De Castelvi v Cia General de Tabacos DC was permitted to cut woods in hacienda but

when Got became the Manager again, prevent him from taking cut wood and piled in
different places on the hacienda.
No damages against company DC did nothing tending to prevent said damages or
at least to minimize them, when he could have done so by appealing to the officers of the
company for relief. Company conceded him all the facilities in order that he might comply
with his obligations, entered into during the time said concession was in force, to furnish
various firms and persons with firewood.

CASE DIGEST: COMPAIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS vs.

ALHAMBRA CIGAR AND CIGARETTE MANUFACTURING CO.
FACTS:
It is admitted that plaintiffs trade name as evidenced by the certificate issued
under the Spanish regime, consists solely of the words La Flor de la Isabela. Plaintiff
does not claim that the word Isabela has been registered by it as a trade name or that
it has a title from any source conferring on it the exclusive right to use that word.
Defendant began the manufacture of cigarettes, offering them to the public in
packages on the front side of each of which appeared the words Alhambra Isabelas.
Action is brought to enjoin the defendant from using the word Isabelas.
The exclusive right to use this name, plaintiff claim arises from two causes: First,
the contraction of the phrase La Flor de la Isabela into the word Isabela by popular
expression and use; and second, the use for more than twenty years of the word
Isabela.
Judgment was for plaintiff and defendant appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether defendants use of the word Alhambra Isabela is an infringement to
the use of trade name.
HELD:
The statute prohibits the registration of a trade name when the trade name
represents the geographical place of production or origin of the products or goods to
which the trade name refers, or when it is merely the name, quality or description of the
merchandise with respect to which the trade name is to be used. In such cases,
therefore, no trade name can exist.
The two claims of the plaintiff are identical; for, there could have been no
contraction brought about by popular expression except after long lapse of time. The

contraction of the phrase in to the word would create no rights, there being no
registration, unless it resulted from long use.
The opinion of the plaintiff must fail. It shows that in not a single instance in the
history of the plaintiff corporation, so far as is disclosed by the record, has a package of
its cigarettes gone into the market, either at wholesale or retail with the word Isabela
alone on the package as a separate or distinct word or name.
Even admitting that the word Isabela may have been appropriable by plaintiff
as a trade name at the time it began to use it, the evidence showing that it had been
exclusively appropriated by the plaintiff would have to be very strong to establish the
fact of appropriation and the right to exclusive use. The law as it stands and has stood
since the Royal Decree of 1888 prohibits the use of a geographical name as a trade
name.
The judgment appealed from is reversed.
Heirs of Raymundo Castro v Bustos (1969) Bustos was convicted of homicide for
killing Castro, 2 mitigating circumstance passion or obfuscation & voluntary surrender.
The law regarding the items of damages that are recoverable in cases of death
caused by a crime, whether the claim therefor is made in the criminal proceedings itself or in
a separate civil action items are identical in both procedures except with attorneys
fees and expenses of litigation which can be awarded only when a separate civil
action is instituted.
Art 2204 does not warrant a complete deletion of said item of damages.
Heirs are entitled to the following when death occurs as a result of a crime:
1. indemnity for the death of the victim of the evidence 12k without need of evidence
and even if mitigating circumstance is present
2. loss of earning capacity item may be considered included in the prayer for actual
damages and for other just and equitable reliefs art 2206 & 1764
3. moral damages mental anguish amount fixed by court. Can be recovered even by
illegitimate descendants and ascendants of deceased in case of death, once heirs
claim such and are able to prove they are entitled thereto, it becomes the duty of the
court to make the award.
4. exemplary damages attended by one or more aggravating circumstances. Fixed by
court separate from fines
5. attorneys fees and expenses of litigation actual amount (only when separate civil
action has been filed or exemplary damages are awarded)
6. interests in proper cases
7. emphasized that indemnity for loss of earning capacity and moral damages are
recoverable separately from and in addition to fixed sum in no. 1. Theses damages
may be subject to Art 2204.
Art 2206 also apply to death of a passenger caused by breach of contract of common carrier.
Same rules on damages are generally to be observed, whether death results from a crime or
a quasi-delict or a breach of contract of carriage.

People vs Pirame

G.R. No. 121998

March 9, 2000

Lessons Applicable: Moral Damages on Taking of Life (Torts and Damages)

Laws Applicable:
FACTS:

March 18, 1993 am: Cipriano Supero saw Pedro Torrenueva being held
by Florencio Perame was struck with an iron pipe by Epifanio Cleopas
and Teodorico Cleopas with a piece of wood hitting him in the forehead
so he fell on the ground dead. He was then buried in the well near the
house of Demetrio Cleopas, father of the accused.

Upon arraignment, Florencio Pirame and Teodorico Cleopas entered a

plea of not guilty. Epifanio Cleopas was not arraigned, being at large.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

RTC: Teodorico Cleopas and Florencio Pirame guilty of the crime of

murder punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and
sentenced each one of them to suffer an imprisonment of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, with the accessories of the law and to pay the cost.
Ordering them to indemnify surviving spouse P50,000 each
and 23,214 for burial and incidental expenses and P50,000 each
for moral and exemplary damages and in all instances without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Deducting time for
preventive imprisonment.

ISSUE: W/N the surviving spouse should be awarded moral and exemplary
damages
HELD: NO. AFFIRMED, but the award of P50,000.00 as moral and

exemplary damages is hereby DELETED

The widow of the victim did not testify on any mental anguish or
emotional distress, which she suffered as a result of her husband's
death. The absence of any generic aggravating circumstance attending
the crime likewise precludes the award of exemplary damages

Bachrach Motor v. Mariano Ledesma; Talisay Milling (Aug 1937)

Facts:
-- Bachrach brought this action to recover the amount of judgments. It
appealed form the judgment declaring the right of PNB to the 6,300
stock dividends as a preferred one absolving PNB and Ledesma
form the complaint.
-- It prayed that:
o The transfer certificate of stock dividends of Talisay Milling of
the PNB be declared null and void
o That Talisay Milling be ordered to cancel the entry of the
transfer of 6,300 stock dividends made by it on its books in
favor of PNB
o That Talisay Milling be order to pay Php 22K in case the
6300 stock dividends could not be sold or if the proceeds of
the sale are insufficient.
o That the defendants pay the cost of suit.
Antecedent Facts:
-- Bachrach obtained judgment against Ledesma in the sum of 3K.
-- The special sheriff, in compliance with the writ of execution attached
all right, title to and interest w/c Ledesma may have in any bonus,
dividend, share of stock, money or property w/c Ledesma is entitled
to receive from Talisay Milling.
o This is by virtue of the fact that Ledesma mortgaged his land
in favor of PNB to guarantee the indebtedness of Talisay
Milling or w/c defendant is entitled to receive from Talisay on
account of being a stockholder.
o The notice of attachment was served to both Ledesma and
Talisay.
Talisay even received a copy of the notice of
attachment.
-- On Oct 3, 1927, Bachrach obtained judgment against Ledesma
o Writ of execution caused attachment of Ledesmas right of
redemption over parcels of land.
o On the day of issuance of the execution, real properties were
mortgaged to PNB to secure payment to said bank by
Ledesma of the sum of P624K
In the same instrument of mortgage, Ledesma
mortgaged in favor of PNB shares owned by him in
Talisay Millng.
Certificate covering 6,300 stock dividends were
delivered as security to Atty. Roman as
representative of bank PNB.
o Talisay Milling granted a bonus or compensation to the
owners of the real properties mortgaged to answer the debts
contracted by it with PNB.
Pursuant to this, Ledesma was allotted P19K.
-- PNB brought an action against Ledesma and his wife for the

recovery of mortgage credit.

o PNB amended its complaint to include Bachrach Motor as a
party because it claims to have some right to certain
properties which PNB was also claiming.
-- CFI Bacolod rendered judgment in favor of PNB.
o Bachrach brought an action against Talisay to recover the
bonus or dividends declared by the corporation against
Mariano Ledesma as one of the owners of the hacienda w/c
had been mortgaged to PNB to secure obligation of Talisay.
Issues:
-- WON pledge of stocks was ineffective against Bachrach because
evidence of its date was not made to appear in a public instrument.
-- WON pledge could not legally exist because the certificate was not
the shares themselves.
o Certificate of stock cannot be the subject matter of the
contracts of pledge or chattel mortgage.
Held:
-- The pledge of stock dividends is valid against Bachrach Motor
because the certificate was delivered to creditor bank PNB,
notwithstanding the fact that the contract DOESN'T appear in a
public instrument.
o Civ. Code provides that: no pledge shall be effective against
a 3rd person unless evidence of its date appears in a public
instrument.
But this provision has been modified by Chattel
Mortgage Law (Sec 4)
A chattel mortgage shall not be valid against any
person except the mortgagor, his
executor/administrator UNLESS the possession of
the property is delivered to and retained by the
mortgagee OR unless the mortgage is recorded in
the office of the Register of Deeds of the province in
w/c the mortgagor resides.
-- Certificate of stock or of stock dividends under the corporation law
are QUASI NEGOTIABLE instruments in the sense that they may be
given in pledge or mortgage to secure an obligation.
o Petitioner Bachrach contends that pledge couldn't legally
exist because the certificate was not the shares themselves
and that the stock certificate cannot be the subject matter of
a contract of pledge or chattel mortgage.

SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JUANITA DE JESUS VDA.
DE DIMAANO, EMERITA DIMAANO, REMEDIOS DIMAANO, CONSOLACION DIMAANO and
MILAGROS DIMAANO, respondents; PURISIMA, J.:

FACTS:
Private respondents are owners of a house at 326 College Road, Pasay while petitioner owns a four-storey school
building along the same College Road. That on October 11, 1989, a powerful typhoon hit Metro Manila. Buffeted by
very strong winds, the roof of the petitioners building was partly ripped off and blown away, landing on and
destroying portions of the roofing of private respondents house. When the typhoon had passed, an ocular inspection
of the destroyed building was conducted by a team of engineers headed by the city building official.
In their report, they imputed negligence to the petitioner for the structural defect of the building and improper
anchorage of trusses to the roof beams to cause for the roof be ripped off the building, thereby causing damage to
the property of respondent.
Respondents filed an action before the RTC for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana. Petitioner interposed
denial of negligence and claimed that the typhoon as an Act of God is the sole cause of the damage. RTC ruled in
their favor relying on the testimony of the City Engineer and the report made after the ocular inspection. Petitioners
appeal before the CA which affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Hence this present appeal.
ISSUES:A

(1) Whether the damage on the roof of the building of private respondents resulting from the impact of the
falling portions of the school buildings roof ripped off by the strong winds of typhoon Saling, was,
within legal contemplation, due to fortuitous event?
(2) Whether or not an ocular inspection is sufficient evidence to prove negligence?

HELD:
1. Yes, petitioner should be exonerated from liability arising from the damage caused by the typhoon. Under Article
1174 of the Civil Code, Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by
stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for
those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.

