Remembering the Bracero Selection Process: Internal Migration, Labor Markets, and Social

Network Formation In Northern Mexico

Abstract:
This study shows how the industrialization of agriculture in northern Mexico provided a
temporary labor market opportunity for displaced migrant workers. In particular, the study examines
how men who were excluded from the formal bracero selection process during 1950s and early 1960s
at the municipal level migrated internally to northern Mexico in an effort to consolidate access to U.S.
labor markets. By migrating internally, the men improved their recruitment chances through direct
contact with Mexican and U.S. government officials who in turn helped place workers on U.S. farms.
Drawing on in-depth interviews and observations, I explain how migrant workers transformed the
economy of a northern Mexican town through both the formation of labor pools and creation of an
informal economy that provided services to waiting migrant workers. These workers did not only
provide a labor force for agriculture developing in northern Mexico, but established a reserve labor force
that later supplied labor to Mexico and U.S. employers in the border region. Finally, the study
demonstrates how formal labor recruitment during the bracero program helped to create a foundation for
contemporary Mexican migration flows based on social networks.
Keywords: Internal migration, labor markets, guest workers.

Introduction
In both Mexico and the U.S., former Mexican guest workers, more popularly known as braceros,
are mobilizing to recuperate wages that were withheld while they labored in the U.S. The social
movement, which has transnational ties, emerged when the descendants of former guest workers and
community leaders learned that braceros were deducted 10 percent of wages that were consequently
deposited in a Mexican savings account to be repaid upon completing the labor contract. Thousands of
elderly Mexican men, now in their latter stages of life, have formed a collective whose purpose is no
longer simply to collect lost wages, but to inform the public about the humiliating selection process that
they endured and their exploitation by the U.S. and Mexican government. The present study, based on a
larger project that examines the labor market incorporation of border residents in northern Mexico, draws
on the life histories of a group of men who meet each week at a public park to recollect their
participation in the bracero program. Each week, men congregate at a public park in which they
socialize and reminisce on how the bracero program affected their life chances and how their own
migration is tied to modern day immigration issues. While the men attend meetings primarily because
they wish to recover deducted earnings during their guest worker tenure, over the course of my research,
I realized that meetings were more than just about recuperating lost wages. The social gatherings
allowed participants to compare stories about the migration process during the bracero program.
This paper reconstructs the journey that bracero aspirants took when they left their Mexican
villages en route to the U.S. and the strategies men adopted to overcome unsuccessful attempts at
enlisting in the program. In particular, the study examines how men who were excluded from the
formal bracero selection process during 1950s and early 1960s at the municipal level migrated
internally to northern Mexico in an effort to consolidate access to U.S. labor markets. By migrating
internally, the men increased their chances of recruitment by gaining access to Mexican and U.S.
government officials who recruited workers for U.S. employment in agriculture. The study also shows
how migrant workers transformed the economy of a northern Mexican town through mass mobility in
which the towns formal and informal economy came to depend on the presence and labor of bracero
aspirants. I also argue that these workers not only provided a labor force for agriculture developing in
northern Mexico, but established a reserve labor force that would later supply labor to Mexico and U.S.
employers in the border region.

The study concludes by demonstrating how formal labor recruitment during the bracero program
in Mexico helped provide a foundational base for contemporary Mexican migration. By focusing on
former braceros, we gain better insight on the interconnection between informal and formal labor
recruitment that provided the basis for large-scale international migration in which worker replenishment
after the program would be replaced by the social networks of braceros. The mens stories also show that
although the U.S.-Mexico border is a thin line that separates Mexico from the U.S. it was more difficult
to cross than previously thought especially for first time border crossers with no previous international
migration experience.

