RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED AT TRIAL

To due process:
Marquez v Sandiganbayan
One of the most vital and precious rights accorded to an accused by the
Constitution is due process, which includes a fair and impartial trial and a
reasonable opportunity to present ones defense. Under Section 14, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution, it is provided that:
(1)
No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law. xxx
In this connection, it is well settled that due process in criminal proceedings
requires that (a) the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with
judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is
lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that the accused is
given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon
lawful hearing.
While the Constitution does not specify the nature of this opportunity, by
necessary implication, it means that the accused should be allowed reasonable
freedom to present his defense if the courts are to give form and substance to
this guaranty. Should the trial court fail to accord an accused reasonable
opportunity to submit evidence in his defense, the exercise by the Court of its
certiorari jurisdiction is warranted as this amounts to a denial of due process.
To be informed:
People v Francisco
While the failure to allege the relationship between accused-appellant and the
complainant appears to be a mere technicality, it nevertheless saves accusedappellant from the supreme penalty of death imposable for qualified rape
because he was not properly informed that he is being accused of qualified rape.
Due process demands that an accused in a criminal case should be informed of
the nature of the offense with which he is charged before he is brought to trial in
order to enable him to prepare for his defense. In meting out the death penalty
upon accused-appellant for qualified rape, the trial court violated accusedappellants constitutional right to be properly informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him.
To be present and to be heard
People v Bodoso
to protect the constitutional right to due process of every accused in a capital
offense and to avoid any confusion about the proper steps to be taken when a
trial court comes face to face with an accused or his counsel who wants to waive
his clients right to present evidence and be heard, it shall be the unequivocal
duty of the trial court to observe, as a prerequisite to the validity of such waiver,
a procedure akin to a searching inquiry as specified in People v. Aranzado[19]
when an accused pleads guilty, particularly
1. The trial court shall hear both the prosecution and the accused with their
respective counsel on the desire or manifestation of the accused to waive the
right to present evidence and be heard.
2. The trial court shall ensure the attendance of the prosecution and especially
the accused with their respective counsel in the hearing which must be recorded.
Their presence must be duly entered in the minutes of the proceedings.
3. During the hearing, it shall be the task of the trial court to
a. ask the defense counsel a series of questions to determine whether he had
conferred with and completely explained to the accused that he had the right to

present evidence and be heard as well as its meaning and consequences,

together with the significance and outcome of the waiver of such right. If the
lawyer for the accused has not done so, the trial court shall give the latter
enough time to fulfill this professional obligation.
b. inquire from the defense counsel with conformity of the accused whether he
wants to present evidence or submit a memorandum elucidating on the
contradictions and insufficiency of the prosecution evidence, if any, or in default
thereof, file a demurrer to evidence with prior leave of court, if he so believes
that the prosecution evidence is so weak that it need not even be rebutted. If
there is a desire to do so, the trial court shall give the defense enough time for
this purpose.
c. elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age,
socio-economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a
trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed waiver.
d. all questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and
understood by the latter, hence, the record must state the language used for this
purpose as well as reflect the corresponding translation thereof in English.
Miguel v Sandiganbayan
Since a pre-suspension hearing is basically a due process requirement, when an
accused public official is given an adequate opportunity to be heard on his
possible defenses against the mandatory suspension under R.A. No. 3019, then
an accused would have no reason to complain that no actual hearing was
conducted.[47] It is well settled that to be heard does not only mean oral
arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, has been
accorded, no denial of procedural due process exists. [48]
To confront accusers and witnesses:
Go v People
The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court.
This is true especially in criminal cases where the Constitution secures to the
accused his right to a public trial and to meet the witnessess against him face to
face. The requirement is the "safest and most satisfactory method of
investigating facts" as it enables the judge to test the witness' credibility through
his manner and deportment while testifying. It is not without exceptions,
however, as the Rules of Court recognizes the conditional examination of
witnesses and the use of their depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of
direct court testimony.
Even in criminal proceedings, there is no doubt as to the availability of
conditional examination of witnesses both for the benefit of the defense, as
well as the prosecution.
The Conditional Examination of a Prosecution Witness Cannot Defeat the Rights
of the Accused to Public Trial and Confrontation of Witnesses
The right of confrontation, on the other hand, is held to apply specifically to
criminal proceedings and to have a twofold purpose: (1) to afford the accused an
opportunity to test the testimony of witnesses by cross-examination, and (2) to
allow the judge to observe the deportment of witnesses.
As the right of confrontation is intended "to secure the accused in the right to be
tried as far as facts provable by witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial
who give their testimony in his presence, and give to the accused an opportunity
of cross-examination,"
To counsel of his own choice:

