct of unit
endorsement examinations.
8. The controller who is appropriately licensed supervises the candidate during the
Practical element of the examination.
2.5.2 Control Room Administrations:
2.5.2.1
Hours of Operation:
Amman TACC operates 24/7 as the following table:

SHIFT
First \ Morning
Second \ Evening
Third \ Night
EDITION No. 6
START
0800
1500
2100
END
1500
2100
0800
Note: The time is in Local Time.
Page 28
TACC MATC II
CHAPTER 2
2.5.2.2 Duty Restriction in the Influence of Alcoholic and Drugs:

No ATC shall undertake his functions while he is under the influence of any alcoholic
beverages or any stimulant substances including drugs.
2.5.2.3 Confidentially:
All ATC shall adhere to the confidentiality agreement signed with the Jordan Civil
Aviation Regulatory Commission CARC. Moreover, any ATC shall not discuss any
pertinent issues in the public to VIP, traffic, incidents, accidents, etc.
2.5.2.4 Visitor(s):
Absolutely no unauthorized visitor(s) shall be allowed to have access to Amman TACC
operation room. Only the management shall have the authority to arrange visitation into
Amman TACC operation room by the following:
1. Student tour group(s);
2. Guests for fact finding;
3. Any other group(s) as may be deemed necessary.
Before bringing visitors into Amman TACC operation room, a check shall be made
with the TACC Chief and TACC Supervisor to ensure the traffic situation convenient
or not.
2.5.2.5 Private telephone calls:
No private telephone calls shall be made or accepted in Amman TACC operation
room.
2.5.2.6 Leave:
1. All leave applications must be submitted to TACC Supervisor for approval.
2. TACC Shift Supervisor should not approve more than ONE LEAVE request
from the same watch on the same day unless there are special circumstances.
3. ATC shall be granted sick leave when the employee is unable to perform his
duties because of illness or injury provided that:
a) The employee has the necessary sick leave approve.
b) The ATC satisfies the TACC chief or duty supervisor of this condition in such
manner and at such time as may be determined by the chief of TACC.
c) Otherwise informed by the chief of TACC before or during the period of
illness, a statement signed by the clinician stating that because of illness the
employee was unable to perform the employee's duties.
2.5.2.7 Control Room Discipline:
1. The TACC Shift Supervisor will compile a duty roster at the commencement of
the shift and this will be displayed on the Operations Room notice board.
2. The duty roster will show the sector manning requirements and hours and will
only be varied on the authority of the TACC Shift Supervisor.
EDITION No. 6
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TACC MATC II
CHAPTER 2
3. Smoking, Eating of Food or Drinking are prohibited in the Operation Room.

4. ATCo shall not leave his allocated control position until relieved by another
ATCo or unless the control position is closed down on the instructions of the
Chief of TACC.
5. All staff not allocated to control positions on the Duty Roster will leave the
Operations Room.
6. It is the responsibility of controllers to reach the TACC by any means in the event
that they miss the TACC official transport.
7. On arrival at the TACC, controllers must proceed direct to the control room;
notify their arrival to the TACC Shift Supervisor and be assigned their duty.
2.5.2.8
Radio / Telephone Discipline:

Good R/T Discipline will be observed at all times.
REMEMBER YOU ARE REPRESENTING JORDAN

1.
2.
3.
4.
Use Standard Phraseology at all times.

DO NOT ARGUE.
DO NOT BE AGGRESSIVE.
Accept any criticism or abuse with Standard Phraseology.
"ROGER YOUR MESSAGE IS COPIED"
5. Report any incidents or violations to the TACC Chief.

2.5.2.9
Taking Over Watch:
On taking over watch, controllers shall carry out the following actions:
1. Check the current weather at OJAI, OJAM and OJAQ.
2. Check the Amman Area forecast weather for the period of watch.
3. Check the serviceability and maintenance periods of facilities and Nav. Aids
relevant to Approach Control.
4. Check NOTAMs in force.
5. Check any revisions to procedures.
6. Check the details of any special operations planned during the period of watch.
7. Check the runways in use at OJAI and OJAM and the terminal flow direction.
8. Check the accuracy and completeness of the prepared flight plan data and flight
progress board.
9. Check the traffic situation.
10. Check the serviceability of the ATC equipment and report all deficiencies to the
Chief of TACC.
11. Sign the watch log sheet for the sector.
2.5.2.10 Read-Back Procedure:
Read back requirements have been introduced in the interests of flight safety. The
noncompliance of the read back requirement is directly related to the possible
EDITION No. 6
Page 30
TACC MATC II
CHAPTER 2
seriousness of a misunderstanding in the transmission and reception of ATC

clearances and instructions. Strict adherence to read back procedures ensures, not
only that the clearance has been received correctly but also that the clearance was
transmitted as intended. It also serves as a check that the right aircraft, and only that
aircraft, will take the proper action on the clearance.
To enhance the safety and to use our equipment usefully the RADAR controller
must watch the extended label of the concerned flights to check if the pilots are
complain with ATC clearance or not.
2.5.2.10.1 Purpose:
1. To develop read back procedures and Implementation process.
2. To ensure the effective mechanism for the implementation of read back
procedure.
2.5.2.10.2 Read back of ATC clearances:
a) Flight crew responsibility:
1. The flight crew shall read back to the air traffic controller safety-related parts of
ATC clearances and instructions which are transmitted by voice.
2. Pilot should briefly read back the contents of the following items, included in
ATC clearances, instructions or approvals, transmitted through voice
communication by ATC facility, Mobile Communication Service facility or
International Air-ground Communication Service facility unless ATC facility
instructs not to reply:
a) Clearances or instructions to take-off, land on, cross, taxi on, line up and
hold short of any runway.
b) Clearances or instructions regarding a route of flight including (SID,
Transition and STAR.
c) Clearances or instructions regarding altitude, altitude restrictions, heading
and speed.
d) Holding instruction, approach clearance or go-around instruction.
e) Radio frequency instruction.
f) Conditional clearances or instructions.
3. The use of the term ROGER or WILCO is not an acceptable read back as it
does not allow the controller to confirm or correct the clearance or instruction.
4. The read back message shall always include the flight call sign (flight number \
call sign). The pilot shall not switch immediately to the next sector frequency
following read back of controllers instruction.
5. A pilot should ensure confirmation of read-back is received:
EDITION No. 6
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TACC MATC II
CHAPTER 2
a) Clearances or instructions, including conditional clearances, shall be read

back or acknowledged in a manner to clearly indicate that they have been
understood and will be complied with.
b) SSR codes and Runway in use (except when transmitted simultaneously to
all aircraft hearing the same frequency.)
2.5.2.10.3 Controller responsibility:
1. The controller shall listen to the read-back to ascertain that the clearance or
instruction has been correctly acknowledged by the flight crew.
2. The controller shall listen to the read-back to as certain that the clearance or
instruction has been correctly acknowledged by the flight crew and shall to
take immediate action to correct any descriptions reverted by the read-back..
3. The Controller should pass a clearance slowly and clearly since the pilot needs
to write it down and wasteful repetition will thus be avoided. In any case
controllers should avoid passing a clearance to a pilot engaged in complicated
taxiing maneuvers and on no occasion should a clearance be passed when the
pilot is engaged in line up or take-off maneuvers.
4. The word "take-off" are used only when an aircraft is cleared for take-off, or
when cancelling a take- off clearance. At other times the word "departure" or
"airborne" is used.
5. If an aircraft read back of a clearance or instruction is incorrect, the controller
shall transmit the word "NEGATIVE" followed by the correct version.
6. If there is a doubt as to whether a pilot can comply with an ATC clearance or
instruction or not, the controller may follow the clearance or instruction by the
phrase "if not possible advice", and subsequently offer an alternative.
2.5.2.10.4 Air Traffic Management Responsibility:
1. The ATM establishes appropriate supervisory means to ensure the correct
application of standard phraseology procedures by ATCOs.
2. The ATM implements the recommendation by the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) in Annex 11 Air Traffic Services, paragraph 3.3.3.
stating that: air traffic control units should be equipped with devices that
record background communication and the aural environment at air traffic
controller work stations, capable of retaining the information recorded during
at least the last twenty-four hours of operation.
3. The ATM should review the MATC I & II to ensure that common practices
and local instructions are contained in MATC I & II and that they are not in
contradiction.
4. The ATM should establish written instructions in the MATC I & II and
supervise their operational implementation to ensure the clear and
unambiguous.
5. The ATM should implement back-up communication means.
EDITION No. 6
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TACC MATC II
CHAPTER 2
2.5.2.10.5 Air Traffic Control mechanism for implementation of read-back

clearance:
1. Randomly check to the recorded audio tapes, for all air traffic control units at
least one time monthly.
2. Supervision by the Chiefs of Units to review the Read back.
3. Issuance of corrective action (instructions).
4. Develop of a training program for refined violations of the Procedures.
5. Send and distribute a Read back form for the reviewed tapes for all concerned
units.
EDITION No. 6
Page 33
TACC MATC II
CHAPTER 2
EDITION No. 6
Page 34
CHAPTER THREE
RADAR FAILURE
PROCEDURE
TACC MATC II
RADAR Failure Procedure
CHAPTER 3
3. RADAR Failure Procedure

3.1 In the event of total failure of the ATC RADAR System the following will be
undertaken:
1. ATC shall advise pilots-in-command of the RADAR failure via the appropriate airground channels.
2. All departures may be suspended until aircraft in flight have been provided with
standard separation based on a procedural control (vertical separation) environment
or have landed.
3. As an emergency measure, the use of flight levels spaced by half the applicable
vertical separation minimum (500 FT) may be resorted to temporarily if standard
Non-RADAR Separation cannot be provided immediately.
4. Inbound aircraft will be held over QTR VOR or AMN VOR and inward clearance
will leave the holding areas for an approach to land will be subject to the position
of the preceding aircraft.
5. Departing aircraft may be continued to be regulated according the FPL or SIDs
with the appropriate Slot Time. To assist ATC in providing separation, pilots-incommand of aircraft departing on SIDs shall report established on the flight plan
ATS routes as soon as possible.
6. When RADAR services are re-established, ATC shall notify pilots via the assigned
frequency and the ATIS System. ATC will also take action to re-establish aircraft
identification before providing RADAR services.
7. Pilots shall take note that extended delays to operations may result depending on
the traffic and weather conditions. ATC will attempt to notify pilots of inbound
aircraft of the extent of the delay to enable pilots to decide whether to hold or to
divert without delay.
8. ATC shall transmit on the ATIS advising all pilots-in-command that RADAR
Failure Recovery Procedures are in Operation; all aircraft are to adhere strictly to
ATC instructions.
9. Longitudinal separation will be extended to 10-15 minutes as appropriate as NonRADAR Separation.
10. Flow control may impose during RADAR Failure Procedures if the prevailing
situations will be extended due to long periods malfunction of the surveillance
systems, and submission a NOTAM should be considered.
EDITION No. 6
Page 35
TACC MATC II
RADAR Failure Procedure
CHAPTER 3
EDITION No. 6
Page 36
CHAPTER FOUR
RADAR CONTROL
TACC MATC II
RADAR Control
CHAPTER 4
4. RADAR CONTROL
4.1. General:
RADAR controller shall be responsible for adjusting RADAR display and for carrying
out adequate checks on the accuracy; RADAR controller shall satisfy himself that the
information presented on RADAR display is adequate for the functions to be
performed.
RADAR controller shall report to TACC supervisor any degradation in the equipment
or any circumstances which makes impractical to provide RADAR service.
While using SSR system, especially those utilizing mono pulse technique (TAHLAS)
or having Mode S capability (INDRA), may be used alone in the provision of
separation between aircraft provided:
1. The carriage of SSR transponders is mandatory within the area.
2. Identification is established and maintained.
4.2. Surveillance Identification of aircraft:
4.2.1. Establishment of identification:
Before providing an ATS surveillance service to an aircraft, identification shall be
established and the pilot informed. Thereafter, identification shall be maintained until
termination of the ATS surveillance service.
If identification is subsequently lost, the pilot shall be informed accordingly and, when
applicable, appropriate instructions issued.
4.2.2 SSR identification procedures:
Where SSR is used for identification, aircraft may be identified by one or more of the
following procedures:
I. Recognition of the aircraft identification in a SSR label;
Note: The use of this procedure requires that the code/call sign correlation is
achieved successfully, taking into account the Note following II) below.
II. Recognition of an assigned discrete code, the setting of which has been verified, in
a RADAR label; and
Note: The use of this procedure requires a system of code assignment which
ensures that each aircraft in a given portion of airspace is assigned a discrete
code.
III. Direct recognition of the aircraft identification of a Mode S-equipped aircraft in a
RADAR label;
Note: The aircraft identification feature available in Mode S transponders
provides the means to identify directly individual aircraft on situation displays
and thus offers the potential to eliminate ultimately the recourse to Mode A
EDITION No. 6
Page 37
TACC MATC II
RADAR Control
CHAPTER 4
discrete codes for individual identification. This elimination will only be achieved
in a progressive manner depending on the state of deployment of suitable ground
and airborne installations.
IV. By transfer of identification , by one of the following methods:
1. Designation of the position indication by automated means, provided that only
one position indication is thereby indicated and there is no possible doubt of
correct identification;
2. Notification of the aircrafts discrete SSR code or aircraft address;
Note: Aircraft address would be expressed in the form of the alphanumerical
code of six hexadecimal characters.
3. Notification that the aircraft is SSR Mode S-equipped with an aircraft
identification feature when SSR Mode S coverage is available;
4. Notification that the aircraft is ADS-B-equipped with an aircraft identification
feature when compatible ADS-B coverage is available;
5. Direct designation "pointing with the finger" of the position indication, if the two
situation displays are adjacent, or if a common conference type of situation
display is used;
Note: Attention must be given to any errors which might occur due to parallax
effects.
6. Designation of the position indication by reference to, or in terms of bearing and
distance from, a geographical position or navigational facility accurately indicated
on both situation displays, together with the track of the observed position
indication if the route of the aircraft is not known to both controllers;
Note: Caution must be exercised before transferring identification using this
method, particularly if other position indications are observed on similar
headings and in close proximity to the aircraft under control.
Inherent RADAR deficiencies, such as inaccuracies in bearing and distance of the
RADAR position indications displayed on individual situation displays and parallax
errors, may cause the indicated position of an aircraft in relation to the known point
to differ between the two situation displays. The appropriate ATS authority may,
therefore, prescribe additional conditions for the application of this method, e.g.:
i. A maximum distance from the common reference point used by the two
controllers; and
ii. A maximum distance between the position indication as observed by the
accepting controller and the one stated by the transferring controller.
7. Where applicable, issuance of an instruction to the aircraft by the transferring
controller to change SSR code and the observation of the change by the accepting
controller; or
EDITION No. 6
Page 38
TACC MATC II
RADAR Control
CHAPTER 4
8. Issuance of an instruction to the aircraft by the transferring controller to

squawk/transmit IDENT and observation of this response by the accepting
controller.
Note: Use of procedures 7) and 8) requires prior coordination between the
controllers, since the indications to be observed by the accepting controller are of
short duration.
V. Observation of compliance with an instruction to set a specific code.
VI. Observation of compliance with an instruction to squawk IDENT.
Notes:
1. In automated RADAR systems, the "IDENT" feature may be presented in
different ways, e.g. as a flashing of all or part of the position indication and
associated label.
2. Garbling of transponder replies may produce "IDENT"-type of indication,
nearly simultaneous IDENT transmissions within the same area may give
rise to errors in identification.
4.2.3 ADS-B identification procedures:
Where ADS-B is used for identification, aircraft may be identified by one or more
of the following procedures:
I. Direct recognition of the aircraft identification in an ADS-B label.
II. Transfer of ADS-B identification.
III. Observation of compliance with an instruction to TRANSMIT ADS-B
IDENT.
Notes:
1. Some aircraft equipped with first generation ADS-B avionics do not have the
capability of squawking IDENT while the emergency and/or urgency mode is
selected.
2. In automated systems, the IDENT feature may be presented in different
ways, e.g. as a flashing of all or part of the position indication and associated
label.
4.3. Surveillance Separation Minima:
The RADAR separation minima to be applied as the following table, the RADAR
controller is responsible for increasing the prescribed Minimum in the event of
RADAR technical limitation or prevailing weather conditions, controller workload
and any difficulty caused by communication problems or traffic congestion.
In low visibility conditions, the RADAR controller shall increase the Horizontal
RADAR Separation Minima.
The Horizontal RADAR Separation Minima " HRSM " prescribed for use in
Amman TACC:
EDITION No. 6
Page 39
TACC MATC II
THALES
RADAR
Control
Service
CHAPTER 4
RADAR Control
INDRA
Sector
HRSM
Sector
HRSM
APP
5 NM
TMAA
5 NM
West
5 NM
AQAP
P.S
East
5 NM
ACCW
5 NM
--
--
ACCE
5 NM
--
--
ACCU
5 NM
ADS-B
Monitor
only
PS: Procedure Separation.

Traffic flying via Talaviv FIR the Longitudinal RADAR separation for overflying
traffic shall be 10 NM provided that both aircraft is at constant speed or the preceding
aircraft is faster by 20 KTs or more, but with CAIRO, Saudi Arabia and Syria FIRs
should be 20 NM provided that both aircraft is at constant speed or the preceding
aircraft is faster by 20 KTs or more.
Cairo
Saudi Arabia
Iraq
Syria
Talaviv
RADAR
Separation
20 NM
20 NM
20 NM
20 NM
10 NM
RADAR
Failure
Procedure
5 MIN
5 MIN
5 MIN
5 MIN
10 MIN
National
Contingency
Plan
15 NM
15 NM
15 NM
15 NM
15 NM
Note: Jeddah and Riyadh ACCs require if the UPS equipment is not operative
from one side, the RADAR separation will be increased from 20 NM to 30 NM.
4.4. Mode C Verification and Errors:
Verification of pressure-altitude-derived level information displayed to the controller
shall be effected at least once by each suitably equipped ATC unit on initial contact
with the aircraft concerned or, if this is not feasible, as soon as possible thereafter. The
verification shall be effected by simultaneous comparison with altimeter-derived level
information received from the same aircraft by radiotelephony.
EDITION No. 6
Page 40
TACC MATC II
RADAR Control
CHAPTER 4
The pilot of the aircraft whose pressure-altitude-derived level information is within the
approved tolerance value need not be advised of such verification. Geometric height
information shall not be used to determine if altitude differences exist.
4.4.1 Mode C Verification:
The accuracy of Mode C reporting is affected by: aircraft altimeter accuracy and
pressure setting. Aircraft deviation from the nominal cleared level ATC system
processing.
1. The criterion which shall be used to determine that a specific level is occupied by
an aircraft shall be 60 m (200 ft) in RVSM airspace.
In other airspace, it shall be 90 m (300 ft), except that the appropriate ATS
authority may specify a smaller criterion, but not less than 60 m (200 ft), if this
is found to be more practical.
2. Aircraft maintaining a level: An aircraft is considered to be maintaining its
assigned level as long as the pressure-altitude-derived level information indicates
that it is within the appropriate tolerances of the assigned level, as specified in
Point 1.
3. Aircraft vacating a level: An aircraft cleared to leave a level is considered to
have commenced its maneuver and vacated the previously occupied level when
the pressure-altitude-derived level information indicates a change of more than 90
m (300 ft) in the anticipated direction from its previously assigned level.
4. Aircraft passing a level in climb or descent: An aircraft in climb or descent is
considered to have crossed a level when the pressure-altitude-derived level
information indicates that it has passed this level in the required direction by more
than 90 m (300 ft).
5. Aircraft reaching a level: An aircraft is considered to have reached the level to
which it has been cleared when the elapsed time of three display updates, three
sensor updates or 15 seconds, whichever is the greater, has passed since the
pressure-altitude-derived level information has indicated that it is within the
appropriate tolerances of the assigned level, as specified in Point 1.
4.4.2 Mode C Errors:
1. The displayed level information is not within the approved tolerance value or
when a discrepancy in excess of the approved tolerance value is detected
subsequent to verification, the pilot shall be advised accordingly and requested to
check the pressure setting and confirm the aircrafts level.
2. If following confirmation of the correct pressure setting the discrepancy continues
to exist, the following action should be taken according to circumstances:
a) Request the pilot to stop Mode C or ADS-B altitude data transmission,
provided this does not cause the loss of position and identity information, and
notify the next control positions or ATC unit concerned with the aircraft of the
action taken; or
EDITION No. 6
Page 41
TACC MATC II
RADAR Control
CHAPTER 4
b) Inform the pilot of the discrepancy and request that the relevant operation
continue in order to prevent loss of position and identity information of the
aircraft and, when authorized by the appropriate ATS authority, override the
label-displayed level information with the reported level. Notify the next
control position or ATC unit concerned with the aircraft of the action taken.
4.4.3 Phraseology:
ATC: CHECK ALTIMETER SETTING, CONFIRM the (level).
ATC: STOP SQUAWK CHARLIE WRONG INDICATION.
Reference: DOC 4444, Chapter 12, point 12.4.3.12
4.5.
4.5.1.
SSR Codes:
General:
Jordan is part of the Middle East Region SSR code allocation plan. All states in the
region are allocated code blocks from the Mode A codes.
4.5.2.
SSR Code Failure:

If known traffic is not identified due to aircraft SSR failure, non-RADAR separation
must be used, and coordination is required with the next control unit for acceptance.
4.5.3.
Inbound SSR code assignment:

Inbound traffic to any Jordanian aerodrome will be code allocated by either:
1. Origination control unit or from the first country in the region and will be
accepted when receiving the estimate message.
2. Amman TACC will allocate a code to any inbound aircraft that does not have an
allocated code, or conflicts with any other assigned code, from the block 0400
0477.
4.5.4.
Over fly SSR code assignment:

1. Amman TACC will accept this code as a part of the estimate message, and use it
for the flight in Amman FIR, and pass it with the estimate message to the next
FIR.
2. Amman TACC will allocate a code to any overflying traffic that does not have
an allocated code, or conflicts with any other assigned code, from the block 0700
0777.
4.5.5.
Outbound SSR code assignment:

1. Amman TACC will allocate a code for outbound traffic from the block 0700
0777.
2. All outbound traffic via Talaviv FIR, Talaviv ACC will pass the code to Amman
TACC.
EDITION No. 6
Page 42
TACC MATC II
4.5.6.
RADAR Control
CHAPTER 4
Domestic SSR Codes:

1. Local flights will be allocated a code from the block 1101 1177.
2. Military flights will be allocated a code from the block 2400 2477.
Note: SSR code 2401 is reserved for VVIP helicopter flight.
3. Aviation training academies flights will be allocated a code from the block 2200
2277.
EDITION No. 6
Page 43
TACC MATC II
CHAPTER 4
RADAR Control
4.5.7. Regional SSR Codes assignment:
STATE FIR
Domestic
Code
Domestic
Code
Transit Code
Amman
0400 0477
1101 1177
2400 2477
0700 0777
Baghdad
7400 7477
Bahrain
2100 2177
2700 2777
Beirut
2500 2577
Cairo
0600 0677
2700 2777
Damascus
3000 3077
Emirates
0400 0477
6000 6077
0600 0677
6100 6177
0500 0577
3400 3477
1700 1777
6200 6277
Jeddah
0100 0177
3500 3577
3000 3077
0200 0277
5000 5077
3100 3177
5200 5277
4500 4577
4200 4277
Khartoum
1200 1277
5200 5277
5300 5377
0100 0177
Kuwait
0600 0677
Muscat
6600 6677
4600 4677
Sanaa
3700 3777
Tehran
1101 1177
6700 - 6777
Tripoli
1300 1377
Transit Code
1000 1077
1200 1277
2200 2277
4400 4477
2600 2677
4300 4477
2300 2377
1600 1677
7300 7377
3300 3377
5700 5777
1400 1477
6500 6577
4000 4077
4700 4777
7001 7077
4100 4177
1500 1577
6300 6377
3600 3677
4000 4077
Reference: ANSIG / 1 WP / 20 ( 03/02/2015 )
EDITION No. 6
Page 44
CHAPTER FIVE
TMA and AREA

PROCEDURES
TACC MATC II
TMA & Area Procedure
CHAPTER 5
5. TMA and AREA Procedure

5.1. General:
The Amman TMA inbound and outbound traffic will be cleared on the system of
SID's or STAR's or RNAV procedures.
Traffic will only be cleared on non standard routes in the following circumstances:
1. Emergency.
2. Medical Flights.
3. Weather Conditions.
4. If RADAR Service is provided.
Classification of Jordan Airspace:
1. Class A: Class A comprises all controlled airspace within Amman FIR above
FL150.
2. Class C: Class C comprises all controlled airspace within Amman FIR
at FL 150 or below.
3. Class G: Class G comprises the rest of Amman FIR.
5.2. Departure Flights Procedure:
Departures are the responsibility of Approach Unit.
Ground controller shall request startup clearance from Approach Unit for all
departing IFR. APP will issue ATC clearances as early as practicable, and it shall
include:
1.
2.
3.
4.
SID designators " Conventional or RNAV ."

Standard outbound level or a lower level if required.
Any other restrictions such as "take-off time."
Any other information or restrictions such as "SSR code, level restrictions,
speed or rate of climb restrictions."
Traffic proceeding via RALNA or MUVIN SIDs, Approach Unit will request SSR
code and QNH from Tel Aviv and pass it to the Tower unit as soon as possible.
Tower Unit shall obtain release clearance from Approach Unit for all departing IFR
traffic.
Approach Unit shall release traffic for departure subject to traffic situation.
5.2.1 Outbound Silent RADAR Handover:
1.
2.
3.
4.
It is clear of traffic holding in the TMA.

It is climbing to the standard outbound or agreed level.
RADAR is fully serviceable with Mode C functioning.
It is not subject to any restriction of speed or heading " own navigation".
EDITION No. 6
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TACC MATC II
CHAPTER 5
5. "10 NM" should be between successive departures.

6. Otherwise, normal RADAR handover must be carried out.
5.2.2 Standard Outbound Levels:
Outbound traffic will only be climbed to the standard outbound levels shown
below " Table 5-1 ".
Traffic will only be climbed above these levels under the following conditions:
a) Traffic is airborne and satisfactory two-way radio communication has been
established.
b) Either RADAR Failure Procedure is established or traffic is under RADAR
control.
c) Coordination has been established with the en-route sector before traffic
climbs above the standard outbound levels.
Table 5-1
TMA ENTRY FIX
Standard
Outbound Level
LOSAR
FL 150
LUDAN
FL 150
QTR
FL 150
KULDI
FL 150
ELOXI
FL 150
If the pilot unable to comply with the ATC instructions, the pilot should advice ATC
ASAP, the ATC can instruct the pilot to proceed to the nearest hold or RADAR
vectoring to gain height.
5.3. Arrival Flights Procedure:
1. INDRA system will automatically print and indicate in the inbound list in the
Tower Unit, all inbound estimates in sufficient time prior to the ETA.
2. In case INDRA system is unserviceable. Approach Unit shall pass EAT to
the Tower Unit 15 MIN earlier; any revision more than 3 min shall be
passed.
3. Approach Unit will pass Tower check before the release of traffic.
EDITION No. 6
Page 46
TACC MATC II
CHAPTER 5
4. Any other information requested shall be passed as soon as possible, like:

POB, reason of flight.
5. Approach Unit passes final approach checks " TWR check, Sequence and
Revisions more than 3 minutes "
5.3.1 Inbound Silent RADAR Handover :
a) Inbound Traffic must be released to Approach Unit vertically separated at entry
point otherwise RADAR handover procedure shall take effect.
b) Inbound Silent RADAR Handover:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Aircraft descending to a standard inbound level or agreed level.

Aircraft flying " own navigation " and is not subject to any heading or speed
restrictions.
RADAR is fully serviceable with Mode C functioning.
"10 NM" should be between successive arrivals.
Traffic should be released at or before TMA entry points. Otherwise, normal
handover must be carried out.
Otherwise, normal RADAR handover must be carried out.
5.3.2 Standard Inbound Levels:

To ensure separation from outbound traffic, inbound traffic will not be cleared
below the following standard inbound levels shown below " Table 5-2 " until clear
of the SIDs unless coordinated with Approach Unit.
Table 5-2
5.4.
TMA ENTRY FIX
Standard
Inbound Level
LOSAR
FL 160
LUDAN
FL 160
QTR
FL 160
KULDI
FL 160
ELOXI
FL 160
PBN Procedure within AMMAN FIR " RNAV Procedure ":
5.4.1 Description:
Amman is implementing PBN Procedures, RNAV 5 for en-route and RNAV 1 for
SIDs and STARs profiles and RNP 0.3 for approaches.
EDITION No. 6
Page 47
TACC MATC II
CHAPTER 5
PBN operations satisfy required track accuracy for at least 95% of the flight time in
accordance with the requirements set out in ICAO Doc.7030 and Doc. 9613.
Equipped aircraft will operate within PBN airspace and shall be certified for PBN
operation that based on navigation sensors of GNSS.
5.4.2 General Procedures:
All published RNAV TMA instrument flight procedures are based only on GNSS, and
doesnt depend on any ground navigational equipment.
RNAV procedures are available to those aircraft with RNAV capability. This could be
confirmed by checking the FPL item 10ANavigation Equipment and the
corresponding details item 18 which is reflected on INDRA RADAR System on
NAV/COM field and field 18, or by RADIO call.
Controllers should confirm the compliance of the traffic to perform an RNAV
procedure by refer to item 10 in the flight plan:
Traffic shall be within RADAR coverage and identified.
Traffic could be vectored prior to the IAFs (Initial Approach Fixes) for sequencing
purposes, considering the Surveillance Minimum Altitude chart (SMA), and then
cleared to resume navigation to the IAF for either to continue the RNAV Approach or
to enter the associated holding pattern for further delaying actions, further more traffic
could be vectored to the IAFs (Initial Approach Fixes) directly.
In case of any failure of the GNSS system reported or performance degradation below
the required navigation performance, the APP controller will carry on an alternative
mean of navigation; subsequent ATC action will take place with the respect to the
nature of the failure to other traffic and to over all traffic situation and might revert to
a conventional means of navigation, phraseology to be used to indicate deficiency of
GNSS system:
1. GNSS REPORTED UNRELIABLE (or GNSS MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE
[DUE TO INTERFERENCE]);
2. IN THE VICINITY OF (location) (radius) [BETWEEN (levels)]; or IN THE
AREA OF (description) (or IN (name) FIR) [BETWEEN (levels)];
3. BASIC GNSS UNAVAILABLE FOR(specify operation) [FROM (time) TO
(time) (or UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE)]; ) BASIC GNSS UNAVAILABLE
[DUE TO (reason, e.g. LOSS OF RAIM or RAIM ALERT)];
4. UNABLE RNP (specify type) (or RNAV) [DUE TO (reason, e.g. LOSS OF
RAIM or RAIM ALERT)].
In reference to PBN applications in Amman FIR as a supplemental mean of
navigation, most of commercial aircraft found to be able to comply with RNAV SIDs
and STARs, and prefer to follow these procedures as published.
EDITION No. 6
Page 48
TACC MATC II
CHAPTER 5
5.5. Holding Areas:

1. AMN VOR Hold:
Holding fix
Inbound
Turns direction
Outbound
MHA
Maximum holding level
AMN VOR
R241 (track 061o)
Left
1 MIN
6000 FT
13000 FT
2. QAA VOR "LOW LEVEL Hold":

Holding fix
Inbound
Turns direction
Outbound
Minimum holding level
QAA VOR
R077 (track 257o)
Right
1 MIN
6000 FT
FL 180
3. QAA VOR "HIGH LEVEL Hold":

Holding fix
Inbound
Turns direction
Outbound
QAA VOR
R189 (track 009o)
Right
1 MIN
FL 190
FL 300
4. QTR VOR Hold :

Holding fix
QTR VOR
Inbound
R081 (track 261o)
Turns direction
Right
Outbound
1 MIN
9000 FT
Inbound QTR R261; turn right, outbound for one-minute.
Minimum Holding Level
9000 FT ALT.
Maximum Holding Level
FL180.
Note: Holding must be contained within 15NM to the East of QTR for separation
purposes.
EDITION No. 6
Page 49
TACC MATC II
CHAPTER 5
5. MDB NDB / QAA DME Hold:

Holding fix
MDB NDB
Inbound
bearing 077 (track 077o)
Turns direction
Right
Outbound
1 MIN
6000 FT
11000 FT
Inbound MDB track 077, turn right, outbound for one minute.
Minimum Holding Level
6000 FT.
Maximum Holding Level
11000 FT.
6. BAKIR FIX Hold:
Holding fix
Inbound
Turns direction
Outbound
Emergency holding level
BAKER (AQB R042 07NM)

R042 (track 222o)
Left
1 MIN
8000 FT
FL 180
7000 FT
Restriction: The hold must be contained within Aqaba APP Control Area
boundaries, and associated hold shall serve traffic proceeding to or departing
from Aqaba/King Hussein International Aerodrome.
BAKIR FIX: 293930N 0350530E, AQB R042-07NM, QTR R206-107NM.
METSA to BAKIR Track 206 -14NM.
Notes:
1. Pilots are requested to relay their messages to King Hussein Tower on FREQ
118.1 or 119.2MHz whenever they are unable to maintain two ways
communication with Amman Terminal Area Control Center (TACC).
2. All operations below 7000FT ALT will be in accordance with Visual Flight
Rules, and controlled by King Hussein Tower within CTR and controlled by
Aqaba Approach within CTA.
EDITION No. 6
Page 50
TACC MATC II
CHAPTER 5
7. Separation between holding areas:
5.6
Holds
Altitude
AMN QAA
MAX ALT 13000
MDB - QAA
MAX ALT 11000
MDB - QAA
MAX ALT 11000
AMN - MDB
MAX ALT 11000
MDB QTR
MAX ALT 11000
QTR QAA
MAX FL180
Co-ordination Procedures :
5.6.1 General and Flight planning between Approach Unit and Tower Unit:
1. Safety and expedition are the prime responsibilities of both ATC units.
2. Adequate coordination between ATC units is to be maintained to ensure continuity
in service and a safe, expeditious flow of air traffic.
3. When attempting to increase expedition, consideration must always be given to the
possible detrimental effect on safety.
4. Where controllers work together, every effort should be made to monitor each
other's actions, thus providing an additional safeguard against errors or omissions.
5. A controlled flight shall be under the control of ONLY ONE air traffic control
unit at any given time.
6. The Approach controller is responsible for coordination of IFR and controlled
VFR flights inbound and outbound.
7. Prevailing weather, Runway condition, Equipment, Navigational Aids and any
other information essential to aircraft operation shall be exchanged between the
two units.
8. In case of Emergency both Units should follow the procedures in TACC MATC
II, Chapter 11, Airport Emergency Plan and amendments.
9. Tower Unit is responsible for:
a) Modifying and updating the departure FPL according to the ATC clearance.
b) Creating any departure flight plan from Amman / Marka Airport which is
not available or lost from the RADAR system for any reason.
10. Amman TACC is responsible for any modification in the "Q Summary" in
FDDs.
EDITION No. 6
Page 51
TACC MATC II
CHAPTER 5
5.6.2 Visual Approach:

Visual approach may only be approved when requested by the pilot provided that:
1. The aircraft is number ONE for Approach.
2. The controller is satisfied that a visual Approach is acceptable in the
prevailing traffic and possible in prevailing weather.
3. Coordination is affected with Tower Unit.
4. Traffic will be cleared to the minimum vectoring altitude (for Amman Marka
Airport 6000 FT), Traffic will be released to TWR after passing 5 DME
AMN or having " airfield or runway" in sight and clear from APP traffic.
5. Traffic will be cleared to the minimum vectoring altitude (for Queen Alia
Airport 4000 FT) and will be released to the Tower Unit as coordinated or
having " airfield or runway" in sight and clear from APP traffic.
Note: Succeeding arrival traffic will not be cleared for visual approach until
preceding one is landed or landing is assured, and each request for visual
approach will be handled individually (traffic shall not be sequenced behind
each other as they might loss visual contact).
5.6.3 Runway Change Procedure:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Runway change will be initiated by Tower Unit.