In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person from liability, it is necessary that he be free from any
previous negligence or misconduct by reason of which the loss may have been occasioned. 12 An act of
God cannot be invoked for the protection of a person who has been guilty of gross negligence in not
trying to forestall its possible adverse consequences. When a persons negligence concurs with an act of
God in producing damage or injury to another, such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the
immediate or proximate cause of the damages or injury was a fortuitous event. When the effect is found
to be partly the result of the participation of man whether it be from active intervention, or neglect, or
failure to act the whole occurrence is hereby humanized, and removed from the rules applicable to acts
of God.
In the case at bar, the lower court accorded full credence to the finding of the investigating team that
subject school buildings roofing had no sufficient anchorage to hold it in position especially when
battered by strong winds. Based on such finding, the trial court imputed negligence to petitioner and
adjudged it liable for damages to private respondents.
There is no question that a typhoon or storm is a fortuitous event, a natural occurrence which may be
foreseen but is unavoidable despite any amount of foresight, diligence or care. In order to be exempt from
liability arising from any adverse consequence engendered thereby, there should have been no human
participation amounting to a negligent act. In other words; the person seeking exoneration from liability
must not be guilty of negligence. Negligence, as commonly understood, is conduct which naturally or
reasonably creates undue risk or harm to others. It may be the failure to observe that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justify demand, or the omission to do something which
a prudent and reasonable man, guided by considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
affairs, would do.
2. It bears emphasizing that a person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the
existence of fault or negligence causative of his injury or loss. The facts constitutive of negligence must be
affirmatively established by competent evidence, 19 not merely by presumptions and conclusions without basis in
fact. Private respondents, in establishing the culpability of petitioner, merely relied on the aforementioned report
submitted by a team which made an ocular inspection of petitioners school building after the typhoon. As the term
imparts, an ocularinspection is one by means of actual sight or viewing. What is visual to the eye through, is not
always reflective of the real cause behind.
In the present case, other than the said ocular inspection, no investigation was conducted to determine the real cause
of the partial unroofing of petitioners school building.

Villa Rey Transit v CA (1970) Quintos passenger of bus owned by Villa Rey, hit bullcart
with bamboo pole at the end, hit and windshield and penetrated in Qs face. Q died.
29 years old. Life expectancy 33 1/3 years. Different in Alcantara v Surro where 4 year basis
was used. None of parties questioned the propriety of the 4-year basis.
LOSS or DAMGES sustained by respondents as dependents and intestate heirs of the
deceased consists not of the full amount of his earnings, but of the support they
received or would have received from him had he not died in consequence of the
negligence of petitioners agent.
Support = earnings necessary expenses of his own living.
Only NET earnings, X GROSS earnings

Davila v PAL plane crash on Nov 1960. Davila was one of 33 passengers. Dec 19 letter
of condolence from PAL. Pilot did not intercept airway amber I as he was supposed to do. It
was a violation of air-traffic rules, weather was clear and accident was directly attributable
to such.
D was a manager of a radio station -8,400/yr; lawyer & junior partner of father
=3,600/yr; farming-3,000/yr. 30 yrs old. Life expectancy of 33 1/3
Computation of loss of earning capacity see Villa Rey Transit case
Art 2206(1)- liable for loss of earning capacity of deceased to damages for
death caused by crime or quasi-delict. Art 1764 made it expressly applicable to death
of a passenger caused by the breach of contract by a common carrier.
Parents entitled to moral damages for mental anguish long period of uncertainty &
suffering 10k
Exemplary of 10k Art 2332 only awarded in contracts and quasi-contract if
defendant acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent
manner.

Villa Rey Transit v. CA

Facts:
On March 17, 1960, Policronio Quintos, Jr. was riding the petitioners bus,
when the said bus frontally hit the rear side of a bullcart filled with hay. The
protruding end of the bamboo pole at the rear of the cart penetrated the
windshield of the bus and landed at Policronios face. He died of traumatic
shock due to cerebral injuries. Private respondents are sisters and surviving
heirs of the deceased. They brought this action against Villa Rey Transit for
breach of contract of carriage. The trial court found that the death was caused
by the negligence of the bus driver, for whom petitioner was liable under the
contract of carriage with the deceased.
Issues:
(1) The number of years to be used as basis of computation
(2) The rate at which the losses sustained by respondents should be fixed
Held:

(1) The determination of the indemnity to be awarded to the heirs of a

deceased person has no fixed basis. Much is left to the discretion of the court
considering the moral and material damages involved, and so it has been

said that "(t)here can be no exact or uniform rule for measuring the value of
a human life and the measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise
mathematical calculation, but the amount recoverable depends on the
particular facts and circumstances of each case. The life expectancy of the
deceased or of the beneficiary, whichever is shorter, is an important factor.'
Other factors that are usually considered are: (1) pecuniary loss to plaintiff or
beneficiary; (2) loss of support; (3) loss of service; (4) loss of society; (5)
mental suffering of beneficiaries; and (6) medical and funeral expenses."

Thus, life expectancy is, not only relevant, but, also, an important element in
fixing the amount recoverable by private respondents herein. Although it is
not the sole element determinative of said amount, no cogent reason has been
given to warrant its disregard and the adoption, in the case at bar, of a purely
arbitrary standard, such as a four-year rule. In short, the Court of Appeals has
not erred in basing the computation of petitioner's liability upon the life
expectancy of Policronio Quintos, Jr.

(2) With respect to the rate at which the damages shall be computed,
petitioner impugns the decision appealed from upon the ground that the
damages awarded therein will have to be paid now, whereas most of those
sought to be indemnified will be suffered years later. This argument is
basically true, and this is, perhaps, one of the reasons why the Alcantara case
points out the absence of a "fixed basis" for the ascertainment of the damages
recoverable in litigations like the one at bar. Just the same, the force of the
said argument of petitioner herein is offset by the fact that, although payment
of the award in the case at bar will have to take place upon the finality of the
decision therein, the liability of petitioner herein had been fixed at the rate
only of P2,184.00 a year, which is the annual salary of Policronio Quintos, Jr.
at the time of his death, as a young "training assistant" in the Bacnotan
Cement Industries, Inc. In other words, unlike the Alcantara case, on which
petitioner relies, the lower courts did not consider, in the present case,
Policronio's potentiality and capacity to increase his future income. Indeed,
upon the conclusion of his training period, he was supposed to have a better

job and be promoted from time to time, and, hence, to earn more, if not
considering the growing importance of trade, commerce and industry and the
concomitant rise in the income level of officers and employees therein much
more.

Damages consist, not of the full amount of his earnings, but of the support,
they received or would have received from him had he not died in
consequence of the negligence of petitioner's agent. In fixing the amount of
that support, We must reckon with the "necessary expenses of his own living",
which should be deducted from his earnings. Only net earnings, not gross
earning, are to be considered that is, the total of the earnings less expenses
necessary in the creation of such earnings or income and less living and other
incidental expenses.
All things considered, We are of the opinion that it is fair and reasonable to fix
the deductible living and other expenses of the deceased at the sum of
P1,184.00 a year, or about P100.00 a month, and that, consequently, the loss
sustained by his sisters may be roughly estimated at P1,000.00 a year or
P33,333.33 for the 33-1/3 years of his life expectancy. To this sum of
P33,333.33, the following should be added: (a) P12,000.00, pursuant to Arts.
104 and 107 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 2206 of our Civil
Code, as construed and applied by this Court; (b) P1,727.95, actually spent by
private respondents for medical and burial expenses; and (c) attorney's fee,
which was fixed by the trial court, at P500.00, but which, in view of the appeal
taken by petitioner herein, first to the Court of Appeals and later to this
Supreme Court, should be increased to P2,500.00. In other words, the amount
adjudged in the decision appealed from should be reduced to the aggregate
sum of P49,561.28, with interest thereon, at the legal rate, from December 29,
1961, date of the promulgation of the decision of the trial court.

G.R. Nos. 144495-96. March 12, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. LEONARDO S. PASCUAL, appellant.

The testimony of a rape victim, if credible and convincing, may be the sole basis of a judgment
of conviction. Furthermore, the exact date and time of the commission of the crime need not be
alleged in the information.
The Case
Leonardo S. Pascual appeals the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City
(Branch 16) dated June 30, 2000, in Criminal Cases Nos. 8384-16 and 8395-16, convicting him
of two (2) counts of rape. The dispositive portion of the assailed judgment reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, after meticulously weighing the evidence presented by the prosecution and the
defense, the Court is morally convinced beyond reasonable doubt the accused Leonardo Pascual
committed the crimes of rape as charged in the two Criminal Cases. He is hereby sentenced to
each of the crimes committed the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA with all its accessory
penalties; to pay the private complainant civil indemnity in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P50,000.00) and moral damages in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00); and to pay costs.
Two Complaints, both dated February 18, 1998, charged appellant with rape, allegedly
committed as follows:
Criminal Case No. 8384-16
That sometime the month of August, 1997, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of the this Honorable Court, the herein accused by means of force and intimidation
and with a knife, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the herein
complainant, against her will and in their own residence.
Criminal Case No. 8385-16
That sometime the month of June, 1997, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused by means of force and intimidation and
with a knife, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the herein
complainant, against her will and in their own residence.
Assisted by his counsel, Atty. Felix Salvador, appellant pleaded not guilty to the rape charges
during his arraignment on April 14, 1998. After a joint trial of the cases, the court a quo rendered
the assailed Decision.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General, in its Brief, presents the prosecutions version of the facts as
follows:

