DOLO VS CULPA

G.R. No. L-5272

March 19, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.
Gibb & Gale, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
Facts:
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc
Kinley, Rizal Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as
a house boy or muchacho. "Officers' quarters No. 27" was occupied solely as an officers'
mess or club. No one slept in the house except the two servants, who jointly occupied a
small room toward the rear of the building, The door of the room was not furnished with a
permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook
or catch on the inside of the door. Aside from the door and window, there were no other
openings of any kind in the room. On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the
defendant, who had received for the night, was suddenly awakened by some trying to force
open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard
no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by
someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. Due to the heavy growth of vines along
the front of the porch, the room was very dark, and the defendant, fearing that the intruder
was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill
you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair which had
been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the
blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to
be a burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable that the chair was merely
thrown back into the room by the sudden opening of the door against which it rested.
Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out
wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran
out upon the porch and fell down on the steps in a desperately wounded condition, followed
by the defendant, who immediately recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual
was wounded, he called to his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back
to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.The deceased and the accused,
who roomed together and who appear to have on friendly and amicable terms prior to the
fatal incident, had an understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock at
the door and acquiant his companion with his identity.The defendant was charged with the
crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial court of simple homicide, with
extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one day presidio mayor, the
minimum penalty prescribed by law.

Issue:
Whether or not Ah Chong is liable for the act for the mistake of facts

HELD:

Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle
to complete exception from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if
the intruder who forced open the door of his room had been in fact a dangerous thief or
"ladron," as the defendant believed him to be. No one, under such circumstances, would
doubt the right of the defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief having
forced open the door notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his
threat that he would kill the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned
that in the darkness of the night, in a small room, with no means of escape, with the thief
advancing upon him despite his warnings defendant would have been wholly justified in
using any available weapon to defend himself from such an assault, and in striking promptly,
without waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts and deliver the first blow.The
question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally
responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be
exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would
constitute the crime o homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the
facts at the time when he committed the act. To this question we think there can be but one
answer, and we hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided
always that the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad
faith.In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is
sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the
offense charged "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in those
cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching
criminal negligence.

G.R. No. L-47722

July 27, 1943
THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, defendants-appellants.
Facts:
In the afternoon of December 24, 1938. Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial
Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received from Major Guido a telegram of the following
tenor: "Information received escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in
Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." . The same instruction was given to the chief of police