Coordination will be effected with Approach.
Runway changes will take-effect when traffic situation permits.
ATC clearances for departure traffic should be revised.
Alternative course of action will be considered, if so required, but if the wind
component urged, the change of the runway would normally occur, arrivals
will be subject to delay action.
Notes:
1. Tailwind component shall not exceed 5 KTS. lCAO doc 4444.
2. When the crosswind component, including gusts, exceeds 28 km/h
(15 KTS), or the tailwind component, including gusts, exceeds 9 km/h
(5KTS).
3. Tailwind shall not exceed more than 5 KTS, when nomination runway
in use, if the tailwind is more than 5 KTS and less than 10 KTS it should be
pilot request and his responsibilities to use runway other than runway in use,
if the traffic permits, when the tail wind is more than 10 KTS its forbidden
and the main RWY for operation is the one its QFU is against wind direction.
4. Crosswind component shall not exceed l0 KTS according to the table and
lCAO Doe 4444. With pilot approval.
EDITION No. 6
Page 52
TACC MATC II
CHAPTER 5
5.6.4 VFR Traffic Procedures:

It is the direct responsibility of the pilot using VFR corridor V1 to avoid collision
with other Aircraft and maintain VFR.
For light aircraft and military fixed wings:
1. South bound ( 4000 FT QNH ).
2. North bound ( 4500 FT QNH ).
For helicopters north and south bound ( 3500 FT QNH ).
5.6.4.1 Operating Rules:
Pilots are required to comply with the following operating rules:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Maintain VMC.
Maintain a continuous listening watch on the required ATC frequency.
Make Visual position reports at the mandatory reporting points.
Follow ATC instructions.
Advice ATC if unable to comply with ATC instructions.
Pass "Operation Normal" reports to Queen Alia Control Tower every 15
minutes while operating within the training area.
5.6.4.2 Visual Flight Rules:

a) VFR flights shall not be operated:
1. Between 30 minutes after Sunset until 30 minutes before Sunrise.
2. Above FL 150.
b) Night VFR Flights within Amman/Marka Airport may be authorized by
CARC CEO provided that;
1. VFR minimum exists in the aerodrome traffic circuit.
2. Only 3 Aircraft are cleared for night flying in the circuit and 2 Helicopters.
3. At least 48 hours notice is provided.
5.6.4.3 SVFR at Amman / Marka CTR:
SVFR flights may be authorized to operate locally within a Control Zone, enter a
Control Zone for the purpose of landing , take off and depart from a Control Zone
provided that :
1. Ground visibility is not less than 1500 meter.
2. Traffic condition permit.
3. Approval from Approach Unit " request shall be handled individually" .
4. The aircraft is equipped with two way radio communications.
5. FPL shall be submitted to ATS reporting office at least 15 minutes before
EOBT.
6. SVFR should be clear of clouds.
7. Clearance to aircraft will be issued as follows:
EDITION No. 6
Page 53
TACC MATC II
CHAPTER 5
"CLEARED TO ENTER CONTROL ZONE BOUNDARY SVFR MAINTAIN

CLEAR OF CLOUDS AND IN SIGHT OF THE SURFACE."
5.6.5
Diversion Procedure:
In case of any traffic request to divert to Amman / Marka Airport or Queen Alia
Airport, the Approach Unit shall:
1. Inform the concerned Tower unit stating the diversion reason and diverted
flight information.
2. The Tower Unit should inform the Approach unit if this flight has a valid
landing permission or not.
3. Any other essential information.
5.6.6 Miscellaneous Operations:

5.6.6.1 The following information shall immediately be coordinated between Tower
Unit and Approach Unit:
1. Missed approach.
2. Diversion.
3. Closure of the airport.
4. Fuel Spillage.
5. Maneuvering area situation.
6. Bird constraint.
7. Runway condition, Status of equipment, if degraded.
8. NOTAM.
9. Equipment status.
10. Any other relevant information.
5.6.6.2 Communication between the Approach Unit and Tower Unit shall be carried
out by any means of:
1. Direct Lines Available.
2. AFTN When necessary.
3. Other means available.
EDITION No. 6
Page 54
CHAPTER SIX
AMMAN / MARKA
AIRPORT PROCEDURES
TACC MATC II
CHAPTER 6
OJAM Procedures
6. Amman / Marka Airport Procedures:

6.1. General:
Amman Control Zone
AMMAN CTR
320356.10518N 355159.09688E
320356.10741N 361059.12258E
1.
Designation and lateral limits
321026.11481N 362759.14456E
320426.11076N 363659.15768E
315256.09991N 362529.14390E
315256.09547N 354659.09195E
2.
Vertical limits
SFC to 5500 FT ALT
3.
Airspace classification
ATS unit call sign
Amman TWR
Language(s)
English, Arabic
Transition altitude
13000 FT AMSL
4.
5.
6.2. Co-ordination Procedures :

6.2.1 Departure Flights Release Procedure :
TWR shall release departure traffic to Approach Unit as soon as possible when clear
from aerodrome traffic, or as follows:
1. At or before ORKAB point for Runway 24, for Runway 06 at or before
AMN.
2. Immediately after airborne when IMC prevails or entering IMC conditions.
3. When requested by APP as soon as possible after it is clear from circuit traffic.
Academy Traffic requesting to proceed IFR to QTR, JAFER Airbase or AQABA
should submit flight plan and to follow standard instrument departure.
Tower shall coordinate SVFR with Approach Unit.
6.2.2 Conventional Arrival Flights Release Procedure :
Inbound traffic will be released to Approach Unit at the TMA entry point, or at any
other point agreed by coordination (Conventional or RNAV entry point), otherwise
Approach Unit shall release arrival traffic to AMM TWR, when:
1. Out bound AMN VOR leaving 6000 FT on the instrument approach.
2. During straight in approach for ILS Runway 24, Tower check will be made at
20 NM and release of control at 10 NM from touchdown and over NIVLU
point for RNAV Approaches.
EDITION No. 6
Page 55
TACC MATC II
OJAM Procedures
CHAPTER 6
3. In poor weather condition traffic will not be released until " field or runway " is
in sight provided that cloud base and RVR not less than aerodrome minima
according to CAT I requirements.
4. In visual approach the traffic will maintain 6000 FT and TWR will advise 6000
FT vacant, release of control to TWR after passing 5 DME AMN.
Notes:
1. During IMC conditions where the minima below the CAT I requirements
ATC shall indicate the attention by not able to issue and ATC clearance
and the aerodrome in such conditions will be considered closed.
2. Take off weather minimums for IFR flights are as follows:
a) AIRCRAFT CAT A AND B
RVR 400M.
b) AIRCRAFT CAT C AND D
RVR 400M.
6.2.3 RNAV Arrival Procedures:
Approach Unit should:
1. If the traffic is commencing an RNAV Approach, Approach Unit should pass
this information to the TWR as soon as possible, not later than IAFs (IVADO,
LOXER, MUSAL and EMILO).
2. Tower check is required shortly prior the traffic leaves the IAFs (IVADO,
LOXER, MUSAL, EMILO).
3. Approach Unit will release the traffic to the TWR on final approach track, in
these cases:
a) Passing waypoint NIVLU.
b) Passing waypoint SOLOL.
4. Landing interval for successive inbound traffic for both RWYs is: 10NM.
5. In case of traffic cleared to enter MUSAL hold either for the APP RWY06 or
Missed APP RWY24, coordination shall take place with the ADOC by APP.
As the holding pattern could extend outside the TMA to the north.
6. MUSAL EMILO holds are considered as one hold, traffic in these holding
patterns shall be vertically separated from each other.
7. EMILO RESOS holds are considered as one hold, traffic in these holding
patterns shall be vertically separated from each other.
Notes:
1. In case of RWY24 is in use, traffic should be at NIVLU at 7200 ft descending,
APP will keep monitoring the traffic until it vacating 6000ft.
2. In case of RWY06 is in use, traffic should be at SOLOL at 5500ft descending.
3. If the traffic is performing RNAV RWY24 APP via IVADO, close
coordination shall take place between the two units as this procedure has no
holding pattern fits, and this traffic shall be cleared for the approach upon
reaching IVADO.
EDITION No. 6
Page 56
TACC MATC II
OJAM Procedures
CHAPTER 6
4. In case of missed approach, TWR shall clear the takeoff path from any other
traffic may be operating in the vicinity of the aerodrome, and shall advice APP
immediately.
6.3. Landing Intervals:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
7 minutes procedural, RWY 24 in use.

5 minutes when RADAR in use, RWY 24 in use.
10 minutes procedural or RWY 06 in use.
10 NM in RNAV.
For straight-in approaches:
a) 10 NM provided RADAR in use.
b) 20 NM procedural.
Note: Priority will be given for arrival traffic over the departure, except for VIP
flight and for those which are experiencing weather deterioration and up normal
situations, Such as (certain military flights, urgent ambulance etc.
Succeeding aircraft will be released for Amman tower when preceding aircraft is:
1. RWY 24: Passing VOR in bound.
2. RWY 06: Traffic in base leg and landing is assured.
6.4. Training Flights Procedure:
IFR Training request standard SID to QTR, JAFER Airbase or AQABA will be
approved subject to traffic situation, considering the following:
1. QTR hold shall not exceed 3 Aircraft at the same time.
2. Practicing Instrument approaches will only be permitted if it does not cause
delay to IFR traffic.
Coordination between the Approach Unit and AMM TWR as appropriate shall be
effected also in the following cases:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Aerobatics and parachute jumping.

Suspension of VFR.
Operation of SVFR.
Night flying.
Glider operation.
Military exercises, or special operations.
Recall of academy flights due to deteriorating weather conditions.
Air force traffic joining from the North or from the East requesting straight in
approach, shall be coordinated between the two ATC units, Amman tower and
Approach Unit.
EDITION No. 6
Page 57
TACC MATC II
6.5
CHAPTER 6
OJAM Procedures
Approach Procedure:
Instrument Approach/Missed Approach Procedures, Amman/Marka
International Airport (OJAM)
Aerodrome elevation: 2556 FT,
RWY 24 THR ELEV: 2459 FT,
RWY 06 THR ELEV: 2556 FT,
MSA: 5400FT, 25NM FROM ARP.
CIRCLING: All aircraft types 4000 FT (1445FT QFE), both RWYs.
6.5.1 Runway 24 :
6.5.1.1 ILS RWY 24:
When cleared for the approach, commence a 45o / 180o procedure turn from AMN
to establish the ILS as follows:
- Outbound AMN R061, for 1 MIN. (AMN 03 DME), descends to 4600 FT.
- Turn right 45o, track 106o, for 1 MIN.
- Turn left 180o to establish ILS RWY 24. Descend on the glide path to DA/H
Initial Approach Altitude
Minimum Holding Altitude
Descend in procedure turn to
No GP (LOC ONLY) Cross AMN (3.4
NM TCH)
MDA
DA/H
straight-in CAT 1
No GPApproach
(LOC ONLY)
A
2728(270)
ALT (Height)
FT 6000
6000
4600 (2142)
3650 (1190)
2850 (392)
B
C
2738(280) 2748(290)
2848 (390)
D
2758(300)
6.5.1.2 VOR RWY 24:

When cleared for the approach, commence a 45o / 180o procedure turn from AMN
to establish the inbound track as follows:
- Outbound AMN R061, for 1 MIN. (AMN 03 DME), descends to 4600FT.
- Turn right 45o, track 106o, for 1 MIN.
- Turn left 180o to intercept AMN R061 inbound.
- After passing AMN continue on AMN R241, descend to MDA.

SDF AMN 3.55 DME
SDF AMN
MDA
EDITION No. 6
ALT (Height) FT
6000
6000
4600 (2142)
4600 (2142)
3650 (1190)
3260 (802)
3261
Page 58
TACC MATC II
OJAM Procedures
CHAPTER 6
6.5.1.3 Missed Approach RWY 24:

Aircraft initiating missed approach will climb on RWY heading to 5000FT (2542FT
QFE) then turn right to 360 and contact ATC for further instructions.
6.5.2
Runway 06 :
6.5.2.1 VOR RWY 06:

When cleared for approach, leave AMN VOR on outbound Radial 061 after one minute
(03 DME), Commence procedure turn, turn right continue descent to intermediate
approach altitude to intercept radial 061 inbound to AMN VOR after passing AMN /
VOR break to right to join left hand down wind (circle to land left base ).
6000 FT ALT
6000 FT ALT
4600 FT ALT (2142 FT QFE)
AMN/VOR
4000 FT ALT (1192 QFE)
EDITION No. 6
Page 59
TACC MATC II
OJAM Procedures
CHAPTER 6
EDITION No. 6
Page 60
CHAPTER SEVEN
QUEEN ALIA AIRPORT
PROCEDURES
TACC MATC II
OJAI Procedures
CHAPTER 7
7. Queen Alia Airport Procedures:

7.1. General:
Queen Alia Control Zone

QUEEN ALIA CTR
315256.09991N 362529.14390E
313126.08290N 362959.15323E
312826.07583N 354859.09862E
314256.08680N 354259.08822E
315256.09547N 354659.09195E
1.
Designation and lateral limits
2.
Vertical limits
SFC to 5500 FT ALT
3.
Airspace classification
4.
ATS unit call sign

Language(s)
Queen Alia TWR

English, Arabic
5.
Transition altitude
13000 FT AMSL
7.2. Co-ordination Procedures :

7.2.1 Departure Flights Procedure:
TWR shall release departing traffic to Approach Unit as soon as possible when clear
from aerodrome traffic, or as follows:
1. Passing 5000 FT.
2. Immediately after airborne when IMC prevails or entering IMC.
3. When requested by APP.
Airborne time shall be passed immediately to Approach Unit, when RADAR system
is not serviceable.
Before vectoring any departure traffic, Approach Unit will consider V1 corridor is
active and assure procedural separation unless otherwise coordinated.
7.2.2 Conventional Arrival Flights Release Procedure:
A special check of position will be made to the Tower either:
1. Beacon inbound " QAA or MDB ".
2. 8 - 10 NM when Radar is in use.
3. Before entering the aerodrome traffic area 5 NM for visual approach and
passing 6000 FT if RADAR is not in use.
4. Over IAF for RNAV ( Refer to Para 7.2.4).
EDITION No. 6
Page 61
TACC MATC II
OJAI Procedures
CHAPTER 7
Approach Unit shall release arrival traffic to Queen TWR when:

1. On final approach before QAA on westerly operation when RADAR in use.
2. On final approach before MDB on easterly operation when RADAR in use.
3. In poor weather condition traffic will not be released until " field or runway " is
in sight provided that cloud base and RVR not less than aerodrome minima
according to CAT I requirements.
4. Down wind or base leg on visual approach not before 5 NM or as coordinated.
Notes:
1. During IMC conditions where the minima below the CAT I requirements
ATC shall indicate the attention by not able to issue and ATC clearance and
the aerodrome in such conditions will be considered close.
2. Take off weather minimums for IFR flights are as follows:
a) AIRCRAFT CAT A AND B
RVR 400M / VIS 1500M.
b) AIRCRAFT CAT C AND D
RVR 400M / VIS 800M.
3. For runway 26 L only:
a) ILS 26L: For inbound flights for ILS CAT II the RVR reading for
touchdown shall not be less than 400 Meters and ceiling is not less than
decision height 140 FT, and for departure flights the RVR reading shall
not less than 400 Meters.
b) The ATC shall pass this minimum to the aircraft concerned early
enough and also should be transmit through the ATIS.
7.2.3 RNAV Arrival Procedures:
1. Tower check is to be made prior the traffic leaves IAFs as follows:
a) Runway 26R / 26L: ORDUN or ASPAL.
b) Runway 08R / 08L: LOTES or RESOS.
2. APP will release the traffic to the TWR after turning IFs (on final approach
track) as follows:
a) Runway 26L: GENIS.
b) Runway 26R: ENADA.
c) Runway 08L: OBSAL.
d) Runway 08R: GEVUP.
3. RESOS LOTES holds are considered as one hold, traffic shall be vertically
separated.
4. ASPAL ORDUN holds are considered as one hold, traffic shall be vertically
separated.
5. RESOS EMILO holds are considered as one hold, traffic shall be vertically
separated.
EDITION No. 6
Page 62
TACC MATC II
7.2.4
OJAI Procedures
CHAPTER 7
Visual Approach:
7.2.4.1 RADAR Vectoring for Visual Approach:

Upon pilot request RADAR vectoring for visual approach, Approach Unit is
required to bring the aircraft to a point where the pilot can see the runway , then will
continue visually provided that:
1. Approach Unit may initiate RADAR vectoring for visual approach provided
the reported ceiling is above the minimum altitude applicable to RADAR
vectoring and metrological conditions are such that, with reasonable assurance,
a visual approach and landing can be completed.
2. Clearance for visual approach shall be issued only after the pilot has reported
the airfield or the runway is insight, at that time RADAR vectoring would
normally be terminated, successive arriving aircraft would be cleared for visual
approach after coordination with tower.
7.2.4.2
Visual approach on Westerly or Easterly operations:

1. Traffic on visual approach will be cleared down to the minimum vectoring
altitude, with no restriction to join base leg of the runway in use except if there
is traffic on V1 route.
2. Approach Unit will release the traffic leaving the initial approach level/or the
minimum vectoring altitude (when RADAR in use), joining downwind or base
leg, as early as possible.
Note: Succeeding arrival traffic will not be cleared for visual approach until
preceding one is landed or landing is assured, and each request for visual
approach will be handled individually.
3. When the VFR corridor " V1 " is active, visual approach clearance will be
subject to close coordination and approval by the tower, considering traffic
situation within this corridor, such clearances will not be a matter of dispute,
but priority will be given to IFR traffic to the extent possible.
Note: Visual approach maybe approved via QAA or MDB if traffic permit's.
4. Tower will consider the precise estimation of arrival traffic inbound to QAA
& MDB, VFR traffic request VFR clearances, issuance of such, will be based
on the estimation of arrival traffic.
Note: For runway 08R; the controller may initiate vectoring of an aircraft for
visual approach provided the reported ceiling is above the minimum altitude
applicable to vectoring and the meteorology conditions are such that with
reasonable assurance a visual approach and landing can be completed
Clearance for visual approach shall be issued only after the pilot has reported
the aerodrome in sight at which time vectoring would normally be terminated.
EDITION No. 6
Page 63
TACC MATC II
7.3
OJAI Procedures
CHAPTER 7
Landing Intervals:
1. For runway 08R and 26R: 7 NM.
2. For runway 08L and 26L: 5 NM provided the following:
a) The aircraft shall use minimum occupancy time and vacate the Runway via the
rapid exit taxiway; if unable the pilot shall inform ATC ASAP and should be
transmit through the ATIS.
b) If the preceding aircraft is a training aircraft for touch and go, succeeding one
will be separated by 5 NM behind, for the same runway, provided that
succeeding a/c performing same speed or less than the preceding aircraft.
c) During IMC conditions landing interval will be increased to 10 NM for all
runways.
3. The landing interval for QAA VOR Procedure is 5 minutes; succeeding aircraft
will be cleared for Approach when the preceding aircraft is QAA inbound leaving
4600 FT.
4. The landing interval for MDB NDB Procedure landing interval 5 minutes,
succeeding aircraft will be cleared for approach when the preceding aircraft is
MDB inbound on Final Approach passing 4500 FT.
7.4
Training Flights Procedure:

1. TWR shall coordinate all training operation in the circuit with Approach Unit
previously to avoid the peak landing hours.
2. Only one training aircraft allowed at the same time.
3. Circuit direction is left-hand on the left runways " 26L / 08L " and right-hand on
the right runways " 26R / 08R ".
4. Circuit altitude for the training traffic at Queen Alia is 3500 FT QNH.
5. 4000 FT QNH Circuit altitude for the training traffic at Queen Alia could be
permitted, prior coordination must be established between TWR and Approach
Unit.
6. Training traffic carrying out IFR Approaches will be coordinated with TWR, but
normal retained back to the approach frequency.
7. If there is any arriving aircraft within the TMA boundary, the training aircraft
will be released to Approach Unit for sequencing.
Note: For Runway 08R; the controller may initiate vectoring of an aircraft for
visual approach provided the reported ceiling is above the minimum altitude
applicable to vectoring and the meteorology conditions are such that with
reasonable assurance a visual approach and landing can be completed
Clearance for visual approach shall be issued only after the pilot has reported
the aerodrome in sight at which time vectoring would normally be terminated.
EDITION No. 6
Page 64
TACC MATC II
7.5
OJAI Procedures
CHAPTER 7
Approach Procedures:
INSTRUMENT APPROACH / MISSED APPROACH PROCEDURES, QUEEN
ALIA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (OJAI)
Aerodrome elevation 2397 FT,
RWY 26L THR ELEV: 2367 FT, RWY 26R THR ELEV: 2397 FT,
RWY 08L THR ELEV: 2362 FT, RWY 08R THR ELEV: 2359 FT,
MSA: 4900 FT, 25NM FROM ARP.
CIRCLING: All aircraft types 3500 FT (1105 FT QFE), All RWYs.
7.5.1 Runway 26L:

7.5.1.1 ILS RWY 26L:
When cleared for approach, descend in the QAA holding pattern to the intermediate
Approach Altitude and intercept the ILS on the inbound leg. Descend on the Glide
path to DA/H.
ALT (Height) FT
6000
6000
Intermediate Approach
4600 (2235)
ILS DA/H
2567 (200)
SDF No Glide Path (LOC ONLY): 4NM to TCH
3600 (1233)
(3.4NM from QAA)

MDA/H No Glide Path (LOC ONLY)
2670
)
7.5.1.2 ILS RWY 26L CAT II:

When cleared for approach, descend in the QAA holding pattern to the intermediate
Approach Altitude and intercept the ILS on the inbound leg. Descend on the Glide
path to DA/H.
ALT (Height) FT
6000
6000
4600 (2235)
ILS DA/H
2507 (140)
EDITION No. 6
Page 65
TACC MATC II
CHAPTER 7
OJAI Procedures
7.5.1.3 VOR RWY 26L :

When cleared for approach, descend in QAA holding pattern to the intermediate
altitude, Leave QAA on R257 (track 077o) to the THR 26L (QAA 7.3NM).
ALT (Height) FT
6000
6000
4600 (2235)
SDF: 4NM to TCH (3.4NM from

QAA)
3600 (1235)
MDA/H
2865 (500)
7.5.1.4 Visual Approach RWY 26L:

Visual Approach will be approved subject to Meteorological and traffic condition,
when requested by pilot. Initial clearance to descend to 4600FT ALT will be given
on passing 10d QAA.
7.5.1.5 Missed Approach RWY 26L:
Climb on RWY heading to 5000FT (QNH), Turn left to QAA or QA maintaining
5000FT (QNH) or as directed by ATC.
Restriction: Turn must be contained within TMA.
7.5.2 Runway 26R:
7.5.2.1
ILS RWY 26R:

When cleared for the approach, leave QAA, to establish QAA R050, to 6.5 NM,
descend to 4600FT, and turn right to establish the ILS RWY 26R.
ALT (Height) FT
6000
6000
4600 (2205)
ILS DA/H
2605 (210)
SDF No Glide Path (LOC ONLY): abeam QAA
4600 (2205)
SDF No Glide Path (LOC ONLY): 3.5 NM TCH
3400 (1003)
2650 (255)
Speed: 180 KTS or less.

EDITION No. 6
Page 66
TACC MATC II
CHAPTER 7
OJAI Procedures
Missed Approach Procedure: Climb RWY heading to 5000FT (QNH), turn right,
and proceed to QAA VOR maintaining 5000FT or as directed by ATC.
RESTRICTION: Turn must be contained within TMA.
7.5.2.2 Visual Approach RWY 26R:
Visual Approach will be approved subject to Meteorological and traffic condition,
when requested by pilot. Initial clearance to descend to 4600FT ALT will be given
on passing 10d QAA.
7.5.3 Runway 08 L :
7.5.3.1 ILS RWY 08L:
When cleared for the approach, descend in MDB holding pattern to the intermediate
approach altitude, intercept the ILS RWY 08L, descend to DH/A.
ALT (Height) FT
6000
6000
4500 (2150)
ILS DA/H
2610 (250)
2940 (580)
Note: Parallel Instrument RWY is not applied.

7.5.3.2 NDB RWY 08L:
Overhead MDB NDB at 6000FT AMSL, fly outbound on track 257 DEG MAG for
one minute descending to 4500 FT, establish inbound track 077 DEG MAG to
MDB NDB, on passing MDB NDB, establish track 077 DEG MAG descending to
2960 (QNH).
Initial Approach Altitude 6000 FT (QNH).
7.5.3.3 Missed Approach RWY 08L:
Missed Approach point 11 DME QAA (4.6 NM from MDB NDB) climb straight
ahead to 5000FT(QNH) turn left to MDB/NDB maintaining 5000FT (QNH) or as
directed by ATC.
7.5.4 Runway 08 R:
7.5.4.1 NDB RWY 08R:
When cleared for the approach, descend in MDB holding pattern to the intermediate
approach altitude, leave MDB on bearing 276 o (track 084o) towards the missed
Approach point (5 NM MDB, 10.6 DME QAA), descend to MDA/H.
EDITION No. 6
Page 67
TACC MATC II
CHAPTER 7
OJAI Procedures
ALT (Height) FT
6000
6000
4500 (2235)
SDF MDB
4500 (1235)
MDA/H
2960 (603)
7.5.4.2 Missed Approach RWY 08R:

Missed Approach Point 10.6 DME QAA (5 NM from MDB NDB) climb straight
ahead to 5000FT (QNH), Turn right to MDB/NDB maintaining 5000FT (QNH) or
as directed by ATC.
EDITION No. 6
Page 68
CHAPTER EIGHT
FAILURES
TACC MATC II
Failures
CHAPTER 8
8. FAILURES:
TACC Supervisor must record any failure in the Log Book or/and occurrence report.
8.1
Partial Service Failure:
8.1.1 INDRA or THALES RADAR Technical Failure:

TACC Supervisor shall:
1. Inform RADAR maintenance and try to determine the duration time of failure
if it is possible.
2. Inform TACC Chief and DANS.
3. Inform control towers.
4. Take any necessary actions to ensure RADAR service provided up to standard.
8.1.2 System Data Integrity:
TACC Supervisor shall Inform all ATC in duty to increase lateral and vertical
separation and if necessary to use procedural separation.
8.2
Complete RADAR Technical Failure:

TACC Supervisor shall:
1. Stop all departures and will be released subject to traffic situation.
2. Inform all concerned flights immediately and try to pass the ETA ASAP.
if it is possible.
4. Inform TACC Chief, DANS and ADOC.
6. Inform adjacent control units.
7. Apply non-RADAR emergency procedures in accordance to MATC I or apply
500 FT and 10 minutes separation when required.
8. Check THALES center in order to establish TACC operation.
9. Inbound traffic may be held as appropriate over the published holds.
10. Broadcast through ATIS regarding the RADAR service within AMMAN FIR.
11. Issue NOTAM if necessary.
12. Re-establish RADAR identification before providing the RADAR service
again.
8.3
VHF Communication System Failure:

In case of failure one "or more" of the VHF frequencies in Amman TACC, TACC
Supervisor shall follow the following instructions:
1. Inform communication maintenance and try to determine the duration time of
failure if it is possible.
EDITION No. 6
Page 69
TACC MATC II
CHAPTER 8
Failures

5. Try to establish the communication by using the CAREX EMERGENCY
FREQUANCY.
6. If the CAREX EMERGENCY fails too, the ATC should try to establish the
communication by using the SELEX DRC.
8.4
Telephone System Failure:

In case the direct lines between Amman TACC and the adjacent or the local airports
or other local departments unserviceable, TACC Supervisor shall follow the
following instructions:
1. Try to establish the communication by using the CAREX EMERGENCY Dial
Telephone.
2. To call the adjacent ACC units check the National Contingency Plan , to call
other local departments, the controller should use one of two land lines in the
supervisor desk:
8.5
Name
Telephone #
Name
Telephone #
DANS
0798508500
OCC
064793589
TACC Chief
0798373130
Permissions
0797511158
ADOC
064885814
Amman Tower
064891801
Talaviv ACC
0097246980210
Queen tower
064452699/599
Ben-Gurion ACC
0097239756320
Aqaba Tower
032031424
Jeddah ACC
0096626850560
Riyadh ACC
0096612215493
Damascus ACC
00963115400540
Cairo ACC
0020222650716
Baghdad ACC
009744503481
Electrical Failure:
In case the main electrical supply lost, there are two generators will work instantly
until the main supply back normally.
TACC Supervisor shall follow the following instructions:
if it is possible.
EDITION No. 6
Page 70
TACC MATC II
Failures
CHAPTER 8

8.6
AFTN Line Failure:

In case the two AFTN lines failure, the ATC should exchange the flight plan data or
any other required data with the adjacent units by one of the following means:
1. Direct lines.
2. Fax.
3. Any other means available.
TACC Supervisor shall follow the following instructions:
1. Inform communication maintenance and try to determine the duration time of
failure if it is possible.
8.7
Facility Damage:
In case of uncontrolled fire in the ANS / Queen Alia building, TACC supervisor shall:
1. Ensure that the fire extinguisher system is activated.