Virginia Pascual, fourteen (14) years old, single, student and presently under the custody of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), testified that in June, 1997, she was
living in their house with her brothers, sisters, her father and a cousin at Barangay 18, Laoag
City. She is the seventh (7th) among nine (9) children, three (3) boys and six (6) girls. Four (4) of
them are living with her in the family home: Lorna, seven (7) years old, Susan, nine (9) years
old, Emy, twelve (12) years old, and Leonardo, Jr., seventeen (17) years old. Their mother was
living in Hawaii with the other children. She would usually sleep with Lorna; while Susan, with
Emy.
Their father worked as a driver of a passenger jeepney plying the route from Laoag City to
Vintar, Ilocos Norte and vice-versa. The passenger jeepney is owned by the barangay captain of
Barangay No. 18, Laoag City, Onofre Gaspar whose wife is the cousin of her mother.
One evening, in June, 1997, she was in her room at the second floor of their house with sister
Lorna, doing her assignment on a table near the bed when her father came and told her to stop
working on her assignment. He was holding a knife. He sent her sister Lorna to get a glass of
water from the refrigerator at the ground floor.
After Lorna had left, appellant covered Virginias mouth with a pillow and laid her down. She
saw him tuck the knife on his waist. She was afraid and was not able to shout because her mouth
was covered by a pillow. While she was lying down, her father removed her shorts and panty. He
spread her legs apart, went on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina (it was on record
that tears were rolling down the cheeks of the witness). While the penis of his father was inside
her vagina, she felt warm liquid. Thereafter, her father stayed on top of her for a while. He was
still in that position when her sister Lorna holding a glass of water, entered the room. When her
father noticed the presence of Lorna, he stood up and put on his pants. She felt pain in her
vagina. He told her and Lorna, If people will come to know about this matter, I will kill you.
Again, on the night of August 25, 1997, Virginia slept with her sisters: Emy, Susan and Lorna in
the room of their father because her room with Lorna was occupied by the visitors of her cousin
Ellaine Guerrero.
She was awakened when her father entered the room where she was sleeping side by side with
her sisters on the floor. He switched on the light and he laid beside Lorna. After a while he
transferred Lorna and laid beside her (Virginia). He then removed his pants and proceeded to
remove her shorts and panty. She was afraid and crying. Her sisters were not awakened. He went
on top of her, inserted his penis into her vagina, and moved his buttocks up and down. After
satisfying his lust, he stood up and put on his pants.
Because of her experience, she lost her apetite. She could not eat for a long time. She could not
concentrate on her studies. She left their house in January, 1998 and stayed in the house of her
barkada Rowena Balantac at Balatong, Laoag City. She revealed to Rowena Balantac what her
father did to her on June, 1997 and in August, 1997. Rowena informed her that her father was
looking for her and that she (Rowena) would be blamed if something would happen to her.
Virginia told Rowena that she did not want to return home because her father would rape her
again. Her aunt Lolita Gaspar learned from Rowena what happened to her. After returning to

their house at Barangay 55, Bulangon, Laoag City, Virginia was asked by her aunt Lolita Gaspar
if the information she got from Rowena was true. Virginia told her aunt it was true. Barangay
Captain Onofre Gaspar, the husband of Lolita, also asked her if what his wife told him was true.
Virginia told him it was true.
Dr. Lorna Castillo, Medical Officer of the Governor Roque Ablan, Sr. Memorial Hospital, Laoag
City, examined Virginia Pascual on February 2, 1998 and reduced her findings in writing. She
found that the victims hymen had old healed lacerations at 3:00 oclock and 10 oclock positions.
A laceration is considered old when it happened ten (10) days or more before examination. The
insertion of a penis into the victims vagina in June, 1997 and August 1997 would be sufficient to
cause the lacerations. (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
Appellant denies the charges and presents his version of the facts in his Brief, as follows:
In the months of the alleged commission of the subject incident, he was working as a driver
plying the route of Laoag-Vintar and vice versa. He starts driving every 7:00 oclock in the
morning and usually stops at around 9:00 oclock in the evening. During his trips, his daughter
Virgie would ride along until she reaches Ilocos Norte National High School where she is a first
year high school student. There was no day in June nor August that herein accused-appellant
failed to ply his usual route.
Being the eldest among his daughters, he expected herein private complainant to be the one
responsible for doing the household chores such as cooking and taking care of her younger
sisters. However, herein private complainant preferred to hang around with friends and go to
other places instead of staying home and helping in the household chores. Thus, the accused
usually whipped her and bumped her head. This disciplinary method had been inflicted upon her
since she was in Grade IV. Whenever he punished her, she would say, Fuck your mother, I wish
you would be dead.
Jimmy Guerrero took the witness stand to corroborate the version of the accused.
Jimmy is twenty nine (29) years old and the first cousin of Virgie, their respective mothers being
sisters. He knows the accused Leonardo Pascual being the father of herein private complainant
because they resided in the same house in June 1997 and even before he was fifteen (15) years
old.
They all resided in the same house where there are three (3) rooms upstairs and four (4) rooms
downstairs. In June 1997, the accused was staying in one (1) room together with his three (3)
daughters while herein private complainant stayed in a separate room.
Jimmy surmises that the instant charged were hatched on account of the constant punishment
imposed by the accused upon his children every time they committed mistakes. (Citations
omitted)

The Trial Courts Ruling

The trial court explained its ruling as follows:
The testimony of the private complainant was simple and forthright. She appeared very confident
without any hesitation in declaring in court that she was raped by her father-accused on the two
occasions alleged in the two criminal complaints, though she was aware that if convicted her
father would be sentenced to death thru lethal injection. She must be telling the truth.
xxx xxx xxx
The defense tried to prove that the motive of the private complainant is to take revenge against
the accused for all the maltreatment she received from her father. The court cannot believe that a
daughter could prevaricate just to take revenge knowing that her accusations would certainly
lead to the penalty of death to a father who reared her for 14 years. Again, the accusation must be
true.
Hence, this appeal.
The Issue
In his Brief, appellant submits the following assignment of errors for our consideration:
I.
The trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crimes charged
despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
II.
Granting arguendo that accused is guilty of a crime, the court a quo erred in convicting
him despite the failure of the prosecution to state the facts constituting the crime
charged in the criminal complaint in violation of his constitutional right to be informed
of the charges against him.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
Main Issue
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
Challenging the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence, appellant avers that the nonpresentation of the eyewitnesses who allegedly saw the rape incidents renders the testimony of
the victim highly dubious. He argues that it is imperative for the prosecution to produce these
eyewitnesses to corroborate the charges of private complainant and to establish his guilt beyond

reasonable doubt. On this basis, he claims that the testimony of the complaining witness will not
suffice to sustain a conviction.
We are not convinced. In a rape case, the prosecution is not bound to present witnesses other than
the victim herself, as the accused may be convicted solely on her testimony, provided it is
credible, natural, convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature and the course of
things. To be sure, corroborative testimony is not essential to warrant a conviction for rape.
The long-standing rule is that when a victim of rape says she was violated, she says in effect all
that is necessary to show that it was inflicted on her. So long as her testimony meets the test of
credibility, the accused may be convicted on the sole basis thereof.
In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime, oftentimes the only evidence that can be offered to
prove the guilt of the perpetrator is the testimony of the offended party herself. Thus, her lone
declaration of facts, if found credible, would be sufficient to sustain a conviction.
In this regard, we may well point out the time-tested doctrine that a trial courts assessment of the
credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight. It may even be conclusive and binding if not
tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence.We
have carefully perused the records of the case and found no such material fact or circumstance as
would obscure, much less reverse, the factual findings of the trial court.
As correctly observed by the RTC, the testimony of the victim on the alleged rape incidents was
clear, consistent and descriptive of the grievous fate she had suffered in the hands of her own
father. The veracity of her testimony was even bolstered by the attempt of appellant to seek her
forgiveness, as well as her resolve to pursue the case even if it would mean his death. She
testified thus:
Q Did your father ever ask forgiveness from you assuming that your narration is true?
A He did, sir.
Q When was that?
A When we came here and also a while ago before the hearing today, sir.
Q And what did you tell your father?
A None, sir.
Q What else did he ask you?
A He said: Why cant you not forget me, my daughter, it is a pity for your brothers and sisters
who doesnt anybody to care for them
(witness is crying)

Q Assuming that your narration is true, madam Witness, and, if this Honorable Court will in
the long run believe your story, do you know the penalty to be imposed upon your father?
A Yes, sir.
Q What?
A Death penalty through lethal injection.
Q And, assuming again, Madam Witness, that your story is true being your father who have
taken cared (sic) of you for fourteen (14) years, do you still want him to undergo that lethal
injection? and die?
A Yes, sir.
On the other hand, the bare denial by appellant cannot overcome the positive and categorical
declarations of the victim. Moreover, his plea for her forgiveness may be deemed as no less than
an indicium of guilt. Certainly, the victim who was only a teenager at the time would not have
filed a rape charge against anyone, much less her own father, if it were not true. It is highly
improbable for a young girl with no record of sexual perversity to fabricate against her own
father a story that may imperil his life or liberty.
Indeed, the evil in a rapist has no conscience, and the beast in him may bear no respect for time
and place, driving him to commit rape anywhere, even in a house where there are other
occupants. It is an accepted rule in criminal law that rape may be committed even when the
offender and the victim are not alone. In fact, rape has been committed in the same room where
other family members were also asleep. Verily, the argument that the crime cannot be committed
in a house where other members of the family reside or may be around is a contention that has
long been rejected by this Court
Second Issue
Time of Commission of the Offense
Appellant likewise contends that the Complaints charging him with rape do not state the exact
dates when it allegedly took place. He asserts that the failure of the prosecution to inform him
thereof is a violation of his right to be informed of the nature of the charges against him. He adds
that such failure prevented him from preparing for his defense, as he could not have determined
where he was or what he was doing when the crimes charged were supposedly being committed.
We disagree. It has been held that the exact date or time of the commission of rape is not an
essential element of the crime. Furthermore, the failure of the prosecution to specify the exact
date or time when it was committed did not make the information or complaint defective on its
face. On this note, we need only to restate the ruling of this Court in People v. Awing in which we
explained as follows:

Section 11 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure is quite clear. It is not necessary
that the precise time the act was committed be alleged in the complaint or information, except
when time is a material ingredient of the offense.
In People v. Pagpaguitan, we have held that the exact date of the commission of the rape is not
an essential element of the crime. In fact, the precise time when rape takes place has no
substantial bearing on its commission. As such, the date or time need not be stated with absolute
accuracy. Indeed, we have held that the allegations that rapes were committed before or until
October 15, 1994, sometime in the year 1991 and the days thereafter, and on or about and
sometime in the year 1988, constitute sufficient compliance with Rule 110, Section 11.
That the information in this case alleged that rape took place on or about November 1996 is
sufficient to inform appellant of the charge against him in Criminal Case No. 39, 870-97. Note
that during direct examination, appellant stated that he had sexual intercourse with private
complainant six (6) times in November 1996. Under cross-examination, he modified his answer
a bit and owned four (4) instances of coitus with the victim during November 1996. These
declarations clearly show that appellant properly understood the offense charged in Criminal
Case No. 39, 870-97, and had the opportunity to prepare his defense, alleging that the sexual acts
were consensual. We find that appellant cannot now validly complain that he was taken by
surprise by the charge against him. (Citations omitted)
An information charging the accused with an offense is valid, so long as it distinctly states the
statutory designation of the offense, as well as the acts and the omissions constituting it. With
respect to the time and date of the commission of the crime, Rule 110, Section 6 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, states that a complaint or an information is sufficient if it states,
among others, the approximate time of the commission of the offense.
Having successfully and satisfactorily established the fact that appellant had sexual intercourse
with his daughter against her will at or about the time alleged in the criminal Complaints, the
prosecution has established beyond moral certainty that he is guilty of the rape charges
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED, and the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Laoag City (Branch 16) in Criminal Cases Nos. 8384-16 and 8385-16 AFFIRMED. Costs against
appellant.
RCPI vs CA

143 SCRA 657 Civil Law Torts and Damages Human Relations Article 19 and 20 of the
Civil Code Negligence
Loreto Dionela received a telegram via the Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc.
(RCPI). However, at the end of the telegram were the following:
SA IYO WALANG PAKINABANG DUMATING KA DIYAN WALA KANG PADALA DITO
KAHIT BULBUL MO

The said portion of the telegram was not intended for Loreto. Loreto sued RCPI for damages
based on Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 19.- Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
ART. 20.-Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same.
In its defense, RCPI averred that there was no intention to malign Loreto and that the attached
message was an insider joke between RCPI employees which was not meant to be attached.
RCPI also disclaimed liability as it insisted it should be held liable for the libelous acts of its
employees.
Loreto however averred that the said message was read by his employees and it affected greatly
his business reputation. The trial court ruled in favor of Loreto. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the liability of RCPI is
predicated under Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court. The cause of
action of private respondent is based on Articles 19 and 20 of the new Civil Code as well as
respondents breach of contract thru negligence of its own employees. RCPI is not being sued for
its subsidiary liability.
RCPI was negligent as it failed to take the necessary or precautionary steps to avoid the
occurrence of the humiliating incident now complained of. The company had not imposed any
safeguard against such eventualities and this void in its operating procedure does not speak well
of its concern for their clienteles interests. Negligence here is very patent. This negligence is
imputable to appellant and not to its employees. RCPI should be held liable for the acts of its
employees. As a corporation, RCPI acts and conducts its business through its employees. It
cannot now disclaim liability for the acts of its employees. To hold that the RCPI is not liable
directly for the acts of its employees in the pursuit of its business is to deprive the general public
availing of the services of RCPI of an effective and adequate remedy.