The Bracero Program and the Development of Northern Mexico

The bracero program was vital to the development of large-scale agriculture in the American
southwest because temporary migrants from rural Mexico became a source of cheap and temporary labor
for U.S. growers (Calavita 1992; Martin 2002; Massey 1986; Pfeffer 1980). The bracero program was
instituted in 1942 to fill labor gaps created with the exodus of poor whites and blacks who left
agriculture for the industrial military production sector during World War II. Though seen primarily as a
temporary program, over the next twenty-two years some
4.5 million temporary work contracts were issued 1. Though in its first year only 4,200 men participated
in the program, braceros eventually comprised more than one-third of the overall seasonal agricultural
labor force in California just one decade after its implementation (Calavita 1992; Pfeffer 1980: 32).
Moreover, once the program ended, former braceros continued to migrate without documents to the
U.S. to continue to provide cheap seasonal labor to former
1 Most of the braceros that I spoke to worked in agriculture. Only two bracero informants that I spoke with
participated in the railroad version of the program. For an in-depth examination of the railroad version of the
program, see Driscoll (1999).

employers (Garcia Y Griego 1983; Massey and Liang 1989; Palerm 1994). Some braceros would
eventually help employers recruit friends and family members in the post-bracero years thereby
creating a seasonal agricultural labor force.
While the bracero program was an important catalyst in the development of U.S. large-corporate
agriculture, it also played an intricate role to the development of northern border state economies. For
example, Mexican northern border cities such as Tijuana, Mexicali, and Ciudad Juarez began to
experience population growth as many of the returning bracero migrants no longer returned to the places
of origin but rather settled in these strategic sites to be in close proximity to U.S. jobs (Palerm 1994).
Between 1940 and 1960, Tijuanas population growth has been attributed to the fact that many returning
braceros settled in the border region where many of their families resided while they worked abroad
(Fussell 2002). Several of the bracero families in my study settled in Tijuana because men relocated
their families near the border where theyy could visit them in-between labor contracts. The bracero
program also induced economic development through the Border Industrialization Program (FernndezKelly 1983; Garcia Y Griego 1983; Seligson and Williams 1981). The Border Industrialization Program
(BIP) of 1965 was a binational agreement between Mexico and the U.S. in which corporations were
established to produce goods that were in turn shipped to American consumers. The BIP program was
established the year after the bracero program ended with the intention of providing jobs to the
thousands of displaced braceros who relocated to Mexican border states and were unemployed. The
maquiladoras never hired braceros as young women who had migrated internally from other regions of
Mexico became the primary beneficiaries of this labor sector.
Often overlooked in the literature is that fact that the bracero program was temporarily linked
to the Sonoran cotton industry in northern Mexico (in particular near Empalme, Sonora), particularly
during the last decade of the program that in the process created an internal labor pool of available
workers for both Mexican growers and later the U.S. (Burr 1961; Fitzgerald 2006; Gonzalez 2006).
During the bracero program, the Mexican government was the intermediary between bracero aspirants
wanting to work in the U.S. and American growers needing workers to pick labor intensive crops.
Therefore, to enlist in the program, residents of Mexican villages did not need extensive social capital
as is the case with modern day Mexican labor flowsto gain access to international labor markets
because the state controlled the labor mobility of migrants and played an intermediary role in placing
Mexicans in U.S. based agricultural jobs (Durand et al. 2001; Massey 1986; Massey et al. 1987).
However, during the bracero program, more bracero aspirants enrolled than available slots which
resulted in a crisis to the selection process at the municipal level (Galarza 1964).

In the sections that follow, I address the role of the Mexican government and Mexican cotton
growers in the creation an internal labor force in northern Mexico that eventually provided access to the
U.S. agricultural labor market. After a brief overview of the basic characteristics of braceros, I explain
the limitations of the formal selection process at the municipal level and explain why aspirants migrated
internally to northern Mexico during the bracero program. I then examine how men, who migrated with
limited resources, experienced temporary displacement as they waited selection and how the
development of an informal economy helped them to negotiate the cumbersome wait time at selection
sites. The study concludes by addressing how the creation of first an internal migrant labor force was
shaped by multiple factors including the state and Mexican labor markets in shaping the labor migrant
networks of former braceros that continued to have long-term repercussions long after the program
ended.