Oanis who was likewise called by the Provincial Inspector. When the chief of police was
asked whether he knew one Irene, a bailarina, he answered that he knew one of loose
morals of the same name. Upon request of the Provincial Inspector, the chief of police tried
to locate some of his men to guide the constabulary soldiers in ascertaining Balagtas'
whereabouts, and failing to see anyone of them he volunteered to go with the party. The
Provincial Inspector divided the party into two groups with defendants Oanis and Galanta,
and private Fernandez taking the route to Rizal street leading to the house where Irene was
supposedly living. When this group arrived at Irene's house, Oanis approached one Brigida
Mallare, who was then stripping banana stalks, and asked her where Irene's room was.
Brigida indicated the place and upon further inquiry also said that Irene was sleeping with
her paramour. Brigida trembling, immediately returned to her own room which was very
near that occupied by Irene and her paramour. Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to
the room of Irene, and an seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the door where they
were, simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers.
Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at the
door where the shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at him. Shocked by the entire
scene. Irene fainted; it turned out later that the person shot and killed was not the notorious
criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson,
Irene's paramour. The Provincial Inspector, informed of the killing, repaired to the scene and
when he asked as to who killed the deceased. Galanta, referring to himself and to Oanis,
answered: "We two, sir." The corpse was thereafter brought to the provincial hospital and
upon autopsy by Dr. Ricardo de Castro, multiple gunshot wounds inflicted by a .32 and a .45
caliber revolvers were found on Tecson's body which caused his death.
Issue :
Whether or not the accused are liable for the act
Held:
The trial court refused to believe the appellants. Their testimonies are certainly incredible
not only because they are vitiated by a natural urge to exculpate themselves of the crime,
but also because they are materially contradictory.The true fact, therefore, of the case is
that, while Tecson was sleeping in his room with his back towards the door, Oanis and
Galanta, on sight, fired at him simultaneously or successively, believing him to be Anselmo
Balagtas but without having made previously any reasonable inquiry as to his identity. . It is
contended that, as appellants acted in innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance of
their official duties, both of them believing that Tecson was Balagtas, they incur no criminal
liability. Sustaining this theory in part, the lower court held and so declared them guilty of
the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence. We are of the opinion, however, that,
under the circumstances of the case, the crime committed by appellants is murder through
specially mitigated by circumstances to be mentioned below. The maxim is ignorantia facti
excusat, but this applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness.
In the instant case, appellants, unlike the accused in the instances cited, found no
circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate action. The person in the
room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity
without hazard to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable
effort to that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed, according to Irene Requinea.
This, indeed, is the only legitimate course of action for appellants to follow even if the victim
was really Balagtas, as they were instructed not to kill Balagtas at sight but to arrest him,
and to get him dead or alive only if resistance or aggression is offered by him.For all the
foregoing, the judgment is modified and appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder
with the mitigating circumstance above mentioned, and accordingly sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from five (5) years of prision correctional to fifteen (15) years
of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of the law, and to pay the heirs of the deceased
Serapio Tecson jointly and severally an indemnity of P2,000, with costs.

G.R. No. L-74324 November 17, 1988

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA, & BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA, accusedappellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Citizens Legal Assistance Office for accused-appellants.
Facts:
The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the accused Pugay were friends.
Miranda used to run errands for Pugay and at times they slept together. On the evening of
May 19, 1982, a town fiesta fair was held in the public plaza of Rosario, Cavite. There were
different kinds of ride and one was a ferris wheel.Sometime after midnight of the same date,
Eduardo Gabion was sitting in the ferris wheel and reading a comic book with his friend
Henry. Later, the accused Pugay and Samson with several companions arrived. These
persons appeared to be drunk as they were all happy and noisy. As the group saw the
deceased walking nearby, they started making fun of him. They made the deceased dance
by tickling him with a piece of wood.Not content with what they were doing with the
deceased, the accused Pugay suddenly took a can of gasoline from under the engine of the
ferns wheel and poured its contents on the body of the former. Gabion told Pugay not to do
so while the latter was already in the process of pouring the gasoline. Then, the accused
Samson set Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him.The ferris wheel operator later
arrived and doused with water the burning body of the deceased. Some people around also
poured sand on the burning body and others wrapped the same with rags to extinguish the
flame.
Issue: Whether or not the accused are liable of the crime
Held:
The next question to be determined is the criminal responsibility of the accused Pugay.
Having taken the can from under the engine of the ferris wheel and holding it before pouring
its contents on the body of the deceased, this accused knew that the can contained
gasoline. The stinging smell of this flammable liquid could not have escaped his notice even
before pouring the same. Clearly, he failed to exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid
every undesirable consequence arising from any act that may be committed by his
companions who at the time were making fun of the deceased. We agree with the Solicitor
General that the accused is only guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence defined in
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.There can be no doubt that the accused
Samson knew very well that the liquid poured on the body of the deceased was gasoline and
a flammable substance for he would not have committed the act of setting the latter on fire
if it were otherwise. Giving him the benefit of doubt, it call be conceded that as part of their

fun-making he merely intended to set the deceased's clothes on fire. His act, however, does
not relieve him of criminal responsibility. Burning the clothes of the victim would cause at
the very least some kind of physical injuries on his person, a felony defined in the Revised
Penal Code. If his act resulted into a graver offense, as what took place in the instant case,
he must be held responsible therefor. Article 4 of the aforesaid code provides, inter alia, that
criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.The proper penalty that the
accused Samson must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging from eight (8) years ofprision
mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