[G.R. No. 128827. August 18, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLANDO CAYAGO y REYES,

accused-appellant.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

For killing his own wife through strangulation and with evident premeditation,
appellant was indicted for parricide.[1] He was tried and subsequently sentenced to
die and ordered to pay damages to the victims heirs.[2] The lower court judge, after
making a twelve page summary of the testimonies of the witnesses, arrived at a
conclusion that appellant is guilty of parricide, in just one short paragraph, which
reads:

After considering the prosecution and the defense evidence, the Court is convinced
that the version of the defense is not credible. In his redirect examination, he
admitted that his wife was reported missing as embodied in his first sworn
statement, which had been marked in evidence as Exhibit K. Said sworn statement
is entirely wrong because his wife was not missing as mentioned by the accused,
but killed her. In the said first statement to the police, he merely wanted to mislead
the police by concocting a lie that his wife is missing, when in truth and in fact, he
had killed her and left her at the comfort room of the abandoned barangay hall,
already lifeless.[3]

Culled from the evidence on record are the following facts which was condensed in
the Appellees Brief, to wit:

At about 1:25 oclock in the afternoon of August 2, 1995, SPO2 Belino Zinampan, Jr.
was at the police headquarters at Pasig City where he received the report of
Rolando Cayago that he saw the decomposing body of his wife at the abandoned
barangay hall of Santolan, Pasig City. Zinampan, SPO2 Antonio Paulite, a police
photographer and Cayago proceeded to the said abandoned barangay hall to verify
the report. Thereat, the group saw the dead and decomposing body of a woman.
Zinampan requested Cayago to identify the body and on recognizing the shoes worn
by the deceased, let out a loud cry and thereafter lost consciousness for about five
minutes. Thereafter, Cayago, in answer to Zinampans question, answered that he

does not know who killed his wife. Zinampan and Cayago then returned to the
police headquarters where the latters statement was taken by the former.

At the time Cayagos statement was being taken, Police Sr. Inspector Pajota noticed
Cayagos several inconsistent statements. Pajota subsequently instructed Zinampan,
SPO2 Paulite and SPO2 Delos Reyes to further interrogate Cayago and, who,
thereafter concluded that Cayago was reluctant and inconsistent in answering our
simple questions. Pajota then advised Cayago to undergo a polygraph examination
at Camp Crame.

On August 3, 1995, when Cayago was about to be brought to Camp Crame for a
polygraph test, he requested permission to go to the nearby church. Cayago
requested that he be accompanied by SPO2 Delos Reyes, who agreed. Thereat,
Cayago admitted to SPO2 Delos Reyes that he killed his wife Myra Cayago and was
willing to give his statement relative to said killing. SPO2 Delos Reyes and Cayago
returned to the police station and upon such information, Sr. Inspector Pajota
instructed Zinampan to secure a lawyer to assist Cayago. Zinampan then requested
Atty. Reynario Campanilla, who agreed to assist Cayago. Atty. Campanilla conferred
with Cayago at the Office of the Investigation Division. After apprising Cayago of his
constitutional rights, Cayago admitted that he killed his wife. Atty. Campanilla then
advised Cayago to personally write down his confession which Cayago did for about
an hour in the presence of Atty. Campanilla. Thereafter, with the aid of a tape
recorder, requested Cayago to read his admission. After informing Cayago of his
constitutional rights against self-incrimination, SPO2 Delos Reyes started taking
down Cayagos extra-judicial confession again in the presence of Atty. Campanilla
and who signed said statement together with Cayago.[4]*

The gravamen of the felony of parricide is the killing of any of the persons
enumerated in Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended. Its
elements are:

1. a person is killed;

2. the deceased is killed by the accused;

3. the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or

a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the
accused.[5] (Italics supplied).

In the case at bar, it is clear that appellant strangulated his wife resulting to her
death. This is supported by appellants own testimony, his confession to the police
and the medical findings corroborating that she died of asphyxia by strangulation.

In his testimony, appellant claims that he embraced his wife so tight but did not
notice she had stopped breathing due to the tightness of the embrace. If it were
true, however, that his intention of embracing her was to stop her from pushing
him, he would have wrapped his arms around her body including her hands. Yet the
medical findings revealed injuries on the neck which is shown by the presence of
fracture on the victims windpipe and hemorrhage inside the windpipe.[6] The
examining physician explained his findings on the victims cadaver which was
already in an advanced state of decomposition at the time it was recovered two (2)
days after the killing:

Q Based on the examination you conducted, Doctor, can you tell us what was the
cause of death?

A The cause of death Maam after the internal examination is asphyxia by

strangulation because of the presence of fracture on windpipe and also the
presence of hemorrhage inside the windpipe.

Q And what could have cause (sic) that injury?

A This particular finding was caused by the application of extensive pressure on the
neck, anterior aspects of the neck.

Q Like what?

A Could be manual strangulation by using a material enough to exert pressure on

the neck.

Q Did you prepare a medico legal report based on the examination you conducted?

A Yes Maam.

xxxxxxxxx

Q Now Doctor, can you explain further the findings that you stated here in your
medico legal report in this portion laceration is noted at the posterior uterine wall
with extrusion of the segments of the small intestines.

A This only shows that there is laceration at the uterus and this is at the posterior
portion at the back portion of the uterus, and this means that something was
inserted thru the vagina and eventually lacerating the uterus, further examination
showed that the small intestine of the deceased/herniated or passed thru this
particular lacerations and was eventually extruded thru the vaginal opening.

Q Can you tell us Doctor what could have cause (sic) this injury?

A It is highly probable that this was caused by something hard inserted thru the
vaginal opening up to the uterus and extensive pressure was applied upon insertion
of the material.

Q What do you mean by extensive pressure?

A Well, considering Maam that it created a laceration on the uterus then a pressure
must be used to cause that lacerations.

Q With that same object?

A Yes Maam.[7]

There is no indication that his wife was sick as to succumb to an immediate

difficulty or cessation of breathing. In any case, appellants testimony before the trial
court is clear and categorical that his wife died in his own hands:

Q What else happened?

A Because there were already passersby she was pushing me, I requested her to go
to the abandoned barangay hall, to have a talk.

Q What happened next?

A I thought we had settled everything when we were talking, inside the abandoned
barangay hall she still pushing me to produce money and then to stop her, I held
her, embraced her.

Q What happened next?

A As I embraced her and while she was still resisting and then I was also tired that
time, and my mind turned blank and I can no longer know what happened. I can no
longer recall what happened.

Q How did you hold your wife?

A I embraced her.

Q Was she in front of you?

A Yes Maam.

Q You were, you were facing with each other?

A The first, we were facing each other but when she kept on resisting she turns her
back.

Q What else happened after that?

A Suddenly she was breathless already and I thought she just stopped resisiting.

Q What happened next?

A When I thought that she just stayed calm, I was, I suddenly, I was surprise (sic)
she already (sic) on my arms.

Q What else happened?

A I got afraid when she fell down I dont know what to do, I ran away and left her
behind.

COURT What time did you arrive at that abandoned barangay hall?

A 11:30 o clock in the evening, your honor.

COURT What time did you run away from that abandone (sic) barangay hall?

A 12:00 oclock in the evening.

COURT Okey, proceed

ATTY. AZANZA Did you struggle?

A No Maam.

Q What did you do that time?

A I did not think of anything, I was afraid that time so I just went home.

Q When you held her tight, what do you intend to do that time?

A I just want her to be silent and to listen to me.

Q Did you box her?

A No, Maam.

Q Do you want to hurt her that time?

A No, Maam.

Q After that, what happened next if any?

A I left the place and went home at Valenzuela.

Q What happened next?

A The following day I went to her sister, elder sister. I want to tell her everything
happened but when I arrived there, the relatives, the cousins, of my wife were there
and I was afraid that they might hurt me, so I was not able to, I left the place.

Q What else did you do if any?

A I went home. I dont know what to do. I was confused that time I could not think of
anything to do, I went to the headquarters of Pasig.

Q What happened at the head quarters?

A I told what happened I confessed everything and we took the cadaver

Q What else happened after that?

A No, more, Maam.[8]

The foregoing testimony materially corroborates appellants extrajudicial confession,

even narrating facts to the minutest detail which would have been known only to
him. Thus,

55. T.:- Ano ang ginawa mo sa pagkakataong ito?

S.:- Niyakap ko po siya ng mahigpit na mahigpit hanggang sa masakal ko siya.

56. T. :- Papaano mo siya sinakal ?

S. :- Yakap-yakap po siya ng aking kaliwang kamay at sakal-sakal naman siya ng

aking kanang kamay.

57. T.:- Ano ang sumunod na pangyayari?

S.:- Namalayan ko na lamang po na nanlupaypay na siya at wala na siyang buhay at

ibinaba ko na lang siya sa semento.

58. T.:- Papaano mo naman nalaman na wala na siyang buhay?

S.:- Kinapa ko po ang kanyang dibdib at nalaman kong hindi na tumitibok ang
kanyang puso.

59. T.:- Anong ginawa mo sa pagkakataong ito nang malaman mo na patay na ang
asawa mo?

S.:- Natakot po ako. Ang ginawa ko ay hinubaran ko siya ng kanyang suot na

pantalon,T-shirt, bra at panty.

60. T.:- Bakit mo naman naisip na hubaran ang iyong asawa matapos mong
malaman na patay na pala siya?

S.:- Para palabasin po na hindi ako ang gumawa sa kanya noon at palabasin na siya
ay ginahasa.