Methodology and Background Characteristics of Ex-Braceros

This paper is based upon 27 in-depth interviews conducted with braceros residing in Tijuana,
Mexico2 from 2004-2005. Through in-depth interviews labor and migration histories for men and their
families were collected. The in-depth interviews were recorded digitally and transcribed. Interviews,
which were conducted in Spanish, varied anywhere from 45 minutes to

Although I also conducted interviews with the family members of braceros, the data that I include in this paper

refer solely to braceros .

2.5 hours. Observations were also conducted when men met weekly at the local park so as to
provide context to the stories that the men revealed during in-depth interviews.
At the time of the study, the mean age of men was 71 years. When the men first migrated to the
U.S. as braceros, they had only completed an average of 1.7 years of formal education. With regard to
current legal status, 8 out of the 27 braceros obtained legal permanent residence (Green Cards) in the
U.S. through employer sponsorships when the program ended. Moreover, five of the 27 men, who were
Mexican residents, had obtained border crossing cards 3.
The majority of men (21 of 27) were born in Central Mexican states including: Michoacan,
Jalisco, Zacatecas, and Guanajuato. The remaining (6 of 27) braceros were from northern states such as
Durango and Sinaloa. When the men first migrated as braceros, none had previous international
migration experience. So the bracero program helped to introduce them to foreign labor markets for the
first time. A 1958 study conducted at the Guaymas, Sonora bracero processing center, at the height of
the program, found that the majority (two-thirds) of men surveyed had worked less than one labor
contract while 40% had worked more than two (Hancock 1959). In my study, Tijuana braceros generally
had migrated in the mid 1950s, and during their tenure as guest workers, they worked an average of four
labor contracts (the minimum for men was one while the high was eleven). Moreover, the mean age of
their first contract (first migrant trip) was about 22 years of age and they worked their last labor contract
at the age of 26.
More than half of the men in the study were initially unsuccessful at obtaining bracero contracts
at the municipal level. Therefore, those men migrated internally to Empalme, Sonora (where recruitment
of braceros took place) in an effort to obtain a labor contract because they had been excluded from the
formal selection process. Throughout the paper, I wish to stress that the bracero migrants in my study
were disadvantaged to begin with not only because they were

A border crossing card is issued by U.S. consulates in Mexico and allows Mexican citizens to enter the U.S. for up
to 72 hours and within a 25 mile radius of the U.S.-Mexico border. The border crossing card entitles citizens of Mexico
to shop and/or visit family relatives. These border crossing cards prohibit gainful employment. Border crossing cards
are also known as laser visas.
3

excluded from the formal selection process but because they lacked social support that was necessary
in the migration process. For example, half of my interviewees grew up in female headed households.
While I do not wish to romanticize nuclear family formation, previous scholarship shows that the
children of former braceros have a higher likelihood of migrating because of the intergenerational
transmission of knowledge along with direct assistance in finding employment and/or housing in the
U.S. (Massey and Liang 1989). Most of the former braceros in my sample lacked kinship social
support which partly explains why they were disadvantaged throughout the migration process as we
will observe through first hand recollections in the sections that follow.

The Official Bracero Selection Process

To enroll in the official bracero program, men had to undergo three distinct steps. In the first
step, men had to secure permits at their municipal level usually from local mayors. When permits at the
municipal level were secured, the men were then forwarded to inspection at the migratory stations which
were located in Mexican northern states (this paper focuses on the migratory station in Empalme,
Sonora) in which they had to pass inspection proving that they came from agricultural backgrounds in
Mexico. In this step, the men also had to pass a medical examination after which they received a
temporary labor contract usually for 45 days that outlined transportation, housing, and wage benefits. In
the third step, selected men where then transported to reception centers (Calexico, California) where
workers were then chosen by U.S. grower representatives and shipped to U.S. farms.
While the selection seemed routine and straightforward, the men that I interviewed for this
study recounted that there were always more people willing to work than there were available
contracts at the municipal level. As a result, men who chose to bypass the selection process at the
municipal level, came to be known as the free ones who rather than await selection in their
municipality, chose to migrate on their own to increase their chances of selection by migrating to
northern Mexico (Galarza 1964). Therefore, an internal bracero process emerged from the mid 1950s
onwards in which men who wanted to enroll in the bracero program migrated internally to northern
Mexico where after picking a quota of cotton received preferential treatment to become braceros in
the U.S.