ARSENIA B. GARCIA,
Petitioner
G.R. No. 157171
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents
March 14, 2005
Facts:
On May 11, 1995 within the canvassing period during 1995 elections, in the Municipality of
Alaminos, Pangasinan. Election Officer Arsenia Garcia and the members of the board of
canvassersv,willfully, and unlawfully decrease[d] the votes received by senatorial candidate
Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. from six thousand nine hundred ninety-eight (6,998) vote to one
thousand nine hundred twenty-one (1,921) votes as reflected in the Statement of Votes by
Precincts with and Certificate of Canvass. the Court pronounces Garcia GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubts finding is a violation of Election Offense, she is thus sentenced to suffer
an imprisonment and she sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold public office and she is
also deprived of her right of suffrage. Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals which
affirmed with modification the RTC Decision, The Court of Appeals likewise denied the motion
for reconsideration. ON THE FOURTH GROUND, NAMELY, THAT THE PETITIONER WAS THE
ONE WHO ENTERED THE REDUCED FIGURE OF 1,921 IN THE CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS
(COC), RedUCTION OF THE VOTES OF CANDIDATE PIMENTEL WAS CLEARLY NOT WILLFUL OR
INTENTIONAL.
Respondent on the other hand contends that good faith is not a defense in the
violation of an election law, which falls under the class of mala prohibita.
ISSUE
The main issue is, Is a violation classified under mala in se or mala prohibita? Could good
faith and lack of criminal intent be valid defenses?
RULING
Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal
Code. When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala
in se, even if they are punished by a special law. Aordingly, criminal intent must be
clearly established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed.

On the other hand, in crimes that are mala prohibita, the criminal acts are not inherently
immoral but become punishable only because the law says they are forbidden. With these
crimes, the sole issue is whether the law has been violated.Criminal intent is not necessary
where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy. Clearly, the acts prohibited in are
mala in se. Intentional increasing or decreasing the number of votes received by a
candidate is inherently immoral, since it is done with malice and intent to injure another.
Criminal intent is presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the
law punishes, unless the contrary shall appear.[13] Thus, whoever invokes good faith as a
defense has the burden of proving its existence.At first glance, however, there is a
noticeable discrepancy in the addition of the subtotals to arrive at the grand total of votes
received by each candidate for all 159 precincts in SOV No. 008423.[15] The grand total of
the votes for private complainant, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, was only 1,921 instead of
6,921, or 5,000 votes less than the number of votes private complainant actually received. T
Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence should be exercised by the
members of the board of canvassers in canvassing the results of the elections.
Any error on their part would result in the disenfranchisement of the voters. The
Certificate of Canvass for senatorial candidates and its supporting statements of
votes prepared by the municipal board of canvassers are sensitive election
documents whose entries must be thoroughly scrutinized.[22]