61. T.:-Saan mo naman inilagay ang saplot ng iyong asawa na hinubad mo?

S.:- Matapos kong punitin ang kanyang t-shirt at muli ko itong itinakip sa kanyang
katawan na nakahubad.

62. T.:- Ano ang sumunod na pangyayari?

S.:- Umalis na po ako at muli akong bumalik sa tinutuluyan kong bahay o silid sa
Valenzuela.[9]

He admitted that in an attempt to confuse authorities as to the true cause of his

wifes death, appellant removed all her clothing including her panty and bra to make
it appear that she was raped. This shows the probability that the victim sustained
injuries in her vaginal opening and lacerations in her uterus, as found in the autopsy
report.[10]

There is no question that the victim is appellants lawful spouse. They were married
before a judge in San Carlos City, Pangasinan on April 18, 1991 as shown by their
marriage contract.[11] A marriage certificate/contract is the best proof of the
relationship between the accused and the deceased in cases of parricide of a
spouse.[12] In appellants testimony, he referred to the deceased as his wife.[13]
This constitutes a declaration of a party as to a relevant fact which may be given in
evidence against him pursuant to Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

Parricide is punishable with reclusion perpetua to death.[14] The higher penalty of

death may be imposed only if there is an aggravating circumstance that concurs in
the commission of the crime. Yet, the lower court judge, in imposing the death
penalty, did not mention his basis for imposing the higher penalty. This violates the
constitutional requirement, reiterated in the Rules of Court, that every decision
must distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based.[15] When the
decision of the trial court does not state the specific factual bases for the conclusion
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt reached therein but merely makes sweeping
generalizations, the same does not strictly follow the standards set by the rules on
Criminal Procedure.[16] Further, the trial judges failure to award civil indemnity in

his judgment of conviction all the more confirms his nonchalant attitude to the
mandate of Section 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, which states:[17]

If it is of conviction, the judgment shall state (a) the legal qualification of the offense
constituted by the acts committed by the accused, and the aggravating or
mitigating circumstances attending the commission thereof, if there are any; (b) the
participation of the accused in the commission of the offense, whether as principal,
accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (c) the penalty imposed upon the accused;
and (d) the civil liability or damages caused by the wrongful act to be recovered
from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of
the civil liability by a separate action has been reserved or waived.

A strict compliance with the mandate of the said provision is imperative in the
writing of every decision. Otherwise, the rule would simply become a tool for
speculations, which this Court will not countenance specially in criminal cases
involving the possible deprivation of human life.

Appellants contention that the statement he gave to the police is inadmissible in

evidence because it was given without affording him the right to counsel
guaranteed by the Constitution has no merit. It is undisputed that appellant was not
arrested because the authorities were not yet aware of the crime. It was he himself
who reported the incident to the police after he went to the abandoned barangay
hall two days later and discovered that his wifes body was still there.[18] Appellant
himself admitted that since he did not know what to do after seeing his wifes
relatives whom he feared for reprisal, he decided to report the matter to the Pasig
police. The right to counsel is afforded by Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987
Constitution only to person(s) under investigation for the commission of an offense.
On their way to Camp Crame, appellant asked that he be accompanied by an officer
to the Pasig Church. There, he volunteered information to the officer on the
whereabouts of his wife and stated that he is willing to put his statement in writing.
[19] Custodial rights of a person are not available whenever he volunteers
statements without being asked. He was not investigated by the authorities. In fact,
after appellant admitted to the police officer that he killed his wife, the officer told
him that he will be provided with a lawyer to assist him. In any case, during the
subsequent events the investigation in the precinct - appellant was assisted by a
lawyer, namely, Atty. Campanilla. At the trial, the latter testified that he talked to
appellant, advised him of his constitutional rights and was present when the latter
wrote his extrajudicial statement admitting that he killed his wife.[20] Atty.
Campanilla even asked for appellants identification card to verify whether the
signature he will sign in his statement is his own.

On the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and uninhabited place, the SolicitorGeneral posits that appellant obviously sought the time and place of the incident,
which was about midnight in an abandoned barangay hall in Santolan, Pasig City, to
consummate the crime,[21] thus, justifying the imposition of the death penalty.
However, nocturnity is not aggravating when other than the time, there is nothing in
the record and even in the testimonies of the witnesses from which it may be
inferred, whether directly or indirectly, that appellant particularly took advantage of
the darkness of the night to facilitate his criminal design.[22] Likewise, uninhabited
place cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance when there is no proof
that the place of commission affords a reasonable possibility for the victim to
receive some help.[23] All that was mentioned is that both appellant and his wife
went to his aunt at about 11 oclock in the evening to borrow money, but was
ashamed to wake her up because it was already too late in the night. Unable to get
money, the victim started pushing the appellant asking him to produce money. He
invited her to the abandoned barangay hall to talk. There she kept on pushing him.
He embraced her so tight that she suddenly died.[24] The foregoing may prove that
he indeed killed her, but it does not in any case show that he purposely sought the
night and the place to kill her. Aggravating circumstances must be established with
the same quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt as fully as the crime itself and
any doubt as to their existence must be resolved in favor of the accused.[25] The
Court fails to see any logical connection in the Solicitor-Generals argument that
appellants reporting that his wife was missing to the police the next day
strengthens the view that the two aggravating circumstances concurred in the
killing. Such reporting may have been done to divert attention from his culpability
and create in the mind of the authorities a doubt as to why he would report a
missing wife when all the while he knew where she was, but certainly not to show
that he took advantage of nighttime and the uninhabited place.

Accordingly, the Court does not agree with the trial courts imposition of the death
penalty and the Solicitor Generals recommendation for its affirmance. Pursuant to
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, when the penalty provided for by law are two
indivisible penalties and there is neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance,
the lower penalty shall be imposed.[26] Forthwith, the death penalty imposed by
the court a quo must be reduced to the indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua.[27]

As for the civil aspect, the judgment of civil liability in favor of the heirs of the
deceased is in consonance with Article 100 of the RPC which provides that Every
person criminally liable is also civilly liable. The award of the civil indemnity for
cases not calling for the application of the death penalty is fixed by current

jurisprudence at P50,000.00,[28] no other proof is necessary other than the fact of

the death of the victim and the accuseds responsibility therefor.[29] Moral damages
can be awarded only when the same is supported by evidence in the records.[30]
There is nothing in the testimony of the victims sister showing that she or her heirs
are entitled to that damages.

WHEREFORE, appellants conviction for parricide is AFFIRMED, subject to the

MODIFICATION that the penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua. He is also
ORDERED TO PAY P50,000.00 as civil indemnity to the children of the victim, in
addition to the award of P26,000.00 as actual damages. The award of moral
damages is deleted for lack of evidence.

SO ORDERED.

Benguet Elec Coop v CA Bernardo was a meat vendor. Jan 14, 1985, first to come to a
jeep full of slaughtered pigs. Upon stepping on the jeep, he had sort of epileptic seizure. The
antenna of the jeep tangled with the hanging open electric wire of Benguet Elec Coop (7
yrs). B was electrocuted. He died. 33 yrs old. Life expectancy of 31 years was decreased to
25 years considering the nature and quality of his work. P150 daily or P54k annual gross
income.
Exemplary damages 20k - need not be pleaded in complaint, cannot be
predetermined. It is awarded at the courts discretion, it can be merely asked to be fixed by
courts. It need not be proved determination is contingent upon or incidental to the amount
of compensatory damages that may be awarded to claimant.
- Imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. It is awarded as a deterrent to
socially deleterious actions. In quasi-delicts act or omission is with gross
negligence. Precautionary measures were not taken by BEC in wanton disregard of
possible consequences.
Moral damages 50k not intended to enrich the complainant but to serve to
obviate his/her spiritual suffering by reason of the culpable action of the defendant. Its
award is aimed to restoration of spiritual quo ante, and it must be commensurate
to the suffering inflicted.

Benguet electri coop vs CA

G.R. No. 127326 December 23, 1999

Lessons Applicable: Degrees of Negligence (Torts and Damages)
FACTS:

January 14 1985 7:50 am: Jose Bernardo , who has been

managing a market stall for 5 years, together with other meat

vendors went to select meat from a jeepney
o As he grasped the jeepney bars he suffered from an epileptic
seizure and fell to the ground
o Romeo Pimienta who initially thought he was joking saw him
turned black so along with the other vendors they brought him
to the hospital where he died shortly from cardio-respiratory
arrest

The jeepney's antenna got entangled with the open electric wire at the
top of the roof of a meat stall

February 6 1985: His widow Caridad O. Bernardo and their minor

children , Jojo, Jeffrey and Jo-an, all surnamed Bernardo filed for
damages against BENECO
o BENECO filed a third party complaint against the jeepney
owner Guillermo Canave, Jr.

CA affirmed RTC: favored Bernardo and ordered BENECO to pay the

damages

ISSUE: W/N BENECO was solely liable for negligence in the electrocution and
death of Bernardo
HELD: YES. AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the P864,000.00 as net income loss
is reduced to P675,000.00 and the P100,000.00 as moral damages is also reduced to P50,000.00.

BENECO was grossly negligent

o violation of the Philippine Electrical Code which requires a
minimum vertical clearance of 14 feet from the level of the
ground since the wiring crosses a public street - barely 8 or 9
feet
o another violation: main line connected to the service line was not
of rigid conduit wiring but totally exposed without any safety
protection

o failed to detect, much less to repair, for an inexcusably long

period of 7 years the uninsulated connection which caused the
death of Jose Bernardo

Canave was well within his right to park the vehicle in the said area
where there was no showing that any municipal law or ordinance was
violated nor that there was any foreseeable danger posed by his act

The amount corresponding to the loss of earning capacity is based

mainly on two factors: (a) the number of years on the basis of which
the damages shall be computed; and, (b) the rate at which the losses
sustained by the widow and her children should be fixed.

The amount of exemplary damages need not be pleaded in the

complaint because the same cannot be predetermined

Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for

the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages. It is awarded as a deterrent to socially
deleterious actions. In quasi-delict, exemplary damages are awarded
when the act or omission which caused injury is attended by gross
negligence.