2. Inform the Queen Tower.
3. Inform the civil defense either by telephone or through the tower or any other
means.
4. Initiate National Contingency Plan if required (Annex 5).
In case part of INDRA Center building destroyed, initiate TACC operation in
THALES Center, if not applicable initiate National contingency plan.
In case major destruction of the building initiate National Contingency Plan and the
evacuation plan.
The following evacuation NOTAMs should issue as follow:
Due to emergency evacuation of Amman TACC all ATC services are
terminated. Flights within Amman FIR should continue as cleared and
contact the next ATC agency as soon as possible.
Flights not in receipt of an ATC clearance should land at an appropriate
airfield or request clearance to avoid Amman FIR. Flights should monitor
frequency 128.3 MHz
Broadcast an evacuation message on appropriate frequencies:
Emergency evacuation of Amman TACC is in progress. No air traffic
control service will be provided by Amman TACC. Use extreme caution and
monitor frequency 128.3 MHz, emergency frequencies and air to air
frequencies. Contact the next air traffic control unit as soon as possible.
EDITION No. 6
Page 71
TACC MATC II
Failures
CHAPTER 8
EDITION No. 6
Page 72
CHAPTER NINE
ROYAL FLIGHTS
TACC MATC II
ROYAL FLIGHTS
CHAPTER 9
9. ROYAL FLIGHTS
9.1
Introduction:
Royal Flight Definition (VVIP Flight):
The Royal flight within Jordan airspace is defined as the movement of an aircraft
specifically tasked to carry one or more members of The Royal Family afforded such
status by the Head of Royal Travel, the Royal Household.
The term (VVIP Flight) refers to the flights of the following persons:
1. His Majesty the King; HMK.
2. Her Majesty the Queen; HMQ.
3. Heads of Foreign Government or states.
4. As coordinated by Royal Flight ( RF ) operations.
VIP Flights within Jordan airspace by members of other Royal Families, Prime
Ministers and Heads of States of foreign countries, may also be afforded Royal Flight
status by the air traffic service units, when notified by the Royal Flight Operation .
The term ( VIP Flight ) refers to the flights of the following persons:
1. The Royal Family;
2. Distinguished guests.
9.2
Special Air Traffic Services Procedures for VVIP Flights (Air Traffic
Restrictions):
Procedures for Royal Flights in Fixed-wing Aircraft:
Royal Flights in fixed-wing aircraft will, whenever possible, be planned to take place
within the national ATS route structure. Non Standard ATC procedures shall be
applied to Royal Flights when pirating in permanent Class A and C airspace. In all
other instances the airspace around the route will be designated CAS-T (CONTROL
AIR SPACE Temporary).
Class G Operations may be conducted under IFR or VFR. ATC separation is not
provided. Traffic Information may be given as far as is practical in respect of other
flights.
CAS-T will be notified as Class G airspace; applicable access criteria and separation
standards apply.
Note: Class G Airspace is Uncontrolled airspace which is the portion of the
airspace that has not designated as CLASS A,B,C,D or E. Class G airspace
extends from the surface to unlimited level, and outside controlled airspace
within Amman FIR. Air Traffic Control (ATC) has no authority or
responsibility over this airspace, but there are VFR minimums which apply.
EDITION No. 6
Page 73
TACC MATC II
ROYAL FLIGHTS
CHAPTER 9
Class G. IFR and VFR flights are permitted and receive flight information service if
requested. (Annex 11).
CAS-T of appropriate height/width bands, and levels, will be established to
encompass any portion of the track and flight level of the Royal aircraft, which lies
outside of permanent Class A and C airspace.
Control zones for Royal Flights (VVIP flight) will extend between + 5NM and- 10
NM radiuses from the center of the aerodrome intended to land in.
When a Royal Flights (VVIP flight) is made within AMMAN FIR either inside or
outside controlled airspace, special temporary airway normally 10 NM wide will be
established for that part of the route designated for VVIP flight.
Blocked altitude 2000 FT above and below flight level specified by flight plan for
the Royal Flight VVIP.
Pass ETAs, ETDs and other information concerning VVIP flights to the CEO of
CARC through the appropriate ATM\ANSP authority or their designated
representatives.
Note: Director of air navigation of QAIA directorate will be informed for ETAs,
ETDs and other information concerning VVIP, VIP flights.
Flight plan of VVIP flight, irrespective of whether condition, must be filed in IFR as
much as practicable.
When the VVIP flight is flying in Amman FIR, no other aircraft shall be cleared to
operate in the block of controlled airspace detailed below:
1. 2000 feet above and below cruising level.
2. The restriction will not be applicable when it is known that horizontal
separation based on current flight plans will exist between the VVIP Flight
and other aircraft.
9.3
General ATC procedures are as follows for VVIP Flight and Distinguished
guests and Transient Services:
TACC Supervisor is responsible for ensuring proper courtesies and services are
provided to VVIP, distinguished visitors and VIPs and transient personnel using
airfield facilities.
In order to facilitate the movement of VVIP flight and distinguished guests and
Transient Services into and out of QAIA airport to conform to the times shown in the
Ceremonial Reception Schedule, the Air Traffic Service Units concerned are
authorized to provide special priority for all VIP flights over all other normal traffic
within their area of responsibility.
All other flights will be subjected to 15 minutes delay prior to or after, the scheduled
movement of the VIP aircraft except:
EDITION No. 6
Page 74
TACC MATC II
ROYAL FLIGHTS
CHAPTER 9
1. At Queen Alia Airport when there is two runways are available and runway
26L is designated for VIP landing or departure Operations.
2. Period of operation 15 minutes before estimated time of departure and 15
minutes after the VIP aircraft will be suspended air traffic other in
collaboration with the Royal Flight Operations.
The most senior controller is the only one who handles the VVIP and VIP
movement.
No clearance given to aircraft in the vicinity of a VVIP flight.
9.4
Take over Watch (TOW) to handle the VIP flight:

Prior to taking over watch or an operating position, a controller must:
1. Ensure that she/he has a full understanding of the air traffic situation including
an awareness of clearances issued but not yet acted upon and any developing
situation requiring early attention;
2. Familiarize himself with the serviceability of all equipment under her/his
charge and responsible to be used during VIP flight keeping (e.g. radio,
approach aids, telephone lines and aerodrome lighting);
3. Obtain all relevant information and be familiarized with the meteorological
condition and trends for the period of VIP flight and where practicable get a
personal briefing from a meteorological office;
4. Ensure she/he is fully conversant with the latest promulgated orders,
instructions, notices and information, particularly with reference to the
serviceability of aerodromes and other air navigation facilities;
Note: Should be taken of details regarding any presidential, VVIP or other
special flights expected during the period of watch.
5. Inspect the airfield (including runways and taxiways) for maintenance for the
use of VVIP flight.
6. Delay of other flight will be notified every 10 minutes by unit concerned.
9.5
ESCORT:
The ADOC and the commander of the escort flight shall have coordination of final
authority for conduction flight in and out of the controlled air space\ Airways \
control zone as necessary to fulfill the coordination Escort need.
9.6
Runway in use:
The aerodrome has one (1) runway available for VVIP \ VIP arrivals and departures
ATCO will give clearance for the runways to be used based on wind velocity and
traffic condition.
EDITION No. 6
Page 75
TACC MATC II
9.7
ROYAL FLIGHTS
CHAPTER 9
Variable direction circuits may be used at times in accordance with local air traffic
control instructions in the interest of noise abatement, mostly in favors of VVIP
movement.
Helicopter:
VIP Helicopter routes for flights inbound and outbound aerodrome Control Zone as
follows:
1. Are identified alphabetically using geographical separation not less than 5 minutes
apart
2. A minimum vertical separation of 1000 feet and are instructed by ATC
controllers.
3. ATC clearance for the runways to be used based on wind velocity and traffic
condition.
9.8
Aerodrome Control Tower procedures:

No aircraft shall be allowed to land or depart from the aerodrome or operate in the
circuit for the period:
1. 15 minutes before ETA of VVIP Flight till Door Open Time.
2. Door Close Time or starting up time, till 5 minutes after take-off.
Note: The ATM headquarter may adjust the above timings to ensure that there is
no disturbance during the period of ceremonies at the airport and if required they
may close the airfield to other operations.
9.9
Controlled airspace:
Standard separation shall be provided in Controlled Airspace. When vertical
separation is applied, the vertical separation minimum shall be 2000 feet at all levels.
No VFR operations shall be allowed during the period of the VVIP Flight is expected
to operate in Controlled Airspace.
EDITION No. 6
Page 76
CHAPTER TEN
REDUCED VERTICAL
SEPARATION MINIMA
TACC MATC II
RVSM
CHAPTER 10
10. REDUCED VERTICAL SEPARATION MINIMA

10.1 The Benefits of RVSM::
1.
2.
3.
4.
Decrease en route delays.

Increase flight profiles.
Reduces en route congestion by adding six new flight levels.
Provides more flexibility to the ATC controllers; reduces workload, less RADAR
Vectoring.
5. More effective and increased options for re-routing flights e.g. " around weather "
.
6. Increased ATM efficiency.
7. Reduce fuel burn consequently fuel saving of approximately 1%P/H "per hour".
10.2 RVSM Implementation Needs:
1. Increase airspace capacity.
2. Obtain more operational flexibility.
3. To reduce traffic congestion.
10.3 RVSM Flight Levels:
1.
2.
3.
4.
FL 280 and below are Non RVSM Flight Levels.

001-179 FL " 290- 310-330-350-370-390-410 " is RVSM Eastbound levels.
180-360 FL " 300-320-340-360-380-400 " are RVSM Westbound levels.
FL 430 and above are Non RVSM Flight Levels.
10.4 Flight in RVSM Airspace:

In summary, the rules for flight in RVSM airspace are that ATC shall:
1. Provide a 1000 FT vertical separation minimum between RVSM Compliant
aircraft.
2. Provide a 2000 FT vertical separation minimum between Non-RVSM Compliant
aircraft and any other aircraft.
3. Provide 2000 FT vertical separation minimum between all formation flights of
civil or State aircraft from any other aircraft.
10.5 RVSM Flight Planning Requirements:
1. Flight Priority:
I. It should be noted that RVSM Compliant aircraft will be given priority for
level allocation over Non-RVSM Compliant aircraft.
II. Specific Flight Planning procedures have been developed for RVSM flights.
EDITION No. 6
Page 77
TACC MATC II
RVSM
CHAPTER 10
These are included in ICAO Doc 7030/4, MID Regional Supplementary

Procedures.
2. The flight plan " FPL" shall include:
I. Operators of RVSM Compliant aircraft shall insert " W " in item " 10 a " of
the FPL Regardless of requested Flight Level.
II. Operators of Non-RVSM Compliant State aircraft with a RFL of 290 or above
shall insert " STS/NONRVSM " in item 18 of the FPL.
III. Operators of formation flights of RVSM-Compliant State aircraft shall NOT
Insert " W " in item " 10 a " of the FPL.
IV. Operators filing Repetitive Flight Plans " RPLs " shall include in item Q of the
RPL the RVSM Compliant status " EQPT/W " for RVSM Compliant aircraft,
and " EQPT/ " for Non-RVSM Compliant aircraft.
V. If a change of aircraft on an RPL results in a modification of the RVSM
Compliant status in item Q, the operators shall submit a change Message
" CHG ".
10.6 RVSM Airborne Systems Requirement:
The following systems must be fully operational prior to entering RVSM airspace:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Two altitude measurement systems.

Automatic altitude keeping device.
At least one altitude-reporting transponder.
One altitude alerting system.
Note: Should any of the required equipment fail prior to entering RVSM airspace,
the pilot should request a new clearance to avoid flight in this airspace.
10.6.1 Transponder Requirements:
1. An operating Mode C transponder is required for flight in all airspace in the
Amman FIR airspace.
2. The tolerance value used to determine that pressure-altitude-derived level
information displayed to the controller is accurate shall be 60 m "200 ft " in
RVSM airspace.
In other airspace, it shall be 90 m " 300 ft ", except that the appropriate ATS
authority may specify a smaller criterion, but not less than 60 m
" 200 ft
", if this is found to be more practical. Geometric height information shall not be
used for separation.
3. After confirmation of the aircrafts level, Mode C readout continues to differ from
the cleared flight level by 60 m " 200 FT " or more, ATC will follow the existing
ICAO procedures prescribed for the failure of Mode C in flight or as prescribed in
MATC II ,Chapter 4.
EDITION No. 6
Page 78
TACC MATC II
RVSM
CHAPTER 10
10.7 System Support:

The requirement for ATC to provide two different VSM in the same RVSM
airspace 1000 FT and 2000 FT VSM generates safety critical system support
requirements:
1. RADAR display systems, if available, must provide controllers with continuous
and unambiguous information on the RVSM compliant status of all flights under
their responsibility.
2. Flight strips must display for controllers the Non-RVSM compliant status of all
civil and State aircraft.
3. Where applicable, the indication that a Non-RVSM compliant aircraft is a State
aircraft should be displayed, both on the radar display and on the flight Strip.
4. Automatic conflict alert systems modified to use the RVSM compliant or NonRVSM Compliant status of the aircraft and apply the appropriate VSM of 1000
FT or 2000 FT alerting trigger.
10.8 Contingency Procedures:
If an RVSM compliant aircraft cannot comply with RVSM height-keeping
requirements because of equipment failure, weather, turbulence, etc, ATC will
provide a 2000 FT VSM or an appropriate horizontal separation from all other
aircraft. Normally, such aircraft should be cleared out of RVSM Airspace,
" FL 280- or FL 430+ ".
Note: In case of RADAR Failure Procedure still we can accept RVSM flights
within RVSM layers.
10.8.1 Meteorological Coordination:
Close coordination between ATS and MET is very important, especially in RVSM
airspace, to get early information on severe weather activity and clear air turbulence
" CAT " for areas where it may affect the safe operation of RVSM flights.
10.8.2 Height keeping errors:
There are two categories of Errors:
1. Technical Errors, or Altimetry System Errors " ASE ", caused by inaccuracies in
the height-keeping equipment of aircraft.
2. Operational Errors, or Assigned Altitude Deviation " AAD ", caused by mistakes,
by ATC or Flight Crews, which result in aircraft being flown at incorrect flight
levels.
3. ASE and AAD are the main components of Total Vertical Error " TVE " the target
level of Safety " TLS " must count for the risk analysis from both technical and
operational errors in specific form in Amman TACC.
EDITION No. 6
Page 79
TACC MATC II
RVSM
CHAPTER 10
10.9 RVSM Transition Procedures:

ATC Sectors controlling airspace in the RVSM Transition Area shall:
1. Apply Flight Levels appropriate to direction of flight, in accordance with the table
below.
2. Apply 1000 FT VSM between RVSM Compliant aircraft and 2000 FT VSM "
Vertical separation minima " between RVSM Non-Compliant aircraft.
3. Establish Non-RVSM compliant civil aircraft below FL290, if landing at an
Aerodrome below the RVSM airspace.
EDITION No. 6
Page 80
TACC MATC II
RVSM
CHAPTER 10
4. Establish Non-RVSM compliant civil aircraft above FL410, if transiting above

the RVSM airspace and landing at an aerodrome outside RVSM Airspace.
5. For aircraft leaving RVSM airspace, apply 2000 FT VSM and establish them at
the appropriate Non-RVSM levels.
Flight allocation scheme (FLAS).
10.10 Vertical Separation Minima:
1. The applicable vertical separation minimum between RVSM Compliant aircraft
operating within the RVSM airspace shall be 1000 FT Within AMMAN RVSM
airspace, a vertical separation Minimum of 1000 FT is applicable only when both
aircraft are RVSM Compliant.
2. The applicable vertical separation minimum between Non-RVSM Compliant
aircraft and any other aircraft operating within the AMMAN RVSM airspace shall
be 2000 FT.
3. Within AMMAN RVSM Transition Area, the applicable vertical separation
minimum shall be 1000 FT between RVSM Compliant aircraft and 2000 FT
between any Non-RVSM Compliant aircraft and any other aircraft.
4. The applicable vertical separation minimum between all formation flights
operating within the AMMAN RVSM airspace shall be 2000 FT.
5. Formation flights of State aircraft shall be considered as Non-RVSM Compliant,
regardless of the RVSM Compliant status of the individual aircraft concerned.
Formation flights of State aircraft will be accommodated within the AMMAN
RVSM airspace on the basis of an applicable vertical separation Minimum of
2000 FT.
6. Since ATC is unable to determine the extent of any equipment failure for an
aircraft experiencing a communication failure in flight, the applicable vertical
separation minimum between an aircraft experiencing a communication failure in
flight and any other aircraft, where both aircraft are Operating within AMMAN
RVSM airspace, shall be 2000 FT, unless an appropriate horizontal Separation
minimum exists.
EDITION No. 6
Page 81
TACC MATC II
10.10.1
CHAPTER 10
RVSM
Controller/Pilot Radiotelephony Phraseology:
Circumstances
Phraseologies
... to ascertain RVSM approval

status of an aircraft
a) CONFIRM RVSM APPROVED;
... to report RVSM approved status
*b) AFFIRM RVSM;
... to report RVSM non-approved

status followed by supplementary
information
*c) NEGATIVE RVSM

[(supplementary information,
e.g. State aircraft)];
... to deny ATC clearance into

RVSM airspace
d) UNABLE ISSUE CLEARANCE

INTO RVSM AIRSPACE,
MAINTAIN [or DESCEND TO, or
CLIMB TO] (level);
... to report when severe turbulence

affects the capability of an aircraft
to maintain height-keeping
requirements for RVSM
*e) UNABLE RVSM DUE

TURBULENCE;
... to report that the equipment of an

aircraft has degraded below
minimum aviation system
performance standards
*f) UNABLE RVSM DUE

EQUIPMENT;
...to request an aircraft to provide

information as soon as
RVSM-approved status has been
regained or the pilot is ready to
resume RVSM operations
g) REPORT WHEN ABLE TO

RESUME RVSM;
... to request confirmation that an

aircraft has regained
RVSM-approved status or a pilot is
ready to resume RVSM operations
h) CONFIRM ABLE TO RESUME

RVSM;
EDITION No. 6
Page 82
TACC MATC II
CHAPTER 10
RVSM
*i) READY TO RESUME RVSM.

... to report ability to resume RVSM
operations after an equipment or
weather-related contingency
... to verbally supplement estimate

messages of aircraft non-approved
for RVSM or to verbally
supplement an automated estimate
message exchange that does not
automatically transfer information
from Item 18 of the flight plan
followed by supplementary
information, as appropriate
... to communicate the cause of a

contingency relating to an aircraft
that is unable to conduct RVSM
operations due to severe turbulence
or other severe meteorological
phenomena or equipment failure, as
applicable
* Denotes pilot transmission.
a) NEGATIVE RVSM
[(supplementary information, e.g.
State
aircraft)];
b) UNABLE RVSM DUE

TURBULENCE (or EQUIPMENT,
as applicable).
Refer to DOC4444, Chapter 12.

10.11 RVSM Alarm in INDRA System:
INDRA System provides the possibility to define if the aircraft RVSM approved or
not from the adaptation database " from flight plan information ". If so, the aircraft
between the FL 290 and FL 410 must be equipped with RVSM to make better use of
the airspace.
When the RVSM alarm is displayed, the track label includes "R" or "S" symbol as
defined in the following:
EDITION No. 6
Page 83
TACC MATC II
RVSM
CHAPTER 10
EDITION No. 6
Page 84
CHAPTER ELEVEN
EMERGENCY
PROCEDURES
TACC MATC II
EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
CHAPTER 11
11. Emergency Procedures

11.0 General:
An incident report shall be filled by the unit in which the incident took place in its
area of responsibility.
TACC supervisor shall inform TACC Chief; TACC Chief will inform DANS, DANS
will inform the Safety Departments " Investigation, Airworthiness, and Aircraft
Operation " accordingly.
Tower supervisor shall inform TACC Supervisor regarding any of the following
cases:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Local standby.
Full emergency.
Aircraft accident.
Weather standby.
Hi-jacking or bomb threat.
Strayed aircraft, overdue position report.
The message will contain the following details:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Type of the case.

Aircraft call sign and type.
Nature of flight " DEP , ARR , Circuit .etc ".
ETA " for local traffic ".
Time of accident.
Position of accident.
When normal operation is resumed
11.1 Fuel Dumping:

An aircraft in emergency or other urgent situations may need to dump fuel so as to
reduce to maximum landing mass in order to affect a safe landing.
When an aircraft operating within controlled airspace needs to dump fuel, the flight
crew shall advise ATC. The ATC unit should then coordinate with the flight crew the
following:
1. The route to be flown, which, if possible, should be clear of cities and towns,
preferably over water and away from areas where thunderstorms have been
reported or are expected;
2. The level to be used, which should be not less than 1 800 m (6 000 ft); and
3. The duration of the fuel dumping.
11.1.1 Separation:
Other known traffic should be separated from the aircraft dumping fuel by:
1. At least 19 km (10 NM) horizontally, but not behind the aircraft dumping fuel;
EDITION No. 6
Page 85
TACC MATC II
CHAPTER 11
2. Vertical separation if behind the aircraft dumping fuel within 15 minutes flying
time or a distance of 93 km (50 NM) by:
a) At least 300 m (1 000 FT) if above the aircraft dumping fuel; and
b) At least 900 m (3 000 FT) if below the aircraft dumping fuel.
Note: The horizontal boundaries of the area within which other traffic requires
appropriate vertical separation extend for 19 km (10 NM) either side of the track
flown by the aircraft which is dumping fuel, from 19 km (10 NM) ahead, to 93
km (50 NM) or 15 minutes along track behind it (including turns).
Refer to MATC I 15.5.3
11.1.2 Local Fuel Dumping Outside Controlled Airspace:

1. Fuel dumping if outside controlled airspace, will be carried out in an Area
agreed with the ADOC, the agreed position shall be defined by VOR/DME.
2. The area defined shall be clear of airways and holding areas.
3. The level to be used which should be not less than 1 800 m " 6000 FT ".
4. At least 19 km (10 NM) horizontally, but not behind the aircraft dumping fuel.
time or a distance of 93 km (50 NM) by Vertical separation at least 3000 FT
below and 1000 FT above the aircraft dumping fuel.
6. The pilot should report the duration of the fuel dumping.
11.1.3 Local Fuel Dumping Inside TMA:
This procedure for any inbound or outbound traffic, the ATC should implement the
following:
1. Fuel Dumping will be carried out in QTR VOR at 9000 FT.
2. For King Hussein Airport traffic, the fuel dumping will be carried out over
BAKIR Point at 8000 FT and Aqaba Approach shall inform TACC " West
Sector " and ADOC.
time or a distance of 93 km (50 NM) by Vertical separation at least 3000 FT
below and 1000 FT above the aircraft dumping fuel.
4. At least 19 km (10 NM) horizontally, but not behind the aircraft dumping fuel.
5. ATC shall pass all necessary instructions prior to the commencement of Fuel
Dumping Operation " Reduce Radio during fuel dumping ".
6. Amman TACC will inform ADOC.
7. The pilot should report the duration of the fuel dumping.
11.2 Emergency Descent:
Upon receipt of advice that an aircraft is making an emergency descent through other
traffic, all possible action shall be taken immediately to safeguard all aircraft
concerned.
EDITION No. 6
Page 86
TACC MATC II
CHAPTER 11
When deemed necessary, ATC shall immediately broadcast by means of the

appropriate radio aids, or if not possible, request the appropriate communications
stations immediately to broadcast an emergency message.
Immediately after such an emergency broadcast has been made, the ATC shall
forward further clearances to all aircraft involved as additional procedures to be
followed during and subsequent to the emergency descent.
ATC shall additionally inform any other ATS units and control sectors which may be
affected.
Refer to MATC I, Para 15.1.4.
11.2.1 Phraseology:
*a) EMERGENCY DESCENT (intentions);
b) ATTENTION ALL AIRCRAFT IN THE VICINITY OF [or AT] (significant
point or location) EMERGENCY DESCENT IN PROGRESS FROM (level)
(followed as necessary by specific instructions, clearances, traffic information, etc.).
* Denotes pilot transmission.
11.3 Strayed Aircraft:
If ATC notices an aircraft deviated from its intended track which reports that its lost,
ATC shall:
1. Inform ADOC and keep them posted with the situation progress.
2. Attempt to establish contact with such aircraft by any means.
3. Use all available means to determine its position.
4. Inform special security protection unit and civil defense at each airport
concerned VIA relevant ATC units.
5. Inform TACC Chief.
6. Inform DANS.
7. When state of emergency is over, all concerned will be informed.
11.4 Unidentified Aircraft:
An aircraft observed on RADAR not coordinated with adjacent ATS units and no
radio communication established shall consider being unidentified target and
immediately ATC shall:
1. Inform ADOC.
3. Try to establish two-way communication with the aircraft.
4. Attempt to obtain information from aircraft in the area.
5. Attempt to obtain information from adjacent ATS units.
6. When state of emergency is over; all concerned people will be informed.
EDITION No. 6
Page 87
TACC MATC II
CHAPTER 11
11.5 Interception of Civil Aircraft:

As soon as an ATS unit learns that an aircraft is being intercepted in its area of
responsibility, it shall take such of the following steps as are appropriate in the
circumstances:
1. Attempt to establish two-way communication with the intercepted Aircraft on
any available frequency, including the emergency frequency 121.5MHZ, unless
such communication already exists.
2. Inform the pilot of the intercepted Aircraft of the interception.
3. Establish contact with the intercept control unit maintaining two-way
communication with the intercepting Aircraft and provide it with available
information concerning the Aircraft.
4. Relay messages between the intercepting Aircraft or the intercept control unit
and the intercepted Aircraft, as necessary.
5. In close co-ordination with the intercept control unit take all necessary steps to
en-sure the safety of the intercepted Aircraft.
6. Inform ATS units serving adjacent FIRs if it appears that the Aircraft has strayed
from such adjacent FIRs.
7. As soon as an ATS unit learns that an Aircraft is being intercepted outside its
area of responsibility, it shall take such of the following steps as are appropriate
in the circumstances:
a) Inform the ATS unit serving the airspace in which the interception is taking
place , providing this unit with available information that will assist in
identifying the aircraft and requesting it to take action in accordance with
MATC I Para 15.5.2.
b) Relay messages between the intercepted aircraft and the appropriate ATS
unit, the intercept control unit or the intercepting aircraft .
11.6 Local Standby:
S
11.6.1 Local Standby will be implemented when the pilot reports he is experiencing
difficulty which might affect the safe operation of the aircraft but not likely to
cause an accident or incident and when the pilot reports:
1. Loss of 25% or 33% of the engines.
2. Cockpit indication of fire warning in the aircraft.
3. Undercarriage warning light on.
4. Flapless landing.
5. Pressurization failure.
6. Partial hydraulic failure.
11.6.2 When receiving the pilot reports the ATC shall:
1. Inform the TACC supervisor.
2. TACC supervisor will act as chief of search and rescue centre, will activate
the search and rescue plan.
EDITION No. 6
Page 88
TACC MATC II
CHAPTER 11
11.6.3 TACC supervisor will inform the following:

1. Unit concerned.
2. TACC Chief.
3. Aircraft Operator.
4. DANS.
11.6.4 The message will contain the following:
1. Nature of emergency.
2. Aircraft call sign and type.
3. E.T.A.
4. Total number on board.
11.7 Full Emergency:
11.7.1 Full emergency will be implemented when the pilot reports that he is experiencing
a difficulty that will affect the operation of the aircraft, when there is a possibility
of an accident and when pilot reports:
1. Loss of 50% or more of the engines.
2. Complete hydraulic failure.
3. Landing with burst tires.
4. Undercarriage malfunction.
5. Abandoned take-off.
6. Hi-jacking.
7. Bomb on board.
8. Shortage of fuel.
11.7.2 When receiving the pilot reports the ATC shall:
1. Approve pilot request.
2. Advice all traffic under control.
11.7.3 TACC supervisor will inform the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Unit concerned.
TACC Chief.
Aircraft Operator.
DANS.
ADOC.
11.7.4 Message will contain the following:

1. Nature of Emergency.
3. E.T.A.
4. Name of the airport and runway in use.
5. Total number on board.
EDITION No. 6
Page 89
TACC MATC II
CHAPTER 11
11.8 Bomb Threat " Aircraft in flight ":

ATC will consider a bomb threat when receives information by the pilot or by any
other sources that a bomb onboard.
Separate the aircraft concerned 2000 FT from other traffic.
ATC will not grant permission for landing, unless authorized by security unit related;
" follow instructions from the ADOC ".
11.8.1 ATC shall Inform:
1. DANS.
2. ADOC.
3. ATC Supervisor at Amman/Marka, Queen Alia and King Hussein Tower.
4. Inform any traffic maybe affected.
11.8.2 If such aircraft has approval to land, ATC shall:
1. Implement full emergency.
2. After landing the aircraft should continue to the end of the runway.
11.8.3 ATC shall obtain the following information to the extent possible:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Aircraft nationality.
Total number on board.
Number of causalities.
Type of bombs.
Crew member physical conditions.
Intended landing aerodrome and E.T.A.
When state of emergency is over, all concerned will be informed.
11.9 Hi-Jack:
11.9.1 Hi-jack in the air within Amman airspace:
When the aircraft displays Mode A " 7500 " or pilot reports or advised by adjacent
ATS unit, that an specific aircraft is experiencing unlawful interference, immediately
ATC shall:
1. Separate the concerned aircraft with vertical separation 2000 FT above and
below if traffic situation permits, and if not alternative course of action will be
considered to take the aircraft outside controlled airspace. Throughout
coordination with ADOC.
2. Inform special security protection unit and civil defense through ATC units at
each airport.
EDITION No. 6
Page 90
TACC MATC II
CHAPTER 11
3. Further action to be taken within Jordanian Airports, through coordination with

ADOC.
4. ATC units will comply with state instructions & runway will be blocked by
vehicles for each airport.
5. When state of emergency is over all concerned will be informed.
11.9.2 Hi-jacked aircraft within adjacent FIRs expected to proceed to
Amman FIR:
When the aircraft displays Mode A " 7500 " or advised by adjacent ATS unit that an
specific aircraft is experiencing unlawful interference and its rerouting to Amman
FIR , ATC shall:
1. Inform ADOC.
2. If the Aircraft within the coverage of Amman RADAR, ATC shall plot the
progress of the path of the aircraft concerned.
3. Inform special security protection and civil defense units at Jordanian Airports
through ATC units at each Airport.
4. Will keep 2000 FT vertical separation below and above the flight level of the
aircraft concerned.
5. Alternative course of action should be taken through intensive coordination with
ADOC, if the situation prevails.
6. When state of emergency is over, all concerned will be informed.
11.10 Aircraft Accident:
Aircraft accident will be implemented when the pilot reports that he is experiencing a
difficulty that will affect the operation of the aircraft, when there is a possibility of an
accident and when pilot reports ATC shall:
1. Advice all traffic under control.
2. Consider diversion and traffic holding.
11.10.1 TACC supervisor will inform:
1. DANS.
2. Chief of TACC.
3. Units concerned.
4. ADOC.
5. Aircraft Operator.
11.10.2 Message will contain the following details:
2. Time of accident.
3. Total number on board if known.
EDITION No. 6
Page 91
TACC MATC II
CHAPTER 11
11.11 Aircraft Emergencies Suspected Communicable Disease, or Other Public