[G.R. No. 142773. January 28, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARLON DELIM, LEON DELIM, MANUEL
DELIM alias BONG (At Large), ROBERT DELIM (At Large), and RONALD DELIM alias BONG,
accused-appellants.
Facts :
On January 23, 1999, at around 6:30 in the evening, Modesto, Rita and Randy were
preparing to have their supper in their home. Joining them were Modesto and Ritas two
young grandchildren, aged 5 and 7 years old. They were about to eat their dinner when
Marlon, Robert and Ronald suddenly barged into the house and closed the door. Each of the
three intruders was armed with a short handgun. Marlon poked his gun at Modesto while
Robert and Ronald simultaneously grabbed and hog-tied the victim. A piece of cloth was
placed in the mouth of Modesto.[4] Marlon, Robert and Ronald herded Modesto out of the
house on their way towards the direction of Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan. Rita and Randy were
warned by the intruders not to leave the house. Leon and Manuel, who were also armed with
short handguns, stayed put by the door to the house of Modesto and ordered Rita and Randy
to stay where they were. Leon and Manuel left the house of Modesto only at around 7:00
a.m. the following day, January 24, 1999.
As soon as Leon and Manuel had left, Randy rushed to the house of his uncle, Darwin Nio, at
Sitio Labayog, informed the latter of the incident the night before and sought his help for the
retrieval of Modesto. Randy was advised to report the matter to the police authorities.
However, Randy opted to first look for his father. He and his other relatives scoured the
vicinity to locate Modesto to no avail. They proceeded to Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan, around
200 meters away from Modestos house, to locate Modesto but failed to find him there. On
January 25, 1999, Randy and his relatives returned to the housing project in Paldit, Sison,
Pangasinan to locate Modesto but again failed to find him there. On January 26, 1999, Randy
reported the incident to the police authorities.At around 3:00 in the afternoon of January 27,
1999, Randy, in the company of his relatives, Nida Pucal, Pepito Pucal, Bernard Osias and
Daniel Delim, returned to the housing project in Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan and this time they
found Modesto under thick bushes in a grassy area. He was already dead. The cadaver was

bloated and in the state of decomposition. It exuded a bad odor. Tiny white worms swarmed
over and feasted on the cadaver. Randy and his relatives immediately rushed to the police
station to report the incident and to seek assistance.When informed of the discovery of
Modestos cadaver, the local chief of police and SPO2 Jovencio Fajarito and other policemen
rushed to the scene and saw the cadaver under the thick bushes. Pictures were taken of the
cadaver.[5] Rita and Randy divulged to the police investigators the names and addresses of
Marlon, Ronald, Robert, Leon and Manuel, whom they claimed were responsible for the death
of Modesto. Rita and Randy were at a loss why the five malefactors seized Modesto and
killed him. Rita and Randy gave their respective sworn statements to the police
investigators.[6] Police authorities proceeded to arrest Marlon, Ronald, Robert, Manuel and
Leon but failed to find them in their respective houses. The police officers scoured the
mountainous parts of Barangays Immalog and Labayog to no avail.
The cadaver was autopsied by Dr. Maria Fe L. De Guzman who prepared her autopsy report.
Before resolving the merits of the case at bar, we first resolve the matter of whether the
crime charged in the Information is murder or kidnapping. During the deliberation, some
distinguished members of the Court opined that under the Information, Marlon, Ronald and
Leon are charged with kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and not with
murder in its aggravated form in light of the allegation therein that the accused willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously grab(bed), h(e)ld, hog-tie(d), gag(ged), with a piece of cloth,
brought out and abduct(ed) Modesto Delim (while) Leon Delim and Manuel Delim stayed in
the house (and) guarded and prevented the wife and son of Modesto Delim from helping the
latter. They submit that the foregoing allegation constitutes the act of deprivation of liberty
of the victim, the gravamen in the crime of kidnapping. They contend that the fact that the
Information went further to charge accused with the killing of the victim should be of no
moment, the real nature of the criminal charge being determined not from the caption or the
preamble of the Information nor from the specification of the law alleged to have been
violated these being conclusions of law but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or
information. They further submit that since the prosecution failed to prove motive on the
part of Marlon, Ronald and Leon to kill Modesto, they are not criminally liable for the death of
the victim but only for kidnapping the victim.
Issue: whether or not the plantiff is accused of murder or homicide
Specific intent may be proved by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. It may be
inferred from
It is true that the prosecution failed to prove motive on the part of the malefactors to abduct
and kill Modesto. Indeed, Randy and Rita testified that they were not aware of any
misunderstanding or grudge between Modesto on the one hand and Marlon, Ronald and
Leon and their co-accused on the other before the incident, or any motivation on the part of
the three malefactors to cause harm to Modesto. Nonetheless, it cannot thereby be
concluded that a person or persons other than Marlon, Ronald and Leon were criminally
responsible for the death of the victim. It is a matter of judicial notice that nowadays persons
have killed or committed serious crimes for no reason at all.[46] In this case, the inscrutable
facts are that Marlon and Ronald, each of whom was armed with a handgun, forcibly took
Modesto from his house at the gunpoint, hogtied, put a piece of cloth in his mouth and after
Ronald and Marlon had left the house with Modesto in tow, Rita heard three gunshots or so
and the cadaver of Modesto was found concealed under the bushes and already in a state of
putrefaction in the afternoon of January 27, 1999. Modesto sustained several gunshot
wounds and died because of a gunshot wound on the head. The criminal acts and the
connection of Marlon, Ronald and Leon with said acts having been proved by the prosecution
beyond reasonable doubt, the act itself furnishes the evidence, that to its perpetration there
was some causes or influences moving the mind.[47] The remarkable tapestry intricately
woven by the prosecution should not be trashed simply because the malefactors had no
motive to kill Modesto.