Gross negligence
o negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting
or omitting to act in a situation where there is duty to act, not
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious
indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be
affected

moral damages are not intended to enrich the complainant but to

serve to obviate his/her spiritual suffering by reason of the
culpable action of the defendant

People vs Gonzales
People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appelle, vs. Fausta Gonzales,
Augusto Gonzales, Custodio Gonzales Sr., Nerio Gonzales, and
Rogelio Lanida, accused; Custodio Gonzales Sr., accused-appellant

Doctrine: The commission of a felony under Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code
requires that an act a punishable act or omission must be committed, and that it
must be committed with deceit and/or fault.
Keywords: murder, felony, criminal intent, credibility of witness
Nature: Appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals
Date: March 19, 1990
Ponente: Justice Sarmiento
Facts:
The appellant is appealing to the court regarding his participation in the
killing of a certain Loly Penacerrada. He claims that he did not participate in the
killing based on the claim that he was not present in the said act.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
- At around 9:00 p.m. of February 21, 1981, Bartolome Paja, barangay
captain of Brgy. Tipacla, Ajuy, Iloilo, was awakened by two of the accused
(Augusto and Fausta). Paja learns that Fausta killed their landlord, Lloyd
Penacerrada, and would like to surrender to authorities. Knife used in
killing was seen, and blood was found smeared on Faustas dress.
- Paja immediately ordered a nephew to take spouses to the police at the
Municipal Hall in Poblacon, Ajay, where the couple informed the police on
duty of the incident.
- Several patrolmen, along with Paja and Augusto proceeded to the
residence at Sitio Nabitasan where the killing incident allegedly occurred,
and found the body of the deceased, clad in underwear, sprawled face
down inside the bedroom.
- Group stayed for an hour in which the scene was inspected, and a rough
sketch of the area was made.
- The next day, a patrolman, accompanied by a photographer, went back to
the scene for further investigations. Fausta was brought back to the police
station.
- The autopsy of the deceased was performed at 11:20 a.m. Report shows
the following:
o Sixteen wounds: five fatal as they penetrated the internal organs
o Multiple puncture, stab, incision, and lacerated wounds
- The day after the autopsy, Augusto appeared before the sub-station and
voluntarily surrendered to Police Corporal Sazon for detention and
protective custody for having been involved in the killing of the deceased.
Augusto requests to be taken to where Fausta was already detained.
Based on the investigations conducted, an information for murder dated
August 26, 1981, was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo against the spouses.
However, they pleaded not guilty. Before the trial, however, a certain Jose Huntoria
presented himself to the wife of the deceased. Huntoria claims to be a witness of
the killing, and on October 6, 1981, volunteers as a witness for the prosecution. A
reinvestigation of the case was called, in which several more were filed as accused,
including the appellant. All the accused except for Lenida pleaded not guilty.

At the trial, the prosecution presented Dr. Jesus Rojas, the physician who
conducted the autopsy on the body, Paja, the patrolmen and constabulary members
who joined in the investigation, the widow, and Huntoria.
Dr. Rojas testified that he performed the autopsy at around 11:20 a.m. on
Feb. 1981 after the deceased was taken to the municipal hall. He found 4 puncture
wounds, 7 stab wounds, 4 incisions, and 1 laceration; five of these were fatal
wounds. Rojas admitted one of two possibilities:
- Only one weapon might have caused all the wounds
- Multiple instruments were used due to the number and different
characteristics
The brunt of the prosecutions case rested on Huntorias alleged eyewitness
account of the incident, which was as follows:
- Testified on July 27, 1982; at 5 pm on Feb. 21, 1981, he left his work at
Brgy. Central, and walked home, taking a short-cut.
- While passing at the vicinity of the Gonzales spouses home at around
8:00 pm, he heard cries for help. Curiosity prompted him to approach the
place where the shouts were from.
- 15-20 m away from the scene, he hid himself behind a clump of banana
trees, and saw all the accused ganging upon the deceased near a
threshing platform. He said he clearly recognized all the accused as the
place was awash in moonlight.
- After stabbing and hacking the victim, the accused lifted his body and
carried it to the house. Huntoria then left home. Upon reaching his house,
he related what he saw to his wife and mother before going to sleep.
- Eight months after the incident, bothered by his conscience and the fact
that his father was a tenant of the deceased, he thought of helping the
widow. Out of his own volition, he travelled to the widows houise, and
related to her what he saw.
Except Fausta who admitted killing the deceased as he was trying to rape
her, the rest denied participation in the crime. The appellant claimed that he was
asleep in his house which was one kilometre away from the scene of the crime, and
he knew of the crime only when his grandchildren went to his house that night.
The trial court disregarded the version of the defense; it believed the
prosecutions version. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellant contended
that the trial court erred in convicting him on the basis of the testimony of the lone
witness, and in not appreciating his defense of alibi. The Court found no merit in the
errors, and rejected defense of alibi. Worsening this is that the appellate court found
the sentence erroneous, and upgraded the penalty to that of murderreclusion
temporal/death.
The case is now brought upon certification by the Court of Appeals, hence the
appeal.
Issue(s): Whether or not the client, under the evidence presented, has committed
the felony of murder.
Held: No, he has not.
Ratio:

Courts analysis of the evidence:

- Investigation conducted left much to be desired. Centeno gave the date of
commission as March 21, 1981. The sketch made was troubling, as it did
not effectively indicate the extent of the blood stains in the scenes of
crime. This would have added a lot of weight to any one of the versi
- ons of the incident.
- Sazon, who claimed that Gonzales surrendered to him, failed to state
clearly the reason for the surrender. It may even be possible that Augusto
surrendered just so he could be safe from the victims kin. Sazon also
admitted that Augusto never mentioned to him the participation of other
persons in the killing.
- Rojas statement showed two possibilities for the killing. Faustas
admission that she was the only killer is plausible. Furthermore, there
were only five fatal wounds, which will be discussed later.
- Huntorias testimony, of which the prosecutions argument solely rests,
needs to be examined further. Huntorias claims in his testimony did not
exactly match with those from his cross-examination. He first claimed that
he recognized the people involved. However, in the cross-examination, he
only saw flashes. This implies that he may not have recognized anyone
at all.
As such, Huntorias testimony could not place a definite act committed or
contributed by the appellant in the killing of the deceased.
On the criminal liability of the appellant:
- There is nothing in the findings or the evidence that establishes the
criminal liability of the appellant as a principal for direct participation
under Art. 17, para. 1 of the Revised Penal Code.
- Furthermore, there is nothing in the findings or evidence that inculpates
him by inducement, under paragraph 2 of the same article. Based on the
definition of felonies in Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code, the prosecutions
evidence could not establish intent nor fault. Recall that the elements of
felonies include:
o An act or omission
o Act or omission must be punishable
o Act is performed or omission incurred by deceit or fault
- The lone witness could not properly establish any acts or omissions done
by the appellant. He stated that he does not know who hacked or stabbed
the victim, thus implying that he does not know what the appellant did.
With this, the essential elements of felonies may not even be present.
- Furthermore, the fact that there were five stab wounds and six accused
would imply that one of them may not have caused a grave wound
(especially given the statement of the physician). This may have been the
appellant, and given that there is no evidence that the appellant caused
any of the wounds, coupled with the prosecutions failure to prove the
presence of conspiracy (that is, how many people actually took part in the
killing), it weakens the arguments against the appellant.
On the lone witness:

Huntorias credibility as a witness is tarnished by two points:

o He came out eight months after the killing. He claims that he feared
for his life, but there was no proof that he was being threatened,
nor was the length of time reasonable given the circumstances.
o He is not exactly a disinterested/neutral witness. He admitted to
being a tenant of the deceased, and stated that one of the reasons
why he testified was because the victim was his landlord.
Under our socioeconomic set-up, a tenant owes the source of his
livelihood from his landlord. As such, they would do everything to get the
landlords to their favour. Posing as a witness would have been a
convenient way to do this, especially as he ceased to be employed as
early as May 1981.

Finally, based on Philippine customs and traditions, it is unlikely for the

appellant to be in the scene of the crime, as under our family culture, aging parents
are usually sheltered and insulated from possible harm. It is improbable for the
accused to bring their aging father when they were clearly in better shape than he
was, and it was unlikely for the appellant to offer his services as they were more or
less enough to handle what could have been a perceived enemy.
Although alibi is a weak defense, in cases like this where the participation of
the appellant is not clear, it may be considered. In light of the evidence on record, it
may be sufficient for an acquittal.
Decision of the CA is reversed and set aside. Appellant acquitted. Costs de
officio.

Pan Malayan Insurance Corporation v CA (Insurance)

G.R. No. 81026 April 3, 1990
PAN MALAYAN INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
ERLINDA FABIE AND
HER UNKNOWN DRIVER, respondents.
FACTS:
On December 10, 1985, PANMALAY filed a complaint for damages with the RTC of Makati
against private respondents Erlinda Fabie and her driver. PANMALAY averred the following:
that it insured a Mitsubishi Colt Lancer car with plate No. DDZ-431 and registered in the
name of Canlubang Automotive Resources Corporation [CANLUBANG]; that on May 26, 1985,
due to the "carelessness, recklessness, and imprudence" of the unknown driver of a pick-up
with plate no. PCR-220, the insured car was hit and suffered damages in the amount of
P42,052.00; that PANMALAY defrayed the cost of repair of the insured car and, therefore,
was subrogated to the rights of CANLUBANG against the driver of the pick-up and his
employer, Erlinda Fabie; and that, despite repeated demands, defendants, failed and refused
to pay the claim of PANMALAY. private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that
PANMALAY had no cause of action against them. They argued that payment under the "own
damage" clause of the insurance policy precluded subrogation under Article 2207 of the Civil
Code, since indemnification thereunder was made on the assumption that there was no
wrongdoer or no third party at fault.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

(1) Trial Court: dismissed for no cause of action PANMALAY's complaint for damages against
private respondents Erlinda Fabie and her driver
(2) CA: affirmed trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the insurer PANMALAY may institute an action to recover the amount it had
paid its assured in settlement of an insurance claim against private respondents as the
parties allegedly responsible for the damage caused to the insured vehicle.
RULING:
PANMALAY is correct.
Article 2207 of the Civil Code is founded on the well-settled principle of subrogation. If the
insured property is destroyed or damaged through the fault or negligence of a party other
than the assured, then the insurer, upon payment to the assured, will be subrogated to the
rights of the assured to recover from the wrongdoer to the extent that the insurer has been
obligated to pay. Payment by the insurer to the assured operates as an equitable that the
insurer has been obligated to pay. Payment by the insurer to the assured operates as an
equitable or negligence of a third party. CANLUBANG is apparently of the same
understanding. Based on a police report assignment to the former of all remedies that the
latter may have against the third party whose negligence or wrongful act caused the loss.
The right of subrogation is not dependent upon, nor does it grow out of, any privity of
contract or upon written assignment of claim. It accrues simply upon payment of the
insurance claim by the insurer.
The exceptions are:
(1) if the assured by his own act releases the wrongdoer or third party liable for the loss or
damage, from liability, the insurer's right of subrogation is defeated
(2) where the insurer pays the assured the value of the lost goods without notifying the
carrier who has in good faith settled the assured's claim for loss, the settlement is binding
on both the assured and the insurer, and the latter cannot bring an action against the carrier
on his right of subrogation
(3) where the insurer pays the assured for a loss which is not a risk covered by the policy,
thereby effecting "voluntary payment", the former has no right of subrogation against the
third party liable for the loss
None of the exceptions are availing in the present case.
Also, even if under the above circumstances PANMALAY could not be deemed subrogated to
the rights of its assured under Article 2207 of the Civil Code, PANMALAY would still have a
cause of action against private respondents. In the pertinent case of Sveriges Angfartygs
Assurans Forening v. Qua Chee Gan, supra., the Court ruled that the insurer who may have
no rights of subrogation due to "voluntary" payment may nevertheless recover from the
third party responsible for the damage to the insured property under Article 1236 of the Civil
Code.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the present petition is GRANTED. Petitioner's
complaint for damages against private respondents is hereby REINSTATED. Let the case be
remanded to the lower court for trial on the merits.