Exclusion from the Formal Selection Process

For the most part, men who traveled with permits from their municipality were promptly
processed usually waiting only a few days before they were then transported to Calexico, California
where they were then selected by grower representatives. However, men who migrated as the free
ones had left their Mexican villages hoping that they could eventually be selected for the bracero
program. These men had left on their own because they had been excluded from the formal selection
process because in some cases the available slots for braceros were taken by friends of the local mayor
and/or others who had provided bribes in return for obtaining access to bracero labor contracts (Craig
1971; Mitchell 1958). Because the men had grown disenfranchised with the selection process at the
local level, they decided to take their own chances by migrating to northern Mexico where the actual
recruitment of braceros took place hoping that they would be selected and not turned away.
The migratory station which processed braceros in Empalme, Sonora soon became a city with
thousands of displaced migrants who had been excluded from the selection process in their Mexican
villages. The town became overburdened with so many bracero internal migrants that one ex-bracero
who I interviewed recalled that, we did not fit in the city. Antonio Lemus recalls that thousands of
young hopefuls traveled to Empalme because they had learned through word of mouth that they
increased their chances of obtaining labor contracts if they went to the migratory bracero processing
centers. The men would all arrive hopeful of obtaining a farm labor contract but as their stay was
prolonged, the earnings that they traveled with began to diminish. Therefore, Antonio Lemus recalls
witnessing young men first experience hunger which then turned to madness because they had spent all
of their savings. Silvestre Ramos recalls walking through the streets of Empalme, Sonora and seeing a
fellow migrant laying on the street. At first, he thought that the young man was passed out from drinking
or had perhaps fainted from the heat of the Sonoran desert. However, when Silvestre touched the young
man, he became terrified because the young man was stiff and had died of starvation awaiting to obtain a
labor contract. Silvestre says that men always heard many stories about braceros who died from
starvation and where the autopsies that were performed on migrants who had passed away found only
pieces of toilet paper or trash in their stomachs. The traumatic events that men witnessed observing
mass hunger and death of waiting migrants had an enduring impact on ex-braceros such that these
stories continued to be a topic of frequent discussions for my research participants. However, in
recounting these traumatic life events, the braceros also shared stories of how they developed strategies
and income generating activities to help them to survive the waiting periods.

Most of the men who traveled to the migratory stations carried with them extra money that they
borrowed from relatives or friends. However, the men traveled only with limited funds and as their stay
increased from days to weeks to months, men who had migrated with limited social resources had to
invent survival strategies. Many of my interviewees survived in Empalme by fishing off of the Gulf of
California located off the Sonoran coast by using a long piece of string as reel, a rock as weight, and a
can as a fishing rod. Through their fishing, they were not only gathered food for themselves but they
also fed friends and other waiting braceros who had similarly run out of food. The men that I
interviewed stated that prior to migrating internally to Sonora, they did not know how to fish. Therefore,
the skill that they learned at the migratory stations helped them to survive when their earnings had
depleted.
As the periods of waiting grew in Sonora, local residents became an important source of social
support as some families provided men with shelter and food when they had no money. Many men,
rather than wait to be selected, saw the informal economy of Empalme, Sonora as an opportunity to earn
money while they awaited selection. One ex-bracero remembered, There were many people who found
out and they began to use their money by selling rice with sugar, that simple, or coffee. They had
business there. With one peso you ate; if you had a peso they would give you chicken. Moreover, he
explained that the informal bracero economy grew because, Everyday you would see at least 4,000
people. Everyday! who awaited selection. In fact, several of the men stated that selling goods to
aspiring braceros became a temporary substitute to wage-labor in the U.S. Salvador Vargas stated that
he had friends from neighboring Guaymas, Sonora who rather than migrate to the U.S. as braceros,
began to sell hotcakes and small bottles of milk to men. His friends earned significant money from
selling hotcakes to braceros such that they never migrated to work in the fields of California because
they had found their niche in the informal economy of Empalme, Sonora.