EDUARDO P. MANUEL, G.R. No. 165842

vs
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. November 29, 2005
Facts:
The prosecution adduced evidence that on July 28, 1975, Eduardo was married to Rubylus
Gaa before Msgr. Feliciano Santos in Makati, which was then still a municipality of the
Province of Rizal.[4] He met the private complainant Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City
sometime in January 1996. She stayed in Bonuan, Dagupan City for two days looking for a
friend. Tina was then 21 years old, a Computer Secretarial student, while Eduardo was 39.
Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit her. Eventually, as one thing led to another,
they went to a motel where, despite Tinas resistance, Eduardo succeeded in having his way
with her. Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he was single.
Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tinas parents, and was assured by
them that their son was still single. Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the
first week of March 1996. They were married on April 22, 1996 before Judge Antonio C.
Reyes, the Presiding Judge of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61.[5] It appeared in their
marriage contract that Eduardo was single.The couple was happy during the first three years
of their married life. Through their joint efforts, they were able to build their home in Cypress
Point, Irisan, Baguio City. However, starting 1999, Manuel started making himself scarce and
went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked
money from Eduardo, he would slap her. [6] Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took all his
clothes, left, and did not return. Worse, he stopped giving financial support.Sometime in
August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the National Statistics Office
(NSO) in Manila where she learned that Eduardo had been previously married. She secured
an NSO-certified copy of the marriage contract. [7]She was so embarrassed and humiliated
when she learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when they exchanged their own
vows.[8]
For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995 in a bar where she worked
as a Guest Relations Officer (GRO). He fell in love with her and married her. He informed Tina
of his previous marriage to Rubylus Gaa, but she nevertheless agreed to marry him. Their
marital relationship was in order until this one time when he noticed that she had a love-bite
on her neck. He then abandoned her. Eduardo further testified that he declared he was
single in his marriage contract with Tina because he believed in good faith that his first
marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification
of his first marriage before marrying Tina.Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced to
marry his first wife because she threatened to commit suicide unless he did so. Rubylus was
charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned. He visited her in jail after three
months and never saw her again. He insisted that he married Tina believing that his first
marriage was no longer valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20
years.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is criminally liable from his acts
Ruling:
The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the
private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid
defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal

intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to
know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. It was the burden of the petitioner to prove
his defense that when he married the private complainant in 1996, he was of the wellgrounded
belief
that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years
since 1975. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring
the presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,
in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code. Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof
that the petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part when he
married the private complainant and, as a consequence, he could not be held guilty of
bigamy in such case. The petitioner, however, failed to discharge his