Health Risk:
11.11.1 General Principles:
Upon notification by a pilot of a suspected communicable disease, or other public
health risk, ATC shall notify the appropriate authorities with the following
informations:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Aircraft identification.
Departure aerodrome.
Destination aerodrome.
Estimated time of arrival.
Number of persons on board.
Number of suspected case(s) on board; and
Nature of the public health risk, if known.
When a report of a suspected case(s) of communicable disease, or other public health

risk, on board an aircraft is received by an ATS unit serving the destination /
departure, from another ATS unit or from an aircraft or an aircraft operator, the unit
concerned shall forward a message below as soon as possible to:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
ATS unit serving the destination/departure,

Appropriate authority designated by MOH.
Aircraft operator or its designated representative.
The public health authority (PHA).
The appropriate authority designated in the Airport Emergency Plan.
Aerodrome authority.
11.12 Other ATC Contingency Procedures:

11.12.1 Emergency Separation:
If during an emergency situation, it is not possible to ensure that the applicable
horizontal separation can be maintained, emergency separation of half the applicable
vertical separation minimum may be used, i.e. 150 m (500 ft) between aircraft in
airspace where a vertical separation minimum of 300 m (1000 ft) is applied, and 300
m (1000 ft) between aircraft in airspace where a 600 m (2000 ft) vertical separation
minimum is applied.
When emergency separation is applied the flight crews concerned shall be advised
that emergency separation is being applied and informed of the actual minimum
used.
Additionally, all flight crews concerned shall be provided with essential traffic
information.
EDITION No. 6
Page 92
TACC MATC II
CHAPTER 11
11.12.2 Short-Term Conflict Alert (STCA) Procedures:

In the event an STCA is generated in respect of controlled flights, ATC shall without
delay assess the situation and, if necessary, take action to ensure that the applicable
separation minimum will not be infringed or will be restored.
Following the generation of an STCA, ATC should be required to complete an air
traffic incident report and in TACC log book.
TACC Chief should retain electronic records of all alerts generated. The data and
circumstances pertaining to each alert should be analyzed to determine whether an
alert was justified or not. Non-justified alerts, e.g. when visual separation was
applied, should be ignored. A statistical analysis should be made of justified alerts in
order to identify possible shortcomings in airspace design and ATC procedures as
well as to monitor overall safety levels.
EDITION No. 6
Page 93
TACC MATC II
CHAPTER 11
EDITION No. 6
Page 94
CHAPTER TWELVE
ON JOB TRAINING
TACC MATC II
On Job Training
CHAPTER 12
12. ON JOB TRAINING

12.1 General Procedures:
1. OJT at Amman TACC will be carried out in accordance with the following
procedures:
a) Supervisor of OJT is responsible to Amman TACC Chief for implementation
and management of OJT.
b) OJT instructors will carry out the monitoring and training of trainee controllers,
and will brief the trainee of the objectives of each training period.
2.
OJTI is responsible for:

a) Safety at all times during operational instructions, and will carry out OJT in
accordance with these instructions, and will ensure that accurate records are
kept in the training record sheet.
b) Prepare training reports as required, and submits the report to Supervisor of
OJT within ascertain time.
12.2 Phase of Training:

The phases of training are three phases:
I. Phase 1:
1. Unit induction:
a) Objective is to familiarize the trainee with unit administration and procedures.
b) Administration by discussing the role and procedures that affect RADAR
controllers.
2. Procedures. Ensure that the trainee is aware of his/her responsibilities
including:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Transport.
Leave.
Sickness.
Shift rosters.
Logbooks
Conduct and discipline.
Incident reporting.
Amman TACC manual.
Supervisor of OJT will check that the trainee is in possession of Manual of Air
Traffic Services and Amman TACC both correctly amended.
EDITION No. 6
Page 95
TACC MATC II
On Job Training
CHAPTER 12
II. Phase 2 " Equipment and Operating Procedures ":
1. Objective is to familiarize the trainee with the RADAR equipment and

operating procedures to be used.
2. Equipment: ensure that the trainee is competent to use the equipment will
proceed the next phase 3 which will cover the following:
a) Voice communication system "VCS" including ATIS.
b) RADAR system.
c) Weather system.
III. Phase 3 " Practical Training ":
The Objective of this phase to demonstrate the trainee is capable of effectively

controlling air traffic in a safe, orderly and expeditious manner, and has the
knowledge of the equipment and procedures relevant to the rating and/or rating
validity.
12.3 Trainees:
1. Will attend training, briefing and instructional work period as instructed by
their OJT instructor.
2. Will work in periods when they are not engaged in practical instruction to
learn the relevant procedures.
12.4 Progress Tests:
OJTI will conduct a progress test on completion of phase 2, and Supervisor of OJT
will conduct a progress test on completion of phase 3, and final assessment.
Note: Supervisor of OJT may delegate the task of phase 3 and final assessment to
independent Examiner.
12.5 Training Report:
OJTI will prepare a training report on completion of phase 2 of training and every 10
hours during phase 3. Using the standard and /or approved form by the DANS for
ATC training report form.
12.6 Examination:
1. The Practical test shall be conducted by ANS safety inspector and designated
examiner who shall have the valid rating for the traffic control and Air Traffic
Management safety officer.
2. The knowledge examination for rating and Validation shall be prepared and
conducted by ANS safety inspector
3. The oral test shall be conducted by ANS safety inspector.
EDITION No. 6
Page 96
TACC MATC II
On Job Training
CHAPTER 12
12.7 General Description of Rating Phases:

He or She shall satisfy the Jordan Civil Aviation Regulatory Commission regulations
" JCAR- Part 65 " " ATC MATC I and MATC II " and AIP , as to His or Her skill
in the provision of RADAR control service and in His or Her knowledge of:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Airspace structure.
Applicable rules, regulations and source of information.
Air navigation facilities.
Air traffic equipment and its use.
Terrain and prominent landmarks.
Characteristics of air traffic and traffic flow.
Weather phenomena.
Emergency and Search and rescue plans.
Principles use and limitations of RADAR, other surveillance systems and
associated equipment.
10. Procedures for the provision of approach or area RADAR control services
as appropriate.
11. Procedures to ensure terrain clearance as appropriate.
12.7.1 TMA Approach Procedural Non-RADAR:
1. Phase 1: As detailed in general description phase 1 " procedures ".
2. Phase 2: In addition to general description phase 2 " equipment ", the trainee
will be briefed on the following:
1. Area of responsibility.
2. Taking over watch.
3. Out bound procedures
4. Estimates.
5. Level restrictions.
6. Stack levels and EATs.
7. Coordination inbound and outbound.
8. Visual approach procedures.
9. Instrument approaches, and landing interval.
10. Approach /terminal flow direction.
11. Diversions.
12. Royal flights.
13. Radio failure procedures.
14. Navigational aids.
15. Holding procedures.
16. Emergencies:
I. General
II. Local standby.
EDITION No. 6
Page 97
TACC MATC II
On Job Training
CHAPTER 12
III. Full emergency.

IV. Aircraft accident.
V. Hi-jack or bomb threat.
VI. Fuel dumping.
17. VFR procedures.
18. Job description of approach procedural controller.
19. AQABA procedures, " approach and / or west sector " as appropriate.
3. Phase 3: The trainee will be able to demonstrate the practical skill, including:
1. Allocating STAR clearance, holding stack levels, receiving, releases and
calculating EATs.
2. Receiving, processing estimates revisions and manual preparation of FPS.
3. Monitoring the TMA frequency and assisting the approach RADAR
controller in maintaining an up-to-date flight progress strip.
4. Passing estimates, revisions and EATs to the relevant ATC unit.
5. Alerting the TMA approach RADAR controller of any apparent
confliction evident from the traffic display, which requires resolution.
6. Coordination with the relevant En-route sector.
7. Pass departure clearances to tower.
8. Assisting the TMA approach RADAR controller in re-establishing
procedural separation in case of RADAR failure.
9. Performing other related duties which may be assigned by Supervisor of
OJT.
Note: These duties could be also included within the task of TMA approach
procedural planner controller.
12.7.2 TMA Approach RADAR:
1. Phase 1: As detailed in general description phase 1 " procedures ".
2. Phase 2: In addition to general description phase 2 "equipment ", the trainee
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
General RADAR specifications and limitations.

RADAR setting up procedures.
SSR code allocations.
RADAR separation standards.
RADAR coordination procedures.
RADAR identification procedures.
Mode C verification procedures.
3. Phase 3: The trainee will be able to demonstrate the practical skill, including:
1. Identifying and tracking aircraft under control, by the use of RADAR.
EDITION No. 6
Page 98
TACC MATC II
2.
3.
4.
5.
On Job Training
CHAPTER 12
Applying non-RADAR separation, when RADAR equipment is failed.

Maintaining an up to-date flight progress strip, in case of RADAR failure.
Hand-over procedure " transferring and accepting ".
Co-ordination procedure has affected, before the aircraft leaves area of
Responsibility.
12.7.3 En-route Procedural Non-RADAR:

1. Phase 1: As detailed in phase 1 general description " procedures ".
2. Phase 2: In addition to general description phase2 " equipment " the trainee
1. Area of responsibility
2. Taking over watch.
3. Control of traffic.
4. Coordination with TMA approach control.
5. Coordination inbound/outbound.
6. Separation standards.
7. High level holding.
8. Coordination with adjacent ATC units and/or ACCs.
9. Diversions.
10. Royal flights.
11. VVIP and / or VIP flights.
12. Radio failure procedures.
13. Navigation AIDs.
14. Emergencies, high-jack, bomb threat and fuel dumping.
15. Duties of E-n-route procedural controller.
16. AQABA procedures " approach and/or west sector " as appropriate.
3. Phase 3: The trainee will demonstrate that he/she is capable to carry out the
following duties:
1. Receiving and processing of estimates and revisions from/to other sector
or ATC units and the manual preparation of flight progress strip in case of
FDO failure.
2. Monitoring the sector frequency and assisting the En-route RADAR
controller in maintaining an up to date flight progress display.
3. Pass all estimates and revisions to the relevant sector or ATC units.
4. Alert the En-route RADAR controller of any apparent confliction evident
from the traffic display, which require resolution.
5. Coordination all traffic entering or leaving the sector area of responsibility,
and all allocation of clearances to provide procedural separation, unless
RADAR separation is to be provided in accordance with agreed
procedures.
EDITION No. 6
Page 99
TACC MATC II
On Job Training
CHAPTER 12
6. In the event of full RADAR failure to assist the En-route RADAR

controller in re-establishing procedural separation.
7. Allocating SSR codes as required by RADAR controller and ensuring that
the correlation process is achieved.
8. Assisting the En-route RADAR controller and file flight progress strip.
9. Performing other related duties which may be assigned by the Supervisor
of OJT.
Note: These duties could be also included within the task of OJT En-route
RADAR controller.
12.7.4 En-route RADAR:
1. Phase 1: As detailed in phase1 " general description procedures ".
2. Phase 2: In additions to general description phase 2 " equipment " the trainee
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
General RADAR specifications and limitations.

RADAR setting up procedures.
SSR code allocation.
RADAR separation standards.
RADAR coordination procedures.
RADAR identification procedures.
Mode C verification procedures.
3. Phase 3: The trainee will demonstrate that he/she is capable to carry out the
following duties:
1. Identifying and tracking aircraft under his/her control, effecting RADAR
control and/or RADAR separation as necessary.
2. Applying non-RADAR separation criteria when RADAR separation is not
desirable or not possible.
3. Maintaining an up to date flight progress display.
4. Accepting aircraft from and transferring aircraft to TMA terminal RADAR
unit.
5. Where co-ordination is required, ensuring that this has been carried out
before aircraft leaves sector area of responsibility.
6. Performing other related duties assigned by the Supervisor of OJT.
Note: For more information refer to ATM Training manual.
12.8 TACC Forms:

Attach in APPINDEX 3.
EDITION No. 6
Page 100
APPENDIX 1
RNAV Charts
1.
OJAI:
INSTRUMENT
APPROACH
CHART - ICAO
AD ELEV
2397 FT
HEIGHTS RELATED TO
THR RWY 08L ELEV 2362 FT
ATIS
APP
TWR
127.600
128.900
118.100
AMMAN/Queen Alia Intl (OJAI)

RNAV (GNSS) RWY 08L
INSTRUMENT
APPROACH
CHART - ICAO
AD ELEV
2397 FT
HEIGHTS RELATED TO
THR RWY 08R ELEV 2359 FT
ATIS
APP
TWR
127.600
128.900
118.100

RNAV (GNSS) RWY 08R
INSTRUMENT
APPROACH
CHART - ICAO
AD ELEV
2397 FT
HEIGHTS RELATED TO
THR RWY 26L ELEV 2367 FT
ATIS
APP
TWR
127.600
128.900
118.100
AMMAN/Queen Alia Intl

(OJAI)
RNAV (GNSS) RWY 26L
INSTRUMENT
APPROACH
CHART - ICAO
AD ELEV
2397 FT
HEIGHTS RELATED TO
THR RWY 26R ELEV 2397 FT
ATIS
APP
TWR
127.600
128.900
118.100
AMMAN/Queen Alia Intl

(OJAI)
RNAV (GNSS) RWY 26R
STANDARD DEPARTURE
CHART-INSTRUMENT
(SID) - ICAO
AD ELEV
Trans Alt
Trans Level
2397 FT
13000
FL 150
ATIS
APP
TWR
127.600
128.900
119.800

SID RNAV (GNSS) RWY 08R
STANDARD
DEPARTURE
CHART-INSTRUMENT
(SID) - ICAO
AD ELEV
Trans Alt
Trans Level
2397 FT
13000
FL 150
ATIS
APP
TWR
127.600
128.900
119.800

SID RNAV (GNSS) RWY 26L
STANDARD
AD ELEV
Trans Alt
DEPARTURE
CHART-INSTRUMENT Trans Level
(SID) - ICAO
2397 FT
13000
FL 150
ATIS
APP
TWR
127.600
128.900
119.800

SID RNAV (GNSS) RWY 26R
STANDARD ARRIVAL
CHART-INSTRUMENT
(STAR) - ICAO
AD ELEV
Trans Alt
Trans Level
2397 FT
13000
FL 150
ATIS
APP
TWR
127.600
128.900
119.800

STAR RNAV (GNSS) RWY 26L/R
2. OJAM:
Amendment: New procedure.
INSTRUMENT
APPROACH
CHART - ICAO
AD ELEV
2556 FT
HEIGHTS RELATED TO
THR RWY 24 ELEV 2459 FT
ATIS
APP
TWR
127.600
128.900
118.100
AMMAN/Marka Intl (OJAM)

RNAV (GNSS) RWY 24
STANDARD DEPARTURE
CHART-INSTRUMENT
(SID) - ICAO
AD ELEV
Trans Alt
Trans Level
2556 FT
13000
FL 150
ATIS
APP
TWR
127.600
128.900
118.100

SID RNAV (GNSS) RWY 24
STANDARD ARRIVAL
CHART-INSTRUMENT
(STAR) - ICAO
AD ELEV
Trans Alt
Trans Level
2556 FT
13000
FL 150
ATIS
APP
TWR
127.600
128.900
118.100

STAR RNAV (GNSS) RWY 24
3. OJAQ:
STANDARD ARRIVAL
CHART-INSTRUMENT
(STAR) - ICAO
AD ELEV
Trans Alt
Trans Level
174 FT
13000
FL 150
ATIS
APP
TWR
127.600
119.200
118.100
AQABA/King Hussein Intl (OJAQ)

STAR RNAV (GNSS) RWY 01
APPENDIX 2
TACC MATC II
APPENDIX 2
1. Terminal Procedures AMMAN/Marka:

DEPARTURES AMMAN/Marka RWY 24
ROUTE
NAVIGATION
ALT/FL RESTRICTIONS
LOSAR4D
Climb on runway heading until passing

ALT 5000FT then turn right to
AMN/VOR, intercept AMN R080 to
LOXER then turn left to establish QAA
R029 to LOSAR.
Cross d7 AMN R080 8500FT or above.

Cross LOXER 9000FT or above.
Cross LOSAR 13000FT or above.
LUDAN4D

ALT 5000FT then turn right to
AMN/VOR intercept AMN R080 to
LOXER then to LUDAN.
Cross d7 AMN R080 8500FT or above.

Cross LUDAN 11000FT or above.
QTR4D

ALT 5000FT then turn left to intercept
AMN R209 to MDB NDB then intercept
QTR R336 to QTR/VOR
Cross AMN 10d (R 209) 7000FT or

above. Cross QTR 9000FT or above.
KULDI4D

ALT 5000FT. Turn left to intercept
AMN R209 to MDB NDB intercept QTR
R336 to QTR turn left to intercept QTR
R077 to KULDI.
Cross AMN 10d (R 209) 7000FT or

above. Cross QTR 9000FT or above.
Cross KULDI FL150 or above.
RALNA4D
Climb on runway heading until 10d

AMN/VOR, then turn right to OSAMA
then to RALNA
Cross 14.5d AMN R250 at 6000FT or

above. Cross OSAMA
Maintaining 8000FT.
MUVIN4D
Climb on runway heading proceed to

MOUAB then turn right to MUVIN track
286 then proceed to TALMI.
Cross 15d. AMN on runway heading at

6000FT or above.
Cross MOUAB at 11000FT or above.
Cross MUVIN 12000FT then proceed to
TALMI.
NOTES:
1. Aircraft unable to comply with the SID profile restrictions MUST request NonStandard departure clearance on start up.
2. Aircraft unable to achieve SID profile restrictions when airborne should carry out
the following contingency: Turn left or right as appropriate at 5000FT fly to
AMN/VOR to enter the holding pattern.
3. Departure traffic on RALNA SID and MUVIN SID shall call TEL-AVIV ACC on
FREQ 121.4 or 132.05MHz as early as possible and in any case traffic should not
cross 10 NM East of SALAM or TALMI without establish contact with TELAVIV ACC.
ADVISE ATC IMMEDIATELY THE CONTINGENCY IS COMMENCED.
RMK: See related chart (AIP - AD 2-31).
EDITION No. 6
Page 154
TACC MATC II
APPENDIX 2
ARRIVALS AMMAN / Marka RWY 24

ROUTE
NAVIGATION
ALT/FL RESTRICTIONS
LOSAR4A
At LOSAR intercept QAA

R029.After QAA. Intercept AMN
R160.
Cross LOSAR 13000FT or

above.
Cross 10d QAA 8500FT
LUDAN4A
At LUDAN intercept QAA R048

After QAA intercept AMN R160.
Cross LUDAN 11000FT or

above. Cross QAA 13d 8500FT
or above.
REPORT QAA 20d.

QTR4A
At QTR intercept QAA R186 After

QAA intercept AMN R160.
Cross QTR 9000FT or above.

Cross QAA 15d 7000FT or
above.
REPORT QAA 15d.

KULDI4A
At KULDI intercept QAA R140.

After QAA intercept AMN R 160.

above.
REPORT QAA 20d.

RALNA4A
At RALNA intercept AMN R258,

proceed to AMN/VOR
Cross RALNA 11000FT.

Cross AMN 13d 6000FT or
above.
KINUR4A
AT KINUR intercept QAA R105.

After QAA intercept AMN R160.
Cross KINUR FL150.

Cross ALNOR 7000FT or above.
Cross QAA 6000FT or above.
NOTE: Follow ATC descent clearance instructions. But not below published profile
altitude restrictions which are minimum safety profiles.
AMMAN INBOUND TRAFFIC WILL BE INITIALLY CLEARED TO QAA TO

AWAIT ONWARD CLEARANCE.
EDITION No. 6
Page 155
TACC MATC II
APPENDIX 2
DEPARTURS AMMAN/Marka RWY 06

ROUTE
NAVIGATION
ALT/FL RESTRICTIONS
LOSAR5D
Climb runway heading on track

to AMN Turn left to re- cross
AMN/VOR, intercept QAA
R340. Turn left to establish
QAA R029 to LOXER then to
LOSAR
Cross AMN above 4000FT Turn left

climbing to re-cross AMN at 5500FT
or above.
Cross QAA at 6000FT or above.
Cross QAA 10d 8500FT or above.
LUDAN5D

to AMN Turn left to re- cross
AMN/VOR, intercept QAA
R340 Turn left to establish QAA
R048 to LUDAN.

or above.
Cross LUDAN 11000FT or above.
QTR5D

to AMN turn left to re-cross
AMN/VOR. Intercept QAA
R340. Turn Right to intercept
QTR R006.
Cross AMN above 4000FT turn left

or above.
Cross QTR at 9000FT or above.
KULDI5D

to AMN turn left to re-cross
AMN/VOR. Intercept QAA
R340 Turn left to intercept QAA
R140 to KULDI.
Cross AMN above 4000FT turn left

climbing to re-cross AMN at
5500FT.
RALNA5D
Climb on track to AMN/VOR

then turn right to OSAMA then
proceed to RALNA.
Cross AMN/VOR at 4000FT or

above. Cross AMN R180 at 5000FT
or above.
Cross AMN 14.5d R250 at 6000FT
or above. Cross OSAMA
maintaining 8000FT then proceed to
RALNA.
MUVIN5D
Climb runway heading to

AMN/VOR then turn right to
intercept AMN R239 to
MOUAB then turn right to
MUVIN
Cross AMN/VOR at 4000FT or

above. Cross AMN R180 at 5000FT
or above.
Cross AMN 15d. R241 at 6000FT or
above. Cross MOUAB at 11000FT
or above.
Cross MUVIN 12000FT.
EDITION No. 6
Page 156
TACC MATC II
KINUR5 D
Climb runway heading to AMN

turn left to re- cross AMN/VOR.
Intercept QAA R340 Turn left to
intercept QAA R105 to ALNOR
then to KINUR.
APPENDIX 2

or above.
Cross KINUR FL150 or above.
NOTES:
1. Turn must be completed within 5NM. AMN/VOR/DME to avoid OJD2.
2. All departures via MUVIN and RALNA SIDs profiles, shall call TEL-AVIV ACC on
FREQ 121.4 or 132.05MHz as early as possible, and in any case traffic should not
cross 10 NM East of SALAM or TALMI without establishing contact with TELAVIV ACC.
3. Low level arrival traffic from BEN-GURION to AMMAN/Marka or Amman/Queen
Alia Airports shall follow RALNA STAR profile.
4. Aircraft unable to comply with the SID profile restrictions MUST request NONSTANDARD departure clearance on start up.
5. Aircraft unable to achieve SID profile restrictions when airborne should carry out the
following CONTINGENCY - Turn left or right as appropriate at 5000 FT fly to
AMN/VOR to enter the holding pattern.

RMK: See related chart (AIP - AD 2-31A).
E
EDITION No. 6
Page 157
TACC MATC II
APPENDIX 2
ARRIVALS AMMAN/Marka RWY 06

ROUTE
NAVIGATION
ALT/FL RESTRICTIONS
LOSAR5A
At LOSAR intercept QAA R029

at LOXER intercept AMN R080
to AMN/VOR.
Cross LOSAR 13000 FT or

above.
above.
LUDAN5A
At LUDAN intercept AMN

R080 to AMN.
Cross LUDAN 11000 FT or

above.
Cross AMN 07d 8500 FT.
QTR5A
At QTR establish QTR R336 to

MDB. Intercept AMN R209 to
AMN.
Cross QTR 9000FT or above.

Cross QTR 15d 7000FT or
above.
above.
KULDI5A
At KULDI establish QTR R077

to QTR turn right to intercept
QTR R336 to MDB intercept
AMN R209 to AMN.

Cross QTR 9000 FT or above.
Cross QTR 15d R336 7000FT or
above.
above.
RALNA5A
At RALNA Intercept AMN

R258, proceed to AMN/VOR.

Cross AMN 13d 6000 FT or
above.
REPORT 13d INBOUND TO AMN/VOR.

NOTE: Follow ATC decent clearance instructions but not below published profile altitude
restrictions, which are Minimum safety profiles.
Initial holding clearance may be issued for QTR or AMN.
RMK: See related chart (AIP - AD 2-35A)
EDITION No. 6
Page 158
TACC MATC II
APPENDIX 2
2. Terminal Procedures Queen Alia:

DEPARTURES Queen Alia RWY 26L
ROUTE
NAVIGATION
ALT/FL RESTRICTIONS
LOSAR2D
Climb Runway Heading until

crossing 13.5d QAA. Turn right to
intercept AMN R209. Intercept
AMN R080 to LOXER. Turn left to
intercept QAA R029 to LOSAR
Cross 13.5NM QAA (or AMN

R206 or QTR R341) at
3200FT or above.
Cross AMN 10d R209 7000FT
or above. Cross 07d AMN
(R080) 8500 FT or above.
Cross LOXER 9000FT or
above.
Cross LOSAR 13000FT or at
assigned level.
LUDAN2D

intercept AMN R209 to AMN.
intercept AMN R080 to LUDAN
Cross QAA 13.5d at 3200FT

or above. Cross AMN 10d
R209 7000FT or above. Cross
AMN 07d R080 8500FT or
above. Cross LUDAN
11000FT or at assigned level.
QTR2D

crossing 13.5d QAA turn left to
intercept QTR R336 to QTR

or above. Cross QTR 15d
QTR at 9000 FT or above.
KULDI2D

intercept QTR R336 to QTR. turn
left to intercept QTR R077 to
KULDI

or above. Cross QTR 15d
QTR at 9000FT or above
RALNA2D

crossing 13.5d QAA then turn right
to OSAMA then turn left to
RALNA.
Cross 13.5d QAA or AMN

R206 at 3200FT or above.
Cross QAA 21d R277 at
7000FT or above. Cross
OSAMA maintaining 8000FT.
MUVIN2D
Climb Runway Heading to 13.5d

QAA turn right to MOUAB then
turn left to MUVIN.
Cross 13.5d QAA or AMN

R206 at 3200FT or above.
Cross QAA 22d R269 at 7000
FT or above. Cross MOUAB
11000FT or above.
Cross MUVIN maintaining
12000FT.
EDITION No. 6
Page 159
TACC MATC II
APPENDIX 2
NOTES:
1. Aircraft unable to comply with SID profile restrictions MUST request non-standard
departure clearance on start up.
2. Aircraft unable to achieve SID profile restrictions after airborne should carry out
QAA/VOR to enter the holding pattern.
3. In case of VFR traffic is flying on V1 Corridor between GHARBIYA and
QUARRY, ATC shall instruct the appropriate departure traffic to maintain on track
until passing MDB/NDB or passing ALT 5000FT.
4. Departure traffic on RALNA and MUVIN SIDs shall call TEL-AVIV ACC on
FREQ 121.4 or 132.05MHz as early as possible, and in any case traffic should not
RMK: See related chart (AIP - AD 2-31C).
EDITION No. 6
Page 160
TACC MATC II
APPENDIX 2
WESTERLY ARRIVALS Queen Alia RWY 26R/26L

ROUTE
NAVIGATION
ALT/FL RESTRICTIONS
LOSAR2A
At LOSAR ,intercept QAA R029 to

LOXER then to QAA/VOR

above. Cross LOXER at
QAA 10d 8500 FT or
above.
LUDAN2A
At LUDAN intercept QAA R048 to

QAA.

above. Cross QAA 13d
8500 FT or above.
QTR2A
At QTR intercept QAA R186 to

QAA..
Cross QTR 9000FT or

above.
above.
KULDI2A
At KULDI intercept QAA R140 to

QAA.
Cross KULDI FL150 or

above.
above.
RALNA2A
AT RALNA intercept AMN R258 to

AMN then turn right to intercept AMN Cross AMN 10d R160 at
R160 to QAA.
6000FT or above.
KINUR2A
AT KINUR intercept QAA R105 to

QAA
Cross KINUR FL150 or

above.
Cross ALNOR 7000FT or
above.
NOTE:
1. ACFT not able to comply with STAR profile. It will be subject to radar control.
2. ACFT on KINUR2A not able to comply with the arrival profile, may ask to Proceed
via KULDI2A.
3. Follow ATC descent clearance instructions. But not below published profiles, which
are Minimum safety profiles.
EDITION No. 6
Page 161
TACC MATC II
APPENDIX 2
DEPARTURES Queen Alia RWY 08L

ROUTE
NAVIGATIONS
ALT/FL RESTRICTIONS
LOSAR3D

intercept QAA R029 to LOXER.
Continue to LOSAR.
Climb to cross AMN R174 (3.1d

to QAA/VOR/DME) at 3200FT
or above. Cross 10d QAA at
8500FT or above.
LUDAN3D

intercept QAA R048 to LUDAN
Climb to cross 3.1d to QAA at

3200FT or above.
Cross QAA 13d at 8500FT or
above,
above.
QTR3D

crossing 3.1d QAA turn right to
intercept QAA R186 to QTR

3200FT or above.
Cross QTR 9000FT or above
KULDI3D

crossing 3.1d QAA turn right to
intercept QAA R140 to KULDI

3200FT or above.
Cross KULDI FL150 or above
RALNA3D

crossing 3.1d QAA then turn left
to intercept QAA R290 proceed
to OSAMA, then turn left to
RALNA.
Cross 3.1d to QAA at 3200FT or

above. Cross QAA 12d R290 at
6000FT or above. Cross OSAMA
maintaining 8000FT.
MUVIN3D

crossing 3.1d QAA. Turn left to
intercept QAA R273 proceed to
MOUAB then turn right to
MUVIN.
Cross 3.1d to QAA at 3200FT or

above. Cross QAA 12d at
6000FTor above.
Cross MOUAB 11000FT or
above.
12000FT.
KINUR3D
Climb runway heading until

intercept QAA R105 proceed to
ALNOR then KINUR.

3200FT or above.
NOTES:
1. Aircraft unable to comply with the SID profiles restrictions MUST request nonstandard departure clearance on start up.
EDITION No. 6
Page 162
TACC MATC II
APPENDIX 2
2. Aircraft unable to achieve SID profile restrictions when airborne should carry out the
following contingency: Turn left or right as appropriate at 5000FT fly to MDB/NDB
to enter the holding pattern.
ADVISE ATC IMMEDIATELY THE CONTINGENCY IS COMMENCED
3. In case of VFR traffic is flying on V1 Corridor between GHARBIYA and QUARRY,
departing traffic shall maintain on track until passing 5000FT QNH, or until passing
by QAA/VOR or abeam QAA/VOR.
4. Departure traffic on RALNA and MUVIN SIDs shall call TEL-AVIV ACC on FREQ
121.4 or 132.05MHz as early as possible, and in any case traffic should not cross 10
NM East of SALAM or TALMI without establish contact with TEL- AVIV ACC.
EDITION No. 6
Page 163
TACC MATC II
APPENDIX 2
ARRIVALS Queen Alia RWY 08R/08L

ROUTE
NAVIGATION
ALT/FL RESTRICTIONS
LOSAR3A
At LOSAR intercept QAA R029. At

LOXER turn right to intercept AMN
R080. At AMN turn left to intercept
R209 to MDB NDB.

above.
Cross LOXER 9000FT or
above.
above.
above.
LUDAN3A
At LUDAN intercept AMN R080. At

AMN turn left to intercept AMN R209
proceed to MDB NDB.

above.
Cross AMN 07d R080
AMN 10d R209 7000 FT or
above.
REPORT over LOXER

QTR3A
At QTR turn left to intercept QTR

R336 to MDB NDB.
Cross QTR 9000FT or

above.
Cross QTR 15d at 7000FT
or above.
REPORT 15d OUTBOUND QTR/VOR.

