5) RODOLFO M. BERNARDO vs. ATTY.

ISMAEL F. MEJIA
Adm. Case No. 2984
August 31, 2007
FACTS:
On January 23, 1987, Rodolfo M. Bernardo, Jr.
accused his retained attorney, Ismael F. Mejia, of
the following administrative offenses:
1) misappropriating and converting to his
personal use part of the money entrusted to
him for payment of real estate taxes on
property belonging to Bernardo,
2) falsification of certain documents, to wit:
(a) a special power of attorney purportedly
executed in his favor by Bernardo; (b) a deed
of sale; and (c) a deed of assignment
purportedly executed in Bernardos favor
3) issuing a check, knowing that he was
without funds in the bank, in payment of a
loan obtained from Bernardo in the amount
of P50,000.00, and thereafter, replacing said
check with others known also to be
insufficiently funded.
On July 29, 1992, the Supreme Court En Banc
declared the respondent, Atty. Ismael F. Mejia,
guilty of all the charges against him and imposes
on him the penalty of DISBARMENT.
On June 1, 1999, Mejia filed a Petition praying
that he be allowed to reengage in the practice of
law. However, the Supreme Court En Banc denied
his petition.
ISSUE:
WON Mejias petition for reinstatement may be
granted.
HOLDING: YES
Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the
Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent on the
sound discretion of the Court. The action will
depend on whether or not the Court decides that
the public interest in the orderly and impartial
administration of justice will continue to be
preserved even with the applicants reentry as a
counselor at law. The applicant must, like a
candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the
Court that he is a person of good moral character,
a fit and proper person to practice law. The Court
will take into consideration the applicants
character and standing prior to the disbarment,
the nature and character of the charge/s for
which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent
to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed
between the disbarment and the application for
reinstatement.
In this case, fifteen years has passed since
Mejias disbarment. Although the Court does not

lightly take the bases for Mejias disbarment, it

also cannot close its eyes to the fact that Mejia is
already 71 years old. While the age of the
petitioner and the length of time during which he
has endured the ignominy of disbarment are not
the sole measure in allowing a petition for
reinstatement, the Court takes cognizance of the
rehabilitation of Mejia. Since his disbarment in
1992, no other transgression has been attributed
to him, and he has shown remorse. Obviously, he
has learned his lesson from this experience, and
his punishment has lasted long enough.
Thus, while the Court is ever mindful of its duty to
discipline its erring officers, it also knows how to
show compassion when the penalty imposed has
already served its purpose. After all, penalties,
such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish
but to correct offenders.

6) GSIS, vs. HON. VICENTE PACQUING &

ATTY. MARIO ANACLETO BAEZ, JR.
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1831
February 2, 2007
FACTS:
In 1971, Bengson Commercial Building, Inc.
(Bengson) borrowed P4,250,000 from petitioner
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
secured by real estate and chattel mortgages.
When Bengson defaulted in the payment of the
amortizations, petitioner extrajudicially foreclosed
the mortgaged properties and sold them at public
auction where it emerged as the highest bidder.
In 1977, Bengson filed an to annul the
extrajudicial foreclosure. The trial court then
declared the foreclosure void and directed
petitioner to restore to Bengson the foreclosed
properties, pay damages and costs of suit.
Subsequently, Judge Vicente A. Pacquing directed
petitioner to pay Bengson the equivalent value of
the foreclosed properties and P31 million as costs
of suit. This order became final on April 24, 1995.
Petitioner filed a petition for relief from judgment
with the court a quo stating that its counsel, Atty.
Rogelio Terrado, went on AWOL and never
informed it of respondent judges order. This
petition, however, was dismissed.
When petitioner failed to return the foreclosed
properties, respondent judge issued an alias writ
of execution ordering petitioner to pay Bengson
the P31 million costs of suit. Pursuant thereto,
respondent Atty. Mario Anacleto Baez, acting as
sheriff of Branch 26, executed the writ and levied
on petitioners shares of stock in San Miguel
Corporation (SMC) worth P6.2 million. The