G.R. No. 172716

November 17, 2010

JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents.
The Facts
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate
offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No.
82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No.
82366) for the death of respondent Ponces husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the
spouses Ponces vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.On 7
September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and
was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to
quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second
punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.The MeTC refused quashal, finding
no identity of offenses in the two cases.3
After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803).
Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a
prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioners motion, the MeTC proceeded with the
arraignment and, because of petitioners absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his
arrest.4 Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to
suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. 5 Petitioner sought
reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.
Petitioner laments the RTCs failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803.
Invoking jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice
in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No.
82366, having been previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the same offense of

reckless imprudence charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the
multiple consequences of such crime are material only to determine his penalty.
The Issues
If in the negative, whether petitioners constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause
bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
The Ruling of the Court
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of
reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the
essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would
be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result
thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty,
it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether
the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal
negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and
prosecutions.35.
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler
protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are
thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48,
but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of nonprosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more
serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article
365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most
severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether
penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept
of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting
crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.

G.R. No. L-42288

February 16, 1935

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CORNELIO BAYONA, defendant-appellant.
Facts:Defendant was driving his automobile on a road in front of electoral precinct no. 4 in
Barrio Aranguel, Pilar, Capiz. He had a revolver with him. He was called by his friend, Jose
Benliro. He alighted from his automobile and approached him to find out what he wanted.
He did not leave his revolver on the automobile, because there people in the road in front of
the polling place and he might lose it. He was within the fence surrounding the polling place

when Jose E. Desiderio, a representative of Department of Interior, took possession of the

revolver defendant was carrying.
Issue: Whether or not the defendant is liable to criminal act
Held:
The law which the defendant violated is a statutory provision, and the intent with which he
violated is immaterial. It may be concede that defendant did not intend to intimidate any
elector or to violate the law in any other way, but when he got out of his automobile and
carried his revolver inside of the fence surrounding the polling place, he committed the act
complained of, and he committed it wilfully. The Election Law does not require for its
violation that the offender has the intention to intimidate the voters or to interfere otherwise
with the election.
G.R. No. 4963

September 15, 1909

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GO CHICO, defendant-appellant.
Facts:
That on or about the 4th day of August, 1908, in the city of Manila, the appellant Go Chico
displayed in one of the windows and one of the show cases of his store, No. 89 Calle Rosario,
a number of medallions, in the form of a small button, upon the faces of which were
imprinted in miniature the picture of Emilio Aguinaldo, and the flag or banner or device used
during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate and identify those in armed
insurrection against the United States. On the day previous to the one above set forth the
appellant had purchased the stock of goods in said store, of which the medallions formed a
part, at a public sale made under authority of the sheriff of the city of Manila. On the day in
question, the 4th of August aforesaid, the appellant was arranging his stock of goods for the
purpose of displaying them to the public and in so doing placed in his showcase and in one
of the windows of his store the medallions described. The appellant was ignorant of the
existence of a law against the display of the medallions in question and had consequently no
corrupt intention.
Issue: Whether or not the defendant is liable of the criminal act
Held:

In the opinion of this court it is not necessary that the appellant should have acted
with the criminal intent. In many crimes, made such by statutory enactment, the
intention of the person who commits the crime is entirely immaterial. This is
necessarily so. If it were not, the statute as a deterrent influence would be
substantially worthless. It would be impossible of execution. In many cases the act

complained of is itself that which produces the pernicious effect which the statute
seeks to avoid. In those cases the pernicious effect is produced with precisely the
same force and result whether the intention of the person performing the act is good
or bad. The case at bar is a perfect illustration of this. The display of a flag or emblem
used particularly within a recent period, by the enemies of the Government tends to
incite resistance to governmental functions and insurrection against governmental
authority just as effectively if made in the best of good faith as if made with the most
corrupt intent. The display itself, without the intervention of any other factor, is the
evil. It is quite different from that large class of crimes, made such by the common
law or by statute, in which the injurious effect upon the public depends upon the
corrupt intention of the person perpetrating the act.

G.R. No. 152133

February 9, 2006

ROLLIE
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., Respondents.