KULDI3A
AT KULDI establish QTR R077 to

QTR then over QTR turn right to
intercept QTR R336 to MDB NDB.

above.
Cross QTR 9000FT or
above.
Cross QTR 15d R336 at
7000FT or above.
REPORT 15d OUTBOUND QTR/VOR.

RALNA3A
At RALNA intercept AMN R258 to

AMN. Turn right to intercept AMN
R209 to MDB/NDB.

Cross AMN 10d R209
7000FT or above.
NOTE: Initial holding clearance may be issued for QTR or AMN follow ATC descent
clearance instructions, but not below published profiles which are minimum safety
profiles.
EDITION No. 6
Page 164
TACC MATC II
APPENDIX 2
DEPARTURE Queen Alia RWY 26R
ROUTE
NAVIGATION
ALT/FL
RESTRICTIONS
LOSAR2D
Climb Runway Heading until crossing

(14d QAA) then turn right to intercept
AMN R209 to AMN/VOR intercept
AMN R080 to LOXER, then turn left
to intercept QAA R029 to LOSAR.
Cross 14d QAA (AMN

R206) at 3200FT or above.
Cross AMN 10d (R209)
AMN 07d (R080) 8500FT
or above. Cross LOXER
9000FT or above.
above.
LUDAN2D

QAA 14d then turn right to intercept
AMN R209 to AMN intercept AMN
R080 to LUDAN .
Cross 14d QAA at 3200 FT

or above.
Cross AMN 10d R209
AMN 07d R080 8500FT or
above. Cross LUDAN
11000FT or above.
QTR2D
Climb Runway Heading until 14d

QAA, then turn left to intercept QTR
R336 to QTR.
Cross 14d QAA at 3200FT

or above.
above.
Cross QTR at 9000FT or
above.
KULDI2D
Climb Runway Heading until 14d

QAA, turn left to intercept QTR R336
to QTR, then turn left to intercept
QTR R077 To KULDI.
Cross 14d QAA at 3200 FT

or above.
above.
Cross QTR 9000FT or
above.
above.
MUVIN2D
Climb Runway Heading to

MDB/NDB, turn right to intercept
MDB bearing 291 to MOUAB then
turn left to MUVIN.
Cross 14d QAA at 3200

FT or above.
7000 FT or above. Cross
MOUAB 11000FT or
above.
12000FT.
EDITION No. 6
Page 165
TACC MATC II
RALNA2D

14d QAA, then turn right on track 315
to OSAMA then turn left to RALNA.
APPENDIX 2
Cross 14d QAA at 3200FT

or above.
OSAMA maintaining
8000FT then to RALNA
point.
NOTES:
1. Aircraft unable to comply with SID profile restrictions MUST request nonstandard departure clearance on start up.
2. Aircraft unable to achieve SID profile restrictions when airborne should carry out
the following contingency: Turn left or right as appropriate at 5000FT to
ADVISE ATC IMMEDIATELY THE CONTINGENCY IS COMMENCED
QUARRY, departing traffic shall maintain on track until passing 5000FT QNH,
or until passing by MDB/NDB or abeam MDB/NDB.
4. Departure traffic on RALNA and MUVIN SIDs shall call TEL-AVIV ACC on
FREQ 121.4 or 132.05 MHz as early as possible, and in any case traffic should
not cross 10 NM East of SALAM or TALMI without establish contact with TELAVIV ACC.
RMK: See related chart (AIP - AD 2-31B).
EDITION No. 6
Page 166
TACC MATC II
APPENDIX 2
DEPARTURES Queen Alia RWY 08R

ROUTE
LOSAR3D
NAVIGATION
ALT/FL RESTRICTIONS
Climb Runway Heading to QA/NDB

Climb to Cross QA NDB 3200
then turn left to intercept QAA R029 to FT or above. Cross (QAA 10d)
LOXER .then to LOSAR
8500 FT or above.
above.
LUDAN3D

Climb to Cross QA NDB 3200FT
then turn left to intercept QAA R048 to or above. Cross QAA 13d
LUDAN.
8500FT or above.
above.
QTR3D

then turn right to intercept QAA R186
to QTR.
Climb to cross QA NDB at

3200FT or above. Cross QAA
15d 7000 FT or above.
Cross QTR 9000 FT or above.
KULDI3D

then turn right to intercept QAA R140
to KULDI.
Climb to cross QA NDB 3200 FT

or above. Cross QAA 15d
7000FT or above.
MUVIN3D
Climb Runway Heading to QA/NDB.

Turn left to intercept QAA R273
proceed to MOUAB then MUVIN.
Cross QA/NDB at 3200FT or

above.
above.
Cross MOUAB 11000FT or
above.
12000FT.
RALNA3D

then turn left to intercept QAA R290
proceed to OSAMA, then turn left to
RALNA.
Cross QA/NDB at 3200FT or

above.
above.
Cross OSAMA maintaining
8000FT.
KINUR3D
Climb runway heading to QA/NDB

then turn right to intercept QAA
R105 to ALNOR .then to KINUR
Climb to Cross QA/NDB 3200FT

or above.
EDITION No. 6
Page 167
TACC MATC II
APPENDIX 2
NOTES:
1. Aircraft unable to comply with the SID profiles restrictions MUST request nonstandard departure clearance on start up.
2. Aircraft unable to achieve SID profile restrictions after airborne should carry out
QUARRY, departing traffic shall maintain on track until passing 5000FT QNH, or
until passing by QAA/VOR or abeam QAA/VOR.
4. Departure traffic on RALNA SID and MUVIN SID shall call TEL-AVIV ACC on
FREQ 121.4 MHz or 132.05 MHz as early as possible and in any case should not
RMK: See related chart (AIP - AD 2-31A)
EDITION No. 6
Page 168
TACC MATC II
APPENDIX 2
3. Terminal Procedures AQABA/ King Hussein:

ARABA DEPARTURE RWY 01
ROUTE
NAVIGATION
ALT/FL RESTRICTIONS
AQC/NDB
R652
QTR/VOR
Climb on track until passing ALT

7000FT then turn right to join R652
to QTR/VOR
Dont initiate right turn before

passing ALT 7000FT.
NOTE: Right turn at ALT 6500FT may be approved if there is no traffic on V4 route.
RAHMA DEPARTURE RWY 01
ROUTE
NAVIGATION
ALT/FL RESTRICTIONS
AQC/NDB
R652
METSA
CAIRO FIR

7000FT turn right to BAKIR FIX (turn
should be completely contained within
AQABA Approach Control Area) then
proceed to METSA.
Dont initiate right turn before

passing
ALT 7000FT. Cross METSA
at
ALT 12000FT or above.
NOTE: Right turn at ALT 6500FT may be approved if there is no traffic on V4 route.
RMK: See related chart (AIP - AD 2-31)
EDITION No. 6
Page 169
TACC MATC II
APPENDIX 2
PETRA DEPARTURE RWY 19

ROUTE
NAVIGATION
ALT/FL RESTRICTIONS
BAKIR FIX
R652
QTR

5000FT (minimum climbing gradient
5%) turn left to join ATS Route R652
to QTR/VOR. Cross AQB/VOR.
R090 at ALT 7000FT or above (turn
should be completely contained within
Aqaba Approach Control Area).
Maximum IAS 210 KTS.
Dont initiate left turn

before passing ALT
5000FT. Cross AQB/VOR
R090 at ALT 7000FT or
above.
METSA DEPARTURE RWY 19

ROUTE
NAVIGATION
ALT/FL
RESTRICTIONS
BAKIR FIX
R652,METS
A

5000FT (minimum climbing gradient
5%) turn left proceeds to BAKIR
hold. Cross AQB/VOR R090 at ALT
7000FT or above Climb in the hold to
cross METSA at ALT 12000 FT or
above then to the assigned level.
Maximum IAS 210 KTS.
Dont initiate left turn

before passing ALT
5000FT. (don't exceed 7
NM from AQB). Cross
AQB/VOR R090 at ALT
7000FT or above.
NOTES:
1. The turns to the left after departure should be completely contained within Aqaba
Approach Control Area.
2. All traffic departing or arriving Aqaba/King Hussein International aerodrome shall
adhere to the standard SIDs and Approach IFR joining instructions as published in
Jordan AIP.
3. ACFT unable to comply with the SID profiles restrictions must request nonstandard departure clearance on start up.
EDITION No. 6
Page 170
TACC MATC II
APPENDIX 2
EDITION No. 6
Page 171
APPENDIX 3
TACC FORMS
The Hashemite kingdom of Jordan

Directorate ANS Division / Queen Alia
Amman / TACC
ATC Performance Check Form .
Name:
APPS
ACS
Evaluation factors
Position
Assessment Items
Date:
A
Legibility
Updating information
Reviewing of accuracy
Use of equipment
Planning
Controlling
Clarity of voice
Priorities of tasks
Traffic Control Operating
Corrective action
Technique
Attention to duties
Adjustment to meet changing conditions
Adherence to SARPS and local procedures
Working speed
Vectoring Techniques
RADAR
Sequencing
Adherence to procedures
Correct phraseology
Voice intelligibility
Radio and direct lines
Correct techniques
Adherence to procedures
Response to information receivers
Coordination
Forwards required information
Effectiveness of operation
Selection of type to be applied
Aircraft capabilities
Separation Standards
Adherence to separation standards
Use of Navigational Aids
Motivation of sub staff
Assignment of man power
Instruction techniques
Staff management supervision Management techniques
Leadership
Performance of liaison duties
Evaluation of performance of sub staff
1. Position Management
a. Display Management
b. Board Management
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Examiner comments
Name & signature
TACC Chief comments
Name & signature
A : Above average , S: Satisfactory , B: Below average
CARC\ANS\TACC\Form # 1

Amman / TACC
Evaluation Form
Name:
Date:
APPS
From
To
From
To
Time
ACS
Strengths/ APPS
Strengths/ ACS
Supervisor comments:
Approval
Objection
Reservation
Weaknesses/ APPS
Weaknesses/ ACS
Supervisor & Signature:
Other data and information ( for TACC Chief use )

..
..
..
TACC Chief comments:
TACC Chief & Signature:
Correction plan (Recommendations and follow-up ):
Copy to:
Copy to:
CARC\ANS\TACC\Form #2

Amman / TACC
Rating Validity Report & Practical Assessment Form.
Name:
Position
Date:
APPS
Time
ACS
From
To
From
To
Satisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Evaluation Factors
APPS
ACS
APPS
ACS
Passed
Passed
Failed
Failed
1. Separation
2. Traffic Management and Control Judgment
3. Coordination and Communication
4. Operation and procedures
5. Equipment
6. Board Management
Final Result
Examiner Comments:
Name & Signature
OJT Chief Comments:
Name & Signature

Amman / TACC
RADAR Practical Training Record.
Trainee Name:
Date
Start
End
Traffic
Volume
Duration
OJTI
/201
/201
/201
/201
/201
/201
/201
/201
/201
/201
/201
/201
/201
/201
/201
/201
/201
/201
/201
/201
/201
/201
/201
/201
Total
Position
Approach
Surveillance
Area
Surveillance

Amman / TACC
ATC Final Practical Assessment Form .
Trainee Name:
Position:
Date of birth:
Date:
License NO:
1. Knowledge and application of ATC procedures:
2. R/T phraseology and telephone technique:
3. Staff relationship (Coordination , flexibility , initiative and reaction to criticism):
4. Assessment of performance covered:
5. Equipment management:
) Satisfactory
) Unsatisfactory
Examiner Comments:
Name & Signature
OJT Supervisor Comments:
Name & Signature
Trainee name & signature:

Passport copy is required.

Amman / TACC
OJT Training Assessment Form.
Name:
Position
Date:
APPS
Time
ACS
Training Phase: One
From
To
From
To
Workload: Light Traffic

APPS
SUBJECT
ACS
EVALUATION FACTOR
S
Passed
Failed
Passed
Failed
1-Use of standard phraseology

2-Use of good voice quality
PHRASEOLOGY
3-Speech rate
4-Make necessary transmission
1-Accuracy
STRIP
MARKING
2-Legibilty
3-Completeness
1-RT channel selection
EQUIPMENT
HANDLING
2-NAV aids Monitor

3-Weather information
4-Adjusment of radar control
Final Result
Examiner Comments:
Name & Signature
Name & Signature
S: Satisfactory. U: Unsatisfactory.

Amman / TACC
Name:
Position
Date:
APPS
Time
ACS
Training Phase: Two
From
To
From
To
Workload: Light to Medium Traffic
APPS
SUBJECT
ACS
EVALUATION FACTOR
S
Passed
Failed
Passed
Failed

PHRASEOLOGY
STRIP MARKING
EQUIPMENT
HANDLING

3-Speech rate
1-Accuracy
2-Legibilty
3-Completeness
2-NAV aids Monitor
COORDINATION
TRAFFIC
MANAGEMENT &
CONTROL
JUDGMENT
1- Coordination procedures
2-Phraseology
3-Coordination through proper channels
4-Interphone communication clear and concise
1-Awareness and preplanning
2-Control Judgment
3-Control of situation
4-Action to correct error
5-Effective traffic flow is maintained
Final Result
Examiner Comments:
Name & Signature
Name & Signature

Amman / TACC
Name:
Date:
APPS
Position
From
To
From
To
Time
ACS
Training Phase: Three
Workload: Medium to Heavy Traffic
SUBJECT
EVALUATION FACTOR
APPS
ACS
Passed
Failed
Passed
Failed

PHRASEOLOGY

3-Speech rate
STRIP MARKING
1-Accuracy
2-Legibilty
3-Completeness
EQUIPMENT
HANDLING

2-NAV aids Monitor
COORDINATION
TRAFFIC
MANAGEMENT &
CONTROL
JUDGMENT
OPERATIONS &
PROCEDURES
1- Coordination procedures
2-Phraseology
3-Coordination through proper channels
4-Interphone communication clear and concise
1-Awareness and preplanning
2-Control Judgment
3-Control of situation
4-Action to correct error
5-Effective traffic flow is maintained
1-Adherance to unit procedures and instructions
2-Adherance to standard
3-Hand Over procedure (silent)
4-Expedtion
5-Applying safety
6-ATC clearances
7-Sequencing
Final Result
Examiner Comments:
Name & Signature
Name & Signature

Amman / TACC
INDRA Training Form
Name:
Session Type
Date:
Start Time
End Time
Duration
SDD
Situation Data Display
FDD
Flight Data Display
CMD
Control Monitoring
Display
Total Duration:
Remarks:
Trainer Name/Sign:
Trainee Name/Sign:

Amman / TACC
COORDINATION FAILURES FORM
Month:
No.
Date
Call singe +
Registration
ACFT
Type
Route
SSR
Code
Dep.
Dest.
COOR
Level
Actual
Level
FIR Entry
FIR Exit
Fault
Point
Time
Point
Time
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Directorate ANS Division / Queen Alia Airport
Amman TACC
Read Back of Clearances and Safety Related Information.
Date
Time
From
Tape Date
Tape Number
To
SDD Number
Listening period
Findings
Recommendations
Follow Up and Corrective Action
TACC Chief Name

& Signature
Copy: DANS
Copy: SMS Officer
SMS Officer Name

& Signature
CARC \ ANS \ TACC \ Form # 11
APPENDIX 4
INDRA SYSTEM
TACC MATC II
INDRA SYSTEM
APPENDIX 4
1. INDRA SYSTEM
1.0 Definitions:
Full Flight Plan :

Complete flight plan, normally associated to a commercial airline, with slight
differences up to the actual airplane performing service .
Physical Screen :
The physical monitor used by the system to interact with controller, where every
Window is displayed .
Pop-up Menu :
Menu displayed upon clicking once on the icon. Menu display is kept after button
release and selection is performed pointing and clicking .
Pull Down Menu :
Menu will keep display while pressing mouse button (normally LEFT button).
Desired option is selected by dragging pointer to the option while pressing. Upon
button release, the menu is removed .
Reconfiguration :
A change in the roles assigned to each Workstation to set a different number of
controllers, different distribution ...
Role :
Any category of controller working in the Visual Control Room and classified by the
controlled aerodrome zone. Typical roles are Tower, Ground and Clearance .
Screen Layout :
Windows distribution and appearance when displayed on the Integrated Work
Station. It is different according to the roles assigned to each ICW .
Variable System Parameter :
Its a certain value entered in the system in order to regulate processes such as timing
for FP insertion in Pending Lists, waiting for terminating a flight after arrival to
gate...Etc.
2.0 Abbreviations:
AAI
ACID
ADEP
AIW
ATA
ATCC
ATD
ATFMC
ATG
ATIS
AW
BYP
EDITION No. 6
AFTN aeronautical identifier or header

Aircraft Identification
Aerodrome of Departure
Aerodrome Information Window
Actual Time of Arrival
Air Traffic Control Center
Actual Time of Departure
Air traffic flow management control
Air traffic generator
Airport Terminal Information Service
Minimum safe altitude warning
By pass mode
Page 183
TACC MATC II
CCC
CFMU
CFL
CL
CMD
CNL
CNF
CTF
CTOT
DBM
DCT
DEST
DME
DRF
EPP
EFS
EOBT
ETA
FDD
FDPS
FIFO
FP
FPL
GND
H/O
HFS
ICW
IFR
ILS
LAN
LB
LLZ
LMG
MET
MIS
NAVAID
NTZ
OS
PEL
PO
PSRT
RDCU
RDPS
RISC
RFL
RWY
SAR
SDP
SDD
SIM
EDITION No. 6
INDRA SYSTEM
APPENDIX 4
Central Computing System

Central of flow management unit
Clearance
Control & Monitoring Display
Cancel
Conflicted flights
Common timing facility
Calculated Take-Off Time
Data base management
Direct
Destination Aerodrome
Distance Measurement Equipment
Data Recording Facility
Exercise planner position
Electronic Flight Strip
Estimated Off-Block Time
Estimated Time of Arrival
Flight data display
Flight Data Processing System
First in first out theory
Flight Plan
Flight Plan
Ground
Hand-Off
Horizontal future situation
Integrated Controller Workstation
Instrument Flight Rules
Instrumental Landing System
Local area network
Clam alert cleared level adherence and monitoring
Localizer
Local map generator
Meteorological
Missing
Navigation AID
Non Transgression Zone
Obstruction Symbole
Planned entry level
Position report
Primary search RADAR tracks
Radar data communications unit
Radar Data Processing System
Reduced instruction set computing
Runway
Search And Rescue
Surveillance data processor
Situation Data Display
Simulator
Page 184
TACC MATC II
SID
SMC
SMGCS
SFS
SRA
SSRC
STAR
STCA
SU
XFL
TAF
TIS
TMA
TWR
UPS
VFR
VFS
VOR
VSP
W
ZN
3.0
INDRA SYSTEM
APPENDIX 4
Standard Instrument Departures

System Monitoring & Control
Surface Movement Guidance and Control System
Survey function selected
Single Radar Access
Secondary Surveillance Radar Code
Standard Terminal Arrival Route
Short term conflict alert
Supervisor
Exit flight level
Terminal Area Forecast
Traffic Information System
Terminal Maneuvering Area
Tower
Uninterruptible Power Supply
Visual Flight Rules
Vertical future situation
VHF Omni directional Range
Variable System Parameter
Wake Turbulence
Area proximity warning
General System Description:

The AIRCON 2100 System is based on a standard product developed by Indra. At the
same time, an autonomous simulator addressed to controllers for training purposes to
allow analysis of new operational procedures provides the operational system .
AIRCON 2100 represents the last product generation and its architecture is based on
the experience gained in the development of open systems for the displaying and
processing of radar data and flight plans, found on numerous systems installed in
Spain (SACTA System), Canada, Germany, Norway, Holland, India and now in
Jordan, One of the main characteristics of the system is its availability, due to the
employment of redundant elements on a distributed scenario, and to the use of tested
and highly reliable commercial equipment .
The system modularity and distribution determines the software architecture, which
uses distributed discrete processes for the different subsystems for its organization. At
the same time, the system makes use of communication by messages, both for inter
communications between tasks and for its synchronicity. In order to assure a
maximum level of maintenance, communications and application tasks have been
isolated .
The software running in the system has been tested and proved extensively in different
emplacements and during longs periods and, therefore, Indra can guarantee that no
additional developments of any kind are required for its correct and stable operation .
The Operating System used is RED HAT ENTERPRISE LINUX 5 .
EDITION No. 6
Page 185
TACC MATC II
INDRA SYSTEM
APPENDIX 4
AIRCON 2100 includes all the necessary functionality required in a modern ATC
system.
3.1 INDRA RADAR Coverage:
RADAR system will be able to detect and process targets from .025 up to 256 NM
except for geographical restrictions in distance and more than 66.000 feet in height,
in a 360 degrees azimuth.
3.2 The integration of all its subsystems is performed via :
Local Area Network (LAN): A redundant five (5) category with a 1-Gigabyte
bandwidth capacity LAN is used and, therefore, future updates of the system can be
easily implemented making use of standard communication protocols .
4.
Main components :
4.1 Flight Data Processing (FDP):

It is based on RISC redundant computers. It manages the flight plans generated within
the System or coming from external sources, including the Repetitive Flight Plans
(RPLs). It confirms all flight data inputs, calculates the flights progression and keeps
all controllers inform by means of screen displays and flight plan strips printing.
Redundant configuration designs the System, having an FDP as operative and another
one as reserve, with the possibility to switch them.
4.2
Surveillance Data Processor (SDP):
It is based on RISC redundant computers. It receives and processes data (primary,

secondary and meteorological) coming from the radar sites. Next, it performs the
merge all the received information to create a coherent airspace picture for controllers
(SDD) presentation. It also performs surveillance tasks (STCA, MTCD) between
aircraft and integrates the radar information and the flight plan information in order to
get a precise tracking. The System is duplicated (operative/reserve) being possible to
switch them .
4.3
RADAR Communications Processor (RDCU):
It centralizes the System radar communications to interpret and convert the received
radar formats to join them. The System is composed of two RDCU units working
parallel. It is possible to carry out the received radar data reproduction during an
established period .
5.0
Controlling positions:
5.1
Situation Data Display (SDD):

It is based on powerful workstations that receive data processed by both the SDP and
the FDP. Later on, it manages all these information for a coherent displaying at the
EDITION No. 6
Page 186
TACC MATC II
INDRA SYSTEM
APPENDIX 4
controllers screens (SDD). At the same time, it displays additional relevant

information such as geographic maps, meteorological data.
5.2
Flight Data Display (FDD):
It displays information concerning flight plans not supplying data display of data on
air situation. It allows controllers to perform adjustments on flight plans and other
significant data.
5.3
Control and Monitoring Display (CMD):

It performs a continuous real time supervision of the System. It also allows monitoring
and System elements status change, Sectorization modification, management of
certain configurable parameters, etc.
6.0
Auxiliary equipment:
6.1
Common Timing Facility (CTF):

It receives the GPS time, spread to all the subsystem (via LAN) and all clocks (via
Terminals) with NTP protocol.
6.2
Data Recording Facilities (DRF):

It performs the continuous recording of tracks; flight plans data and controller actions
to allow a later reproduction and analysis.
6.3
Data Base Management (DBM):

It provides the necessary facilities the creation and modification of the adaptation
databases to supply the system with the precise knowledge of its geographical
environment to achieve the required efficiency. From this database, all necessary data
to define the control center characteristics are defined (fix points, aerodromes,
airways, Sectorization, adjacent control centers, QNH zones, etc.).
7.0
Simulator environment:
7.1
Simulator (SIM):
It provides to the controllers an operational replica of the real scenario for training
purposes. It is a multiple exercise simulator system and allows the use of several
exercises, simultaneously and independently. It allows the analysis of new operational
procedures as well as the management and maintenance of the full set of sessions and
exercises recorded in the Simulation Library. It also allows the creation of new
exercises, the selection of training scenarios and provides a complete set of interactive
capacities in order to guarantee full control and management.
7.2
Instructor Pilot Position (PILOT SM):

It allows training scenarios selection, session control and control of aircraft simulated
interactively in such a way that it generates the communication answer to the control
positions from this position.
EDITION No. 6
Page 187
TACC MATC II
7.3
INDRA SYSTEM
APPENDIX 4
Exercise Manager (ATG/EPP):
This unit manages the exercises.

8.0
Plot and Track symbols:
The plots which not created a track yet can be displayed for selected radar. Once the
track is created, the plot symbol is no longer displayed.
The plot symbol is a shape associated to a unique plot, its location in the SDD is
automatically moved by the system in order to present the actual position of the flight.
The symbols to each type of plot are described in following table:
The track symbol is a shape associated to a unique track, its location on the SDD
Area is automatically moved by the system in order to represent the actual position of
the flight, the symbols to each type of track are described in following table:
EDITION No. 6
Page 188
TACC MATC II
9.0
APPENDIX 4
INDRA SYSTEM
Labels and track colors:

The system provides the capability of classify the tracks by means of color codes.
The color code is an adaptation data and it is applied to the symbol, leader, track, past
positions, and tracks velocity vector. The below table states the colors used to
distinguish the different types of tracks.
LABEL COLOUR
MEANING
GREEN LABEL
CONTROLLED IFR
YELLOW LABEL
CONTROLLED VFR
LIGHT BLUE+ GREEN CALLSIGN
INBOUND SECTOR IFR
LIGHT BLUE+ YELLOW CALLSIGN
INBOUND VFR
NOTE: light blue color was installed to indicate uncontrolled flights inside,
outside sectors shown in the picture:
EDITION No. 6
Page 189
TACC MATC II
LINE #
INDRA SYSTEM
APPENDIX 4
FIELD
DISPLAYED INFO
VALID DATA
SECTOR NAME
4 CHARACTERS
ROF/RAM/SSR/HEADING
2 CHARACTERS
FQ/RO/SQ/HG
YELLOW
COLORED
8.33/UHF WARNINGS
1 CHARACTERS
8 YELLOW: 8.33 WARNING
8 RED: 8.33 ALERT
U YELLOW : UHF EQUIPPED
RVSM
1 CHARACTERS
R RED : RVSM ALERT
R YELLOW : RVSM WARNING
S YELLOW: NON RVSM
S GREEN : RVSM EQUIPPED
ONE
2 CHARACTERS
AW: MSAW (YELLOW: prediction;
RED: violation)
ZN: APW (YELLOW: prediction;
RED: violation)
ZN: RAW (GREEN)
MC: MTCD (YELLOW: prediction;
RED: violation)
PO: Position Report
Distress
2 CHARACTERS
EM (RED): Emergency
HJ (RED): Hijack
RF (RED): Radio Communication
Failure
LB (YELLOW): CLAM alert
COORDINATION
REQ.MARK
1 CHARACTER
Call sign
7 CHARACTERS
^ mark
1 CHARACTER
Ground speed/ Vertical

speed
3 CHARACTERS
Altitude indicator
1 CHARACTER
Mode C
3 CHARACTERS
MSAW/ APW/ RAW/ MTCD/PO
TWO
THREE
Vertical Speed Indicator

C
EDITION No. 6
1 Character
=> Aircraft climbing ,
=> Aircraft descending
Space => Aircraft maintaining altitude
Page 190
TACC MATC II
Cleared flight level (CFL)

D
Planned entry level(PEL)
E
F
A
FOUR
APPENDIX 4
INDRA SYSTEM
3 Characters
CFL value for controlled tracks
PEL value for inbound tracks
Exit flight level (XFL)

Free Text
Aircraft type/ Mode A
3 CHARACTERS
--------3 CHARACTERS
Wake turbulence category
1 CHARACTER
Last point/SID/STAR/DEST
5 CHARACTERS
Assigned heading (Only for

extended mode)
3 CHARACTERS
Assigned speed (Only for

extended mode)
3 CHARACTERS
Assigned vertical rate

indicator (Only for extended mode)
1 CHARACTER
Requested flight level (RFL) (Only

for extended mode)
2 CHARACTERS
FIVE
10.0 Situation Data Display SDD :

The following informations will guide the new users of the SDD Position to all
available windows with its description; the SDD screen is divided into three main
areas:
10.1 General Information Area (Upper Menu):
1. Minimum Safe Altitude Warning [MSAW] Icon:
The Minimum Safe Altitude Warning (MSAW) is defined in adaptation and it is
activated /deactivated at CMD. When it is activated, the icon text color is GREEN
and, when it is deactivated, the icon text color turns to YELLOW. When Safety Net
is not available, this functionality is not operative, and its color turns to RED.
EDITION No. 6
Page 191
TACC MATC II
INDRA SYSTEM
APPENDIX 4
2. Short Term Conflict Alert [STCA] Icon:

The Short Term Conflict Alert (STCA) is also defined in adaptation and it is
activated /deactivated at CMD. When it is activated, the icon text color is GREEN
and, when it is deactivated, the icon text color turns to YELLOW. When Safety Net
is not available, this functionality is not operative, and its color turns to RED.
3. Area Proximity Warning [APW] Icon:

The Area Proximity Warning (APW) is defined in adaptation and it is activated /
inhibited by the CMD. When it is activated, the icon text color is GREEN and,
when it is inhibited, the icon text color turns to YELLOW.
4. Medium Term Conflict Detection [MTCD] Icon:

The Medium Term Conflict Detection (MTCD) it is activated /deactivated by the
CMD. When it is activated, the icon text color is GREEN and when deactivated
YELLOW.
5. Primary Search Radar Tracks [PSR T] Icon:

The [PSR T] icon allows the activation of the PSR to initiate the tracking of PSR
plots falling in a system, following colors represents the icon status:
Activated: BLACK on LIGHT GREY
Deactivated: WHITE on GREY
6. [OPTIONS] Icon: options included are:

a) HISTORY: Activate / deactivate the tracks past positions display,
the activation status can be also selected by means of the key
combination <Alt> + <H>.
b) PSR PLOT: Activate/deactivate the primary plots display.
c) PSR BYP: Activate/deactivate the primary tracks display.
d) SSR PLOT: Activate/deactivate the secondary plots display.
e) SSR BYP: Activate/deactivate the non-correlated secondary tracks
display.
f) CORR: Activate/deactivate the correlated secondary tracks display.
EDITION No. 6
Page 192
TACC MATC II
INDRA SYSTEM
APPENDIX 4
g) REPORT: Activate/deactivate the ADS position reports, activating the "PO" alert
in track label when an expected report is not received.
h) FILLED: Activate/deactivate the display of under-control sectors in a different
background color.
7. Survey Function Selected [SFS] Icon:

This icon is used to select the operational mode:
I. (INT) Integrated Mode or Multi RADAR: The Position displays multi radar
tracks processed by the SDP coming from all System radars, which are operative.
Thus, the plot position is calculated taking into account the information sent by
several radars.
II. (MON) Mono-RADAR Mode: The position displays the mono-RADAR tracks
received from the SDP of radar selected by the controller from the radar sites
defined by adaptation.
III. (BYP) By-Pass Mode: (BYP) By-Pass Mode the SDP does not process the
received RADAR information. It comes directly from the RDCU system of the
radar site selected to the SDD. The SDD position is the one in charge of the
received information process, track creation, etc. The FDP information is still
accessible but as the SDP is not a part of the process, all relation between the FDP
and the SDP is cancelled.
Following functions are not available when the mode of operation is (BYP):
1. Correlation of track with Flight Plan.
2. STCA.
3. Mode C Tracking.
4. Synthetic Tracks.
5. APW Prediction and Intrusion.
6. Hand-over.
8. RADAR Source [RADAR] Icon:
This icon displays the selected current RADAR source.
9. Weather Radar Data Source Information [Wx: ] Icon:
Select the weather RADAR whose data will be displayed if available.
10. [Presentation Range] Icon:
This icon displays the current selected range in NM and by pressing on it you can
select different ranges.
11. Altitude Filters Activation/ deactivation [FALT] Icon:
The [FALT] icon allows the activation/deactivation of the altitude filter for the
SDD SIT Area.
Its activation status is shown by the icon text color: YELLOW if it is activated, and
WHITE if deactivated,
EDITION No. 6
Page 193
TACC MATC II
INDRA SYSTEM
APPENDIX 4
12. See plots [ST] Icon:

To select the color of the plots belonging to a selected RADAR (only if the SDD in
supervisor mode) in other hand this icon shows the mode of the SDD.
13. Sectors Display: It displays the sectors assigned to the position.
14. Expansion [EXP+ F9] , Contraction Scale [EXP- F10] Icons:
To increase the presentation range of the SDD SIT area, to contract an area of the
SDD SIT Area.
15. Centering [CEN] , De-Centering [DCEN] Icons:
Centering icon performs a return of the SDD SIT Area to geographical center
determined by the system, De-centering or drifted center this icon performs the
change of current SIT Area center display to another point.
16. Flight Plan [FPL] Icon:
Allows the controller to select the type of FP-operation to be performed.
17. Flight plan Action Window: This window allows choosing different actions or just
information displays (View and Hist.) for an existing FP or creation of a nonexisting FP, upon selection of the corresponding command. Editable fields depend
on the selected command/action.
EDITION No. 6
Page 194
TACC MATC II
Field
Flight ID
Radio Call sign
NO
A/C TYPE
DEP
DEST
NAV/ COM
EDITION No. 6
APPENDIX 4
INDRA SYSTEM
Description
Valid Data
Aircraft Identification or
ACID
2 to 7 alphanumeric characters
Phonetic Airline Opera
Up to 20 characters.
Non-editable field. Defined in
DBM.
Number of Aircrafts
Up to 2 numerical characters
(1-99)
Type of Aircraft
2 to 4 alphanumeric characters.
The first one shall be an
alphabetic character.
It shall be known by the
system.
Type of wake turbulence
L = light
M = medium
H = heavy
J = super-heavy
Departure Aerodrome
Four alphabetic characters.