People v Serzo
Accordingly, an accused may exercise his right to counsel by electing to be
represented either by a court-appointed lawyer or by one of his own
choice. While his right to be represented by counsel is immutable, his option to
secure the services of counsel de parte, however, is not absolute. The court is
obliged to balance the privilege to retain a counsel of choice against the statess
and the offended partys equally important right to speedy and adequate
justice. Thus, the court may restrict the accuseds option to retain a counsel de
parte if the accused insists on an attorney he cannot afford, or the chosen
counsel is not a member of the bar, or the attorney declines to represent the
accused for a valid reason, e.g. conflict of interest and the like.[29]
Also, the right to counsel de parte is, like other personal rights,
waivable[30] so long as (1) the waiver is not contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals or good customs; or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law[31] and (2) the waiver is unequivocally, knowingly and
intelligently made.[32]
In Sayson vs. People,[33] this Court held that the duty of the court to appoint a
counsel de oficio is not mandatory where the accused has proceeded with the
arraignment and the trial with a counsel of his choice but, when the time for the
presentation of the evidence for the defense was due, he appears by himself
alone because of the inexcusable absence of his counsel. In another case, this
Court held that the right to be heard and to reopen the case (and send it to trial
anew) could not be allowed if doing so would sanction a plainly dilatory tactic
and a reprehensible trifling with the orderly administration of justice.

People v Lara
The right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at the precise moment custodial
investigation begins and being made to stand in a police line-up is not the
starting point or a part of custodial investigation.
Waiver of right to counsel
People v Nicandro
Like other constitutional rights, the right against self-incrimination, including the
right of a person under investigation to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right, may be waived. To be valid, however, a waiver of the
right must not only be voluntary; it must be made knowingly and intelligently
(People vs. Caguioa, supra), which presupposes an awareness or understanding
of what is being waived. It stands to reason that where the right has not been
adequately explained and there are serious doubts as to whether the person
interrogated knew and understood his relevant constitutional rights when he
answered the questions, it is Idle to talk of waiver of rights.
Against self-incrimination:
People v Yatar

In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the
blood sample taken from him as well as the DNA tests were conducted in
violation of his right to remain silent as well as his right against self-incrimination
under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution.
This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion,
but against testimonial compulsion.37 The right against self- incrimination is
simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an
admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is
not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.
Against Double jeopardy:
Bangayan Jr v Bangayan
Double jeopardy attaches if the following elements are present: (1) a valid
complaint or information; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the defendant
had pleaded to the charge; and (4) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted or
the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.[37] However, jurisprudence allows for certain exceptions when the
dismissal is considered final even if it was made on motion of the accused, to wit:
(1) Where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused
after the prosecution has rested, which has the effect of a judgment on the
merits and operates as an acquittal.
(2) Where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused, because of the
denial of his right to a speedy trial which is in effect a failure to prosecute.[38]
The only instance when the accused can be barred from invoking his right
against double jeopardy is when it can be demonstrated that the trial court acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such
as where the prosecution was not allowed the opportunity to make its case
against the accused or where the trial was a sham.[39] For instance, there is no
double jeopardy (1) where the trial court prematurely terminated the
presentation of the prosecution's evidence and forthwith dismissed the
information for insufficiency of evidence;[40] and (2) where the case was
dismissed at a time when the case was not ready for trial and adjudication.
People v Court of Appeals
A void judgment has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for any
purpose. In contemplation of law, it is non-existent.[23] It cannot impair or create
rights; nor can any right be based on it. Thus, respondent Almuete cannot base
his claim of double jeopardy on the appellate courts decision.
People v Sandiganbayan
x x x it is clear in this jurisdiction that after trial on the merits, an acquittal is
immediately final and cannot be appealed on the ground of double
jeopardy. The only exception where double jeopardy cannot be invoked
is where there is a finding of mistrial resulting in a denial of due
process.
Ysidoro v Leonardo De Castro
s applied to judgments rendered in criminal cases, unlike a review via a Rule 65
petition, only judgments of conviction can be reviewed in an ordinary appeal or a
Rule 45 petition. As we explained in People v. Nazareno,[18] the constitutional
right of the accused against double jeopardy proscribes appeals of judgments of
acquittal through the remedies of ordinary appeal and a Rule 45 petition, thus:
The Constitution has expressly adopted the double jeopardy policy and thus bars
multiple criminal trials, thereby conclusively presuming that a second trial would