CALIMUTAN, Petitioner,

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Facts:
On 04 February 1996, at around 10:00 a.m., the victim Cantre and witness Saano, together
with two other companions, had a drinking spree at a videoke bar in Crossing Capsay,
Panique, Aroroy, Masbate. From the videoke bar, the victim Cantre and witness Saano
proceeded to go home to their respective houses, but along the way, they crossed paths
with petitioner Calimutan and a certain Michael Bulalacao. Victim Cantre was harboring a
grudge against Bulalacao, suspecting the latter as the culprit responsible for throwing stones
at the Cantres house on a previous night. Thus, upon seeing Bulalacao, victim Cantre
suddenly punched him. While Bulalacao ran away, petitioner Calimutan dashed towards the
backs of victim Cantre and witness Saano. Petitioner Calimutan then picked up a stone, as
big as a mans fist, which he threw at victim Cantre, hitting him at the left side of his back.
When hit by the stone, victim Cantre stopped for a moment and held his back. Witness
Saano put himself between the victim Cantre and petitioner Calimutan, and attempted to
pacify the two, even convincing petitioner Calimutan to put down another stone he was
already holding. He also urged victim Cantre and petitioner Calimutan to just go home.
Witness Saano accompanied victim Cantre to the latters house, and on the way, victim
Cantre complained of the pain in the left side of his back hit by the stone. They arrived at
the Cantres house at around 12:00 noon, and witness Saano left victim Cantre to the care
of the latters mother, Belen.8Victim Cantre immediately told his mother, Belen, of the
stoning incident involving petitioner Calimutan. He again complained of backache and also
of stomachache, and was unable to eat. By nighttime, victim Cantre was alternately feeling
cold and then warm. He was sweating profusely and his entire body felt numb. His family
would have wanted to bring him to a doctor but they had no vehicle. At around 3:00 a.m. of

the following day, 05 February 1996, Belen was wiping his son with a piece of cloth, when
victim Cantre asked for some food. He was able to eat a little, but he also later vomited
whatever he ate. For the last time, he complained of backache and stomachache, and
shortly thereafter, he died. Right after his death, victim Cantre was examined by Dr. Conchita
S. Ulanday, the Municipal Health Officer of Aroroy, Masbate. The Post-Mortem Examination
Report10 and Certification of Death,11 issued and signed by Dr. Ulanday, stated that the cause
of death of victim Cantre was cardio-respiratory arrest due to suspected food poisoning. The
body of victim Cantre was subsequently embalmed and buried on 13 February
1996.Unsatisfied with the findings of Dr. Ulanday, the Cantre family, with the help of the
Lingkod Bayan-Circulo de Abogadas of the ABS-CBN Foundation, requested for an
exhumation and autopsy of the body of the victim Cantre by the NBI. The exhumation and
autopsy of the body of the victim Cantre
In his testimony before the RTC, Dr. Mendez affirmed the contents of his exhumation and
autopsy report. He explained that the victim Cantre suffered from an internal hemorrhage
and there was massive accumulation of blood in his abdominal cavity due to his lacerated
spleen. The laceration of the spleen can be caused by any blunt instrument, such as a stone.
Hence, Dr. Mendez confirmed the possibility that the victim Cantre was stoned to death by
petitioner Calimutan.13
Issue: whether or not the petitioner is liable for the act
Ruling:
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code classifies felonies according to the means by which they
are committed, in particular: (1) intentional felonies, and (2) culpable felonies. These two
types of felonies are distinguished from each other by the existence or absence of malicious
intent of the offender In intentional felonies, the act or omission of the offender
is malicious. In the language of Art. 3, the act is performed with deliberate intent (with
malice). The offender, in performing the act or in incurring the omission, has the intention to
cause an injury to another. In culpable felonies, the act or omission of the offender
is notmalicious. The injury caused by the offender to another person is "unintentional, it
being simply the incident of another act performed without malice." (People vs. Sara, 55
Phil. 939). As stated in Art. 3, the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of
foresight or lack of skill.34
In the Petition at bar, this Court cannot, in good conscience, attribute to petitioner Calimutan
any malicious intent to injure, much less to kill, the victim Cantre; and in the absence
of such intent, this Court cannot sustain the conviction of petitioner Calimutan for the
intentional crime of homicide, as rendered by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. Instead, this Court finds petitioner Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the culpable felony of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under

EDUARDO P. DIEGO, complainant, vs. JUDGE SILVERIO Q. CASTILLO, Regional Trial

Court, Dagupan City, Branch 43,respondent.