If unknown, then enter the
ZZZZ keyword.
If created while aircraft is
airborne, then enter the AFIL
keyword.
Destination Aerodrome
Four alphabetic characters.
Navigational/
Communications
Equipment
Up to 20 alphabetical characters
N = Non-equipped
S = Equipped
A = LORAN A
C = LORAN C
D = DME
E = Decca
H = HF RTF
I = Inertial Navigation
L = ILS
M = Omega
O = VOR
Page 195
TACC MATC II
APPENDIX 4
INDRA SYSTEM
P = Doppler
R = RNAV
T = TACAN
U = UHF RTF
V = VHF RTF
W = RVSM
Y = Frequency 8.33 Mz
RVSM
SURVEILLANCE
EQUIPMENT
EDITION No. 6
RVSM Capability Status
EQ = equipped
NO = non-equipped (for civil
flights)
UN = unknown
EX = exempted (for military
flights)
SSR Equipment.
Up to 20 alphabetical characters
N=> None. (The aircraft do not
carry transponder equipment).
It is not allowed this value if an
SSR Code is assigned.
A=> Mode A (Transponder
equipment can send positional
information but without altitude
information)
C=> Mode C (Transponder
equipment can send both
positional and altitude
information)
X=> Mode S (nor aircraft
identification transmission
neither
pressure altitude information)
P=> Mode S (Transponder
equipment can send pressure
altitude transmission but it
cannot sent aircraft
identification
transmission)
I=> Mode C (Transponder can
send aircraft identification
transmission but it cannot send
pressure altitude transmission)
S=> Mode S (Transponder can
send both aircraft
identification and pressure
altitude transmission)
Blank = C
Page 196
TACC MATC II
APPENDIX 4
INDRA SYSTEM
ICAO SSR Code
4 numerical characters (octal)

Blank = It allows the FDP to
automatically assign an SSR
Code
Flight Rules
I = IFR
V = VFR
Y = IFR followed by VFR
Z = VFR followed by IFR
Blank = I
FT
Flight Type
S = scheduled
N = non-scheduled
G = general aviation
M = military
X = other
Blank = other
SID
Standard Instrumental
Departure Procedure
CSSR
Alphanumeric characters (2 to
7). Must be a known SID.
FP route
See following NOTE on Route
Field Validation Rules.
Standard Terminal Arrival

Route Procedure
Alphanumeric characters (2 to
7). Must be a known STAR.
EOBD
Estimated Off-Block Date
YYMMDD (00 to 99 and 01 to

12 and 01 to 31) date of
departure.
EOBT
Estimated Off-Block Time HHMM (00 to 23 and 00 to 59)
FIR ROUTE
STAR
MSG
EDITION No. 6
Last AFTN Received

Message
AFTN message; e.g.: FPL,

DLA, CHG,
If the FPL only has the first
AFTN message(the FPL
message),
on the field appear FPL
Page 197
TACC MATC II
APPENDIX 4
INDRA SYSTEM
Calculated Take-Off Time
HHMM (00 to 23 and 00 to 59)

Updated with the last received
CFMU message.
Last CFMU Received

Message
Type of the last received

CFMU message; e.g.: SAM,
SRM, SLC,
FLS, DES,
ATD
Actual Time of Departure
HHMM (00 to 23 and 00 to 59)
EET/ ETA
Estimated Elapsed Time

Estimated Time of Arrival
HHMM (00 to 23 and 00 to 59)
CTOT
ATFMC
CRUISING SPEED Cruise Speed
Kxxxx: 4 numerical characters

(Km/h)
Nxxxx: 4 numerical characters
(Knots)
Mxxx: 3 numerical characters
(Mach number)
Flight level (hundreds of feet):
Fxxx where xxx 000 to 999.
CRUISING
LEVEL
Altitude (hundreds of feet):

Axxx where xxx 000 to 999.
Level (tents of meters): Sxxxx
where xxxx 0000 to 9999.
Altitude (tents of meters):
Mxxxx where xxxx 0000 to
9999.
Estimate Fix Point
Up to five alphabetic
characters.
It shall be known by the
system.
ESTIMATE TIME
Estimated time over a

significant point
HHMM (00 to 23 and 00 to 59)
ESTIMATE
LEVEL
3 digits (hundreds of feet)
ESTIMATE FIX
EDITION No. 6
Page 198
TACC MATC II
APPENDIX 4
INDRA SYSTEM
Speed
Indicated Speed on the Position

Report
Pos Report FIX
Fix point
Next Fix point to overfly

indicated on the Position Report
Pos Report ETO
Estimated Time Overfly
Indicated time to overfly the fix

point on the Position Report
Alternate Airports
9 alphanumeric characters:
Airport(Space)Airport
(Each airport 4 characters)
Additional information
Defined Field from ICAO
Notes
Free text
This Free text is visible from
the lists on the SDDs
Clearance Flight Level
Clearance Flight Level

Requested Level
En-Route Cruise Level

Strip
4 alphanumeric (number of the

sector to print the strip, only
applicable on the SDD position)
REG
Aircraft Register
8 alphanumeric characters
STS
Status
20 alphanumeric characters
Aircraft Identification
6 hexadecimals characters (0-9,

A-F)
Original Route from Field

15
Pos Report SPEED
ALT AD(S)
FIELD 18
FREE TEXT
CFL
ECL
MODE S
ORIGINAL
ROUTE
NOTE: item ATFMC stands for AIR TRAFFIC FLOW MANAGEMENT CONTROL,
CFMU is the central of flow management unit, item used in EURO CONTROL.
EDITION No. 6
Page 199
TACC MATC II
INDRA SYSTEM
APPENDIX 4
18. FPLs Retrieval:

This option triggers all FPLs retrieval procedures for subsequent actions on them.
19. Conflict:
The controller can request the list of FP pairs if detected to be in conflict by the
MTCD (Medium Term Conflict Detection) function, you will be able to check the
conflict by pressing directly on the window or by clicking with the LB on the
MTCD indicator of the track label; conflict window has two main areas:
a) List area titled by CNF CONFLICTED FLIGHTS: Shows the list of flight
plans in conflict.
b) Chart Area: it is a graphic display of the conflict represented in X-Y chart,
where X= time in minutes and Y= represents the distance between flights
projected to be in conflict.
The conflicts in the chart are displayed in two colors RED high severity or
YELLOW medium severity and also the chart area box titled either by:
a) Horizontal Future Situation Window (HFS):
The HFS window represents a Radar Data Display window, which is similar to
the SDD SIT Area.
b) Vertical Future Situation Window (VFS):
The VFS window represents the traffic over-flying a determined correlated track
at a determined time.
20. Maps [MAP] Icon:
This icon allows the activation/deactivation of map settings by clicking with left
button.
21. Fixed Configuration [CONFIG] Icon:
To allow the selection of a fixed configuration or programming of a new one,
LOAD to load an old one, SAVE to save a new programming.
22. Quick-Look Sectors Selection [QL SC] Icon:
Allows the selection of sectors to show you the flights with that sector.
23. Quick-Look [QLOOK] Icon:
Is used to activate/deactivate the Quick-Look function to visualize the selected
sector tracks, YELLOW if it is activated and WHITE deactivated.
EDITION No. 6
Page 200
TACC MATC II
APPENDIX 4
INDRA SYSTEM
24. Filter OFF [FILTER OFF] Icon:

It allows the activation/inhibition of all current filters defined for the SDD SIT Area.
25. [Menu] Icon:
This icon displays or closes the Main Menu area, which is displayed at the bottom
of the SDD screen, YELLOW if it is activated, and WHITE if deactivated.
10.2 MAIN MENU AREA FUNCTIONS:

Main Menu area is located at the bottom of the SDD screen; it is composed of icons
and switches, which perform the different functions.
ITEM
TYPE
DESCRIPTION
SECTOR LIST
ICON
FP LIST
INBOUND
ICON
SECTOR INBOUND LIST
DEPARTURES
ICON
DEPARTURES LIST
ARRIVALS
ICON
ARRIVALS LIST
IN/OUT
ICON
CPDLC messages List.
ADS AIR
ICON
flights equipped with ADS
VIEW 1
ICON
AUXILIARY WINDOW 1
VIEW 2
ICON
AUXILIARY WINDOW 2
VIEW 3
ICON
AUXILIARY WINDOW 3
CLOCK
ICON
System Clock
BRIGHT
ICON
BRIGHTNESS CONTROL
LAST POS
ICON
LAST POSITION WINDOW
EDITION No. 6
Page 201
TACC MATC II
APPENDIX 4
INDRA SYSTEM
SECTORS
ICON
ASSIGNED SECTORS LIST
LMG
ICON
LOCAL MAP GENERATOR
DATBLK
ICON
DATA BLOCK SETTINGS
RBL OFF
ICON
DELETE ACTIVE RBLS
ORI OFF
ICON
RETURN LABELS TO DEFAULT

POSITION
RANGERINGS
ICON
RANGE RINGS
ROU OFF
ICON
DELETE FP ROUTES
ALM CNL
ICON
Cancel all aural alarms
QNH
ICON
QNH window
ACTIVATE OR DEACTIVATE
AUTO ORIENTATION OF
LABELS
ACTIVATE OR DEACTIVATE
MTCD ALARM IN LABELS
ACTIVE RESTRICTED AREAS
ON/OFF
OVERLAP
ICON
CONFL
ICON
AREAS
ICON
VELVECT
ICON
METEO
ICON
RBL ALM
ICON
QUICK EST
ICON
ESTIMATE WINDOW
MET MSGS
ICON
METEO MSGS WINDOW
SYS MSGS
ICON
SYSTEM MSGS WINDOW
FINDER
ICON
FINDER OPTIONS WINDOW

TO FIND ELEMENTS ON
DISPLAY
SSR F
ICON
SSR FILTER WINDOW
F3D
ICON
3D FILTER WINDOW
ICON
DECREASE SCREEN RANGE
ICON
INCREASE SCREEN RANGE
EDITION No. 6
VELOCITY VECTOR
PRIMARY PLOTS WITH MET
INFO
RANGE BEARING LINE ALERTS
ON/OFF
Page 202
TACC MATC II
APPENDIX 4
INDRA SYSTEM
ICON
LEFT MOVEMENT
ICON
RIGHT MOVEMENT
ICON
UP MOVEMENT
ICON
DOWN MOVEMENT
PRINT LISTS
ICON
PRINT SDD POSITION

TABULAR
PRINTERS
ICON
AVAILABLE PRINTERS
LOGIN
ICON
LOGOUT
ICON
LOGIN WINDOW TO FREE

SCREEN
LOGOUT & FREEZE ALL
ACTIONS ON THAT POSITION
NOTE:
Inbound list means the flight lists inbound to the assigned sector and does not
mean the arrivals.
III. The flight plan lists that Indra system brings can be treated as ELECTRONIC
FLIGHT STRIPS.
IV. DATBLK: stands for DATA BLOCK CONFIGURATION that can be reflected
on the SDD.
V. LMG: stands for LOCAL MAP GENERATOR.
II.
11.0 Flight Data Display FDD:

This chapter provides information for new users of the FDD Position. It presents every
work available window with a description; the screen has two main area:
1. General Information Area (GI_A).
2. Main Menu Area (MM_A):
The FDD Position allows the controller mainly to handle flight plans during the
strategic planning phase. That is, the controller of this position manages future flight
plans (Flight plans received trough AFTN and Repetitive Flight Plans (RPL).
The main functions of the FDD position are :
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
FPL handling.
RPL handling.
AFTN messages handling.
Access to FPLs and RPLs databases.
Wind Data input.
Restricted Areas handling.
EDITION No. 6
Page 203
TACC MATC II
INDRA SYSTEM
APPENDIX 4
7. Flow Planning (FPLs).

8. AFTN Lines Configuration.
9. NOTAM and Meteorological messages handling.
11.1 General information area:
This area is always displayed at the FDD position, that is, no device can close it. It is
located on the left top side of the screen to access the AFTN messages correction. There
are two different queues to manage the received messages:
1.
Q Queue FP Messages (FPM) and they are:

a) Body erroneous messages.
b) Correct and erroneous messages, when the processing for a type of messages has
been conditioned from the CMD position to a manual confirmation.
c) FP status non suitable for automatic processing
d) Correct and erroneous NOTAM messages (always).
e) MET messages (METAR, SPECI, TAF, SIGMET, ATIS, AIRMET, SNOWTAM
and GAMET) with errors.
NOTE:
1. When you receive an estimate message or CPL the counter color comes RED .
2. The queue operates on a FIFO basis (first in, first out).
3. Q Queue are prioritized, that is, depending on the message type, the insertion
criterion is different. This happens for NOTAM messages which have top
priority. So these messages are included firstly in the queue (both corrected and
erroneous) so the operator can acknowledge as soon as possible .
4. If there is no error in FPL, the modification messages cause the FP updating.
If any field (not the ones marked as optional) cannot be detected nor has errors,
the message is sent to the Q Queue for manual correction .
2. AAI Queue:
Erroneous AFTN Header messages and they are: AFTN Messages with erroneous
header and the service (SVC) message, which are not of repetition. Up to 30 messages
are displayed .
11.2 MAIN MENU AREA: Main Menu Area is located at the bottom of the FDD Position
screen. It is composed of icons that perform different functions
EDITION No. 6
Page 204
TACC MATC II
INDRA SYSTEM
APPENDIX 4
Meaning of each function described in the table:

i
ICON
DESCRIPTION
FP ACT.
FP OPERATION WINDOW
FP RTr
FP RETRIEVAL WINDOW
FP MIN
MINIMAL FP WINDOW
HIST RTR
HISTORICAL RETRIEVE
RPL ACT
REPETITIVE FLIGH PLANS WINDOW
RPL RTr
REPETITIVE RETRIEVAL WINDOW
RUNW
RUNWAYS WINDOW
AFTN TX
AFTN MSGS WINDOW
ARCHIVE
AFTN RETRIEVAL WINDOW
QNH
AIRPORT PRESSURE WINDOW
WINDS
WIND DATA TO VIEW OR MODIFY
AREAS
RESTRICTED AREAS WINDOW
FLOW
MENUE TO CHOOSE THE TRAFFIC TYPE
METEO
METEO INFO WINDOW
NOTAM
NOTAM OPERATION / RETRIEVAL

WINDOW
T.FLOW
TRAFFIC FLOW OPTIONS
LINES
AFTN LINE STATUS
INFO
DOCUMENTS ENTRY KEY / HELP KEY
EST
QUICK ESTIMATE WINDOW
FREE TEXT
FREE TEXT MSGS WINDOW
CLOCK
SYSTEM TIME / DATE
LOGOUT
LOCK THE POSITION
PRINTER
AVAILABLE PRINTERS
EDITION No. 6
Page 205
TACC MATC II
INDRA SYSTEM
APPENDIX 4
NOTE: When no FDP is available, a warning window will be displayed in FDD to warn
about the failure and following picture appears:
12.0 Control and Monitor Display CMD:

The Control and Monitoring Display Position (CMD) is one of the components of the
Tower and Approach Integrated System. Its main aim is to offer help to technical staff
in the Traffic Control Centre, providing a work environment able to monitor the whole
system in an easy but precise way in real time. For that reason, the position is connected
to the other subsystems. Its main element is a computer with screen, mouse and
keyboard.
The CMD provides the function to monitor the whole ATM system and the external
data input environments (sensors, AFTN lines, etc.).
The system has the capability to support up to two (2) CMD positions. Both positions
have the same functions, but these functions can be limited depending on the user
profile by the use of different access passwords.
EDITION No. 6
Page 206
TACC MATC II
INDRA SYSTEM
APPENDIX 4
12.1 The CMD Screen has three main areas:

1. General Information Area (GI_A) at the top of the window:
It shows the alarm messages and current time and date. Alarm messages are
warnings about modifications, adjustments or malfunctions concerning the
system.
2. Controller Monitoring Area (CM_A) in the middle of the window:
This area shows the design of the system and the status of each component is
denoted by a set of color codes, as shown in tables:
ALL SUBSYSTEM COLOR CODES
COLOUR
STATUS
DARK GREEN
RED
ORANGE
WORKING
NOT WORKING
MANUALLY STOPPED
SDD COLOR CODES
COLOUR
STATUS
DARK GREEN
LIGHT GREEN
RED
PURPLE
BLUE
ORANGE
WORKING
WORKING IN MONO RADAR MODE
NOT WORKING
BY PASS MODE
PLAYBACK MODE
MANUALLY STOPPED
FDP, SDP and DRF CODES
COLOUR
STATUS
DARK GREEN
WORKING
RED
NOT WORKING
YELLOW
STAND IN
ORANGE
MANUALLY STOPPED
AFTN LINES STATUS
COLOUR
STATUS
DARK GREEN
WORKING
RED
NOT WORKING/FAILURE
YELLOW
OFF-LINE
EDITION No. 6
Page 207
TACC MATC II
INDRA SYSTEM
APPENDIX 4
LAN1, LAN2 codes
COLOUR
STATUS
BLACK LAN1
WORKING
GRAY
WORKING
LAN2
RED
NOT WORKING
WHITE VANILLA
To be checked
3. Main Menu Area (MM_A) :

The main menu is situated at the bottom of the screen and it has a set of icons to
get access to its functionality.
ICON
FUNCTIONALITY
SECTORIZATION
SECTORIZATION PLANNING WINDOW
SNET STATIST
SAFETY NETS STATISTICS
LINES STATIST
AFTN LINES STATISTICS
SDP RADAR
SUPERVISE SET OF RADARS
OPE.FUNCTIONS
OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS WINDOW
SYS.PARAM
SYSTEM PARAMETERS
TANDEM
SWICH BETWEEN FDPs , RDPs &DRFs
GLOBAL FUNC.
REINITIALISE/CLOSE/START UP CMD
EVENTS
EVENT WINDOW
LOGOUT
LOCKS THE POSITION / LOG IN WINDOW

APPEARS
NOTE: ATC'Os are allowed to check on the SECTORIZATION function

ONLY in the CMD.
EDITION No. 6
Page 208
TACC MATC II
INDRA SYSTEM
APPENDIX 4
13.0 Mouse button relation with our different displays:

13.1 Mouse button functions over the SDD:
BUTTON
FUNCTION
Request information operations and
low-level local actions.
Copy data from a field.
Move windows.
Create/Erase RBLs
Close edition windows.
Paste data to a field.
LEFT BUTTON
CENTER
BUTTON
RIGHT
BUTTON
map selection and RBL creation

acceptance
13.2 Mouse button functions over the FDD:

BUTTON
FUNCTION
LEFT BUTTON
Data entering, display pull-down menus

Drag a window by pressing and hold the
mouse central button on the window title
Copy data field
CENTER BUTTON
RIGHT BUTTON
Paste data field

Without a defined use
13.3 Mouse button functions over the CMD:

BUTTON
LEFT BUTTON
CENTER BUTTON
RIGHT BUTTON
EDITION No. 6
FUNCTION
Selection, menus access, data
input
None
Present the user window in
certain subsystems (SDD, FDD,
DRF and CMD)
Page 209
TACC MATC II
INDRA SYSTEM
APPENDIX 4
EDITION No. 6
Page 210
APPENDIX 5
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

CARC
Air Traffic Management Department
ATM National Contingency Plan for Amman FIR
First Edition
November 2013
Capt. "Mohammad Amin" AI Quran: .-~----Chief Commissioner.

Date: \ / 11 /2013.
Edition No.1
Effective Date.L" of November 2013
Distribution list
This document will be distributed to all whom concerned the following list:
1. ICAO-MID office in Cairo
2. All Adjacent ACCs, Cairo ACC, Jeddah&Riyadh ACC, Baghdad ACC, TelaAviv
ACC and Damascus ACC.
3. Royal Jordanian Air force.
4. Amman Terminal Area Control Center TACC.
5. QAIA Tower.
6. Amman Marka Tower
7. KHIA Tower.
8. QSMS Unit.
9. Investigation Department.
10. ANSSD department.
11. CEO.
12. ANS commissioner.
13. Planning and Studies.
14. Director of communication.
Edition No.1
Effective Date:1st of November 2013
Intentionally left Blank
Edition No.1
ATM National Contingency Plan

Within Amman FIR
1.
OBJECTIVE
This contingency plan contains arrangements to ensure the continued safety of air
navigation in the event of partial or total disruption of air traffic services (ATS). The
contingency plan is designed to provide alternative routes, using existing airways in most
cases, which will allow aircraft operators to fly through or avoid airspace within the Amman
FIR. This contingency plan is for the implementation in the event of disruption, or potential
disruption, of air traffic services and related supporting services within Amman AoR for the
provision of such services.
Note: the Facility Contingency Plan includes procedures for alternative Aiding units in case the
main facilities are failed to operate, these procedures are included in APPENDIX A of this
contingency plan.
2. Applicability:
This Contingency plan prescribes rules governing the operation of aircraft within Jordan in
the event of partial or total disruption of air traffic services (ATS).
Major conflicts might effectively close one or more FIRs in the region; the following
procedures have been formulated, in the event of direct involvement of the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan in a hostile activities, which might require closing down of part or all
Airports, Navigational facilities and Surveillance facilities in addition to part or all of Jordan
Territorial Airspace.
3. AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT
3.1 ATS Responsibilities
Tactical ATC considerations during periods of overloading may require re-assignment of
routes or portions thereof.
3.2 In the event that ATS cannot be provided within Amman FIR:
a) All units will immediately advise affected aircraft of possible rerouting or diversion
options due to the closure.
b) Amman ACC will inform all affected adjacent FIRs accordingly of the airspace
closure advising affected routes and available rerouting possibilities and any flow
control restrictions taking effect at the time of the closure of the airspace.
c) This information will be passed by NOTAM and all other means of communication
ensuring that operators and all relevant ATC Units have received the information.
d) All aircraft approaching the affected area under Amman Control will be advised
immediately of available options.
3.3
The Civil Aviation Regulatory Commission shall publish the corresponding NOTAM
indicating the following:
Edition No.1
a) Time and date of the introduction of the contingency measures and the airspace
closure;
b) Airport and airspace available for landing and overflying traffic, and airspace to be
avoided;
c) Airports within the affected area and their status.
d) Details of the facilities and services available or not available and any limits on ATS
provision (e.g., ACC, APP, TWR including details of available NAV aids for rerouting
of traffic), including an expected date of restoration of services if available;
e) Information on the provisions made for alternative services;
f) Establishment of ATS contingency routes;
g) Procedures to be followed by pilots; and
h) Any other details with respect to the disruption and actions being taken that
aircraft operators may find useful.
i) Procedures to be followed by coordination with neighboring ATS units at a time;
j) Specific instructions to aircrew e.g. monitoring of additional frequencies and relay
of position reports.
k) If possible, provide an estimate for the duration of the airspace closure.
4. Separation
Separation criteria will be applied in accordance with the Procedures for Air Navigation
Services-Air Traffic Management (PANS-ATM, Doc 4444) and the Regional Supplementary
Procedures (Doc 7030), and 15 minutes longitudinal separation shall be applied.
5. Level Restrictions
Where possible, aircraft on long-haul international flights shall be given priority with respect
to cruising levels.
6. Other measures
Other measures related to the closure of airspace and the implementation of the contingency
scheme within the Amman FIR may be taken as follows:
a) Suspension of all VFR operations;
b) Delay or suspension of general aviation IFR operations; and
c) Delay or suspension of commercial IFR operations. (Departures)
7. TRANSITION TO CONTINGENCY SCHEME
During times of uncertainty when airspace closure seems possible, aircraft operators should
be prepared for a possible change in routing while en-route, familiarized of the alternative
routes outlined in the contingency scheme as well as what may be promulgated by Amman
TACC via NOTAM.
In the event of airspace closure that has not been promulgated, Amman TACC should, if
possible, broadcast by (ATIS) to all aircraft in Amman airspace, what airspace is being closed
and to stand by for further instructions.
Recognizing that when closures of airspace or airports are promulgated, individual airlines
might have different company requirements as to their alternative routings, therefore
Amman TACC will be alerted to respond to any request by aircraft and react commensurate
with safety.
Edition No.1
8. TRANSFER OF CONTROL AND COORDINATION

The transfer of control and communication shall be at the common FIR boundary between
ATC units unless there is mutual agreement between adjacent ATC units. ATC units within
Amman FIR should also review current coordination requirements in light of contingency
operations or short notice of airspace closure.
9. PILOTS AND OPERATOR PROCEDURES
Pilots need to be aware that in light of current international circumstances, a contingency
routing requiring aircraft to operate abnormal traffic flows, could result in an intercept by
military aircraft. Aircraft operators must therefore be familiar with international
interception procedures contained in ICAO Annex 2 Rules of the Air, paragraph 3.8 and
Appendix 2, Sections 2 and 3, and CARC regulations Part 91 section 195.
Pilots need to continuously guard the VHF emergency frequency 121.5 MHz and should
operate their transponder at all times during flight, regardless of whether the aircraft is
within or outside airspace where secondary surveillance radar (SSR) is used for ATC
purposes. Transponders should be set on a discrete code assigned by ATC or select code
A2000 if ATC has not assigned a code. If an aircraft is being subject to interception, the pilot
shall immediately:
Follow the procedures prescribed In Jordan AIP ENR-1.12 and:
a) Follow the instructions given by the intercepting aircraft, interpreting and
responding to visual signals in accordance with international procedures;
b) Notify, if possible, the appropriate ATC unit;
c) Attempt to establish radio communication with the intercepting aircraft by making
a general call on the emergency frequency 121.5 MHz and 243 MHz if equipped;
and
d) If any instructions received by radio from any source conflict with those given by
the intercepting aircraft, the intercepted aircraft shall request immediate
clarification while continuing to comply with the instructions given by the
intercepting aircraft.
10. OVERFLIGHT APPROVAL
Aircraft operators should obtain over flight approval for flights operating through Jordanian
airspace, where required. In a contingency situation, flights may be rerouted at short notice
and it may not be possible for operators to give the required advanced notice in a timely
manner to obtain approval. Amman TACC responsible for the airspace in which contingency
routes are established should consider making special arrangements to expedite flight
approvals in these contingency situations.
11. Communications and Radar Failure.
11.1. Total or Partial Radar Failure
1. The TACC controller shall inform immediately all traffic flying within Jordan airspace
2. Implement contingency procedures if necessary (emergency separation procedure)
may be applied during the recovery time until deemed separation or standard
procedural separation is established.
Edition No.1

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Inform the adjacent ACCs and ADOC immediately and all Jordanian aerodromes
control towers to stop all departure traffic temporarily until recovery procedures are
achieved.
In the event of complete failure of radar equipment, the radar controller shall apply
the following duties stated in MATC 1 CHAPTER 8 Para 8.8.4:
Plot the position of all identified aircraft,
Establishing Non-radar separation.
The controller shall send all arrival traffic to the published holding patterns as
appropriate AMN /VOR hold and QTR/VOR HOLD, QAA/VOR hold and MDB/NDB
hold provided up to the required level as published in AIP & MATCII.
Holding separation shall be applied according to MATC II & AIP.
The ATCO shall implement SIDs & STARs procedures and to use the deemed
separation, as published in TACC MATC II.
Supervisors shall give priority for implementing the procedures included in
APBENDIX A, when the main TACC fails to operate, such alternative procedures may
enhance the prevailing situation.
11.2 Radio Communication Failure

a) For any pre-planned disruption of communication, all adjacent FIRs will be advised
accordingly.
a) Otherwise, if the failure affects Direct Telephones and AFTN (AFS) communication
with adjacent units, all possible means of communication should be attempted, dial
up telephones, relay, fax and e-mail and defined cellular whenever available.
b) NOTAM will be issued to all affected agencies including operators stipulating
expected duration and ATC services available.
c) The above NOTAM would also include rerouting instructions, procedures to be
followed by adjacent units and pilots if applicable.
d) In the event of total communication failure the FIR would have to be considered as
temporarily closed until such time that relay facilities would enable aircraft to transit
without air to ground communications.
e) Flow control restrictions would be implemented to the appropriate extent.
11.3 Loss of Facilities Due to any Cause.
Amman TACC will advise adjacent ATC Units of the disruption and the extent it is going to
affect normal operating procedures.
12. CONTINGENCY UNIT
The TACC supervisor is assigned the responsibility of monitoring developments that may
dictate the enforcement of the contingency plan and coordination of contingency
arrangements:
Contact Person:
TACC supervisor
Telephone:
+ 962 6 4451672, +962 6 4451607
Fax:
+ 962 6 4451667
During a contingency situation, the TACC supervisor will liaise with the involved adjacent
centers.
Edition No.1
The ICAO MID Regional Office will:

a) Closely monitor the situation and coordinate with CARC and the IATA Regional Office,
so as to ensure air navigation services are provided to international aircraft operations
in the MID Region.
b) Take note of any incidents reported and take appropriate action.
c) provide assistance as required on any issue with CARC/CEO involved in the
contingency plan; and
d) Keep the President of the Council of ICAO, the Secretary General, D/ANB and C/ATM
continuously informed on developments, including activation of the contingency plan.
13. REROUTING
In the event of closure of AMMAN FIR, the aircraft operators should file their flight plans
using the alternative contingency routes listed below to be followed incase that the current
airways system is affected.
13.1. Contingency Routes
In case the closure of the following ATS routes:
1. UL768 and UR785 and the ATS route B544, all traffic will be rerouted via the
following ATS routes:
a) Overflying , Westbound traffic via:
- ATS route G662 segment ALKOT-BUSRA
- ATS route UM449 segment GIBET-BUSRA
- ATS routes N318 and L513 segments GENEX-QAA and QAABUSRA
- ATS route UB411 segment DEESA-ROVAR
- ATS route N318 and A412 segments GENEX-QAA then QAAZELAF.
- ATS route UM690, segment ROVAR-ZELAF
b) Overflying, Eastbound traffic via:
- ATS route G662 segment BUSRA-ALKOT
- ATS route UM449 segment BUSRA-GIBET
- ATS route A412 and L513, R652 and N318 segment
- ZELAF-QAA-QTR-KULDI-PARAM.
- ATS route UB411 segment ROVAR-ASH
- ATS route UM690 segment ZELAF-ROVAR.
2. ATS route A412/L200 and L513 in case of closure:
a) Departures traffic will be cleared via:
- MOUAB, then via TELAVIV FIR,
- ATS route L513 and R652, segment QTR-ROVAR via CAIRO
FIR.
Edition No.1
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
- ATS route R652 and UL768, segments GRY-TRF-OVANOOTILA-SOKAN.