Bracero aspirants who had previously worked in food preparation began to use their skills to earn
money. Aurelio Nava explained that he ended up working for his uncle making chicken soup. He
prepared the food and then walked around the contracting center selling hot soup straight out of a bucket.
Other bracero aspirants sold prepared fruit and vegetable salads to braceros. Still other braceros began
to work for local families and merchants. For example, Silvestre Reyes recalls that when he first came to
the contracting center in Monterey, Nuevo Leon, he worked as a street ice cream vendor and began to
sell ice cream to men. By getting that job, he was able to eat and pay his way north once he collected
enough to pay a coyote. Some braceros began to also work for local families selling burritos and tamales
to migrant workers.
Another type of informal economy that emerged was one that was dedicated to cheating migrants
from the few savings that they traveled with. In an effort to increase the money that they traveled with,
many migrant workers gambled the money that they traveled with. However, they did not know back
then that they were gambling their money with skilled poker players who posed as amateurs and/or to
other types of games whose sole purpose was to steal the earnings of braceros. For example, migrant
men like, Rafael Torres, remembers surviving Empalme, Sonora by taking advantage of braceros who
did not have street smarts. During an interview, he explained that an uncle gave him a two-sided coin
prior to leaving his village so that he could use it to make extra money. Rafaels uncle had previously
migrated to Empalme and had a difficult time obtaining a bracero contract; therefore, he gave his
nephew the two-sided coin so that he would have the means to earn extra money by wagering with other
men. He explains:

I would spend my time flipping coins winning watermelon and ice cream bars. I had a .20 cent
coin with two heads. There I was the only one who won. So with ice cream bars and
watermelon I never needed to buy them, and I would give them to my friends.
The men who regularly met at the park each Sunday frequently spoke about the adventures and hardships
that they had undergone while awaiting to be contracted. In their reflections, the men stated that they
had helped convert the sleepy town of Empalme, Sonora into a thriving town whose economy depended
on the labor of internal migrants. The ex-braceros stated they helped create a vibrant informal economy
through the proliferation of food and sleeping services. Soon the cotton agriculture sector began to also
tap into the bracero labor reserve in which the local government began to institute a rule in which
bracero aspirants who picked cotton received preferential treatment in the selection process. While
migrant-based social capital continued to be a factor that defined mens ability to survive their informal
selection process, soon it was the Mexican labor market and local Sonoran government which instituted
a new process to control the flow of migrants north of the border.

The Development of the Mexican Cotton Industry in Sonora

My research participants had migrated as bracero aspirants to Empalme, Sonora in northern
Mexico because returning braceros taught their friends and relatives that the formal selection process at
the village level was only one means by which to gain access to foreign labor markets. The men began
to teach others that their chances of obtaining bracero slots increased if they migrated internally to
Empalme, Sonora where the selection process took place. However, to qualify for the bracero program
men were required to work in the cotton industry of northern Mexico where if they worked for brief
periods of time, they gained preferential treatment when the selection process took place.