be unfair if the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a previous final
judgment. Further prosecution via an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is
likewise barred because the government has already been afforded a complete
opportunity to prove the criminal defendants culpability; after failing to persuade
the court to enter a final judgment of conviction, the underlying reasons
supporting the constitutional ban on multiple trials applies and becomes
compelling. The reason is not only the defendants already established innocence
at the first trial where he had been placed in peril of conviction, but also the
same untoward and prejudicial consequences of a second trial initiated by a
government who has at its disposal all the powers and resources of the State.
Unfairness and prejudice would necessarily result, as the government would then
be allowed another opportunity to persuade a second trier of the defendants
guilt while strengthening any weaknesses that had attended the first trial, all in a
process where the governments power and resources are once again employed
against the defendants individual means. That the second opportunity comes
via an appeal does not make the effects any less prejudicial by the standards of
reason, justice and conscience.[19] (emphases supplied)
However, the rule against double jeopardy cannot be properly invoked in a Rule
65 petition, predicated on two (2) exceptional grounds, namely: in a judgment of
acquittal rendered with grave abuse of discretion by the court; and where the
prosecution had been deprived of due process.[20] The rule against double
jeopardy does not apply in these instances because a Rule 65 petition does not
involve a review of facts and law on the merits in the manner done in an appeal.
In certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not examine and assess the
evidence of the parties nor weigh the probative value of the evidence.[21] It
does not include an inquiry on the correctness of the evaluation of the evidence.
[22] A review under Rule 65 only asks the question of whether there has been a
validly rendered decision, not the question of whether the decision is legally
correct.[23] In other words, the focus of the review is to determine whether the
judgment is per se void on jurisdictional grounds.[24]
People v Sandiganbayan 665 SCRA 89
Cannot find in internet
People v Atienza
The elements of double jeopardy are (1) the complaint or information was
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court had
jurisdiction; (3) the accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the
accused was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed without his
express consent.
Trial in absentia
Parada v Veneracion
Section 14 (2), Article 3 of the Constitution provides, inter alia, that trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been
duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. The requisites then of a
valid trial in absentia are: (1) the accused has already been arraigned; (2) he has
been duly notified of the trial; and (3) his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
It is worthy to stress that due process of law in judicial proceedings requires that
the accused must be given an opportunity to be heard. He has the right to be
present and defend in person at every stage of the proceedings. Incidentally, the
right to a hearing carries with it the right to be notified of every incident of the
proceedings in court. Notice to a party is essential to enable him to adduce his
own evidence and to meet and refute the evidence submitted by the other party.

[7] No less than the Constitution provides that no person shall be held to answer
for a criminal offense without due process of law. A violation therefore of any of
the rights accorded the accused constitutes a denial of due process of law. The
circumstantial setting of the instant case as weighed by the basic standards of
fair play impels us to so hold that the trial in absentia of Parada and his
subsequent conviction are tainted with the vice of nullity, for evidently Parada
was denied due process of law.
Right to speedy trial
Villareal v People
The right is deemed violated when the proceeding is attended with unjustified
postponements of trial, or when a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the case being tried and for no cause or justifiable motive.[54] In
determining the right of the accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than
a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled
hearings of the case.[55] The conduct of both the prosecution and the defense
must be weighed.[56] Also to be considered are factors such as the length of
delay, the assertion or non-assertion of the right, and the prejudice wrought
upon the defendant.[57]
We have consistently ruled in a long line of cases that a dismissal of the case
pursuant to the right of the accused to speedy trial is tantamount to acquittal.
[58] As a consequence, an appeal or a reconsideration of the dismissal would
amount to a violation of the principle of double jeopardy.
Mari v Gonzales
his right to a speedy trial may be defined as one free from vexatious, capricious
and oppressive delays, its "salutary objective" being to assure that an innocent
person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if
otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time
compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate
defense he may interpose. Intimating historical perspective on the evolution of
the right to speedy trial, we reiterate the old legal maxim, "justice delayed is
justice denied." This oft-repeated adage requires the expeditious resolution of
disputes, much more so in criminal cases where an accused is constitutionally
guaranteed the right to a speedy trial.
A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused
necessarily compels the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.
Exhaustively explained in Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, an accused's right to speedy
trial is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays. In determining whether petitioner was
deprived of this right, the factors to consider and balance are the following: (a)
duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to
assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay.
We emphasize that in determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts
are required to do more than a mathematical computation of the number of
postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. A mere mathematical
reckoning of the time involved is clearly insufficient, and particular regard must
be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
Imperial v Joson
Although the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure concededly mandates
commencement of the trial within 30 days from receipt of the pre-trial order[71]
and the continuous conduct thereof for a period not exceeding 180 days,[72]
Section 3 a (1), Rule 119 provides that delays resulting from extraordinary

remedies against interlocutory orders shall be excluded in computing the time

within which trial must commence. In determining the right of an accused to
speedy trial, moreover, courts are "required to do more than a mathematical
computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the
case" and to give particular regard to the facts and circumstances peculiar to
each case.[73] Viewed in the context of the above discussed procedural
antecedents as well as the further reassignment of the case to Prosecutor
Baligod as a consequence of Prosecutor Sias subsequent transfer to another
government office, we find that the CA correctly brushed aside petitioner
Francisco's claim that the postponements of the pre-trial conferences in the case
before the Sariaya MTC were violative of his right to a speedy trial.