Rizal Surety v CA G.R. No. 112360. July 18, 2000

J. Purisima

Facts:
Rizal Surety issued a 1 million peso fire insurance policy with Transworld. This was increased to
1.5 million. A four span building was part of the policy. A fire broke out and gutted the building,
together with a two storey building behind it were gaming machines were stored. The company
filed its claims but to no avail. Hence, it brought a suit in court. It aimed to make Rizal pay for
almost 3 million including legal interest and damages. Rizal claimed that the policy only covered
damage on the four span building and not the two storey building. The trial court ruled in
Transworlds favor and ordered Rizal to pay actual damages only. The court of appeals increased
the damages. The insurance company filed a MFR. The CA answered by modifying the
imposition of interest. Not satisfied, the insurance company petitioned to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
WON Rizal Surety is liable for loss of the two-storey building considering that the fire insurance
policy sued upon covered only the contents of the four-span building.
Held: Yes. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
The policy had clauses on the building coverage that read:
"contained and/or stored during the currency of this Policy in the premises occupied by them
forming part of the buildings situated within own Compound"
"First, said properties must be contained and/or stored in the areas occupied by Transworld and
second, said areas must form part of the building described in the policy xxx"
This generally means that the policy didnt limit its coverage to what was stored in the four-span
building.
As to questions of fact, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the so called
"annex " was not an annex building but an integral part of the four-span building described in the
policy and consequently, the machines and spare parts stored were covered by the fire insurance.
A report said: "Two-storey building constructed of partly timber and partly concrete hollow
blocks under g.i. roof which is adjoining and intercommunicating with the repair of the first
right span of the lofty storey building and thence by property fence wall."
"Art.1377. The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the
party who caused the obscurity"
Landicho v GSIS- the 'terms in an insurance policy, which are ambiguous, equivocal, or
uncertain are to be construed strictly and most strongly against the insurer, and liberally in favor
of the insured so as to effect the dominant purpose of indemnity or payment to the insured
The issue of whether or not Transworld has an insurable interest in the fun and amusement
machines and spare parts, which entitles it to be indemnified for the loss thereof, had been settled
in another SC case.

G.R. No. L-20455

March 31, 1965

NAZARIO CATUIZA, petitioner,

vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and the HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Tolentino, Garcia and D. R. Cruz for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an appeal, taken by defendant-appellant Nazario Catuiza, from a decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, which convicted him of the
crime of multiple homicide, with multiple serious physical injuries, through reckless negligence,
with which he is charged and sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6)
months of arresto mayor to six (6) years of prision correccional and to indemnify the following
in the sums set forth after their respective names, to wit:
1) the heirs of:
a) Pedro Pagdanganan,

P17,850.00;

b) Gualberto Castillo,

P 9,635.00;

c) Ramon Batangan,

P10,890.00;

d) Angel Dimla,

P10,680.00;

e) Mr. Felipe B. Ilano,

P11,060.00;

f) Paz Nieves,

P10,922.00;

g) Felix Ligon,

P 9,180.00;

h) Leoncio Atayde,

P10,460.00;

2) Julian Lipana,
3) Florentina
Santillan,

P 8,788.00;
P 4,100.00;

with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, not to exceed one third (1/3) of the principal
penalty, and to pay the costs.
The basic facts are set forth in the decision of the Court of Appeals, from which we quote:
In the morning of August 10, 1957, Halili Transit buses Nos. 197 and 606, loaded with
students and professors of Araneta University and Far Eastern University left Manila on
an educational trip to the Central Luzon Agricultural College in Nueva Ecija. It had been
raining, the weather was cloudy and the concrete road wet. Between kilometers 99 and
100 of the National Highway leading to Cabanatuan, bus 606 driven by the accused
Nazario Catuiza, which was following bus 187, collided with a jeep, coming from the

opposite direction, resulting in the death of eight persons and serious injuries to two
others, all passengers of the jeep.
The questions raised in the Court of Appeals, were:
1) whether the collision and the consequence thereof are imputable or not to appellant Catuiza,
and 2) whether the sums paid by insurance companies and the financial aid given to the heirs of
the victims should be deducted from the award.
In connection with the first question, the Court of Appeals said:
The prosecution's evidence tended to show that at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning
Halili buses Nos. 187 and 606 sped thru the town of Gapan northward toward Sta. Rosa,
Nueva Ecija. In the meantime, a jeepney carrying ten persons named in the decision (of
the Court of First Instance) was cruising southward from Cabanatuan City at 15 to 20
miles per hour. After bus 187 met and passed the jeepney, bus 606 then running over 70
kilometers per hour swerved to the left, its left front wheel about one meter beyond the
center line in an apparent attempt to overtake the other bus. But in so doing, bus 606 after
applying its brakes hit the jeepney on its left side throwing it to the West shoulder of the
road near the canal where it lay battered (Exhibits B, C, D, & E); while bus 606
continued to slide and then swerved to the right shoulder of the road until it finally landed
on its left side in the canal some 40 paces from the point of impact (Exhibits B, C, 10, 10a).
xxx

xxx

xxx

The evidence for the defense tended to show that between kilometers 99 and 100 the
driver of the bus 606 which was behind bus 187 saw a freight truck coming from the
opposite direction, followed by a jeep driven by a woman. The witnesses for the defense
are not agreed as to the distance between the freight truck and the jeepney. They were,
however, unanimous in declaring that a woman was at the steering wheel. After bus 187
had met and passed the jeep, the latter which was running 50 miles per hour tried to
overtake the freight truck ahead and in so doing collided with the bus 606.1wph1.t
Upon a review of the record the Court of Appeals accepted the version of the prosecution and
held that the proximate cause of the accident was appellant's reckless negligence. He now
maintains that the Court of Appeals erred: (a) "in affirming the award of P1,000 made by the trial
court for damages to the jeep of Pedro Pagdanganan"; (b) "in not reducing from the damages due
to the deceased, the indemnities received from the insurance companies on their life insurance
policies"; (c) "in not holding that loss of earning capacity cannot be awarded to the heirs of the
deceased, where they are not dependent upon said deceased for support"; (d) "in not equitably
reducing the damages awarded by the trial court ... considering the absence of malice or
intentional wrong on the part of the accused, and considering, furthermore, that the deceased
were guilty of contributory negligence" and (e) "in not sustaining the theory that in necessary and
essential industries, it is the duty of the courts to place some limitations on recoveries of
damages against them."

With respect to the first question, it is urged that, since the information herein merely charges
multiple homicide and physical injuries, with no allegation that the acts of the accused resulted,
also, in damages to property, the award of P1,000 for damages to the jeep of the deceased Pedro
Pagdanganan is erroneous. This contention is well taken, for appellant cannot be convicted of
and sentenced for something with which he is not charged (People vs. Narvas, L-14191, April 27,
1960; People vs. Despavellador, L-13814, January 28, 1961).
As regards the second contention, appellant cites Article 2207 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, reading:
If the plaintiff's property has been insured, and he has received indemnity from the
insurance company for the injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract
complained of, the insurance company shall be subrogated to the rights of the insured
against the wrongdoer or the person who has violated the contract. If the amount paid by
the insurance company does not fully cover the injury or loss, the aggrieved party shall be
entitled to recover the deficiency from the person causing the loss or injury. (Emphasis
ours.)
This provision refers, however, to damages to "property" and is, accordingly, inapplicable to
damages resulting from the loss of human life and/or injury sustained by natural persons. In fact,
by making specific reference to "property", said Art. 2207 necessarily excludes from its
operation upon the principle "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" all other damages,
including those suffered in consequence of loss of life or injury suffered by natural persons.
Indeed, whereas insurance policies on property have, under the law, no other purpose than to
reimburse the insured for such loss as the property insured may have suffered, such is not the
object of life insurance.
Appellant's third claim is predicated upon the second paragraph of Article 2206 of said Code.
This article reads in full:
The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three
thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and
the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter, such indemnity shall in every case be
assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical
disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article 291,
the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or
intestate succession, may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period
not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased
may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.

The case at bar comes under the first subdivision of this Article. Its second subdivision is not in
point, for the award made in the decision appealed from is in favor of the "heirs" of the deceased,
to which the first subdivision refers, whereas the second subdivision applies to persons entitled
to support from the deceased who are not his heirs.
In connection with the fourth contention, appellant alleges that the jeep of Pedro Pagdanganan
was overloaded, from which he (appellant) deduces that there has been contributory negligence
on the part of the deceased. In view of this inference and because he had acted without malice,
appellant concludes that the damages awarded by the trial court should in equity be reduced. This
pretense is clearly devoid of merit. To begin with, absence of malice is of the essence of the
crime charged. Hence, it cannot mitigate the liability arising therefrom. Secondly, the alleged
overloading did not contribute, in any manner whatsoever, to the collision. Thirdly, the
passengers of the jeep did not contribute, and could not possibly have contributed to the
occurrence of said collision.
As regards the last assignment of error, suffice it to say that there is nothing in our laws to justify
the claim that the award for damages should be reduced merely because appellant is engaged in a
necessary and essential industry. The State has, at one time or another, granted some concessions
to necessary and essential industries, in connection with taxes, import quotas, imposts, exchange
control, and other similar regulations of or impositions by the government. Our laws make no
distinction, however, between necessary and essential industry on the one hand, and other
endeavors on the other, insofar as responsibility for damages caused to third persons are
concerned.
WHEREFORE, modified as to the indemnity due to the heirs of Pedro Pagdanganan, which is
reduced from P17,850.00 to P16,850.00 the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, in all
other respects, with costs against petitioner Nazario Catuiza. It is so ordered.

[G.R. No. 128452. November 16, 1999]

COMPANIA MARITIMA, INC., EL VARADERO DE MANILA, MINDANAO TERMINAL
AND BROKERAGE SERVICES, CARLOS P. FERNANDEZ, VICENTE T. FERNANDEZ,
LUIS T. FERNANDEZ, and RAMON B. FERNANDEZ, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and EXEQUIEL S. CONSULTA,. respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decisioni[1]of the Court of Appeals, dated
February 27, 1996, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon City,
dated March 16, 1993, which ordered petitioners to pay private respondent, Atty. Exequiel S.