Before describing the intersection of the cotton industry and the bracero program, it is
important to briefly describe the expansion of northern Mexicos economy during the years of the
bracero program. The state of Sonora and Sinaloa were densely populated regions because they were
far removed from central Mexico and were located in desert region so agriculture remained relatively
underdeveloped until 1940. However, beginning in 1940, the Mexican government with loans from the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development began to implement dam projects which made
year-round irrigation possible, and in the process, increased acreage for agricultural production (Dozier
1963). By 1960, the area of irrigated land would reach some 8.6 million acres which was more than
double prior the modernization of northern Mexicos agriculture (Rochin 1985: 264). The
modernization of northern Mexican agriculture would also double crop yields for cotton, wheat, and
sorghum (Rochin 1985). Thus, in Sonora, cotton and wheat production and to a lesser extent winter
vegetables and fruits became important for the local economy (Dozier 1963; Hicks 1967).
Cotton soon became the most important crop to Mexicos northern economy for between 1940
and 1960, roughly the time period of the bracero program, the area of cotton production grew by 6.9
percent per year that would eventually make Mexico the largest exporter of cotton in the world (Hicks
1967). By 1960, 99 percent of cotton, 71 percent of wheat, and 65 percent strawberries, tomatoes, and
melons grown in Mexico were harvested in the fields of northern Mexico. Although northern Mexicos
cotton production was booming, Mexican farmers faced labor shortages because locals migrated as
braceros (Dozier 1963; Gonzalez 2006).
To meet the needs of Mexican growers, the Mexican government gave preference to internal and
local migrants who picked cotton for growers in Ciudad Obregons Yaqui Valley and nearby regions
(Burr 1961; Fitzgerald 2006; Gonzalez 2006). Once migrants picked a quota of cotton, they received
what came to be known as the cartas de control (control letters or letters verifying having worked in
Sonora picking cotton). Clifford Burr, the former manager of the migratory station in Empalme, wrote
that between 1959 and 1961 alone Mexican farmers provided employment to roughly 50,000 internal
migrants who came to Sonora in search of bracero labor contracts. Moreover, he explained that men
who worked in the cotton industry for three weeks received preferential treatment at selection time (Burr
1961; Gonzalez 2006; Mitchell 1958). Jesus Gasca who was contracted in both Empalme, Sonora and
Monterey, Nuevo Leon explains how the cartas de control functioned.

Well, afterwards I began to pick cotton always in [Ciudad] Obregon, [Sonora] because they
would give us a letter that they used to call control so that we would be selected for a [bracero]
contract. With that letter from [Mexican farmer] bosses it was a control that employers had.
Well the boss would give you a letter. With that letter you would go to get a labor contract at
the migratory station in Empalme.
Prior to arriving in northern Mexico, kinship based networks played an integral role in helping migrant
workers gain access to the migratory stations through the acquisition of loans. Once in northern
Mexico, friendship ties provided important social support in helping bracero aspirants survive the
cumbersome wait. However, the local government from Sonora working in collaboration with Mexican
farmers, would be the primary agent that regulated the passage of braceros to the U.S. through the
institutionalization of the labor certification program.
The Mexican government justified the implementation of cartas de control by arguing that
braceros needed to work the Sonoran fields, particularly cotton, as a means to provide awaiting bracero
aspirants with work and the opportunity to develop farmwork skills. Because the labor certification
throughout the bracero program was constantly upgraded by Sonoran government officials, aspirants
learned to circumvent the restrictions by relying on others who explained how the process worked from
year to year. I observed a conversation between Jesus Gasca and Juan Noble discussing the constantly
fluctuating standards the labor certification used to select aspirants.
Jesus: No I entered [the U.S.] since there were cartas de control. First it was picking 15 days.
But then because many would not pick and they would only lay underneath a tree.
Juan: They only waited for the 15 days to pass! [Explanation to Jesus comment]
Jesus: Fifteen days because they carried with them their money to eat. Afterwards the bosses
[Mexican farmers] said, No, fifteen days no more! Afterwards they put a 2,000 kilo [minimum
limit]. It was two tons. The person who picked two tons got his carta de control. I got to pick 15
days and two tons. I picked in Tamaulipas 15 days so that I would get a contract in Monterrey
[Nuevo Leon]. Then I got to pick here in [Ciudad] Obregon [Sonora] for 15 days as well but the
following year they saw that it was not a business because the harvest was not picked. Many
people would only hangout underneath a tree until the 15 days passed. Then the bosses said that
it would be by kilos. They made us pick two tons, two tons. They would give us our carta de
control.