b) Arrivals traffic will be cleared via:
- SALAM,
- ATS route R652, ROVAR-QAA
- ATS route UR785 and ATS route R652, segments
ZELAF-TRF-GENEX-QAA.
South border ROVAR via R652 to/from CAIRO FIR: in case of closure.
- Departures or arrivals have to use L513 to QAA-LOSAR-BUSRA or A412
LUDAN-ZELAF, and vice versa. OR via TELAVIV FIR instead of L513 or
A412.
Contingency agreements with Cairo ACC
In the event that ATS cannot be provided within AMMAN FIR:
A. Flights from AMMAN FIR to CAIRO FIR
Westbound: ROVAR FLs 280 & 300
B. Flights from CAIRO FIR to AMMANFIR
Eastbound: ROVAR FLs 270 & 310
In the event that ATS cannot be provided within Cairo FIR:
A. Flights from Cairo FIR to AMMAN FIR
Eastbound: ROVAR: NIL
B. Flights from AMMANFIR to Cairo FIR
Westbound: ROVAR: FLs 360& 240
In the event that ATS cannot be provided within the AMMAN/Cairo FIRs,
A. Flights from AMMAN FIR to Cairo FIR
Westbound ROVAR FL 280
B. Flights from Cairo FIR to AMMAN FIR
Eastbound ROVAR: NIL
Contingency agreement with Jeddah&Riyadh ACCs
In the event that ATS cannot be provided within Jeddah FIR:
A. Flights from JEDDAH FIR to AMMAN FIR
Westbound: GRY FL280, FL320, FL340, FL360, FL380.
TRF FL320, FL360.
OTILA FL280, FL340 & FL380.
B. Flights from AMMAN FIR to JEDDAH FIR
East bound: TRF (B544) FL290, FL330, FL370
TRF (UP559) FL 290, FL330,
In the event that ATS cannot be provided within Amman FIR,
A. Flights from AMMAN FIR to JEDDAH FIR:
East bound: GIBET FLs 290,310 and FL330.
RASLI or SODAR FL290, FL310, FL350
PARAM, GENEX and ALKOT FLs250, 270&330
DEESA FLs270.290
B. Flights from JEDDAH FIR to AMMAN FIR
West bound GIBET FL280, 300, 320
OTILA GENEX, PARAM and ALKOT FL260, 300, & 340
TRF FL300, 320,340
DEESA FLs280, 300
9. In the event that ATS cannot be provided within the Jeddah/Amman
FIRs:
Edition No.1
A. Flights from JEDDAH FIR to AMMAN FIR

Westbound OTILA FL340, FL380
TRF FL320, FL360,
GRY FL260, FL280
B. Flights from AMMAN FIR to JEDDAH FIR
Eastbound TRF FL 290,330.
Note 1. Initiation: AMMAN TACC SUPERVISOR will initiate and activate this plan when
circumstances require, in-coordination with DANS and DATM.
Chart AMMAN FIR is attached.
All aircraft should establish and maintain contact on published VHF frequencies with
AMMAN TACC listed below:
No
1
2
3
4
5
6
Sector
Upper sector
Lower east sector
Lower west sector
Queen Alia Approach sector
Aqaba approach
Stand by frequency
Frequency
128.5 MHz
132.525 MHz
132.425 MHz
128.9 MHz
119.2 MHz
128.3 MHz
Remarks
14. Focal Points for Contact:

State/Jordan
International Organization
Civil Aviation Regulatory
Commission / Jordan
Point of Contact
DIR/ ATM
Mr. Nayef AlMarshoud
TACC/Supervisor
ICAO
Mr. M Khonji
Telephone/Fax
E-mail
TEL: +962 6 4897729
FAX: +962 6 4891266
datm@carc.gov.jo
Mobile: +962 7 97498992
TEL: + 962 6 44 51672
+ 962 6 44 51607
FAX: +962 6 44 51667
TEL: 202 22764841/5
Fax: 202 22674843
mkhonji@cairo.icao
.int
Note 2.
The above-mentioned procedures should be used as a guideline for Supervisors and
Managers to foremost ensure safety to aircraft already within or approaching Amman FIR,
and will not by no means cover all possible contingency situations. In all cases there is bound
to be different scenarios where common sense and optimizing of resources will be at a
premium.
Edition No.1
Amman FIR chart
11
Edition No.1
APBENDIX A
Facility contingency plan

CONTENTS
1
1.1
1.2
Introduction
Purpose
Scope
2.1
Objective
Obligations under Chicago Convention
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
CNS system
Ground/Ground Communication
Surveillance equipment
Flight Data Processing
Surveillance Data Processing
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
Available Assets
TACC 1
TACC 2
TACC 3
Voice communication system
2
3
Test and maintain
Initiation of contingency plan

Requirements
Initiation plan
Initiation procedures
6.1
6.2
6.3
7
AIRSPACE MANAGEMENT (ASM)
Technical Operations Support during OCP Activation
Crisis focal points contact numbers
11
Edition No.1
1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose of this Contingency Plan
Air Traffic Operational Contingency Plan, includes the following: - Procedures
- Requirements
- responsibilities to develop
- coordinate
- support
- Maintain
- Revise
- Test
- Train
- Document
- Implementation.
1.2 Scope
The purpose of this OCP known as the Facility Contingency Plan (FCP) is to
reduce the impact and risk to the Amman TACC in the event a facility is, or
facilities are, unable to safely and efficiently provide ATC services as required
by Jordan JCAR regulations & MATC I and MATC II (Amman TACC). Also, it can
be triggered by a natural disaster, major system failure (Amman TACC 1) or
other event that directly affects personnel, the delivery of operational ATC
services, or other technical capabilities. In the event the Parent Facility or
facilities become incapacitated, all affected airspace must be assumed by
(Amman TACC 2 or 3) which are the alternative Supporting facilities for the
continuation of ATC services, to the extent possible, must also be assumed by
other Support facilities as the neighboring ACCs (Jeddah & Riyadh ACCs). The
event may require activation of the OCP, the facility Emergency Operations
Plan.
Note: when transferring from TACC1 to TACC2 or TACC3, if the duration of the
transfer is more than 10 minutes supervisor shall notify Jeddah&Riyadh ACCs to
take over, until the transfer is completed.
- TACC1: INDRA system, the main location of the ACC center.
- TACC2: THALES system, located near to TACC1, in the same
building.
- TACC3: INDRA simulator software and hardware equipment,
located in Amman Marka Airport.
2 Objective
This contingency Plan includes details of the arrangements will take place to
ensure the continued safety of air navigation in the event of partial or total
disruption of Air Traffic Services (ATS) within Amman FIR, due to the outages
of different systems.
12
Edition No.1
3 CNS system (The availability of the aiding facilities)

It is not feasible to provide guidance on every aspect of CNS systems as it would
affect contingency operations. However, a list of the essential considerations
covering CNS and other technical requirements are provided below for the
continuation of air traffic services at the aiding facilities which will be used as
alternative actions, the following requirements are available in TACC2 and TACC3:
3.1 Ground/Ground Communication
- Telephone, Intercom and hotline communication requirements.
- (Strip) printers and respective connections.
- Voice and data communications with airports, adjacent Centers and flow
management units AMHS.
- OLDI connections. When available
- Fax devices.
3.2 Surveillance equipment requirements:
Surveillance Infrastructure.
Availability, new connections/links.
Surveillance data sharing agreement. (When available).
Adaptation of existing or setting up of new agreement (when available).
Surveillance coverage requirements.
Evaluation of radar performance is Dual/triple coverage provided.
(Coverage is provided Amman FIR and the overlapping Areas with adjacent
states to comply with handover procedures, this is provided by more than
one resource).
3.3 Flight Data Processing

-
Controller Working Positions.

Sectorization schemes potential implications for standing procedures.
Flight data management and distribution rules.
Flight data update eligibility.
Interfaces with: adjacent ACCs (not available), TMAs, TWRs, Military control
units are available.
3.4 Environment Data processing (off-lines-tools)

- Environment data management and distribution rules, Environment data
- Update eligibility.
3.5 Surveillance Data Processing
- Sensor configuration and coverage.
- Potential implications for separation minima or type of service provided.
- SSR Code allocation - potential implications for allocation rules.
These considerations stated above are quite adopted in THALES ACC (TACC
2), and TACC 3 is still (in the-process).
4 Available assets at the aiding facility TACC1 & 2 and 3
13
Edition No.1
4.1 TACC 1:
- This facility is supported with different inputs; the main system is INDRA
software and hardware (AIRCON2100). INDRA radar is a Secondary
Surveillance Radar with Mode S using Red Hat enterprise LINUX 5, designed
to five sectors, ACCU, ACCLE, ACCLW, TMAA and AQB/APP, also it includes
supervisor and two FDO positions, also the system supported with
additional inputs according to the following:
- Thales input, mono pulse system, conventional surveillance system.
- Two Military inputs from different locations. (QTR and RASELNAQAB)
- ADS-B system input from different locations Arreesha, MARKA/AP, Safawi
area and KHIA airport.
- AMHS Terminal Input.
- INDRA ATM system Interfaces with Tower units in the airports for the
purpose of flight plan data exchange and situation awareness.
- One Working station at military ADOC.
4.2 Backup system TACC 2, supported with EURCAT1000, THALES system,
designed of three control sectors: Approach, West and East sector, In
addition to supervisor and FDO positions.
4.3 TACC 3 (pending).
INDRA software and hardware, (AIRCON2100). A Secondary Surveillance
Radar with Mode S using Red Hat enterprise LINUX 5 includes three sectors:
Approach, West and East sector, also in addition to supervisor position.
4.4 Voice Communication System, supporting TACC 1, 2 and 3.
5 Test and maintain
TACC 2 will be on silence mode (available) and must be tested each one
month for two hours within the morning shift, to ensure availability and
readiness of this facility.
During shift rotations, 24/7, supervisors are requested to periodically update
all flight plans in the queue and non-queued windows of the FPPS system, for
the purpose of maintaining TACC 2 system updated and well prepared.
6 Initiation of contingency plan
6.1 Requirements
When on duty supervisor experiences outages of current TACC 1, shall evaluate
the situation before initiates the contingency plan according to the following:
a) A dangerous situation has been identified.
b) Focuses on the safe handling of aircraft in the airspace of the failing unit
TACC 1.
c) Using all technical means still operationally available to:
o Secure actual traffic situation
o Consider possible options
o Delegation of ATS, when appropriate (stated below).
14
Edition No.1
o CFLAS. (cleared flight level allocation scheme) (OCP LoAs) stated in

the OCP above item No.4, 5,6,7,8.
o Try to determine the magnitude of problem and the duration of the outage.
o Prepare fall-back instructions to ensure the safety of operations.
6.2 Initiation plan
This contingency plan can be triggered by a natural disaster, major system
failure(s) or other event(s) that directly affects personnel, the delivery of
operational ATS services, or other technical capabilities.
a) When the following events occur, contingency requirements must be
initiated:
Total loss of TACC1 room due to object collision (aircraft, vehicle...),
severe damage of building.
Total loss of TACC1 room due to weather conditions (earthquake,
Lightning, wind, snow, flooding ....) Leading to evacuate the personnel of
the building, severe damage of the building.
Total loss of TACC1 room due to hostile action leading to evacuate the
Personnel of the building. Security measures.
Total loss of TACC1 room due to chemical pollution, leading to loss of the
staff.
Total loss of TACC1 room due to pollution (exterior fire smoke) leading
to evacuate the staff.
Total loss of TACC1 room due to electromagnetic irradiation.
Total loss of TACC1 room due to:
i. Loss of all Power Supply resources (power failure)
ii. Total loss of TACC data (voice, radar, network, phone)
Total loss of power supply due to:
i. Water, fire, flood, earthquake, lightning,
ii. Equipment failures (wiring damages...)
Note: Any other occurrences might occur and expected to have major impact on
the TACC room, henceforth the supervisor will coordinate with chief of TACC
and DANS to activate the contingency requirement on immediate action.
6.3 Initiation procedures
When the contingency measures have been initiated by the on-duty
supervisor, the following steps shall be followed:
a) Focuses on stabilizing the situation(recovery action) and, if necessary,
preparing for longer term contingency arrangements:
o
o
o
o
15
Contingency measures should be initiated;

Complete notification of all concerned, according to the list below.
Determine and coordinate flow control measures. (OCP LoAs)
Initiate delegation of ATS, where appropriate. (Jeddah&Riyadh ACC).
Edition No.1
b) Starts when staff of the failing unit(TACC 1) arrives at the aiding unit(TACC 2
or 3):
Assign staff to the 'aiding' unit (TACC 2 or 3).

Open contingency working positions at 'aiding' unit (TACC 2 or 3).
Stabilize new situation; (assume control gradually)
Staff of the failing unit (TACC 1) should become familiar with the
operational facilities of the aiding unit (TACC 2 or TACC 3).
(Furthermore, training refresher program will include practicing on the
system).
Improve the flow capacity. Start to clear traffic to the intended operation
and to carry on normal coordination.
Maintain the published or introduce a reduced ICAO route structure and
Sectorization in the failing unit (TACC 1). According to the OCPs
agreements with adjacent units.
Utilize all technical means to establish and maintain communication
necessary to provide ATS in the 'failing' unit TACC 1.
c) Determine and coordinate flow control measures.

1. In this stage, the controllers shall adhere to the Flight Allocation Scheme
(FLAS) in the LoAs (OCPs) that agreed with adjacent centers, Jeddah, Cairo
and Baghdad ACCs, when assigning flight levels in such circumstances.
2. During the situation prevails, the minimum horizontal separation will be15
minutes.
Note: OCPs agreement shall be available in the operation room, all the time and
available for the supervisors in such circumstances.
7 AIRSPACE MANAGEMENT (ASM)
During partial or total outages of an ACC the FUA might be affected
depending on system availability and foreseen contingency agreements. The
AMC (Airspace Management Cell) or Civil/Military Coordination, would
continue with its responsibilities pending system and staff availability which
might affect the access to airspace.
8 Technical Operations Support during OCP Activation
a) Upon notification of a triggering event, the supervisor must notify and
coordinate the OCP response with the Technical Support division.
b) TACC 1 is the primary control center; the supervisor will be authorized to
reduce level of ATC services provided that a facility can provide requiring
activation of an OCP.
c) The supervisor must coordinate the status quo with the adjacent ACCs, to
ensure Technical Operations Support for the affected facilitys OCP.
Delegation of responsibility will be considered with Saudi Arabia Jeddah & Riyadh
ACCs who will takeover in case of malfunction of TACC 1, 2 and 3.
16
Edition No.1
9. Action plan
Partial or total failure of TACC1:
In case of TACC1 is partially failed, the following scenario is accepted for the
supervisors to follow:
a) The lower east sector is considered to be as an upper sector in case of the
main upper sector is failed to achieve the required rule within the area of
responsibilities. Also it happens that the same situation fits when the lower
east sector is failed, the upper sector will represent the main rule for the
failed sector as lower sector in addition to its main functionality.
b) The lower west sector is considered to be as TMA approach sector in case of
the main TMA radar approach sector is failed.
c) The TMA radar approach sector is considered to be the lower west sector
when the main sector is failed.
d) Aqaba approach sector can be run by the lower west sector when it fails to
provide approach services for KHIA airport.
e) When three sectors in TACC 1 are failed to perform, the supervisors shall
consider transferring plan to the aiding unit TACC2 with immediate effect.
a) Communication failure
TACC1 is supported with the following communication system, and each
sector has assigned a separate frequency:
All sectors in TACC1 are supported with five frequencies according to the
function to be performed, - upper sector 128.5 MHz-lower sector
132.525MHz-lower sector-132.425MHz-approach radar sector 128.9MHzaqaba sector-119.2 MHz- standby frequency for all sectors 128.3MHz.
Each sector is provided with stand by frequency to avoid any un-expected

communication failure, the 128.3 MHz, is available for all sectors to replace
failed frequency.
Each sector is equipped with DRC devices to support the failed

communication sector. At least 4 sectors will be equipped with DRC devices.
Verbal coordination with all ATC units concerned can be done through short
code dial system, if the main hotlines are considered to be out of service.
Two dialing PSTN (Public Service Telephone Network) telephones are

available for coordination, (+ 962 6 4451672) (+ 962 6 4451607)(+962 6
4451693)(+962 6 4451631) with all units concerned, are set in case of the
main VCS system fails.
b) Surveillance system failure
The main surveillance system INDRA is supported with three main data
resources, representing back up options for controllers to switch over, in
case of the main resource is unable to provide the data required, the
following steps are to be followed:
17
Edition No.1
In case of the main ATM ACC system INDRA is working properly, and no
data input regarding traffic situation progress, controllers are asked to adopt
the following inputs as stand by requirement:
Mono-pulse radar conventional Thales system.

Military QTRANNEH input only, where standard procedure for minimum
separation using this system has been clarified, referring to local instructions
in this regard.
ADS-B system is located in different places of Amman FIR to fill the required
coverage.
c) The following procedure shall be considered when other event may have
direct impact on personnel delivery which will create Staffing issue due to
the follows:
No Staff
Illness (Seasonal Influenza)
Weather
Industrial Relations issues
TACC chief or any other representative who has been assigned instead, to
coordinate all staffing issues, to deliver the maximum number of personnel to
perform their duties in such events.
As mentioned above, many resources are available according to the
availability of the different systems in use, basically supervisors can
nominate the best solutions when partially system is failed to perform
according to the stand by sectors.
When two sectors are reported out of service in TACC1, supervisors shall
consider running the failed sectors through TACC2; migration to the aiding
unit is possible and shall be considered, according to item 6.3. When three
sectors or more, migration to TACC2 is a must.
18
Edition No.1
1 Crisis focal points contact numbers

Name
Title
Telephone
CEO
+962 79 558 1962
DATM
+962 79 749 8992

+962 6 489 7729
DANS QAIA
+962 79 749 8993
Chief of TACC
+962 79 511 5471
QAIA TWR
+962 6 445 2699
Amman Marka TWR
+962 6 489 1801
KHIA TWR
+962 32031424
RJAF
+962 6 488 5814
Riyadh ACC
+966 1 221 5493
Jeddah ACC
+966 2 685 0560
Bagdad ACC
+974 4 503 481
Cairo ACC
+202 2 265 0716
Damascus ACC
+963 11 540 0540
Tel Aviv ACC
+972 4 698 0210
Ben-Gurion ACC
+792 3 975 6320
RJ OCC
+962 6 479 3589
RJ dispatch
+962 6 479 3587
MET Office
+962 6 489 4460
Edition No.1
19
CNS contact personnel list:

Thales Radar Search Head
Thales Technical Room
Radar Workshop
INDRA Technical Room
AFTN Center
Radar Chief (ENG. NAIM)
Radar Supervisor (HUSSEIN)
Radar Engineer (Eng. SULEIMAN)
Radar Engineer (Eng. Wisam)
Radar Engineer (Eng. Ibrahim)
Radar Technician (Muhannad)
Both TACC1+2
21
Edition No.1
+962 6 4451674
+962 6 4451673
+962 6 4451665
06-4892282-Ext-5675 cisco
06-4892282-Ext-3500 cisco
0795800470
0777910134
0799874955
0797012346
0795057006
0777784764
+962 6 4451672
Appendix B
ATC Contingencies to ensure public health and Communicable Diseases
1.0 PURPOSE
1.0.1. The objective of this circular is to guide national and international
supervisory authorities in the execution of the supervision of air
navigation service providers compliance with the provisions of Jordan
Regulation, ICAO DOCs and Air Traffic Services Manuals. It also aims to
ensure the coordinated and rapid introduction of new agreed and
validated concepts of operations or technology in air traffic
management.
1.0.2. To clarify the implementation process of procedures in regards of
public health and communicable diseases).
1.0.3. This Advisory Circular provides Air Navigation Service Providers
(ANSPs) with procedure for the execution of contingency in the event of
public health and Communicable Diseases.
2.0 References
2.0.1
2.0.2
2.0.3
2.0.4
Jordan Regulations.
Manual of Air Traffic Control Part I & II.
ICAO Doc 4444.
Article 14 ICAO Chicago conventions.
3. Introduction:
3.1. It is important to keep in mind that in the case of airborne communicable
diseases, Respiratory Protection is but one of several lines of defense.
Control measures that should be developed and implemented to prevent and
control the spread of such diseases will vary with the situation and may
range from the application of basic hygiene rules to the provision of
appropriate protective procedure not limited to Respiratory Protection. If a
pandemic situation is declared or an outbreak of an airborne communicable
disease becomes known, control measures recommended by public health
authorities must be implemented. Nonetheless, should Respiratory
Protection be recommended, an air navigation service provider shall set up
procedure to carry out the roll of air navigation in the event of
communicable diseases and public health issues.
3.2. The ANS contingency plan shall cover all aspects of ATS including
Communicable Diseases.
3.3. The procedures outlined below are intended as a general guide to air traffic
services personnel.
3.4. All ATC units are involved in the entire process of this procedure.
3.5. Article 14 ICAO Each contracting State agrees to take effective measures
to prevent the spread by means of air navigation of cholera, typhus,
smallpox, yellow fever, plague and any other such communicable disease as
the contracting States shall from time to time decide to designate.
21
Edition No.1
3.6. ATC contingencies related to Communicable Diseases:

3.6.1. The purpose of Jordan contingency plan is to assist in providing ATSs
for the safe and orderly flow of international air traffic in the event of
disruptions of air traffic services and related supporting services and in
preserving the availability of ATS routes within the Amman FIR in
Communicable Diseases incident.
3.6.2. Notification of suspected communicable diseases, or other public
health risk, on board an aircraft:
3.6.2.1. The pilot in command shall notify ATS unit as soon as he/she
becomes aware of a suspected case of a communicable disease on
board his/her aircraft The flight crew of an en-route aircraft shall,
upon identifying a suspected case(s) of communicable disease, or
other public health risk, on board the aircraft, promptly notify the
ATS unit with which the pilot is communicating, the information
listed below:
3.6.2.1.1.
Aircraft identification;
3.6.2.1.2.
Departure aerodrome;
3.6.2.1.3.
Destination aerodrome;
3.6.2.1.4.
Estimated time of arrival;
3.6.2.1.5.
Number of persons on board;
3.6.2.1.6.
Number of suspected case(s) on board; and
3.6.2.1.7.
Nature of the public health risk, if known.
3.6.3. The ATS unit, upon receipt of information from a pilot regarding
suspected case(s) of communicable disease, or other public health risk,
on board the aircraft, shall forward a message as soon as possible to the
ATS unit serving the destination/departure aerodrome.
3.6.4. Notify the appropriate authority designated by the State and the
aircraft operator or its designated representative.
3.6.5. When a report of a suspected case(s) of communicable disease, or
other public health risk, on board an aircraft is received by an ATS unit
serving the destination/departure, from another ATS unit or from an
aircraft or an aircraft operator, the unit concerned shall forward a
message as soon as possible to the public health authority (PHA) or the
appropriate authority designated by the State as well as the aircraft
operator or its designated representative, and the aerodrome authority.
3.6.6. Where the destination aerodrome is outside of an ATC Units
jurisdiction clear coordination shall be maintained between the ATC
units involved stating the nature of the suspected case of the
communicable disease on board the flight and such notification actions
conducted by the ATC units.
3.6.7. Each ATC unit shall maintain a list of contact numbers of the relevant
Airport Authorities within their jurisdiction.
Note 1: See Annex 9 Facilitation, Chapter 1 (Definitions), Chapter 8, 8.12 and 8.15,
and Appendix 1, for relevant additional information related to the subject of
communicable disease and public health risk on board an aircraft.
Note 2: The PHA is expected to contact the airline representative or operating agency
and aerodrome authority, if applicable, for subsequent coordination with the aircraft
concerning clinical details and aerodrome preparation. Depending on the
22
Edition No.1
communications facilities available to the airline representative or operating agency,

it may not be possible to communicate with the aircraft until it is closer to its
destination. Apart from the initial notification to the ATS unit whilst en-route, ATC
communications channels are to be avoided.
Note 3: The information to be provided to the departure aerodrome will prevent the
potential spread of communicable disease, or other public health risk, through other
aircraft departing from the same aerodrome.
Note 4: AFTN (urgency message), telephone, facsimile or other means of transmission
may be used.
Note 5: It is accepted that the designated Airport Authority and/or the operator will in
turn notify other relevant parties concerned in accordance with pre-established
procedures as laid down by that Airport Authority.
23
Edition No.1
APPENDIX 6
AIP CHARTS
( Page number related to AIP )
AIP
JORDAN
ENR 6-1
08 DEC 2016
EN-ROUTE CHART-ICAO
3500'E
33
40'
N
3700'E
3600'E
3930'E 33
40'
N
3900'E
5 E
2016
V AR
EAN
AN
21
0
10
FL
3
21
2
11
03
2
21
3
19 69
0
FL
60
0
FL
31
0
00
10
FL
3
21
3
00
FL
6
21
2
10
0
FL
3
03
3 U
M
UM
55 690
FL
6
FT
500
03 U
2 M
69
0
FL 1
60 9
21
0
03
2
FL600
11000FT
166
21
2
169
23
L513
349
FL 51
60 3
2
189 09
13 3000 0
FT
13
02
9
U M4
49
009
FL60
0
9000
FT
L5
13
189
0
850
0F T
FL 6
0
00
10
FL
6
FL
3
FL 2
5
FL 6
0
OJD7U N L
GN D
346
01
03 3
0
FL 600
L513
26
009 UM 4
19 49
FL 6
189
00
8
21
U M4
4
28 9
UM
35 690
166
203
20
9
L5
13
U M4
2449
009
193
005
0
32
V OR/
TAC1
14.
7
(
GRY)
3124'
45"N
03717'12"E
29
2
2
65
\R
59
31
00'
N
LEGEND
#
7
FL 250
TMA
ATS ROUTS
166
KI
N OD
FL600
9
UM44
30
3012'
0"N
03616'
1"E
UB411
47
GI
BET
346
UM
6
28 90
50
3600'E
CIVIL AVIATION REGULATORY COMMISSION
FL 250
25 EGSIS
2905'
15"N
03628'
50"E
#
7
DEESA
#
7
074
CIVIL AERODROME
254
UB411
OBSOT
2954'
51"N
03734'
55"E
279
10 0 102030405060708090100
KM
5
2.
5
5 0 5 10 15202530354045 50 N M
3700'E
VOR/DME
WAY- POINT
BOSAL
2929'
12"N
03759'
33"E
3800'E
#
7
CIVIL/MILILTARY AERODROME
VORTAC
Y41
5
70
1:
1,
700,
000
FL250
074
099
2945'
09"N
03641'
02"E
FL600
FL 600
FL 250
2926'
20"N
03625'
1"E
2924'
51"N
03458'
17"E
167
2936'
40"N
03548'
40"E
FL 250
2932'
01"N
03529'
00"E
UB411
30
U M4 4 9
21
347
UB411 55
2
75 17
0
=
FL 600
255
UM449
6 167
347 1
075
11
UB4 250 =
18
TAMI
M
070 FL600
P ETRA
2942'
6"N
03622'
10"E
254
#
7
P.D AREA
AM
MA
JE D
NF
DA
I
HF R
IR
346
OJD6 FL600
GN D
FL250
FL
3
10
FL
6
00
FL 600
UM449
38
UM
6
51 90
FL
6
800 00
0F
T
03
0
P5
UL
76
N3
18
19
M3
40
023
20
7
FL
600
800
0F T
FL
600
FL
250
39
UM
69
013
027
02
9
185
L5
30 13
FL 6
00
7000
FT
0
60
F L 0F T
0
70
19
M3 1
2
65
\R
19
29
M3
2
19
20
193
3
R6
5
FL
6
700 00
0F
T
023
203
FIR
AM
MA
N
02
3
20
3
19
40
M3
2
R6
5
17
FL
6
800 00
0F
T
02
3
9000FT
0
14
SEA
DEAD
FIR
-AV
IV
TEL
R6
5
20 2
3
03
3 UM
19 690
ERR
DIT
ME
14
GURIAT
11
2
#
7
OV AN O
3148'
01"N
03909'
51"E
4
32
02
3
249
52
R6
#
7
3
R2
04
5
7 68 329
UL
15
9
14
2900
32
00'
N
OTI
LA
321'
31"N
0391'
53"E
354
21
0
9
32
2
R65
UB5 44
03
0
768
UL 8
3
072
069
0 144
33
174
KI
P AS
3123'
24"N
03706'
41"E
V OR/
DME116.
1
(
TRF)
3141'
36"N
03844'05"E
UB544
285
9 257
R
D FI
HDA
BA G
IR
AN F
AMM
353
FL 150
600
FL
240
FL
FL 300
318
15
TURAIF
R652
ALKOT
3132'54"N
03711'22"E
SODAR
3156'
2"N
03843'
26"E
S S
14
0
9
15 UP55
30
R652
UB544
40
FL600
9
32
RASLI
3154'
24"N
03836'
48"E
252
S
N
33
00'
N
FL
T
00 F
130
9
14
173
FL240
105
173
UB544
353
26
68 329
L7
FL600
FL240
6
FL
240
FL
U 5
2 00
9
14
284
UB544
173 17 353
FL600
FL240
68
2
FL
3500'E
7
UL 1 328
8 1 00
14 FL6 40
#
7
N W B
2901'
56"N
03440'
16"E
ELETA
0F
L200
247 0
60
DAP U K
331'
39"N
03840'
26"E
600
FL
240
FL
8000FT
FL
785
UR
63
FL 600
=
251
8
32
FT
8
76
UL 16
00
2934'
58"N
03511'
59"E
UB4
28
OJ
D5
067
=
R
1300
14
=
R
1
31
U LI
N A
80
SESMO
=
R
L2 0
MODAD
3235'
40"N
03841'
38"E
2
66
2926'
33"N
03445'
41"E
5
FL2
KARI
K
S 1
7
S0
UB4 1
1
6
FL
077
KU LDI
3118'47"N
03632'14"E
KU MLO
3258'
12"N
03828'
8"E
U N L
OJP 9GN D
10000FTAMSL
GN D
GEN EX
ELOXI
3129'35"N
3134'1"N
0370'52"E
03645'34"E
257
T-
#
7
9
31
0
69 225
M
\U 16 00
=
R
14
FL30
0
FL15
0
0F
METSA
2927'
07"N
03459'
03"E
8 NM A Q B
CT R 6500F T
SF C
200
=
R
=
S
R
11
#
7AQABA\King Hussein
700
2940'
53"N
03507'
08"E
7
12 25
FL600
9000FT
3049'
44"N
03608'
35"E
=
R
LON OL
3008'
01"N
03535'
00"E
AQABA
DV OR/
DME113.
1
(
AQB)
2934'
59"N
03500'29"E
=
R
N
45
R
=
A
CT
QATI
M
= 077
N3 1
104
R
=
FT
247
P ASI
P
336'
0"N
03856'
0"E
FIR
OJD8
FL150
GN D
=
R
2956'
00"N
03516'
00"E
284
L2 0
247
11
067
60 0
DESLI
3149'0"N
03659'1"E
=
R
MU N RA
=
R
=
R
LOXU S
3013'
1"N
03526'
1"E
FL30
0
FL15
0
FL60
13000
KAREM
3251'
10"N
0383'
24"E
KODER
3233'
0"N
03738'
1"E
3048'
51"N
03547'
41"E
=
R
SOKAN
338'
9"N
03822'
7"E
=
R
0
30
FL N D
3 G
JD
O
LOSI
L
8
14
FL600
FL30
0
7000
FT
ALN OR
3139'55"N
03625'8"E
EGLOT
3116'57"N
03618'24"E
3 256
076 1
9000FT
11
20
9
14
2700
31
00'
N
_=
R
R652
GN D
KI
N U R
3136'26"N
03637'13"E
FT
ORN AL
3247'
55"N
03751'
53"E
066
0
L202
N AMBO
3318'
26"N
03839'
39"E
FI
R
AMMAN
FL600
GND
1
13
QTR01
3114'54"N
03603'34"
E
OJP 1
1
4000FTAMSL
329
OJP 10
5000FTAGL
MESLO
322'
31"N
03631'48"E
= 104 N318
QAA01
3144'
23"N
03609'27"E
GN D
GETU P
3158'33"N
03630'37"E
62 324
G6 10
QATRANEH
DV OR/
DME112.
9
(
QTR)
3114'
54"N
03603'34"
E
284
0
11
LU DAN
322'
57"N
03637'13"E
4
14
2800
14
FL60
0
6000
FT
7
22
0
60 T
FL 0F
0
90
2
32
DV OR/
DME115.
2
(
QAA)
3144'
23"N
03609'27"E
TMA
AMMAN
FL255
6000FT
N3 1
N ADEK
3227'
28"N
03714'
29"E
13000
=
R
#
7
S
1
22
2500
0
60
FL 50
2
FL
QUEEN ALIA
41
FL 0FT
0
90
7
04
104
7
22
12
A4
7
04
6
T
FL
0F
00
13
0 247
L20
1
067 FL600
=
R
246
8
22
1
04
62
G619
AMMAN\Queen Alia
_
R
KU P RI
328'
26"N
03645'30"E
2
14
6000FT
L200
A 2300
6
GN D
273
1
04
5000FTAGL
28
8
9
02
0
20
\L 227
12 9 00
A4047 FL6 00 FT
5
32
00
FT
9
20
0
60
FL 50
2
FL
7000
29
FL600
=
=
R
=
R
R
= =
=
R
R
R
=
R
2
ASLON
3212'11"N
03651'11"E
62
G623
N318
093
12
3
FL6 0
9000FT
OJD2
7
04
=
R
2800
12
A4 23
V OR/
DME114.
0
(
TAN )
3328'
56"N
03839'1
1"
E
1
22
6
T
FL
0F
00
13
5
14
=
S
R
A4
260
FL600
\
12
A4 00
L2
MOU AB
3147'
58"N
03535'59"
E
0
FL60
7000FT
=
S
R
L200
080 16
_=
+R
23
074
10
8
3155'
50"N
03537'6"E
LOXER
321'48"N
03622'51"E
2300
AMMAN\Marka
L200 254
OSAMA
LOSAR
329'30"N
03628'50"E
=
R
8
04 10
6
06
8
22
0
20
2\L
8
04
7
22
00
\L2
12 25
00
A4
0
60
FL 0F T
1100
3200'
15"N
03603'58"E
1
A4
BU SRA
3220'
0"N
03637'
0"E
32
62
G6 4
1
32
00'
N
OJD4
10000FTAMSL
GN D
AMMAN
A4 23
00
FL6
40
FL2
3243'
0"N
03634'
0"E
2
14
OJP 1
U N L
GN D
DV OR/
DME(
AMN )
3200'
15"N
03603'58" E
12
0
33
SW I
DA
#
7
GI
BOX
AMN 01
12
A4 20
DAXEN
3244'
45"N
03741'
5"E
327'
0"N
03633'
8"E
P.N.A.
#
7
RAFI
F
3312'
47"N
03819'
19"E
85
R7
60
DAMASCUS FIR
BAKI
R
#
7
ABBAS
3326'
0"N
03743'
30"E
Z ELAF
3256'
56"N
03759'
59"E
AMMAN FIR
30
00'
N
SU LAF
3327'
18"N
03810'
27"E
0
15
SEA
TANF
33
00'
N
29
00'
N
3800'E
ON REQUEST
COMPULSARY
REPORTING POINT
_
Y
30
00'
N
=
R
#
7
ROUTE DESIGNATOR
MAGNETIC TRACK
DISTANCE IN NM
UPPER LIMIT
LOWER LIMIT
073
R41
1
V
U
13
U N L
1
1500FT
3900'E
29
00'
3930'E N
AIRAC AMDT 14/2016
APPENDIX 7
Air Traffic Service Airspace
TACC MATC II
APPENDIX 7