garnished shares were later sold at public auction

with Bengson as the only bidder.
Petitioner moved to quash the writ on the ground
that its funds and properties were exempt from
garnishment, levy and execution under Section
39 of RA 8291. Respondent judge denied the
motion stating that only funds and properties that
were necessary to maintain petitioners actuarial
solvency, like contributions of GSIS members,
were exempt from garnishment, levy and
execution under RA 8291.
Petitioner filed this administrative complaint
against Hon. Pacquing for ignorance of the law,
bias and partiality, and for violation of RA 8291.
In its complaint, petitioner alleged that the
respondents refused to take cognizance of
Section 39, RA 8291. Respondent judge refused
to await an authoritative and definitive resolution
of the issues on the exemption of GSISs funds
and properties from execution or the issue of
whether GSIS is entitled to a relief from judgment
of his P31 million peso costs of suit.
The Court referred the complaint to the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA), it found nothing in
the records to support petitioners accusations
against both respondents. According to the OCA,
even assuming that respondent judge erred in
interpreting RA 8291, such error did not
constitute gross ignorance of the law. It also
failed to prove malice, fraud, dishonesty or bad
faith on the part of respondent judge in issuing
the assailed alias writ of execution. On
petitioners allegations against respondent Atty.
Baez, the OCA likewise found no reason to hold
him liable for failing to defer the execution of the
writ. The OCA then recommended the dismissal
of petitioners complaint against respondents.
ISSUE:
WON the administrative case filed against the
respondents shall prosper.
HOLDING: NO

assertion that respondent judge precipitately

issued the alias writ is not supported by the
records. On the contrary, the records indicate
that the writ was issued more than three years
from the finality of the order directing petitioner
to pay Bengson P31 million as costs of suit. Its
issuance was not all tainted with undue haste. In
the exercise of his judicial discretion, respondent
judge believed that the issuance of the alias writ
had become forthwith a matter of right following
the finality of said order. The rule is that once a
judgment becomes final, the winning party is
entitled to a writ of execution and the issuance
thereof becomes a courts ministerial duty.
Assuming, that respondent judge erred in issuing
the alias writ, his act would still not merit
administrative sanction absent malice or bad
faith. Bad faith does not simply connote poor or
flawed judgment; it imports a dishonest purpose,
moral obliquity or conscious doing of a wrong.
Moreover, the party who alleges partiality must
prove it with clear and convincing evidence.
Petitioner failed in that aspect.
Regarding the accusations against respondent
Atty. Baez, the Court finds no basis to hold him
liable for executing the assailed writ at that time.
Atty. Baez merely carried out a ministerial duty.
He had no discretion to implement the writ or not.

7) ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, vs. ATTY.

LEONARD DE VERA
A.C. No. 6697
July 25, 2006
FACTS:
An administrative case against Atty. de Vera was
filed before the State Bar of California. It arose
from an insurance case Atty. de Vera handled
involving Julius Willis, III who figured in an
automobile accident in 1986. Atty. de Vera was
authorized by the elder Willis (father of Julius who
was given authority by the son to control the case
because the latter was then studying in San
Diego California) for the release of the funds in
settlement of the case. Atty. de Vera received a
check in settlement of the case which he then
deposited to his personal account.

For a judge to be administratively liable for

ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must
be gross or patent. To constitute gross ignorance
of the law, such acts must not only be contrary to
existing law and jurisprudence but also motivated
by bad faith, fraud, malice or dishonesty.

The Hearing referee in the said administrative

case recommended that Atty. de Vera be
suspended from the practice of law for three
years. Subsequently, Atty. de Vera resigned from
the California Bar which resignation was accepted
by the Supreme Court of California.

We hold that respondent judge was neither

biased nor partial against petitioner when he
issued the alias writ of execution. Petitioners

Thereafter, Zoilo Antonio Velez filed a complaint

for the suspension and/or disbarment of
respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera based on the

ground of respondent's alleged misrepresentation

in concealing the suspension order rendered
against him by the State Bar of California.
Complainant averred that the respondent, in
appropriating for his own benefit funds due his
client, was found to have performed an act
constituting moral turpitude.
ISSUE:
WON respondent Atty. De Vera committed
malpractice.
HOLDING: YES
Section 27 of Rule 138 of our Rules of Court
states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of
attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
therefor. A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or
through
paid
agents
or
brokers,
constitutes malpractice.