Facts:
On January 9, 1965, accused Lucena Escoto contracted marriage with Jorge de Perio, Jr.,
solemnized before then Mayor Liberato Reyna ofnDagupan City. The couple were both
Filipinos. In the marriage contract, the accused used and adopted the name Crescencia
Escoto, with a civil status of single; In a document dated February 15, 1978,
denominated as a Decree of Divorce and purportedly issued to Jorge de Perio as
petitioner by the Family District Court of Harris County, Texas (247 th Judicial District), it
was ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing
between Jorge de Perio and Crescencia de Perio are hereby Dissolved, Cancelled and
Annulled and the Petitioner is hereby granted a Divorce.) Subsequently, on June 4, 1987,
the same Crescencia Escoto contracted marriage with herein complainants brother,
Manuel P. Diego, solemnized before the Rev. Fr. Clemente T. Godoy, parish priest
of Dagupan City. The marriage contract shows that this time, the accused used and
adopted the name Lucena Escoto, again, with a civil status of single. [1]
After trial of the criminal case for bigamy, respondent Judge promulgated a decision.The
decision states that the main basis for the acquittal was good faith on the part of the
accused. Respondent Judge gave credence to the defense of the accused that she acted
without any malicious intent.Complainant herein alleges that the decision rendered by the
respondent Judge is manifestly against the law and contrary to the evidence. He questions
the evidentiary In his comment, respondent Judge explains that what was in issue was the
criminal culpability of the accused under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Respondent
Judge does not dispute that the second marriage was bigamous because at the time it was
contracted, the first marriage was still subsisting since divorce is not recognized in our
country and because the accuseds first husband was still alive. Respondent Judge, however,
maintains that what was controlling was whether by virtue of the divorce decree the accused
honestly believed, albeit mistakenly, that her first marriage had been severed and she could
marry again. According to respondent Judge, the same is a state of mind personal to the
accused. He further stressed that knowledge of the law should not be exacted strictly from
the accused since she is a lay person, and that ineptitude should not be confused with
criminal intent.
Issue: Whether the decision of the judge is right or not
These findings notwithstanding, the issue before us is whether or not respondent Judge
should be held administratively liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and/or
gross ignorance of the law. We have heretofore ruled that a judge may not be held
administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision he renders. To
unjustifiably hold otherwise, assuming that he has erred, would be nothing short of
harassment and would make his position doubly unbearable, for no one called upon to try
the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his
judgment. The error must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or in evident bad faith. It
is only in this latter instance, when the judge acts fraudulently or with gross ignorance, that
administrative sanctions are called for as an imperative duty of this Court.As a matter of
public policy then, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not subject to disciplinary
action, even though such acts are erroneous. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt
motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with

ignorance of the law can find refuge. It does not mean, however, that a judge, given the
leeway he is accorded in such cases, should not evince due care in the performance of his
adjudicatory prerogatives. After evaluation of the merits of the case, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) recommended that respondent Judge be reprimanded with a stern
warning of a more severe penalty in the future. The act of respondent Judge in rendering the
decision in question took place on February 24, 1999 or before the effectivity, on October 1,
2001, of A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC which classified gross ignorance of the law as a serious charge
and penalized the offense with a fine of not less than P20,000 but not more
than P40,000.Applying the rule as then prevailing, and in line with applicable
jurisprudence, the sanction on respondent Judge should be a fine in the amount of P10,000.

[G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001]

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.