Consulta, the total amount of P2,590,000.00, as attorneys fees, and P21,856.40, as filing fees, in
connection with three cases which the latter, as attorney, handled for the former.
The facts are as follows:
Maritime Company of the Philippines was sued by Genstar Container Corporation before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, Manila. On November 29, 1985, it was ordered to pay Genstar
Container Corporation the following amounts:
a.$469,860.35, or its equivalent in pesos at the current exchange rate.
b. 25% of the total obligation, P2,000.00 as Acceptance Fee, and P250.00 per appearance - as Attorneys Fees.
c.

Costs of suit.

As a result, properties of petitioners Compania Maritima, Inc., El Varadero de Manila, and

Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Services at Sangley Point, Cavite, were levied upon in
execution. The properties, consisting of the tugboats Dadiangas, Marinero, and Timonel, the
floating crane Northwest Murphy Diesel Engine, and the motorized launch Sea Otter, were worth
P51,000,000.00 in sum. However, the same were sold at public auction for only P1,235,000.00 to
the highest bidder, a certain Rolando Patriarca.ii[2]
Petitioners Compania Maritima, Inc., El Varadero de Manila, and Mindanao Terminal and
Brokerage Services engaged the services of private respondent, Atty. Exequiel S. Consulta, who
represented them in the following cases: (1) Civil Case No. 85-30134, entitled Genstar Container
Corporation v. Maritime Company of the Philippines, wherein petitioners properties were levied
upon although petitioners had not been impleaded as defendants therein; (2) TBP Case No. 8603662, entitled Compania Maritima, Inc., v. Ramon C. Enriquez, which was a criminal case for
falsification and for violation of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, against Deputy Sheriff Enriquez before the Tanodbayan; and (3) Civil Case No.
86-37196 entitled Compania Maritima v. Genstar Container Corporation, an action for
Injunction, Annulment of Execution Proceedings, and Damages.iii[3]
The cases were eventually resolved in this wise: (1) in Civil Case No. 85-30134, the trial court
dismissed the third-party claim and motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
filed by Atty. Consulta; (2) after Atty. Consulta filed the complaint with the Tanodbayan in TBP
Case No. 86-03662, petitioners transferred the handling of the case to another lawyer; and (3)
Civil Case No. 86-37196 was eventually dismissed on motion of both parties, but only after the
trial courts denial of the motion to dismiss filed by Genstar Container Corporation was upheld on
appeal by both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.iv[4]
For his services in the three cases, Atty. Consulta billed petitioners as follows: (1) P100,000.00
for Civil Case No. 85-30134; (2) P50,000.00 for TBP Case No. 86-03662; and (3) P5,000,000.00
for Civil Case No. 86-37196, including the subsequent appeals to the Court of Appeals and the

Supreme Court. Petitioners did not pay the amount demanded but only P30,000.00 for Civil Case
No. 85-30134 and P10,000.00 for TBP Case No. 86-03662.v[5]
Because of the failure of corporate petitioners to pay the balance of his attorneys fees, Atty.
Consulta brought suit against petitioners in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon City.
He sought the recovery of the following: (1) P70,000.00, as the balance of the P100,000.00
attorneys fees billed for Civil Case No. 85-30134; (2) P40,000.00, as the balance of the
P50,000.00 attorneys fees for TBP Case No. 86-03662, and (3) P5,000,000.00 as attorneys fees
for Civil Case No. 86-37196, including the subsequent appeals therefrom to the Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court. He likewise asked for moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and
the costs of suit.vi[6]
On March 16, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision which in part stated:
Considering all the circumstances as above set forth, this Court believes that the amount
equivalent to five percent (5%) of the amount involved, or the amount of Two Million Five
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P2,550,000.00) would be reasonable attorneys fees for the
services rendered by the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 37196 and the two related proceedings in the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.
As for the services rendered by the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 30134, for which he appears to
have already been paid P30,000.00, the Court believes that an additional amount of P20,000.00
would be reasonable.
On plaintiffs demand of P40,000.00, in addition to the P10,000.00 he had initially received for
services rendered in the Tanodbayan case No. 86-03662, the Court grants him an additional
P20,000.00.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff and orders the defendant to pay the
plaintiff, jointly and severally, damages as follows:
a. For services rendered by plaintiff in Civil Case No. 37196 and the related proceedings in the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court - Two Million Five Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P2,550,000.00).
b. For services rendered by plaintiff in Civil Case No. 30134 - Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00).
c. For services rendered in the TBP Case No. 86-03662 - Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).
d. Filing fees in the amount of P21,856.40.
The defendants counterclaim and plaintiffs counterclaim to defendants counterclaim are both
dismissed.
SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Said the appellate court:
In Civil Case No. 37196, where appellee rendered his legal services, appellants property worth
Fifty One Million Pesos (P51,000,000.00) was involved. Likewise, the aforementioned case was
not a simple action for collection of money, considering that complex legal issues were raised
therein which reached until the Supreme Court. In the course of such protracted legal battle to
save the appellants properties, the appellee prepared numerous pleadings and motions, which
were diligently and effectively executed, as a result of which, the appellants properties were
saved from execution and their oppositors were forced to settle by way of a compromise
agreement.
....
It is a well-settled rule that in the recovery of attorneys fees, whether as a main action or as an
incident of another action, the determination of the reasonableness is within the prerogative of
the courts (Roldan vs. Court of Appeals, 218 SCRA 713; Radiowealth Finance Co., Inc. vs.
International Corporate Bank, 182 SCRA 862; Panay Electric vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA
456).
Based on the aforequoted ruling, We find that the court a quo did not commit any reversible error
in awarding attorneys fees equivalent to five percent (5%) of the total value of properties
involved in Civil Case No. 37196.
Hence, this appeal. Petitioners raise the following issues:
a) Whether or not the amount of attorneys fees awarded to the private respondent by the court a
quo and affirmed by the Honorable Court is reasonable.
b) Whether or not the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction may be applied in the case
at bar.
With respect to the first question, it is pertinent to note two concepts of attorneys fees in this
jurisdiction. In the ordinary sense, attorneys fees represent the reasonable compensation paid to a
lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered to the latter. On the other hand, in its
extraordinary concept, attorneys fees may be awarded by the court as indemnity for damages to
be paid by the losing party to the prevailing party.vii[7]
The issue in this case concerns attorneys fees in the ordinary concept. Generally, the amount of
attorneys fees due is that stipulated in the retainer agreement which is conclusive as to the
amount of the lawyers compensation. In the absence thereof, the amount of attorneys fees is
fixed on the basis of quantum meruit, i.e., the reasonable worth of his services.viii[8] In
determining the amount of attorneys fees, the following factors are considered: (1) the time spent
and extent of services rendered; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; (3) the
importance of the subject matter; (4) the skill demanded; (5) the probability of losing other
employment as a result of the acceptance of the proffered case; (6) the amount involved in the

controversy and the benefits resulting to the client; (7) the certainty of compensation; (8) the
character of employment; and (9) the professional standing of the lawyer.ix[9]
Both the Court of Appeals and the trial court approved attorneys fees in the total amounts of
P50,000.00 and P30,000.00 for the services of Atty. Consulta in Civil Case No. 85-30134 and
TBP Case No. 86-03662, respectively. Based on the above criteria, we think said amounts are
reasonable, although the third-party claim and motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction filed by Atty. Consulta in Civil Case No. 85-30134 was dismissed by the trial court,
while TBP Case No. 86-03662 was given by petitioners to another lawyer after Atty. Consulta
had filed the complaint. On the other hand, although the order of the trial court in Civil Case No.
86-37196 granting the motion to dismiss filed by both parties did not state the grounds therefor,
it is reasonable to infer that petitioners agreed thereto in consideration of some advantage.
Hence, the rulings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court that, because of the complexity of
the issues involved and the work done by counsel, the amount of P2,550,000.00 was reasonable
for Atty. Consultas services.
In addition, the value of the properties involved was considerable. As already stated, to satisfy
the judgment in favor of Genstar Container Corporation in Civil Case No. 85-30134, properties
of petitioners worth P51,000,000.00 were sold at public auction. Only P1,235,000.00 was
realized from the sale and petitioners were in danger of losing their properties. As the appellate
court pointed out, Atty. Consulta rendered professional services not only in the trial court but in
the Court of Appeals and in this Court. There is no question that through his efforts, properties
owned by petitioners were saved from execution.
It is settled that great weight, and even finality, is given to the factual conclusions of the Court of
Appeals which affirm those of the trial courts.x[10] Only where it is shown that such findings are
whimsical, capricious, and arbitrary can they be overturned. In the present case, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the factual conclusions of the trial court that: (1) the issues in Civil Case No.
86-03662, including the appeals taken therefrom to the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court,
were quite complex; (2) the pleadings filed by Atty. Consulta were well-researched; and (3) as a
result of Atty. Consultas efforts, the adverse parties were induced to agree to the dismissal of the
case.
Petitioners contend, however, that: (1) the said cases merely involved simple issues; (2) the
pleadings filed by Atty. Consulta did not exhibit an extraordinary level of competence, effort,
and skill; and (3) they did not benefit from the efforts of Atty. Consulta. These allegations have
not been proven. Petitioners have not shown that the factual findings of both the Court of
Appeals and the trial court are contrary to the evidence. Nor have they shown that they did not
benefit from their representation by Atty. Consulta.
With respect to the liability of individual petitioners Carlos P. Fernandez, Vicente T. Fernandez,
Luis T. Fernandez, and Ramon B. Fernandez, we hold that the mere fact that they were
stockholders and directors of corporate petitioners does not justify a finding that they are liable
for the obligations of the corporations.

It is well-settled that as a legal entity, a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from
its individual stockholders or members. The fiction of corporate entity will be set aside and the
individual stockholders will be held liable for its obligation only if it is shown that it is being
used for fraudulent, unfair, or illegal purposes.xi[11] In this case, the Court of Appeals held that
individual petitioners were guilty of fraud, based on its finding that they refused to pay the
attorneys fees demanded by Atty. Consulta. It should be noted, however, that although petitioners
Compania Maritima, Inc., El Varadero de Manila, and Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage
Services have an obligation to pay Atty. Consulta for his attorneys fees, the amount thereof was
still in dispute. It was therefore improper for the Court of Appeals to conclude that individual
petitioners were guilty of fraud simply because corporate petitioners had refused to make the
payments demanded. The fact remains that at the time of demand, the amount due to Atty.
Consulta had not been finally determined.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated February
27, 1996, is AFFIRMED with the modification that individual petitioners Carlos P. Fernandez,
Vicente T. Fernandez, Luis T. Fernandez, and Ramon B. Fernandez are absolved from personal
liability for attorneys fees to Atty. Exequiel S. Consulta.
SO ORDERED.

Trans-Asia Shipping Lines v. CA

Facts:
Plaintiff boarded a vessel from Cebu to Cagayan de Oro. After an hour of slow voyage,
the vessel stopped at Kawit Island and dropped its anchor. Passengers demanded that
they be returned to Cebu, and was heeded to by the parties.
Held:
The carrier would not have been liable for loss or income if the plaintiff was unable to
report to his office on the day he was supposed to arrive were it not for delay.

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