NAME
LATERAL LIMITS
VERTICAL LIMITS
CLASS OF AIRSPACE
UNIT PROVIDED
SERVICE
CALL SIGN
LANGUAGES
AREA AND
CONDITIONS
HOURS OF SERVICE
3
FREQUENCY/PURP
OSE
REMARKS
AMMAN FIR
Includes the territory of the H.K.J
29 21 26N 034 57 43E
29 11 03N 036 04 20E
29 30 03N 036 30 21E
29 52 03N 036 45 21E
30 00 03N 037 30 21E
30 20 03N 037 40 21E
30 30 03N 038 00 21E
31 30 03N 037 00 21E
32 00 02N 039 00 22E
32 09 15N 039 12 03E
AMMAN ACC
AMMAN CONTROL
ENGLISH , ARABIC
H24
At Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iraqi

boundaries.
Then the point 321349N 391804E
At the Southern corner of the
Jordanian-Iraqi boundaries
Upper Sector
128.5MHz
Lower East Sector
132.525MHz
Lower West Sector
132.425MHz
NOTE 1 : No alternate occurred to Jordanian Airspace Boundaries which will remain as published in ICAO Regional Plans (EUR,MID And AFI)
EDITION No. 6
Page 240
TACC MATC II
NAME
LATERAL LIMITS
VERTICAL LIMITS
CLASS OF AIRSPACE
1
UNIT
PROVIDED
SERVICE
4
CALL SIGN
LANGUAGES
AREA AND CONDITIONS
HOURS OF SERVICE
3
AMMAN ACC
AMMAN CONTROL
ENGLISH , ARABIC
H24
Thereafter the points

322120N 391536E
321815N 390237E
322840N 385910E
323006N 390510E
And point 332229N 384737E
At the Jordanian Iraqi Syrian

boundaries.
APPENDIX 7

FREQUENCY/PURPOSE
REMARKS
Upper Sector 128.5MHz

Lower East Sector 132.525MHz
Lower West Sector
132.425MHz
Thereafter to the point 321834N

365017E
follow the Jordanian-Syrian
political boundaries to the point
324107N 353809E
AT Jordanian-Syrian-Israeli
boundaries
FL600
GND
Class of Airspace: A,C,G
NOTE 1 : No alternate occurred to Jordanian Airspace Boundaries which will remain as published in ICAO Regional Plans (EUR,MID And AFI)
EDITION No. 6
Page 241
TACC MATC II
ROUTE DESIGNATOR
(RNP/RNAV)
NAME OF SIGNIFICANT POINTS
COORDINATES
WAY-POINT IDENT OF
VOR/DME BRG &DIST
ELEV DME ANTENNA
DISTANCE
NM
30NM
FL600
ALT 7000FT
CLASS A+C
A412 (RNAV 5)
FIR BDRY (OSAMA)
315550.00N 0353706.00E
QAA
R288 29.8NM
2800FT
QAA01
QUEEN ALIA DVOR/DME (QAA)
314423.41N 0360926.59E
UPPER LIMITS
LOWER LIMITS
AIRSPACE CLASSIFICATION
23NM
FL600
ALT 9000FT
CLASS A+C
GETUP
315833.47N0363037.47E
QAA
R047 23NM
2800FT
7NM
FL600
ALT 9000FT
CLASS A+C
LUDAN
320256.60N 0363713.29E
QAA
R047 30NM
2800FT
9NM
FL600
11000 FT ALT
CLASS A+C
KUPRI
320825.87N 0364530.21E
QAA
R047 38.9NM
2800FT
6NM
FL600
ALT 13000FT
CLASS A+C
ASLON
321211.02N 0365111.25E
QAA
R047 45NM
2800FT
25NM
FL600
ALT 13000FT
CLASS A+C
QAA
R047 69.9NM
2800FT
28NM
FL600
ALT 13000FT
CLASS A+C
DAXEN
324444.79N 0374105.26E
QAA
R047 98.2NM
2800FT
20NM
FIR BDRY (ZELAF)

325656.20N 0375959.26E
QAA
R047 118.3NM
2800FT
NADEK
322728.00N 0371429.00E
EDITION No. 6
APPENDIX 7

DIRECTIONS OF
CRUISING LEVELS
ODD
REMARKS
CONTROLLING UNIT
CHANNEL
EVEN
For continuation refer to AIP of Israel.

Transfer of CTL
Amman Upper Sector 128.5MHz

Amman Lower West Sector
132.425MHz.
Amman Approach 128.9MHz.
According to ENR.1.6-5 Para 2.7
ATS Route Segment LUDAN-ZELAF

Non-ICAO Standard according to the
table of cruising level.
Portion ASLON-NADEK is excluded

from Prohibited area OJP9
FL600
ALT 13000FT
CLASS A+C
Transfer of CTL
For continuation, refer to Syria AIP
Page 242
TACC MATC II
ROUTE DESIGNATOR
(RNP/RNAV)
COORDINATES
1
APPENDIX 7

WAY-POINT
IDENT OF
VOR/DME
BRG &DIST
ELEV DME
ANTENNA
2
DISTANCE
NM
UPPER LIMITS
LOWER LIMITS
AIRSPACE
CLASSIFICATION
DIRECTIONS OF
CRUISING LEVELS
ODD
EVEN
5
DESLI
314900.10N 0365900.60E
KUPRI
320825.87N 0364530.21E
FIR BDRY (BUSRA)
322000.00N 0363700.00E
EDITION No. 6
CONTROLLING
UNIT CHANNEL
6
For continuation, refer
to Saudi AIP
G662 (RNAV 5)
FIR BDRY (ALKOT)
313254.00N 0371122.00E
REMARKS
QAA
R102 54.1NM
2800FT
19NM
QAA
R084 45.5NM
2800FT
QAA
R052 39.0NM
2800FT
QAA
R033 42.6NM
2800FT
23NM
14NM
Transfer of CTL
FL600
FL250
CLASS A
FL600
FL250
CLASS A
FL600
ALT 11000 FT
CLASS A+C
Amman Upper Sector

128.5MHz
Amman Lower West
Sector 132.425MHz
According to ENR.1.65 Para 2.7
Transfer of CTL
For continuation, refer

to Syria AIP.
Page 243
TACC MATC II
ROUTE DESIGNATOR
(RNP/RNAV)
COORDINATES
1
L200 (RNAV5)
FIR BDRY (OSAMA)
315550.00N 0353706.00E
WAY-POINT
IDENT OF
VOR/DME
BRG &DIST
ELEV DME
ANTENNA
2
QAA
R288 29.8NM
2800FT
AMN01
DISTANCE
NM
UPPER LIMITS
LOWER LIMITS
AIRSPACE
CLASSIFICATION
23NM
FL600
ALT 7000FT
CLASS A+C
FL600
ALT 9000FT
CLASS A+C
16NM
AMMAN DVOR/DME (AMN)

320014.65N 0360357.55E
LOXER
320147.76N 0362251.46E
QAA
R029 20.8NM
2800FT
8NM
FL600
ALT 9000FT
CLASS A+C
MESLO
320231.00N0363148.00E
QAA
R042 26.3NM
2800FT
5NM
FL600
ALT 9000FT
CLASS A+C
LUDAN
320256.60N 0363713.29E
QAA
R047 30NM
2800FT
QAA
R047 38.9NM
2800FT
QAA
R047 45NM
2800FT
9NM
FL600
ALT 11000FT
CLASS A+C
FL600
ALT 13000FT
CLASS A+C
FL600
ALT 13000FT
CLASS A+C
KUPRI
320825.87N 0364530.21E
ASLON
321211.02N 0365111.25E
6NM
25NM
NADEK
322728.00N 0371429.00E
QAA
R047 69.9NM
2800FT
28NM
FL600
ALT 13000FT
CLASS A+C
DAXEN
324444.79N 0374105.26E
QAA
R047 98.2NM
2800FT
10NM
FL600
ALT 13000FT
CLASS A+C
EDITION No. 6
APPENDIX 7
DIRECTIONS OF
CRUISING LEVELS
ODD
EVEN
5
REMARKS
CONTROLLING UNIT
CHANNEL
6
For continuation, refer to
Israel AIP
Transfer of CTL
All traffic shall adhere to

airway centerline
ATS Route Segment LUDANDAXEN

Non-ICAO Standard according
to the table of cruising level
Page 244
TACC MATC II
ROUTE DESIGNATOR
(RNP/RNAV)
COORDINATES
WAY-POINT IDENT OF
VOR/DME BRG &DIST
ELEV DME ANTENNA
DISTANCE
NM
UPPER LIMITS
LOWER LIMITS
AIRSPACE
CLASSIFICATION
1
ORNAL
324754.59N 0375152.73E
2
QAA
R049 107.4NM
2800FT
3
10NM
4
FL600
ALT 13000FT
CLASS A+C
KAREM
325110.40N 0380324.38E
QAA
R050 117.2NM
2800FT
22NM
FL600
ALT 13000FT
CLASS A+C
KUMLO
325811.82N 0382807.67E
QAA
R053 138.5NM
2800FT
11NM
FL600
ALT 13000FT
CLASS A+C
DAPUK
330139.44N 0384026.29E
QAA
R054 149.1NM
2800FT
14NM
FL600
ALT 13000FT
CLASS A+C
FIR BDRY (PASIP)

330600.00N 0385600.00E
EDITION No. 6
APPENDIX 7
QAA
R055 162.6NM
2800
DIRECTIONS OF
CRUISING LEVELS
ODD
EVEN
5
REMARKS
CONTROLLING UNIT
CHANNEL
6

Transfer of CTL
Iraq AIP
Page 245
TACC MATC II
UPPER LIMITS
LOWER LIMITS
ROUTE DESIGNATOR
(RNP/RNAV)
COORDINATES
WAY-POINT IDENT
OF VOR/DME BRG
&DIST ELEV DME
ANTENNA
DISTANCE
NM
26NM
FL600
ALT 9000FT
CLASS A+C
L513 (RNAV5)
MUNRA
304944.29N 0360834.88E
QAA
R175 56.4NM
2800FT
QTR01
QATRANEH DVOR/DME (QTR)
311454.41N 0360334.31E
QAA01
QUEEN ALIA DVOR/DME (QAA)
314423.41N 0360926.59E
LOXER
LOSAR
320930.06N 0362849.77E
QAA
R029 20.8NM
2800FT
QAA
R029 30NM
2800FT
FIR BDRY (BUSRA)

322000.00N 0363700.00E
QAA
R029 42.6NM
2800FT
320147.76N 0362251.46E
EDITION No. 6
APPENDIX 7
AIRSPACE
CLASSIFICATION
30NM
FL600
ALT 7000FT
CLASS A+C
21NM
FL600
ALT 9000FT
CLASS A+C
9NM
FL600
ALT 9000FT
CLASS A+C
FL600
ALT 13000FT
CLASS A+C
13NM
DIRECTIONS OF
CRUISING LEVELS
ODD
EVEN
5
REMARKS
CONTROLLING UNIT
CHANNEL
6
ATS Route Segment QTR01BUSRA

Non-ICAO Standard according
to the table of cruising level
Transfer of CTL
Syria AIP
Page 246
TACC MATC II
APPENDIX 7
UPPER LIMITS
LOWER LIMITS
ROUTE DESIGNATOR
(RNP/RNAV)
COORDINATES
WAY-POINT IDENT OF
VOR/DME BRG &DIST
ELEV DME ANTENNA
DISTANCE
NM
FIR BDRY (ULINA)

292451.00N 0345817.00E
QAA
R080 125.9NM
2800FT
16NM
FL600
ALT 8000FT
CLASS A+C
SESMO
293458.00N 0351159.00E
QAA
R197 138.3NM
2800FT
40NM
LOXUS
301300.90N 0352600.70E
QAA
R198 98.7NM
2800FT
40NM
LOSIL
304851.20N 0354741.31E
QAA
R194 58.6NM
2800FT
29NM
M319 (RNAV5)
MOUAB
314758.00N 0353559.00E
EDITION No. 6
ODD
EVEN
5
REMARKS
CONTROLLING UNIT
CHANNEL
6
Egypt AIP
Transfer of CTL
SESMO is a mandatory
reporting, own navigation
from ULINA-LOXUS is
forbidden
41NM
QTR01
QATRANEH
DVOR/DME
(QTR)
311454.41N 0360334.31E
AIRSPACE
CLASSIFICATION
DIRECTIONS OF
CRUISING
LEVELS
FL600
ALT 8000FT
CLASS A+C
FL600
ALT 7000FT
CLASS A+C
FL600
ALT 7000FT
CLASS A+C
FL600
ALT 7000FT
CLASS A+C
QAA
R273 28.8NM
2800FT
Transfer of CTL
Israel AIP
Page 247
TACC MATC II
ROUTE DESIGNATOR
UPPER LIMITS
LOWER LIMITS
WAY-POINT IDENT OF
VOR/DME BRG &DIST
ELEV DME ANTENNA
DISTANCE
NM
COORDINATES
1
QAA
R104 46.2NM
2800FT
14NM
FL300
FL150
CLASS A
(RNP/RNAV)
APPENDIX 7
AIRSPACE
CLASSIFICATION
DIRECTIONS OF
CRUISING
LEVELS
ODD
EVEN
5
CONTROLLING UNIT
CHANNEL
6
For continuation, refer to Saudi
AIP
Transfer of CTL
N318 (RNAV5)
FIR BDRY (GENEX)
312935.47N 0370051.52E
REMARKS
Amman APP 128.9 MHZ

According to ENR.1.6-5 Para
2.7
ELOXI
313400.99 N0364534.23E
QAA
R104 32.5NM
2800FT
8NM
KINUR
313626.07N 0363712.78E
QAA
R104 24.9NM
2800FT
11NM
ALNOR
313955.26N 0362507.52E
QAA
R104 14NM
2800FT
14NM
QAA01
QUEEN ALIA DVOR/DME
(QAA)
314423.41N 0360926.59E
FIR BDRY (MOUAB)
314758.00N 0353559.00E
EDITION No. 6
29NM
FL300
FL150
CLASS A
FL 300
ALT 7000FT
CLASS A
FL600
ALT 6000FT
CLASS A
FL600
ALT 6000FT
CLASS A
QAA
R273 28.8NM
2800FT
Transfer of CTL
For continuation, refer to Israel
AIP
Page 248
TACC MATC II
APPENDIX 7
ROUTE DESIGNATOR
(RNP/RNAV)
COORDINATES
WAY-POINT IDENT OF
VOR/DME BRG &DIST
ELEV DME ANTENNA
DISTANCE
NM
UPPER LIMITS
LOWER LIMITS
AIRSPACE
CLASSIFICATION
DIRECTIONS OF
CRUISING LEVELS
ODD
EVEN
BAKIR
294053.00N 0350708.00E
QATIM
295600.00N 0351600.00E
QAA
R199 117.7NM
2800FT
19NM
FL600
ALT 8000FT
CLASS A+C
QAA
R198 98.7NM
2800FT
40NM
FL600
ALT 8000FT
CLASS A+C
QAA
R194 58.6NM
2800FT
29NM
LOXUS
301300.90N 0352600.70E
LOSIL
304851.20N 0354741.31E
EGLOT
KULDI
311847.07N 0363214.16E
FIR BDRY (KIPAS)
312324.00N0370641.00E
EDITION No. 6
17NM
13NM
QTR01
QATRANEH DVOR/DME
(QTR)
311454.41N 0360334.31E
311656.94N 0361823.86E
14NM
TFC DEP OJAQ via METSA

to proceed DCT ULINA after
METSA then refer to Egypt
AIP
FL600
ALT 8000FT
CLASS A+C
FL600
ALT 8000FT
CLASS A+C
QAA
R200 150.0NM
2800FT
QAA
R199 134.6NM
2800FT
FL600
ALT 7000FT
CLASS A+C
FL600
ALT 9000FT
CLASS A+C
QAA
R160 28.5NM
2800FT
12NM
FL600
ALT 9000FT
CLASS A+C
QAA
R138 32.1NM
2800FT
30NM
FL 300
FL 150
CLASS A+C
QAA
R109 53.2NM
2800FT
CONTROLLING UNIT
CHANNEL
6
R652(RNAV5)
METSA
292707.00N 0345903.00E
REMARKS
TFC ARR OJAQ via ULINA

to proceed direct METSA
then refer to Jordan AIP
OJAQ AD 2

132.425MHz
Amman Approach 128.9MHz
AQABA Approach Sector
119.2MHz
According to ENR.1.6-5 Para
2.7
Route Segment QTRMETSA only for TFC
Departing or Arriving
Aqaba/King Hussein Airport
Transfer of CTL
Saudi AIP
Page 249
TACC MATC II
ROUTE DESIGNATOR
(RNP/RNAV)
COORDINATES
WAY-POINT IDENT OF
VOR/DME BRG &DIST
ELEV DME ANTENNA
DISTANCE
NM
QAA
R200 152.4NM
2800FT
28NM
QAA
R190 136.9NM
2800FT
18NM
TAMIM
293640.00N 0354840.00E
QAA
R184 129.0NM
2800FT
30NM
PETRA
294206.00N 0362210.00E
QAA
R170 122.8NM
2800FT
UB411 (RNAV5)
FIR BDRY (ULINA)
292451.00N 0345817.00E
ELETA
293200.80N 0352900.10E
FIR BDRY (DEESA)

294509.00N 0364102.00E
APPENDIX 7
17NM
UPPER LIMITS
LOWER LIMITS
AIRSPACE
CLASSIFICATION
4
DIRECTIONS OF
CRUISING
LEVELS
ODD
EVEN
5
Aqaba Approach Sector 119.2MHz

132.425MHz
FL600
FL 250
CLASS A
FL600
FL 250
CLASS A
QAA
R163 122.3NM
2800FT
Transfer of CTL
For continuation, refer to Saudi AIP
For continuation, refer to Saudi AIP
Transfer of CTL
UB544(RNAV5)
FIR BDRY (SODAR)
315602.00N 0384326.00E
MODAD
323539.88N 0384138.14E
DAPUK
330139.44N 0384026.29E
FIR BDRY (NAMBO)
331825.68N 0383938.59E
EDITION No. 6
CONTROLLING UNIT CHANNEL

6
For continuation, refer to Egypt AIP
Transfer of CTL
FL600
ALT 8000FT
CLASS A+C
FL600
FL 250
CLASS A
REMARKS
QAA
R080 131.3NM
2800FT
40NM
QAA
R063 138.7NM
2800FT
QAA
R054 149.1NM
2800FT
QAA
R048 157.7NM
2800FT
26NM
17NM
FL600
FL240
CLASS A
FL600
FL 240
CLASS A
FL600
FL 240
CLASS A

132.425MHz
Transfer of CTL
For continuation, refer to Syria AIP.
Page 250
TACC MATC II
ROUTE DESIGNATOR
(RNP/RNAV)
COORDINATES
1
WAY-POINT
IDENT OF
VOR/DME
BRG &DIST
ELEV DME
ANTENNA
2
DISTANCE
NM
UPPER LIMITS
LOWER LIMITS
AIRSPACE
CLASSIFICATION
4
UL768 (RNAV 5)
FIR BDRY (OTILA)

320131.00N 0390152.84E
APPENDIX 7
QAA
R078 147.8NM
2800FT
38NM
FL600
FL 240
CLASS A
DIRECTIONS OF
CRUISING LEVELS
ODD
EVEN
5
REMARKS
CONTROLLING UNIT
CHANNEL
6

AIP
Transfer of CTL
Amman Upper East Sector
128.5MHz
Amman Lower East Sector
132.525MHz
MODAD
QAA
R063 138.9NM
2800FT
25NM
11NM
325811.82N 0382807.67E
QAA
R053 138.7NM
2800
FIR BDRY (SOKAN)

330809.00N 0382207.00E
QAA
R048 140.0NM
2800FT
323539.88N 0384138.14E
KUMLO
EDITION No. 6
FL600
FL 240
CLASS A
FL600
FL 240
CLASS A
Transfer of CTL
For continuation, refer to Syria
AIP
Page 251
TACC MATC II
ROUTE DESIGNATOR
(RNP/RNAV)
COORDINATES
1
UM449 (RNAV5)
FIR BDRY (GIBET)
292620.00N0362501.00E
PETRA
294206.00N 0362210.00E
KINOD
301200.30N 0361600.60E
APPENDIX 7

WAY-POINT IDENT OF
VOR/DME BRG &DIST
ELEV DME ANTENNA
DISTANCE
NM
QAA
R170 138.4NM
2800FT
QAA
R170 122.5NM
2800FT
QAA
R172 92.4NM
2800FT
16NM
30NM
UPPER LIMITS
LOWER LIMITS
AIRSPACE
CLASSIFICATION
4
DIRECTIONS OF
CRUISING LEVELS
ODD
EVEN
5
CONTROLLING UNIT
CHANNEL
6

AIP
Transfer of CTL
FL600
FL 250
CLASS A
FL600

132.425MHz
FL 250
CLASS A
38NM
REMARKS
FL600
Amman Approach 128.9MHz.
FL 250
CLASS A
MUNRA
304944.29N0360834.88E
QAA
R176 91.45NM
2800FT
28NM
EGLOT
311656.94N 0361823.86E
QAA
R160 28.4NM
2800FT
24NM
ALNOR
313955.26N 0362507.52E
QAA
R104 14.1NM
2800FT
19NM
GETUP
315833.47N0363037.47E
QAA
R047 22.9NM
2800FT
4NM
MESLO
320231.00N0363148.00E
QAA
R042 26.3NM
2800FT
5NM
GIBOX
320700.00N0363308.00E
QAA
R037 30.3M
2800FT
13NM
FIR BDRY (BUSRA)

322000.00N 0363700.00E
QAA
R029 42.6NM
2800FT
EDITION No. 6
FL600
FL 250
CLASS A
FL600
ATS Route Segment MUNRABUSRA

Non-ICAO Standard according to
the table of cruising level.
ALT 8500FT
CLASS A +C
FL600
ALT 8500FT
CLASS A +C
FL600
ALT 8500FT
CLASS A +C
FL600
ALT 8500FT
CLASS A +C
FL600
ALT 11000FT
CLASS A +C
Transfer of CTL
For continuation, refer to Syria
AIP
Page 252
TACC MATC II
APPENDIX 7
ROUTE DESIGNATOR
(RNP/RNAV)
COORDINATES
WAY-POINT IDENT OF
VOR/DME BRG &DIST
ELEV DME ANTENNA
DISTANCE
NM
UPPER LIMITS
LOWER LIMITS
AIRSPACE
CLASSIFICATION
4
DIRECTIONS OF
CRUISING LEVELS
ODD
EVEN
6
For continuation, refer to Egypt AIP
Transfer of CTL
FL600
ALT 8000FT
CLASS A
QAA
R200 152.0NM
2800FT
QAA
R197 138.3NM
2800FT
16NM
39NM
FL600
FL 250
CLASS A
QAA
R193 100.6NM
2800FT
51NM
MUNRA
304944.29N 0360834.88E
QAA
R176.3 54.5NM
2800FT
35NM
FL600
FL 310
CLASS A
FL600
FL 310
CLASS A
KULDI
311847.07N 0363214.16E
QAA
R138 32.1NM
2800FT
19NM
FL600
FL 310
CLASS A
ELOXI
313400.99N0364534.23E
QAA
R104 32.5NM
2800FT
19NM
FL600
FL 310
CLASS A
DESLI
314900.10N 0365900.60E
QAA
R079 42.5NM
2800FT
55NM
FL600
FL 310
CLASS A
KODER
323300.00N 0373800.50E
QAA
R052 89.5NM
2800FT
19NM
FL600
FL310
A CAA C
ORNAL
324754.59N 0375152.73E
QAA
R049 107.5NM
2800FT
QAA
R047 118.4NM
2800FT
11NM
FL600
ALT 13000FT
CLASS A
SESMO
293458.00N 0351159.00E
LONOL
300800.60N 0353500.10E
FIR BDRY (ZELAF)

325656.20N 0375959.26E
EDITION No. 6
CONTROLLING UNIT CHANNEL
UM690 (RNAV5)
FIR BDRY (ULINA)
292451.00N 0345817.00E
REMARKS

Amman Lower West Sector 132.425MHz
Aqaba Approach Sector 119.2MHz
Hours of Operation (LT):
SUN
MON
TUE
WED
THU
1600-0600 Next Day

1600-0600 Next Day
1600-0600 Next Day
1600-0600 Next Day
1600-0600 Next SUN
ATS Route Segment ELOXI-ZELAF

Non-ICAO Standard
Transfer of CTL
Page 253
TACC MATC II
ROUTE DESIGNATOR
WAY-POINT IDENT OF
(RNP/RNAV)
VOR/DME BRG &DIST
ELEV DMEANTENNA
COORDINATES
1
DISTANCE
NM
UPPER LIMITS
LOWER LIMITS
AIRSPACE
CLASSIFICATION
KAREM
325110.40N
0380324.38E
FIR BDRY (RASLI)
315424.00N
0383648.00E
EDITION No. 6
QAA
R080 125.9NM
2800FT
QAA
R050 117.4NM
2800FT
6NM
63NM
DIRECTIONS OF
CRUISING LEVELS
ODD
UR785 (RNAV 5)
FIR BDRY (ZELAF)

325656.20N
0375959.26E
APPENDIX 7
FL600
FL 240
CLASS A
FL600
FL 240
CLASS A
QAA
R047.3 118.4NM
2800FT
EVEN
REMARKS
CONTROLLING UNIT
CHANNEL
6
Transfer of CTL
Amman Upper East Sector
128.5MHz
Amman Lower East Sector
132.525MHz According to
ENR.1.6-5 Para 2.7
Transfer of CTL
AIP.
Page 254

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The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

Civil Aviation Regulatory Commission

Air Navigation Services

Manual of Air Traffic Control Part II

Issued in accordance with Jordan Civil Aviation Regulations

Eng. Ahmad Azzam

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION SHEET

Manual of Air Traffic Control Part II

Chief of AMMAN TACC

DOCUMENT STATUS AND TYPE

Safety Regulatory Requirement

NAME and SIGNATURE

1.3 Authority/responsibility for Changes

1.6 Change History

1.8 Distribution of the Manual

1.7 Controlling the Manual

1.5 Interpretation of Words

1.12 General Instruction

1.13 Symbols and abbreviations

CHAPTER TWO : Terminal Area Control Center

2.2 THALES RADAR Center

2.2.1 THALES RADAR System Description

2.2.2 THALES RADAR Control Sectorization

2.2.3 Sector Manning Level

2.3 INDRA RADAR Center

2.3.1 INDRA RADAR Control Sectorization

2.3.2 Merging / Splitting Sectors Procedure in Amman TACC

2.3.3 Sector Manning Level

2.3.4 Strip Layout

2.4.1 Navigation Aids Frequencies

2.4.2 Voice Communication System " VCS " Frequencies

2.5.1 Responsibilities and Duties

2.5.2 Control Room Administrations

2.5.2.2 Duty Restriction in the Influence of Alcoholic and Drugs

2.5.2.5 Private telephone calls

2.5.2.7 Control Room Discipline

2.5.2.8 Radio / Telephone Discipline

CHAPTER THREE : RADAR Failure Procedure

CHAPTER FOUR : RADAR Control

4.2 Surveillance Identification of aircraft

4.2.1 Establishment of identification

4.2.2 SSR identification procedures

4.2.3 ADS-B identification procedures

4.3 Surveillance Separation Minima

4.4 Mode C Verification and Errors

4.4.1 Mode C Verification

4.5 SSR Codes

4.5.2 SSR Code Failure

4.5.3 Inbound SSR code assignment

4.5.4 Over fly SSR code assignment

4.5.5 Outbound SSR code assignment

4.5.7 Regional SSR Codes assignment

CHAPTER FIVE : TMA and Area Procedure

5.2 Departure Flights Procedure

5.2.1 Outbound Silent RADAR Handover .. 45

5.3 Arrival Flights Procedure

Inbound Silent RADAR Handover

5.3.2 Standard Inbound levels

5.6 Co-ordination Procedures

General and Flight planning between Approach Unit and

5.6.1 Tower Unit

5.6.2 Visual Approach

5.6.3 Runway Change Procedure ... 52

5.6.4 VFR Traffic Procedures