Yet even when cartas de control were instituted to control the movement of some bracero aspirants,
internal migrants continued to travel to the contracting centers so the state placed even further
restrictions. In the following narrative, Jesus explains how he was one of the lucky bracero aspirants to
have received a carta de control under all of the conditions which were instituted by the state at various
times throughout the period. He recalls:
First, it was for all people who completed 15 days. Or everyone who completed 2,000 kilos.
Then they began to have a lottery for the cartas de control. They had a lottery! Even if you
picked 2,000 kilos, you did not know if you were going to be selected. Fifty or twenty people.
They would have a lottery for 20 people. The last letters were given away by lottery! I was
lucky once to have received a letter by lottery still!
Although the cartas de control were instituted by the Mexican government to control the international
movement of men, Jesus explained that there were bracero aspirants who came from landowning
families or from families who had businesses. The men who came with capital were able to migrate to
Sonora and enlist as pickers, but they had sufficient money that they waited out the 15 days but never
picked a kilo of cotton because they were required to sign up for work, but performance was not
enforced. To rectify the situation, Mexican ranchers began to institute first a 1,000 kilo then a 2,000 kilo
picking limit to prevent migrants from waiting out the 15 days. Once the 2,000 kilo was instituted,
bracero men who carried cash paid locals to help them pick cotton in exchange for money so they would
rapidly accumulate 2,000 kilos and move on to wage-labor in the U.S.
The Mexican government (at both the national and state level) worked in conjunction with
Mexican employers to control who would migrate north of the border (Fitzgerald 2006). While
networks played an intricate role in helping the men to migrate north, once at the migratory stations
in Empalme, mens movement north of the border was defined by Mexican growers and local
Sonoran government officials. It was both growers and local government officials who instituted
quotas in Sonora before aspirants were allowed to come in contact with

U.S. government officials who would in turn process aspirants.

Conclusion
The narratives presented in this paper demonstrate the antecedents that established a foundational
base for modern day labor networks from Mexico to the U.S. Most international migration studies today
focus on the role of social networks as a form of social capital that can be converted to gain access to
jobs and housing (Massey et al. 1987; Waldinger and Lichter 2003). This study has attempted to
demonstrate the economic and political factors and various government agencies that were involved in
the creation of an internal migrant labor force during the bracero program. The men in the study
migrated internally as they were lured by the prospects of participating in the bracero formal selection
process. However, by migrating to northern Mexico, migrant workers formed part of an internal labor
market that first provided labor to cotton growers who were in desperate need of workers. Upon
providing the temporary labor power for northern Mexican growers, internal migrants were then selected
to work for large-scale corporate farms in the U.S. Through their internal migration, braceros helped to
not only create an informal reserve labor force, but in the process transformed the economy of Empalme,
Sonora in which the city depended on the labor and presence of migrant workers.
Though the primary agents of the bracero selection process were the Mexican and U.S.
government who granted labor contracts for U.S. employment., braceros who were stranded in northern
Mexico depended on migrant networks to survive the adverse conditions that prevailed as the waiting
time prolonged. The friendships that the men fostered in the migratory stations helped them to provide
social support system that helped them to survive in a region in which they had no family members or
shelter. Men also depended on the information of others to learn that migration to northern Mexico
provided an alternative path to U.S. labor markets.

In closing, the study has demonstrated the complex process of enrolling in the bracero program
for men who were excluded from the formal selection process from the mid 1950s till the program came
to an end in 1964. The study demonstrated the various actors that came to be involved in creating a
reserve army of labor including the Mexican and U.S. government, Mexican cotton farmers, and U.S.
growers. Therefore, the study shows that while international migration is a social process, there are
many actors involved in the construction of the ties that link Mexicans to U.S. jobs.

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