Moreover, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility mandates every lawyer to hold in
trust all money and properties of his client that
may come into his possession. Accordingly, he
shall account for all money or property collected
or received for or from the client.
Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon
demand the funds or property held by him on
behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption
that he has appropriated the same for his own
use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the
trust reposed in him by, his client. Lawyers who
misappropriate the funds entrusted to them are
in gross violation of professional ethics and are
guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal
profession. Those who are guilty of such
infraction may be disbarred or suspended
indefinitely from the practice of law.
In this case, Atty. de Vera did not deny
complainant's
allegation
in
the
latter's
memorandum that he (de Vera) received
US$12,000.00 intended for his client and that he
deposited said amount in his personal account
and not in a separate trust account and that,

finally, he spent the amount for personal

purposes. Atty. de Vera insists that the foregoing
facts do not prove that he misappropriated his
client's funds as the latter's father (the elder
Willis) gave him authority to use the same. By
insisting that he was authorized by his client's
father and attorney-in-fact to use the funds, Atty.
de Vera has impliedly admitted the use of the
Willis funds for his own personal use. Absent any
proof that he was authorized by the elder Willlis,
his constitutes more than substantial evidence of
malpractice.
Therefore, the Court ordered the suspension
of Atty. Leonard de Vera from the practice of law
for TWO (2) YEARS.

8) CYNTHIA ADVINCULA, vs. ATTY. ERNESTO

MACABATA
A.C. No. 7204
March 7, 2007
FACTS:
The case is a disbarment case against respondent
on the ground of gross immorality. It was alleged
that sometime in December 2004, complainant
seek for legal advice from petitioner regarding
her collectibles from a travel company.
Respondent sent Demand Letter and sometime in
February 2005, they met at Zensho Restaurant to
discuss the possibility of filing complaint against
the travel company because the latter failed to
settle the accounts. After the dinner, respondent
sent complainant home and while she is about to
step out of the car, respondent held her arm and
kissed her on the cheek and embraced her very
tightly.
The two met again to finalize the draft for the
complaint and while on their way home after the
said meeting the respondent stopped his car and
forcefully held her face and kissed her lips while
the other hand was holding her breast. Cynthia
succeeded in resisting his criminal attempt and
immediately managed to get out of the car.
Thus she decided to refer the case to another
lawyer. Subsequently, she filed this complaint for
disbarment against respondent Atty. Macabata,
charging the latter with Gross Immorality.
ISSUE:
WON the respondent committed acts are grossly
immoral which would warrant the disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law.
HOLDING: NO
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON I A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,

dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

evidenced as well of his asking for apology from

complainant in his text message.

CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the

integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

The Court explained that acts of kissing or besobeso on the cheeks as mere gestures of
friendship and camaraderie, forms of greetings,
casual and customary. The acts of respondent,
though, in turning the head of complainant
towards him and kissing her on the lips are
distasteful. However, such act, even if considered
offensive and undesirable, cannot be considered
grossly immoral.

Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct

that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession.

In Bar Matter No. 1154, good moral character was

defined as what a person really is, as
distinguished from good reputation, or from the
opinion generally entertained of him, or the
estimate in which he is held by the public in the
place where he is known. Moral character is not a
subjective term but one which corresponds to
objective reality.
It should be noted that the requirement of good
moral character has four ostensible purposes,
namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect
the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect
prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant
lawyers from themselves.
The SC held that lawyers are expected to abide
the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to
the Bar but all throughout their legal career as
lawyers belong to an exclusive and honored
fraternity. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard
the integrity of the legal profession and should
adhere to the unwaveringly to the highest
standard of morality.
In herein case, the respondent admitted to the
act of kissing the complainant on the lips as

Regardless of the fact that the respondent

admitted that he kissed the complainant, the
Court held that this was not accompanied by
malice because the respondent immediately
asked for forgiveness after sensing the
annoyance of the respondent after texting him.
Thus the Court held that this is not grossly
immoral nor highly reprehensible which will
warrant disbarment or suspension. But the Court
reprimanded respondent to be more prudent and
cautious.
Moreover, complainants bare allegation that
respondent made use and took advantage of his
position as a lawyer to lure her to agree to have
sexual relations with him, deserves no credit. The
burden of proof rests on the complainant, and she
must establish the case against the respondent
by
clear,
convincing
and
satisfactory
proof, disclosing a case that is free from doubt as
to compel the exercise by the Court of its
disciplinary power.